

POLITICAL THEORY

Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War**Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism.** By S. M. Amadae.

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 408p. \$59.00 cloth, \$19.00 paper.

— Peter Stone, *Stanford University*

Often historians get accused of failing to see the forest for the trees. That is, they are taken to task for dwelling on places and names and dates for their own sake, without indicating what patterns these facts reveal. S. M. Amadae cannot be accused of this mistake. While she pays close attention to historical detail, she is eager to demonstrate that her collected facts tell a story. Unfortunately, this story is not nearly as coherent or self-evident as she suggests. Where Amadae sees a forest, I am afraid I can see only trees.

Amadae lays out the story she wishes to tell in her introduction: “This book is the story of the ideological war against communist and totalitarian forms of economic and political order. A gauntlet was thrown down by an earlier generation of scholars who sought to rescue capitalist democracy from the threat of authoritarian socialism. It was taken up after World War II by a new generation, who fought with tenacity, and won in such absolute terms that it is difficult for a present-day observer to grasp the scope of the victory that was won. . . . This book recounts the defeat of Marxism by rational choice liberalism: a philosophy of markets and democracy that was developed in part to anchor the foundations of American society during the Cold War” (pp. 1–3).

I am not sure how to interpret this grandiose claim. Amadae apparently believes that there are social scientists who 1) model social behavior mathematically under the assumption that people are rational; 2) are liberals; and 3) believe that the models they construct provide good reasons for being liberals. She further contends that the arguments put forth by these “rational choice liberals” defeated Marxism. This final claim seems very problematic. True, Marxism has been eclipsed, but that is because the Soviet bloc collapsed. Rational choice liberalism can hardly claim credit for this event.

But perhaps Amadae merely meant that rational choice liberalism defeated Marxism intellectually, by providing devastating responses to its criticisms of liberalism and thereby shoring up liberalism’s intellectual foundations. Such an interpretation cannot save her argument. For if Marxism had generated philosophical criticisms of liberalism during the Cold War, Amadae never spells out what they were. Granted, she does in a prologue show that an “earlier generation of scholars”—Karl Popper, F. A. Hayek, and Joseph Schumpeter—“sought to rescue capitalist democracy from the threat of authoritarian socialism.” But as her own summaries of these philosophers’ arguments make plain, none of them thought Marxism had powerful arguments in its favor, arguments that needed answers they could not provide. Rather, they were simply concerned about the brute fact that Soviet-style communism might someday

encompass the entire world, regardless of the arguments against it. The threat to liberal democracy to which Amadae believes rational choice liberalism responded thus remains unclear.

Setting all of this aside, it is not even clear to me what “rational choice liberalism” means to the author. I assume it is something like what I described before—a body of work purporting to show that rational choice models provide philosophical support for liberalism. But her efforts to subsume some mathematical results under this rubric are quite contrived. She considers, for example, Arrow’s Theorem, and social choice theory generally, to be clear examples of rational choice liberalism in action. Social choice theory, however, does not endeavor to model human behavior at all; instead, it asks what sorts of judgments about human welfare are possible, given various assumptions about individual preferences. It can be related to rational choice theory—via studies of mechanism design, for example—but it need not be. Amadae also makes an effort to show that Mancur Olson’s *Logic of Collective Action* (1965) qualifies as a defense of liberalism (pp. 177–80). But this effort attempts to add a lot of intellectual baggage onto what is essentially a straightforward analytical result in a manner that is quite unconvincing.

Amadae is at her weakest, however, when she attempts to describe how rational choice theory (however defined) defeated its intellectual challengers (whatever they were). She makes it sound as if conclusions stated in mathematical language were intellectually irresistible. Nowhere is this more apparent than in her treatment of Arrow’s Theorem. “Arrow’s impossibility theorem,” writes Amadae, “is a theoretical masterpiece precisely because it covers extensive philosophical ground in an apparently incontestable fashion, both providing a basis for American political and economic liberalism while simultaneously undermining the alternative philosophies of communism, idealist democracy, and totalitarianism” (p. 87). That is one heck of an achievement. How did the theorem accomplish all this? Apparently, many philosophical questions relating to the foundations of democracy were contested hotly (by Marxists and others) in Arrow’s day. “Arrow,” Amadae writes, “resolves many of the controversies among economists in the 1940s by weaving firm positions on those contentious issues into the fabric of his impossibility theorem” (p. 110). In other words, Amadae believes that these controversies can be considered solved because Arrow assumed solutions to them while specifying axioms for his theorem.

Axioms cannot solve problems. No matter how well specified they are, they require defense like any other supposition. But throughout most of her consideration of Arrow and his critics, Amadae treats axioms as somehow above rational criticism. In comparing Arrow’s treatment of the problem of social choice with that offered by Edward McClennan, for example, she writes that “[u]nfortunately, since both systems are derived from axiomatized arguments, there is no way to definitively resolve the debate between the two polar positions since each is based on different underlying assumptions” (p. 270). Amadae acts as though the argument is over as soon as the axioms have been specified, when in actuality, the argument has only just begun at that point.

In the end, *Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy* is most successful at providing facts with which students of rational choice theory can tell their own stories about the history of the field. And there are plenty of facts here; Amadae has clearly done her homework. Her own efforts to tell a story with these facts, however, are simply not very successful.

Welfare and the Constitution. By Sotirios A. Barber. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 184p. \$27.95.

— David J. Siemers, *University of Wisconsin–Oshkosh*

The Constitution's Preamble clarifies its founders' purposes, including their belief that the document would "promote the general welfare." Sotirios A. Barber argues that this phrase obligates the national government to more actively promote the welfare of citizens, particularly children and the poor. From Barber's perspective, his book should not have to be written, as "some positive governmental duty . . . seems hard to deny" (p. xii). Compelling him to write are "prestigious and powerful" (p. xii) voices who say otherwise, including the Supreme Court in *DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services* (1989). These "negative constitutionalists" claim that the national government's only obligation beyond ensuring that citizens can participate in the democratic process is to forgo hindering them, as required by the Bill of Rights. Barber attempts to refute this argument to show that "the Constitution is more a charter of positive benefits . . . than a charter of negative liberties" (p. 2).

Barber believes the Preamble commands "welfare constitutionalism." Also allowing him to forgo textual analysis to establish this point is Michael Walzer's statement that every state is a welfare state (*Spheres of Justice*, 1983), which Barber takes as axiomatic. Some historical support for this welfarist view is provided, mainly from *The Federalist*, but the main focus of the book is to expose negative constitutionalism as untenable and disingenuous.

Barber portrays negative constitutionalism as pointless, because "it makes no sense to establish a government for the purpose of limiting the government" (p. 51). If there are no positive governmental obligations to citizens, then there is not even a right to police protection, an absurd result for him. Even Hobbesians would expect more. Furthermore, negative constitutionalists often rely on "welfare" arguments to justify their views, stating that it is better for individuals and society if citizens are not guaranteed a certain level of well-being. In truth, theirs is a welfarist conception of government, too, but one which does not acknowledge that truth or take citizens' needs seriously.

Since discussion must shape government's general welfare obligations, Barber eschews a definitive statement of its nature. He does, however, set certain parameters on the discussion itself. For instance, welfare claims must be secular because those based on religion cannot be justified by reason. Following John Rawls, he also posits that the general welfare cannot be found through utilitarian calculations. The general welfare must consider the physical and psychological needs of individuals as

individuals, not as parts of an aggregate public. Barber borrows from Martha Nussbaum ("Aristotelian Social Democracy," in Bruce Douglas, Gerald Mara, and Henry Richardson, eds., *Liberalism and the Good*, 1990) to sketch briefly the policy implications of his view, concluding that a reasonable concept of the general welfare will include universal health care, protection from preventable pain, humanistic education, "support for rich social relations," and protection of the environment (p. 114). Pursuing these objects "or something like them—something flowing from a persuasive theory of human well-being—are constitutionally obligatory on officials who swear fidelity" to a welfarist constitution (p. 115).

The strength of this book lies in its intuitive appeal. The world's richest nation has not looked after its most vulnerable members very well, after all. To mandate that the national government heed their welfare through constitutional fiat will strike many as a viable solution to the failure of the political process to do so. At the very least, Barber's exhortation that government officials have an obligation to give greater weight to the general welfare and less to particular interests is well taken. "Positive constitutionalism" may be one way to limit the influence of entrenched, narrow interests, particularly in mature democracies.

Also of value is Barber's thought-provoking perspective that the Constitution is inadequate to the task for which it was designed. He seems to hope for a communitarian rebirth that would place the welfarist view on a firmer footing than is possible under the present "bourgeois" Constitution, with its interests checking other interests.

The book's refutation of negative constitutionalism is of interest as well, but it is far from fully satisfying. Barber admits his difficulty in taking these arguments seriously. Given this, his critique is not dispassionate or sympathetic, of course, but it also does not seem to give these arguments their due, particularly when considering the practical consequences of the welfarist alternative. The *DeShaney* case might have been decided differently, granting citizens a *right* to government protection from harm at the hands of other citizens. However, such a decision would expose governments to a new class of lawsuits, significantly increase their insurance costs, and further limit the willingness of professionals and volunteers to work for the state. The result might well corrode the very services Barber hopes to see extended. Positive constitutionalism could be workable, but the case for it needs to be made positively. The author makes the case negatively, by skewering the logic of negative constitutionalists like David Currie.

Barber claims that both Publius and Lincoln endorsed welfarist readings of the Constitution. Only a thin version of this argument stands up to scrutiny. Hamilton, Madison, and Lincoln each felt that, rightly construed, the constitutional system would promote the general welfare. They each argued for specific provisions to be written into law to promote it as they understood it. But they were content to let statutory rather than constitutional law determine what government did to promote welfare, a position not fundamentally at odds with the negative constitutionalists. The practice of these statesmen

suggests that there is an ethical obligation, but not necessarily a constitutional demand, on lawmakers to promote the general welfare. The dense, logic-based refutation of negative constitutionalism presented in *Welfare and the Constitution* will interest legal scholars. Unfortunately, it will probably not be accessible to a broader audience, particularly undergraduates, who would benefit from weighing the strengths and weaknesses of positive and negative constitutionalism.

Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics. By Nasser Behnegar. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 221p. \$30.00.

— Timothy Fuller, *Colorado College*

Leo Strauss was among the most influential figures in the revitalization of political philosophy in America in the second half of the twentieth century. Nasser Behnegar provides us a detailed examination of Leo Strauss's critique of and place in political science. It is often assumed by critics of Strauss's work that he rejected the accomplishments of the modern social sciences because he was sharply critical of certain features of the discipline of political science. The issue was joined with notoriety in *Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics* (1962), edited by Herbert Storing, which included Strauss's postscript that political scientists were fiddling while Rome was burning but did not know that they were fiddling or that Rome was burning. Behnegar brings the debates back before a new generation in political science, placing Strauss's position into the context of his work as a whole.

Readers of *Natural Right and History* (1953) know that Strauss carefully studied the work of Max Weber, expressing significant reservations about central features of Weber's work but acknowledging his centrality to any serious understanding of the assumptions that still dominate much of the social sciences. It was Strauss's Socratic task to reopen a dialogue over political science by reexamining classical political science as inherited from Aristotle.

Against a purely descriptive or explanatory, ethically neutral science of politics, and against relativism, Strauss offers the following alternative: to identify human excellence or virtue with a sufficient degree of clarity as to encourage political judgments that always aim at preserving and enhancing that excellence; to clarify what it means to be morally serious as opposed to sophisticatedly amoral, and to trust the former and distrust the latter; to maintain a sense of the political order as a whole and the relation to it of the more limited, specific examinations undertaken of features of it; and to overcome the temporal parochialism that dwells on what is current at the expense of our inheritance. In addition, we are then called upon to appreciate the characteristic predicaments of political life to which we must respond, but which will never be amenable to formulation as "problems" for which there is any definitive policy "solution," requiring us always to seek reliable practical judgment (pp. 207–9). If politics is natural to human beings, it is absurd to conduct politics in the hope of ending politics. How can we want to eradicate a natural constituent of

our being? There is nothing here that is antidemocratic. Even if a liberal democratic regime is achieved and maintained, and even if we agree that there is no more appropriate alternative, these other questions abide to be addressed in the liberal democratic context since they are implicated in every context. Strauss's questioning was intended as a friendly comment. Liberal democracy, as embodied in the modern constitutional state, is a long-developing, admirable response to the persistent realities of political life, but not a supersession of those realities.

The return to classical political philosophy in search of the foundation of a genuine science of politics may be friendly to liberal democracy but can be radical in its opposition to much of the modern philosophy prominent within liberal democracy. There is a disjunction between the achievement of liberal democracy itself and much intellectual discourse on that achievement. The search for universally valid "laws" of human behavior, which buoyed the spirits of the progressive social scientists but became an increasingly elusive and disappointing quest, instead of stimulating a return to the origins of inquiry, created a dispirited barrier to such a return. It is difficult to think around the modern attitude, even when disillusioned with claims made on its behalf. The historical attitude, in ruling out the notion of "going back" to something, is loath to consider that there is something to be rediscovered here and now because it is permanently with us. "Going back" is a prejudicial account of "seeing clearly." As Behnegar says, the issue "is not whether one should be an advocate of the ancient or of the modern social science but to see more clearly the problems of social science. It is only by understanding these problems that one can even begin to consider whether a return to classical political philosophy is possible or necessary" (p. 27). It would thus be "scientific" to be truly open to questioning what an adequate understanding of "scientific" is. To rekindle hope in the face of the suspicion that there can be no knowledge of moral norms requires "working through relativism to its end" (p. 61). Behnegar sees Strauss as suggesting that to extricate ourselves from intellectual despair means courageously to labor in hope—hope already implying the search to encounter that which does not depend on us, but which is real.

Behnegar provides a fine account of Strauss's analysis of the fact/value distinction elaborated by Weber, and the difficulties it engenders. Strauss recognized that Weber was aware of difficulties and contradictions but saw no way to resolve them. For example, in encountering past thought, which does not rest on modern assumptions, one is tempted either to say that such thought is mistaken in light of the superior modern understanding or to admit that one has modern prejudices as opposed to outdated prejudices. But what is needed is the conviction that one should search for the best understanding, which means that one must question the assumptions on which one has been operating. To know that such assumptions are assumptions is to have the possibility of knowing the need and desire for what is more than assumptions. What is often taken today to be "intellectual honesty" is a prejudicial rejection of the search for transcendent meaning on the ground that it is "dishonest" to take that possibility seriously (pp. 197–99).

Behnegar's is an accurate account of Strauss's aims. He restores to us the inquiring Strauss who is neither a dogmatist nor a mere (neo-) conservative, but who was willing to think untimely Platonic/Aristotelian thoughts in response to untimely Nietzschean/Weberian thoughts. This is a valuable contribution.

Black Heretics, Black Prophets: Radical Political Intellectuals. By Anthony Bogues. New York: Routledge, 2003. 272p. \$85.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Ange-Marie Hancock, *Yale University*

Anthony Bogues begins his book as a provocative intellectual journey that is at once a political and epistemological intervention. Grounding his work in the African diaspora, he seeks to investigate black radical intellectuals on their own terms, making the argument that figures such as W. E. B. DuBois, C. L. R. James, Ida B. Wells, Walter Rodney, and Bob Marley should be evaluated for unique rather than derivative contributions to political theory. In this vein, the book begins squarely within the confines of intellectual history, albeit with traditionally marginalized exemplars.

The author defines two streams of black radical thought—heretical and prophetic—which are intended to serve as organizing themes for the exemplars that follow in subsequent chapters. Defining heresy as a constitutive action of black radical intellectual production, Bogues first defines it as the engagement in a “double operation—an engagement with Western radical theory and then a critique of this theory” (p. 13). This theoretical and discursive turn is made possible only after the resolution of DuBoisian double consciousness, the “profound disjuncture between the lived experiences of being a racial/colonial subject and the account of this lived experience by his or her learned discursive system” (p. 14). The slave narrative of Quobna Cugoano, the antilynching activism of Wells, *Black Jacobins* by James, *Black Reconstruction* by DuBois, *Ujamaa* and the *Arusha Declaration* by Julius Nyerere, and *Groundings with My Brothers* and *Walter Rodney Speaks* by Rodney are analyzed across four chapters in order to illuminate the heretical tradition in black radical political thought.

Throughout these chapters, Bogues stresses that the emphasis of these authors on racial vindication has made a unique contribution. In fact, it is often clear that Bogues himself has embarked on a project of racial vindication. In his uneven argument to separate Cugoano's narrative from a larger tradition of literary interpretation, the author attempts to exegetically transform the work into an exemplar of black radical heresy that fundamentally challenges natural rights theory. He is most convincing when he distinguishes Cugoano from Diderot and Locke; on the other hand, it is unclear earlier how Hannah Arendt's letters to Karl Jaspers serve this general argument.

Bogues continues this project of racial vindication in his chapters on Wells (Chapter 2), and James and DuBois (Chapter 3). The Cugoano and Wells chapters elaborately describe the dehumanizing aspects of blackness constructed by institutions of slav-

ery and lynching and the interventions made by both authors. In the chapter on James and DuBois, one primary point of uniqueness brought to bear in support of the racial vindication project is the deployment of “Marxian categories in their interpretations of events [although] both the categories and the events were invested with new meaning” (p. 71).

Bogues is most certainly correct that James and DuBois and the other heretics he cites—Cugoano, Wells, Nyerere, and Rodney—rehumanize people of African descent through projects of racial vindication. Unfortunately, this argument is neither new nor particularly innovative. Bogues's own project of racial vindication is blind to more recent analyses that indicate its perils and problems.

Both Kevin Gaines (*Uplifting the Race*, 1996) and Cathy Cohen (*The Boundaries of Blackness*, 1999) have argued in various venues that emphasis on racial vindication served an important purpose in empowering communities of the African diaspora in their struggles for greater access to social, political, and economic resources. Yet their arguments for the earlier benefits of racial vindication were supplemented with the contemporary recognition that blind allegiance to racial vindication perpetuates intracommunity marginalization along intersecting lines of difference, such as class, gender, and sexual orientation (see also Robin D. G. Kelley, *Freedom Dreams*, 2002). While the analysis of Rodney's work reveals that author's grasp of intracommunity fractures, involving a complex commitment to the liberation of Guyana and other Caribbean nations that acknowledges race and class as intersecting oppressions, Bogues elides this acknowledgment (p. 127; see also pp. 71, 133, 157).

This uncritical promotion of racial vindication as an effective empowerment strategy also occurs when Bogues chronicles Nyerere's self-admitted theoretical debt to John Stuart Mill in destabilizing romanticized notions of a monolithic African past in response to gender critiques (see pp. 106–7, 121). Bogues fails to make this link among many of the heretics he analyzes. Recognition of intersecting identities and oppressions did not begin with black feminists of the 1980s and 1990s; the intellectual history of intersectionality is dotted with theoretical contributions from many of the figures he profiles. Ironically, making this point would only enhance his argument that these heretics made unique contributions to mainstream political theory.

While the heretics are described and analyzed over four chapters and 125 pages, Bogues reserves only two chapters and 48 pages to cover the second stream of black radical intellectual production, redemptive prophecy. This asymmetry quite logically leads to a thinner analysis of the redemptive prophets, which creates some concern regarding the usefulness of the overall typology for future research concerning black radical intellectuals. With no recapitulation of the contours of the redemptive prophetic stream, the author dives into a history of Rastafari and three of its best-known acolytes—Leonard Howell, Claudius Henry (Chapter 6) and Bob Marley (Chapter 7). The writing in these chapters is enthralling and reveals the author's passion for this aspect of West Indian political culture.

Yet the chapters reveal little about the prophetic tradition he defines only briefly in Chapter 1 (p. 19). Given Bogue's determined efforts to prove black radical intellectuals' unique contributions, the distinction between the prophetic tradition and the heretical tradition at the end of the Rastafari chapter alludes to his preferred tradition: "However, in the redemptive prophetic stream the questions of history are posed and discussed differently. The prophetic gaze is different from that of the heretic. The heretics utilize categories that, while plotting an alternative genealogy, do not necessarily step outside the recognized episteme" (p. 184). Unfortunately, the organization of *Black Heretics, Black Prophets*, combined with the uncritical commitment to racial vindication, prevents the author from completely achieving the provocative intervention he sought as he embarked upon this project.

Untimely Politics. By Samuel A. Chambers. New York: New York University Press, 2003. 224p. \$45.00.

— Diana Coole, *Queen Mary University of London*

The first thing one notices about this book is that its author's name appears in brackets. Is this perhaps a disingenuous act of modesty or disavowal? Samuel Chambers never alludes to these puzzling parentheses in the text, but they are surely an invitation to its untimely reading. This, Chambers explains, is a reading that refuses to unmask the writer and instead follows the web spun by a text through its protean historical allusions and discursive relationships. It is indicative of the untimeliness he commends more generally as an exemplary approach to politics.

This is political theory in the Continental tradition. Its main influences are Heidegger, Nietzsche, Foucault, and Derrida. It is a strength of the book—albeit a somewhat paradoxical one—that it succeeds in interpreting significant aspects of their philosophies in an accessible and rigorous manner. Chambers is helped here by a clear agenda that ties the different stages of his argument together as components of the untimely approach he commends. Untimeliness (good) versus timeliness (bad) operates as a polemical dichotomy throughout the book, and Chambers explains how it yields opposing accounts of language, history, philosophy, agency, political theory, and politics. Having proffered a persuasive interpretation of untimeliness on each of these levels, he brings his approach to bear on a case study of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).

What, then, is this distinction between timely and untimely interventions? Very broadly, one might summarize it as the difference between mainstream Anglophone approaches, with their presuppositions of methodological individualism, linear history, language as a tool, and politics as a set of problems to be solved, and Continental senses of the structural and discursive networks that situate agents, speech acts, and events within a shifting field of forces and a complex temporality. The effect of this latter approach is to render any interpretation of politics far more ambiguous and complicated than more conventional approaches acknowledge. Chambers is especially scathing here about those recent political theorists who have advocated a pragmatic turn, since he finds their problem-solving ambi-

tions too narrow. In their concern about the timeliness of their interventions (as neither premature nor too late), they betray, he argues, an Aristotelian understanding of language (as an instrument or possession of agents: the *as-if-objective* [AIO] model, as he calls it) and of time (as a sequence of nows, a temporal continuum). As such, they fail to recognize the complex historicity and linguistic structures that must also be engaged with if political interventions are to be effective.

The richer and more radical approach that untimeliness implies is cashed out in an analysis of DOMA, an act passed by the 104th Congress with the aim of defining terms like marriage and spouse in a solely, and legally enforceable, heterosexist way. Chambers's main conclusion is that the act's critics remain far too circumspect when they dwell on a liberal language of rights, on the prejudices of politicians, or even on a generally homophobic malaise in society at large. In the first case, they resort to explanations based on narrowly legislative issues or individual psychology, and in the second, they are unable to explain what is politically damaging in this specific act, if all legislation emerges within a homophobic context. An untimely reading locates the act more broadly within a field of "discursive heterosexism" wherein sexual meanings are contested and reinforced. It thereby invokes an untimely agency, which "can continue the struggle against DOMA outside of legislative and judicial arenas" (p. 9). For the act's targets are not individuals or the erosion of timeless traditions, Chambers argues, but contested subject positions.

The author's application of his approach is cleverly executed here. He also manages to hit all the target areas of timely presuppositions that he had carefully challenged in the preceding chapters. There are nonetheless a number of questions that might be posed. First, the analysis of DOMA is presented as an "exemplary case" of an untimely reading (p. 155), and it is certainly well chosen as an illustration. But how far is this also a typical or representative case? The analysis is persuasive because Chambers has selected just the sort of example that will respond to his sort of reading, that is, one that concerns subjectivity, identity, and sexual practices. This is a cultural politics with an especial interest in discursive power. But if the relevant structures were, for example, more economic ones (if the act had concerned, say, poverty and structures of capital and class were at stake), would the primary focus remain discursive, and would this still look so efficacious?

Second, in order to convey his sense of untimeliness, Chambers draws on a Derridean metaphoric of ghosts and specters. This invokes the absent presences: the meanings that make untimely reappearances by haunting the present with traces of the past and anticipations of the future; the impossibility of distinguishing between the real and the unreal. The language is evocative, but I am not convinced that its metaphysical nuances necessarily serve Chambers well. There is a rich language of the invisible, the virtual, traces, lines of force, structures, relationships, that might have been more appropriate for his concern with the social and power relations that situate every utterance, act, or event. Is it not unnecessarily mystifying to refer to the gays and lesbians in DOMA's discursive dramatics as ghosts?

This relates, finally, to my suspicion that besides or beneath the spooky Derridean language, Chambers's proposals are possibly less original than he implies. Is the politics he commends more than an acknowledgment of Foucault's agonistic field of power and resistance? And might the analysis of DOMA not have been conveyed equally well within the framework of the agency-versus-structure debate? The author discusses agency in a number of places (his untimely version is again Foucauldian). He also presents his interpretation of DOMA as a "political act of structural and discursive heterosexism" (p. 8). This transcription is not intended to detract from the richness of his analysis, nor to deny that his poststructuralist emphasis on genealogy, historicity, temporality, and discourse can supplement the sometimes arid terms of the agency/structure debate. But it might have been useful to relate his untimely theory specifically to this more familiar debate within the social sciences. If nothing else, this could have served as an invitation to readers who might not normally turn to Continental theory for methodological inspiration, to learn from Chambers's splendid and, yes, timely, volume.

Liberalism Under Siege: The Political Thought of the French Doctrinaires. By Aurelian Craiutu. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003. 356p. \$80.00 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

— Richard Boyd, *University of Wisconsin-Madison*

Alan Kahan and Roger Boesche have coined the terms "aristocratic liberalism" and "strange liberalism," respectively, to describe enigmatic nineteenth-century thinkers like J. S. Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville. Aurelian Craiutu dubs the political theory of the French "Doctrinaires"—most notably, François Guizot, Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard, Charles de Rémusat, and Prosper de Barante—an "elitist liberalism." This may strike some as an odd term of endearment. But this book raises provocative questions about the compatibility between antidemocratic assumptions and a legitimate concern for liberty across a wide swath of nineteenth-century French political thought. Liberalism's strong suit has always been its universalistic and emancipatory thrust, and the case of the Doctrinaires promises important lessons into what Craiutu calls, following Tocqueville, the "difficult apprenticeship of liberty," marking liberalism's transition in the Restoration years from a purely oppositional philosophy to a concrete method of governance (p. 115).

Living in the wake of the Charter of 1814, which restored the Bourbon monarchs, the Doctrinaires were a vibrant group of thinkers and statesmen whose contributions to liberal political theory have been unduly overlooked, according to Craiutu. This book is not only an attempt to rehabilitate the Doctrinaires but an ambitious survey of the vibrant intellectual life of Restoration France, as French liberals turned to arts and letters and especially "to history in order to find convincing . . . arguments in favor of the legitimacy of the principles of 1789" (p. 58). Even so, all was not honey and roses for Restoration liberals. French politics was radically polarized. Usually stigmatized as shameless opportunism or weakness of will, moderation became a badge of honor. The Doctrinaires sought a

juste milieu between radicals determined to perpetuate the Revolutionary logic of 1789, on the one side, and reactionary *ultras* who sought to sweep away the liberties to which it had given birth, on the other.

Craiutu builds his case for the enduring significance of the Doctrinaires by his richly detailed history of their struggle to defend liberty under perilous circumstances. This is a fine example of historical political theory at its very best, bringing political speeches and more academic historical and philosophical writings to bear on timeless questions like representation, civil liberty, public opinion, and the problem of political order. However, his case for the relevance of the Doctrinaires also, and maybe more importantly, hinges on their influence on canonical political thinkers like J. S. Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville. The book's highlight is Chapter 4, which focuses on the "Hidden Dialogue Between Guizot and Tocqueville." Tocqueville scholars have been preoccupied by his remark that he communed regularly with the writings of Pascal, Rousseau, and Montesquieu. Without denying this, Craiutu mounts a compelling case that far and away the greatest influence on Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* and later writings was François Guizot, whose lectures Tocqueville attended and whose *History of Civilization in Europe* he requested soon after his arrival in the United States. Guizot and Royer-Collard are the sources of Tocqueville's distinction between political democracy and democracy as a "social condition," or *état social*; his celebrated complaints about democratic despotism and modern individualism; and his faith in the Providential march of equality. According to Craiutu, the main outlines of Tocqueville's thinking about democracy were in place long before he arrived in America, and his trip to America was more akin to putting ornaments on the Christmas tree than "the innocence of a dazzled traveler to an exotic new continent" (p. 114).

This book's lone weakness is that it is often hard to tell where the author's presentation of the Doctrinaires' thought leaves off and where his defense of their actions and ideas begins. This becomes an issue in the book's last three substantive chapters on representation, political capacity, and publicity. Craiutu admits that the Electoral Law of 1817 supported by Guizot might legitimately be described as "extremely conservative because of the limited franchise that denied a significant part of the adult population the right to vote." Like J. S. Mill and other nineteenth-century liberals, the Doctrinaires saw suffrage as rooted in "political capacity," which is variable and contingent, and thus "the distribution of political rights must follow and reflect the formation of new capacities in society." The right to vote is "a complex right that depends on the social condition, the moral and material development of society, and the progress of civilization" (p. 236). According to Royer-Collard, "capacity grants full political rights only to those individuals presumed capable of using them reasonably and withdraws it [sic] from those presumed to lack this capacity" (p. 228). The term "presumed" here is key, because despite the Doctrinaires' theoretical appeal to a wide range of complex considerations about "social intelligence" and the deliberative capacity of individuals, this "presumption" of political capacity boils down to the sole matter of

social class, limiting suffrage to those who paid at least 300 francs of direct taxes. In fairness, after a long list of Guizot's accomplishments and favorable epigrams about Guizot by leading thinkers of the age, Craiutu pulls no punches in citing his faults (p. 68, 174–177), and records in conclusion his own preference for Tocqueville (p. 274). Still, one wishes that in resurrecting these highly contentious assumptions about political capacity the author had been more explicit in contrasting the Doctrinaires and Tocqueville to achieve a greater critical distance between himself and his subjects (cf. p. 115). For Tocqueville, suffrage is not simply a contingent right that must “follow” or accurately “reflect” some given level of what the Doctrinaires called “political capacity”; rather, the exercise of suffrage *generates* political capacity by its extension to ever-greater segments of society. The author turns a more critical eye toward the Doctrinaires' restrictions of a free press. Notwithstanding their general appreciation of the importance of publicity and the free exchange of ideas in maintaining a representative government, in 1814 the Doctrinaires supported laws abridging freedom of the press. In this instance, Craiutu not only adduces circumstances and the rationale justifying their controversial decision—and Guizot's eventual support under more auspicious conditions for a series of laws granting greater freedom to newspapers and journals—but he sharply contrasts the Doctrinaires with Benjamin Constant's strong defense of a natural liberty of the press.

Despite the clear lines Craiutu draws between the Doctrinaires' conundrums and liberalism's present discontents, I am not altogether persuaded that the solutions they offered are appropriate for modern democratic society. But even if readers finish this book with nagging doubts about the wisdom and enduring relevance of the Doctrinaires, they will have none whatsoever about the scholarly merits of Craiutu's eloquent plea on their behalf.

Imagining Interest in Political Thought: Origins of Economic Rationality. By Stephen G. Engelmann. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003. 194p. \$74.95 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

— Terence Ball, *Arizona State University*

The concept of interest looms large in libertarian and neoliberal thought, which holds that only individuals (and not collectivities, like states) are real and only they know what is in their own best interest. If there is a public interest, that is only a summation or aggregation of individual interests. These individual interests exist prepolitically; that is, they are prior to the individual's engagement in politics (which is viewed as a high-stakes game played by self-interested players), and serve as the main (if not sole) motive for political engagement. The state has no business being in or interfering with business—thus the rationale for “privatization” and “deregulation.” Given the choice between allocating values via “politics” or “markets,” always choose markets. And then extend the logic of “economic rationality” to cover *all* aspects of human life, including the choice of one's mate and the dispensation of justice. So say

the neoliberal theorists of the “Chicago” school, most notably Gary Becker and Richard Posner.

Stephen Engelmann's aim in *Imagining Interest in Political Thought* is to trace, in a nonchronological way, aspects of the history (or, if you prefer, genealogy) of a certain conception of interest that he calls “monistic interest,” which he takes to be foundational for neoliberal thinking. He nowhere offers a clear and concise definition of this suggestive concept, but, roughly, the idea is this: An interest is not a single material thing but a complex ideational structure involving imagined futures. Engelmann—following Shaftesbury and (especially) Bentham (as ingeniously interpreted in the recent work of Douglas Long)—holds that the *imagination* plays a central and indeed indispensable role in constructing interest. To use a crude Benthamic example: Suppose I am to be punished for some offense. Punishment is the intentional infliction of pain. As a rational utility-maximizer, I have an interest in avoiding pain (from punishment or any other source). The pain I experience is not confined to the moment of its material or visceral infliction; it is experienced first and repeatedly and perhaps most vividly in my imagination. (The old saw that “a coward dies a thousand deaths and a brave man but one” is untrue; imagination doth make cowards of us all.) The law uses our uniquely human capacity to imagine future states to constrain our behavior by having us impose our own internal discipline.

This, Engelmann claims, is the “logic” that Benthamite political and legal thought shares with modern neoliberal theory and practice. In a neoliberal regime, thought and action are shaped and constrained not externally, by the state, but by an internalized “economy” constructed out of interests that do not exist prior to that regime but are instead its creations. The watchword of neoliberalism is “choice,” and each of us is supposedly a sovereign chooser. But in a neoliberal regime, we do not so much have choice as choice has us: Our imaginations, and hence our interests, are prodded and goaded in particular directions, and (to borrow a phrase from Marx) behind our backs. And this is done, again, not by the state but by what Engelmann (roughly following Foucault) calls “government,” that is, the surreptitious internalized regime that rules each of us so easily and effortlessly, even as we fail to recognize its presence and its all-pervasive power.

If this seems a bit murky, it is. Engelmann's intended meaning is too often ensnared in the toils of his clotted prose. This is most unfortunate, for there is a fine intelligence at work here. A competent editor could have worked wonders with this manuscript and thus have done the author—and most especially the reader—an enormous service. As it is, we encounter sentences such as the following: “Finally and most importantly, state interest is contained by the state. This means that it is limited in the extent to which it can attack the institutions that are its basis, whereas Bentham was not” (p. 81).

Much of Engelmann's history is potted, and rather reminiscent of the historical spoof *1066 and All That* (WC Sellar and RJ Yeatman, 1931): “The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were of course quite bloody” (p. 82). But more than that, the

veracity of his history is sometimes questionable. For example, Chapter 2 is directed, as its title tells us, “against the usual story.” “According to this progressive story,” Machiavelli and Hobbes were both theorists of interest; indeed, “Hobbes was Machiavelli’s more systematic successor” (p. 17). Engelmann does not identify even a single teller of this tale, and unsurprisingly so: It is false. For starters, Machiavelli was a republican who emphasized radical contingency or *fortuna*, whereas Hobbes was an ardent antirepublican who called recourse to “fortune” mere “ignorance of causes” (there are, of course, many other differences, including radically incommensurable conceptions of “liberty”). Engelmann further asserts without argument or evidence that Hobbes “had [little] use for the language of interest” (p. 19) and was “not a philosopher of interest” (p. 23), which is patently false. As Quentin Skinner has shown in some detail, Hobbes held that most men are moved not by rational argument but by rhetoric or “eloquence” and a due regard to their interests (*Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* [1996], esp. pp. 348–50). Other errors, no less astonishing, appear throughout. We are told of “Calvin’s emphasis on the worthlessness of all that is human” and that “Shaftesbury is . . . schizophrenic” (p. 83)—the latter because Shaftesbury wrote two books on different topics. We are also informed that “the medieval mirror-of-princes tracts can reasonably be called conduct books for rulers” (p. 84). Well, yes, except that this particular genre was not uniquely medieval but began much earlier, with Cicero’s *De Officiis* (44 B.C.) and Seneca’s *De Clementia* (A.D. 56), and extended up to and beyond such Renaissance treatises as Machiavelli’s *Prince* (composed ca. 1513) and Erasmus’s *Education of a Christian Prince* (1516). These and other mistakes and misstatements mar what might otherwise have been a fine book.

Skepticism and Freedom: A Modern Case for Classical Liberalism. By Richard A. Epstein. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 320p. \$39.00.

— Gerald F. Gaus, *Tulane University*

Richard Epstein advances a consequentialist case for classical liberalism and seeks to answer skeptical challenges to it. He is adamant that any plausible justification of a politico-economic order must be consequentialist: “dogmatic” deontic pronouncements, such as Kant’s “fall on barren ground today” (p. 3). For Epstein, the Pareto criterion is the core of normative political economy, though he is willing to employ the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and, in fact, social welfare functions that include interpersonal comparisons and trade-offs of welfare.

Epstein’s consequentialism is even more complicated—one might say eclectic—than this suggests. He commences with what he describes as a “revised natural law position” (p. 18), according to which there are certain “empirical regularities across time, space, and culture” that provide the basis for consequentially justified principles for all societies. One might think the calculation problem would be daunting: It looks as though we would need to show that some rule is optimific across time, space, and culture. Epstein’s response is ambivalent. On the one hand, he

suggests that it is not all that difficult to find empirical laws upon which to base calculations, since “the huge size of the sample makes it possible to find elements of order hidden in the swirl of human events” (p. 19)—an argument that sociologists since Emile Durkheim have employed to show that the complexity of individual facts do not pose a barrier to uncovering social facts. Yet, although Epstein aims to counter radical skepticism, he upholds a moderate skepticism, and thus rather than explicit calculation, he often embraces an evolutionary account, according to which the appeal of principles “rests on a test of durability: those principles and practices that endure generally do so because they serve well the communities of which they are a part” (p. 19). Traditions and customs, he maintains, “gravitate to the solution that a sound cost–benefit analysis would dictate” (p. 20). At the heart of this book is a striking (and, I venture, implausible) commitment to evolutionary functionalism: If social systems all have norm N , then N now performs a necessary function that not only enhances social welfare but actually tends to converge on the optimific norm.

In any event, the traditional set of classical liberal principles—individual autonomy, private property, freedom of contract, tort law, regulation of monopoly, and the like—are said to be consequentially justified. Epstein stresses that he is not a libertarian; thus, he endorses forced exchanges that benefit both parties, for example, to efficiently supply goods. But redistribution is prohibited. One might think that this is obvious given his commitment to the Pareto criterion, but again things are complicated. Recall that he accepts the Kaldor-Hicks test (that the move from social state X to Y is efficient, even when some lose by moving from X to Y , so long as those who gain from the move *could* compensate the losers out of their gains). Indeed, Epstein accepts that the best argument for redistribution is the decreasing marginal utility of income, which of course relies on straightforward interpersonal comparisons of utility. While he thinks the argument is admissible, he seems to hold that on consequentialist grounds—especially given government failure—no redistribution of any sort could increase social welfare. I say “seems” as he also has another argument, more than a little unusual for a consequentialist. Not only is he a consequentialist but he is also a Lockean: When analyzing the tasks of government, protection of individual freedom is especially important since it is a Pareto improvement over the state of nature. It is puzzling why a consequentialist should evaluate the permissibility of a move from social state X to Y on the ground that X (a state honoring freedom) is Pareto superior to Z (the state of nature).

Only the first quarter of *Skepticism and Freedom* is devoted to Epstein’s eclectic consequentialist case for classical liberalism, which he has more fully articulated elsewhere. Most of the book is devoted to replying to deeply skeptical positions that challenge classical liberalism. He takes up moral relativism (especially as advocated by Richard Posner), “conceptual skepticism” (that concepts such as coercion, liberty, and ownership are not well defined, or function in ways that undermine classical liberalism), and, most interestingly, philosophical and psychological considerations that cast doubt on whether people are

really rational utility maximizers. Epstein is at home when talking law, not philosophy: His analyses of philosophical problems are impatient and not especially enlightening. His treatments of, for example, J. J. Thomson's Trolley Problem (pp. 101–3), abortion (pp. 103–7), and the supposed incommensurability of values (pp. 156–61) are not especially insightful. He is, however, more successful in showing that philosophical lawyers, such as Cass Sunstein, and philosophical economists, such as Robert H. Frank, err in supposing that analyses of philosophical puzzles about preferences—for example, whether they are adaptive, about relativities, or intransitive—have radical implications for legal practice and public policy. The discussions of psychological studies, such as those concerning the endowment effect, heuristics, and cognitive biases, are by far the most enlightening; there is a great deal to learn from these excellent chapters about the implications of these studies for our understanding of rationality and the defense of market freedom.

Although Epstein proclaims his empiricism and rejects “dogmatic” morality, his case for classical liberalism ultimately rests on “armchair economics” (p. 91); optimistic assumptions that social evolution selects for welfare-enhancing customs and that their welfare-enhancing status is not undermined by recent technological, social, and computational developments; and a complicated mix of consequential criteria, from simple Pareto to Kaldor-Hicks to Lockean to interpersonal social welfare functions. And, in addition, he relies on numerous empirical conjectures (e.g., pp. 59–64). Dogmatism is not avoided by building law and public policy on speculative hypotheses, just because they are speculatively empirical; and certainly it is an error to assert that nonconsequential moral principles are inherently dogmatic. In the end, Epstein's book should serve as a warning that those defending freedom not rest on armchair economics and armchair empiricism, no matter how modern they appear.

Platonic Noise. By J. Peter Euben. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 210p. \$55.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

— Catherine H. Zuckert, *University of Notre Dame*

As J. Peter Euben explains in his introduction, *Platonic Noise* is a collection of essays held together more by a common approach than by a theme or a sustained argument. In every chapter but one, he juxtaposes a “Greek text, author or epoch . . . with a contemporary text or thinker to explore a substantive issue” (p. 9). His opening analysis of Philip Roth's *The Human Stain* as a re-working of the story of Oedipus provides an initial example of the benefits of exploring the startling similarities between very different historical periods and genres. What seemed to be merely a story about an African-American's attempt to escape the prejudices against his race becomes a complex analysis of an individual's attempt to escape his fate. In the one chapter (2) in which Euben does not introduce such a contrast between the Greeks and his contemporaries, he defends this approach on the basis of an examination of Friedrich Nietzsche's essay on “The Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.”

Like Nietzsche, Euben wishes to surprise and provoke his readers by using Greek materials to highlight the problems of his own times. In Chapter 4 he thus suggests that, despite their tendency to isolate their viewers and make them passive, television sitcoms might be used to educate present-day Americans politically the way Aristophanes had educated his fellow Athenians. Using foul language and fantastic premises, these sitcoms could also lead spectators “to laugh at those who confidently assumed that they knew what morality was, at those political leaders who were sure of their wisdom and power, and at those social conventions and cultural practices that were assumed or claimed to be ‘natural’” (p. 65). The only example of a truly intelligent use of the medium Euben could find, however, was *The Simpsons*, as analyzed by Paul Cantor. Apparently it takes a genius—and not merely comic genius—to formulate and deliver a political education of the kind Aristophanes provided.

In order to provoke his readers, Euben also sees that he needs to heed Nietzsche's warning “against glib assimilations that encourage co-optation of the Greeks rather than engagement in a (Greek-like) struggle with them” (p. 15). The Greek texts will not provide contemporary readers with enough distance from their own times to see their own times—and hence themselves—better, Euben recognizes, if the ancient authors are read simply in terms of current crises. Recognizing a problem is not enough to solve it, however. Euben's use of *Oedipus at Colonus* to explicate Hannah Arendt's Hellenism in Chapter 3 could be faulted, as he tells his readers Arendt herself was, for confounding the acts and speeches of individual heroes like Theseus and Oedipus with democratic political action and debate. Euben defends his own practice, as he does Arendt's use of an admittedly inaccurate and incomplete account of ancient Greek politics, “as a provocation . . . [to open] up the present for real thinking, if not real political struggle” (p. 63). According to Euben, “Politics is the struggle against a wisdom that cannot be defeated because it ‘reminds’ us of our mutability and the enigmatic quality of situations or lives For Nietzsche, Arendt, and perhaps Sophocles, the continued contest against this ‘fate’ spurs us to action and gives life its energizing passion” (p. 62; emphasis added). In using Sophocles to explicate Arendt, Euben admits that he may have attributed an understanding of human life to the ancient tragedian that he did not actually hold. In effect, Euben thus denies Sophocles his own voice and destroys the distance between ancient Greece and modernity he wished to preserve.

Euben's view of politics would be frightening, moreover, if he did not present it primarily in terms of the “acts” of individual authors, usually theorists. As all readers of Hamlet know, too much thought can be debilitating. But struggle undertaken on the basis of passion, by continually changing beings in ineluctable circumstances, looks an awful lot like sheer irrationality. Euben tries to bring out the positive possibilities of change and uncertainty, especially in the face of our inescapable mortality. Emphasizing not only the mutability but also the circumstantial character of human life, in Chapter 5 he suggests, in partial disagreement with Sheldon Wolin, that Plato

and Machiavelli did not turn to theorizing simply because their practical political ambitions and aims were frustrated. These political theorists were trying to come to terms with a great sense of loss. Rather than merely look back nostalgically to “the good old days” of Socrates or the Roman republic, however, they formulated a vision of a new and different future.

Fully aware of the pitfalls of utopian political thinking, in Chapter 6 Euben then presents an impressive case for the Stoic reaction to the fall of the Greek city states only in order to point out the pitfalls of Martha Nussbaum’s attempt to revive their universalistic, rationalistic morality as a basis for world politics now. This reader wishes he had continued to bring out the tensions between the universalizing character of reason and particularistic political attachments in the last and title chapter. By emphasizing the polyphony in both the Platonic dialogue and Don DeLillo’s *White Noise* without coming to any resolution or project, Euben leads his reader to wonder in the end if, in the face of death, the personal is not and cannot be political. Do we all die alone, as Ernest Hemingway maintained, and thus see, in the end, that all social institutions and ties are merely transitory illusions? Or is it the prospect of our own death that leads us, like Odysseus, to appreciate the ties that bind us to friends and family?

Lubavitchers as Citizens: A Paradox of Liberal Democracy. By Jan Feldman. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 212p. \$32.50.

— Ayelet Shachar, *University of Toronto*

In her book, Jan Feldman offers a meticulous case study of the political culture of a subset of Chassidic Judaism known as Lubavitch or ChaBad. The Lubavitch, explains Feldman, do not adhere to liberal values of critical rationality, universalism, and individual autonomy on the basis of their alternative conception of the good. This concept of the good is guided by the Chassidic interpretation of the Torah, the core of Jewish law. At the same time, Lubavitchers function well in the modern, urban, nonsecluded world in which they dwell. Unlike the Amish or Hutterites with whom they are often compared, Chassidim do not depend on isolation from secular society for survival. They vote, run for office, and serve on local boards. This political activity makes the Lubavitch an excellent test case for Feldman’s main claim: that democratic values and behaviors need *not* depend on possessing a “liberal mindset” (p. 2). The author’s core aim is to dispel the view that because they are members of a nonliberal group, Lubavitchers are incapable of informed, rational, autonomous political deliberation as democratic citizens. It is interesting to note that she does not challenge the very portrayal of Lubavitch as nonliberal. Instead, she attempts to explain to a secular audience how Lubavitchers understand the world according to their own theological terms. The most striking feature of this analysis is the conclusion that reason and intellect lead to *emunah* (faith), not vice versa (p. 123). Thus, Lubavitchers are not foreign to the “faculty of reason,” though their conception of reason lacks scrutiny of beliefs and truth claims by treating them as provisional until

demonstrated through objective proof. Their style of reasoning is keen and acute, despite its not resting on radical skepticism.

Next, Feldman tackles the claim that Lubavitchers’ political activity is suspect because of their collective identity as an insular religious community, which allegedly delivers a bloc vote. Her main methodology is to provide a rich and detailed account of Lubavitch political life in two urban centers: Brooklyn and Montreal. She paints a picture of a community that is loosely and nonhierarchically organized with no officially recognized political structures. But given the charismatic leadership of the Lubavitcher Rebbe (during his lifetime), the absence of bureaucratic/formal channels of political organization in this community does not necessarily equate with a lack of unofficial channels for galvanizing support for particular policies or specific candidates.

In a more persuasive line of argument, Feldman advances the claim that Chassidic voters should not be evaluated against an idealized, perfectionist conception of the classic *citoyen* that is not found in practice. When evaluated against the backdrop of the average American or Canadian voter, she argues, concerns about Lubavitchers’ capability to adequately deliberate on political issues remain largely unfounded (p. 193). She then addresses the claim that Lubavitchers “abuse” the political system by advancing their objectives as a distinct, religious minority group. Again, she argues that it is unfair to hold the Lubavitch to a higher standard of “good citizenship” than that demanded of any other interest group. Lubavitchers clearly adhere to the model of fair play and respect for procedural justice. They pursue their rights within the parameters set by the Constitution, play by the rules, and respect the rights and equality of fellow citizens. If this does not qualify as an expression of “good or at least adequate citizenship” (p. 193), asks Feldman, what does?

Ultimately, the author’s deep entanglement with the Lubavitcher test case forecloses the theoretical horizon of the inquiry into the relationship between liberalism and democracy. This problem is aggravated by her tendency to overemphasize the positive about the Lubavitch and downplay the negative. This is most visible in the discussion of the interracial tensions between Chassidim and other minorities (pp. 53–59), and the chapter devoted to Lubavitcher women (pp. 135–67) in which the author strains to portray differentiations on the basis of sex (which are strictly enforced by the Lubavitch) as unambiguously beneficial and enabling, if not outright empowering, to women. This interpretation may be plausible for some gender-specific practices (such as *tabarat ha-mishpach*) but is far less convincing in the context of legally sanctioned inequalities (such as the husband’s power to refuse the *get* to the *agunah*), which unlike mere “differentiation” along gender lines, put women at a structural disadvantage vis-à-vis men in the case of separation or divorce. Even less plausible is her attempt to represent a uniform voice of “what Lubavitch women say” about their status and stature within the community (pp. 144–62).

That said, Feldman makes a compelling case, particularly in the context of education, for rejecting simplistic assumptions

about women's inability to exit the Lubavitch community. Whereas Chassidic boys are exposed primarily to religious studies (beyond a minimum of required secular courses of study), girls receive a comprehensive secular education in addition to their religious instruction. Upon graduation, young Lubavitch women are generally better positioned to gain employment outside the community and to financially support their families—as they often do. This division of labor occurs in a cultural context where Talmudic scholarship is of greater value than enjoying material success. However, I believe Feldman is correct in claiming that it challenges a degrading portrayal of Chassidic women as “helpless damsels in distress” (p. 141). A more sophisticated analysis of women's status within this community must therefore be informed not only by their engagement in traditional (and gendered) caregiving responsibilities, but also by reference to their education, earning power, and greater preparation for success in the secular world.

The book's finest chapters provide illuminating insights into the history, customs, beliefs, and collective organization of this close-knit minority community, which operates within the confines of a larger, secular society. Unfortunately, the latter chapters, which engage in theoretical debates about civic virtues, liberal values, and the concept of toleration, are not as sharp and crisp as the book's ethnographic parts. Perhaps the major shortcoming is the author's failure to define the limits of the claim that liberal and democratic values are not necessarily intertwined. For instance, it remains unclear whether Feldman believes that there are any circumstances under which Lubavitchers' nonliberal conception of the good may conflict with their democratic right to publicly exercise the franchise. If such conflict may occur, the author provides little guidance as to how to resolve it in a just and fair manner. This is a serious flaw in a book devoted to investigating the relations between the subgroup and the state. Furthermore, Feldman seeks to establish that liberal values and democratic attributes are not synonymous. This is the central edifice of her defense of the Lubavitch. Accordingly, if liberalism and democracy are distinct concepts, then there is no contradiction between the community's rejection of certain liberal values and its adherence to active, democratic participation in the public sphere. But one could make a reverse argument. It seems equally plausible to suggest that the Lubavitch, and other religious minority groups, should hope for some degree of continued entanglement between liberalism and democracy if they are to survive as distinct *nomoi* communities within a larger, secular society. Otherwise, nothing prohibits the majority of voters from democratically restricting the rights and freedoms of distinctive religious groups for no other reason than to restrict their perceived “otherness.” Given their smaller numbers and the historical record of persecution and violence mounted against them, are not enclaves of religious traditionalism better served by enduring constitutional protections in a society that upholds liberal values, rather than by advise to put their trust in the vicissitudes of majority rule? From this vantage point, it appears that Feldman must concede that core liberal values ought to inform democratic

values, especially if she envisions a state that is more hospitable towards nonliberal minorities.

Despite these shortcomings, *Lubavitchers as Citizens* offers a fresh and enlightening account of the Lubavitch as a complex community whose members navigate almost seamlessly between the sacred and profane, in the process eroding the possibility of clearly marking the legitimate boundaries between intense group loyalty and profound civic engagement.

Freedom and Its Conditions: Discipline, Autonomy, and Resistance. By Richard E. Flathman. New York: Routledge, 2003. 224p. \$75.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Jodi Dean, *Hobart and William Smith Colleges*

Richard Flathman's most recent exposition of his continued engagement with the philosophy and politics of freedom has two objectives. Taken in reverse order, the second objective is “to broaden and enrich the theoretical resources available to thinking under the ideological rubric of liberalism” (p. 5). To this end, the chapters of this book are readings of thinkers not typically part of the liberal canon—Foucault, Montaigne, Nietzsche, and the philosopher Stuart Hampshire. Flathman's achievement on this score is admirable, a valuable lesson to those of us in political theory too ensnared in our own particular archives to reach out and engage texts and thinkers commonly associated with tendencies and orientations we do not endorse. Indeed, the author pursues this objective as a kind of exercise of self-criticism, drawing out the changes his readings of Foucault, Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Hampshire have effected on his thinking about freedom as set out in four previous books. In this way, *Freedom and Its Conditions* might be understood performatively, as practicing precisely that sort of disciplined resistance (to past ways of thinking or settled views, in this case) he finds necessary for freedom.

Accordingly, Flathman's first objective in the book is to understand the relations among freedom, discipline, and resistance. His major contention is that freedom is not necessarily or categorically incompatible with discipline and resistance. Although the author does not put it in quite these terms, the claim here can be framed in terms of the problem of linking the three concepts together: We can understand freedom and discipline together (in Lockean terms as freedom within reason or in Kantian terms as autonomy, say) and we can understand freedom and resistance together (perhaps as negative freedom in a Hobbesian sense or in light of the struggles emphasized in radical theory), but it seems difficult to think of freedom in terms of both discipline and resistance. So, on the one side, there is freedom within reason and order, a way of thinking about freedom that risks emphasizing conformity at the expense of creativity or “free-spiritedness” (a kind of robust and creative independence that Nietzsche celebrates and Flathman values). And, on the other side, there is freedom as resistance, a way of thinking that too easily slides into extremes of egoism, self-assertion, and anarchy. Flathman's solution to the problem of linking up freedom, discipline, and resistance is to

prioritize freedom as resistance and value discipline as it helps sustain the capacity to resist.

His argument proceeds from two premises (dealt with at length in his earlier work). The first is that freedom is to be understood as primarily a condition of individual persons (a premise non-controversial to liberals but hotly contested if not downright rejected by the rest of us). The second (taken in part from Stanley Benn and William Weinstein) is that talk about freedom is significant when something is at stake, that is to say, when something or someone is trying to prevent us from doing what we want. Together these ideas form the background of a notion of freedom as agonistic, a view of freedom “not, or not exclusively, as unobstructed or unopposed thinking and doing but as a triumph over conflicting and antagonistic forces” (p. 21). These forces, moreover, are just as, if not more likely to be, within selves as they are between or among them, an idea Flathman develops through a reading of Foucault’s account of the care of the self and enhances in the course of his reflections on Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Hampshire.

Among the attributes of agonistic freedom resulting from these readings are two that I mention here. First, rather than relying on the notion of a unified or sovereign self, Flathman’s agonistic freedom conceives the self as fragmented or dispersed, produced out of continuing interactions among diverse impulses, affects, beliefs, and intensities. Reason is not the ruler, much less the primary attribute, of this self. Freedom, in other words, does not depend on reason coming in to control unattractive appetites. Instead, freedom is the benefit or ideal or aspiration that the self endeavors to produce as it seeks to build affiliations among those aspects of itself it values and to exclude or control those aspects of itself it finds alien. The free self is thus born out of internal conflict. Conflict is freedom’s condition of possibility, the very condition that inspires freedom, that gives to freedom its soaring quality, that special dimension some call creativity or overcoming and others of us call transcendence.

Second, the free self produces itself self-consciously through specific practices of discipline or cultivation. It actively chooses to adopt particular modes of discipline, even though these modes are of course given to it by its context. Although Flathman does not endeavor to distinguish among forms of discipline, in his reading of Montaigne, he emphasizes skepticism as a disciplinary practice entailing specific efforts to doubt, suspend judgment, and search for alternatives. He also tends to associate self-discipline with intensive, perhaps even martial, arts of the self, frequently drawing upon a language of combat. As he notes in the course of his discussion of Nietzsche, “even the domains of inquiry and reflection, often characterized as peacefully contemplative, are arenas of conflict and discord. And to the extent that my quests for knowledge involve me in interactions with other persons, those relationships will always have a competitive or conflictual as well as a sometimes cooperative character” (p. 68). One might say that if Hobbes linked freedom to a war of all against all, then Flathman understands it along the lines of war of all within all. Put too simply, within each of us are

impulses to conform and to act out, impulses to submit uncritically, and impulses to dominate and disrupt. The free self must thus discipline itself to fight on both these fronts. When victorious, this self can celebrate and be celebrated for its individuality and singularity.

To be sure, some will be unsatisfied to find that the conditions of freedom Flathman considers do not include the bare minimum of economic freedom. Others, however, will take heart from his insistence that embodiment is an obvious condition of human freedom. At the very least, his innovative rethinking of the liberal’s free individual should force liberalism’s critics to cease invoking the straw men of autonomous, unified, decontextualized, sovereign selves and take more seriously the aspirations to freedom at the heart of liberal theory. Faced with the author’s arguments, we need to ask ourselves whether, in light of our acceptance of Nietzsche’s dictum that there is no doer behind the deed, we want to embrace the project of creating this doer or whether the very idea that the doer creates itself, as Flathman suggests, fails to grapple with the magnitude of the critique of the subject central to post-structuralist thought. Is there a middle ground here? Approached from a different angle, is Flathman’s insistence on agents as the sources of acts preferable to ways of thinking that conceive Acts as prior to and outside of those who might perform them? An interesting intersection here might be found in the rare and exceptional character of freedom for Flathman and of Acts for thinkers like Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek.

Freedom and Its Conditions is also a welcome contribution to current debates because of its insistence on the link between discipline and resistance. Some today (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, for example) associate the failure of discipline with a kind of liberatory refusal, a refusal that, like stupidity or the slackening of a rope, finds freedom in what might be called failure, giving up, or simple noncompliance for reasons that may or may not be conscious. In my view, Flathman’s arguments present a vital counter to such positions, suggesting that refusal or noncompliance should not be thought of as the same as freedom, that freedom requires something more, again, something transcendent.

Republicanism in the Modern World. By John W. Maynor. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 2003. 240p. \$62.95 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

Citizenship and Identity: Towards a New Republic. By John Schwarzmantel. New York: Routledge, 2003. 186p. \$80.00.

— Margaret Ogrodnick, *University of Manitoba*

The hegemony of liberalism in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy is evident by the number and quality of its theorists, and by the extent to which advocates of alternatives feel compelled to develop and finely differentiate their theories in opposition to liberalism. This tendency is strongly apparent in the books on republicanism by John W. Maynor and John Schwarzmantel. Both authors are centrally driven by the current theoretical and political preoccupation with group

identity politics, and argue that republicanism is superior to liberalism in addressing the corresponding challenges to civic solidarity and participation.

To Schwarzmantel, republican ideas of shared citizenship and the common good are the antidote to the fragmentation of liberal democracies by particular interests and identities. However, he eschews notions of the universal citizen in favor of a group-differentiated citizen with a wider political consciousness and patriotism. He considers the latter to be antithetical to some republicans (like Rousseau and the typically centralist French model of republicanism), but he advances that there are precedents (for example, the Frenchman Charles Renouvier) for the idea that plural identities can be accommodated in the participatory and cohesive republic. He ambivalently endorses nationalism as a source of civic integration, despite its historical association with exclusion and conflict, given its possibilities for extending citizenship to excluded others (such as immigrants), and provided that “supranational” identity is also recognized in light of today’s transnational groupings. In developing republican loyalties and capacities in a pluralistic context, Schwarzmantel is wholehearted about his institutional suggestions. He advocates a representative assembly of groups as a “supplement” to traditional liberal-democratic representation based on individual voters. He is also enthusiastic about federalism and decentralization as mechanisms for providing national or cultural autonomy within a wider civic framework. All this, he argues, will most effectively take place in a situation of greater economic equality in order to facilitate the loyalty of the poor to the state and to thwart the disproportionate political power stemming from economic power.

Maynor is inspired by different historical roots in his republican alternative to liberalism: the “neo-Roman” version of Machiavelli. He applies to contemporary difference politics Machiavelli’s insight into the maintenance of liberty by civic virtue, commitment to the common good, and the institutionalized channeling of clashes between different social groups. Maynor adopts fellow republican Philip Petit’s understanding of liberty as “nondomination” and the freedom from arbitrary interference and attendant anxiety that even the threat of domination entails. Key to securing such liberty is the need for the state to “track” the interests of citizens through participatory institutions at every policy stage, from agenda setting to mandatory reviews of policy solutions. To motivate and enable citizen participation, a certain kind of civic virtue is required that Maynor argues is incompatible with liberal neutrality on the good, as espoused by Will Kymlicka and John Rawls. Maynor goes beyond liberal tolerance and mutual respect to advocate a republican brand of civic virtue characterized by the orientation to fuse self-interest with the common good, and the capability to participate and listen to diverse others in public forums. Such civic virtue would be taught in public schools and informally learned through participation in state institutions. If pluralism and multiculturalism are the ultimate challenges to today’s polity, then, he argues, republicanism is best able to

respond, not only through its emphasis on nondomination and its plethora of participatory channels, but also because it does not ask citizens, like Rawlsian liberalism, to bracket their comprehensive identities when they come to the public forum.

Both Schwarzmantel and Maynor extensively build their cases through their points of agreement and disagreement with other contemporary theorists. Such an approach serves as a broad overview of the literature to the uninitiated, but familiar readers may find the balance tipped too far in this direction, and it does come at the expense of leaving their own suggestive analyses underdeveloped. Turning specifically to Schwarzmantel, *Citizenship and Identity* does the service of integrating contemporary European writers who are less familiar to an Anglo-American readership. However, the support he brings to republicanism from the history of ideas is so eclectic, including Marx and Proudhon (pp. 22–23, 45, 60–62, 66, 110–11, 113, 158), that it precludes his book as a source for a clear understanding of the historical lineage of republicanism. Just like liberalism, republicanism has historically had its own forms of the universal citizen. Beyond the bare concern of republicans for a strong sense of civic unity, it is unclear why Schwarzmantel’s suggestions for redressing difference politics are uniquely republican. Nonetheless, his recommendations for the already familiar ideas of group-based representation and decentralization credibly arise from his analysis, whatever their theoretical label. It is here that more elaboration is needed. For example, he does not spell out the criteria for groups to be accorded representation, or for individuals to be recognized as members of such groups, nor what it means for a group assembly to be “supplementary” to existing liberal-democratic assemblies (pp. 54–55, 59–60, 125–29, 148). On the question of decentralization, the tension between the universal citizen and the group-differentiated citizen bubbles up on such questions as education and national groups, with the solutions too summarily found, in this case by quickly redressing the obstacles to “common citizenship” through a “common education” with a “particular cultural education” as “a sort of ‘optional extra’” (p. 120).

As a tract on republicanism, Maynor’s book has the virtue of drawing from a clear republican lineage in Machiavelli, and he makes a strong case for Machiavelli’s applicability to contemporary difference politics and the forging of republican civic virtues and participatory institutions. Between Maynor’s analysis of Machiavelli and his lengthy presentations of contemporary liberal and republican thinkers (criticizing the former and endorsing or developing the latter), he does not get around to the main substance of his republican proposals until the last two chapters. By this time, it is clear that he is offering a genuine alternative to liberalism in terms of the legitimacy of group identities in public forums, and the institutional support for a high degree of participation animated by republican virtues inculcated through civic education. However, this substantive treatment comes near the end of *Republicanism in the Modern World*, just when the reader hopes he would be warming up, and important issues

are closed with insufficient development. For example, he reiterates a claim made earlier in his critique of Rawls that the nondomination espoused by modern republicanism is able to redress the subjugation of women (pp. 110–14, 139–40). Given the capacity of contemporary liberal feminists to follow their historical sisters in appropriating gender-blind liberal theory to formulate concrete policy recommendations for the equalization of women, Maynor does not do enough to substantiate his claim that republicanism is superior to liberalism in challenging the division between private and public spheres and diminishing women's domination in the family. (See, for example, Susan Moller Okin for a feminist appropriation of Rawls in *Justice, Gender, and the Family*, 1989).

Maynor avoids “rock-hard policy recommendations” because republicanism is a “fluid public philosophy” that depends on citizen input and is specific to the character of the locale (p. 149). Schwarzmantel is concerned about too high a level of generalization in his republicanism, but still considers that “[a]ny theory is bound to operate at some level of generality” (pp. 54, 145). In my view, as indicated, both books would have benefited from more theoretical specificity and, furthermore, could have made more use of an Aristotelian methodology of developing and buttressing theoretical points by incorporating the institutions and practices of actual states into normative analysis. Schwarzmantel makes some use of this Aristotelian method by discussing, for instance, the Scottish Parliament and the local and cultural powers of national associations in the pre-1914 Habsburg Empire (pp. 6, 106, 108, 114–16, 121, 128). Maynor has the occasional word in this direction as illustrated by his remarks on the Norwegian legal requirement for government agencies “to notify affected individuals and groups before the full implementation of public policy” (p. 163).

Both authors refer to and reject the view that liberalism could just as easily be hyphenated with “republicanism” as with “democracy” (Maynor, pp. 23–24, 33, 63, 91–92; Schwarzmantel, pp. 9–10). Maynor goes to greater theoretical effort to demonstrate their difference with some success. Certainly, the enterprise animating both books will appeal to those who find the rational self-interest of liberalism a dubious foundation for public commitment and an activist civic culture. Nevertheless, both books still evidence the hold of liberalism on the modern Western mind. Despite Schwarzmantel's choice of Rousseau as a justification for his republican vision, this predecessor haunts his analysis more than guides it (pp. 5–6, 35, 46, 53, 55, 64, 75, 122, 126, 138–41, 146). And even where Schwarzmantel approves, in Rousseau's condemnation of economic inequality as an impediment to democratic equality, he chooses a reform liberal remedy of a guaranteed income (pp. 61, 72, 147). As for Maynor, the distinction between republican “nondomination” and liberal “non-interference” is highly subtle (pp. 35–51), and the most “liberal-friendly” aspects of Machiavelli are what appeals—his ideas on pluralistic conflict, for example, and not his pagan civic religion.

The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the Present. By Jason Read. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. 214p. \$57.50 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

— David A. Duquette, *St. Norbert College*

Is Marxist philosophy dead or is there something of significance and importance in Marx's social and economic theory for the present world, particularly his analysis and explanation of capitalism? The general consensus, both in the theoretical realm of scholarship and the practical world of politics, seems to be negative. We now appear to live in a “post-Marxist” world where Marx's conceptions no longer apply; or perhaps, despite the significant impact and following he had for almost a century, Marx never really did provide an accurate explanation of the domains of material production and sociopolitical and cultural life, and their connection. Perhaps capitalism is not a fundamentally exploitative, alienating, and self-contradictory system necessitated to implode but rather, as Francis Fukuyama has suggested, it brings us progressively and somewhat happily to the “end of history.”

Jason Read's book goes against this grain in providing a positive reconsideration of the relevance of Marx to the present. He suggests that what might be seen as the triumph of capitalism, its increasing expansion and hegemony over human life, is a result of a “profound mutation,” the nature of which has escaped the purview of traditional Marxist critique. The problem lies in good part in the conception of a “mode of production,” wherein Marx conceptualized the forces and relations of production, the division of labor, and the economic structure generally—also referred to as the “economic base.” Upon this productive and economic system rests the so-called superstructure, which includes law, politics, culture, ideology, and forms of consciousness found in art, religion, and philosophy. In the traditional Marxist analysis of the “base/superstructure” model, the real motor of change and development lies in the base, whereas phenomena at the level of the superstructure are largely surface effect, with some interactive influence upon the base but, as Friedrich Engels put it, with the base being in the end determinant. Read's interpretation of Marx, and that of the various other commentators he refers to, challenges this view as overly simplistic and incapable of explaining capitalism today or its origination historically.

Read's view is that capital cannot be separated from the superstructure because production involves not only material production, in the sense of material goods manufactured in a factory, but also what he calls the “production of subjectivity,” that is, of beliefs, desires, and culture generally. Today especially, capitalist production is “micro-political” in inserting itself into daily life and subjectivity (the term “subjectivity” presumably referring to what the term “superstructure” designates). A new critique of capital is thus called for, one that in giving attention to the micro-political dimension overcomes the division between economic and philosophical analysis, a critique that recognizes the limitations of Marx's own analysis but also draws upon places in his texts that link culture and economy.

Marx does not treat systematically the materialistic production of ideas and subjectivity, but both in *Capital*, Volume 1 (1867), and, particularly, in the notebooks entitled *Grundrisse* (written in 1857–58 but not published until 1939) Read argues, “against the grain,” that there are explications that point in the direction of a theory of the production of subjectivity.

According to Read, this issue has been taken up by various poststructuralist philosophers, such as Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Felix Guattari, as well as the structuralists Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, and the “autonomist” Marxists Antonio Negri and Mario Tronti. In appealing to such divergent thinkers and schools of thought, Read is not being simply eclectic. He does a good job of showing how these thinkers converge in drawing out of Marx a conception of “immanence” that allows for a more complex, dynamic, and holistic understanding of capitalism, while at the same time requiring recognition of a greater degree of ambiguity and uncertainty than traditional Marxists would have about its direction and fate. Althusser’s conception of “immanent causality,” the idea that in the mode of production causes do not exist outside of their effects, is particularly important, as well as his strategy of a “symptomatic reading” of capitalism, which recognizes not only “multiple logics” and tensions in Marx’s works but also that capitalism in the present cannot be understood in terms of rigid hierarchies. However, whereas Althusser emphasizes the way that subjectivity is materially produced by capital, it is the poststructuralists like Foucault and Balibar and the autonomist Marxists Negri and Tronti who emphasize the independent role of subjectivity and how, for example, power, violence, and desire contribute to an expanded sense of production and of the “effectivity of subjectivity.” Thus, subjectivity is not only materially produced but is itself productive of capital and wealth, resulting in somewhat of a “contradictory identity” of subjection and subjectification.

Read’s interpretive strategy for reading Marx in light of the present, and for reading the present in light of intersections discovered in the works of various Marxist and post-Marxist thinkers, leads to some interesting, albeit mixed, conclusions regarding the relevance of Marx for the present and the explanation of capitalism. Despite the author’s response to the charge of turning Marx into a sort of post-Marxist with the claim that he has given “an almost obsessive attentiveness to the actual writings and arguments of Marx” (p. 8), these writings are admittedly not univocal on the matters at issue. Furthermore, it would seem that if Marx’s categories and their connections are in significant ways historically situated, and if capitalism has become in the present so mutated that it requires significant reworking of explanatory concepts, not only of production but of labor, capital, consumption, and so on, then one wonders if we have not departed significantly from Marx’s central paradigm in a way that historically and theoretically is post-Marxist. Marx not only tended to privilege the “production of objects” and things and marginalize nonproductive activities, but he also resisted giving recognition to the role of the rising service- and knowledge-based industry that has now become central. Perhaps it is appropri-

ate to say that the seeds of the contemporary post-Marxist interpretation of capitalism are dormant in Marx’s writings but require a significant historical development for the theoretical realization, involving a “transformation of the ontology of production underlying Marx’s thought” (p. 159), a very significant shift indeed.

Also, if the perspective of the production of subjectivity indicates that the future is not subject to inexorable laws but, rather, that the logic of antagonism is open to contingency and a multitudinous play of forms of subjectivity, then not only is any expectation of capitalism’s necessary demise undermined but it becomes unclear whether capitalism as such can really be understood systematically, since necessitation in its structure and formation seems to give way to possibility, novelty, and uncertainty. What appears to remain constant and significant for Marx and post-Marxist analysis is how capitalism produces a mystification of relationships. The crucial question is whether the unmasking of mystification through theoretical critique can spur “living labor” into rejecting and overcoming it, as opposed to conspiringly submitting.

These reservations are only by way of entering into conversation with the author’s text. Overall, Read does a good job of accomplishing the task he sets for himself, the exploring of intersections in the Marxist and post-Marxist explications of capitalist society and the formation of an interpretive strategy for a retrospective reading of Marx. My only complaint about *The Micro-Politics of Capital* is that it tends occasionally to fall into postmodernist jargon, perhaps under the influence of the contemporary writings with which it is in dialogue. Those of us not steeped in the language game of this literature are better served by more consistently straightforward prose.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau: A Friend of Virtue. By Joseph R. Reiser. Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 2003. 211p. \$42.50.

— Pamela K. Jensen, *Kenyon College*

Joseph Reiser has written an insightful, wonderfully readable, and sympathetic exploration of Rousseau’s defense of the morally virtuous or just life. Like the citizens in the *Social Contract* and like Emile, we should find our own happiness in serving the welfare of others, but, if necessary, we should also possess the strength of will to choose the good for its own sake, even at the cost of our own happiness (pp. 8, 55, 87). The “problem of virtue” Rousseau sets out to solve, then, is not so much to learn what justice requires, but rather—as reflected in his own notorious shortcomings—to motivate people to *do* what justice requires (pp. 5, 22, 81). Accordingly, Reiser argues that Rousseau’s novel contribution to political and ethical thought is his “moral psychology,” or “physics of the soul” (p. 14), a profound understanding of the passions that make us act, and, in particular, of *amour-propre*. Rousseau traces the political and ethical corruptions of his times to *amour-propre*, especially in its “inflamed” or “disordered” form (pp. 20, 107), and presents an education in unadulterated virtue as the only cure.

Amour-propre, which makes us “*rational* but *unreasonable*” (p. 10), defeats the hopes of the proponents of enlightened self-interest as a reliable moral or political motive. Amour-propre explains both why men fail to stand up for themselves in politics and why they prefer to seek their own well-being only at the cost of others, with the result that they are good neither for themselves nor for others. Reisert’s Rousseau calls on amour-propre to answer the question of why men who are born free are everywhere in chains. In his persuasive analysis, Reisert points thus to a specific kind of demoralization operative in modern hierarchical societies—one that, less than grinding people down by an oppression they regard as insurmountable, inures them to feeling it; misdirecting their energies and setting them inveterately against one another, while inclining them at the same time supinely to acquiesce in tyranny (pp. 32, 51).

Reisert’s succinct, lucid, and amply illustrated account of the political and ethical importance of amour-propre, and his case for the superiority of Rousseau’s psychology on this score to his most important predecessors and heirs, make significant contributions to scholarship. Reisert also befriends Rousseau, who is often declared *persona non grata* among liberal democrats, by urging that we include his voice in the ongoing scholarly conversation about how to cultivate and/or to preserve virtue in liberal democracy (pp. 7–8). To define his position more clearly, Reisert also enters into helpful exchanges with several influential interpreters of Rousseau.

Not surprisingly, given the priority of education over institutions in Rousseau’s enterprise, enlightened statesmen, or their philosophical-literary equivalents, must always be at the helm. Judging that the prospects even for Emile’s virtue are gloomy without the ever-present attentions of his wise tutor (and claiming that Emile only acquires his virtue by imitating the tutor), Reisert concludes both that we stand in the same need as Emile and that we have in Rousseau the requisite mentor and friend. He argues that Rousseau’s relationship to his readers is parallel to the tutor’s relationship to Emile, albeit arising from a legislative ambition that is greater than the tutor’s, encompassing, as it does, the bringing of generations of readers toward virtue (pp. 168–69).

To inspire the “*passion for virtue*” (p. 109) in us, Rousseau depicts it in others, putting the virtuous life in the most lovable light, most notably in his philosophical novels *Emile* and *Julie* (aimed respectively at men and women) (p. 169). In the “*self-commanding virtue*” the protagonists exhibit, he presents models for our imitation or “*exemplary lives*” (pp. 22, 174). A friend who, like Rousseau, lays his own soul bare is the authority figure we need to rectify our judgments, stiffen our spines, and hold our amour-propre at bay (p. 23). In obeying the counsels of an intimate friend, we seem to obey only ourselves, and, to put it in Rousseau’s terms, feel ourselves to be, therefore, as free as we were before.

Without wishing to detract at all from the originality and well-grounded character of Reisert’s case for the paramount importance of the tutor–Emile relationship, and while appreciating his keen sensitivity to Rousseau’s overall legislative inten-

tions, I will nevertheless raise a few questions about the argument.

Among the significant points of contact between *Emile* and the *Republic* that Reisert adduces is the implicit political conservatism of the endings of both works. He argues that, short of the very worst cases, the imperfections of political regimes—say, Emile’s France—do not excuse us from “*practicing virtue*” in our own lives (pp. 137–38). If true freedom resides in the heart of a free man, it will always be possible to build a model regime in one’s own soul. This teaching seems to replicate the political resignation that Rousseau criticizes in his contemporaries. Could Rousseau really want to teach quiescence or quietism to men of whom Reisert says they are already only too willing to put up with despotism? Rousseau’s teaching on duty would seem, in any case, to subvert the “*the laws of France*,” since all duties derive from rights not recognized there. And, as presented by Rousseau, justice not only involves us in the welfare of others but also calls forth the virile self-respect we need to stand up for ourselves.

According to Reisert, the tutor is an idealized version of Rousseau, endowed “*with all the virtues . . . that he himself so conspicuously lacked*” (pp. 105, 141). One could argue, however, that Rousseau’s way of befriending the reader implies at least a friendly criticism of virtue and of the tutor’s position as a “*figure of authority*” in Emile’s life. Both the downside of the tutor–Emile relationship and the downside of the “*passion for virtue*” may be surmounted, however, in the particular way Rousseau performs his legislative function. The providential intercession of a benevolent, quasi-divine tutor—the obvious benefactor of a chosen person or chosen people—makes one dependent on a will that may come to seem arbitrary. By contrast, an invisible authority, who, by his confessions of weakness, cedes all claims to being an authority, violates neither the principle of freedom nor equality; nor do people see themselves as subject in any way to his will: There is no subjection so perfect as that which maintains the appearance of freedom.

Finally, the tragedy dogging the lives of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s virtuous protagonists and his own literary theory raise a question about his intentions. Does his very appeal to our passions subvert his praise of the sacrifice of inclination to duty?

The State of Democratic Theory. By Ian Shapiro. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 200p. \$19.95.

— Leonard C. Feldman, *University of Oregon*

This wide-ranging and nuanced book offers nothing less than a reconceptualization of the basic purpose of democracy. Ian Shapiro’s core argument is that the aggregative and deliberative approaches are misguided in viewing the purpose of democracy as the expression of a “*general will that reflects the common good*” (p. 3). Rather, democracy is best thought of as a call to limit or minimize domination. While such a refiguring of democracy might seem to inevitably push Shapiro to imagine democracy in terms of a popular practice or ethos, he

succeeds in keeping his focus on institutions and regime design. Given this reconceptualization of democracy's purpose, he goes on to provide a principle for guiding democratization efforts: "Democratic systems are most likely to reduce domination to the extent that they bring decision making into better conformity with the principle of affected interest and strengthen the hands of those whose basic interests are vulnerable in particular settings" (p. 147).

With great insight and nuanced judgment, Shapiro weaves together three literatures—normative democratic theory, the empirical literature on democratization, and debates over the nature of power (and domination). And the book ranges even farther than that: The facility with which the author incorporates economic theory, ethnographies of impoverished communities, and constitutional law is extraordinary. His reframing of democracy's essence is extremely appealing. It reconnects debates over democracy to theories of power and domination, a relation that had become attenuated, and it situates democratic theory in a context—not some power-free vacuum in which people choose the best form of government, but in the real-world context of hierarchies and power disparities. This means, as Shapiro writes, that "democracy is now judged not by the either/or question whether it produces social welfare functions or leads to agreement, but rather by how well it enables people to manage power relations as measured by the yardstick of minimizing domination" (p. 51).

At the heart of Shapiro's argument for democracy as a domination-limiting enterprise is a defense of *political competition* in Chapter 3. In this line of thought, the author presents a reevaluation of Joseph Schumpeter's often-critiqued theory of representative democracy, as well as an argument for using antitrust tools against the contemporary U.S. two-party system. For him, rhetorics of bipartisanship and consensus on Capitol Hill are not pipe dreams covering over a more troubling reality; rather, they are in and of themselves signs of unhealthy collusion and "the quasi-monopolistic dimensions of the system" (p. 108). Provocatively, he argues that American democracy does not suffer from the putative "thinness" of the Schumpeterian conception, but from its failure to fully realize robust elite competition for power.

In Chapters 1 and 2, Shapiro brings real-world insights to the debate over deliberative democracy, supplementing the many critiques of others that are based on more abstract theories of language and power. Using the Clinton-era health-care debate, he explores how vast disparities in wealth and power shape the terms of deliberation. Furthermore, he points out that deliberation can often lead to wider and deeper disagreements, not consensus. Still, he concludes with a qualified defense of deliberation as valuable in certain circumstances for protecting vulnerable persons whose basic interests are at stake, while also remaining attuned to the potential for deliberation to exacerbate unjust hierarchies. The goal of "enhancing the voice of critically weakened democratic participants" (pp. 75–76) orients Shapiro's very convincing approach to judicial review as well. Rather than seeing judicial review as liberalism's check on

the excesses of democracy, he argues that it be understood as a self-correcting feature of democracy. This is more than a terminological point: It means adopting more judicial restraint than the Supreme Court exercised in creating the elaborate trimester framework in *Roe v. Wade*, but at the same time embracing an activist commitment to preventing, or correcting for, the domination that occurs within the democratic process.

Chapters 4, "Getting and Keeping Democracy," and 5, "Democracy and Distribution," seem less well integrated into the "democracy and domination" framework, but they contain some notable insights nonetheless. For instance, engaging the empirical literature on democratization, Shapiro makes an important contribution to the debate over whether political communities with deep cultural divisions can sustain democracy. "Consociational" systems of power sharing are often instituted in such situations in place of competitive representative democracy, reflecting a pessimistic and "primordialist" view of intractable group identities. He rejects primordialism and criticizes antidemocratic solutions, such as partition for deepening cultural conflict and people's investments in exclusionary group allegiances. He argues for experiments in democratic institutional design, to see how far it is possible to nurture electoral competition and cross-cutting coalitions in divided societies.

In the introduction, Shapiro writes that "hierarchical relations are often legitimate, and when they are, they do not involve domination on my account" (p. 4). Unfortunately, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate hierarchy is undertheorized. The book's approach to domination might have been strengthened by greater engagement with certain theorists of power, such as Michel Foucault, who are dismissed rather quickly for holding a view that power is omnipresent and for offering little by way of advice for designing institutions to deal with the problem. More detailed engagement might have helped pin down Shapiro's understanding of "domination." Finally, it is intriguing to think about how *The State of Democratic Theory* fits with some of the more abstract "agonistic" democratic theory, such as Chantal Mouffe's critique of both the aggregative and deliberative approaches to democracy in *The Democratic Paradox* (2000). Shapiro's defense of competition over consensus, and his vision of democracy as resistance to domination, share a real affinity with the agonistic approach and could, I think, be viewed as offering a pragmatic, institutionally focused development of some of the core commitments of the agonistic approach.

Deliberative Democracy and the Environment. By Graham Smith. New York: Routledge, 2003. 163p. \$90.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper.

— Douglas Torgerson, *Trent University*

Criticizing liberal democracy as inadequate to environmental challenges, green political theorists have recently tended to embrace key tenets of deliberative democracy. Graham Smith follows this tendency in a concise, engaging, and highly

accessible volume that combines a critique of the environmental inadequacies of liberal democratic institutions with an account of the potential merits of deliberation in promoting “ecological democratisation” (p. 101).

Smith’s account is far from a simple exercise in cheerleading for deliberative democracy, however, and he especially emphasizes that it cannot supply a complete model of democracy, due to the political necessity that discussion end at some point in order for decisions to be made. What Smith particularly endorses is not the wholesale replacement of liberal democracy but the fostering of deliberative institutions within it. Although this book largely constitutes a summation and assessment of an emerging trend in green political theory, Smith also makes an important and original contribution (of relevance to the literature of deliberative democracy as well) through his precise and extensive appraisal of deliberative institutions that have so far been brought to bear on environmental problems.

Environmentalism may be viewed, in general terms, as a response to the industrialist tenet that humanity has both the collective capacity and the collective right to dominate nature. Smith sees in deliberative institutions, not a guarantee that this industrialist tenet will be rejected in favor of an environmentalist one, but rather a potential: that of opening up serious consideration of a plurality of perspectives on the environment that are typically foreclosed by the established institutions of liberal democracy.

Environmentalist perspectives suggest that the human capacity to control the natural environment has conventionally been greatly overestimated, thanks to reductionist moves that deflect attention from problems of complexity and unpredictability. Largely following John Dryzek, Smith argues that more “ecologically rational” institutions are needed (p. 61). Deliberative institutions have the advantage of helping to expand “limited and fallible perspectives” (p. 62), and Smith crucially includes the perspectives of experts. Drawing upon a large literature critical of the role of experts in environmental politics (e.g., Ulrich Beck, Brian Wynne, Frank Fischer), he points to deliberation as an “ingenious mechanism” for democratically regulating the authority of experts while fostering ecologically sensitive judgments (p. 63).

Smith emphasizes a plurality of views in environmental ethics that challenge the conventional anthropocentric position that human beings have the obvious right to dominate nature. Deliberative institutions, he indicates, are necessary both for this position to be challenged and, more generally, for there to be a discussion that effectively includes the plurality of environmental values. For his own part, Smith does not altogether abandon anthropocentrism in favor of ecocentrism. Stressing the inescapable centrality of human judgment in ethical and political deliberation, Smith instead recommends an ecologically enlightened or “weak” anthropocentrism (p. 13)—though presumably one could, while retaining the same substance, just as well turn this formulation around to speak of a weak or qualified ecocentrism.

For Smith, deliberative institutions are oriented, not necessarily to consensus (à la Jürgen Habermas), but to a “mutual understanding” (p. 59) in which the exchange of differing opinions serves to enhance the quality of judgment. Here Smith relies particularly on Hannah Arendt’s account of the “enlarged mentality,” though he also endorses Iris Marion Young’s concern that the distinctiveness of differing voices needs to be heard. Such a concern guides his detailed assessments of deliberative institutions—e.g., those he terms “citizen forums” (p. 86)—in terms of their differing capacities to enhance discussion, to expand participation, and to resist co-optation by powerful interests. Yet Smith is right to note that a concern with voice encounters “ontological dilemmas” (p. 107) when combined with aspirations for an ecological democracy capable of adequately taking into account the complex plurality of environmental values. The obvious conundrum, especially when one entertains an ecocentric perspective, is that human beings are going to be the ones doing all the talking. In this regard, Smith makes the astute move of suggesting that the way out may lie less in a reductionist focus on rules and procedures than in the potential emergence of an “ecological culture” (p. 116) that could be encouraged (though not guaranteed) by enhanced deliberation.

Deliberative institutions are principally understood by Smith as mechanisms for the development of “reflective” public opinion and its transmission to centers of decision making in the liberal democratic state (p. 76). Smith also speaks of linking these institutions to “a more radical project of ecological democratisation” (p. 81). The substance of his discussion in this regard centers, however, on envisioning in institutional terms “the possible shape” of the *goal* of ecological democratization (p. 127). Although Smith does make a valuable contribution here, the focus on goals tends to neglect the daunting question of the political *means* necessary to fulfil such a radical project.

Although Smith is by no means oblivious to problems of power and co-optation that are stressed from more critical perspectives, he acknowledges that he tends to be rather “optimistic” about the potential of the liberal democratic state (p. 126). Smith here replicates and renders explicit a common tendency of the deliberative literature to be fairly sanguine about prevailing power structures, and to take at face value their supposedly democratic character.

This orientation neglects the authoritarian and oligarchic features of what are conventionally labeled “liberal democracies.” These features, although fairly obvious in any case, become unmistakable in concrete, critical assessments of the way serious environmental initiatives—the kind Smith might advocate—typically are deflected or co-opted by the powers-that-be in advanced industrial societies. From such a critical perspective, the model of deliberative democracy would not be taken as an adequate guide for democratic action, but could be valued as one source of strategic initiatives in an uncertain, continuing struggle for democratization.

Failure to Hold: The Politics of School Violence. By Julie A. Webber. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 232p. \$72.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper.

— Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, *Whitman College*

What do conventional accounts of shooting rampages in public schools fail to reveal, and what might qualify as a more adequate analysis? Why do such incidents occur, and how might we begin to address the circumstances that provoke them? What is the relationship between the routinized forms of violence that define much of everyday life within the United States and the more episodic forms that provide the stuff of newspaper headlines? These are some of the questions taken up by Julie Webber in this provocative but uneven book.

Webber's argument is built around her often insightful examination of three incidents of public school violence that took place between 1997 and 1999; in West Paducah, Kentucky, Jonesboro, Arkansas, and Springfield, Oregon. Conventional explanations of these incidents, especially those purveyed by the mainstream mass media, invite educational policymakers to respond by adopting strategies of containment, such as those involving restrictive dress codes, metal detectors, surveillance cameras, and so on. Each of these strategies is aimed at preventing weapons of not-so-massive destruction from passing through the schoolhouse door, and all are predicated on a deep distrust, if not profound fear, of the stated beneficiaries of these disciplinary practices.

Practices of this sort, Webber argues, merely intensify the more pernicious effects of what she, adopting a concept from neo-Marxist scholarship, calls "the hidden curriculum of schooling" (p. 3). Although not elaborated as thoroughly as it might be, the central principle of that curriculum appears to postulate that at its best, the public school is to assume the character of a home of happy harmony, a place where real conflict is absent, where socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic inequalities are overcome, where history is a progressive flow of so much pabulum, where the prevailing norms for success in twenty-first-century America are unproblematically reproduced. For many adolescents, the socio-psychological pressure spawned by the tension between the idealized exhortations implicit in this curriculum and the reality of strategies of confinement generates the very rage the former seeks to deny and the latter seeks to quell. Ironically, Webber argues, the students who most intensely experience the gap between what the hidden curriculum promises and a culture that routinely contravenes that pledge are precisely those most likely to turn to violence, whether directed against themselves in self-destructive conduct, such as risky sexual conduct or suicide, or, alternatively, against their peers, whether via the fantasized violence of video games or in the form of bullets sprayed throughout the cafeteria. Those who expect little from school, as well as those who are already severely victimized, by racism, class deprivation, homophobia, or whatever, are far less likely to be disappointed by their educational experience and, so far, less likely to transmute that disillusionment into mayhem.

Not surprisingly, given her Marxist and equally evident Foucauldian theoretical sympathies, Webber holds that public schools "reproduce the dominant relations of production in a given society" (p. 4), which, in the United States, means that students are trained to think of education simply as a means to (possible) employment, and to value that employment as a means to unrestrained consumerism. Perhaps surprisingly, given these same Marxist and Foucauldian sympathies, when Webber seeks to imagine a public school that might foster the emancipation of young minds, she turns to John Dewey and the progressive educational reforms he espoused. In thinking through this issue, in addition to Marx, Foucault, and Dewey, who already make for strange theoretical bedfellows, Webber also draws on Sigmund Freud, Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean Baudrillard, Roland Barthes, D. W. Winnicott, José Ortega y Gasset, and others, thereby creating what she calls "a mishmash of theories pulled together to explain a very complex social problem" (p. 10).

The obvious question to ask of such an enterprise is whether such a theoretical hodgepodge is adequate to the task Webber sets herself in this book. In asking this question, I do not mean to reject theoretical eclecticism per se, but I do mean to ask whether the particular mix employed by Webber enables her to offer a coherent account of school violence, as well as the measures that might be taken in response to it. Two brief examples suffice to indicate the sort of problem I have in mind. First, on the one hand, in turning to Dewey, Webber's aim is to ask what sort of public schools might teach students the critical intelligence that will enable them to flourish in a democratic society. More specifically, her vision of a school that is worthy of a genuine democracy is one that appears as a "free public space of experimentation for the social good" (p. 9). Yet such liberal humanist discourse, as well as its implicit vision of a possible future in which students engage in creative problem solving under the gentle tutelage of nonauthoritarian instructors, is sure to be skeptically greeted by those who, following Foucault, have learned to hear such discourse as a veiled rationale for ever more insidious forms of social control. Second, Webber's belief in the possibility of creating schools that facilitate the emergence of a more robust democracy appears at odds with her Marxist sensibilities, which suggest that the public school is little more than a "kindergarten-to-twelfth-grade assembly line" (p. 29) aimed at producing the sorts of docile bodies required by contemporary capitalism.

To note that *Failure to Hold* does not entirely succeed in its own project is not to deny its real merit. Webber's argument offers a welcome alternative to the mass media hysteria that typically accompanies incidents of exceptional violence in public schools, the containment strategies that invariably follow them, and the facile explanations proffered by talking heads, who point to the proliferation of firearms, the seductiveness of Goth culture, the banishment of God from the public school, and the fine line between adolescence and psychopathology.

AMERICAN POLITICS

Information and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power. By Bruce Bimber. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 268p. \$65.00 cloth, \$22.00 paper.

— Grant Reeher, *Syracuse University*

Bruce Bimber has written an important and useful book about the new information technologies—primarily the Internet—and American democracy. Bimber's theoretical focus is information, which he defines broadly. His overarching argument is that the cost of information, and the ways in which it is organized, managed, and distributed, have important and at times decisive consequences for political life and political institutions. He uses this perspective to attempt to “illuminate contemporary political developments as well as some critical moments of historical change in the United States” (p. 13).

Bimber begins with the historical narrative and describes four “information regimes” in American political history. These regimes are punctuated by “information revolutions, which involve changes in the structure or accessibility of information” (p. 18). The first regime was associated with the Jacksonian period and was a product of the information revolution produced by the U.S. Postal Service and the newspaper industry. The second, associated with the industrial revolution and the growth of the state, was mostly about information complexity, and helped establish pluralist politics. The third was driven by broadcasting, which reopened a new kind of mass politics. There are numerous facets, wrinkles, and countervailing trends in these revolutions and regimes, which the author describes well.

This is an interesting treatment, which includes a rereading of classic works of American political theory and other political theory in terms of information, including, for example, the Founders, Tocqueville, and Weber. Indeed, most scholars picking up the book will be drawn to it out of the assumption that it is about the Internet and American politics, and that is true, but incomplete. The book is also an imaginative alternative account of the political development of the United States, told through the lens of political information. Appropriately, Bimber intends his version to be an important supplementary account and not a replacement for other theories of political development.

The newest, fourth regime is, of course, the one occasioned by the Internet. Bimber's thesis “is that technological change in the contemporary period should contribute toward information abundance, which in turn contributes toward post-bureaucratic forms of politics. This process involves chiefly private political institutions and organizations such as civic associations, as well as interest groups, rather than formal governmental institutions rooted in law or the Constitution” (p. 21). The result of the information abundance and new information ecology is “a diminished role on many fronts for traditional organizations in politics,” as well as “accelerated

pluralism,” and a politics increasingly “organized around not interests or issues, but rather events and the intensive flow of information surrounding them” (p. 22).

Bimber uses both quantitative and qualitative evidence in sketching all this out empirically, and in particular relies on a set of his own case studies and surveys from recent years. This evidence is useful and makes for interesting reading, but also reveals the book's principal shortcoming, which I will describe below.

The book concludes with a brief comparison of current developments in other nations, a rumination on political inequality in terms of political information that draws principally on the conclusion of Robert Dahl's *Democracy and Its Critics* (1989), and a critical consideration of the new technology's effects on the public sphere, which draws principally on Habermas.

Information and American Democracy should appeal to scholars working in politics and information technology, American political development, social movements, democratic theory, and political participation, in roughly that order. In that vein, it should also be noted that it deftly treats a wide range of literatures in the field and that it is well written. I do not, however, see it having much of a readership outside academic circles, given its format, style, and content.

The book has its flaws, of course. Bimber's conclusions have a tendency toward the “on the one hand, on the other” format—his final conclusion on the value of the new technology for American democracy is decidedly agnostic. And while his case studies provide compelling stories about the political power of the Internet, the connection between the theoretical arguments and the empirical material is not always clear, and it is not clear just how the American political development narrative bears on understanding the current case studies and the contemporary situation more generally. Indeed, in many respects, Bimber has written two books contained here in this volume, divided roughly in half.

My deepest criticism, however, is that the author understudies and underrates the horizontally interactive aspect of the Internet, or to use other terms that have been advanced to describe the aspect, the many-to-many, citizen-to-citizen (c-c), interconnective, social-capital and community-building potential of the Internet, and in particular, of e-mail. It is this limitation, I think, that leads him to puzzle over aggregate-level data on participation that indicate little overall positive effect from the new technology, and that simply do not compute with his qualitative stories in the case studies. He is aware of this limitation in his focus, and notes and argues for it several times. Nonetheless, it prevents him from thoroughly appreciating the Internet's true political potential, and why it can appear to some organizations to be of little real use, while other organizations that have figured out how to tap its community-building, participatory, and grassroots potential—such as, as of this writing, Howard Dean's presidential campaign—have enjoyed great Internet successes. Another way to say this is that particularly in Bimber's quantitative data, but also in his qualitative data, both the

independent variable of Internet use and the dependent variable of political activity need to be broadened and enriched, in order to understand what is really happening—and what could happen—in his fourth regime.

But these criticisms are not intended to discount the overall positive contribution of this book, which is significant. I would place it among a small number of books within the past five years or so that have illuminated this subfield, a subfield that will only grow in importance in the discipline.

Relevant No More? The Catholic/Protestant Divide in American Electoral Politics. By Mark D. Brewer. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003. 180p. \$55.00.

— Timothy A. Byrnes, *Colgate University*

In his book, Mark D. Brewer makes three arguments. The first is that Roman Catholics in the United States tend to identify with the Democratic Party, and to vote for Democratic candidates. The second is that this behavior distinguishes Catholics from Protestants in such significant ways that the Catholic/Protestant divide continues to be an important factor in electoral politics. Both of these arguments are well supported, and if the author had contented himself with them, then *Relevant No More?* would have made a useful, though not pathbreaking, contribution to the literature on religion and politics in the United States. The problem is that Brewer insists on making a third claim over and over again. His third claim is that the first two arguments disprove a widely held “conventional wisdom” that Catholics have abandoned or deserted the Democratic Party in recent decades, rendering talk of a Catholic/Protestant split outdated and irrelevant. This final claim is impossible to sustain, and the author’s stubborn insistence on it ends up weakening the book considerably.

Nevertheless, along the way, Brewer does an admirable job of establishing that the Catholic/Protestant split is still relevant in U.S. politics. He offers page after page of clearly presented analysis of voting patterns of all kinds that show convincingly that Catholics still lean Democratic in electoral politics, and that this leaning distinguishes them clearly from their Protestant neighbors. There are charts depicting presidential voting, House voting, and party identification for the period 1952–2002, and similar charts displaying the same data grouped by decade. Sure enough, for this entire fifty-year period, without a single exception, Catholics have supported Democratic presidential and congressional candidates in higher percentages than Protestant voters did, and Catholics have consistently identified with the Democratic Party in higher percentages than Protestants have. To be sure, the magnitude of some of these differentials has declined in recent years, but the differentials are obvious and quite impressive in their consistency.

A large part of the book is devoted to the potential effects of other alternative variables that might be underlying the central findings, and that might be rendering spurious the apparent Catholic/Protestant split. Brewer looks at a long list of variables and finds them all wanting: race, gender, age, Hispanic ethnicity, frequency of church attendance, “religious salience,” and the

mainline/evangelical divide in American Protestantism. Some of these variables interact with the basic Catholic/Protestant split in interesting ways, but not a one of them, in methodological terms, takes away from the straightforward conclusion that Brewer articulates repeatedly in the volume: “the electoral behavior of Catholics in the United States continues to differ from that of Protestants. Catholics remain more likely than Protestants to support the Democratic Party” (p. 132).

I have no criticism to make of the analysis in these terms. The statistics are clearly presented and the alternative explanations tested seem to be the appropriate ones. The book ends with another recapitulation of its central empirical claims, and I for one came away quite convinced. What I did not come away with, however, was surprise. Brewer’s conclusions were pretty much consistent with what I took to be the case before I opened the book. On the basis of my reading over the years of analysts like Andrew Greeley and Henry Kinski, I would not have characterized a finding that Catholics exhibit an enduring, if somewhat receding, commitment to the Democratic Party as particularly controversial.

Brewer offers just such a characterization, however. He argues repeatedly that analysts of American electoral behavior have assumed an “exodus, desertion, abandonment” on the part of Catholics in regard to the Democratic Party (p. 45). By the end of the book, however, including a careful review of its footnotes, I found myself asking who it is exactly that the author thinks believes this so-called “conventional wisdom.” Greeley? No. Kinski and William Lockwood? No. Mary Bendyma and Ted Jelen? Well, no. As Brewer himself acknowledges, these are some of the most prominent students of Catholic voting behavior, and they have been publishing widely (one is tempted to say conclusively) on the subject for years. If they do not represent conventional wisdom on this subject, then who does? Who is it that has been purveying this notion of dramatic “exodus,” wholesale “abandonment,” epoch-making “desertion.” My reading of the literature on religious affiliation and voting behavior is that no one has actually been making such sweeping claims, and that instead, Brewer has constructed a straw man in order to lend his competently reached, but not particularly surprising, conclusions greater weight than they deserve.

It is true that various analysts have said that the Catholic tilt toward the Democratic Party has been less pronounced in recent years than it was in the past. Other analysts (including me, as cited in this book) have argued that this relative decline has rendered Catholic voters more available to Republican candidates than they were in the past, and that Catholics have played crucial roles in short-lived but successful Republican electoral coalitions (e.g., 1972 and 1980). Some analysts have even argued that all of this has resulted in a blurring of the clear political and cultural lines between New Deal Catholics and traditional Protestant Republicans. But an abandonment of the Democratic Party by Catholics? An end to the relevance of the Catholic/Protestant split in American electoral politics? None of these analysts have made such claims because they all know that such claims are not supported by the evidence. Instead of debunking “conventional wisdom,” I am afraid that Brewer

has taken nuanced claims concerning subtle but significant shifts in U.S. voting behavior and made caricatures of them.

In an admirably clear paragraph near the end of *Relevant No More?* the author asks, “Have American Catholics abandoned the Democratic Party?” The answer to this question, he concludes, is no. “Certainly there has been some decline in Catholic support for the Democrats over the last thirty years,” he continues, “as many analysts have noted. However, Catholics have certainly not abandoned or deserted the Democratic Party” (p. 135). Put in such clear terms, backed up by such persuasive analysis, and buttressed by ample citation of Greeley and the rest, this conclusion sounds to me an awful lot like what one might call “conventional wisdom.”

How Policies Make Citizens: Senior Political Activism and the American Welfare State. By Andrea Louise Campbell.

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 256p. \$39.50.

— Gary Mucciaroni, *Temple University*

This is a persuasively argued, well-researched, and nicely written work that makes a key contribution to our understanding of the politics of Social Security retirement insurance. Because of the singular importance of Social Security as a domestic federal program, Andrea Louise Campbell’s study fills a significant gap. At a broader level, the book explores a subject to which political scientists are only starting to turn: the relationship between public policy and political participation and its implications for democracy.

Relying primarily upon mass survey data, the author describes what she calls an “upward participation-policy cycle.” Social Security has stimulated and shaped senior citizens’ political participation, which, in turn, has greatly influenced policy-making for Social Security. Before Social Security, seniors participated equal to or less than younger groups of Americans; afterward they became the most active segment of the population. Thus, the program gave rise to a formidable political constituency that lent critical support to the program’s further expansion in the 1970s and staved off threats to it during the 1980s, when it experienced financial difficulty.

Seniors participate in politics at higher rates than their relatively lower levels of income and education would lead one to expect. Campbell traces how Social Security “changes the level of resources, engagement and mobilization seniors bring to the participatory arena” (p. 40). By allowing seniors to retire earlier and augmenting their incomes (lifting many of them out of poverty), Social Security provides them with the wherewithal to participate. By supplying them with 40% of their income, on average, the program induces a high level of interest in the politics of Social Security. By stimulating seniors’ political interest, the program transforms a mere demographic category into a politically relevant group that is the object of political parties’ efforts to mobilize voters, campaign contributors, and volunteers. Another important finding is that Social Security has differential effects on participation rates *among* seniors. Again, Social Security recipients are something of an exception to the usual relationship between higher socioeco-

omic status and higher rates of participation. Campbell finds that low-income seniors display a higher level of interest in Social Security than their more affluent cohorts because the benefits that they receive constitute a larger proportion of their incomes.

The cycle is completed when politicians respond positively to seniors’ demands. Campbell’s analysis of roll-call voting of conservative Republicans in Congress reveals seniors’ political muscle. Notwithstanding their antigovernment conservatism, these legislators vote in a more pro-Social Security direction as the proportion of elderly constituents in their state or district rises. In short, constituency interest trumps ideology.

Campbell also compares the participation rates of Social Security recipients with those of other welfare state programs. Consistent with Joe Soss’s study (*Unwanted Claims*, 2000) of how the different designs of welfare programs shape recipients’ attitudes toward government and their rates of participation, she finds that recipients of means-tested programs like public assistance and food stamps participate less than non-means-tested programs like Social Security and veterans’ benefits. This relationship holds when we control for recipients’ socioeconomic status, indicating the independent impact of policy design.

The argument that policy design shapes citizens begs a critical question—why do different groups receive programs with different designs, some which facilitate the development of their citizenship capacities and others that stifle it? This question is not central to the author’s study, but part of the answer must be the different ways in which groups are socially constructed, as discussed by Helen Ingram and Anne Schneider (“The Social Construction of Target Populations: Implications for Politics and Policy,” *American Political Science Review* 87 [June 1993]: 334–47).

Campbell thoughtfully teases out the implications of her findings for democratic citizenship, equality, and governance. That Social Security has been a success in lifting many seniors out of poverty and improving their material well-being is beyond question, as is the widespread political support that the program enjoys among all age groups. However, seniors’ mobilization behind Social Security is more complicated when it comes to its ramifications for political equality. On the one hand, the program has helped greatly to mobilize seniors and develop the citizenship capacities of a large group of lower-income Americans who would otherwise be much less involved. Thus, Campbell argues, Social Security mitigates the dampening effects on participation among low-income Americans that is due to the absence of strong working-class political organizations in the United States. On the other hand, the disproportionate influence wielded by seniors on Social Security may constrain policymakers’ ability to address other important social concerns and less politically resourceful groups whose claims upon the government are as legitimate as those of older Americans. Finally, as policymakers contemplate reforms to Social Security that the impending retirement of the post–World War II baby boom generation necessitates, Campbell cautions that they need to be concerned about more than the likely impacts of reforms on the recipients’ financial situations and the

program's fiscal health. They must also carefully assess any reforms' effects on political participation and equality.

The author might have enriched her findings from the survey data by conducting interviews with Social Security recipients. It would have been illuminating, for example, to hear seniors articulate their sense of internal and external efficacy, how the design of the program shapes their sense of entitlement and deservedness, and how their status as recipients and political participants affects their identity and solidarity as members of a politically meaningful group. Using survey or interview data, she might also have distinguished between the effects of Social Security on the underlying political values and beliefs of the elderly (if any) and their specific policy preferences.

Nothing detracts, however, from the high quality and significance of Campbell's work. For students of Social Security, *How Policy Makes Citizens* takes its place alongside Martha Derthick's (1979) *Policymaking for Social Security*, and perhaps one or two others, as mandatory reading. Those interested in the nexus between public policy and citizen participation should also welcome this addition to our knowledge about a subject that has not received the attention it deserves.

Appointing Central Bankers: The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union. By Kelly H. Chang. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 160p. \$50.00.

— Irwin L. Morris, *University of Maryland, College Park*

The Federal Reserve (Fed) is one of the most powerful—and seemingly independent—American bureaucracies. This book insightfully integrates much of the research on the Fed appointment process and makes an important contribution to our understanding of the role of elected officials in the Fed policymaking process. By adapting the tools she uses to analyze Fed policymaking, Kelly Chang also enhances our understanding of appointment politics at the European Central Bank (ECB).

In the case of the Fed, Chang examines the extent to which “politicians influence monetary policy through appointments” (p. 4) and “[w]ho influences appointments” (p. 6). With existing theories of appointment politics and previous work on the Fed appointment process as stepping-stones, she constructs a sophisticated model of Fed appointments. To test the implications of the model, she develops a procedure for estimating presidential, senatorial, and Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) member preferences in a common policy space. Once the actors' ideal points are identified, it is possible to predict the outcome of any particular appointment opportunity and then to compare the model's predictions with the empirical record. The analysis supports two conclusions that are broadly consistent with the recent literature: 1) Politicians influence Fed policy through the appointment process, and 2) both the president and the Senate can influence appointments, though their relative influence varies over time.

Chang then adapts her appointment theory to the European Monetary Union (EMU) in order to understand the likely future of ECB policy and the impact of EMU expansion on

ECB policy. A brief, but thorough, description of the ECB provides the context for the appointment model presented in the volume. Somewhat surprisingly, the model suggests that the future incorporation of countries with relatively inflationary preferences will have no impact on EMU monetary policy. In this respect, the analysis counters the conventional wisdom, a perspective that assumes “a sort of mean monetary policy among the preferred policies of member countries” (p. 92). More should be made of this result. If the model captures the politics of the ECB appointment process, it is, in fact, *impossible* for any enlargement of the EMU to independently impact (positively or negatively) interest rates. Barring a wholesale preference shift by all of the original countries on one side of the status quo policy position to the other side, the unanimity rule plainly precludes any appointments that would result in a policy change. ECB policy should be extraordinarily stable; it should manifest as something like a monetary policy rule centered on the initial policy. These implications are easily testable, and EMU development will be interesting to watch under these extraordinarily restrictive policymaking arrangements.

Finally, Chang examines the historical development of the Fed appointment process. The 1900 to 1935 period is characterized as an era of conflict between the supporters of a centralized Fed over which elected officials had little control (Republicans and eastern bankers) and a decentralized Fed controlled by officials appointed by the president (Democrats, rural bankers, farmers, and small businessmen). According to Chang, the Federal Reserve Act (1913) created a decentralized Fed run by political appointees due to the Democrats' electoral success in 1912. Later, the severity of the Great Depression ended opposition to centralization, and the Democrats passed a subsequent Federal Reserve Act (1935) creating the centralized modern Fed. Though historically interesting, the chapter is theoretically thin. Specifically, the treatment of the politics of the creation and development of the Fed fails to explain one of the most interesting facts in the historical record: the Democrats' willingness to scale back the appointment power in 1935. Given the discussion in the book, the Republicans should have preferred the 1935 revisions (due to the increased centralization), whether or not elected officials maintained their level of appointment control. It is unclear, then, how the Republicans elicited concessions that appear patently unnecessary. There are reasonable explanations (i.e., centralization and appointment power were inseparable for the eastern bankers), but they are inconsistent with Chang's treatment of the issue.

Ironically, the book's primary contribution—the development of a procedure for placing the ideal points of presidents, senators, and FOMC members in a common policy space—is also a central weakness. A number of ideal point estimates will surprise readers familiar with Fed policymaking. For example, Nancy Teeters, “the quintessential monetary policy liberal” (p. 9), has a more conservative ideal point than half of her FOMC colleagues. Alan Greenspan is apparently more liberal than three-quarters of the FOMC, and G. William Miller is the single *most* conservative FOMC

member. The presidential estimates are no better; they are, according to Chang, “somewhat surprising” (p. 54). From most liberal to most conservative—on monetary policy—the presidents are H. W. Bush, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Clinton. As Republicans tend to be more conservative than Democrats, these are definitely unconventional findings. And the one Republican apparently placed correctly—Reagan—was famous for supply-side, soft-money Fed appointees (e.g., Martha Seger, third most liberal FOMC member on Chang’s list). Such senators as Carol Moseley-Braun (D-IL) (at the far right end of Chang’s distribution) also appear out of place.

There is a considerable amount of research on the monetary policy preferences of FOMC members and presidents, and even some work on senatorial monetary policy preferences (see Thomas Havrilesky’s [1995] *The Pressures on Monetary Policy*, 2d edition, for a description of these literatures). In most cases, the raw data upon which Chang’s estimates are based are the same raw data used by others contributing to this literature. The new estimates are all in a common policy space, and that is a significant achievement, but the absence of any effort to reconcile the new estimates with those in the existing literature is disappointing.

Overall, *Appointing Central Bankers* makes an important contribution to our understanding of appointment power dynamics and their impact on monetary policy in the United States and the ECB. It is a “must read” for students of these institutions and should become an important methodological reference for students of other central banks and other types of regulatory agencies.

The Prophetic Pulpit: Clergy, Churches, and Communities in American Politics. By Paul A. Djupe and Christopher P. Gilbert. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 272p. \$80.00 cloth, \$28.95 paper.

— Clyde Wilcox, *Georgetown University*

Over the past 20 years, political scientists have learned a great deal about the way that religion influences political attitudes and behavior. We have greatly refined our measurement of Christian denominations, and this has led to new findings about the role of large religious groupings on politics. We have improved our measurement of public and private religiosity, and this has helped us understand the importance not only of how religious a citizen is but also of how he or she is religious. Finally, we have asked new questions about religious doctrine and experience that have helped us understand the role of beliefs on political behavior.

Yet many Christians practice their religion, in part, in the group setting of a local congregation. They often meet together regularly with the congregation, engage in social events sponsored by the church, and form friendships with others who attend the church. Protestant congregations are usually headed by one or more pastors, who deliver regular messages, minister to the congregation, and may provide religious instruction and guidance. These pastors have a complicated role, for they may see themselves as representatives of their denomination, as rep-

resentatives of the congregation, and as a prophetic voice on behalf of what they perceive to be God’s will.

Because pastors play such a central role in religious communities, they have become the focus of a great deal of scholarly research. There have been studies of pastors in local communities by Ted Jelen and others, and studies of pastors in particular denominations across the country by John Green, James Guth, Corwin Smidt, Lyman Kellstedt, Laura Olson, and several other political scientists and sociologists. Yet there remains much that we do not know about pastors and the way that politics may enter into their ministry.

Paul Djupe and Christopher Gilbert add to this growing literature in *The Prophetic Pulpit*. Their focus is on two of the largest mainline Protestant denominations: the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America and the Episcopal Church. They have conducted a large mail survey of pastors and priests in these two denominations, resulting in more than 2,400 respondents. The response rate among Lutheran pastors was close to 50%, but only 31% of Episcopal priests replied. The lower response rate among Episcopal priests is especially unfortunate given the growing divisions in that faith, reflected in the controversy over the ordination of an openly gay bishop in 2003.

The authors’ data show that these two denominations fit neatly into earlier studies of mainline clergy. A plurality of their clergy believe that Christians should try to transform the social order rather than focus on individual salvation, and they are nearly twice as likely to address issues like hunger and the environment as issues such as abortion. The clergy tend to be politically liberal, and liberals tend to be more politically active than conservative clergy.

These pastors and priests have their own political preferences, perhaps derived in part from their theology and from their interpretation of God’s will. But Djupe and Gilbert argue that their political advocacy and activity is constrained by a number of other factors. Most of the liberal clergy perceive that the average member of their church is more conservative than they, and fear that staking out too strong or too liberal a position might cost them current or potential members, divide their church, or interfere with other elements of their ministry. Clergy also depend upon resources in the local community and within the denomination, and the presence or absence of these resources influences their political activity. This latter discussion explores new ground and shows the importance of focusing not just on pastors but on pastors within local and national contexts.

This book is normal science in the best sense of the term. It fits neatly within established studies and fills in gaps in our knowledge about these two specific denominations. It also adds to our knowledge by exploring the constraints on pastoral political activity. The statistical models are interesting, although in an effort to make the book accessible to a wider audience, the authors do not always fully explain or justify their independent variables. Some of the independent variables seem likely to be highly correlated as well.

The book is derived entirely from the pastoral survey, which means that the only information on congregational beliefs comes

through the perceptual filter of pastors. It is easy to imagine that some pastors perceive their congregation to be much closer to their views than it really is, while others incorrectly perceive a great gulf between them and the members of their church. The authors have data on 60 specific congregations, which they intend to combine with these survey data in a later book. We know far less about the nexus between pastors and their congregations, and this next book is likely to make an even more important contribution to our literature.

This volume, however, serves as a nice introduction to pastoral politics for students of political behavior, and it will be of interest to specialists in religion and politics for its exploration of constraints and pastoral political activity, especially the local and denominational context. It would also make a nice supplemental text in a religion and politics course.

Voting for Women: How the Public Evaluates Women Candidates. By Kathleen A. Dolan. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003. 184p. \$65.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.

— Sara J. Weir, *Western Washington University*

With her book, Kathleen A. Dolan has delivered a well-written, important text that offers the reader an insightful explanation of how voters evaluate women candidates and the conditions under which candidate sex has an impact on the outcome of elections.

Dolan observes: “Electing women to office takes two things: women who will stand as candidates, and voters who will vote for them” (p. 3). The book focuses on the second aspect of this observation by examining who votes for women, why they do so, and how the public evaluates these women. While there is already sizable literature on women as candidates, her work focuses on whether, when, and why people support women candidates with their vote.

By combining data from the National Election Study with historical information about elections and women, as well as case studies and vignettes drawn from the experiences of contemporary women candidates, Dolan educates the reader well beyond the statistical findings. Her study is especially important methodologically because it is among the few to base its results on the outcomes of actual elections, rather than experiments or hypothetical situations. Drawing upon the NES conducted by the University of Michigan, the author analyzes results from congressional and senatorial elections from a 10-year period (1990–2000). The chapters presenting the data analysis are clearly written, with tables and analysis accessible to those readers with limited knowledge of statistical methods, while at the same time being methodologically sophisticated in ways that confirm the nuances and complexities of her findings.

In discussing her major findings, Dolan acknowledges how complicated these questions are: “The candidate’s sex, and the gendered considerations it raises, has a more complex and nuanced impact on voters than we may have imagined” (p. 154). She does not suggest that a candidate’s sex is no longer relevant in elections. Instead, her findings confirm that there is no fixed pattern explaining the impact of candidate sex in con-

gressional and senatorial races. Consistent with past literature, Dolan’s study finds that political party and incumbency remain the primary predictors explaining how voters evaluate candidates: “[W]hereas candidates’ sex does have some impact on voters’ attitudes and behaviors in Congressional elections, that impact is small compared to more traditional political influences, such as political party and incumbency, and the impact is smaller than some research would indicate” (p. 160).

Beyond the major findings she presents, Dolan also explores the results as they relate to the research questions she poses early in the book. The discussion of these results, along with her speculation regarding the evaluation of women candidates in the future, provides the reader with new insights and is fertile ground for future research. For example, she discusses the different ways in which voters are likely to evaluate Democratic and Republican women candidates and the degree to which salience outweighs political party in voter evaluation of candidates: “Here, people were more likely to have more information about women candidates, both Democratic and Republican, than about men of either party” (p. 155). She finds that issues are limited in their impact but that they “were more important in the voting in Senate elections than in those for the House” (p. 157). This leads her to speculate that the impact of issues may depend on the level of office sought. She also finds that women and minorities “were more likely to vote for women candidates for the House of Representatives, but neither of these considerations was related to voting for women Senate candidates” (p. 156).

The book concludes with a restatement of the findings and thoughtful speculation about the future of women candidates. Many of Dolan’s findings challenge or modify the conventional wisdom regarding the impact of candidate sex on voting behavior. These findings should form the basis for future research and scholarly investigation.

Voting for Women will be useful for a number of political science courses. The focus on how the public evaluates women candidates sets it apart from other studies examining the election of women to public office and makes it an important contribution to the literature in the fields of women in politics and voting behavior.

The Green Agenda in American Politics: New Strategies for the Twenty-First Century. By Robert J. Duffy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003. 288p. \$35.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

— Frank L. Davis, *Lehigh University*

The shifting typography of American politics over the last couple of decades of the twentieth century makes a discussion of interest group efforts to influence elections and policy particularly relevant. Such trends as burgeoning new communications technologies, the changing character of political parties, and the collapse of campaign finance rules have transformed the role and potential impact of interest groups. In this book, Robert Duffy examines environmental interest groups’ recent efforts to set the agenda in environmental policy and elections and concludes with his expectations about their implications

for the future. As he points out, while these groups' attempts at influencing the electoral and policy agendas are not new, the nature and extent of their efforts, and the character of the political system in which they operate, most definitely are.

Because of the wide range of activities encompassed in agenda setting, Duffy's mission could easily have degenerated into a detailed catalog of tactics and techniques. The book, however, weaves the intricate and complex changes in environmental groups' work into a fascinating exploration of the environmental movements' constituent groups' goals, strategies, and opportunities, fulfilled and not. The author combines a thorough knowledge of groups' activities with a clear grasp of American politics and political science. His writing is particularly clear: straightforward and elegant with minimal reliance on "jargon." The result is a book of great value for scholars and students. Scholars specializing in interest groups and those concerned with environmental policy will find rich descriptions of the dynamics of environmental interest group campaigns. Students in upper-level and graduate classes in environmental policy and interest groups will find a text infused with the genuine excitement of political struggle that demonstrates the lessons of current political science. The book's accessibility, along with Duffy's ability to situate environmental group activism in the context of broader political and institutional developments, also make it suitable as a supplementary text for introductory courses in American government.

Duffy's discussion in Chapter 2 of recent developments in interest group politics relies on the work of Mark Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, William Browne, and others in arguing that we have entered a fundamentally new era in interest group politics, one that requires interest groups to adapt by becoming more active politically. Chapter 3, which offers a brief but useful overview of lobbying strategies and electoral activity by environmental groups from the 1950s through the early 1990s, sets the stage for Duffy's primary focus—describing and explaining what is new in contemporary environmental advocacy.

Chapter 4 documents new developments in environmental group lobbying. Duffy makes a persuasive case that advocacy by environmental organizations has become more extensive and sophisticated in recent years. Most interesting here is his argument that better use of technology and more attention to communication strategies are the result of a concerted effort by foundations and other donors to build the capacity of environmental groups—to make them, in short, more effective participants in policymaking. Here, Duffy comes down squarely on the side of those who argue that national groups continue to play an essential role in contemporary environmental activism.

Chapters 5 and 6 document the emergence of new and more aggressive forms of electioneering by environmental groups in congressional and subnational elections, respectively. Most notably, Duffy documents a dramatic increase in the amount of political money raised and spent by environmental groups, as well as a shift away from direct contributions to independent expenditure, issue advocacy, and voter education campaigns. Rather than wait for congressional candidates to raise

environmental issues on their own, some groups waged their own paid media campaigns to frame the issues for debate, seeking to force candidates to address environmental issues. In so doing, environmental groups hoped to raise the prominence of environmental issues, to reenergize their grass roots, and thus to elect more public officials who would support their policy goals. Duffy challenges the conventional view that environmental groups are electoral "paper tigers," arguing that they "can and have played an important and in some cases decisive role in congressional elections, as well as in state and local races" (p. 10).

The greatest strength of the book is the author's adept use of case studies. Rather than using cases simply as examples of his points, Duffy allows the lessons of current agenda setting to grow out of the explication of his cases. In this way, he is able to communicate the intricacies and interrelatedness of political struggles. The case with which he opens his introductory chapter is illustrative of this approach. He recounts the story of the Heritage Forest Campaign, which successfully lobbied the Forest Service to adopt a controversial rule protecting nearly 60 million acres of roadless forests. As Duffy notes, the campaign was well funded by a number of foundations and included the collaboration of more than 500 environmental groups over a number of years. The campaign employed a variety of techniques: public opinion polling, traditional and on-line organizing, and everything from door-to-door canvassing and direct mail to Internet contacts and websites. From this case and others, one is brought to an understanding of the myriad political factors at work: The essential lifeline provided by patrons, the importance of group alliances, the intricacies of grassroots mobilization, the variety of technological tools employed (from traditional door-to-door campaigns to e-mail), the role of issue visibility and with it media attention, and the unpredictability of policy outcomes are but a few.

Although there are several recent books that focus on environmental groups, I am unaware of any that focus exclusively on environmental groups and their electoral and lobbying strategies. In general, recent books on environmental groups have a different focus, with some examining the role of such groups in particular environmental policy disputes (Gary C. Bryner's *Blue Skies, Green Politics*, 2d ed. [1996]), and others examining the financial/organizational challenges facing the large membership groups (Mark Dowie, *Losing Ground* [1995], Anna Bramwell, *The Fading of the Greens: The Decline of Environmental Politics in the West* [1994], and Ronald G. Shaiko, *Voices and Echoes for the Environment: Public Interest Representation in the 1990s and Beyond* [1999]). Although Deborah Lynn Guber's *The Grassroots of a Green Revolution: Polling America on the Environment* (2003) seeks to explain why environmental issues rarely influence electoral outcomes, the political strategies of environmental groups are not her central concern.

Like his *Nuclear Politics in America: A History and Theory of Government Regulation* (1997), which received the Caldwell Award for best book on environmental politics and policy, Duffy's *The Green Agenda in American Politics* deserves a wide readership.

Public Reaction to Supreme Court Decisions. By Valerie J. Hoekstra. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 190p. \$60.00.

— Christina Wolbrecht, *University of Notre Dame*

What effect do Supreme Court rulings have on public opinion? Many have long cherished (or lamented) the idea that the public esteem the Court enjoys allows it to confer a certain legitimacy on particular issue positions. As a result, the story goes, public opinion tends to shift in the direction of Court decisions. At the same time, highly unpopular rulings might undermine that esteem and threaten the Court's reservoir of public support, an important resource for ensuring compliance with its rulings. The possibility that the Court, seeking to protect its public standing, will not stray too far from what is acceptable to the public is often suggested as an important source of indirect accountability for the independent judiciary.

The impact of the Supreme Court on public opinion thus warrants our careful attention. Yet the standard public-opinion polls used in political science are designed around the topics and calendar of the other branches. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that research thus far has yielded incomplete and indecisive findings. In *Public Reaction to Supreme Court Decisions*, Valerie Hoekstra's innovative surveys are constructed around the schedule and issues of the Court, allowing her to discern the Court's impact on public opinion in ways not possible in previous research. Hoekstra's approach is to look for responsiveness to the Court's rulings in "those places where access to information is sufficient to produce informed citizens" (p. 6). To this end, she traces the reaction to four "ordinary" (p. 33) cases in the communities in which each conflict originated. In each of her four two-wave panel studies (respondents are surveyed before and after the ruling is announced), samples are drawn from both the immediate and surrounding community, allowing comparisons between those with the presumed greatest level of interest in the case (immediate) and those with exposure to the same information but presumably less inherent interest (surrounding).

After delineating the context of each case (Chapter 2), Hoekstra examines media coverage and public awareness in Chapter 3. As one might expect, coverage of each case tends to be substantially greater in the local press than in the national media. As a result, the local community generally reports levels of case awareness that exceed what typically is found for Supreme Court cases in national surveys. High levels of awareness suggest a population with enough information about the ruling that persuasion by the Court is at least a possibility. Yet in Chapter 4, the author finds only mixed evidence of persuasion effects. Small aggregate attitude shifts in the direction of the Court's decision occur in just two of her four cases, and as she predicts, only among respondents from the surrounding communities. While citizens in the immediate community are more aware of the case, Hoekstra reasons that because her analysis shows that they also attach more importance to it, their attitudes may be less susceptible to change. In contrast to the expected role of "source credibility" (p. 11), Hoekstra uncovers

no evidence that those with higher initial levels of Court support are more likely to adjust their issue attitudes. The consistently high levels of Court support among most respondents, combined with the generally small degree of attitude change, may explain this unexpected result. Finally, in Chapter 5, Hoekstra asks what impact these rulings have on support for the Court. Here she finds clear evidence that citizens update their evaluation of the Court in response to its decisions. Among those who know and care about a case, the Court's actions directly affect its level of support.

The author's unique approach offers insight into both the potential for and limits of the Court's impact. Under certain conditions and for certain groups, the Court's decisions can and do affect public opinion. However, the Court seems to be the subject of evaluation rather than a source of persuasion: Citizens appear more likely to change their opinion of the Court than to change their opinion on the issue. As Hoekstra recognizes, these results may be linked to a paradox: Awareness seems requisite for a Court's decision to affect attitudes, but citizens who have reason to be most cognizant of a case might also have particularly strong, and thus perhaps inflexible, opinions on the issue, hindering the Court's impact. The image one is left with is not so much a revered institution instructing the public on policy issues, but a Court subject to reward or punishment at the (public opinion) polls in response to its policy decisions, much like the other branches of government.

These are intriguing results that suggest a number of interesting questions. Indeed, Hoekstra might have done more to suggest extension to her research and explore the consequences of her findings. Who, other than residents of local communities, might be susceptible to opinion effects? Other aware groups, such as issue publics, may be even less open to attitude persuasion. She finds some evidence that those who pay more attention to politics are more likely to shift their attitudes in the direction of the Court's ruling, while more educated individuals are less susceptible to persuasion. What other individual and contextual factors might mediate this relationship? Finally, how consequential are the effects uncovered here, even where public reaction was strongest (Court support)? On the one hand, if only the community from which a case originates reacts, the effect may be considered limited, even unimportant. On the other hand, every case begins somewhere, and other groups also may have sufficient awareness and interest to reevaluate the Court in light of its rulings, raising the possibility of an important additive effect over multiple decisions. While Hoekstra shows that highly aggregated data can obscure real effects, it remains unclear how widespread and consequential the Court's impact on public opinion may be.

Hoekstra should be commended for her clever and revealing approach to discerning the contours of public responsiveness to Court decisions. Clearly, as she suggests, the connections between the high court and the public are complicated, tenuous, and contingent. They are also quite important, and worthy of this interesting and insightful book.

Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action. By William G. Howell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 280p. \$45.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— Robert J. Spitzer, *SUNY Cortland*

Richard Neustadt's (1960) *Presidential Power* shaped a generation of writings about the presidency, but it has also imposed an intellectual myopia on the study of the presidency in two important respects: Its power-to-persuade argument has retarded thinking about nonpersuasion-based presidential decisions and actions, and it has obfuscated understanding of the presidency's recent institutional evolution toward nonlegislative policymaking. Building on recent important work by Kenneth Mayer and Philip Cooper, among others, William G. Howell drives a stake into the heart of the Neustadt-centered view by marshaling an eclectic array of data to support his assertion that "direct presidential action" is increasingly the presidential *modus operandi*. With two reservations, he succeeds admirably.

The tools of direct presidential action are familiar, yet even now understudied: executive orders, presidential proclamations, national security directives, executive agreements, and memoranda of understanding. Focusing mostly on executive orders in the context of a rational choice framework, Chapter 1 begins with the historical and legal basis of unilateral action in a discussion that succinctly and effectively reveals the limitations of the Neustadt view of the presidential world, although Howell understates the extent to which past institutionalist scholars have taken issue with Neustadt and paved the way for Howell et al.

Chapter 2 offers a spatial model of unilateral action utilizing rational choice, an approach Howell claims "is revolutionizing the presidency subfield" (p. 24). He attributes two specific benefits to rational choice: that it "shifts the analytic focus away from the president and toward the decisions that presidents regularly make," and that it "emphasizes the things that all presidents have in common" (p. 24). These goals are laudatory, but to claim that they are uniquely advanced by rational choice is simply false, as this claim ignores much of the important presidency literature of the last 20-plus years, including, but not limited to, the qualitative and American political development institutionalists, policy theorists, and others. Indeed, one of the unfortunate traits of too much rational choice analysis is a studied ignorance of relevant other work that arrives at similar conclusions without benefit of rational choice blinders. Thus, for example, Howell notes his recent "discovery" that "[t]he number of unilateral directives . . . has literally skyrocketed during the modern era" (p. 13), yet seems unaware that, as early as 1972, Louis Fisher's *President and Congress* unearthed the very same discovery. Howell's analysis is undeniably worthy and valuable, but grandiose claims counterproductively denigrate other valuable work and other methodologies, and detract from that which is presented.

Chapter 3 relies on case studies to flesh out three hypotheses that, Howell asserts, set "a higher standard of proof" (p. xv), apropos of rational choice theory building. The three hypotheses assert that greater congressional fragmentation yields greater,

and more significant, unilateral presidential action; incoming presidents whose party affiliation is different from that of their predecessor are more likely to issue unilateral directives; and presidents issue more unilateral directives during periods of unified than divided government. These perfectly sensible, if self-evident, propositions guide subsequent analysis.

Chapter 4 tests the hypotheses via Howell's shrewd separation of significant from insignificant executive orders. He then quite brilliantly leaps to a big question: To what extent is presidential unilateral action constrained by Congress and the courts? In some fascinating work in Chapter 5, he compiles legislative efforts to alter, modify, or overturn executive orders, and further explores Congress's big hammer: control over the appropriations process. Chapter 6 explores judicial adjudication of executive unilateral action, noting that judges have tilted heavily toward the executive. Another brilliant database: a compilation of all executive order challenges heard in any federal court from 1945 to 1998. Culling thousands of cases, Howell produces a list of 83, where he finds that challenges to executive orders fail 83% of the time—and even among the failures, some are arguably not. While subsequent researchers will quibble with some of the author's methodological strategies, these prodigious databases provide the meat and muscle undergirding the analysis. More importantly, they underscore a larger truism that arises almost inferentially from the analysis: that the separation of powers is still the animating institutional organism of executive action, even as unilateral presidential action functions to defeat this arrangement of powers.

Despite the overarching logic of his analysis, Howell concludes that this secular institutional trend toward ever-greater executive unilateralism "need not continue forever" because "judges may feel emboldened to overturn presidents with greater frequency" (although no reason is given for why this might occur) and because "[t]here is nothing in the logic of the unilateral politics model that requires presidential power to increase monotonically over time" (p. 181). If the model does not predict it, presidential reality certainly points to it, as does the thrust of Howell's data—in apparent contradistinction to his theory. Here, then, is one reservation to *Power Without Persuasion*: Despite Howell's repeated genuflecting to the power and potency of rational choice, this analysis, and book, could easily proceed without it. And in the case of the above-stated conclusion, for example, the rational choice prism seems to impede rather than facilitate recognition of larger trends, just as the laborious analysis that produces the book's three guiding hypotheses seems utterly irrelevant to their formulation. The second reservation is that Howell fails to make the case that the executive policy generated by unilateral action rises to the level of significance of legislative policymaking. Howell notes correctly that presidency scholars have placed too much emphasis on presidential success in Congress as the gold standard for defining presidential success. Yet his unilateral action cases remind the reader that unilateral policymaking usually nibbles at the edges of national policy tides. On matters from abortion to budgeting, congressional or court actions still dwarf executive unilateralism, when they intercede.

This point notwithstanding, however, the author's basic argument is surely correct. The unilateral presidency has followed an identifiable upward spiral. And in the context of the more generalized trend toward executive aggrandizement, Howell may be chronicling an ever more redefined presidency.

Public Opinion and Democratic Accountability: How Citizens Learn about Politics. By Vincent L. Hutchings. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 192p. \$35.00.

— Martin Gilens, *Princeton University*

The starting point of Vincent Hutchings's marvelous book is the common observation that the public appears to lack sufficient knowledge about political issues to participate meaningfully in democracy. As many observers have noted, the news media contain a paucity of substantive political information, and most Americans are uninformed about most issues and unaware of the positions taken by their elected representatives. The seemingly inevitable conclusion is that citizens cannot possibly hold their representatives accountable in any significant way.

Yet Hutchings argues that the American public (and mass media) are fulfilling their democratic responsibilities much more ably than is commonly believed. His position rests first on the obvious but often overlooked fact that not all political information is equally important for each citizen's political decision making. Most people care about a few issues rather than the full range of issues on the political agenda at any one time. Rather than every citizen needing to be sufficiently informed about all issues on the political agenda, citizens can fulfill their democratic responsibility if they are sufficiently informed about the particular issues that they personally care about. Thus, studies that find that most people are uninformed about most issues implicitly adopt an inappropriate standard and are of little relevance for judging the public's ability to perform its democratic function.

Consistent with this notion of "issue publics," Hutchings shows that citizens with a greater concern about a particular issue are more likely to know their incumbent senators' votes on that issue or the position on the issue taken by candidates for senator or governor (net of general measures of political information, education, media consumption, campaign interest, etc.). Such knowledge is higher, he finds, among survey respondents who express clear preferences on an issue, who are personally affected by it, or who belong to interest groups (like unions or religious organizations) with ties to the issue.

Secondly, Hutchings notes that even within the issue domains that an individual citizen cares about, he or she need not keep tabs on all political developments at all times. Rather, citizens (and the media) can make a standing assumption that politicians will usually behave in expected ways (for example, by voting along party lines) and that the specifics of such behavior need not be attended to; only politicians' unexpected behavior needs to be brought to the public's attention. Consistent with this understanding, the author finds that while newspapers typically contain sparse information about individual

senators' votes, they are far more likely to give prominent coverage to a senator's vote if it differs from the position of his or her party.

Combining these two sets of ideas and analyses, Hutchings arrives at a model in which citizens can effectively monitor their representatives by attending only to unexpected behavior relevant to the particular issues that they care about. But do the patterns of news content and citizen information acquisition suggested by this model really translate into citizens' voting behavior? He shows that they do.

Examining Senate elections from 1988 to 1992, for example, Hutchings found that a senator's objective voting record on relevant issues affected the vote choice of citizens interested in those particular issues (again, net of a wide range of controls for general political knowledge and engagement). For many groups, this pattern held only when the issue of interest was raised in a given election, but for the most attentive groups (e.g., union members), responsiveness to senators' objective voting record was evident across all elections.

Like many of the important advances in the social sciences, the ideas Hutchings develops in this book are simple—even obvious—but frequently neglected by researchers. *Public Opinion and Democratic Accountability* brings together insights from a disparate array of intellectual traditions. The author melds these ideas together in a comprehensive and integrated framework and tests them with a series of clever and rigorous analyses of both existing and original data.

What makes this book especially compelling is the care with which Hutchings conducts his work. He does not rest, for example, when his empirical findings are consistent with his hypothesis; instead, he considers alternative models that might also generate those findings and devises tests to distinguish one account from the other.

The public's ability to participate meaningfully in democratic governance is among the most central and enduring topics in political science. Hutchings goes beyond earlier work on this topic in describing and then testing a more sophisticated and strategic conception of what the public needs to know in order to perform its democratic function. To do so, he combines existing survey data with his own analyses of legislators' voting records and extensive coding of news media content.

This book will be widely read, and future research on democratic accountability will need to take both Hutchings's arguments and his empirical evidence into account. In short, this is a first-rate examination of one of the discipline's most fundamental concerns.

Why Budgets Matter: Budget Policy and American Politics. By Dennis S. Ippolito. University Park: Penn State University Press, 2003. 329p. \$55.00 cloth.

— Daniel J. Palazzolo, *University of Richmond*

Dennis Ippolito has written another important book on the federal budget. Yet whereas his previous books focused on parts of the budget, for example, credit programs (*Hidden Spending*, 1984), entitlements (*Uncertain Legacies*, 1990), and defense

spending (*Blunting the Sword*, 1994), *Why Budgets Matter* is a comprehensive analysis of federal budgeting from 1789 to 2001. Although it has become conventional wisdom that the budget dominated Washington politics in the 1980s and 1990s, Ippolito shows that the budget has been an instrument of government policy since the origins of the federal government.

One genuine achievement of the book is the organization of a massive amount of information into historical periods that correspond with larger developments in American politics. Ippolito combines secondary sources with extensive references to government financial documents to map budget decisions over time, identify changes in major priorities, and link budget decisions to broader developments in United States domestic and foreign policy. The history is divided into six periods: the “small government” era (1789–1860), budgeting for government growth (1860–1915), the transition to modern government (1915–40), war and defense budgets (1940–70), social welfare budgets and deficits (1970–90), and reconciliation and balanced budgets (1990–2001). Each historical chapter contains information and analysis of changes in aggregate revenues and spending, allocations among major spending categories (e.g., mandatory and discretionary programs) and revenue sources (e.g., excise, customs, individual income taxes), and tax policy and expenditures for specific government departments and programs. In order to make comparisons over time and between parts of the budget, most of the data are presented as percentages of the gross domestic product. Each of the historical chapters also describes relevant changes in the budget process. The final chapter concisely summarizes future budgetary challenges, especially the impending crisis of entitlement spending.

A second important point made in the book is that policy innovations enacted with perhaps modest intentions in earlier periods grow in complexity and can have enormous consequences in later periods. The revenue effects of the individual income tax authorized by Amendment 16 to the Constitution in 1913 are limited to the receipts of a relatively small number of wealthy income earners until World War II, when the tax is extended to the mass population of workers. The Social Security Act of 1935 began as a limited pension program, but it laid the foundation of the welfare state and ultimately grew to be the most expensive program in the budget. Unexpected growth in the costs of Medicare and Medicaid, begun in 1965, will continue to vex policymakers well into the twenty-first century. Ippolito notes that Medicare prescription drug coverage (not approved by Congress until after the book was published) should not greatly affect the proportion of health-care outlays to the economy over the next decade, but will have much greater repercussions after the baby boomers become eligible for benefits (p. 302).

Perhaps the most important contribution of the book is the description of how the purposes of budgeting evolved over time and how they are linked to larger transformations in American politics. For most of U.S. history, budgeting has been anchored by the principle of balance, yet even in the early nineteenth century, policymakers struggled with the prac-

tical demands of the principle. Moreover, the goal of balancing the budget quickly became less important than deciding the levels of spending and taxation at which the budget should be balanced. Spending and revenue levels were largely determined by historical exigencies (recessions and wars) and presidential priorities. In the twentieth century, the principle of a balanced budget itself receded in importance and became more difficult to achieve, as new and competing purposes of budgeting entered the fray. With the Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt began to use the budget as a fiscal policy tool and a vehicle for addressing various social ills and basic material needs. World War II brought greater demands on U.S. foreign policy and reduced the flexibility of the defense budget. Resources to fight wars traditionally required additional taxes or borrowing, but wartime expenditures were temporary deviations in discretionary spending from the norm, and debts would be paid after the war was over. As the United States emerged as a major superpower and confronted communism, peace dividends began to shrink, and the defense budget required sustained resources in order for the U.S. military to perform more complicated and expensive tasks both during and between military engagements.

The competing purposes of the budget—to provide a strong national defense and ongoing international military presence, to improve social conditions, and to use taxes and spending to shape fiscal policy—converged in the 1960s and 1970s. New commitments in health care (Medicare, Medicaid), a host of social welfare programs, and increases in Social Security benefits drove the mandatory side of the budget; the Vietnam War and Soviet nuclear threat demanded more for defense; and the twin evils of recession and inflation created new challenges for fiscal policy. The mix of policy choices and multiple purposes of the federal budget laid the ground for the partisan debate over the role of government that continues to this day.

A broad historical account of budget policy will inevitably have to cut corners in a few areas. For instance, Ippolito makes only a few comparisons between state and federal spending in the nineteenth century. It would be interesting to carry forward this vertical dimension of budgeting into the twentieth century. The implications of trade-offs between federal and state spending have become more important as policymakers attempt to achieve competing policy goals and deal with the mounting complications of federal–state programs. The concerns are particularly grave in the area of health-care policy.

Given the extensive body of data and information on developments in budget policy, the book offers an invitation to scholars interested in theories of legislative decision making and policy change. Do major shifts in budget policy conform to a common set of conditions? What are the precise causes of congressional responses to presidential budget proposals? To what extent do tax and spending policies meet expectations of path-dependent theories of policy change? Thus, in addition to establishing the centrality of the federal budget to American politics, *Why Budgets Matter* lays the foundation for further study of budget policy.

Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins of American Social Policy. By Laura Jensen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 256p. \$60.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.

— Ralph Ketcham, *Syracuse University*

This book starts with the author's concern that in the Clinton era, "the end of welfare as we know it" had happened, particularly that the poor and the needy had lost an inclusive "entitlement" to assistance from the federal government. Laura Jensen's experience as a municipal official in Connecticut and in teaching a graduate seminar in American welfare policy gave her in-depth, current understanding of the welfare debates of the 1990s. As a historian, she studied earlier practices in United States history that provided benefits and even entitlements to certain groups of Americans.

Patriots, Settlers, and the Origins of American Social Policy is thus a study of two important episodes in American history that provided what the author sees as examples of early entitlement programs: the provision of pensions for veterans of the Revolutionary War (and later the War of 1812 and the Civil War), and public land policy from the 1780s to the Homestead Act of 1862 and its application in the defeated South after the Civil War. Jensen provides thorough, well-researched accounts of the passage of the dozens of pension and land bills, and detailed accounts of their provisions and implementation, especially between about 1815 and 1855. She shows that nearly all the laws were discriminatory, that is, were not "universal" in that they provided benefits to some and explicitly excluded others. Thus, they in effect took money (or lands) from some citizens (in the form of taxes or disposal of public lands) and provided it to others as a matter of right or entitlement. They were distributive, or redistributive, in ways that usually reflected biases of class, race, or gender—thus, officers were benefited over enlisted men in grants of pensions, women were excluded from some land grant laws, and defeated Confederate soldiers were denied Homestead Act grants, while men of color in the South were explicitly included in the grants. Jensen's account of these events, like good history, is accurate, and her telling of the whys and wherefores of the passage of the various acts is insightful. For this, students of American history and American public policy can be grateful.

The problem with the book, though, is the distracting and dubious explaining of the pension and land-law episodes as if they were illustrative of current welfare and entitlement debates—and the consequent discussion of them in the jargon of those contemporary issues. In an opening chapter, "Entitlements in Law and History," with subsections on "Rethinking the American State and American Governance," "The E-Word in Contemporary American Politics: What's in a Name," and "Entitlements as a Policy Device," the author surveys the debates of the last 20 years or so, leaving quite clear her displeasure with the welfare and entitlement revisions of the 1990s. She concludes that the pension and land grant laws were "selective entitlements [that] fostered the concentration and purposeful application of central state capacity to privilege particular interests at the expense of more

collective concerns" (p. 233)—a pattern that has persisted in American history to the detriment of fairness. Furthermore, this pattern has in the United States obstructed "the development of the kind of citizen-based system of social provision that other democracies came to envision in the late nineteenth century," and represents an "historic failure to embrace the most basic guarantees for all its citizens" (pp. 235–36). Her point is to argue that this unfortunate pattern started way back and, since it has become a standard part of American politics, still afflicts the country today.

In the use of policy studies and political development terminology, and the incessant "presenting" of her study, the author often misses the important historical context of both the pension and land grant legislation. The pension bills had to do principally with deserved recompense for patriotic service (and very little to do with alleviating poverty or the needs of the citizenry in general), while the land grant bills had to do at first principally with the public use of the money from the sales of the lands, and then with the final fulfillment of the Jeffersonian aspiration of a freehold farm for every American who wanted one—perhaps an entitlement, but more fundamentally an encouragement of good citizenship. Altogether, the book would have been much more useful had it simply sought to understand and tell the story of the pension and land grant episodes in the broad context of history (the author knows a great deal about that) and left out the encumbrance of current entitlement controversies.

Of Time and Judicial Behavior: United States Supreme Court Agenda-Setting and Decision-Making, 1888–1997.

By Drew Noble Lanier. Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 2003. 280p. \$49.50.

— Christopher Zorn, *National Science Foundation*

Drew Lanier's first book offers the most comprehensive quantitative look at the macrohistorical development of the Supreme Court to date. The book's structure is straightforward: An introductory overview is followed in Chapter 2 by a methodical review of the Court's personnel and doctrinal development from the beginning of the Fuller Court (1888–1910) to the end of the Stone Court (1941–46). Next come a series of thorough, quantitative descriptions of the change in the Court's agenda (Chapter 3), opinion writing (Chapter 4), and decision making (Chapter 5), all based on a monumental data-collection effort undertaken at the University of North Texas during the latter part of the twentieth century. While they are largely descriptive, Lanier offers both informed speculation for the patterns he observes, as well as continual comparisons with previous work on the period (with which his own analyses largely agree).

Chapter 6 is the analytical heart of the book, first offering and then empirically analyzing a series of hypotheses about the determinants of the Court's aggregate liberalism in three broad areas (economic cases, civil rights and liberties, and judicial power) over the period under scrutiny. Methodologically, the analysis relies on fractional cointegration in an error-correction model

framework, correctly noting (and empirically confirming) the likelihood of fractional dynamics in series as heterogeneously aggregated as these three. As one would likely suspect, given the relatively slow change in the Court's membership and agenda, all three series exhibit both long-memory characteristics and relatively slow equilibration following "shocks." But while the internal dynamics of the trends studied are of some interest, his findings with respect to the proximate causes of those changes are, frankly, disappointing. A slight increase in the Court's economic liberalism followed the onset of the Great Depression, and a somewhat larger tendency to rule liberally in civil rights and liberties cases occurs as a function of presidential liberalism; few other of Lanier's hypotheses are borne out by the data.

By far the book's most significant contribution is the wealth of data it offers. Lanier has done us all the favor of reproducing in detail every series he analyzes in Chapters 3 to 6, thus providing the most finely grained aggregate-level data on the Court's activities available to date. Even experienced observers of the Court will likely find something new in the myriad plots of the various aspects he presents—I, for one, was more than a little shocked to note the significant part of the Court's agenda made up of criminal cases during the latter part of the nineteenth century. And while the book's analyses extend to the late 1990s, the true emphasis (and strength) is its detailed coverage of the Court during the period from 1888 to 1946, a span Lanier correctly asserts has received woefully inadequate attention by comparison to more recent times.

Of course, along with its assets, *Of Time and Judicial Behavior* also has its liabilities. Much of the analyses in the descriptive chapters are, in fact, descriptive to a fault: Rather than engaging in any integrative discussion, the text merely mirrors the data. To the extent that the author does go beyond the data to address causal mechanisms there, the analyses often come across as somewhat ad hoc (or perhaps post hoc). Relatedly, I would also like to have seen a greater degree of integration across the various chapters—for example, a discussion of the relationship among the Court's agenda, voting, and opinion-writing activities, rather than simply separate analyses of the three. There are also stylistic issues: Both the historical overview of the Courts in Chapter 2 and the chapter on agenda setting often seem formulaic, if not quite pedantic, the latter particularly so in its comparisons to earlier work, such as Richard Pacelle's (1991) *The Transformation of the Supreme Court's Agenda*.

But probably the biggest potential criticism of the book is theoretical, specifically, the mismatch between the theoretical constructs brought to bear and the modus operandi of the investigation. In brief, Lanier is too reliant on the all-too-familiar (and, to my mind, theoretically impoverished) triumvirate of legal, attitudinal, and strategic perspectives on individual-level judicial decision making. Leaving aside the oversimplification, lack of subtlety, and general intellectual myopia such an approach demands of its adherents, the microlevel perspective for which that set of constructs was developed is of correspondingly less use in a macrolevel study such as Lanier's. This is not to undercut the importance of understanding the behavioral underpinnings of long-term historical change, but rather simply to note

that such perspectives cannot be the sole theoretical basis for an explanation of such change. What is needed in addition is to integrate, in a nuanced, dynamic way, the interplay of individual and systemic factors, including (and perhaps most important) the influence of the latter on the former. To what extent, for example, did the contentious turn-of-the-century politics of the Fuller Court (including, for example, Harlan's dissent in *Plessy v. Ferguson*) influence the views on judicial comity of a young Columbia law professor named Harlan Stone?

Accomplishing such a study would be no mean feat, and it is unfair to criticize Lanier for realizing only part of that goal. In the end, *Of Time and Judicial Behavior* moves us substantially toward that ideal, and for that, the book and its author deserve praise.

(The opinions expressed herein are those of the author, and do not reflect those of the National Science Foundation or of the United States government.)

Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946–1997. By David E. Lewis. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. 224p. \$45.00.

— James C. Clingermayer, *Murray State University*

In this marvelous book, David Lewis addresses an often neglected but nonetheless important issue: the design of the structure of government agencies. Using the framework of the "new economics of organization," Lewis argues that many aspects of agency structure—specifically the degree to which bureaucracies are "insulated" from the direct control of the chief executive—can be explained as a function of the interaction and rivalry between the executive and legislative branches. The argument made here is reminiscent of arguments made by Lewis's mentor, Terry Moe, but is a real improvement upon much of Moe's work in that he makes very clear-cut, testable propositions regarding the implications of the conflict between the White House and Congress, and subjects those propositions to empirical examination, using both large data sets of agency creation and termination as well as case studies of small numbers of agencies.

Lewis assumes from the outset that chief executives and legislators have somewhat different interests and preferences regarding the design of public agencies. Presidents are assumed to desire direct, uninsulated control over bureaucracies, while Congress is assumed to be less supportive of presidential management of agencies and more committed to a design that would insulate agency management from central control. Agencies may be insulated by having no layers of bureaucracy over them, by having a multimember governing board or commission, often serving fixed terms, and by requiring specific qualifications for those holding leadership positions within the agencies. Congress is assumed to be particularly likely to oppose presidential control when the legislative branch is controlled by majorities of a party other than that of the president. Lewis hypothesizes that as the size of the majority in opposition to

the president's party goes up, the likelihood of insulation in the design of new statutorily created agencies goes up. Yet when there is unified party control, the size of the majority in Congress lowers the probability of insulation. Lewis also argues that as presidential approval for a president goes up under divided government, the likelihood of insulation for newly created agencies also goes up, as Congress tries to weaken a strong president. Agencies created when there is an unpopular president and divided government are less likely to be insulated.

Presidents have responded to congressional refusals to approve agencies in the uninsulated form by creating new agencies by executive orders, departmental orders, or reorganization plans. In turn, Congress may withhold funds from a newly created or reorganized agency, yet this is a dangerous and awkward weapon to use, particularly when the agency or president is relatively popular. In extreme cases, Congress may terminate an agency that displeases them. That was the fate of the National Biological Service created by President Clinton after Congress failed to create an agency design to the president's liking. Lewis's statistical analysis reveals that agencies created by statute have much less chance of termination than do agencies created by executive action during the time period (1947–97) that is the focus of his research.

Lewis does an excellent job of carefully analyzing the interactive effects of divided government, partisan majorities, and presidential approval. Less astute scholars searching for simple and direct relationships would have missed the interactive impact of these variables. Unfortunately, these effects are difficult to explain to undergraduates, so the book may be a bit too advanced for some classes, yet it would be an ideal supplemental text for graduate-level courses dealing with bureaucratic politics, the presidency, and American political institutions.

By Lewis's own admission, he has failed to devote much attention to several issues that could affect the general phenomenon of agency insulation. The specificity of enabling statutes, the details of administrative procedures, particular budgetary techniques, and the role that different kinds of agency functions and interest-group configurations play are not seriously examined in this book. Yet Lewis suggests that later work can and will incorporate these factors into the analysis.

Although *Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design* is a very good book, a few minor, factual errors pop up in the text. For example, Congressman Bill Emerson of Missouri is identified as representing Mississippi (p. 94). Senator Bob Graham of Florida is inexplicably identified as a Republican (p. 78). These are minor flaws that should have been caught prior to publication. A more important issue is the selection of time periods for the data analysis. Much of the data for the statistical analysis are derived from the *U.S. Government Manual*, beginning in 1947. Yet many of the most important insulated agencies, the independent regulatory commissions, were created long before that time. Many of these commissions were created during times of united partisan control of the executive and legislative branches. The institutional rivalry argument might need some adjustment to account for the design of those agencies. Lewis also seems to assume that if an agency is originally

designed to be insulated, it will almost certainly remain insulated. That may be true, but some skeptical readers would have preferred that such a conclusion be demonstrated rather than simply assumed.

The author clearly has broad interests in American national government, but some readers may recognize that Lewis's argument may fruitfully be applied to the design of state agencies. By examining the effects of divided government and majority power in state legislatures, scholars could subject Lewis's hypotheses to critical tests using far more agencies and more years than in his study of federal agencies. In any case, Lewis's research is likely to motivate other scholars to delve into the origins of agency structure for many years to come.

Legislative Deferrals: Statutory Ambiguity, Judicial Power, and American Democracy. By George I. Lovell. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 290p. \$65.00.

— Steven Puro, *St. Louis University*

Relationships between the U.S. Congress and U.S. courts are a central focus of many American political studies. Analyses of congressional-judicial cooperation and conflict between elected legislators and appointed, unelected, federal judges have emphasized the development and maintenance of institutional powers and contrasts in democratic accountability of elected and unelected officials. An underlying theoretical question in these interactions is why judges' institutional position allows them to resolve policy issues.

In *Legislative Deferrals*, George Lovell explores whether the U.S. Congress empowers the federal judiciary to shape the meaning of key legislative provisions. He examines whether legislators engaged in strategic legislative deferrals through statutory ambiguities and interpretive questions that would require later resolution in the courts. If legislators are able to empower judges to make policy, such legislative deferral behavior challenges mainline assumptions about both representative accountability of legislative processes and the independence of legislative-judicial relationships. Lovell utilizes historical-institutional analysis on the basis of case studies of four important labor statutes from 1898 to 1935: Erdman Act (1898), Clayton Act (1914), and from a later era the Norris-LaGuardia Act (1932) and Wagner Act (1935). He follows the path of new historical-institutional scholars, offered in works by Cornell Clayton and Howard Gillman (eds., *Supreme Court Decisionmaking: New Institutional Approaches* [1999]), among others, who have developed alternative explanations of judicial decision making to behavioral models of judicial choice. The historical-institutional approach allows Lovell to effectively introduce a new series of puzzles about legislative-judicial interactions and the maintenance of the judiciary's institutional powers that will interest American politics scholars.

Lovell offers a tempered analysis of official Congressional records, documents concerning the behavior of leading labor spokesmen and lobbyists—such as AFL President Samuel Gompers—and U.S. Supreme Court decisions to assess “how well participants in the legislative process anticipated the role

of the courts and whether those participants tried to shape the role judges would play” (p. 12). In two of four case studies, Lovell found that legislators and interest groups engaged in a legislative deferral through strategic legislative choices that expanded judicial discretion to resolve statutory provisions. These strategic choices were based upon legislators’ and participants’ anticipation of interpretive issues that would be decided by federal courts. The measurement of legislative deferrals requires the specifying of complex institutional processes across different branches, and also requires judgment about legislative and interest groups’ anticipation of judicial policymaking. The author is parsimonious in making these evaluations about whether a legislative deferral has occurred. He should expand his study to address policy side effects, both short and long term, for legislators and participants. Future analyses of legislative deferral behavior should address questions of measurement and the definition of strategic legislative–court relationships in different eras. The legislative deferrals concerning statutory language allowed judges to make crucial labor policy decisions. These judicial policy choices reintroduce debates concerning connections between judicial authority and democratic processes.

The book poses a central question of whether courts can be barriers to democratic accountability “because they appear to reverse the achievements that organized social groups like labor make through seemingly more democratic legislative processes” (p. 154). In the four case studies there was substantial emphasis upon labor organizations’ legislative goal to end judicial injunctions against labor’s organizing and collective bargaining activities. Lovell’s legislative deferral research framework provides a broader theoretical underpinning than normal separation of powers analyses to explain judicial policymaking as a key element in shaping legislative compromises. I support his legislative deferral formulation concerning cooperation among branches; especially noteworthy is the argument that legislators shift responsibility to actors outside the legislative chambers in order to avoid direct conflicts with the courts and to limit direct accountability by either legislative or judicial branches. His arguments support Mark Graber’s analysis (see “The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary,” *Studies in American Political Development* 7 [1993]: 35–72 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act that legislative deference to the courts was a source of judicial power.

Lovell’s analysis of legislative–judicial interdependence conflicts with analyses of critical legal scholars (see, e.g., Karl Klare, “Judicial DeRadicalization of the Wagner Act and The Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941,” *Minnesota Law Review* 62 [1978]: 265–339). These scholars have criticized early-twentieth-century U.S. Supreme Court decisions as defying popular will by limiting the possibilities for labor organizations and the development of a U.S. labor movement. A broader institutional question is how interdependence in interbranch legislative–judicial relations affects possibilities of significant policy reforms. Future interbranch institutional studies could examine courts’ continuing ability to make policy under varying conditions of institutional power.

Lovell successfully begins to unravel important puzzles about interbranch relations and institutional development in American politics. His arguments concerning complex interactions among interest groups, Congress, and the courts enlarge our understanding of past events concerning labor legislation and labor–industrial relationships. Lovell’s legislative deferral framework leads to broader understanding of federal judges’ institutional power and their capacity for policymaking on major statutes. *Legislative Deferrals* produces an excellent path to facilitate additional questions concerning interdependence between legislative and judicial policymaking and democratic accountability in American government.

Electoral Democracy. Edited by Michael B. MacKuen and George Rabinowitz. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003. 351p. \$69.50 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

— Mark D. Brewer, *Colby College*

This is a collection of essays originally written for a conference held in honor of Philip E. Converse. While all of the chapters here do engage Converse to a certain degree, this is due primarily to the importance of his work in the areas of public opinion and electoral behavior. This is not a set of worshipful essays, but rather a collection of thoughtful and, in some cases, provocative pieces on public opinion and democracy in the United States.

The book is organized into three sections, each of which deals with one element of the relationship between public opinion and electoral democracy. The first section, focused on how individuals process information and develop political opinions, begins with a piece by Donald Kinder. Building on his work on the politics of race, Kinder argues that citizens organize their political thoughts and develop their political views through the use of a group-centered model, specifically one of in-groups and out-groups. Citizens form opinions on issues, to a certain degree, on the basis of their evaluations of the groups connected to or affected by a particular issue, and some citizens do so more than others. The degree to which an individual uses this “ethnocentric” method goes a long way toward explaining his or her opinions on a wide variety of issues. Larry Bartels picks up on the theme of individual opinions, and argues that public opinion in a democracy is really a set of highly variable and in many ways arbitrary *attitudes*, rather than a grouping of fixed and stable *preferences*. After making his case, Bartels examines the implications of this lack of preferences for democratic theory. The final two chapters in the first section serve to bring readers up to date on two crucial areas of public-opinion formation. Herbert Weisberg and Steven Greene review the last 50 years of social psychology research on intergroup relations, and focus specifically on what this research means for the concept of party identification. Marco Steenbergen and Milton Lodge close the first section with a detailed account of the 20-year research effort in the area of political cognition, an effort that has been fundamentally concerned with how the mind deals with information and ultimately forms political decisions. Steenbergen and Lodge review the key findings produced by this research program and outline the questions that remain unanswered.

The second section of this book examines vote choice. Attempting to engage the reader in a theoretical exercise, Robert Luskin asks: What exactly would a “fully informed citizenry” look like, both in terms of the characteristics it would possess and the decisions it would make? While Luskin offers few answers, he does at least raise important questions. Stuart Elaine Macdonald, George Rabinowitz, and Holly Brasher examine the role that issues play in vote choice, specifically questioning whether voters base candidate selection on a proximity model that asks how close a candidate is to the voter’s position on a particular issue, or on a directional model that asks if the candidate is on the same side as the voter on an issue. Using data from the 1996 National Election Studies, the authors present strong evidence for the directional model over the proximity model, and discuss the implications of their finding for democratic theory. The third chapter in this section is an investigation by Michael MacKuen, Robert Erikson, James Stimson, and Kathleen Knight of the role ideology plays in party identification and vote choice. The authors find that the percentage of voters who are “ideologically literate” has risen dramatically since the 1970s, that the effect of ideology on vote choice has increased in recent years, and that ideology and partisanship are now more closely and coherently linked than at any time for which survey data exist. These results mirror those produced recently by many other scholars, and are of critical importance for making sense of current American politics.

The third section of this volume focuses on the linkages between the opinions and behaviors of elites and those of the masses. Michael Traugott analyzes a topic that has been largely overlooked in public opinion research: Do citizens think the government should heed poll results in the formulation of public policy? In short, the answer is “no,” which seems to surprise Traugott and leads him to question the degree to which Americans support the democratic principle of citizen influence over public policy. John Zaller endeavors to revive interest in V. O. Key’s concept of *latent opinion*, defined by Zaller as “opinion that might exist at some point in the future in response to the decision makers’ actions and may perhaps result in political damage or even defeat at the polls” (p. 311). Although the concept is difficult to get a grasp on, Zaller convincingly argues that because latent opinion is the kind of opinion that politicians pay most attention to, scholars need to devote greater time and effort to the investigation and understanding of the nature of this phenomenon.

The final chapter to be discussed here is the strongest in the volume. John Aldrich attempts to combine accounts of electoral politics during periods of change (think Key) with accounts of electoral politics during periods of stability (think Converse and his Michigan colleagues). In a little under 30 pages, Aldrich comes up with an elegant theory of politics during periods of stability (“equilibrium”) and periods of instability (“disequilibrium”). In short, and at the risk of taking away from the force of the argument, Aldrich’s explanation of how electoral politics moves from equilibrium to disequilibrium and back again is as follows. Opinion change occurs among

the mass public, initiating the move of politics into disequilibrium. In response to changes among the mass, the behavior of elites changes, sending a new and differing set of cues to the mass. Gradually, mass behavior changes in response to the alterations in elite behavior. Issue positions, partisanship, and vote choice—among both the mass and the elites—are now back into alignment, and politics is once again in a state of equilibrium. Aldrich tests his explanation with an empirical examination involving multiple measures of belief and behavior from 1952 to 1996 and finds strong support for his theory.

Often, edited volumes are little more than a recycling of material that is available elsewhere. This is *not* the case here. While it is highly unlikely that all of the chapters in *Electoral Democracy* will appeal to one scholar, there is something for everyone involved in the study of public opinion and electoral behavior. Graduate students and those making the switch from another subfield will find the chapters by Weisberg and Greene and Steenbergen and Lodge quite useful. Those interested in the normative implications of public opinion for democratic governance would be well served by reading the chapters of Kinder, Bartels, Luskin, Traugott, and Zaller. And those wanting new empirical work on emerging issues can turn to the pieces by Macdonald et al., MacKuen et al., and Aldrich. This is a welcome and valuable contribution to the discipline.

Constructing Identities in Mexican American Political Organizations: Choosing Issues, Taking Sides. By Benjamin Márquez. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. 181p. \$40.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— John A. Garcia, *University of Arizona*

Benjamin Márquez has maintained a longtime interest and research record in the realm of the Mexican origin community and organizational vehicles of change, adaptation, and defense. His latest book explores four specific Mexican American organizations and how social identities are molded to coincide with the organization’s view of the American polity and objectives for their constituency. The four groups are Southwest Network for Environmental Economic Justice (SNEEJ); Southwest Industrial Areas Foundation; Mexican American National Association (MANA); and the Texas Association of Mexican American Chamber of Commerce.

The crux of Márquez’s analysis lies with three critical distinctions of organizational goals and perspectives. They are *integration*, *racial*, and *revolutionary change*. An integration-oriented organization seeks to end racial domination and achieve racial/ethnic assimilation. Similarly, a racial-oriented organization also wants to end racial domination but maintain distinct racial and cultural boundaries. Finally, a revolutionary-oriented organization finds existing structural relations untenable and a total restructuring of society required. The importance of these organizational distinctions lies in the constructed identities that result from each type of organizational outlooks. The author is quick to acknowledge the multifaceted nature of personal identities and how they can be fragmented. At the same time, his focus is on how organizations create identities that are separate from an

individual's social identity. Through this constructed identity, associations interpret collective experiences and translate them into specific strategies to advance the group's goals.

With the focus upon Mexican American identity politics, Márquez examines the boundaries of the organizations: racial discrimination, economic disadvantage, and cultural hegemony. He introduces important dimensions associated with the racial/ethnic politics literature, which include the permanency of racial intergroup relations and status versus significant social change; a system versus an individual blame explanation for inequality; access to politically controlled resources; and the probability of successful challenges to the "order" of a subordinated society. He continues his general discussion of minority politics and its organizations by introducing class. Questions of the extent of class mobility within a free-market economy or patterns of labor-market segmentation and the effects of globalization serve to interrelate the intersection of race and ethnicity with social class. This element is pertinent as each of the examined groups attracts Mexican Americans from class strata within this population. The added elements of culture and its role in organizational life warrant discussion by Márquez. He distinguishes between cultural attitudes and behaviors as personal choice versus organizational use of cultural traditions and practices to accent goals and objectives, as well as bases for motivation for participation and activism. Thus the conceptual groundwork is set, and the use of four case studies, involving both archival and interview-based data, illustrates the development, strategies, asserted identities, and objectives of these Mexican origin organizations.

With the three types of organizational identities, two of the ideal types are illustrative (i.e., integration and revolutionary) of the four organizations examined. Even though we are dealing with ideal types, it is not clear why a "racial organization" was not included. The author comments that unlike groups within the African American community (i.e., Nation of Islam), a separatist orientation has not had much of a following in the Mexican American community. It is not clear if no such organization(s) exists or the author chose to exclude this type of organization from his book. Three of the organizations are described as integration identity types in which race (or ethnicity), class, and culture are evident in each association. These key elements are present in each of the four groups, in varying degrees and manifestation. For example, culture is part of the personal identity of its membership, in its community ties and concerns, and in ceremonial aspects of its meetings and conferences.

On the other hand, part of MANA's organizational objectives is cultural "maintenance" and reformulation of cultural beliefs and practices. Among the MANA members, gender and gender relations with institutions and society also provide a core basis for collective actions. Thus, the intersection of race, ethnicity, class, and culture come into play within this organizational context. While all of these organizations are identified as Mexican American, the dynamics and complexity of these multifacets still need to be explored as to how ethnically based groups use their ethnicity. For example, the SWNEEJ identifies itself as multicultural and representing economically

depressed communities. Yet culture and ethnicity define the geographic base and organizational styles for many of its chapters. The web of race-class-culture is precisely an intermingling of experiences and attributes that get filtered in different ways. Some of those ways we attach to race/ethnicity. The challenge still remains for researchers to understand that controlling, sorting out, or isolating the effects of ethnicity in an analytical manner does not capture fully the role of ethnicity or its absence. In these case studies, ethnicity helps to define the basis for membership, organizational objectives (i.e., to counter racism, economic subjugation, and cultural hegemony, motivational cues for political action, and framing issues); yet the uniformity of what ethnicity encompasses for the Mexican origin has variations. In a very real sense, Márquez helps to illustrate these ethnic variations through these four organizations. At the same time, the role of Mexican origin and its organizational forms and structures warrants more exploration as to how the multifaceted web works simultaneously.

Another area that Márquez explores is the potential for cooperative activities across these organizations. Given their respective objectives, kinds of strategies, and "stratum" of their membership base, he does not see a high likelihood. While he uses the Prop 187 initiatives and all of its ancillary events, personalities, and circumstances as an example of "coalitional opportunity," his analysis sends mixed signals. That is, a Mexican origin community under siege should come together. The mixed signals indicate that they do not and/or that it is a very tenuous relationship. At the same time, the nexus for collaboration is present (i.e., common concerns about minority status, discrimination, ties to the community, etc.). His discussion on NAFTA illustrates both divisions and overlap. In the case of the latter, MANA changed its opposition as it felt critical concerns were addressed. There exist both individual and organizational networks such that cooperativeness occurs for very specific purposes and for a limited period of time or outcome. Again, the imagery of a web connotes the organizational dynamics that take place across Mexican Americans organizations.

What are the necessary preconditions, contextual factors, and personal/organizational networks that combine for collaborative endeavors? Márquez has been a consistent contributor toward a wider and better understanding of the Mexican American organization experience and impact on segments of the political system. *Constructing Identities in Mexican American Political Organizations* both raises important distinctions within the Mexican American organizational life and shows how ethnicity plays out in this context. I would encourage him to keep delving into the intricacies and complexity of ethnicity in American political life.

The Presidency and Women: Promise, Performance and Illusion. By Janet M. Martin. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003. 350p. \$55.00.

—Lori Cox Han, *Austin College*

As Americans await the election of the first woman president, we can at least appreciate the increased role that women have

played within both the White House and the executive branch in recent decades. And while the current Bush administration, as well as the Clinton administration, made concerted efforts to place women in key roles within both the cabinet and White House staff positions, this change from women as political anomalies within an administration to the expectation that high-profile positions can and should be held by women has only been a recent development. In this thorough and detailed analysis of the role that women have played in several presidential administrations during the latter part of the twentieth century, Janet M. Martin eloquently shows the struggle for women's voice to be heard within the executive-branch corridors of power, in terms not only of women's leadership in key staff and cabinet positions but also of the representation of women's issues on the national policy agenda.

In documenting the extensive influence on the executive branch that women have enjoyed in recent decades, particularly in the formation of policy, Martin includes five administrations—Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter—for an in-depth, case-study analysis. Stating that most presidential biographies and other studies include little or no information on women or women's issues (with the exception of the first lady), Martin makes a compelling case for the need to study the intricacies and nuances involved in presidential policymaking, particularly the attention that is paid to particular constituencies (such as women) and interest-group activities. In the introductory chapters, she provides a helpful overview on major works on the presidency as well as an historical overview, beginning with the Washington administration, which explains how presidents have reacted to both institutional and political pressures concerning women's appointments to federal positions as well as important public policies affecting women.

Franklin D. Roosevelt and Dwight Eisenhower were the first Democratic and Republican presidents, respectively, to appoint women to cabinet positions. These early cabinet appointments of Frances Perkins in 1933 (as Secretary of Labor) and Oveta Culp Hobby in 1953 (as Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare) were considered rare exceptions to the political rule for their time. The next woman to be appointed to a cabinet position would not come until 1975, when Gerald Ford selected Carla Anderson Hills as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. Because no women served in the Kennedy, Johnson, or Nixon cabinets, one might assume that these administrations did not strongly support women's issues. But as Martin aptly demonstrates, one must look beyond a cursory examination to consider the events taking place behind the closed doors of the White House to truly determine the influence that women had on policymaking and in setting the national agenda. For example, while the Kennedy administration did not publicly support the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), Kennedy took several steps to address the issues presented to him from the President's Commission on the Status of Women, a committee that he established in 1961. Those steps included the opening of several positions within the federal civil service for women, passing equal-pay legislation, and promoting the courts as an appropriate vehicle for change on the basis of the Fourteenth

Amendment as a means for eliminating sexual discrimination. As Martin notes, under Kennedy, the federal government "had become involved in issues of women's rights, and in the policy concerns of women, in a systematic and ongoing fashion, fostering dialogue as well as action in new areas" (p. 85).

As Martin details, Johnson continued the progress made within the Kennedy administration, and made the appointments of women to high-ranking positions within the federal government a priority. Many aspects of his "Great Society" policy program also benefited women. Nixon, whose years in the White House corresponded with rapid growth in the women's movement across the nation, went on record as a presidential candidate in 1968 in support of the ERA (as all Republican platforms had done since 1940). Nixon would also create an office for women's issues within the Executive Office for the President, and while the administration's efforts at promoting women's issues may have been partially motivated by politics as well as a real effort to include women in government, "the striking thing is that the Nixon administration felt the need to stay consistently involved with the question of the role of women in government" (p. 166). For Johnson and Nixon, the absence of women in the cabinet did not mean that progress was not made on behalf of women and pertinent public policies. Change was slow but steady from 1961 through Nixon's departure in 1974. The rest of the 1970s would see a decline in momentum for legislative efforts to end discrimination, in spite of strong support from both Ford and Carter for passage of the ERA. According to Martin, Ford missed an opportunity for strong leadership on women's issues, opting instead for the "caretaker" model of presidential leadership. And while Carter appointed more women to high-level department and agency positions than any president before him, progress for the inclusion of women in the executive branch, as well as attention paid to important women's issues, stagnated throughout the 1980s with the election of Ronald Reagan.

The clear strength of Martin's research comes from the methodology that she employs—the depth and breadth that a qualitative, case-study approach offers. This work also shows the wealth of information available to political scientists in presidential libraries, as she garners much detail of the strategies and inner workings of the White House from the many archival files available to key White House staffers in each administration. This book also demonstrates the important overlap between two subfields within political science—presidency research and women and politics research. As such, the author continues as a leader in the small but growing ranks of other scholars—most notably Mary Anne Borrelli—who provide a fresh perspective on the institutional aspects of the executive branch through a gender-conscious lens.

In sum, this is an excellent addition to both presidency and women and politics literature, and *The Presidency and Women* is appropriate for both graduate and undergraduate courses. For graduate students, Martin offers a thorough institutional analysis intertwined with the intricate political maneuverings that occur within the White House and executive branch. The book is also well written and highly readable, making it an accessible text for

undergraduates. The only weakness, as often occurs, comes with the necessary end of this particular manuscript: Ending with the Carter administration provides no clear answers as to how the story continues to unfold throughout the next four administrations, yet poses several important questions for further research. For example, how did women play a role within the Reagan administration, given the distinct shift in ideology? The momentum was somewhat recaptured with Bill Clinton's election in 1992, but as Martin concludes, while women's presence within the White House and executive branch has been solidified, only stronger presidential leadership in the area of women's issues will bring about significant legislative and societal change.

Managing National Security Policy: The President and the Process. By William W. Newmann. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003. 304p. \$36.95.

— Kevin V. Mulcahy, *Louisiana State University*

The issues associated with homeland security call for an evaluation of the structural processes by which national security decisions are made. Similarly, the factors that shape the president's use of advice in making such decisions have reassured the critical importance accorded to them during the Cold War. Of particular importance is the who/whom question: Who has the president's ear and for whom will this advisory process have consequences? In sum, presidential decisions are peculiar because, while their consequences can be momentous, their evolution is often highly informal and idiosyncratic. Presidents are surrounded by vast advisory systems but often choose to restrict deliberation to a small circle of sympathizers.

William W. Newmann's concern is with presidential management styles regarding the national security advisory system and how this advisory process evolves over the course of an administration. He employs in-depth case studies of the making of arms-control policy in the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations in order to elucidate the formulation and development of their decision-making organizations. His analysis posits two central themes: "First, presidents feel pressure to centralize decision making in the White House in an effort to gain more direct control over the policy process" (p. 2); and secondly, "the key to understanding the decision-making process rests upon the study of the relationship between the president and his chief advisors" (p. 2). Most important, Newmann seeks to account for the dynamics of the national-securing policymaking process; in particular, he argues for a model that would identify a discernible pattern of presidential decision making that persists across administrations.

His "evolution model" has two basic components: One is spatial; the other is temporal. At the beginning of each administration, the new president makes a stated commitment to a broad, formalized, interagency advisory process for national security decision making. Over time, this decisional space narrows into smaller ad hoc groups and, finally, to an informal coterie of confidantes. For Newmann, the key contribution of the evolution model is its attention to the

way in which the structure of the decision-making unit changes over time. He also asserts that the particular advisory process employed determines presidential preferences: "Each president brings with him into office his own administrative personality. It is his preferred way of receiving information and advice, making decisions, and involving himself in the process" (p. 56).

For example, Newmann notes that "Carter's confidence allowed him to push the other structures aside, rely on Brzezinski's almost exclusively, and make decisions that he believed were the correct ones" (p. 100). As to Reagan, however, his "detached style and his willingness to allow the hardliners and pragmatists to continue their rivalry allowed the formal interagency process to capture the informal structure and obliterate the confidence structure" (p. 135). George H. W. Bush and his senior advisors "understood the pressures that they faced. However, they refused to follow the path toward deep centralization that Carter had, and they were unhampered by philosophical divisions. They adapted . . . adding informal and confidence structures . . . to their formal structures. . . . It also explains why the Bush administration does not provide a tale of bureaucratic rivalry, as in the Carter administration, or vicious competition, as in the Reagan administration" (pp. 164–165).

If the comparison of these management styles suggests a preference for that of the first President Bush, one would be correct. Newmann begins his concluding chapter with this observation: "The ultimate purpose of the study of national security decision making is to uncover ways in which presidents can avoid the problems such as those encountered by Carter and Reagan, while steering their decision processes toward the type of structures that helped Bush avoid these problems" (p. 171). Almost as standard operating procedure, the Bush administration started at a point to which other administrations would evolve, that is from an initial reliance on a formalized interagency process to one with a more circumscribed number of participants and more informal decision-making process. In sum, it is the president's personal style of leadership that will ultimately determine the effectiveness of the decision-making process.

Managing National Security Policy makes an unquestionably valuable addition to the scholarly literature on the processes by which presidential decision making is constructed. Newmann has provided a particularly good elaboration of the dynamic structures of the advisory process. However, the recommendability of a model of decision making must be judged against three judgmental criteria: degree of innovation, explanatory value, and an evaluation of the quality of decisions produced. In this, his evolution model must be judged somewhat wanting. First is the question of just how new the premises are. It is a commonplace of American foreign policy that presidents are free to consult whomever they wish (their barber included). Secondly, the evolution from formal to informal to confidential decision making is an often noted phenomenon in an environment where presidents soon discern that their only friends may be White House staffers, relatives, and, as Truman

observed, their dogs. Moreover, Newmann correctly recognizes the extraordinary power of the assistant for national security affairs; however, he does little to analyze the conceptual roles—such as coordinator, counselor, agent—that these assistants have adopted to suit presidential preferences. Finally, his model seems to accept this narrowing of the advisory circle to be not only inevitable but also desirable. Newmann mentions Lyndon Johnson's Tuesday Lunch and the contraction of his advisory circle to Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow, but he does not speculate on the likelihood and consequences of a confidence structure's becoming a self-referential camarilla.

However, this is perhaps to criticize prematurely what will likely be a successor study. Newmann's study is a valuable addition to the literature on national security policymaking and will be welcomed for its careful evaluation of the relationship between process and policy over three administrations in the complex area of strategic weapons. Furthermore, the evolution model should become a staple of graduate seminars in American foreign policymaking for its capacity to generate further empirical and theoretical research.

Gay Rights and American Law. By Daniel R. Pinello. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 364p. \$70.00 cloth, \$23.00 paper.

— Jyl Josephson, *Rutgers University, Newark*

This ambitious book will be of interest to scholars in a wide range of fields, including judicial politics, civil rights, social movements, U.S. federalism, and lesbian and gay politics. The book provides much that will be of considerable interest to lesbian and gay rights activists. It is the first book-length quantitative study of gay and lesbian rights litigation, and as such is a treasure trove of information, as well as of questions that deserve further exploration. The detailed appendices also carefully document the author's approach to researching the subject and the state of quantitative research on judicial behavior in this area of law, and thus could prove useful to scholars teaching research methods as well. The volume also raises more questions than it answers regarding the normative questions surrounding both gay rights litigation and the American legal system, questions perhaps more properly treated by political theorists than by legal empiricists.

Daniel Pinello sets out to study how both federal and state appellate courts treated cases regarding lesbian and gay rights between 1981 and 2000. To do so, he identified 468 cases during the period of study that addressed the rights of lesbian and gay people. In addition to analyzing the case outcomes, he conducted a survey of state judges to collect personal attribute information. Combining the attitudinal and legal approaches to judicial decision making, Pinello provides a comprehensive quantitative analysis of the cases selected, as well as a qualitative discussion of case narratives. For purposes of analysis, he classifies the cases according to subject matter as well as their centrality to lesbian and gay rights claims.

The book begins with a general overview of the research questions it raises and its basic conclusions based on the empirical data. The second chapter presents the human side of gay rights

litigation through case narratives of selected cases. This chapter itself may be worth the price of the book to activists since it brings together many of the cases frequently cited by activists and provides more depth and context for the cases. The cases are selected not just for their significance but also for the ways in which they illustrate the empirical findings presented in later chapters. Many of the federal cases will be familiar to those steeped in this arena of law, such as *Nobozney v. Podlesny* (7th Cir. 1996); others such as *Stemler v. City of Florence* (6th Cir. 1997) will be less familiar—but Pinello is certainly correct to call the facts of this case “astounding” (p. 42). The case illustrates that homophobia combined with the failure to take domestic violence seriously on the part of police can have fatal consequences, and the author's analysis of the case rings true.

The heart of the book is Pinello's quantitative analysis of the cases in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. The third chapter will particularly interest scholars of judicial behavior, and the findings are too numerous to list comprehensively here. Pinello finds that regional variations do make a significant difference; southern states are less conducive to gay rights claims. In addition, states that still had state sodomy laws were less likely to find in favor of gay rights litigants, particularly in cases involving family law. Subject matter also mattered: Courts generally saw discrimination claims and claims regarding free speech and association rights in more favorable terms than family rights cases. The author also found some temporal variation with respect to family law cases: Courts in the 1990s began to see these claims in a more favorable light than did courts on similar claims made in the 1980s. In terms of judges' individual characteristics, judges who were younger, female, Jewish, and/or members of racial or ethnic minorities voted more often in favor of gay rights than did judges who were male, Catholic, or fundamentalist Protestants.

Those interested in judicial federalism will find Chapter 4 of most interest. Here, Pinello tests the question of whether state or federal courts are more friendly venues for federal civil rights claims. Contradicting the arguments of some judicial behavior scholars, his analysis confirms that state courts have provided more favorable outcomes to gay rights litigants. This is so despite the fact that state courts are more frequently the arena for less successful areas of litigation in gay rights, such as family law.

Although Pinello notes that he did not set out to study the role of precedent, or *stare decisis*, his exploration of this subject is interesting whether or not one is interested in gay rights. Because of the novelty of some of the questions raised in gay rights litigation, this area of law provides many legal questions on which there is little in the way of binding precedent. Thus, he examines the behavior of judges in cases where there is, and where there is not, binding precedent. Scholars of judicial behavior will find in his methodological innovations much to explore. Unsurprisingly, Pinello finds that intermediate appellate courts were more bound by *stare decisis* than were courts of last resort. It is interesting to note that he also found that conservative justices seemingly more influenced by *stare decisis* in this area of law than were liberal justices.

The book's concluding chapter summarizes the author's findings regarding regional variation in case outcomes, what he terms "the promise of the states" (p. 145), and the value to gay and lesbian litigants of diversity on the bench. An especially interesting discussion in this chapter relates to the question of whether, and in what ways, judges' religious affiliations are relevant to judicial decision making. Pinello's finding that judges who listed their religious affiliation as Catholic were much less likely to vote in favor of gay rights litigants than were judges whose affiliation was Jewish is not surprising, but what does this mean for consideration of religion in judicial appointments and elections? Pinello reproduces an Internet discussion by law professors regarding the propriety of studying judges' religious affiliations and their effect on judicial behavior. He suggests that, given the significance of judges' religious affiliations for outcomes in gay rights litigation these affiliations are a matter of public import. As a good empiricist, however, he is not willing to push this discussion too far, and so the discussion raises more questions than he himself explores.

Pinello has written a thoroughly documented, highly useful, and careful scholarly study of gay rights litigation in the last two decades of the twentieth century. It is an important book that should be much discussed by gay rights activists as well as legal and political theorists and scholars of American politics. Given the rich empirical data that he has provided, there is much ground here for empiricists, and much of great interest to those interested in more speculative and normative explorations of the topic as well. Pinello notes his debt to Rogers Smith, and *Gay Rights and American Law* is a fine example of the kind of empirical scholarship that American political theorists should find invaluable in advancing normative inquiry regarding the U.S. political system as a whole. The questions of judicial federalism, and of the role of law and courts in protecting the rights of minority groups, are far too important to leave solely to judicial behavioralists and legal empiricists.

Taking Sustainability Seriously: Economic Development, the Environment, and Quality of Life in American Cities.

By Kent E. Portney. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. 312p. \$65.00 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

— David Howard Davis, *University of Toledo*

In an original and broad analysis, Kent Portney examines 24 cities, extending geographically from Seattle and Portland to Chattanooga and Jacksonville, on the basis of their sustainability. The term means a combination of environmental protection, economic smart growth, and social justice. It is borrowed originally from natural ecology, and later from the analysis of developing countries. Typically, sustainability is a positive value, winning favor from the ideological Left.

Portney creatively ties his analysis to the literature of urban affairs, synthesizing more than a hundred theoretical books and articles. Many are from international relations and comparative government. For example, he frequently uses the Brundtland Commission report to the United Nations and covers the Green Metro Index of the World Resources Institute. He maintains

that environmental protection is the single most important element in a city's sustainability effort. Air- and water-quality problems go beyond the geographical boundaries of a city, hence are hard to control. Solid and hazardous waste is subject more to municipal control with recycling and brownfield remediation.

Advocates of sustainability recognize that not all economic growth is beneficial, since some may worsen the environment by polluting the air and water, producing sprawl, creating traffic congestion, and sucking tax dollars out of the central city. The goal, which Portney applauds, is smart growth. This includes eco-industrial parks, cluster development, and financial incentives for desirable companies. Chattanooga, for example, has fostered the manufacturing of electric buses.

Portney next addresses the communitarian strain in sustainability, which he finds to have difficulties. He notes, for example, that this process may conflict with the practicalities of cleaning air and water, and downgrades the benefits of expertise. Moreover, on a number of occasions, he points out that communitarian promoters lack empirical evidence of its success.

Social justice is supposed to be the third virtue of sustainability. On the one hand some recent evidence suggests that the burden of pollution falls disproportionately on African Americans, Latinos, and the poor. Yet Portney observes that land-use plans may protect affluent white neighborhoods. More pressing aspects of social justice may be schools, housing, and the criminal justice system, which are not closely connected to environmental protection.

Besides its extensive discussion of the literature, the book quantifies sustainability in 34 variables, ranging from zoning and brownfields to solid-waste recycling and bicycle paths, combining them to make a single index. Seattle and San Jose score high and New Haven and Milwaukee score low among the 24 cities with good programs (pp. 70–71). In his concluding chapter, Portney ambitiously calculates a Pearson's R for his variables. He finds that a high poverty rate correlates negatively. An older and better-educated population correlates positively. Being located in California, Oregon, or Washington state correlates positively. Yet overall, the statistical analysis does not show clear connections, which Portney accepts, concluding "that there is really not a single kind of city that finds sustainability particularly appealing" (p. 237).

In spite of the book's wide scope, detailed exposition, and statistical analysis, the reader can easily conclude that the concept of sustainability is flawed. While the author is not a cheerleader, he obviously likes the idea and seems a bit disappointed with the statistical results. A more elaborate analysis might tease out more correlations. An N of 24 is small, and all the cities are ones with good programs. Perhaps they could be paired with 24 cities without programs.

Although *Taking Sustainability Seriously* seeks to emphasize the role of cities, rather than the national government, it neglects the dominating role of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in air- and water-pollution control. Nor does the book mention the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. This is in spite of an excellent discussion of institutional capacity on page 33. Although one statistical variable is

the percent voting for Clinton in 1996 and Gore in 2000, political party is otherwise ignored. Parts of the book are heavy reading, and it could benefit from simpler definitions presented earlier in the chapters.

Overall, Portney had made an important contribution to urban studies with imaginative connections and far-ranging discussion. His knowledge of the field is extensive and his insights are trenchant.

The Two Majorities and the Puzzle of Modern American Politics. By Byron E. Shafer. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003. 360p. \$35.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— Stanley P. Berard, *Lock Haven University*

This collection of 10 essays by Byron E. Shafer brings an unusual breadth of theoretical, historical, and comparative perspective to the interpretation of contemporary politics in the United States. The volume's most valuable contribution is the sustained treatment in several essays of the impact of "the two majorities" on American governance.

Shafer starts with the assumption that policy preferences in America are aligned along two broad issue dimensions, economic-welfare and cultural-national. A moderately liberal majority on economic matters coexists with a moderately conservative majority on cultural questions. Party loyalties among voters are more closely tied to economic than cultural issues, but Democratic activists tend to be liberal on both dimensions while Republican activists tend to be conservative on both. Given the nature of the two majorities, Democrats have the electoral advantage when the political context emphasizes economics, Republicans when the context emphasizes cultural values.

Before 1968, partisan politics had been organized around economic issues, and elections normally resulted in Democratic control of the national government. Cultural issues came to prominence in the 1960s, but they did not crowd economic issues off the political agenda. Instead, partisan conflict revolved around both dimensions. Divided government became the post-1968 norm: The party aligned with one issue majority controlled the presidency, and the other controlled Congress.

Several essays are especially effective in showing how political actors mediate the impact of the two majorities on national policymaking. The structure of the two majorities, coupled with the ideological preferences of party activists, makes it difficult for either party to find the electoral center in presidential politics, though both Democrats (the "New Democrats") and Republicans (George W. Bush's "compassionate conservatism") have tried. Once in office, a centrist president must contend with a congressional party that includes a large contingent of programmatic ideologues. Bill Clinton campaigned as a centrist in 1992, but his Democratic majority in Congress included a large portion of liberals who expected policy payoffs on cultural issues. Clinton's loss of control over the policy agenda was to cost his party dearly in the 1994 midterm election.

Clinton actually had become president much as an old Democrat would have. His 1992 campaign emphasized the econ-

omy and appealed to bedrock elements of the New Deal coalition. In 1994 Republicans successfully portrayed the Democrats as incompetent and too liberal, especially on cultural issues, and won a majority of both houses of Congress for the first time in 40 years. The Republicans suffered their own reversal of fortune when they attempted to accomplish large budget cuts in the 1995 budget impasse. Clinton was able to style himself a defender of popular social insurance programs, playing to the Democrats' advantage on economic issues. Clinton's 1996 reelection was the ultimate result.

The two majorities also placed white southern Democrats in a key strategic position, at least until 1994. They were the only party faction that embodied the majority position on both economics and cultural issues. As a result, they were key to the formation of congressional majorities in many instances, including several during the first Bush and early Clinton administrations: the 1990 and 1993 budget processes, the Gulf War authorization, and passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement. Shafer covers this ground well, but the demise of the southern Democrats demands far more attention than he gives it. The 1994 southern congressional elections drastically altered the possible forms that both divided government and bipartisan coalitions could take.

Shafer also places the "era of divided government" in broader historical and comparative context. In one essay, he interprets long-term change in American party politics using Vilfredo Pareto's concept of the "circulation of elites." In the late New Deal era, organized labor and white-collar Republicans defined partisan alternatives and kept them focused on economic issues. The 1960s saw the rise of the New Politics Democrats, who infused the party with an agenda of cultural liberalism. In this, Republican strategists saw an opportunity to bring cultural conservatives into the party. Their efforts reached fruition in the 1980s with the party's incorporation of another emerging elite, Evangelical Protestant leaders.

Two chapters compare American postwar partisan eras to those of other G-7 countries. The two issue dimensions, economic and cultural-national, constitute the substance of politics in all these nations, and in all of them the cultural dimension emerged to be important after a period in which politics had been organized around economic issues. In several of the countries, the arrival of the newer issues played a key role in at least one transition to a new political era. However, the timing of these transitions and the nature of the political orders they produced were conditioned by different social and constitutional structures and different historical sequences. A common issue stimulus thus produced a wide variety of political orders: divided government (U.S.), Thatcherism (Britain), cohabitation (France), and the alternation of government (always in coalition with the Free Democrats) in pre-unification Germany.

Some of the essays contribute little to the elaboration of the two-majorities model, but they are good representatives of Shafer's self-consciously interpretive and historical approach. "Reform in the American Experience" makes a convincing case for the persistence of "reform" as an ideological imperative throughout American history, although Shafer's conclusion that

reform movements necessarily challenge from within the majority party is based on a misinterpretation of the progressive movement as a strictly Republican phenomenon (p. 200). The final chapter views American exceptionalism as the coexistence of four values that infuse all social institutions over the sweep of American history: populism, individualism, democratization, and market-making. In other cultural contexts these might be viewed as pairs of opposites, but in American culture they reinforce one another in their elaboration. Shafer thus makes American exceptionalism a tractable notion for comparative analysis.

In sum, the outlines of a compelling model of contemporary American politics are clearly visible in a number of these essays. Further, all the essays in *The Two Majorities and the Puzzle of Modern American Politics* fulfill Shafer's aspiration for them: an interpretive political science that is grounded in history, comparison, and theory, and one that retains the language of politics as it is practiced.

The Presidency and Political Science: Two Hundred Years of Constitutional Debate. By Raymond Tatalovich and Thomas S. Engeman. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. 288p. \$45.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

— Thomas S. Langston, *Tulane University*

The authors seek to present the perspectives on the presidency of roughly 60 classic and modern authors. Their intended audience consists primarily of “those students who enter college and who pursue graduate education in the twenty-first century” (p. xii). They aim to “carry forward” to such readers (and their instructors) a “legacy of learning” on the presidency, represented by the “vagaries of informed opinion” on the subject (p. xii).

The book is organized, for the most part, historically. Hamilton and Jefferson are followed by “Jeffersonians” and “Hamiltonians,” who in turn are succeeded by a large number of other types, including progressives (Chapters 4 and 6), constitutionalists (Chapters 5 and 7), liberal academics, Carter revisionists, and movement conservatives (Chapter 9). By casting a broad net over their subject, Raymond Tatalovich and Thomas Engeman recover for the field some overlooked writers, such as two from the 1880s, George Ticknor Curtis and Henry Clay Lockwood. Similarly, Tatalovich and Engeman's review of Richard Neustadt's contribution to the field is enriched by the attention they give to the less heralded scholarship of Herman Finer. The authors also provide a highly useful review of Edward Corwin's *The President: Office and Powers* (4th ed., 1957). The famous institutionalist, they argue, was more realistic about both the limits of presidential management and the reality of prerogative than most presidency scholars of his time.

Less positively, the breadth of this book's coverage seems to have been purchased at the price of an unevenness in depth. In the authors' review of the first presidency, for a significant instance, they do not adequately distinguish between the roles and ideas of the president himself and his first treasury secretary, Alexander Hamilton. Washington, from this accounting,

consciously set out from 1791 on to lead Congress through his cabinet. This is, to say the least, a bold reading in need of greater elaboration. Similarly, Tatalovich and Engeman have much to say about the “Jeffersonian model,” but little to offer with regard to Jefferson himself. As a generation of scholars has discussed (for a recent example, see Marc Landy and Sidney Milkis, *Presidential Greatness*, 2000), Jefferson intended his to be a party to *end* parties in the United States. Without knowing this about Jefferson, it is questionable whether the students whom the authors wish to enlighten will be coming away from this book with a true appreciation of Jefferson's role in founding a system that bears his name.

Tatalovich and Engeman make their most significant contribution in exploring early- to mid-twentieth-century debates over the presidency and the Constitution. This was a period of profound change in government and nation, and it is not surprising that amid such changes, debate on the presidency became endemic. The authors recover for today's readers Calvin Coolidge's idiosyncratic effort in his autobiography to combine prudence with partisanship in his conception of the president's role as public leader, and they devote an entire chapter to the debate of the 1950s and early 1960s between two celebrated political scientists and public intellectuals, Willmoore Kendall and James McGregor Burns, who used constitutional theory as a weapon of partisan and ideological battle.

Tatalovich and Engeman “condemn” (p. 8) the shortsightedness of Kendall and Burns (and many others) because they believe that the stakes in the intellectual history of presidential commentary are high. It is possible, “by looking comprehensively across American political history,” to “separate the fundamental truths about presidential power from the many transient beliefs” about the subject (p. xi). The truth, as the authors see it, is that the “Jeffersonians surely got the message wrong when they repudiated the Washington-Hamilton precedents in favor of a party-based leadership” (p. 106). It is interesting that they credit the relatively obscure Charles C. Thach, Jr., with getting the message largely right.

Thach was the author of a 1929 work that is now, thanks to a 1969 reprint edition (*The Creation of the Presidency, 1775–1789*), the standard account of the early history of Article II. Thach's historical detective work supports a conception of the presidency as an office of ample power, without need for institutional reconstruction. The presidency, as the Framers crafted it, is an office of powerful prerogative means directed at limited ends. The Constitution's separation of powers, Thach has convinced the authors, was designed to *empower* the president. “This point,” they write, “needs to be broadcast throughout political science” (p. 106).

Tatalovich and Engeman attempt to provide a common analytical frame of reference for their narrative by repeatedly returning to a set of six questions about the sources and reach of presidential power. The most important question, they believe, is whether presidents rely on prerogative or incumbency. Other questions relate to the influence of personality, party, and rhetoric, and the president's anticipated leadership in the realms of foreign affairs, legislation, and executive branch coordination.

Although their use of these questions as a heuristic is at times forced and even perfunctory, they make good use of them in their final chapter. There, the authors simplify their taxonomy of writers on the presidency, settling upon a four-cell table, with three cells occupied. Hamiltonians support a strong presidency within a government of limited powers; Jeffersonians seek formal presidential weakness within a weak government; while progressives champion “strong presidents as essential for an administrative state of almost unlimited ends” (p. 221). It is clear throughout that the authors find the first alternative, which embraces prerogative, to be the most reasonable. Nevertheless, they are unsettled by the difficulties of placing limits on this necessary residuum of discretion, and end *The Presidency and Political Science* by expressing their fear that in the twenty-first century, the “expansive ends of contemporary government” will push the means of presidential power beyond what “this, or any, generation of admirers of the Founding is willing to bear” (p. 229).

Bringing Society Back In: Grassroots Ecosystem Management, Accountability, and Sustainable Communities. By Edward P. Weber. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. 336p. \$67.00 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

— Walter F. Baber, *California State University—Long Beach*

This book is admirable at several levels. It offers environmentalists some measure of reassurance that participatory politics can achieve ecologically rational outcomes. It adds to the body of evidence that deliberative democrats can use to argue that their theoretical insights have the potential for practical application. And it reminds those of us who teach classes in political inquiry how valuable a well-executed comparative case study can be. In fact, this solidly researched and well-written book by Edward Weber can be the subject of serious criticism only for failing to do what it never intended to do. First, however, it is only fair to acknowledge the author’s success in achieving his stated aims.

Weber offers a richly descriptive account of three grassroots environmental management (GREM) efforts in three environmentally sensitive communities—the Henry’s Fork Watershed Council in Idaho’s Snake River Valley, the Applegate Partnership in southwestern Oregon, and the Willapa Alliance at the mouth of Washington State’s Columbia River. These three cases share several things in common. First, each of these communities had been the site of a protracted standoff between development interests and environmentalists over seemingly irreconcilable values. Second, the opposing forces in each community were able to recognize that they were trapped in their own positions by what amounted to a mutual veto power. Finally, each of these cases describes “outside the box” policy responses that have generally been recognized as successful innovations in political coalition building at the regional level.

The historical accounts of these GREM experiments would be of sufficient value by themselves to justify our attention. But Weber has provided something more valuable still. His analysis demonstrates that decentralized, collaborative, and

participatory governance arrangements can produce approaches to natural resource preservation that are both environmentally sensible and philosophically defensible. He achieves this by focusing his discussion of GREM on the concept of democratic accountability.

Weber defines accountability as “the control of behavior and the existence of an authority relationship between those being held to account and the entity or entities making sure accountability exists” (pp. 11–12). He observes that the conventional wisdom about accountability describes it as a one-way street, a relationship of subservience between superior and subordinate. This view of accountability is clearly ill suited to a process of policy formation carried out in a decentralized arena by actors who are almost exclusively private citizens rather than public officials. Yet some theory of accountability is necessary if those who wield the coercive power of government are to be expected to enforce the results produced by GREM. As Weber observes, accountability must be demonstrated “across the existing levels of government” (p. 101). So he goes beyond merely describing three successful experiences with GREM to provide a new conception of democratic accountability that is better suited to broadly participatory decision making outside the conventional boundaries of government. He characterizes this alternate form of accountability as 360 degree accountability.

As the name implies, 360 degree accountability is multi-directional. It implies “a compact of mutual, collective responsibility, wherein participating individuals are accountable to everyone else” for the quality of policy outcomes (p. 87). The effectiveness of this form of accountability can be assessed by examining 1) the diversity of representation in producing outcomes; 2) the benefits accruing to the broad range of interests represented by participants in the process; 3) the specific effects of outcomes on individuals and groups within the community; and 4) the relationship of outcomes to existing laws, regulations, and programs. Clearly, policy outcomes that succeed in these ways are more likely to be accepted at the local level by those with the ability to forestall effective action. And outcomes meeting these criteria are far more likely to enjoy the support of those in government who are authorized to see that agreements reached in deliberation are carried out in fact. By deploying this evaluative framework in his discussion of the three cases presented, Weber makes a strong argument for both the political and ecological viability of decentralized, collaborative, and participatory governance.

This theoretical construct for evaluating GREM, as well as other forms of participatory and community-based decision making, is the “value-added” element of *Bringing Society Back In* that takes the book beyond its primary arena of discourse in public policy and administration. Democratic theorists, and deliberative democrats in particular, will find Weber’s analysis both intriguing and useful. They will, however, notice a hole that needs to be filled. And so we come to the unfair criticism that Weber has failed to do something he never intended to do in the first place.

As important as democratic accountability is to the future of grassroots deliberative democracy, another consideration is

equally important. These decentralized and largely nongovernmental arrangements face the challenge of *legitimacy* as surely as they face the challenge of *accountability*. To borrow a distinction from Jürgen Habermas, policy pronouncements are important both as facts and as norms. Systems of accountability, to the extent that they ensure coercive enforcement of policy outcomes, create for citizens a “fact” in that there is a new rule in their political world that they must take into account. But that fact, by itself, does not constitute a norm. It does not require citizens to acknowledge the “rightness” of the rule, only its reality. And as most environmentalists would be

quick to point out, protecting the environment is as much (or more) about changing attitudes as it is about enforcing rules.

Now this is not to say that *Bringing Society Back In* hits a conceptual wall when it comes to the question of legitimacy. Accountability and legitimacy are clearly related concepts, and one can readily imagine the general contours of an argument leading from the former to the latter. The issue is merely beyond the scope of this thoroughly admirable book. It falls to others in the communities of environmental policy and democratic theory to explore this question, building upon the foundation that Edward Weber has so thoughtfully provided.

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms Around the World.

By Gabriel Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 296p. \$49.00 cloth, \$19.00 paper.

— David C. Rapoport, *University of California Los Angeles*

The revival of religion as an immense political force came as a complete surprise to virtually all social scientists, a major reason that the Chicago Fundamentalism Project was one of the most interesting and valuable collective academic undertakings since World War II. Organized by Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, it involved at least six annual conferences and received written contributions from nearly a hundred prominent scholars who became knowledgeable about different aspects of the subject. During the 1990s it produced five important and widely known volumes.

The theoretical and conceptual discussions of the project were contained mainly in a huge “four-part essay” in the final volume, *Fundamentalism Comprehended* (1995). Its authors were Scott Appleby, Emmanuel Sivan, and the late Gabriel Almond, one of our own, a beloved political scientist of giant proportions. Almond’s first *APSR* article appeared in 1934, a coauthored piece with his teacher and sponsor Harold Lasswell. During the next 70 years, he was the author or coauthor of seminal works *The American People and Foreign Policy* (1950), *Appeals of Communism* (1954), *Politics of the Developing Areas* (1960), *The Civic Culture* (1963), and *Crisis Choice and Change* (1973). *A Discipline Divided* (1990) treated the bitter divisions within political science generated by methodological disputes; and finally, 60 years after completing it, he published his doctoral dissertation, *Plutocracy and Politics in New York* (1998)! He died Christmas 2002 at the age of 91, a few months before *Strong Religion* came out.

Fundamentalism “refers to a discernible pattern of religious militancy by which self-styled ‘true believers’ attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community, and create viable alternatives to secular institutions and believers” (p. 17). Each of the seven major world religions has produced one or more fundamentalist move-

ments. The earlier theoretical essay of the Fundamentalism Project is elaborated in this text, a “framework for the analysis of the rise, growth, and decline of fundamentalist movements” (p. 14). One significant timely question is “are fundamentalist movements now capable of or inclined to carry the battle against their enemies far beyond their territorial borders so that we can be said to be facing a ‘third world war’ as President Bush termed the conflict against terrorism? Is it a war further, not only against Islamists but against the fundamentalists in general?” (p. 6).

The authors treat the phenomena preeminently in political terms. The approach is fully justified by the facts, but the view still seems foreign to most people who focus on violence, especially that produced by Islamic elements. The volume begins by discussing the “Enclave Culture,” or the general character of the cultures and systems that have emerged from Judaism, Christianity, and Islam to cope with secularism. A second chapter compares some 20 examples from seven world religions to distinguish those that are truly fundamentalists from simply militant religious movements. The next two chapters enumerate conditions (cultural, economic, and political) for the development of the phenomena. Then the focus is on the role of chance factors, that is, the life and character of leaders. The four different ways (conqueror, transformer, creator, and renouncer) that fundamentalist groups deal with the external political environment are examined in the fourth chapter. Special attention is given to democratic and nondemocratic systems where conditions of ethnic heterogeneity and conflict are crucial. The concluding chapter assesses fundamentalism’s future as globalization spreads, religious competitions intensify, and the “war against terror” continues. Prognosis is always a risky enterprise, and it is especially so when we remember that no social scientist foresaw the initial emergence of the phenomena, a failing that is still unexplained.

Nonetheless, the diagnosis and conclusions seem sensible and reassuring, especially to those desperately confused and frightened by 9/11. Globalization tends to contract, rather than expand, fundamentalism’s appeal. In democratic states, most fundamentalists find ways to participate without undermining the constitutional order. When fundamentalists gain control of the state, as in Iran, they learn to moderate their demands in order to survive. Secular “authoritarian” governments have crushed the fundamentalists, especially in the Islamic

world, but the “refugees of defeated Islamist groups” were joined together by Al Qaeda (p. 239) for what seems to be a desperate last-ditch, and ultimately unsuccessful, stand. The United States is an attractive target for two basic reasons. No other state symbolizes secularism as well, and it supports many regimes in the Muslim world that have dealt the fundamentalists crippling defeats. Obviously, we neither can nor want to change the first circumstance, and hopefully our anxieties will not prevent us from altering the second.

The title of the book is odd. The authors explain that the term “fundamentalism” can be confusing, offensive, and debased. A new term “strong religion” is offered (pp. 17–18), but then for some unexplained reason, they ignore their own argument. The rest of the book uses the term fundamentalism only!

Strong Religion rests on solid research and persuasive reflections, but we are never told who the intended audience might be. Although the analysis is more systematic, those of us who are familiar with the Fundamentalism Project’s achievements will find little that is new here. Obviously, it will be a useful text for undergraduates who lack both time and money (and perhaps the patience) for the giant earlier volumes. But this short convenient volume contains too many unexplained details, and the writing is often repetitious. *Fundamentalisms and the State* (Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, Eds., 1993) was the last volume to discuss violence extensively, and there were many important developments and reasons to develop that subject here. But while the observations provided are certainly appropriate, it does seem that they deserve more than the meager space allotted (i.e., pp. 234–41).

Women’s Movements Facing the Reconfigured State.

Edited by Lee Ann Banaszak, Karen Beckwith, and Dieter Rucht. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 372p. \$75.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

— Dorothy McBride Stetson, *Florida Atlantic University*

If there is a political science counterpart to that field of physics occupied with a search for a unified theory of everything, it is comparative politics. Comparative politics scholars take on vast and complex questions of power and governance, develop complicated theoretical propositions, and, with determination, expose these theories to an empirical environment with too many variables and too few cases. These big questions are, of course, the really interesting ones. In this pioneering tradition, Lee Ann Banaszak, Karen Beckwith, and Dieter Rucht assembled a team of scholars to study the intersection of two of the most significant changes in the late-twentieth-century postindustrial democracies: the reconfiguration of states—comprising changes in their organization, powers, and discourse—and the shifts in the organization, strategy, and discourse of women’s movements. Their goal was to make sense of each of these transformations, the interactions between them, and the effects of these interactions on both the states and the movements.

What makes a study comparative is the systematic exposure of theory to empirical methods. Given that, however, there are options available to researchers contemplating a major project.

In *Women’s Movements Facing the Reconfigured State*, rather than design a set of research questions and methods to be followed by each contributor, the editors offer a framework that maps a number of significant research questions, which the authors can use to study one or more countries. This strategy, in their words, allows for a “less stringent and more flexible pattern of comparison” (p. 27). In confronting a completely new area of research such as this, their approach has much to recommend it, and the group has produced an informative and provocative work.

The editors set forth the conceptual framework and methods in the first chapter. Reconfiguration involves the process of moving state authority within the state, as well as altering state/society relations. Three patterns of in-state changes are labeled *uploading*, for trends toward moving responsibility to higher state and superstate levels; *downloading*, for the move from higher to lower levels; and *lateral loading* for the horizontal shift of policy responsibility from elected to nonelected, mostly bureaucratic, bodies. *Off-loading* is the name for state/society shifts as states reduce expenditures through privatization and reductions in welfare state programs. These metaphors provide a very useful shorthand for referring to complex shifts in policymaking.

The second part of the introduction sets forth a model for analyzing the interactions between states and movements that tracks variations from cooperation and assimilation, on the one hand, and conflict and confrontation, on the other. Patterns of interaction can be mapped over time—in this book the 1970s are compared with the 1990s—and the changes that are observed can be compared to the particular type of state reconfiguration occurring in the country. The research questions are: 1) As the configuration of power and responsibility has changed in the state and in state/society relations, how have women’s movements responded? and 2) To what extent have the interactions of women’s movements and the state changed the state itself?

As the authors note, there are still few systematic comparative studies of women’s movements and state responses. That explains the need to take the time to develop a conceptual framework that carefully defines the state and state processes. However, it is curious that the authors do not make a similar effort to define women’s movements and their processes. Their definition of women’s movements as “movements whose definition, content, leadership, development, or issues are specific to women and their gender identity” (p. 2 n. 3) is general enough to encompass a variety of phenomena. But it essentially leaves it up to the individual researchers to define what constitutes the movement in particular countries. This is flexible, but does it allow for comparative conclusions?

After the introduction, there are eight chapters which, to varying degrees, apply the framework of state reconfiguration and movement politics to one or more countries. Each is an informative and useful study in its own right. There are single-country studies of changes in women’s movements in Italy (Donna della Porta) and Spain (Celia Valiente) and of welfare reform in the United States (Mary Katzenstein). The

cross-national studies of movement/state politics focus on specific issues, such as parity (Valiente and Jane Jenson), equal pay, abortion (Banaszak), constitutional reforms (Alexandra Dobrowolsky), participation (Beckwith), and violence against women (Amy Elman). While each author is inspired by the central question of state reconfiguration, not all use the framework provided in the introduction, making it difficult to compare findings across the various chapters.

Instead of a single concluding chapter, therefore, there are three, all more inspired by placing the results in terms of the general social movement literature than by zeroing in on the question of state reconfiguration and its effects on women's movements. Carol McCluerg Mueller and John McCarthy assess changes in radical, socialist, and liberal feminist activism in response to changes in the state. The authors of this chapter equate state reconfiguration (something new) with political-opportunity structure theory (something familiar). Yielding to that temptation renders their results less insightful than the preceding chapters. The second is a study of four social movements in Germany by Dieter Rucht. German patterns among labor, women's, peace, and environmental movements suggest that the most similarity is found between women's and environmental movements.

The final chapter is by David Meyer, who is charged with pulling all the chapters together. This is a challenge given the variation in the authors' use of the organizing framework of the first chapter. Being an expert in social movements like Mueller and McCarthy, Meyer tends to be drawn to conventional social movement theory of political opportunity and political mobilization, rather than exploring insights offered by the state reconfiguration framework. The conclusion suggests, as does the entire book, many directions for future research. But I would have liked to see Banaszak, Beckwith, and Rucht write a concluding chapter in the terms of their introductory chapter and offer explicit suggestions for the next research to be undertaken by themselves and others in exploring the topic of state reconfiguration and social movements.

Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor, and the Paradox of State-Sponsored Development. By Eva Bellin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002. 256p. \$35.00.

Liberalization Against Democracy: The Local Politics of Economic Reform in Tunisia. By Stephen J. King. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003. 168p. \$44.95 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

—Melani Cammett, *Brown University*

Two recent books based on close studies of Tunisian politics focus on the dynamics of nondemocratic rule in the developing world. Together, they complement each other by providing a comprehensive picture of how democracy has remained elusive in distinct spheres of the Tunisian political economy. Eva Bellin's *Stalled Democracy* concentrates on the urban sector to explain why capital and labor have remained reluctant democrats, despite the predictions of structural accounts of democratization based on the experience of industrialized countries.

Stephen King's *Liberalization Against Democracy* provides a close ethnographic study of agricultural sector reform to show why economic liberalization has not bred political opening in rural politics, contrary to the expectations of neoliberal economic theory. The two studies agree that societal groups have not been agents of democratization in Tunisia—and, indeed, their reluctance is critical to any explanation of persistent authoritarianism—but diverge on the logic underlying their arguments. This difference is not just an artifact of their distinct foci (the urban versus the rural sectors) but is also due to different perspectives on how economic liberalization has affected and might continue to affect domestic politics.

Two “paradoxes”—the “developmental paradox” and the “democratic paradox”—are at the center of Bellin's explanation for “stalled democracy,” or a political state in which democracy is “stunted halfway between autocracy and fully accountable government” (p. 4) in late developers. The first paradox arises because the developmental state *creates* social forces, such as an indigenous bourgeoisie and a class of wage laborers as part of its efforts to promote growth and development. Once they take root in society, these forces can potentially amass sufficient power to challenge the state and control the policymaking agenda. The second paradox occurs because state sponsorship creates classes that have limited commitment to democratization. Dependence on a state that distributes favors on a discretionary basis dampens support for general political opening. Further, capital and labor are reluctant to extend their privileged positions in the domestic political economy to society as a whole through the creation of more genuinely representative institutions.

In the first five chapters, Bellin makes her case through a detailed, historically grounded account of the rise of capital and organized labor and their shifting relationships with the state in postindependence Tunisia. A final chapter aims to generalize the framework by extending the arguments to developing countries in diverse regions. The argument places substantial weight on measuring the power and autonomy of capital and labor vis-à-vis the state. The author defines power as the capacity to impose preferences on the state (p. 47), and autonomy as the ability to adopt political positions and operate independently of the state (p. 49). Although the respective power of state and society is not zero-sum, she argues, the power and autonomy of these two categories are mutually exclusive.

In Chapters 1 and 3, Bellin sets out to demonstrate that both capital and labor acquired significant power over the course of several decades. The discussion reflects a deep familiarity with the ups and downs of indigenous private sector and labor movement. This deep contextual knowledge of the shifting fortunes of Tunisian social groups since independence may explain the vacillating descriptions of the bourgeoisie as “significant” yet “persistently weak” (Chapter 1). Because of contradictory characterizations of the power of societal groups, the analysis effectively places greater stock in societal autonomy from the state (or lack thereof) to explain stalled democracy. Power is only significant to the extent that it is acted

upon, pointing to the importance of autonomy, or the capacity to act independently of the state.

Comparison with other cases extends Bellin's logically rigorous account of stalled democracy. The ambivalent attitudes of state-sponsored capitalists in Indonesia, South Korea, Brazil, and Mexico and organized labor in Mexico, South Korea, Egypt, and Zambia support the linkage between the developmental paradox and persistent authoritarianism. Further, the cases show that support for democratization from either capital or labor—and not both—is sufficient to unhinge stalled democracy. For example, in South Korea, an autonomous labor movement threw its weight behind political opening while business provided *ex post facto* support. The reverse held true in Mexico. These comparisons raise interesting questions about when either capital or labor support alone is sufficient to loosen the foundations of authoritarianism.

Bellin makes a strong case for how the twin developmental and democratic paradoxes potentially undermine political liberalization. The argument might be on shakier ground in suggesting possible paths away from authoritarianism. In particular, she argues that marketization can break the vicious circle by undermining the discretionary power of the state (p. 46) and that cronyism has not been politicized in Tunisia (pp. 76–77). Studies of transitions from planned to market-based economies demonstrate that there is no necessary or even likely linkage between economic and political liberalization. Both state and societal elites devise cunning strategies to shore up control over resources, profit from newly privatized assets, and limit true competition, even as they profess their commitment to economic reform. Indeed, the Tunisian case may be a case in point, as families close to the president have allegedly gobbled up investment opportunities in the late 1990s generated by privatization and structural adjustment. The book's treatment of the private sector as a unit, which potentially masks the differential effects of marketization on investors, depending on their extent of capital holdings, sectoral activity, trade orientation, or political connections, may obscure how intensified economic liberalization in the 1990s and beyond could have reinforced privileged access to opportunities among certain elites and, hence, state discretionary power.

King directly challenges the conventional, neoliberal wisdom about the political and economic benefits of trade liberalization. Through a study of the political economy of reform in the agricultural sector, the supposed primary beneficiary of structural adjustment, his book demonstrates that economic outcomes do not necessarily support the predictions of neoliberal economists. Instead, politics and the political priorities of the state shape how reforms are enacted. The book speaks directly to contemporary debates about the relationship between political and economic change. Chapter 1 reviews these approaches, arguing that modernization theory and more recent literature on “transitions” to democratic rule neglect the origins of elite preferences and factional splits. Like Bellin, King highlights the role that social groups, such as capital labor or farmers, can play in driving democratiza-

tion. But King places more stock in democratic projects propelled by less privileged social groups: If social structure matters for democracy, then a more egalitarian class structure will support this trend. He argues that neoliberal reforms increase inequality and therefore are inherently inimical to political change. By reinforcing “traditional” rural patron–client relations, marketization consolidated authoritarianism.

Chapter 2 attempts to generalize the argument to the whole national political economy by arguing that neoliberal reforms strengthened both urban and rural elites. But the book is strongest in tracing the politics of economic reform in the rural sector through a close case study of Tebourba, a prominent agricultural town in northern Tunisia. Chapters 3 and 4 describe the process of privatizing agriculture and its social effects in Tebourba. In-depth ethnographic research convincingly demonstrates that economic liberalization has concentrated land holdings in the hands of a small group of wealthy farmers, exacerbated the economic hardship of smallholders and landless peasants, and reinvigorated rural patron–client relations. Thus, King successfully debunks the argument that economic opening necessarily spurs political liberalization even in the rural sector, where the benefits of neoliberal reform are theoretically greatest. In Chapter 5, he links these findings to an economic literature on development and average farm size, showing that the political dynamics of agricultural reform in Tunisia go against the growing consensus that small and middle farmers can achieve greater productivity than large holders. Instead, state officials structured land redistribution to favor important elite allies.

This book makes an important contribution to the moral economy literature by showing how the state—and not just local communities of the marginalized—can promote notions of distributional justice. Tunisian state officials manipulated moral economic arguments to encourage wealthier rural residents to redistribute wealth on a “voluntary” basis in order to diminish potential unrest from dislocating economic shifts (pp. 89, 106). Buried in observations interspersed throughout the book, this important insight deserves greater emphasis and further development. What are the economics of the moral economy and how are notions of fairness constructed? King shows how Islamic charitable obligations provided the ideological framework for the moral economy in Tebourba but does not explore which aspects of these traditions were systematically emphasized or downplayed.

A central claim of the book—that marketization *re*traditionalized rural social relations—also deserves further elaboration. Did the economic reforms of the 1980s and 1990s revive prior patterns of patron–client relations or create new social relations? What is missing is a full, sociological account of the postindependence state, as well as a clear understanding of rural social relations in the decades leading up to reform. King makes broad contentions that structural adjustment unduly benefited elites, notably the old *beylical* families who were linked to the ruling monarchy in the precolonial and colonial periods. But this contradicts the conventional wisdom on postindependence state–society relations in Tunisia, where the

independent state marginalized the beylical elite and, if anything, favored midlevel provincial elites closely tied to the independence movement. Thus, if the old, beylical families have benefited from recent land reforms, this raises important historical questions and demands an explanation in itself. The argument also suggests that the state and its rural elite allies have *reinvented* rather than revived tradition to profit from structural adjustment.

These two studies not only illuminate the macro- and micro-politics of economic reform in Tunisia but also offer important lessons for persistent authoritarianism in many late developers. Bellin's explicitly comparative, cross-national framework offers more readily generalizable findings, while King's near-exclusive focus on a single case limits its explanatory power beyond Tunisia. But single-case studies can yield important causal hypotheses and can undercut existing, established claims. Both works challenge theorized linkages between economic and political reform, particularly in the developing world, even as they diverge in their perspectives on how, if ever, marketization can trigger democratization. By filling in precise causal mechanisms, such close case studies are an essential part of the growing literature on democratization and persistent authoritarianism.

Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policymaking since the 1960s. By Erik Bleich. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 246p. \$65.00 cloth, \$23.00 paper.

— Martin A. Schain, *New York University*

One of the most important results of the wave of third-world immigration into Europe during the past 30 years has been the emergence of multicultural and multiracial societies in countries in which the image of homogeneity has been widespread. The presence of people of color is no longer exotic, or even unusual, in major European cities, and, as Erik Bleich notes at the beginning of this fine study, ethnic minorities, frequently referred to as "immigrants," are a substantial and growing part of the population of all major European countries.

In the European context, Britain and France provide us with a comparative puzzle. Both countries have had a large postwar wave of nonwhite immigrants from outside of the continent. In both countries, naturalization is relatively easy, and in both (with some exceptions) most children born on national soil are (or become) citizens. Thus, ethnic minorities, who start out as immigrant workers, have rapidly become settled citizens. In both countries, the legislative efforts to manage the challenges of race and racial relations that have emerged from this reality were initiated more than 30 years ago, and have been enhanced since. "Yet," as Bleich argues, "the two states diverge substantially in the types of institutions they have established" (p. 7).

This policy puzzle is somewhat similar to that analyzed by Gary Freeman almost 25 years ago (in *Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The French and British Experience 1945–75*, 1979). Like Bleich, Freeman used com-

parison to understand differences, and both tend to see ideas and ways of defining and framing questions as important in their analyses. For Freeman, however, the relationship between race and class is far more important. Racial conflict in France is held in check by institutions (particularly trade unions) for which ideas of working-class solidarity tend to dominate racial divisions. However, even as Freeman's book was in press, this argument as a basis for comparison with Britain was becoming more difficult to sustain. The racism of French working-class respondents toward immigrant workers, which has influenced trade union behavior, is demonstrated and analyzed by Michèle Lamont (in *The Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Boundaries of Race, Class, and Immigration*, 2000).

Bleich's explanation of the differences between race policies in Britain and France is relatively simple and compelling. Essentially, the differences are explained by the sharp contrast of ideas in the form of "frames" that drove the dominant group of policymakers in each case. While many differences in policy outcomes can be explained by conflict theory—groups and parties—or the problem-solving approach that focuses on the role of policy communities, or by the institutionalist perspectives, Bleich sees these as secondary, assuming that what we want to understand is differences in the content of policy choices that are made. He argues that the same kinds of political actors in each country produced contrasting kinds of policies (p. 173) because they were operating with contrasting sets of ideas about the need for policy on racism, its goals, and the ways it should be effective.

For British policymakers in 1965, the concepts of race and ethnicity, essentially defined by color, were central to the way that they thought about policy. The core legislative problem was how to attack access racism in the context of deep anti-immigrant sentiment within the electorate. Although expressive racism (incitement to racial hatred) was not ignored, these policymakers were most concerned about breaking down barriers to integration, and therefore about access racism. Moreover, many within this group saw the British problem of racism as similar to that of the United States during the same period, and modeled their approach on legislation that been recently passed in Washington. They were particularly struck with the effectiveness of using an administrative/civil law approach for dealing with grievances, rather than using criminal procedures.

For French policymakers in 1972, on the other hand, the focus on expressive racism was most important. The context for this group was not the problems of integration that were emerging from immigration, argues Bleich, but rather expressions of postwar anti-Semitism (p. 120). Only gradually did they shift their concerns to immigrant minorities and access racism. For the French policy group, criminalizing racism was an assertion of the collective will against acts that were manifestly wrong, a reassertion of color-blind republican values. For them, there has been a tendency "to take race out of antiracism" (p. 182) by using the force of criminal justice against those who would violate the rights of others. For Bleich, there is no doubt that the British approach is more

effective in dealing with the everyday kind of racism, since “obtaining convictions using criminal procedures proves extremely difficult” (pp. 52 and 10). Moreover, the basic legislation in each case set a path for each country that has largely determined legislation that has followed.

Although the argument is powerful, the analysis works better for the British case, primarily because the policymaking group was smaller and certainly more coherent, a group within the Labour Party itself. The core of the French initiating group was the Movement Against Racism and for Friendship Among People (MRAP), a group often close to the Communist Party, but the larger group was unusual because it ranged across party and even ideological lines. In the French case, Bleich comes close to simply arguing a general political culture, rather than a group frame. Moreover, although the original legislation in both Britain and France was passed virtually without opposition, the reasons were very different in each case. The British legislation in 1965 was part of a government program, an important component of Labour’s approach to integration, and part of consensus building with the Tories on immigration restriction. The French legislation in 1972 was a low-salience response to a series of racist incidents, initiated by a parliamentary committee in collaboration with the MRAP and other groups that had been advocating these ideas for well over a decade; the lack of partisan division was an indication of its perceived unimportance. This low salience has endured, and antiracism laws in France have never become as important as corresponding legislation in Britain. Therefore, it would seem that different frames not only influence policy content but the salience of policy as well.

With these few reservations, I find the analysis in *Race Politics in Britain and France* well conceived and well documented. Bleich demonstrates how relatively small groups in each country were able to define the problem of racism and to build that definition into subsequent legislation. In addition, their original influence was magnified by path dependency in legislation that followed. By focusing on the big ideas of frames, Bleich helps us to understand more clearly that it is impossible to understand policy without first understanding what the problem is and who defines it.

Democracy and Redistribution. By Carles Boix. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 280p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.00 paper.

— Gerard Alexander, *University of Virginia*

Carles Boix offers “a complete theory of political transitions” and a “unified model” (p. 2) that traces regime outcomes to structures of economic inequality, asset specificity versus mobility, and the balance of organizational power between classes. The first two explain the induced preferences of social sectors over regime alternatives, the third their capacity to achieve those preferences.

The core argument will be familiar to those who know the research done in the tradition of Robert Dahl’s (1971) *Polyarchy* and its influential depiction of rulers weighing the costs of including versus excluding others from decision making. In this tra-

dition, elites have varying capacities to exclude opponents and confront threats under democracy. Several scholars have fleshed out this schema. Perhaps most clearly, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John Stephens’s (1992) *Capitalist Development and Democracy* emphasizes the effects of variation in Dahl’s “costs of suppression,” resulting from changing class balances of power. The “costs of toleration” have received more varied treatment. Researchers within the materialist tradition emphasize foremost the threat of redistribution of property, income, or both, which elites face at the hands of electoral majorities. One strand of this theorizing argues that redistributive impulses are likely to grow with heightened inequality.

A second strand traces variation in redistributive impulses to degrees of mobility versus specificity of assets. Ronald Rogowski (“Democracy, Capital, Skill, and Country Size: Effects of Asset Mobility and Regime Monopoly on the Odds of Democratic Rule,” in Paul Drake and Mathew McCubbins, eds., *The Origins of Liberty*, 1998) argued that a ruler can afford to exploit sectors with specific assets but must be more inclusive of owners of mobile assets. Rogowski used this to explain, inter alia, why advanced industrial societies tend to be democracies, while oil states tend toward authoritarianism despite high income.

Boix’s innovations are to combine inequality, asset specificity, and class balances of power into a single model; to execute an important shift in one of Rogowski’s assumptions; and to test the results in a range of impressive ways. Whereas Rogowski modeled a ruler contesting power with a homogeneous population owning assets, Boix depicts an elite that owns more versus less mobile assets, and which contests power with subordinate social groups, with the system additionally characterized by a variable degree of inequality.

The result is crisp predictions. In settings with either high inequality or highly specific elite assets (or both), redistributive threats in democracy are likely to be high, and so elites strongly prefer authoritarian policies. In contrast, either greater equality or the credible threat of capital flight (which requires mobile assets) makes subordinate groups less likely to pursue redistribution. In either case, varying costs of repression complete elite calculations regarding regime strategy. This model allows Boix to explain the well-known correlation between wealth and democracy (modernization diminishes inequality and causes capital to become increasingly mobile, making democracy less threatening to elites), to account for occasional democratic outcomes at low levels of income, and to offer a revised explanation for authoritarianism in oil states: Now the rulers are the elite owners who fear taxation of immobile assets in democracy.

Boix tests these against both qualitative evidence (concerning Switzerland and the United States) and quantitative evidence drawn from two data sets jointly covering relevant proxies from 1850–1980 and 1950–90. These two chapters, otherwise effective and impressive, have one very unfortunate characteristic. His model has two independent variables: the level of likely redistribution in democracy, and the balance of power between classes. But the second is dropped in these empirical chapters,

which test the very different prediction that “[t]wo broad structural conditions, the distribution of income among individuals and the mobility of assets, determine both the type of political regime and the extent of political violence in any country in the long run” (p. 65). The obvious risk Boix runs is not so much of running directly from preferences to outcomes as of portraying elite strategies as resulting only from elite consideration of the costs of toleration alone, and not also the costs of repression. Later in the book, the latter reappear sporadically.

That said, Boix’s creative and valuable quantitative analyses consistently demonstrate correlations in expected directions. He persuasively concludes that “per capita income, as employed in the modernization literature in postwar samples, is simply a proxy for other more fundamental factors” (p. 92). His qualitative sections permit intriguing intranational comparisons, whose findings are consistent with the quantitative results.

Boix considers how his model’s predictions might be affected by economic growth, social mobility, trade openness, and variation in democratic decision rules. The last substantive chapter uses his assumptions to consider a truly wide-ranging battery of issues revolving around the politics of redistribution across centuries and continents. Along the way, he improves the core model of Mancur Olson’s (2000) *Power and Prosperity* in order to move several large-scale discussions in truly exciting directions.

Any such far-reaching book must contain shortcomings. The foremost concerns how Boix situates his own core model in preexisting theorizing. His explicit engagement with Barrington Moore’s (1966) *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*—which details both their overlap and Boix’s improvements—is exemplary (p. 40). Similarly, explicit engagement would have been highly appropriate in the case of others, especially Rogowski. A second shortcoming concerns the model’s domain of applicability. The notion of “a complete theory” suggests one that transcends a key and frustrating limitation of the most prominent and influential traditions of theorizing about regime outcomes. That theorizing consistently speaks best to the left/right, class-based regime contestation characteristic of Western Europe and Latin America. But it remains unclear to what extent Boix’s model overcomes this limitation. Most obviously, state socialist systems are difficult to analyze in terms of contestation over private property and income, which remain central to Boix’s analysis. It seems no coincidence that he repeatedly excludes the state socialist countries from his quantitative analysis and does not otherwise address transitions from the communist subtype of authoritarianism.

Neither of these shortcomings nor other minor ones, however, can overshadow how much Boix has accomplished in *Democracy and Redistribution*. He combines into a single analysis factors that others had treated in isolation. He shifts selected assumptions in highly fruitful directions. He tests resulting predictions in a range of very impressive ways. And he demonstrates, with his consideration of extensions of the model, the analytic dexterity and imaginative reach for which his research is already justifiably well known.

The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India. By Paul R. Brass. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003. 448p. \$50.00.

— Irfan Nooruddin, *The Ohio State University*

In this book, Paul Brass, one of America’s foremost scholars of Indian politics, draws on four decades of fieldwork to make an important contribution to a rapidly growing literature on the causes of Hindu-Muslim riots in India, the persistence of which is justly considered an embarrassment to the world’s largest democracy.

The book centers on the politics of riots in the North Indian city of Aligarh. Focusing on a single city over 38 years allows Brass to conduct a diachronic analysis of riots in a single site, an ideal research design for understanding the persistence of riots. The key to the book’s importance is its provocative argument. Essentially, Brass implicates the political order of North India in fomenting Hindu-Muslim riots for electoral gain (p. 6). Riots, he explains, are not spontaneous eruptions of primordial hatreds but “dramatic productions, creations of specific persons, groups, and parties operating through institutionalized riot networks within a discursive framework of Hindu-Muslim communal opposition and antagonism that in turn produces specific forms of political practice that makes riots integral to the political process” (p. 369). Once riots end, the process enters its final stage of generating “post hoc interpretations, analyses, and explanations that are in no way scientific or adequate to yield satisfying causal statements, but rather themselves contribute to the persistence of riots” (p. 369).

The argument thus has three main components. First, there exist in some North Indian cities (why not in the South is a question Brass does not address) what Brass calls “institutionalized riot systems.” In these systems, “known persons and groups occupy specific roles in the rehearsal for and the production of communal riots” (p. 32). These people stoke tensions between Hindus and Muslims (p. 118) and, when the political context is right, unleash violence staged to appear spontaneous (p. 258). Second, riots are political instruments used prior to elections to “consolidate one community or the other or both at the local, regional, and national levels into a cohesive political bloc” (p. 34). Lastly, the naming, discussion, and analysis of riots in India is political, feeding into what Brass calls “blame displacement.”

The book’s organization reflects this tripartite argument. Following an opening section providing an overview of the terrain, it is divided into five additional parts. Part II describes the demographic, caste, and communal composition of Aligarh and recounts some of its more calamitous riots. Part III considers effects of spatial and economic distribution on riots (the chapter on the geography of riots is particularly interesting). Part IV presents evidence on the relationship between elections and riots, while Part V develops the “blame displacement” thesis. Part VI summarizes Brass’s conclusions concerning the persistence of Hindu-Muslim conflict in Aligarh.

Any book of this size and scope is bound to raise questions and here I consider five, several of which present opportunities

for future research. First, Brass's argument appears limited to North India as he makes no mention of the South. As such, the reader is left wondering why South India has been immune to the vicious electoral strategies that have allegedly resulted in such violence in the North.

Second, the culpability of the police and civil administration in failing to prevent riots and, indeed, in being full participants in the killing of Muslims is thoroughly documented in this book. For instance, in discussing Aligarh's November 1978 riots, Brass claims that "most of the people killed . . . were shot by the police" (p. 96). About ten days after this phase of rioting, "the district magistrate and senior superintendent of police were replaced" (by whom we are never told) and "under [their] strict control, no further deaths occurred" (p. 96). Yet Brass offers no explanation for such observed variation in police and civil administration responses.

Third, Brass insists that "communal riots have preceded and have led to intensification of interparty competition" but not the other way around (p. 220). But the most plausible argument here is endogenous. That is, where elections are expected to be keenly contested, the incentive to use riots to polarize and mobilize voters increases, which is consistent with Brass's finding that "riots have often occurred in close temporal proximity to elections" (p. 231).

Fourth, Brass regrettably fails to use his rich data from Aligarh to comment directly on the other recent explanation of Hindu-Muslim violence in India (Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life*, 2002). While Brass makes clear his disdain for Varshney's work (see p. 419, note 44, for an almost ad hominem attack), he never deals with the "civic life" argument as a possible alternative explanation.

Finally, and most disturbingly, the tone of the book suggests a lack of objectivity on the part of the author. Brass clearly sees Muslims as the victims of Hindu aggression in India, but the line between identifying certain political parties claiming to represent Hindus and all Hindus as the culprits is blurred. Consider this long quotation, which is jarring in its pejorative nature: "In India . . . the two communities that are seen to be at war or prone to intergroup violence are also associated with distinctive approaches to history. . . . In India, it is the Muslims who have a true historical consciousness. . . . Most Hindus, by contrast, cannot and do not try to separate what others consider mythology from history. . . . Their own dates for their origins, their books, their monuments tend to be fantastic, not credible, said to have arisen in eras that all schoolboys in the West know to have been pre-historic, even pre-Homo sapiens" (pp. 382–83). Such claims, for which no evidence is given in support, are irrelevant to his central argument, and their inclusion serves only to distract.

These criticisms notwithstanding I remain convinced that Paul Brass has written an important book with an original and compelling argument for the how, when, where, and why of Hindu-Muslim riots in modern India. To my knowledge, this is the first explanation to tackle all four questions simultaneously, which fact alone should ensure that it is widely read and a staple on South Asia and comparative ethnic conflict graduate syllabi.

Creating Cooperation: How States Develop Human Capital in Europe. By Pepper D. Culpepper. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 272p. \$35.00.

— Gary Herrigel, *University of Chicago*

David Soskice and Peter Hall's agenda-setting edited volume *Varieties of Capitalism* appeared in 2001, and much of the work that appeared as chapters there is now beginning to appear as the first books of assistant professors. Pepper Culpepper's superb, theoretically literate, and empirically well researched comparative monograph is one of these. It is a good example of the interesting ways in which those working within the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) research program are pushing the theoretical boundaries of the rational choice-based institutional approach developed by the two senior mentors. In fact, Culpepper's account of industrial-training reform initiatives in France and eastern Germany has genuine drama in this regard. He finds (some) successful cooperative reform among decentralized social actors in areas where the preconditions for such cooperation, at least from the rationalist point of view of VOC, were inauspicious. To account for this, he boldly ventures into the enemy territory of constructivist political economy for conceptual guidance. In the end, Culpepper claims to have returned to the rationalist camp safely, but the tension generated by the illicit encounter underlies much of the book's argument and makes for extremely compelling reading.

The occasion for this drama is the efforts in both eastern Germany and France during the 1990s to implement reforms in their industrial-training systems modeled after the highly successful western German dual system. In the latter system, independent small, medium, and large firms cooperate together in the training of apprentices. Part of the apprenticeship occurs at the expense of the firm in shop-floor training programs and part at the expense of the state in vocational school classrooms. The remarkable feature of the West German system is that firms incur the training expense and participate in this system despite the fact that the opportunity exists for other firms to free ride and "poach" skilled labor trained at someone else's expense. In the VOC view, such decentralized cooperation is possible because strong secondary associations and the state protect the system by sanctioning free riders when they emerge. The result is a "high skill equilibrium" where firms voluntarily produce labor with highly portable and general skills and, moreover, see the market advantages of pursuing production strategies that rely on that kind of labor (and thus create further demand for it). It is fair to say that such decentralized cooperation is a kind of poster child for the nonmarket cooperation that the institutional design of coordinated market economies (CMEs) makes possible.

The problem posed by efforts to replicate this system in east Germany and France, according to Culpepper, is that the institutional preconditions and actor capacities that make the system successful in west Germany were either not in place at all (in France) or only newly in place (in east Germany). In particular, because the proposed system was so new, firms did not rightly see its benefits (Culpepper calls this "analytic

uncertainty”) and employer associations and the state had very weak sanctioning capacities “because everyone [was] uncertain what everyone else [would] do” (p. 21). In such cases, the VOC framework (along with most other rational choice views) would predict policy failure. Culpepper finds a good deal of that, but he also finds some success (in the German province of Saxony and the Valley of the Arve in France). The question then is: How is successful cooperation under these circumstances possible?

Now comes the Oedipal moment in the story—and the move that makes Culpepper’s argument quite original: To explain cooperation in the absence of effective sanctioning ability, he turns, cautiously, to constructivism. Drawing on the work of Charles Sabel and David Stark on deliberation and the importance of local knowledge in economic transformation, Culpepper suggests that the problem in his cases is that in order for independent and decentralized firms to understand that the adoption of the new training regime is in their interest (an “objective” given for Culpepper), and hence agree to cooperate in the policy, they have to be persuaded through dialogue and discussion that this is the case. Thus, he focuses on the presence of local deliberative arrangements in Saxony and the Arve Valley that bring private firms, associations, and the state together in the design of the dual system. Such deliberative arrangements make it possible to identify wavering firms (those not currently but most likely to be cooperative) and explain to them what the benefits of the new system are and thus persuade them to cooperate despite the high cost of doing so. Winning over the waverers, he suggests, creates a demonstration effect in which even more skeptical firms, seeing the number of cooperators increase, recognize the benefits of cooperation. Deliberation and the transmission of local knowledge into policy through embedded networks explains successful cooperation, not the presence of effective sanctioning ability on the part of the state or secondary associations.

So, does this appeal to deliberation and local regional texture make Culpepper a renegade from the VOC camp? There are many moments in which it appears that he abandons the high-plateau rationalist commitments of VOC for life in the green and fertile valley of constructivism. But he claims, very adamantly, that this kind of conclusion should not follow because he adopts a rationalist perspective on deliberation, rather than a constructivist one. He likes the way constructivists frame the problem of cooperation, he explains, not the solutions they provide for the problem. In particular, he objects to the strong constructivist position on deliberation adopted by Sabel, because the claim there is that actors are so uncertain of what their interests are and of what their identities are that they constitute both through the process of deliberation and collective experimentation. Culpepper does not believe that things are so uncertain for his Saxon and Arve Valley firms: They know who they are and what their interests are; it is just that they did not know that the reforms would be in their interest. The process of deliberation clarifies this for them—the deliberating associations, firms, and local governments exercise a kind of dialogic capacity. High plain of rationalism, not

green valley of constructivism, is where the explanation for cooperation lies. Constructive critic, not renegade.

It is fascinating to follow Culpepper as he makes this argument. Will he or will he not? Is he or is he not? He is a deeply learned and widely read scholar, very aware of the steps he is taking and, as a result, constantly stopping to address potential alternative explanations and challenges to his research design, empirical argument, and theoretical line of thought. I highly recommend *Creating Cooperation* to anyone interested in the problem of cooperation in general, rational choice versus constructivism in political economy, and the specific politics of human capital creation in contemporary Europe. This is a fascinating and bold book on many levels.

The Left Transformed in Post-Communist Societies: The Cases of East-Central Europe, Russia and Ukraine. Edited

by Jane Leftwich Curry and Joan Barth Urban. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003. 304p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

— Hubert Tworzecki, *Emory University*

The fate of communist successor parties in countries of the former Eastern Bloc has already received considerable scholarly attention, with notable contributions by John Ishiyama, Anna Grzymala-Busse, and Attila Agh, among others. The new volume edited by Jane Curry and Joan Urban adds to this growing body of research by offering case studies of the Polish, Hungarian, Lithuanian, East German, Russian, and Ukrainian communist party organizations within a broader social and political context of their respective countries.

The chief puzzle to be explained is the vast divergence of trajectories among communist successor organizations. In Hungary and Poland, the trajectory has been one of rapid (though hardly instantaneous) distancing from the Leninist past in favor of Western-style social democracy. In both countries, long-standing cultural identification with western Europe, a “national consensus” (to use Herbert Kitschelt’s term) type of state socialism, a history of organized societal opposition to the regime, the presence of reformist elements within the communist parties, and, in the postcommunist era, political institutionalization along western European lines (prompted in no small way by preparations for European Union membership) make this “social-democratic” path relatively easy to explain. Nevertheless, the chapters on Hungary and Poland (by Diana Morlang and Jane Curry, respectively) offer detailed and valuable insights into the kinds of calculations, choices, and decisions that communist successor organizations in these two countries faced along the way.

The trajectory of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) is in many ways a polar opposite of its Polish and Hungarian counterparts. This is not to say that Russian communists remain firmly attached to Marxism-Leninism. Far from it. Luke March’s case study of the CPRF presented in this volume traces this organization’s gradual distancing from its Leninist heritage, but in the completely opposite direction: Instead of westernization, there is the attempt to write the communist period into the broad sweep of Russian history.

The CPRF does not see the Bolshevik Revolution as a historical break, but as a natural consequence of thousand-year-old national traditions of collectivism and of a particular form of imperial state power. Consequently, the author characterizes the party's current ideological mix of nationalism and communism as an updated form of "national bolshevism."

The most interesting cases, however, lie between these polar opposites: In places such as Lithuania, the former East Germany, and Ukraine, the demands and pressures on communist successor parties were less one-sided, and therefore their post-1989 trajectories are arguably more difficult to explain. Why is it, for example, that Lithuania, alone among the three Baltic republics, is a case of successful social-democratization of the former communists? (In both Latvia and Estonia the parties failed to break out of the Leninist mold.) As Algis Krupavicius's contribution to the book shows, the answer appears to lie in the fact that only in Lithuania, the Communist Party was not thoroughly dominated by ethnic Russians, and therefore its successor organization did not marginalize itself as a party catering to ethnic Russian nostalgia for the Soviet past.

In Ukraine, according to Andrew Wilson's chapter, the explanation for the lack of transformation on the part of the former communists appears to reflect the country's arrested state of political development: not quite Soviet anymore, but not quite democratic either, and with plenty of residual identification with and nostalgia for the Soviet Union. In the former East Germany, the societal context was diametrically different from the Ukrainian one—political and economic change was rapid and thorough—but the fate of the country's ex-communists had much in common with that of their Ukrainian counterparts: As Thomas Baylis shows in his contribution to the volume, it was characterized by stagnation and shaped by what the party activists perceived as nostalgia for a political entity (East Germany) that was no more.

The final chapter of *The Left Transformed in Post-Communist Societies*, written by Joan Urban, seeks to place the above findings within a broader theoretical framework. Unfortunately, it is the book's weakest point: Much more analytical mileage could have been extracted from the fascinating case studies presented in this volume. As it stands, it is up to the readers to read the cases and draw their own conclusions.

Green States and Social Movements: Environmentalism in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Norway.

By John Dryzek, David Downes, Christian Hunold, and David Schlosberg with Hans-Kristian Hernes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 240p. \$72.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany and the United States.

By Miranda Schreurs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 306p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.00 paper.

— Kelly Kollman, *Carleton College*

These two well-researched books do something that is rare in the study of environmental politics. They attempt to describe, explain, and explore the consequences of differences in the national environmental movements that arose in the 1960s in

most advanced industrial democracies. Because these movements appeared at the same time, were influenced by common processes of international learning, and seem to be well explained by theories, such as Ronald Inglehart's postmaterialism thesis, that emphasize similarity rather than difference, very little work has acknowledged or systematically examined cross-national variations in environmental politics. Both works do an excellent job of filling this gap.

While the overarching questions driving these works are similar, what the authors see as the implications of their research is quite different. Drawing on the influential theory of discursive democracy developed by its lead author, the book by John Dryzek et al. relates the nature of a country's environmental movement to the degree of democratization occurring in that society as a whole. Miranda Schreurs's book, by contrast, seeks to understand how national differences affect international environmental politics, as well as how international developments influence domestic policy communities.

Schreurs begins *Environmental Politics in Japan, Germany and the United States* by describing the different environmental policy approaches used in each of her three cases. She argues that Germany can be classified as a "green social welfare state" that emphasizes precaution and the necessity of government regulation. By contrast, the United States has become increasingly neoliberal in its approach to dealing with environmental problems and tends to rely on cost-benefit techniques and market-based solutions. Japanese environmental politics borrows from both of these models. The government emphasizes the importance of the market but is willing to intervene and negotiate with industry when necessary.

Having set up the empirical puzzle, Schreurs spends the rest of the book analyzing why the environmental movements look so different in each country, how these differences affect policy, and how participation in global environmental regimes has changed the strategies and goals of domestic environmental actors.

She argues that these questions largely can be answered by examining the differing institutional environments within which the movements developed and operate. In Germany, for example, a proportional representation electoral system gave rise to an influential parliamentary Green Party. She emphasizes the role the party has played in fostering a consultative policy community made up of industry, environmentalists, and government officials. In the United States, laws favorable to the formation of nonprofit groups have facilitated the creation of large, well-financed, environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Their ability to shape policy, however, is hindered by the pluralist political system that often pits them against even larger and better financed business groups. While environmental NGOs find it difficult to influence Congress, they have been able to make good use of the powerful U.S. courts.

The courts also played a key role in the development of Japan's early environmental movement. Local citizen groups used the courts to force the government to address industrial pollution problems after a series of well-publicized, human

health-related industrial disasters. Laws unfavorable to the formation of nonprofit groups, as well as electoral laws that do not favor the formation of new parties, however, made it difficult for these local citizen groups to organize at the national level. As a result, the environmental movement in Japan has remained weak and fragmented.

Schreurs argues, however, that these differences in environmental communities only partially influence national policy outcomes. Particularly in Germany and Japan, where governments are willing and able to act in the absence of citizen mobilization, environmental groups have not always been the driving force behind environmental policy change.

Schreurs then examines one of these extramovement sources of policy change, the influence of global environmental politics. She argues that international policymaking processes have reinforced the environmental movement in Germany and almost reinvented the NGO community in Japan. The Japanese government has sought to build up its environmental NGOs so that they can participate in this increasingly important area of international relations. Perhaps the author's most interesting observation, one she unfortunately does not seek to explain, is that the United States has seemed much less willing and capable of learning from outside its borders.

Schreurs does an excellent job of outlining the development of environmental politics in her three country cases. The institutional analysis she uses to explain her cases is well supported, although hardly groundbreaking. The arguments laid out in the book are weakened to a certain extent by her use of evidence and her selection of policy cases. She is well known for her work on Japan and Germany. Perhaps as a result, she devotes less space to the U.S. case, and her analysis appears somewhat underdeveloped.

Her choice of policy cases is also problematic. She examines three international policy regimes—acid rain, stratospheric ozone depletion, and global warming—to illustrate the three countries' different approaches. Although they provide a good reference point for comparison, they may not be particularly representative of national environmental policymaking processes. The United States, for example, is simply more wary than Germany or Japan of multilateral cooperation of all kinds, not just environmental agreements. She also uses cases that focus on industrial air pollution, where Germany has often taken a leadership role. Had she examined nature-protection policies, it would have been hard to present Germany as anything but a laggard.

Dryzek et al. begin their analysis in *Green States and Social Movements* with a very similar set of questions. They too are interested in exploring how different national structures affect the nature of environmental movements and the movements' influence on policy outcomes. They take a more historic view of the question and argue that states have long been molded by social movements. The state's core tasks have been expanded over time to incorporate the demands of different social movements. The bourgeoisie helped make economic growth part of

the state's core mission, and the working class movement was responsible for the creation of the welfare state.

While all states share common core tasks, they differ in their approach to dealing with social movements. Dryzek et al. argue that states can be categorized according to two criteria: inclusive versus exclusive and passive versus active. Using these criteria, they contend that their country cases represent four different types: expansive corporatism in Norway (actively inclusive), pluralism in the United States (passively inclusive), authoritarian liberalism in the UK (actively exclusive) and legal corporatism in Germany (passively exclusive). These differences help explain variations in the strength of the environmental movement in the four countries under study.

The authors argue that movement inclusion in state policymaking processes is only successful when that movement can align its interests with a core state imperative. If it fails, inclusion will result in co-optation and minimal policy influence. For this reason, the most successful environmental movements are found in passively exclusive states, in this case, Germany. This type of state neither tries to crush the movement as an actively exclusive state would nor does it succeed in co-opting movements as actively inclusive states do. Thus, ironically, the undemocratic elements of the exclusive state help facilitate a healthy, innovative, and vibrant movement.

Additionally, Dryzek et al. claim that environmental movements in passively exclusive states help democratize society through their engagement in civil society. Not surprisingly, they also argue that a green state, in which environmental conservation becomes a core imperative, is most likely to occur in Germany where the passively exclusive state has fostered a viable oppositional public sphere.

The authors are least convincing in supporting these last two claims. They do not fully develop their arguments about democracy and social movements, and they fail to justify why the promotion of environmentalism entails grassroots democracy in a way not necessary for other social movements. In a footnote they state, "Countries such as Germany and Norway show that a welfare state can be sustained without an oppositional sphere" (p. 194). This claim is neither logically compelling nor supported by the facts. The trimming back of the welfare state in Germany and other continental European countries has clearly coincided with the decline of the labor movement.

Because both books employ a similar institutional explanatory framework, they suffer from a common weakness. Institutions and state structures are important for explaining national variations in environmental politics, but it is hard to imagine that they are solely responsible for them. One obvious variable that neither book considers is the role of culture. At times its absence seems glaring. Dryzek et al., for example, argue that the actively inclusive Norwegian state has muted the independent voice of its environmental movement. They never mention the value of consensus seeking that pervades most accounts of Norwegian politics.

Similarly, both books miss a key element of the rise of the environmental movement in Germany. The comparative strength of the German environmental movement has its roots

in postwar German history. The postwar generation had more reason to question the values of their parents than their counterparts in other advanced industrial democracies. This clash of values helps explain the depth of the movement's social critique, as well as its long-standing commitment to grassroots democracy.

Despite these flaws, these two very worthwhile books go a long way in addressing an important but underresearched topic in comparative politics. They also come to surprisingly similar conclusions. Both agree that the German environmental movement has been the most influential of the ones they examine. They also agree that the United States has lost its position as an environmental pioneer and is quickly becoming an environmental laggard. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, both books argue that differences between national environmental movements and policy outcomes can largely be explained by domestic state structures and institutions.

Politicians and Economic Reform in New Democracies: Argentina and the Philippines in the 1990s. By Kent Eaton.
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002. 351p.
\$58.50.

— Jeffrey Cason, *Middlebury College*

The political context in which market-oriented economic reform takes place in developing countries has attracted the attention of political scientists since such reforms were more widely adopted in the 1980s. Much of the literature has focused on the role of the executive in carrying out these reforms, regardless of whether they were enacted under authoritarian or democratic regimes. In this important new book, Kent Eaton argues that—under democracies of varying quality—legislatures are quite important in determining the destiny of reform. The argument is indeed quite convincing and carefully made. Eaton does not claim that legislatures initiate reform on a regular basis in the new democracies he analyzes, nor does he make any claims about the effectiveness of the reforms. He also limits his object of study, for the most part, to the different aspects of fiscal reform, which is certainly one of the most important types of economic reform that new democracies undertake. In the end, he wants to account for the variation in the content and implementation of reforms, and wants to specify the institutional conditions under which legislatures are more or less likely to go along with executive-initiated reform.

At the core of Eaton's argument is a distinction between candidate-centered and party-centered political systems, and he argues that under party-centered systems, legislatures are much more likely to go along with reforms proposed by executives of the same party. He deconstructs the institutional settings in his case studies—the Philippines and Argentina—and reaches straightforward conclusions about how institutional differences lead to policy and implementation differences in the cases. He concludes that in the candidate-centered system of the Philippines, legislatures are much less likely to go along with tax reform that simplifies the tax code and removes opportunities for discrimination among taxpayers. In the party-

centered system of Argentina, on the other hand, Eaton finds that legislators were much more willing to go along with tax reforms that broadened the tax base and reduced flexibility in the application of the tax code.

In addition to focusing on how legislators respond to reform proposals from the executive, the author pushes his argument about the differences between candidate-centered and party-centered systems by looking at how bureaucratic reform plays out in the context of fiscal reform, and finds that the differences are significant here as well. On the one hand, in party-centered systems, legislators want to see reform actually carried out, so as to be able to take credit for it, and support greater resources for the bureaucracies to carry it out. On the other hand, politicians in candidate-centered systems want to limit the application of reforms so that they can save their own particular constituencies from having to pay the new taxes that the fiscal reform creates, implying that even if they do pass reform, they may try to block its being carried out. Eaton finds strong supporting evidence in both the Philippines and Argentina.

The argument then gets more detailed yet when Eaton pushes it to consider decentralization, and particularly the degree to which revenues are transferred from the national to local governments automatically or with a significant degree of discretion on the part of legislators. Here, the argument also gets more complicated, and it does not come down to a distinction simply between candidate-centered and party-centered systems, as that distinction breaks down. Rather, the degree to which there is automatic transfer of tax resources depends on the peculiarities of institutional context. For example, in Argentina, there was automatic transfer of tax revenues to the provinces when the Peronists controlled the legislature and not the executive in the 1980s. When the Peronists controlled both the legislature and the executive in the 1990s, however, they reversed course, recentralizing national control over revenue distribution. In the case of the Philippines, legislators abandoned a previous opposition to decentralization when faced with a new constitution that imposed term limits on legislators. Since one consequence of the term limits was a much greater likelihood that politicians would return "home" to their districts in other political capacities, they viewed decentralization more favorably. As these examples make clear, Eaton emphasizes, quite rightly, that attitudes toward decentralization can be explained by looking at the career prospects of legislators, and both types of action are consistent with a political survival motivation.

Another virtue of *Politicians and Economic Reform in New Democracies* is the empirical detail that Eaton provides. He presents just the right amount in his case studies, and explains their institutional contexts efficiently and clearly. For example, the Argentine case of reform is especially interesting, as it poses a fairly obvious question: How was it that Peronists were able to dismantle much of the Peronist legacy in such a short period of time in the early 1990s? Without a deeper look at the peculiarities of the Argentine case, this outcome would be unintelligible. The details of the Argentine and Philippine cases also

make another of Eaton's arguments clearly: that the institutional incentives facing politicians frequently trump ideology when it comes to determining policy preference.

One might then ask: How generalizable are these findings beyond the Argentine and Philippine cases? While the theoretical argument presented here is quite compelling, and the two cases confirm it, the argument still relies heavily on the evidence in these two cases. To answer this question (indeed, Eaton anticipates most potential criticisms of his work quite effectively; it is a "tight" book in that sense), he includes a chapter that compares reforms in other contexts. He considers four additional Latin American cases (Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela) and finds significant support for his argument. The findings in the other four cases do not always replicate the two primary cases in outcome, for a variety of contextual and institutional reasons that Eaton lays out, but they come close enough to make his general argument much more robust and nuanced. Indeed, this book does exactly what good comparative politics should do: It is cross-regional, theoretically informed, clearly argued, and chock full of solid empirical detail.

German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era. By Scott Erb. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003. 272p. \$53.00.

— Emil Nagengast, *Juniata College*

For the first time since 1945, Germany has a grand capital that befits a powerful state and an assertive foreign policy, but, according to Scott Erb, post-Cold War German foreign policy has demonstrated an impressive degree of continuity since the Bonn republic. Erb's purpose in this book is three-fold. First, he describes the emergence during the Cold War of (West) Germany's devotion to multilateralism. Second, he argues that multilateralism has remained the guiding principle for the formulation and implementation of German foreign policy priorities since unification. Third, he presents Germany's "post-sovereign identity" as a model for all states in the era of globalization.

During the Cold War, West German foreign policy was frequently cited as evidence of the flaws in realist assumptions concerning state behavior. Even the realists conceded that German foreign policy was characterized by multilateralism and an eagerness to pool sovereignty. The debate focused, however, on the essence of Germany's self-proclaimed "European identity." From the realist perspective, Germany's devotion to multilateralism was a rational pursuit of national self-interest within the structural constraints of the Cold War. Liberal-institutionalists saw in German behavior evidence of the significance of interdependence and institutions in promoting cooperation. Constructivism's focus on identity suggested that something much deeper was at work. Multilateralism may have begun as a means to strategic ends (e.g., national unification), but by the 1980s, German policymakers had come to identify their interests with the interests of others, and, in particular, with "Europe." In short, for the Germans, multilateralism had become an end in itself. German unification and

the end of the Cold War provided an important test of realism and constructivism that has not received the attention it deserves. According to realist assumptions, Germany's European identity would fade as the strategic usefulness of this multilateralism diminished. According to constructivist assumptions, we would see a continuation of Germany's devotion to multilateralism, because the Germans had internalized this new identity as the guiding principle of foreign policy priorities.

Erb enters this theoretical debate in defense of constructivism. The most striking feature of this book is that Erb manages to weave a serious theoretical argument into an historical narrative in a way that gives the reader a solid grasp of more than 50 years of German foreign policy. He makes a compelling case that the story of German foreign policy between 1949 and 2003 has been the emergence, and then strengthening, of what he calls a "post-sovereign foreign policy identity." His thesis is: "Germany's multilateral cooperative approach to foreign policy is likely to persist both because it rests on culturally shared values and because it works" (p. 8).

Erb begins his history in the Adenauer era when the Federal Republic of Germany was caught between the priority of Western integration and loyalty to the alliance, on one hand, and the rejection of war as a policy option, on the other hand. This "dualism" returns later in the book when Erb describes the recent domestic debates over German military policy in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Adenauer forged Germany's first consensus: "the redefinition of German national interest within a Western set of ideals, such as economic cooperation, free trade, and shared values" (p. 34). Willy Brandt's reconciliation with the East complemented Germany's "Western identity." At this point, according to Erb, multilateral cooperation was still a "tactical necessity," but "the efficacy of these principles in balancing German Cold War concerns and pursuing national interests via the use of soft power in institutional settings slowly came to define the norms and shared understandings guiding German foreign policy" (p. 49). By the mid-1980s, Germany had adopted the post-sovereign identity and defined national interest in terms of promoting cooperative institutional structures. Considering the significance of this transformation for Erb's argument, it is puzzling that he devotes so little of his book to examining the process that produced this new identity. He provides compelling evidence that something had changed by the 1980s, but he does not adequately answer the important question: What caused this change?

In the post-Cold War era, German leaders defied realist predictions and strengthened their dedication to European integration. The apparent "militarization" of German foreign policy (e.g., the decisions to support U.S. military action in Kosovo and to send German troops to Afghanistan) has been mistakenly interpreted as a break with the post-sovereign identity; instead, Germany's "new" security policy "allowed both Kohl and Schroeder to engineer an adaptation of German foreign policy to a new and very different environment while maintaining the norms and principles guiding that policy" (p. 177).

The current U.S.-German rift is best understood as a clash between Germany's post-sovereign identity and the "U.S. realist/

power-politics foreign policy identity” (p. 184). Erb argues that this division was overshadowed by the Cold War. But with the frustration of U.S. unilateralism and the broadening of Germany’s foreign policy horizon, it was inevitable that Germany’s determined multilateralism would generate tension between Washington and Berlin: “At the start of the twenty-first century the Germans have become Wilsonian, and the Americans practitioners of Bismarckian *realpolitik*” (p. 212).

Erb’s concise history provides strong empirical support for constructivism, but one of the few shortcomings of *German Foreign Policy* is that in his eagerness to dismiss realism, he does not present a fair description of the realists’ explanation of the national self-interest behind Germany’s “European identity.” For example, he never mentions Timothy Gatten Ash’s (1993) impressive work *In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent*. Nonetheless, Erb has made an extremely useful contribution to the literature on German foreign policy. He makes a solid case that there is something different about German foreign policy and that the rest of the world would be well served to examine Germany’s uniqueness: “By historical irony, the most nationalist state of the early twentieth century may be in a position to play a leadership role in moving the international system away from the kind of myopic national self-interest that has dominated world politics to this day” (p. 226).

Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa: Experiments in Democratic Persuasion. By James L. Gibson and Amanda Gouws.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 280p. \$55.00.

— Kristina Thalhammer, *St. Olaf College*

American Jurist Learned Hand once reflected: “I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes. . . . Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law no court can even do much to help it” (p. 4). The values that underpin political institutions in established democracies are often fragile. Yet a culture in which we accept that those with whom we fundamentally disagree have the right to speak and act politically provides an indispensable context for competitive democratic discourse and elections. Ironically, it is during periods of political transition, when the institutions are most fragile, that tolerance is both most important and least likely to be widely held. The South African case vividly demonstrates this paradox.

Although tolerance has been studied extensively in the United States and in a handful of other settings, James Gibson and Amanda Gouw’s study of tolerance within newly democratic South Africa offers unique insight into the roots of tolerance and its fragility. The authors look at the many questions related to tolerance raised by South Africa’s rapid attempt to democratize. They set out to investigate how South Africa’s political culture impedes or promotes “development of democratic institutions and processes and the consolidation of democratic reform” (p. 4). They are interested not only in tolerance as it

exists but also in how tolerance can change in this context: “to examine tolerance *as it might become* in South Africa” (p. 9).

The profile of South African tolerance as it exists is not encouraging. The authors outline the long and complex history of political violence and exclusion, which has contributed both to intolerance and to high levels of perceived threat among South Africans. They then investigate existing levels of tolerance. Applying the “least-liked” measures used in most tolerance research, the authors document that ordinary South Africans exhibit little tolerance at this relatively early stage of South Africa’s postapartheid democracy; intolerant individuals outnumber tolerant individuals by at least three to one: “For most South Africans, the idea of putting up with their political enemies is distasteful and/or foreign. . . . Intolerance is not a sideshow in South African politics, as perhaps it is in more established and stable democracies; instead the main stage of politics is littered with intolerance” (p. 71). Perhaps more discouraging, this research shows that South Africans’ intolerance is neither pluralistically distributed nor directed at extremist fringe groups, but is often aimed at mainstream competitors for political power.

Like most people, South Africans tend to translate perceptions of threat into intolerance. The authors employ social identity theory, a body of theory rarely integrated into discussions of political tolerance, to explore the ways in which people come to understand their relationship to the many racial, ethnic, and linguistic groups that compose South African society. This work offers some useful insights into the origins of threat perceptions and intolerance: “Group identity *per se* does not contribute to perceptions of threat, but *among identifiers who believe in the necessity of internal conformity, the threat posed by the political enemies is perceived as more substantial*” (p. 92, emphasis in original). Thus, South Africans’ intolerance is connected to attitudes about what they believe South Africa should look like and concern about other groups’ ideas. These attitudes tend to be grounded in group identities that are somehow connected to a xenophobic view of those in other groups. The authors convincingly identify intolerance as the result of a social process, rather than an attribute of individual psychology.

Studies in other contexts have shown that intolerance can be converted to tolerance or at least neutralized. The authors attempt to investigate whether “South Africans can be ‘talked out’ of their intolerance, whether they can be persuaded to adopt a more democratic position in disputes over civil liberties” (p. 119). They explore several theories of persuasion and test a variety of hypotheses about short-term attitude change. While other research has shown that manipulation of context affects levels of tolerance, the South African actual political context is so replete with violence that it supplants any context provided in the brief fabricated vignettes. Gibson and Gouws’ findings do not paint an optimistic prospect for South African tolerance. Their attempts to manipulate tolerance (e.g., by exposing subjects to argumentation) reveal that although South Africans’ tolerance can be manipulated, it is easier to encourage greater intolerance than to inspire increased tolerance.

Some of Gibson's previous work suggests that tolerance may be the most difficult democratic value to learn; other research contends that political culture changes very slowly (e.g., Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, 1963; Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, 1997). Gibson and Gouws investigate whether South Africans are gradually learning to be more tolerant by means of a panel study, extending over 18 months. Macrolevel data show little change in tolerance between 1996 and 1997, but on the individual level, 43% of South Africans changed their basic tolerance or intolerance. To explain these variations, the authors explore connections between economic and political perceptions and the principal predictors of political tolerance: threat perceptions, support for democratic institutions and processes, and psychological insecurity. One of their most important findings is that threat perceptions, which reflect historical experiences, are "more stable than is political tolerance itself" (p. 189) and are not for the most part sensitive to perceived changes in South African politics or the economy. Other findings are not as easy to report, in part because the dominant characteristics of tolerance vary considerably across the four racial groups (Africans, Whites, Coloureds, and Asians).

Gibson and Gouws have created a pathbreaking study of political tolerance in a new democracy. Their work sheds light on prospects for consolidation of South African democracy and of democracy in other states with violent histories and ethnic heterogeneity. It offers both fresh findings and questions for tolerance research, including issues about the value of least-liked group measures over time, the complexity of understanding tolerance in multiethnic societies, and the paramount role of threat perceptions in societies with a recent history of violence. Finally, *Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa* reminds us of the fragility of tolerance and the ease with which we can be persuaded to set it aside.

New Approaches to Comparative Politics: Insights from Political Theory. Edited by Jennifer S. Holmes. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003. 176p. \$55.00.

— Gerard Huiskamp, *Wheaton College*

The primary purpose of Jennifer Holmes's collection is to give demonstration to a number of ways in which research and theorizing in the subfields of comparative politics and political theory are fruitfully informed by the concerns and methods of the other. Comparative politics is of use to political theory, for instance, in that it assists in sharpening concepts and clarifying the arguments political theorists want to make. Comparativists' traditional reliance on field research, specialized geographical expertise, and immersion in the data can serve as a vital spark to theoretical intuition—particularly useful in helping political theory to inquire into experiences that go beyond Western ways of knowing. Political theory is of interest to comparative politics in helping researchers to develop new concepts and frameworks for comparative analysis. Superficially, this might sound like the old division of intellectual labor in new bottles; but the volume over-

comes that dichotomy by insisting that it is every bit as necessary for political theorists to get their hands dirty engaging in comparative empirical analysis as it is for field researchers to ground their inquiries in the larger debates developed in contemporary theory and the history of political thought. In both cases, this borrowing enables political scientists to ask more interesting questions, to gain greater clarity in the way we conceptualize political phenomena, and to achieve a more perspicacious understanding of our subject matter.

Beyond a simple meditation of research and analysis, this volume is situated in a long tradition of critical reflections on political science in the United States, a tradition perhaps most prominently associated with David Ricci's (1984) *The Tragedy of Political Science*. Chapters by Holmes and Michaelle Browsers update Ricci's chronicle of the behavioral revolution's triumph—the project to make political science a "real science," that is, to remake it in the image of the natural sciences—in recounting how both political theory and comparative politics reacted to their increasing marginalization in the discipline. The volume's authors expressly align themselves with the Perestroika movement, an internal rebellion in the American Political Science Association, which criticizes the APSA for defending and perpetuating an increasingly narrow and rigid theoretical orthodoxy, and by virtue of this, and a corresponding reification of methods over substance, to be courting political irrelevance (p. 7, *passim*). The contributors thus understand the discussion Perestroika has generated to have awakened new possibilities for the discipline—a new political science animated by the great questions of political philosophy and the political problems and struggles of the real world. As such, it is a reaction against the scientism of the age and an attempt to reclaim political science's "true roots," which historically have been simultaneously philosophical, comparative, and engaged (p. 8).

It is important to note that the book is not a diatribe against particular methods or theoretical schools, as at least some of the authors count themselves as astute practitioners of quantitative analysis using advanced statistical techniques. All insist, however, that our various methodological tools be used in service of interesting questions—rather than our questions be tailored to the requirements of our preferred tools. From this angle, one can read the book's mission to transform the boundaries between subfields as an account of counterhegemonic challenge in the true Gramscian sense. As Holmes intimates in her plea to move beyond the old dichotomous debates within comparative politics between quantitative universalists and qualitative, idiographic area-studies folk (p. 1), the usual tendency in attacking hegemony is a reactive one: to decry the reigning system as bad, and to seek to overturn its defining features (or, as Ricci suggested [pp. 307–12], to quietly subvert hegemony from within through "deception" and "robinhooding"). This book takes a much different tack. The authors seek to articulate, and demonstrate in practice, a proactive counterhegemony, predicated on methodological pluralism and a commitment to a broader conversation, based on the concerns of the "real world" of politics and the priority of concepts and questions over methods.

The contributors to the volume range widely in their objects and geographical locus of study, the scope of their comparison, and the tools they bring to bear in seeking to answer the questions they pose. What unites them is precisely a focus on asking more interesting and useful questions—to enliven inquiry within political science, and simultaneously to make the discipline more relevant to nonspecialist and nonelite audiences. The approach offered is one that is made sensible through a decentered metaphor of “negotiation”—of finding a way to answer a pressing question, navigating the world equipped with a variety of tools and concepts to make sense of that world; of engaging in a more open “dialogue between ideas and evidence” (Charles Ragin, *The Comparative Method*, 1987); and of beginning or extending intercultural dialogues on conceptual frameworks, sharing and (partially) assimilating knowledge to engage in new ways of knowing. In this manner, as Browsers argues (p. 16), concept formation is meaningful beyond assisting in the operationalization of variables for hypothesis testing; conceptual innovation of this sort is the offspring of understanding in a new way, itself a contribution to our knowledge of the world.

At one level, the project to find useful linkages between political theory and comparative politics is simply an admonition to engage in something like Ricci’s “great conversation,” breaking down the barriers between subfields and disciplines as a means to diversify our intellectual gene pool. Browsers (p. 18), for example, quotes favorably James Scott’s warning (in Atul Kohli et al., “The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium,” *World Politics* 48 [October 1996]: 37) about the dangers of disciplinary inbreeding; and several essays demonstrate the costs of a narrow theoretical inspiration. Kirk Bowman and Seán Patrick Eudaily’s chapter interrogating the assumptions of “democratic peace” research, for instance, shows how an overreliance on Kantian categories and assumptions leads not only to spurious claims of why democracies do not fight each other but also indirectly to a vapidly ideological self-justification of imperial foreign policy (p. 118).

At another level, the volume’s explorations between subfields and the political world is an epistemological injunction, directing attention to the uniquely recursive nature of knowledge flows in the social sciences. Alasdair MacIntyre, long ago, made the argument that humans’ capacity for reflective agency is an inherent limiting factor in the pretension to lawlike generalizations in political science (“Is a Science of Comparative Politics Possible?” in MacIntyre, ed., *Against the Self-Images of the Age*, 1971). Here, a number of the authors make original contributions to this discussion by demonstrating empirically this recursivity between theorizing and human action. Ann Davies, for example, explores how concepts travel between the world of theory and practice, and back into theorizing, by tracing Enlightenment influences on republican state building, as well as subsequent scholarly evaluations of the liberal thought based on the practical governance choices of state builders (p. 35).

This mosaic of different approaches to asking and answering interesting questions, which political scientists sympathetic to the Perestroika movement will find compelling, is

not, alas, likely to alter the opinions of those who see the discipline as the quest for a master science of human politics. The authors in *New Approaches to Comparative Politics* do not pretend to such an endeavor. The one thing that even sympathetic readers might miss, however, is a more sustained comparative analysis of the ways in which the various authors were able to fruitfully combine approaches. That is, the volume would have profited by extending the recursive moment between theory and comparative analysis one more time, to come back to more integrally theorize about the epistemological commonalities underlying these demonstrations of methodological pluralism—as well as the larger ontological implications of consulting a wider range of voices and interests in our conversations and processes of knowledge formation.

The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist

Europe. By Marc Morjé Howard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 220p. \$60.00 cloth, \$24.00 paper.

—Christiane Olivo, *University of Northern Colorado*

This study seeks to accomplish two primary goals. The first is to create an “empirical baseline” for comparing the rates of membership in voluntary associations across a varied set of countries and regions as a way of measuring the relative strength of civil society. This comparison shows that postcommunist countries have particularly weak civil societies compared with postauthoritarian and long-established democracies. The second, and central, goal is to explain why civil society is weak across the postcommunist region.

To develop his empirical baseline, the author uses data from the 1995–97 World Values Survey on membership in nine different types of voluntary organizations. Marc Howard emphasizes that measuring *rates of membership* rather than *numbers of organizations* better grasps participation in civil society, as often in postcommunist countries voluntary associations exist on paper only, with few or no members. Dividing regimes into three groups, he finds the average number of organizational memberships per person is 2.39 in the eight older democracies (such as the United States and Australia), 1.82 in the ten postauthoritarian countries (such as Argentina and the Philippines), and 0.91 in the thirteen postcommunist countries (such as Bulgaria and the Czech Republic). His analysis indicates, moreover, that the most significant variable explaining levels of organizational membership is prior regime type, rather than such typical variables as socioeconomic status, political rights, and civil liberties. The author concludes that “a person’s prior communist experience is associated with a decrease of .98 in her or his predicted organizational membership, an extremely large amount . . . especially since this takes into account the effect of other variables widely considered to have a strong influence on participation” (p. 90).

Howard’s main interest is to investigate why so many postcommunist citizens are not engaged in civil society. He offers a three-part explanation based on original quantitative and qualitative research on Russia and Eastern Germany. First, he hypothesizes that “the more people mistrusted communist

organizations, and the more they avoided them during the communist period, the less likely they will be to participate in voluntary organizations today” (p. 105). Measuring mistrust of communist organizations by membership level in such organizations, his quantitative data support the hypothesis for both countries. Second, the author examines the persistence of private networks that developed under communism as a means of surviving the shortage economy, and close-knit friendship circles that developed as a space of trust separate from the politicized public domain. The persistence of such networks has no demonstrated effect in Russia, most likely because dire economic conditions make reliance on friendship networks a continuing necessity. In Eastern Germany, “people whose personal networks have not persisted seem to participate in voluntary organizations at higher levels than those people whose friendship networks have stayed the same or grown” (p. 109). But the difference is not terribly significant: Organizational membership per person is a little above 0.8 for those with a low level of persistence of friendship networks and just below 0.7 for those with a high level (p. 108). Third, his data show that in both countries, postcommunist disappointment negatively impacts organizational membership. Howard concludes that the most powerful explanatory factor is mistrust of communist organizations.

In order “to provide a detailed discussion of the cognitive and experiential reasons why people do or do not participate in voluntary organizations” (p. 121), the final part of the study offers an interpretation of 60 in-depth interviews with ordinary East Germans and Russians. This chapter makes for compelling reading; and most of the qualitative data clearly support Howard’s quantitative findings. However, in the examination of his most important explanatory factor—mistrust of communist organizations—most of the author’s examples of individuals who are currently active, that is, belonging to two or more voluntary organizations, seem to negate his argument, rather than bolster it. Three of the five examples he offers do not support the claim that those with positive experiences with *communist organizations*—which he earlier contrasted to civil society organizations by clarifying that “they were neither voluntary nor autonomous, and participation in them was often forced, coerced, or undertaken for instrumental and careerist purposes” (p. 105)—would go on to be active postcommunist citizens, because they were involved mainly in dissident activities (such as publishing underground *Samizdat* materials and organizing a student group during the revolutionary period) that took place beyond communist state organizations, not within them.

Howard’s study makes several contributions to the literature on postcommunist democracies. The author’s empirical baseline allows for systematic comparison of participation levels across countries and regions, while demonstrating clearly the similarities among postcommunist countries—even those with very different developments, such as Eastern Germany and Russia. This turns our attention to the legacies of communist regimes in explaining the differences between postcommunist and postauthoritarian experiences. Moreover, he argues persuasively that neoliberal institutional “crafting” has not been

successful in overcoming these legacies and motivating changes in societal behavior with regard to joining voluntary associations. Howard also offers extensive, original quantitative and qualitative data about the weakness of postcommunist civil societies. This leads me, however, to two general limitations of this otherwise clear and thorough study.

First, at least two of Howard’s three explanatory factors—mistrust of communist organizations and postcommunist disappointment—seem to be long-standing and well-acknowledged explanations for the lack of participation in postcommunist civil societies. Retreat from the public sphere occurred swiftly after the heady days of the revolutionary period. Many analysts have pointed to postrevolutionary malaise and ongoing disappointment with the reality of democratic capitalism as an explanation for disinterest in participation. Similarly, the argument that forced participation and disillusionment with communist institutions have led to a more general distrust of organizations is well known.

A second limitation of Howard’s analysis is one that he acknowledges but dismisses in order to “reach wider and more far-reaching conclusions about organizational membership across societies and individuals” (p. 68). With most of the data focused on aggregate membership levels, we do not find much attention to the different types of civil society associations in these postcommunist countries. And yet the author draws on civil society theories that differentiate between types of associations and their potential impact on democracy. Gardening groups and sports clubs, for example, are arguably less influential on political or economic developments than are political parties, environmental groups, or professional organizations. Hence, more attention to membership rates in different types of organizations would tell us even more about the particular weaknesses of postcommunist civil society.

Eastern European Capitalism in the Making. By Elena A. Iankova. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 238p. \$50.00.

— John A. Gould, *Colorado College*

Since Adam Przeworski’s (1991) *Democracy and the Market*, scholars have stressed the need to involve society in postcommunist transformations. By engaging societies, this literature argues, governments facilitate difficult postcommunist economic transformations and build more socially accountable democracies (see also David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, *Postsocialist Pathways*, 1998; Mitchell Orenstein, *Out of the Red*, 2001). Elena Iankova’s book contributes to this argument through a close examination of “the institution of tripartism” in Poland and Bulgaria. While marred by occasional areas of ambiguity, the work provides a comprehensive and useful discussion of the postcommunist tripartite in both countries.

Iankova’s broad claim is that preserving social peace and legitimizing and consolidating key social actors are “domestic necessities” for democratization and economic restructuring in postcommunist societies (p. 17). “The institution of tripartism” (p. 7) accomplished these tasks and thus played an important role in the Polish and Bulgarian transformations.

Iankova weaves a number of causal claims into this discussion. Tripartism served as a form of “temporary safety valve to prevent an explosion of social conflict” during a time of significant change. Successful tripartism built support for reform by, among other things, “fairly redistributing the burden” of economic reform; setting an acceptable minimum living standard and casting accompanying safety nets; consolidating the rules and norms of collective bargaining; and allowing meaningful worker and employer input into property transformation programs. By moderating and giving society a voice in painful change, tripartism thus reinforced the broader process of democratization. It kept important social actors at the table—providing an incentive for the identification and consolidation of interests, legitimizing their associational freedoms, and teaching rival groups the value and art of compromise (pp. 11–13).

The author’s goal is to demonstrate these claims using a comparison of Polish and Bulgarian cases. The base of the comparison is variation along a number of factors—the most salient of which are legacies of state socialism and extrication and the degree to which key actors had a “strategic commitment” to social partnership (p. 19, but see the other variables discussed on p. 174). When commitment is low, as it generally has been under “right-leaning” local and national governments, social dialogue gets placed on the “slow track” (p. 113), resulting in higher levels of social tension.

At the risk of oversimplifying a complex story, Solidarity’s long process of resistance to communism resulted in close ties between trade unions and parliament in 1989. With direct representation, there was little initial need for formal coordination of state–society institutions. In addition, Solidarity neoliberals like Polish Minister of Finance Leszek Balcerowicz had a low strategic commitment to the concept of social partnership. The neoliberals also felt that the government needed to avoid intervention below the national level. Finally, Solidarity’s history of “ethical” rather than interest-based opposition to the regime delayed the crystallization of interest-based politics. These factors led to a diversified, informal tripartite negotiation process until 1993, when a committed “left” government negotiated the Enterprise Pact. This established an institutional mechanism for social dialogue in 1994.

The Bulgarian trajectory, by contrast, is rooted in a weak opposition to communism, a comparatively mild economic crisis, and the ability of party insiders to initially “manage” a controlled break with the old regime. These culminated in a subsequent polarization of the political system between opposition forces and the former communists. High levels of conflict, however, led to a more inclusive, broader, and more rapidly institutionalized tripartite coordination. Hence, while successive governments changed the face of the national tripartite between 1990 and 1993, there was greater continuity in substance that contributed to several early pacts on economic restructuring.

Iankova provides a detailed history of social dialogue through 2000, including detailed lists of tripartite mechanisms, the numbers of meetings, and the topics discussed. The effects of tripartism are harder to gauge, and here the book stumbles slightly. Although she dutifully records the numbers of strikes

presumably wherever the data is available, it is not clear that she makes the case for her main claim that social peace aids in the development of markets and democracy. There is very little discussion of democratization in Bulgaria or Poland, and the discussion of each country’s economic reforms and economic performance remains sketchy at best. Despite the author’s assertion that property transformation was the source of greatest social tension in Central Europe (p. 14), there is only a peripheral focus on privatization.

In addition, many of the main economic breakthroughs in the 1990s—including the Enterprise Pact in Poland and the introduction of the currency board in Bulgaria—followed significant union *unrest*. Iankova could have focused more on these critical junctures and explained how the subsequent progress related to the absence or the restoration of tripartite bargaining.

Nevertheless, Iankova covers a lot of ground that has not been covered elsewhere, and *Eastern European Capitalism in the Making* is an important addition for specialists and research libraries. She makes a good case for the argument that post-communist tripartism should be distinguished from Western variants. She also has an interesting discussion of the corporatist legacies of state socialism in Chapter 2 that centers on the concept of managing hypocrisy. In addition, there are case study–driven chapters on sectoral and regional tripartism to remind readers that not all politics occurs at the national level. There is also a useful appendix detailing the numerous changes in the Bulgarian tripartite from 1990 through 1993.

One contribution of particular interest is Iankova’s excellent coverage of the role of international actors in promoting social dialogue. The International Monetary Fund, for example, has proven to be a strong supporter of tripartism in Bulgaria. It has made stabilization loans conditional on social peace between the government and its social partners. After the adoption of a currency board in 1997, the IMF set maximum limits on wages, linked wage increases to productivity, and sought out meetings with unions to justify its measures (pp. 85–86). Similarly, Poland’s institutionalization of tripartism in 1994 followed an influential 1992–93 European Union Phare project. Later on, the accession process reinforced the importance of maintaining institutions for a social dialogue, even as those institutions came under pressure from the “right” government of Jerzy Buzek and Leszek Balcerowicz (pp. 121–22). International pressures have thus proven crucial to maintaining both countries’ social dialogue in the face of low commitment.

Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change

Around the World. By Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 240p. \$60.00 cloth, \$21.00 paper.

— Peggy Kahn, *University of Michigan–Flint*

In this work, Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris argue that an important aspect of modernization has been empirically observable cultural change that has brought support for liberal gender equality. Such change, in turn, has had demonstrably positive but uneven impacts upon women’s political participation.

Rising Tide is part of a larger research program that, while retaining many of the basic assumptions of classical modernization theory, seeks to recast the theory in several respects: redefining the unifying feature of modernizing social change as a broadening of human choice; emphasizing the growth of individualistic, self-expressive modern values; providing extensive empirical evidence of cultural change; and distinguishing two discrete phases of modernization, agrarian to industrial and industrial to postindustrial transitions, each with distinctive values developments. To document cultural change, the book draws also upon the World Values Survey, a large-scale survey project of the values and beliefs of publics in more than 65 countries, conducted in three waves, from 1990–91, 1995–96, and 1999–2001. The survey included five questions that the authors briefly, but not entirely convincingly, assert capture key gender attitudes, which they categorize dualistically as modern liberal equality norms or deviations from such norms. In addition, the book draws on decades of research on women's political participation in liberal democracies. For those who share the authors' theoretical and methodological approach, the findings will be useful, but other readers may find parts of the book provocative and not altogether satisfying.

In the first half, Norris and Inglehart argue that modernization, a coherent process of economic, cultural, and political change, includes a probabilistic process of cultural change toward liberal gender equality norms—ideas that men and women are similar in political, work, educational, and family roles. Social modernization unfolds in two distinct stages: The first stage of industrialization draws women into public life, though in subordinate positions, while the postindustrial phase tends to create gender equality in the worlds of family, work, and politics. The authors try to show the generally culturally egalitarian force of modernization by correlating rankings of countries by GDP/capita (and Human Development Index rank) and findings on the Gender Equality Scale that draw on questions in the World Values Survey; by showing that within countries, birth cohorts score significantly differently, depending upon the degree of modernization prevailing in the society as a whole during childhood and adolescence; and by arguing that individual cultural values scores are related to the individual's modernization as indicated by age, education, and religion (but also markedly to their gender). Though there are significant anomalies, the authors adduce considerable evidence for their thesis.

In the second half of the book, Norris and Inglehart explore more middle-range hypotheses regarding the specific political consequences of the “rising tide” of modernization and norms of gender equality, especially within societies making transitions to postindustrialism. In most cases they affirm that in postindustrial society, the movement is away from inequality, but they note that political behavior has not changed as quickly as cultural change might suggest it would. They acknowledge that legacies of the communist experience are significant, yet they argue that political institutions only determine the pace, not the ultimate direction, of change. The authors explore many varieties of women's political participation in relation to

men's: ideological values and left–right voting behavior; political activism in “traditional” forms of voting, party membership, union membership, levels of political interest, and frequency of political discussion; women's civic activism; women's protest activism; and women's officeholding in liberal democratic institutions.

The book's key assertion that modernization itself, a slow-moving, even “glacial” trend, is responsible for attitudes and outcomes of gender equality raises some questions. It cannot capture the problems and puzzles of shorter-term development or the proximate causes of gender norms and gendered social and political outcomes. In fact, the overall argument seems a fairly deterministic one, since the book's narration is focused on long-term, generally unidirectional trends, and political mobilizations make no appearance. In their conclusion, the authors deny they are making a deterministic argument; they affirm the importance of institutional and policy reform but caution that in the absence of cultural support for equality, gender equality policies risk being subject to backlash.

The authors also report substantial discrepancies in outcomes among countries that, according to economic or other modernization indices, should converge and some surprising convergences among countries that should be divergent. For example, they note the religiosity of the United States despite modernization theory's assertion of secularization over time, variations among countries in egalitarian values at similar developmental levels, the appearance of decisive “modern” gender gaps in poor countries, and the decrease in women's political participation in the postcommunist transitions. These anomalies are bracketed, rather than seriously explored.

While the book does discuss women's (and men's) cultural attitudes in relation to individual level variables that are modernization related, it does not engage with class as a social process and a set of structures produced through global capitalism often with negative consequences for women in particular locations. The authors' approach cannot address, for example, the ways in which colonial and capitalist “modernization” introduced the domestication of traditionally highly mobile, productive women in agrarian societies; the complex positions and loss of power of women in manufacturing sectors in the *maquiladoras* or in the South Korean economic “miracle”; or the fact that in the United States and other postindustrial societies, the liberal equality of some women appears increasingly to be accompanied by the marginalization of others, many of whom are global migrant care workers. The reader may wonder whether norms of liberal gender equality speak equally to the lives of poor and better-off women: Does the American low-income single mother benefit from being treated as a male breadwinner? Are liberal equality and Western modernization the aspiration of women around the world and the only route to women's development and empowerment, as the argument suggests?

Written in the tradition of empirical modernization literature, *Rising Tide* tries to distill very general measurable trends; inevitably flattens much human experience into commensurable data; fails to address complex issues of the social and political meaning of data in different contexts; and cannot specify

complex power-laden mechanisms of social and political processes. Nevertheless, it offers many important and intriguing arguments, advancing the empirical literature on value change and women's participation in postindustrial democracies and engaging with the important question of women's empowerment across the globe.

Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America.

By Steven Levitsky. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 304p. \$70.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

— Peter M. Siavelis, *Wake Forest University*

The advent of neoliberalism and the withering of the import-substitution-industrializing state pose essential challenges to labor-based political parties in the Americas. Steven Levitsky asks why some Latin American labor-based parties were able to adapt to these changes and survive while others failed. By presenting the most meticulous and complete study of the contemporary Argentine Peronist Party (or Justicialist Party–PJ) to date, and by placing it in comparative perspective, Levitsky makes an important contribution to the study of parties in the Americas, and more broadly, demonstrates the centrality of informal structures for understanding how political parties function.

Levitsky employs an organizational approach to explain the adaptability of Peronism, focusing on the party's internal dynamics and structure. His deep understanding of the complexity of the internal organization of the Peronist party grows out of an impressive array of interviews with leaders and activists. His study is rich with insights into the real functioning of the party and is backed up by hard data and illuminating anecdotes. He uncovers the underlying "invisible" rules of the game that govern programmatic change and leadership turnover. He shows that the PJ's populist origins provided it with the improbable combination of very strong clientelistic linkages to the masses and low levels of routinized, structured rules. This combination underwrote the party's adaptive flexibility, where the leadership could redirect the party programmatically, shed its trade union orientation, and adopt a middle-class, postmaterialist focus. In doing so the party ensured its survival.

The very informality and flexibility of the PJ allowed it to remake itself when faced with an existential crisis and an unprecedented defeat at the polls in 1983. Responding to economic crisis and increasing pressure from international creditors, Peronist President Carlos Menem took advantage of this organizational flexibility to impose his will and redirect economic policy. The PJ's leadership successfully adopted and sold to the public a new market-oriented socioeconomic model, and at the same time, transformed Peronism from a labor-based to a clientelistic party, where unions became less important and influential. Still, the party's clientelistic structures allowed it to do so without alienating traditional rank-and-file Peronists, who were still provided local arenas of influence and concrete rewards for their continued electoral loyalty. These realities provided for the transformation (rather than obliteration) of the Peronist Party, Levitsky argues, contributing an important

measure of stability to the Argentine political system from the transition until the crises of 2001.

These findings are important for students of party systems. Much of the literature heralds party-system institutionalization as the key to governability, representation, and party continuity. Levitsky, on the other hand, makes the innovative and convincing argument that flexible and loosely structured parties may be better equipped to deal with the rapid environmental change wrought by neoliberalism and the decline of traditional working-class politics. While he acknowledges that a lack of institutionalization can facilitate corruption and limit representation, he successfully forces theorists to rethink the almost automatic connection between party institutionalization and stability. He also acknowledges that for the long term, the advent of patronage politics may hold some unpleasant implications for Peronism, as the traditional embeddedness and "cultural" appeal of the party is undermined by its perceived pragmatism and opportunism.

With respect to informal party structures, Levitsky shows that party statutes and formal rules had very little to do with political recruitment, policymaking, and the PJ's real centers of power. Rather, a complex network of informal understandings, agreements, and activities by organizations and actors ensured continuity at the party's base while rapid change proceeded at the national level. Peronism's "base units" and *punteros* (local leaders with formal, and often informal, ties to party organizations) tended to forgo the party's rules and formal structures to build personal networks of support and influence, while still providing an electoral base for the national party. Those who study Latin American politics may contend that Levitsky uncovers little that is new, because after all, clientelism has been around for quite some time. Still, this is not a run-of-the-mill study of clientelism as just another of Latin America's many political neuroses. Rather, the author shows how clientelism can positively contribute to governability. Nor is his portrayal of "clientelism" the usual static one. He shows how and why clientelism waxed and waned as a tool of the party, and how it was creatively used to replace Peronism's diminishing ideological appeal in the wake of the transformation of labor-based politics.

Levitsky's very useful concluding chapter comparatively analyzes Peronism, discussing the fate of similar labor-based parties in Peru, Venezuela, Chile, and Mexico. The author might have better attempted to tease out additional theoretical generalizations from this comparative analysis. For example, he notes the crucial leadership role played by Menem in turning the programmatic tide of the Peronist party, and points to the failure of Peruvian presidents to take advantage of similar contexts and opportunities for party reorientation. This failure, he argues, shows that "strategic flexibility is no guarantee that leaders will choose appropriate strategies" (p. 245). Is leadership, then, a more important variable than Levitsky suggests? What is more, it would have been useful to discuss the generalizability of the argument concerning the relationship between institutionalization and effectiveness with respect to parties that are not traditionally labor based. Do the arguments

presented here apply only to Latin American, labor-based leftist parties? Might one find a similar value in low levels of institutionalization in nonpopulist, non-traditionally labor-based parties either in, or outside of, Latin America?

Despite these observations, Levitsky provides what is clearly the most important recent study of the contemporary Peronist party. But more importantly, this accessible, highly readable, yet theoretically informed analysis opens the way for new avenues of research into the determinants of party change, and into the formal and informal dynamics of the internal working of Latin American political parties.

Comrades No More: The Seeds of Change in Eastern Europe. By Renée de Nevers. Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 2003. 320p. \$50.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

— Sarah Birch, *University of Essex*

This volume investigates the dynamics of the transition from communism in six Central European states: Poland, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. The stated aim of the study is to explain variations in the timing of transition and the direction taken by different states. The text is situated within a growing subdiscipline that straddles the division between comparative politics and international relations. Some of the most exciting work on democratic transitions is currently being done in this field, and an analysis of the postcommunist transitions from this perspective is to be welcomed. At the same time, the existing literature purporting to explain the rapid collapse of state socialism in Central and Eastern Europe is very large. To be of use to scholars, any new work in this field must demonstrate that it has something genuinely new or different to add.

Renée De Nevers recognizes this, but she claims that there have not heretofore been any truly satisfactory accounts of why the events in question took place when and how they did. Her study deploys three main explanatory variables: the relations between the ruling elites in each state and their respective societies, external influences (including both the impact of events in the USSR and the role of events in other Central European states), and the perceptions of the ruling elites in each of the states under analysis. After a short introduction, the book starts with a general theoretical chapter, followed by a chapter detailing the key features of the collapse of the USSR and their implications for events in Central Europe. The next five chapters, which form the meat of the analysis, assess the role of the three main explanatory variables in accounting for change in each of the six states, relying largely on a detailed reading of secondary and some primary source material integrated into a “thick description” of events. Poland and Hungary are viewed as states in which reform was initiated from above; the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia (which are considered together in one chapter) are given as examples of reform from below; Bulgaria and Romania figure as late-reforming states. The volume closes with a conclusion that sums up the analyses undertaken in the preceding five chapters and reiterates the overall argument.

The attempt to explain state-level processes through the lens of an IR approach is intriguing; nevertheless, comparativists are likely to be somewhat disappointed with *Comrades No More*, due to the size of the explanatory black box that lies at its center. The three main factors held to account for differences in the course of transition in the countries under investigation ultimately reduce to one: the perceptions of national elites as to the necessity of reform. The other two variables—elite-society relations and cross-national demonstration effects—are seen in terms of reactions by national elites to the internal and external contexts in which they operate. That the analysis turns largely on a single explanatory factor is not necessarily problematic in and of itself. Yet the way in which elite perceptions are described leaves the reader feeling that something is missing. We are told, for example, that “cognitive blinders prevented some leaders from grasping the full extent of the changes going on around them” (p. 5) and that some were more adept than others in perceiving the “urgency of reform” (p. 22 et passim). Elites are thus viewed as either prescient or myopic. There are two main problems with this approach: Firstly, it is based on a highly teleological assumption, and secondly, it is doubtful how much it really explains.

With hindsight, of course, the chain of events that unfolded in the Central European states in 1989 and 1990 appear to have been heading in a common direction from the outset, yet it is unclear why we should expect elites to have seen it that way at the time, or why we should take for granted the inevitability of communist collapse and the eventual initiation of a certain type of reform program. Furthermore, many comparativists will undoubtedly wish that the author had worked harder to come to grips with the strategies of the actors involved. The cognitive processes described in this volume seem somewhat shallow. Actors either comprehend “the need for substantial changes in governance” (p. 21) or they fail to comprehend this need. They either understand the extent of their true legitimacy and accurately estimate their ability to compete in a more open political environment, or they fail to appreciate this. Understanding yields appropriate reform action, whereas failure to understand leads to ultimately self-defeating responses. It would have been useful to have had a fuller account of what drives cognitive processes themselves. We are told that people reason by analogy with previous experience (pp. 38–43), yet it is not entirely evident from this account why the cognitive processes of elites in some countries differed systematically from those in others. Was it socialization, political culture, ideology, too-bounded rationality, or some other factor? The size of this black box will inevitably be somewhat unsettling to many readers.

It is also somewhat unclear that this study does really represent a novel assessment of the communist collapse. Individual country studies on many of these states have yielded more insightful appreciation of the factors—cognitive and otherwise—that drove chains of events in each case. Moreover, demonstration effects and state-society relations are standard features in most accounts of these developments. All in all, one is left with the impression that much of this material is the

result of recycling and repackaging, rather than offering a genuinely novel theoretical perspective. The text might serve as a useful accompaniment to courses in comparative politics and international relations, but I am unconvinced of its value as a scholarly monograph.

Women in Contemporary Mexican Politics. By Victoria E. Rodríguez. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003. 334p. \$50.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Judith Adler Hellman, *York University*

Publishers' exaggerated book jacket claims regarding the originality of the author's contribution to knowledge have often provided reviewers with witty—if unfair—opening remarks and a hook on which to hang their first paragraph. When we consider the amount of literature available on Mexican politics and the number of books that are published on women and politics or just on women and politics in Latin America, it does seem remarkable that no full book-length study has appeared on women in Mexico. However, Victoria E. Rodríguez admirably works to fill that gap, and her book fulfills the publisher's claim that it offers "the first comprehensive analysis" of the way in which Mexican women have made use of new opportunities to participate in the political process.

Focusing on the relationship between women and the political system, Rodríguez analyzes the ways in which women, long dramatically underrepresented in—if not to say all but absent from—the Mexican political elite, have increasingly emerged as key political actors over the last two decades. As she notes, despite their near exclusion from high-level appointed and elected positions, women are increasingly influential in policymaking. This influence springs from their participation in nongovernmental organizations and local and national social movements, as well as their activity in the electoral process as voters, electoral observers, campaign managers, participants in demonstrations and marches, and candidates for internal party positions and public office.

In order to explain how it is that Mexican women are increasingly active in movement and in party politics but remain grossly underrepresented in formal elected or appointed office—or, as she puts it, why women have been active in civil society while remaining marginal players in formal politics—Rodríguez draws on a sample that includes women from a full range of political parties, all regions of Mexico, various arenas of political activity, different levels of government (federal, state, and local), and all three branches of government.

Drawing on her interviews with these politically active women, Rodríguez analyzes the socioeconomic changes in Mexico (such as economic downturns and shifts in labor-force participation and household composition) that have encouraged women's participation, and she identifies the principal obstacles that continue to impede their insertion into political life. She looks at the education and family background of female politicians, how they came to power, which, if any, offices they have held, what kinds of alliances they have developed along gender lines, and the policy agendas they advance. Much like

the research on Mexican political elites conducted in decades past by Roderic Camp and by Peter Smith—work which inevitably focused on male politicians—Rodríguez's survey of female political activists and officeholders centers on their place of origin, age, and generational differences, socioeconomic status, education, career paths, and parental influence. Notably, however, the author emphasizes a category, "spouses and children," that would have been largely, although not entirely, irrelevant to the earlier work of her male colleagues.

Along the way, Rodríguez explores the link among the electoral reforms of the last quarter century, the overall process of transition to democracy in Mexico, and the emergence of women as political actors. She also provides a useful chapter-long summary of the history of the Mexican women's movement. This she traces from its origins in the *soldaderas* who participated in the Mexican Revolution through to the current Fox administration's incorporation of gender in official discourse and its creation of specific institutions "targeted" at women and the family, such as the National Women's Program.

However, to the extent that Rodríguez emphasizes how shockingly few Mexican women are involved in politics, the reader wants to know: compared with whom? When she notes the "dramatic underrepresentation" of Mexican women in high-level appointed and elected positions (p. 4), or that "only a handful" have occupied the most prominent political positions (p. 6), the reader expects to find comparative data that would highlight the contrast not only between Mexican women and men but also with women in other, *comparable* political systems. To be sure, in Chapter 4, she discusses the percentages of women worldwide in national legislatures, cabinet positions, state governorships, national and local legislatures, and other political positions. Unfortunately, the way in which these data are presented is less than useful and persuasive. Many of the comparisons are between the U.S. and Mexican political systems, and while it is interesting to know that Ireland, Latvia, Panama, Saint Lucia, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh have all been governed by women (while Mexico and the United States have not), this information does little to illuminate what we really want to know about the structure of political opportunity for women in Mexico. What we need to know is how Mexico stacks up against countries with similar levels of socioeconomic development and similar cultural and historical backgrounds—in short, with other relatively well-off and advanced countries in Latin America.

Fortunately, while the comparative references to other political systems may be less than telling, Rodríguez's interviewees provide her some key clues as to why the emergence of Political Woman has taken so long in Mexico. Asked what obstacles they had faced, her subjects mention a range of problems that are "very similar to the structural and personal barriers experienced by women worldwide" (p. 45), such as sexism, family opposition, and the extra burden of domestic responsibilities. However, they also underscore the degree to which the systemic corruption of the Mexican political

system during seven decades of one-party rule, and the tremendous risks run by anyone courageous enough to buck this system, created an environment that discouraged women's participation.

Overall, *Women in Contemporary Mexican Politics* is a well-written, carefully researched book offering us the promised "comprehensive analysis" that has long been lacking, along with predictions for Mexican women's increased future participation that we have to hope will be borne out.

Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil.

By David Samuels. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 264p. \$65.00.

— Fabiano Santos, *Rio de Janeiro Graduate Research Institute*

The recent and growing literature on Brazilian politics and institutions is divided into two main perspectives: A first perspective emphasizes politicians' parochial concerns, and the fact that legislators are always seeking to bring pork benefits to their bailiwicks, turning the president into a kind of prisoner of subnational interests. Furthermore, according to this viewpoint, party discipline is low and legislative behavior unpredictable. The second perspective defends the opposite—that is, party behavior is disciplined, Chamber of Deputies' decisions are predictable, and their members are unable to exercise their particularistic profligacy. David Samuels's book is a major contribution to this debate, explicitly in support of the first tradition, sustained by rich and well-organized empirical research, which combines statistical data, interviews, and case studies.

Although this work follows a conventional view about Brazilian politics, its argument is original. Unlike scholars who based their models on the reelection assumption, Samuels questions the relation between governability problems and the drive for reelection in Brazil. Instead, his lens is turned to the way federal institutions shape politicians' ambitions as well as legislative behavior. More specifically, he argues that Brazilian political problems derive from a combination of progressive ambition and the way federalism impacts on national politics. To demonstrate this proposition, the book is divided into three sections, each dedicated to showing through different angles the correctness of its central claim.

In the first section, Samuels offers an important contribution to the study of political careers and its impact on legislative politics. In this sense, he is certainly one of the pioneers in the use of ambition theory as a tool for understanding the political opportunity structure in Brazilian politics, which is not a trivial achievement. Two findings are relevant in this regard: 1) Brazilian politicians do not seek to build a career in the Chamber of Deputies; they view a congressional seat as a potential means for achieving a more powerful office, specially at the executive level in state or municipal administration; 2) the absence of careerism inside the legislative body prevents the development of a hierarchy of positions and universalistic norms allowing access to those positions in the Chamber. In particular, the seniority principle as a rule for internal ascent is only valid for the positions of speaker of

the House and party whips, but does not apply to committee chairs, thus rendering the standing committees unappealing as an instrument of legislators' retention. Samuels, at this point, raises one of the fundamental paradoxes regarding the empowerment of legislative bodies in recent democracies: The Legislature cannot achieve institutionalization because the career incentives for deputies and senators point to the executive branch as the primary locus for intervening in relevant public decisions, and at the same time, the career profile does not change to help retain politicians in the Legislature because the latter is not sufficiently institutionalized (a process that would require exclusive career investments).

A second major contribution relates to the effects of national and subnational elections for executive offices upon national congressional races—the so-called coattail effects. This issue is dealt with in the second section of the book. Samuels, supported by statistical data as well as evidence from interviews, newspapers, and alliance patterns, demonstrates not only that congressional candidates coordinate their efforts around the gubernatorial dispute and not the presidential race, but also that gubernatorial coattails affect the outcome of the congressional elections. This, in turn, serves to explain why governors have influence over congressional deputies and, therefore, how federalism indeed impacts national executive-legislative relations in Brazil. To my knowledge, this is the first thorough scholarly work on coattail effects in Brazilian politics, and it can be said that it is done with academic rigor and elegance.

The third section deals with intergovernmental relations and shows how federalism interacts with progressive ambition, affecting policy performance, political accountability, and democratic governance. Three findings are relevant at this point: 1) Pork barreling exists but is not efficient in securing incumbency for congressional deputies; 2) pork barreling is efficient in the sense of allowing deputies to pursue their progressive ambition strategy; 3) Brazilian federal institutions have been designed to forward legislators' two inter-related goals: to provide resources to their supporters and to serve their own political ambitions. Once again, Samuels shows a meticulous way of working with the evidence, as well as a remarkable analytical capacity.

In spite of the abovementioned achievements of *Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil*, I would like to add some critical remarks. From a general point of view, the time element is missing. The critical perspective on Brazilian political parties, very common in U.S. academic circles and followed by Samuels, does not consider the simple fact that the current party system is relatively young. Any conclusion about the negative effects of Brazilian democratic institutions upon the national party system requires a much longer time span than the one under scrutiny. Indeed, the very fact that the statistical data do not allow one to discard presidential coattail effects (see Table 5.5, p. 103) indicates that governors' influence on congressional politics might not be an obstacle to the institutionalization or nationalization of national parties. In

sum, the reach of Samuel's findings is restricted to the relations among federal institutions, career strategies, and legislative behavior—being silent, however, about long-term tendencies of the Brazilian party system.

From a theoretical standpoint, the combination of two almost opposite traditions should be more clearly stated. As is well known, ambition theory derives from the rational choice paradigm, while institutionalization theory follows the structural-functional approach. I agree that those traditions are more compatible than we are prepared to acknowledge, and Samuel's findings can be taken as a demonstration of this fact. Unfortunately, it seems that the study of this analytical topic was not within Samuel's preoccupations, a fact, notwithstanding, that surely does not diminish the merits of the book as whole.

Politics and the Russian Army: Civil–Military Relations, 1689–2000. By Brian D. Taylor. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 374p. \$75.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

— Jonathan Adelman, *University of Denver*

Brian Taylor has produced an excellent work the first time out of the box. He has written on Russian civil–military relations over more than 300 years, an important and yet somewhat neglected topic, and has done so with significant original research. He rigorously tests four theories (out of nine) to help explain the seemingly unusual development of Russian civil–military relations—from a strong praetorianism in the first century covered to the model of a reliably tame army obedient to civil authority, even as the state crashes about it or the party purges it. As a political scientist, he should be especially commended for undertaking such a fine comparative historical study.

The four major theories Taylor tests over time are domestic structure, organizational structure, corporate interest, and organizational culture. Overall, he finds organizational culture and domestic interest the most compelling. This thread of an organizational culture over the centuries encompasses the belief that any kind of intervention against Russian political leaders (whether tsars, general secretaries of the Communist Party, or the new presidents) is basically illegitimate. This is a fascinating finding, given the repeated weakness of the Russian states in not producing military coups from potentially strong armies. This finding, in contradiction to other scholars, is the most significant in the book.

And yet, although Taylor has done a fine job in a readable work on an important yet neglected topic, there are a number of additions that might have improved the work. To begin with, there is very little space devoted to comparative aspects of civil–military relations. Just as the lengthy study of comparative revolutions (Theda Skocpol, Barrington Moore, Nikkie Keddie, Jack Goldstone, etc.) has greatly enriched the study of revolutions, so too does the comparative study of civil–military relations help us to better understand the case study. For example, the study of Imperial Russia (1689–1917) would have been enriched by looking at

the civil–military relations of other important imperial cases: the Ottoman Turkish Empire, Imperial China, Imperial Japan, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. If knowledge is almost by definition comparative, much that might seem unique to Russia actually adheres to its status as a multinational empire.

Similarly, the Soviet period (1917–91) would have benefited by comparison to other Communist countries, especially China (1949–2003). Then the Soviet army would be seen not as typical of Communist civil–military relations but as an anomaly compared to the politically powerful armies in such Communist states as China, Vietnam, and Cuba. These comparative aspects would definitely have enriched *Politics and the Russian Army*.

So, too, would have been somewhat more emphasis on the civil side of civil–military relations. Naturally, studies such as these tend to focus on the military side of the relationship. Yet Russia underwent enormous economic, political, social, and international changes during more than 300 years. While they crop up from time to time, a systematic analysis of the changing nature of the Russian state, society, and economy would definitely have improved the study.

In addition, there is a most curious omission in this book. World War II (or the Great Patriotic War) is completely omitted. It does not even appear in the index to the volume! Yet, as Seweryn Bialer (*Stalin's Successors*, 1980) showed so well, World War II had a profound impact on Russia in so many ways, including civil–military relations. The role of the Russian military changed, as Bialer shows, throughout the war and had significant impact on the postwar era. Why, for example, did not the Russian military during World War II, like the German military in World War I, basically seize power and run the country for the survival of the nation?

The Russian civil war, as various works have shown, also had a great impact on Russian civil–military relations. Yet it receives short shrift, only five pages. And World War I, which was so critical, receives another five pages. How can these three great wars, which helped determine the fate of Russian civil–military relations in the twentieth century, receive barely 11 pages in a volume of 374 pages? Similarly, the wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya and their impact receive minimal treatment.

Overall, however Taylor has done a fine job in his first effort. We can await further such efforts in the future, making a real contribution to the field.

Dissolution: Sovereignty and the Breakup of the Soviet Union. By Edward W. Walker. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003. 216p. \$65.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

— Joel C. Moses, *Iowa State University*

In Russia's second decade as a country, a majority of surveyed Russians have no idea why June 12 is celebrated as the national holiday of their independence, while a larger percentage in Russia and other post-Soviet countries consider the breakup of the Soviet Union the greatest disaster in their lifetime. Ethnic

separatists in Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova battle for independence or defy their central governments as autonomous quasi states, while the national leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus attempt to integrate their economies with a common currency and other attributes of a single country. Post-Soviet countries mirror the confusion that led to the USSR's dissolution in 1991. The breakup—unforeseen, unplanned, and undesired by most in the USSR and the West—is cogently analyzed in this book by Edward Walker.

The author rejects conventional wisdom in post-Soviet countries and Western academic literature that attributes the breakup to conspiracies by Western and Soviet elites or ethnic discontent overwhelming the central government. He contends that the breakup resulted from an unintended sequence of events, initiated by union-republic elites in a context of great ambiguity and only enflamed by the mistaken responses of Mikhail Gorbachev. Ironically, the vast majority of the Soviet Union voted for continuation of the USSR in the national referendum of March 1991. The Soviet Union collapsed less than nine months after the referendum because of an escalating buildup of demands for greater “sovereignty” and “independence” on the part of union-republic elites, which had become freer to challenge central authority under Gorbachev's economic and political reforms after 1987.

For Walker, the breakup was almost inevitable. Both sides reacted to each other in a reality conditioned by their Soviet institutional and normative legacy. Soviet constitutions had vested nominal sovereignty in the major eponymous ethnic groups as union-republics under Soviet ethno-federalism. The same union-republics from 1922 through the last Soviet constitution of 1977 also retained nominal rights of self-determination and even secession for their ethnic majority. These were meaningless declarative rights—unspecified, unrealizable by any laws, and undefined until Gorbachev's reforms. Yet the self-determination of ethnic groups and their right of secession, ostensibly legitimated by the constitution and doctrinal myths about Soviet ethnic nationalities, became the very rallying points for union-republic elites to assert their increasing economic and political autonomy from the central government in 1988–91. Gorbachev, too, was affected by Soviet nationality myths about the so-called Soviet friendship of peoples, evidenced in his unwillingness to allow secession for any union-republics except by the terms of the extremely draconian law on secession forced through the Soviet parliament in 1990.

The demands by leaders of the union-republic eponymous groups sparked equivalent challenges for sovereignty by numerous other ethnic minorities against their own union-republic governments. The minorities, geographically located within the union-republics, asserted themselves against their ethnic majorities, despite their institutionally vague status as so-called autonomous republics, territories, and districts without formal sovereignty and a right of secession under Soviet constitutional and doctrinal myths. As central communist authority collapsed under Gorbachev's political reforms, a cascade of sovereign resolutions passed by all union-republic

governments and ethnic-minority enclaves found almost everyone by 1991 declaring their sovereignty and independence without actually understanding the ambiguous meaning of the terms or the consequences of their actions. The one group of union-republics resolute in insisting on complete political independence from the Soviet Union from the very outset in 1989–90 and with a broad popular mandate were the three previously independent Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Their defiance of Gorbachev and his hard-line response only ratcheted up the level of demands for sovereignty and independence throughout the Soviet Union, even prior to the August 1991 abortive putsch. That abortive putsch and Ukraine's independence vote in December 1991 were almost anticlimactic events in what had already become the imminent dissolution of the country. For Walker, Gorbachev's attempts to save the country as some form of loose confederation in the last four months of 1991 after the putsch were doomed and feckless.

Dissolution is more an interpretive history based on secondary sources by Soviet participants, Western diplomats, and academics and less an originally researched study of late Soviet politics. The strength of the book is Walker's ability to integrate these various sources into a focused explanation of the Soviet Union's demise. The weakness of the book is that policies and events relative to ethnic nationalities and the breakup of the Soviet Union cannot be isolated and treated separately from Gorbachev's overall program to transform the Soviet Union and end the Cold War with the West. Walker alludes to these other aspects of Gorbachev's program, if sardonically, throughout the book, but key here is Gorbachev's own motivation and vision. In his own memoirs and numerous speeches, Gorbachev has confessed his own failures in not appreciating the scope of the nationality problem in the Soviet Union until too late. His priorities were political and economic reform and foreign policy. His envisioned opposition until 1991 were hard-line Stalinists in the party leadership. The outbreak of ethnic nationalism and demands for sovereignty overwhelmed him because they appeared until 1990 to be an annoying secondary sideshow to the big picture. In contrast, Boris Yeltsin—just as flawed a communist leader and almost as dominant as Gorbachev in influencing events in 1990–91—comes off in Walker's interpretation as relatively blameless for the USSR's demise, despite clinging just as much as Gorbachev to the goal of a confederated Soviet Union very late into 1991.

A fuller interpretation of the Soviet Union's breakup should include its central protagonist Gorbachev in all of his goals and obstacles in 1987–91, but in fairness to Walker, his book was based solely on the specific factors and sequence of events accounting for the Soviet Union's breakup. A well-written, fair, and balanced overview of the period, *Dissolution* would be recommended for undergraduate courses in Soviet and post-Soviet politics. However, as a comprehensive analysis of the USSR's breakup and the one individual, Gorbachev, most directly responsible, it is incomplete.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

A Grand Strategy for America. By Robert J. Art. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 352p. \$29.95.

The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade, and Domestic Politics. By Steven E. Lobell. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003. 256p. \$55.00.

— Henry R. Nau, *George Washington University*

Writing books about American grand strategy became a cottage industry after the Cold War ended. Nevertheless, the two books reviewed here contribute new insights. Both address American grand strategy from a realist perspective. Material and domestic interests drive American foreign policy more than institutions (e.g., G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Constraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*, 2001) or ideas (Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 1996). Bob Art examines military aspects of American grand strategy and unflinchingly reaffirms the relevance of the use of force and American alliances in the new world of grand terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Steven Lobell focuses on economic aspects and demonstrates the importance of liberal commercial policies for transitioning from American hegemony to a more pluralistic world.

Art, a senior and seasoned scholar, deploys his craft masterfully. In *A Grand Strategy for America* he presents a clearheaded, classical, national-interest analysis that starts with a ranking of America's basic interests. The only *vital* interest, he argues, is homeland security, to prevent an attack on American territory. Two other interests qualify as *highly important*: to prevent great power competition and wars in Eurasia (Europe or Asia) that, as history shows, America cannot escape; and to preserve access to reasonably priced and secure oil supplies from the Middle East. And three further interests rank as *important*: to preserve an open international economic system, foster the spread of democracy and human rights and avoid genocide, and protect the global environment. Threats to these interests include grand terror attacks, the spread of weapons of mass destruction to hard-to-deter state leaders and terrorist fanatics, looming prospects of global warming, and the eventual emergence of peer competitor states in Eurasia that might disrupt global peace and markets.

Art then dissects eight grand strategies to promote American interests against these threats. They include American dominion, universal collective security, regional collective security, cooperative security, containment, selective engagement, offshore balancing, and isolationism. The first four strategies he finds wanting because they exceed either the resources (U.S. dominion) or the degree of consensus (universal and regional collective security, as well as cooperative security) necessary to implement them. Containment works only against

specific great-power threats, of which there are none at the moment.

Of the remaining three, Art finds that selective engagement does the best job of safeguarding American interests. It takes advantage of the sunk costs of America's alliances and avoids the need to rebuild these alliances once new threats emerge (offshore balancing) or the illusion that America can hide from such threats altogether (isolationism). Currently, as the author points out, America defends some 37 countries through formal or informal agreements. These countries are located primarily in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. He calls for maintaining forward bases in these areas at roughly present levels (212,000 troops on land, 43,000 afloat, numbers now expanded by U.S. operations in Iraq). He acknowledges that such a strategy may not be selective enough for some critics but argues persuasively that it is much cheaper over the long run than more selective strategies. Certainly, this judgment has been vindicated by U.S. military activities in Iraq, where even though allies such as Germany disapproved America's action, they permitted the United States to use forward bases at considerable savings to the American taxpayer.

Art's analysis is a sober reminder to European and American multilateralists that the use of force remains essential for managing world peace beyond the Atlantic region. Europe still has no credible fighting (as opposed to peacekeeping) force to deploy outside Europe, although it is assembling a small rapid-reaction force. For major threats, it relies on the United States, in part, as Art correctly observes, because Europeans continue to trust American military and especially nuclear leadership more than they do the leadership of one another. He advocates the use of force, however, only to protect vital or highly important interests. In rare cases when the use of force is cheap, quick, and effective, it might also be used to protect democracy (Philippines 1989), prevent mass murder (Rwanda 1994), or preempt threats to more important interests (such as the threat to NATO in Bosnia). And although Art allows for the possibility that America may have to act unilaterally on occasion, he gives no example and completes the book too late to make a judgment on U.S. intervention in Iraq.

Art assumes, correctly I believe, that a large degree of consensus continues to exist between the United States and its principal allies. But if the allies reject the use of force in all but the most extreme situations, the United States may be forced to adopt a strategy somewhat less than selective engagement but more than offshore balancing. Such an alternative is a strategy that operates from the perimeter of world trouble spots but counters threats aggressively, rather than waiting for them to emerge. This strategy would abandon fixed forward bases in favor of greater air and naval power in order to project lightly armed forces into troubled situations around the periphery of Eurasia and the Middle East for specific missions and periods of time. This "offshore plus" strategy, which some Pentagon

planners seem to favor, would reduce dependence on allies to fight conflicts but still depend on allied and international cooperation to keep the peace in unstable countries after the fighting ends.

Lobell has more limited aims in his conceptually rigorous and tightly reasoned study. He explores how declining hegemons reconcile their international commitments with domestic resources, while not undermining their economic power or national security. Both commitments and resources are ultimately a function of the degree of openness of the international commercial system and the impact that this system has on the domestic power struggle between liberal free traders and economic nationalists. An international system populated by challengers who practice free trade will “ratchet up” the relative power of free traders within the hegemon. These groups favor grand strategies that minimize defense costs through arms limitations and more efficient open markets, and thus prolong the transition to a more pluralistic world. By contrast, an international system populated by contenders pursuing imperial commercial policies empowers economic nationalists in the hegemon. Economic nationalists favor strategies of punishment that impose higher defense costs and retaliatory tariffs. These strategies expand the hegemon’s commitments and exhaust its resources, precipitating a more rapid and violent decline of the hegemon.

Lobell tests this argument against three historical periods: 1) Great Britain from 1882 to 1914; 2) Great Britain from 1932 to 1939; and 3) Spain from 1621 to 1640. In the first period, Britain confronted a mix of liberal contenders in the United States, Japan, and France after 1904 and imperial contenders in Germany, Russia, and France before 1904. In this situation, liberal free traders in Great Britain, including the Labour and Liberal Parties, financial service institutions, export firms, the Treasury and Foreign Office, and Gladstonian-minded civil servants, dominated British grand strategy. Minimizing defense outlays, they devolved power to Japan in the Far East (Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902), the United States in the Western Hemisphere (Hay-Paunceforte Treaty of 1901), and France in the eastern Mediterranean (Entente Cordiale in 1904). Great Britain also concluded the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907 and even sought arms limitation agreements with imperial Germany. Germany’s naval buildup in 1912–13 eventually undermined the influence of free traders in London. From that point on, economic nationalists gained power, and British grand strategy shifted progressively from cooperative to punitive strategies toward contenders.

In the period from 1932 to 1939, Britain faced a world of mostly imperial contenders—Japan, the Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy. The exception was the United States. In this situation, Britain pursued policies of “restrained punishment.” Economic nationalists, including inefficient iron, steel, coal, and auto industries, state planners, the military services, defense ministries, and empire organizations, pushed through increased military expenditures, imperial preferences, abandonment of the gold standard, state intervention in the economy, quotas

on Japanese exports, loan and credit embargoes against Germany, and trade sanctions against Italy. By the mid-1930s, free traders at the Bank of England, Treasury, and elsewhere began to compromise with nationalists to “restrain” the policy of punishment. The result was that Britain armed too late to deter Germany but embraced imperial trade policies that clashed with U.S. free-trade objectives after the war.

From 1621 to 1640, Spain faced a world of entirely imperial challengers. Accordingly, economic nationalists determined its grand strategy. Including King Philip IV, his aide the Count-Duke of Olivares, and various empire organizations invested in Portugal, the Indies, and Flanders, the nationalists progressively taxed and squeezed the liberal factions centered in the Cortes (parliament) of Castille; the shipping, textile, and manufacturing industries; and the Genoese bankers. Spain waged a war of punishment against the United Provinces in northeastern Europe, the French and Turks in Italy, the Protestant states in Bohemia, and the Dutch and English in the Americas. By midcentury, Spain had exhausted its resources and gradually faded from great power status.

From this analysis and in contrast to Art, Lobell concludes that the United States should reject grand strategies of selective engagement as well as primacy and devolve power more quickly to liberal challengers in the European Union and Japan. In this manner, the United States takes advantage of a world of predominantly liberal challengers and conserves American resources, while encouraging remaining imperial countries (China and Russia) to follow suit.

Lobell reminds us that power is never value neutral but organizes commercial systems in liberal or imperial terms. Even more importantly, power organizes *political* societies in liberal (democratic) or imperial (authoritarian) terms. U.S. national interests depend on this political identity of nations as much as on their relative power. When identities change, the rank ordering of national interests may change. If a hegemon emerges in Europe that is democratic, namely, the European Union, is it still a highly important interest of the United States to prevent such a hegemon? And if democratic hegemons do not threaten America’s basic interests, does not the spread of liberal democratic regimes become a highly important or even vital interest of the United States, rather than just an important one? After all, the United States does not seek merely to defend its homeland from attack. It seeks to preserve a liberal democratic society. A liberal international commercial system advances this objective, as Lobell suggests. But no liberal commercial system exists without an underlying military order that preserves a liberal peace, sometimes, as Art argues, by using force against despotic threats. What governs the use of force in these situations, however, are not just territorial or economic objectives. Political objectives matter more. We could defeat terrorism materially but, in the process, lose our civil liberties. No one would consider that homeland security. Realists are slowly beginning to recognize that political values, which motivate power, are also facts and that it is only “realistic” to take them into account.

Studies in International Mediation: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Z. Rubin. Edited by Jacob Bercovitch. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 304p. \$75.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— Gilbert M. Khadiagala, *The Johns Hopkins University*

Jeffrey Rubin died in 1995, leaving a remarkable record of scholarship on conflict resolution and international mediation. As a social psychologist, he was one of the key scholars who furnished genuine interdisciplinary insights into the art and science of mediation. Through these efforts, comparative studies from broad contexts, such as family, labor, and business, have enriched knowledge of third-party intervention in international conflicts. In the spirit of acknowledging Rubin's contributions, Jacob Bercovitch has assembled essays from mediation scholars and practitioners who ponder some of the contemporary themes in the field.

Bercovitch's introductory chapter seeks an overarching theme to the book that is anchored on explanations for effectiveness of mediation in international relations. In the conclusion, he returns to the question of measuring success, drawing much more closely from Rubin's perspectives on the resources of successful mediators. Yet the editor's introduction and conclusion are too modest to do justice to contributions that seem to cover broader conceptual and empirical ground. Perhaps essays that honor an eminent scholar need not stick too rigidly to the conceptual strictures of edited books that are often lambasted for lacking a strong organizing framework. Dispensing with such conventions may allow contributors to sit comfortably and think loudly about the state of the field. This book succeeds not at generating novel knowledge about mediators in a wide array of international conflicts but, rather, in affording prominent scholars and policy analysts the opportunity to reflect (and restate) their own ideas and experiences about mediation.

Peter Carnevale and Dean Pruitt's theoretical chapters reiterate the terms of the debate on the role of power and leverage in mediation. How is power defined and contextualized in mediation? Do powerful mediators prevail over weak ones? Carnevale sidesteps the perennial conflicts about whether power and leverage are crucial to mediation outcomes; instead he makes a useful distinction between strategic and tactical power, concepts that speak to distinctive notions of power and allow a differentiation of structural (resource) and process components of power. Furthermore, in a theme that is subsequently elaborated by Marieke Kleiboer, Carnevale warns that powerful mediators do not always prevail in mediation: They may overreach their hands or become constrained by domestic and international concerns. Similarly, Pruitt's essay adds a perceptual component to I. William Zartman's structural thesis on the factors leading disputants to resolve conflicts. He argues that although third-party intervention works best where parties are already facing an unbearable stalemate, success is dependent on the motivation and optimism of disputants about searching for peace.

There are solid contributions that combine conceptual analysis and case studies, in particular, Karin Aggestam on the Oslo process, Zartman on the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Chad and Congo, Judith Fretter on the United Nations' role in mediation, and Kleiboer's on the United States mediation of the Falkland crisis. Both Zartman and Fretter agree that the ability of international organizations to mediate is hampered by their lack of a corporate identity; instead they muddle through intervention roles by serving as sites of mediation efforts by individuals designated by members of these organizations. The chapter by James Wall, Daniel Druckman, and Paul Diehl attempts to specify the growing mediation roles of international peacekeepers, but it falls short of providing a clear explanation of these roles, ending predictably with what they describe as a "mixed feeling" conclusion: "In the mediation of intense conflicts by peacekeepers as well as civilians, we are able to evaluate the mediation when it fails. However, it is very difficult to evaluate when it is not a failure. Seldom is any intense conflict—in peacekeeping or civilian sectors—totally resolved by mediation" (p. 159).

Larry Dunn and Louis Kreisberg offer an excellent account of the proliferation of mediation and peacemaking activities by transnational organizations, notably nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Long confined to nonofficial, track II, supplementary diplomatic tasks, NGOs have assumed more weighty roles as mediators, oftentimes supplanting official state actors. The NGOs' intervention opportunities and clout stem partly from their proximity to disputants and strategic engagement in conflicts as providers of emergency, humanitarian, and development assistance. Traditionalists decry the intrusion of these actors in peacemaking enterprises, charging that they "crowd" negotiating circuits and "meddle" in areas in which they have the least expertise. Dunn and Kreisberg nonetheless show that given the complexities of contemporary conflicts (especially intercommunal wars), it is more realistic to conceive of multiple intermediaries as service providers, performing differentiated but supplementary roles. The key to managing new transnational actors is how to coordinate their activities with those of governments and international organizations. The theme of coordination and coherence of intermediary roles is also analyzed by Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aal. They contend that although multiple intermediaries invariably increase the likelihood of conflicting interests and positions, varied experiences in the former Yugoslavia, Mozambique, Central America, and Central Africa point to effective coordination of mediation roles.

The academic tribute to Rubin is well deserved. *Studies in International Mediation* also offers a chance to those who have not had the opportunity to read the primary works of the leading authors that Bercovitch has assembled. Such preliminary exposure probably should be an inspiration for further exploration of their works. Like Pruitt and Carnevale's *Negotiation in Social Conflict* (1993), this book should be useful in introductory conflict resolution classes.

Banking on Reform: Political Parties and Central Bank Independence in the Industrial Democracies. By William T. Bernhard. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. 256p. \$65.00.

— Susanne Lohmann, *University of California, Los Angeles*

This is a classical comparative politics treatment of a topic that has attracted a lot of attention in economics and relatively little attention in political science: central bank independence. Economists analyze what they take to be the politics of central bank independence by setting up reductionist three-player games that collapse the government, the central bank, and the private sector (or the people) into three “representative” agents. They then proceed to characterize the conditions under which central bank independence is a Good Thing. Central bank independence is treated as a *deus ex machina*: A government that is better off with an independent central bank can just simply declare its central bank independent and make its declaration stick.

To analyze the politics of central bank independence, we need to move away from such thin economic analysis. First, we need to relax the representative-agent assumptions and account for conflicts of interest within the government, within the central bank, and among the people, which includes attending to the political mechanisms by which such conflicts are resolved. Second, we need to address the roots of central bank independence by modeling the embeddedness of the central bank in the larger political system. This is the research program in political science, to which William Bernhard contributes, with the result that he can explain puzzles and patterns the economics literature can not.

We observe institutional change over time and institutional variation across countries. In the 1970s and 1980s, we find few independent central banks. Starting in the late eighties and throughout the 1990s, we see a wave of central bank reforms culminating in Europe with the establishment of an independent European central bank. Now, I suppose we could say, the early adopters—Germany, Switzerland, and the United States—intuitively got it right, and other policymakers followed once they read the central banking literature and saw the light. I do believe this is a case where the successful practice of the early adopters combined with an academic literature to influence reality, but there is more to the story. Certainly the research program in comparative politics is to prefer an explanation that relates institutional change over time, and the staggered pattern of reform across countries, to the political fundamentals of the countries in question.

Enter Bernhard. He argues that the choice of central bank independence, or of institutional arrangements that further independence, is a function of intraparty or intracoalitional conflicts. Such conflicts can threaten the ability of a party or party coalition to attain and remain in power. The act of delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank removes monetary policy from the political agenda so that it can no longer serve as a source of conflict. Moreover, parties and party coalitions are fraught with information asymmetries and monitoring problems. For example, backbench legislators

are less well informed about government policy and suspicious of their government ministers. An independent central bank can serve as a credible information source separate from the government.

With a happy mix of case studies and regression analysis, Bernhard proceeds to tie together all the various puzzles and patterns as he provides empirical support for his hypothesis. *Banking on Reform* is comparative politics in action and at its best.

Inevitably, any truly comparative (systematic cross-country) exercise will run into a member of the audience who has deeper and more specialized knowledge about one of the countries included in the analysis and who will object, “This is not [fill in name of country].” I happen to know a lot about Germany, and I followed Bernhard’s argument for all countries except for Germany. A book review is not the place to develop a full-blown alternative theory, so let me just pursue one line of thought.

One of the puzzles Bernhard describes is the independence enjoyed by the Bundesbank in the late 1970s and early 1980s when it followed a monetary policy that ran counter to the economic policy of the Social-Liberal Coalition. In the early 1980s, the Bundesbank pushed interest rates to their highest postwar levels. This was the time when German unemployment rates ratcheted up to *their* highest postwar levels from which they have since not recovered. The Social-Liberal Coalition fell apart over questions of monetary and economic policy. Certainly in the perception of the Social Democrats (and this is also Bernhard’s view), the Bundesbank hurt the popularity of the Social-Liberal Coalition and contributed to its demise.

Here is what does not quite fit. Bernhard suggests that the Social-Liberal Coalition needed an independent central bank to reduce intracoalitional conflict and thus supported the Bundesbank. But the Bundesbank *increased* the conflict between the coalition partners: It drove them apart and the Free Democrats into the arms of the Christian Democrats. I interviewed leading Social Democrats in 1984, and it is clear to me that if the Social Democrats could have killed the Bundesbank, that is what they would have done. Leaders and backbenchers alike *hated* the Bundesbank. The problem was that they could not touch the Bundesbank because of the sacred status it enjoyed with the general public. In the late 1990s I was once again witness to conversations that now suggested to me that the Christian Democrats were just as unhappy with the extreme independence of the Bundesbank, which was seen as out of control. Much better to fold the Bundesbank into a European central bank and thereby get rid of it. Remember Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s fierce determination to move forward with a European central bank? On this count he was backed by an all-party consensus that ran counter to economic models, implying that Germany would not benefit from a European monetary union and, counter to public opinion polls, suggesting that the German people were opposed to giving up their *deutsche mark*.

My argument is backed up by the work of Carlo Tognato, who recently analyzed the language of the Deutsche Bundesbank: How do Bundesbank representatives speak when they address the general public, on the one hand, and more specialized audiences, on the other? He found that public discourse on money and central banking in Germany is permeated with religious figures of speech; specialist discourse has no religious overtones. *Vis-à-vis* the general public, the Bundesbank pictures the deutsche mark as a religion, the Bundesbank as its high priest, and the *Deutsches Volk* as a select people. Germans are dropping their church memberships in droves, but their brains are still responding to religious cues. Tognato's dissertation pins down one root of Bundesbank independence—arguably *the* most powerful root: religion. As the idea for a European central bank was being formulated in the 1990s, scholars and policymakers pieced together an institution that in many respects resembles the Bundesbank. But it turns out that the religious underpinnings of Bundesbank independence did not travel nearly as well as the formal institution: The speeches of the European central bank are untouched by religious imagery. The European central bank is more independent on paper, but it is politically not as out of control as was the Bundesbank of old.

Globalization and Human Rights. Edited by Alison Brysk. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. 310p. \$49.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

— Richard Sandbrook, *University of Toronto*

If you approach this book expecting it to illuminate the complex relationship between globalization and human rights, you will be disappointed. The editor's introduction and conclusion reflect, but do not dispel, a pervasive indeterminacy, while the individual contributions head off in all directions.

The terms in which the issue is cast could not but produce highly ambiguous conclusions. Globalization, the independent variable, is defined far too broadly. Encompassing four disparate dimensions—transnational migration and citizenship, global markets and commodification, international flows of information, and transnational norms embodied in governance (p. 7)—globalization inevitably engenders multiple and contradictory effects. To compound the analytical challenge, human rights, the dependent variable, is also multidimensional. It includes security rights, social rights, and collective rights. Furthermore, the editor then points out that the “filtering” effect of national states on global flows is important, but that this effect itself depends on the type of state involved in this filtering process. Hence, we arrive at the obvious but unhelpful thesis: that the threats and opportunities for human rights depend on the type of globalization, the kind of rights affected, and the filtering role of the state (p. 15). But with four types of globalization, three kinds of human rights, and several kinds of filtering states, this framework is unlikely to illuminate an admittedly complex reality. And it does not.

Although the contributions to this volume are disparate in focus, level of analysis, methodology, and normative stance,

many are engaging and informative on their own terms. Richard Falk introduces a note of realism and controversy when he asks whether an inherent contradiction arises between the promotion of human rights and the goals of global market forces. He concludes that there is no such inherent contradiction, though reconciling the two will require fundamental global reforms pressed through a “globalization-from-below.” It is refreshing to see human rights treated as an ideology of domination, as well as an analytical concept. Jack Donnelly's penultimate chapter—“Human Rights, Globalizing Flows, and State Power”—is a concise, comprehensive, and insightful reflection on the relationship between globalization and human rights. If the reader reads only one chapter in this book, it should be this one. Donnelly concludes that although several international human rights norms have weakly developed, states must still be treated as the bulwarks of human rights. States are still needed to tame the negative tendencies of global market forces, just as they tamed national market forces in the form of the liberal-democratic welfare state.

Globalization and Human Rights concludes with a potentially useful discussion of “policy possibilities.” Although one agrees with many among the myriad prescriptions proffered by the editor, one often wonders who is to be the agent of the deep reforms that transform power relations. For example, if it is true that “human rights require cosmopolitan democracy” (p. 255), how will cosmopolitan democracy be achieved? The apparent answer is unpromising: “[T]ransnational campaigns for greater accountability should balance policymaking insiders with grassroots outsiders” (p. 254). This sounds like a prescription for paralysis or co-optation.

Capitalism, Not Globalism: Capital Mobility, Central Bank Independence, and the Political Control of the Economy.

By William Roberts Clark. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003. 192p. \$60.00.

— Thomas D. Willett, *The Claremont Colleges*

This is an important book that should enjoy a wide readership. It also has a catchy title. However, I did not figure out what “capitalism, not globalism” means, and since I have not yet seen it on bumper stickers or protestors' signs, I gave up the effort. This is a serious scholarly work, not a pop discussion of capitalism and globalization. The subtitle gives an accurate description. The book deals with major issues, such as the influence of globalization on domestic macroeconomic policymaking, and shows convincingly that we need to be wary of broad generalization about the effects of international capital mobility and central bank independence on domestic policymaking. In place of grand and typically false generalizations, we need to focus on more nuanced contingent hypotheses.

Standard open-economy macroeconomics shows that increasing capital mobility will have differential effects on the strengths of domestic monetary and fiscal policy, and that even the signs of these effects depend on whether fixed or flexible exchange rates are in place. Thus, contrary to the typical broad generalization that globalization undercuts the effects of domestic

economic policies (and in the extreme will lead to a withering away of the state), increasing capital mobility will make national fiscal policy stronger under fixed exchange rates and monetary policy stronger under flexible exchange rates. Likewise, contrary to the frequently expressed belief that high capital mobility and pegged exchange rates will lead to greater discipline over domestic macroeconomic policies, by making it easier to finance deficits in the short run, this combination can actually reduce discipline over fiscal policy. Italy in the 1980s and Argentina in the 1990s provide powerful examples of this possibility.

A major strength of William Roberts Clark's analysis is that he brings to bear these more nuanced conclusions of modern open-economy macroeconomic analysis to the treatment of the politics of macroeconomic policies. In doing so, he contributes importantly to the growing integration of the fields of comparative and international political economy. Once we recognize the importance of international developments on domestic politics and economics and the impact of domestic politics and economics on international policies, the rationales for the traditional separation of these two fields disappear.

Clark's contributions go well beyond providing state-of-the-art applications of open-economy economics for political scientists. The author also makes major contributions to the ongoing debate over partisan versus political business-cycle approaches to the politics of macroeconomic policies. He cogently emphasizes that we need to analyze not only the political incentives to manipulate macroeconomic policies, but also the physical and institutional limitations on policies and their effects imposed by such factors as the degree of capital mobility and central bank independence and the nature of the exchange rate regimes in place. Again, we also need to differentiate between effects on monetary and fiscal policy and in some cases their interaction. Thus, for example, contrary to the conventional wisdom that fixed exchange rates, central bank independence, and high capital mobility discipline domestic macroeconomic policy, the presence of the first and third factors can undercut the ability of an independent central bank to offset a fiscally induced political business cycle. (The key here is that the fiscal expansion induces capital inflows that are too powerful to be offset by the central bank and, hence, force domestic monetary expansion to complement the fiscal expansion.)

Another important contribution of Clark's book is that he offers not just theory but empirical support for such explanation. His formal modeling and econometrics can make the full book heavy going for political scientists who do not already have a good deal of economics. Fortunately, however, Clark is a clear writer and presents extensive introductions and conclusions to each chapter, as well as nontechnical introductory and concluding chapters. Therefore, a good appreciation of the arguments should be accessible to any political scientists interested in comparative or international political economy. The sophistication and insights of the analysis will make it important reading for many economists as well.

Clark rightly argues that we cannot usefully analyze the effects of economic developments and constraints on policy in

the absence of specific models of political economy. Here, however, we are somewhat at sea. The battle continues to rage not only between advocates of partisan versus political business cycle (PBC) approaches but also among adherents of different versions of PBC theory. Given the different spins by warring scholars, it is hard for the nonspecialist to gain a perspective on the current state of this literature. Clark's chapter gives the best midlength perspective currently available. He comes out squarely on the PBC side. He provocatively argues in the introduction: "Recent empirical studies have produced confusing results because they were looking for the effects of capital mobility on a phenomenon that does not exist—namely, partisan differences in policies and outcomes" (p. 2). I am much more comfortable with his later summary of the partisan literature: "A review of this literature reveals many contradictory findings and few authoritative empirical tests" (p. 81). Reading the evidence in *Capitalism, Not Globalism* has shifted down my priors of the empirical usefulness of partisan explanations of macroeconomics policies, but not all the way to zero.

Another important qualification of Clark's analysis is that, like much of the other recent literature, he does not distinguish between fixed and adjustably pegged exchange rates. For many purposes, however, such as evaluating effects on discipline or the likelihood of currency crises, this distinction can be crucial. In his specific application, this distinction may well have not made a great deal of difference, but there is clearly fruitful work to be done extending Clark's theoretical and empirical analysis to a wider range of exchange rate regimes.

When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict Among Major Powers.

By Vesna Danilovic. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. 312p. \$55.00.

Deterrence Now. By Patrick M. Morgan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 358p. \$70.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

— Zeev Maoz, *Tel Aviv University*

Deterrence is a theory that incorporates psychological, economic, political, and military ideas about the prevention of war through the threat of disproportionate punishment to would-be challengers of a given status quo. This notion was built into military and diplomatic measures that defined national security policymaking for millennia. Yet the convergence of deterrence theory and the policy peaked during the nuclear era. This theory appealed to both academic scholars and to policymakers as a middle-of-the road alternative to appeasement or Armageddon.

Research on deterrence over the past two decades required reconsideration of many of the traditional maxims of deterrence theory. Quite a few studies tested the fundamental propositions of the theory. In addition, the political developments of the last two decades—the end of the Cold War, the rise of wars of low-intensity conflict, and the challenge of international terrorism—raised new issues about the theory and practice of deterrence. The two studies reviewed herein reflect these trends.

Vesna Danilovic's book sets out to test several propositions about the conditions for the success and failure of deterrence. Danilovic argues that deterrence theory failed to distinguish between threats that are inherently credible and those that are not. Not all threats are inherently credible in the sense that the deterrer has a fundamental interest in the issues at stake. In some cases, the deterrer may have a general interest in maintaining an image of resolve and commitment even when the issues at stake do not serve immediate interests. She contends that the more intrinsically important the issues at stake, the more credible the deterrent threat, and thus the more likely is deterrence to work. She points out that other factors—in particular, capabilities, resolve, and reputation for honoring commitments—are at work as well. Danilovic's contribution lies in the assessment of the effect of inherent credibility on the stability of deterrence.

The second chapter of *When the Stakes Are High* consists of an elaborate discussion of major powers and global contenders. This discussion does not do justice to the subject because it is clearly not immediately related to the question of deterrence as it may well take place in situations involving or excluding major powers. Dealing with major powers only may well generate biased inferences. The theoretical rationale for the population of cases analyzed in this book is better served by Appendix B (pp. 225–30), which provides an operational definition of major powers and major power contenders.

Danilovic distinguishes between general and immediate deterrence and between direct and extended deterrence (Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*, 1983). She views immediate deterrence as failed general deterrence (pp. 54–56). The study focuses on all four types of deterrence, as opposed to other studies that typically focused on cases of immediate-extended deterrence. (A notable exception is Paul Huth and Bruce Russett ["General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models," *American Political Science Review* 87 (March 1993): 61–73], who tested general deterrence, in addition to previous tests of extended deterrence.)

This study offers a set of carefully constructed empirical tests of the impact of two sets of variables on deterrence outcomes. The first set—capabilities and resolve—is derived from traditional deterrence theory. The second set of factors—intrinsic credibility and regime-related domestic costs—has received less attention in the literature.

The findings suggest that all four factors affect the onset of a deterrence effort and deterrence success. The ratio of the defender to a challenger's capabilities, the defender's relative regional interests (the measure of inherent credibility), the defender's past behavior (a measure of resolve), and the defender's democracy score increase the likelihood that deterrence would be applied in conflict, and the probability that the deterrence effort would be successful (the challenger acquiesces, or a compromise is reached).

One problem with the study is its failure to encompass a fundamental distinction between conventional and nuclear settings with regard to what constitutes high stakes. Beyond the

intrinsic interests of the defender and challenger, the stakes are also defined by the type of deterrence and the capabilities involved. The United States attempted to overcome the credibility gap in Europe during the Cold War by placing tactical and intermediate nuclear weapons on the Soviet Union's doorstep. A distinction between nuclear and conventional deterrence is equally or more significant to the definition of stakes than are trade- or alliance-related indicators of inherent credibility. It would have been profitable to examine the robustness of the findings with respect to nuclear and nonnuclear episodes of deterrence.

This criticism notwithstanding, Danilovic's work is a significant contribution to the literature on deterrence. The author combines hypotheses from traditional deterrence theory with original hypotheses concerning the effect of inherent credibility on deterrence, and she lays out a careful design for examining these hypotheses. The findings offer ample food for thought for the application of deterrence in a post-Cold War world. The book should be studied by students and practitioners of deterrence, and it carries significant implications for the practice of deterrence in a unipolar world.

Deterrence Now is an ambitious undertaking by a scholar who has made significant conceptual contributions to the study of deterrence in the past. Patrick Morgan attempts to assess the state of knowledge on deterrence theory and policy to date. In addition, he also addresses several new challenges to deterrence theory and policy, some of which did not receive sufficient attention in the literature, and some of which are an outgrowth of the post-Cold War world.

The first chapter discusses the practice of deterrence during the Cold War era. The discussion leads to a somewhat mixed conclusion: "[Nuclear weapons] were not irrelevant, but their main contribution lay in heightening incentives for war avoidance, . . . promoting caution in a very severe political conflict, and avoiding the appeal of cheap-victory strategies which nuclear weapons themselves made possible" (p. 41).

The second chapter discusses rationality and deterrence. It reaches a controversial conclusion that rationality is not necessary for deterrence. Moreover, the irrationality of deterrers may account for deterrence success in some cases. None of these arguments is supported by facts. Rather, Morgan's argument is that the debate between rational deterrence theorists and their critics could be resolved by removing rationality as a requirement of deterrence altogether. Quite a few scholars from both the rational deterrence school and its critics would have some problems with this argument.

Morgan's review of the empirical literature suggests that there exists a remarkable convergence across empirical studies of deterrence, regardless of genre and method. Nuclear weapons per se do not have a dominant effect on deterrence outcomes. The overall record of deterrence efforts is mixed, with some positive results. The challenger's motivation is the most important factor determining deterrence success or failure. Finally, local rather than overall military balances affect deterrence outcomes.

The last part of the book consists of an analysis of collective actor deterrence, the effect of the Revolution in Military Affairs

(RMA) on deterrence, and the future of deterrence in a post-Cold War world. Morgan freely admits (p. 201) that much of the discussion is speculative due to the lack of empirical research on these subjects. However, his insights are worthy of serious consideration. He argues that collective actor deterrence is likely to be tenuous and difficult to manage. Clearly, the failure of collective action deterrence in the case of Iraq—a process that unfolded after the book had been in press—supports this observation.

Morgan's assessment of the effects of RMA on deterrence is more optimistic. Technology is seen to have a positive impact on the ability to deter through the use of surgical strikes and "post-heroic" warfare (Edward N. Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*, 2001, pp. 68–80). At the same time, other factors, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and information warfare, may offset these positive implications.

Deterrence Now is an exceptionally well written book. It is impossible to escape the specialized jargon of deterrence discourse. Morgan, however, does a superb job of explaining the key concepts and the fundamental practical dilemmas of deterrence. The clear language makes this book a pleasure to read, both for the uninitiated and for those versed in the deterrence literature.

The book addresses important issues that received only rudimentary treatment in the past, and reconsiders deterrence in light of recent technological and political changes. On both matters, the discussion is sensible and illuminating. Some of the insights are bound to be controversial, however. The argument about deterrence without rationality is controversial and may even be self-defeating. The discussion of the inherent difficulties in testing deterrence theory is questionable. This seems to be contradicted by Morgan's comprehensive review of the numerous large-*n* and case study-based studies, which suggests that not only is such testing possible, but it also yields fairly consistent cross-method and cross-study findings. Finally, his lumping together of compellence (or compellance, as spelled in the book) and deterrence might raise considerable objection. These are fundamentally two different—and, in my view, diametrically opposed—issues. Deterrence is, as Morgan argues correctly, a theory of war avoidance through the use of threats. Compellence is a theory of the use of force for political purposes that may entail both dissuasion and coercion. As Clausewitz's classical definition of war goes: "War is an act of force designed to compel our enemy to fulfill our will" (Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, 1973 [1832], p. 1). This strange wedding of the two concepts raises quite a few questions about the assessment of collective actor deterrence or of the effects of RMA on deterrence.

This said, however, this book is an important contribution to the study of deterrence. It should become essential reading to anyone who wishes to understand how deterrence was practiced in the past and what kind of challenges the theory and the practice of deterrence face down the post-Cold War road that lies ahead.

Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation. Edited by Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. \$65.00.

— Fernando Lopez-Alves, *University of California, Santa Barbara*

This is a book that revisits the war–state making nexus, incorporates the role of guerrilla groups, brigands, and paramilitary forces in institution building, carves a role for the police corps in theories of state formation, and, not less importantly, adds to the usual set of cases often included in this type of collection the experience of the United States. For all of this, the effort should be praised and taken very seriously, not the least of all because, as one reads through the volume, one senses the challenges posed both for authors and editors involved in the collection. In addition to some well-known authors who have contributed worthwhile chapters, the editors have profited from the collaboration of innovative younger scholars who have tried to add new insights and fresh research to these subject matters, and they have done so elegantly and solidly.

Taken together, this collection is a must read for those interested in collective action, armed forces, police forces, and non-conventional warfare in connection with state building and democracy. The editors have provided a detailed and solid introduction and conclusion—although the conclusions are, as is usually the case, somewhat repetitive. The introduction by Diane Davis sets up the problems the book attempts to tackle and provides a sort of short scholarly history of each of these—by now traditional—questions. The conclusion by Anthony W. Pereira does a very good job of summarizing arguments and findings.

The collection possesses additional virtues. For example, providing the reader with the right dosage of scholarship on the right type of subject remains one of the greatest tests of edited volumes. This one passes the test with distinction. The book, for instance, gives us the right dosage of work on conventional armed forces, and it does it from agile perspectives that are most welcome in a field of inquiry that, more often than not, has theoretically lagged behind others and produced routine and almost tedious studies. And as the title promises, the majority of the chapters (8 out of 12) focus on less researched subject matters: nontraditional forces or even groups whose power derives from their prior affiliation with armed forces, as is the case with veterans.

Most authors in this volume arrive at a similar conclusion: first, that irregular armed forces and police can enjoy—and do enjoy—different degrees of legitimacy and popularity during important periods of institution building; and second, that this affects politics at the local and national level in various degrees. A general point they suggest is well taken: Unlike traditional views on these issues, the influence that irregular armed forces and police can wield on politics and institutions is not just a consequence of their military strength. Their legitimacy in the eyes of the population may matter even more.

Like most edited volumes, however, this falls prey to a major problem: how to correlate contributions from different scholars into a coherent theoretical statement about a specific

subject matter. There is, no doubt, a core theme that runs through the book: how armed groups of different types—whether independent from, connected to, or opposing the state in different ways—influence state building and development. Yet because most chapters focus on questions that are not necessarily related to the next chapter's subject matter, the volume is in need of a fair dosage of intellectual elaboration to establish a baseline from which the reader could grasp how these contributions would inform a general theory of state formation.

Most edited volumes confront this problem, and only a few are able to overcome it. Despite all its virtues, this is not, unfortunately, one of them. Questions of conventional warfare, or the role of the police in local politics and its connections to the military, for instance, are only distantly related. The real challenge is precisely to make that connection. One can see how problems associated with the post-American Civil War mobilization of Union veterans in the United States, and the nature of paramilitary forces in Colombia in relation to democracy, can belong to the same type of general question. Yet one needs some scholarly elaboration to make that linkage explicit. Such elaboration, unfortunately, is absent from the very good introduction and conclusion that the editors offer, and that elegantly sum up the major questions and conclusions of the chapters. The same can be argued about most authors: The exceptions to the rule are Charles Tilly, Anne Raffin, William Reno, and the short chapter by Miguel Centeno.

In other words, while most of the chapters of *Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation* are interesting, worthwhile reading, and offer precious data that deserve to be incorporated into a comparative theory of state making, only a few authors dare to risk encompassing theoretical statements. Thus, despite all the praise that it deserves, the collection still does not do enough to integrate its different contributions into a comprehensive, comparative framework that could be taken as a general reference for future work on this very important aspect of state building.

Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World.

Edited by François Debrix. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003. 304p. \$69.95 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

— Michael J. Shapiro, *University of Hawaii*

The “linguistic turn,” which had made a significant impact on philosophy by the mid-twentieth century, invaded the social sciences decades later (beginning in the early 1980s). In the discipline of political science, until quite recently, the invasion was confined primarily to the subfield of political theory. However, eventually, even the somewhat intellectually challenged subfield of international relations began experiencing the spillover effects of linguistic philosophy's challenge to empiricist epistemology. In this book, the linguistic turn's impact on international relations is taken as an accomplished fact and is explicated and implemented through its articulation in the postempiricist approaches known as constructivism and poststructuralism.

In both his introduction and his chapter on the language–IR relationship, the volume's editor, François Debrix, does a creditable job of representing the diverse influences of contemporary linguistic philosophy on IR methods, analyzing especially well both the compatibilities and tensions between poststructuralist and constructivist approaches, which he locates under the general rubric of nonfoundationalism. Debrix's first step is to argue that, contrary to foundationalist conceits, the world does not tell us what to say about it (or, one might say, as Michel Foucault has famously put it, the world does not turn to us a legible face). Thereafter, he points out that once nonfoundationalism is accepted and internalized, new domains of inquiry open up. Rather than accepting the geopolitical imaginaries articulated in official policy discourses (which traditional IR scholars have tended to recycle), those inoculated by variations of the linguistic turn have produced a diverse and critical IR literature, some of which Debrix reviews, primarily to illustrate the alternative metatheoretical predicates of their investigations.

The collection of essays that follows Debrix's shaping remarks displays the strengths and weaknesses of the anthology genre (especially because, of late, publishers demand strictly cropped contributions). On the one hand, the reader gets an assortment of interpretations of the significance of the linguistic turn for IR, but on the other, none of the treatments enjoys enough space to engage in effective inquiry. In this volume, each chapter provides a view of language philosophy (with J. L. Austin's speech act approach being the dominant choice), followed by a brief illustration of its significance for a postempiricist IR. At a minimum, the attention to Austinian speech acts throughout the volume, especially Austin's explication of illocutionary meaning—statements in which saying something is doing something—should instruct those schooled in traditional philosophies of the social sciences to rethink the radical separation between discourse and action. And readers encouraged to pursue the texts of Austin (and Wittgenstein, who also receives some attention), will be apprised not only of an alternative, inquiry-enabling view of language but also of the interpretive contexts that afflict attempts to stabilize the meaning of concepts. Karin Fierke's explication and illustration of Wittgenstein's notion of the “language game,” in a chapter on language and method in IR, is especially instructive in this respect. She also provides a compelling critique of the assumption that a focus on discourse has nothing to do with “empirical research.”

Apart from its pedagogy about contemporary language philosophy, the collection offers commentaries on politically relevant concepts. Thus, recognizing that language philosophies of Austin and Wittgenstein put pressure on a simplistic, causal view of human agency, several of the authors turn to issues of action and responsibility. For example, after doing a politically acute reading of Austin's essay “A Plea for Excuses,” Kennan Ferguson raises some provocative issues about the responsibility for warfare. He illustrates why Austin's approach to the action–agency relationship provides a more effective frame for treating issues of responsibility than can be

achieved within strictly causal, intentionalist epistemological imaginaries.

Timothy Luke's chapter on discursivity and concursivity is also conceptually innovative. Addressing himself to the issue of how international events occur in the twenty-first century, he contrasts a focus on "concursivity" (the discursive map of shared practices and understandings) with the neorealism of conventional IR theorists. Similarly, Siba Grovogui creatively mobilizes the concept of the postcolonial gaze, which is more familiar within the discipline of comparative literature than IR, in order to illuminate the ways in which speech act theory, wedded to a reverse (i.e., self-reflective) ethnographic stance, can issue in a politically perspicuous mode of postcolonial criticism.

At their best, the other chapters in the volume offer critical insights into historical and contemporary events—for example, Janice Mattern's treatment of the language–power nexus articulated during the historic "Suez crisis," Katja Weber and Andrew Cowart's analysis of the discursive debate between Adenauer and Schumacher about Germany's post–World War II role, and Anthony Lang's critical sorting of approaches to moral discourse as they bear on the recent "humanitarian intervention" in Somalia.

Otherwise, much of the analysis in the various chapters rehearses the now-familiar debates between a traditional neorealism, which still dominates IR, and the increasingly influential critical margin, which has managed to achieve a conceptual release from referential approaches to language. Notable in this aspect are three chapters: Harry Gould's response to the challenge of a more causal and intentionalist theory of action, Nicholas Onuf's critique of linear identity narratives, and Franke Wilmer's treatment of the incommensurability between official discourses on war and the narratives of victims. Ultimately, especially for the uninitiated in critically oriented IR, *Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World* provides a valuable survey of implications.

Locating the Proper Authorities: The Interaction of Domestic and International Institutions. Edited by Daniel W. Drezner. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003. 288p. \$55.00.

— B. Peter Rosendorff, *University of Southern California*

Since Robert D. Putnam ("Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42:3 [1988]: 427–60), the work on two-level games has emphasized the effects of domestic politics on international institutions. The reverse process—the impact of international organizations on domestic political institutions—has, by contrast, received short shrift. Daniel Drezner and his colleagues fill this gap with clarity and creativity. Drezner offers two core hypotheses in the introduction—mechanisms by which international institutions can be used by political elites to overcome problems of domestic politics—and the subsequent chapters provide compelling arguments and evidence.

Hypothesis 1 (H1), so labeled by the excellent concluding chapter by Duncan Snidal and Alexander Thompson, declares

that entrepreneurial elites will utilize international organizations (IOs) to overcome domestic veto players who might prefer no change to policy reform. This "veto player problem" is more acute, and hence this mechanism is more likely to be utilized by governments of "decentralized" states. International organizations, it is argued, can reward (or punish) veto players when they cooperate (or fail to cooperate), and they can provide information, expertise, and other resources in ways domestic authorities cannot, limiting the incentives for domestic players to veto the policies in question.

The second hypothesis (H2) addresses the "commitment problem" faced by governments in centralized states—governments anticipate domestic pressure to defect from a cooperative international regime, and are unable to commit to stable policies over time. The IO induces costs to defection, both for the regime and its political opposition, making abrogation of international agreements less likely.

H1 gets the most attention from the authors in the volume. Jon C. Pevehouse shows that new democracies use IOs to lock in economic reforms that may be unpopular with other veto players, thereby strengthening the hand of the new democratic elite; Eric Reinhardt shows that the dispute settlement procedure (DSP) at the World Trade Organization enhances compliance by forcing reluctant legislatures to agree to liberalization; Kenneth A. Schultz argues that the president can diffuse congressional opposition to the use of force abroad in humanitarian missions by obtaining IO support for the mission, raising the costs to Congress of opposing the deployment. Key to these arguments is the presumption that the international organization levels costs (either directly or indirectly) on the domestic veto players if the nation violates its international obligations.

International institutions facilitate cooperation in a number of ways: They provide information and expertise, coordinate expectations, and offer carrots and sticks. While threatened or actual retaliation can induce cooperation of a state's executive, these authors argue that the IO induces differential costs across domestic players. The IO imposes costs on obstinate domestic veto players (and not the cooperative ones) if they refuse to cooperate (or can reward them when they do), hence, extracting their cooperation.

First, the project is opaque as to how the IO impacts one domestic group and not another—are IOs so carefully selective in their punishments? Alternatively, what is it about the domestic polity that makes the costs incurred by the veto players different once the IO is in place? Ideally, the authors of the case study chapters would have spelled this out; Snidal and Thompson's comment that "the specific cases need more detailed investigation and theoretical guidance" (p. 210) certainly resonates. The case study authors might have delved more deeply into the structures of the IOs they analyze, to investigate if their impacts do differ across domestic agents. Notably, Snidal and Thompson remark that the IOs' rewards and punishments may also affect the executive (the "initiator," in the parlance of the volume), but "they do not affect the analysis" (n. 8, p. 204). It is quite conceivable, however, that the degree to which the rewards and punishments affect the initiator will

alter the decision calculus to engage in the cooperative endeavor in the first place.

Second, where the authors empirically test their claims, they often avoid the key issue—whether IOs alter the payoffs to the veto players—and instead test claims that while consistent with the models and arguments posited, are not central to the book's core hypotheses. Pevehouse shows that new democracies are more likely to join IOs, but he does not test the underlying argument—IOs can penalize domestic groups if they veto the executive's reforms. Reinhardt, who shows that early settlement is possible when the executive has a recalcitrant congress, neglects to test the links between the transaction costs associated with using the DSP and settlement of disputes. Schultz comes closest to linking the "audience costs" (that penalize any player that backs down from a commitment) with actual episodes of humanitarian intervention with IO involvement.

The case studies provide mixed evidence in support of H2; IOs may improve an executive's credibility in the face of domestic pressure to renege—especially in centralized states. This is a variation on the more standard "tying of hands argument" (for instance, Giovanni Maggi and Andres Rodriguez-Clare, "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures," *Journal of Political Economy* 106 [1998]: 574–601, where the executive is bound not to give in to protectionist demands), yet the authors did not tackle this hypothesis with nearly the same enthusiasm as H1. There is also an open question: Why does the commitment device have to be international in nature? Or more specifically, when might we expect a state to appeal to an international institution over the myriad domestic alternatives (such as independent agencies, central banks, judiciaries, etc.)?

Drezner also identifies three other hypotheses, none of which get the attention they deserve: Repeated interactions strengthen the power of the initiators over the ratifiers, IO design matters, and external initiators are less successful than internal initiators in their interaction with the domestic ratifiers. The two less formal (and more constructivist) chapters (both happen to use China as the case study) have the most success here: Jean-Marc F. Blanchard shows how an IO and internal initiators can change domestic policy in the face of opposition; Alastair Iain Johnston shows how persuasion and social influence matter for the design of regional security regimes.

Locating the Proper Authorities is a significant development in the two-level game literature. It reestablishes the importance of the interaction of domestic and international actors in world politics, and it produces highly suggestive arguments and evidence that IOs can change domestic policy choices. Sorely needed, however, is a simultaneous approach, one that permits a bidirectional causality or feedback between the levels of analysis. As in the general equilibrium approach from economic theory, equilibrium actions at the international level are in the end codetermined with equilibrium behavior among domestic political agents. A second generation of two-level games literature is now needed.

The Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining. By Christopher Gelpi. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 232p. \$39.50.

International Norms and Decision Making: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model. By Gary Goertz. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003. 192p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

— Barry O'Neill, *UCLA*

Gary Goertz's approach to international norms is conceptual, treating their relation to organizational decision processes, whereas Christopher Gelpi measures their importance by testing whether they have altered the course of military crises away from what pure realism would predict.

In Goertz's account, organizations make decisions not by choosing the optimal action in each instance but by setting up a continuing policy. We usually think that moral decisions are made by general rules while instrumental ones use case-by-case utility maximization, but Goertz argues that organizations treat both kinds with general rules. One might expect that policies evolve in increments, with organizations modifying them little by little according to acquired experience. His thesis is that policies stay fixed for long periods and then change suddenly, that is, stable phases punctuated by shifts. An example of a long stable phase was Canada's role in UN peacekeeping: Since the Suez Crisis, Canada has not once declined a request to send its troops, and even though elements of the elite have been unhappy with it, this policy has not been seriously reconsidered within the government or in public.

The reference in the subtitle of *International Norms and Decision Making* to punctuated equilibrium borrows from the modern theory of evolution. In 1972, Niles Eldridge and Stephen Jay Gould published their claim that Darwin's picture of gradual development was wrong, that natural species typically stay constant for a long period and then suddenly shift. The older theory had hung on partly because of a bias against publishing cases that violate accepted doctrine, plus a tendency to blame the lack of examples of smooth evolution on gaps in the fossil record. Paleontologists have suggested a mechanism behind this lingering and leaping, that small subpopulations become genetically separated and evolve quickly, then reconnect with the larger group and take over. For Goertz's claim about international norms to be more than a description, he also must outline a mechanism. One of the reasons is functional, that an institution must allow expectations to "converge," and this calls for overall stability in its policies. Another reason is internal: A hierarchical organization continues its policy until some political shock puts the question on the desk of a high-enough decision maker.

Theories of decision making based on general rules must prescribe what to do when the rules conflict. (Theories of maximizing behavior avoid this problem, since trade-offs are implied by the function to be maximized.) Goertz suggests the use of fuzzy logic, the probability-like system from computer sciences, in which set membership is a matter of degree, rather than dichotomous. A choice situation is covered by conflicting

norms to different degrees, and fuzzy logic aggregates these degrees to choose a course of action.

Gelpi's goal in *The Power of Legitimacy* is a bold one: detecting the influence of norms on international crises. He analyzes instances where two states entered a crisis, settled it, and later entered a second crisis. Sometimes the second crisis was over a new issue, and sometimes the issue was covered by the earlier settlement, that is, was under a governing norm. Then, in the former cases, without a norm in the second crisis the challenged party would tend to offer a partial compromise; however, with a norm it could stand firm with more confidence that the challenger would back down, at least if norms matter. The reasons are that the norm from the first settlement provides a focal point to settle at the status quo, and it also isolates the crisis as a special case, and so the challenger need not worry that giving in would harm its broader reputation. Thus, if norms are important, one should observe firmer defenders and more compliant challengers in those repeated crises covered by a previous settlement. Under realist theory, the two crises would not interact and a defender would be as hesitant to stand firm, with or without a previous settlement.

The International Crisis Behavior data set yielded 122 cases between 1929 and 1979 of a pair of states entering two crises. In 67 of these, the second crisis involved an issue that had been settled in the first, and in the other 55 it did not. Gelpi found that in the face of a moderately firm defender, a challenger tended to be as intransigent when violating a previous settlement as when not; in the face of a very firm defender, a challenger was much more compromising when violating a previous settlement than when not. It is more striking that norms made a difference in these issues of national security, he notes, where they are usually held to be less relevant.

Gelpi tests various subsidiary hypotheses, and he also provides two case studies, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis followed by the 1970 Cienfuegos crisis in which the Soviet Union was apparently building a base in Cuba to support its missile-launching submarines, and the 1956 Suez Crisis followed by Nasser's 1967 blockading of the Gulf of Aqaba and closing of the Straits of Tiran. The Soviet Union complied over Cienfuegos and the crisis ended quickly, but Nasser's stance led to the Six Day War. Commendably, Gelpi includes the Nasser case just because it violates his theory, to see what it reveals about the mechanism at work. (He attributes the exception to diplomatic bungling by Secretary General U Thant, plus Nasser's non-state-centric desire to lead the Arab World.)

The use of natural data always makes it difficult to attribute causation. While Gelpi takes steps to make a matched comparison and attributes the difference to norms, one must wonder why so many challengers provoked a second crisis then backed down. Did they not foresee the same considerations that he is raising, of focal points and inability to use reputation to tie one's hands? Challengers entered the data set by virtue of their own decision, and this fact may bring in some unknown bias that may explain the differential behavior without introducing norms. Gelpi suggests that these challengers were espe-

cially motivated to undo the settlement, but there are other possibilities. If these represent political blunders or inadvertence, it would be expected that the challenger would back down quickly. One way to pursue this question of a state's motive in challenging and reversing would be statistical techniques for strategically biased data where the decision to enter the database is modeled (Curtis Signorino, "Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 93 [June 1999]: 279–97). Another way would be to look more deeply at some of the cases.

Of course, one can find flaws in Gelpi's analysis as in any other, and subsequent writers will and should, but his arguments are cleverly conceived and his study very carefully conducted. The book is a fine example of the recent movement to test ideas that had been seen as too intangible to allow measurement. It is also especially clearly written.

Gelpi's book takes issue with realist theory and Goertz's with utility maximization, and so both authors take positions on how norms relate to self-interest. For different reasons, both reject the idea that a norm is an equilibrium of a game. Gelpi holds that the equilibrium approach precludes the important question of how norms change. However, a refined game treatment can avoid their objections (Barry O'Neill, *Honor, Symbols and War*, 1999). For one, a norm should not be seen as a strategy in a specific game; it is a *kind* of strategy in a *kind* of game. A norm might say that in general, when you have the opportunity to exploit someone by telling him or her an untruth, do not. It involves a game *form*, which can be instantiated in the world as different games, in different contexts, and with different utilities attached to the outcomes. Although normative behavior may be an equilibrium for most of the actual games, it might not be for the less typical ones. If the environment changes so that the atypical ones become more common, there will be pressure on the norm to shift. A developed equilibrium account can deal with norm violation and change.

Goertz's objection to an equilibrium-based definition is that it trivializes norms. If parties act normatively from self-interest, norms add nothing to an expected utility approach. However, a theory of norms goes beyond equilibria because not all equilibria are instances of norms. Equilibria supported by mutual expectations, like two people meeting at an agreed place, should not be included. To count as a social norm, the behavior must be supported by rewards or punishments deliberately applied by other parties. The enforcement behavior is itself a norm binding these other parties, and the whole system—basic norms, supporting norms, their supporting norms—stays in place because it is an equilibrium. (Simple examples can be constructed to show how the account does not lead to an infinite regress.) The overall approach of Gelpi and Goertz to norms is compatible with game theory, and their arguments can be more easily made with an equilibrium definition. Both books deal with a central theme in international relations theory and are likely to be widely read.

International Relations and Scientific Progress: Structural Realism Reconsidered. By Patrick James. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2002. 328p. \$64.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

—Randall L. Schweller, *The Ohio State University*

Since the end of the Cold War, structural-systemic theories of world politics, which dominated the field's intellectual landscape for decades, have fallen out of favor and been replaced by dyadic studies of conflict and war in the quantitative empirical literature and by "second-image" theories in the qualitative literature. There are many reasons for this sea change within the discipline. Critics of neorealism—the most well-articulated and familiar structural-systemic theory—claim that it failed to predict and cannot explain the end of the Cold War; that its emphasis on parsimony and enduring continuities of international politics make it irrelevant in an increasingly complex and turbulent world; that its state-centric assumption and "billiard ball" view of the state is anachronistic in today's highly interdependent and globalized international environment populated by powerful transnational and subnational actors; and that it cannot explain and, indeed, is subverted by the robust empirical finding that dyads composed of democratic states rarely, if ever, go to war.

Swimming against this intellectual tide (or, more accurately, tidal wave), Patrick James aims, as the title of his book suggests, to reinvigorate systemic theory, in general, and structural realism (neorealism), in particular. Unlike Kenneth Waltz, whose neorealist theory only explains a few very important things, James ambitiously sets out to construct a structural theory with wide explanatory range, covering most aspects of international conflict, crises, and war. For this task, James offers a new state-of-the-art version of Waltz's theory, which he calls elaborated structural realism (ESR). The theory's ontological foundation is rooted in "systemism," an awkward term for theory that incorporates both unit- and system-level variables and their interactions. In James's parlance, systemism is a superior alternative to either individualism or holism because it can account for micro-micro, macro-macro, and hybrid (micro-macro and macro-micro) connections.

Borrowing from the work of Michael Brecher and Hemda Ben Yehuda, James defines the international system to include, in descending order of abstraction, an environment (or external setting), structure, actors, context, issues, and process. The advantage of adopting such a comprehensive definition is that it can account for both structural and process-level variables and the reciprocal interactions between these two dimensions of the international system. The disadvantage, and it is a serious one, is that the model is composed of so many moving parts that it is nearly impossible to hold the variables constant for the purposes of untangling their individual effects and, more difficult still, specifying the model's internal dynamics, namely, how, why, and what changes in the parametric values of the variables lead to specific outcomes as opposed to others.

Undaunted by this complexity, James goes on to expand neorealism's minimalist definition of system structure (as anarchy and the system-wide distribution of capabilities among

"like" units) to include, among other things, the concentration of capabilities, the number of alliances, and polarization within the system. Here, James commits a conceptual misstep, in my view, because his definition of structure consists of not only structural elements associated with capabilities but also behavioral characteristics, for example, polarization and the number of interstate alliances. The latter are more correctly viewed as effects of structure, not components of it. Leaving aside the issue of conceptual clarity, there is a practical reason that limited definitions of structure tend to be more useful than more expansive ones: Elements used to define structure cannot be explained by it. Thus, the more elements used to define system structure, the less it explains.

In the next three chapters, James engages the reader in a hard-core discussion of the meaning of scientific progress in international relations. In Chapter 3, he painstakingly develops a framework for evaluating scientific progress that can be applied to the field of international relations. This analysis culminates with the introduction of a new concept, the scientific research enterprise, which facilitates the proper scope and mechanism for evaluating worldviews, ontologies, paradigmatic entities, theories, and hypotheses. In Chapters 4 and 5, he describes the foundation and evolution of structural realism as a scientific research enterprise, and then applies his methodological framework to make a substantive evaluation of structural realism. Not surprisingly, he concludes that structural realism as a system-level theory has great unrealized explanatory potential. More surprisingly, James asserts "that an actor-oriented approach, paradoxically, may be at an increasing disadvantage when it comes to theorizing about the twentieth century and beyond" (p. 203). The sophistication of this analysis is truly impressive and, at times, mind-boggling. If nothing else, he clearly shows that he is one of the heaviest hitters in the field with regard to these lofty philosophical matters. Readers should be warned, however: If your eyes glaze over when reading recondite Lakatosian discussions of positive and negative heuristics, you will probably fall into a state of unconsciousness well before completing these chapters.

Although there is a bit too much exposed plumbing for my taste, James's insightful and provocative theoretical musings throughout *International Relations and Scientific Progress* should be required, though difficult, reading for specialists in the field. Conversely, nonspecialists will likely characterize most passages of the book as dull, jargon-riddled, excessively abstruse, self-referential, and of no practical value. The question remains, however: Does James succeed in reinvigorating structural realism? Perhaps. But there is no evidence to support this view or its opposite. The problem is that elaborated structural realism, at this early stage of its development, falls well short of being a fully articulated theory. Indeed, James offers the reader only a schematic (mostly, bare-bones) presentation of ESR—one that amounts to little more than a periodic table of elements devoid of substantive content, much less specific propositions that can be tested and falsified. Since empirical testing of James's theory must await its further development, I was left feeling as though I had been told a joke without a punchline. After all,

the only surefire way to know if one has built a better mousetrap is to set it on the floor and see how well it catches mice. Notwithstanding the author's high-powered ruminations on the scientific research enterprise, the best evidence of theoretical progress in the social sciences is, in my view, a convincing demonstration that the proposed theory is more useful, not just more comprehensive or descriptively accurate, than the one it seeks to replace. On this verdict, the jury is still out for ESR.

Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism, and Order in World Politics. By Edward Keene. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 180p. \$58.00 cloth, \$21.00 paper.

— Anthony Pagden, *UCLA*

The argument of Edward Keene's ambitious book is simple and, ultimately, compelling. He makes two broad claims. The first is that international relations theorists have consistently misread Hugo Grotius and, consequently, most subsequent accounts of the law of nations, as maintaining that sovereignty could only be one and indivisible. They have done this because they have assumed that the conception of the state that emerged during the seventeenth century, in which sovereignty was indeed, in Jean Bodin's phrase, "indivisible as a point in geometry," applied as forcefully to the relationship between states as it did to relationships within states. But, Keene argues, Grotius did not hold that sovereignty was divisible. More startlingly, he maintained that in international law, individuals not only could hold private rights, the rights, most obviously, to property, but they might also, if they believed their security to be threatened, wage their own personal war. Grotius's view was widely shared until well into the nineteenth century. The great English jurist Henry Maine, for instance, declared in 1887 that "sovereignty has always been regarded as divisible in international law." The same applies *mutatis mutandis* to individual rights, for although few today would go so far as to concede a private right to wage war, individual rights to property was, and has remained, inviolable in both local, civil, and international law.

That is Keene's first claim. The second, which follows from it, is that IR theorists, because of the "inadequacy of their conceptual apparatus and the narrowness of their historical vision" (p. 95), have tended to assume that the Westphalian model—as it has come to be called—of international relations, in which sovereignty was indivisible and the state was therefore the only player, applied not merely to the European signatories of the Treaty of Westphalia but to the entire world. On Keene's account, however, what followed from the Grotian assertion about private right and the divisibility of sovereignty was precisely a dual perception of how the world was to be governed under the law of nations. In Europe, what followed from Westphalia was a regime of "tolerance." Sovereign states agreed to tolerate one another's divergences and peculiarities so long as these did not result in unacceptable territorial claims. Beyond Europe, however, a quite different order emerged. Here, sovereignty was seemingly infinite in its divisibility, and here,

"tolerance" was replaced by the ambition to impose what Keene calls "civilization" upon the world. What IR theorists have consistently overlooked is that the modern world has been shaped not only by the post-Westphalian state system, with which they have (in Keene's view) been exclusively concerned, but also—and more markedly—by the evolution of the European system of world empires.

The modern European empires had grown out of ventures that were originally limited to trade, and they had grown up in regions where the Europeans had initially been but one set of interlopers among many. In such a situation, sovereignty could only ever be divided. From this there emerged a bewildering variety of ways of conceiving sovereignty. All of this resulted in what, from the point of view of any modern international lawyer, was a curious, hybrid beast. But diverse though it was, it had one single objective, beyond, that is, the immediate ambition to enrich the mother country. It existed to bring "civilization" to the non-European world. In so doing, in the tortured words of the jurist James Lorimer in 1883, "it vindicates the ultimate will of the inferior race—the will, that is to say, at which the inferior race must arrive when it reaches the stage of civilization to which the higher race has attained" (p. 114). Offensive though this might have been to the "inferior races" concerned, it was only occasionally homicidal. But Lorimer's use of "race" already indicates the beginning of the shift that in Nazi Germany would not only reverse the traditional order between civilization and barbarism—in that now the forces of "barbarism" were to be found within rather than without—but also put a violent end to the whole regime of "tolerance" in Europe established by Westphalia, and reestablished by the Congress of Vienna.

In Keene's view, this history has placed the postimperial world in a very difficult position. Because no one has been prepared to recognize that international law had always assumed the existence of divided sovereignty and of two distinct international regimes, the present attempt to harmonize the two—to introduce the notion of undivided sovereignty *and* a regime of toleration for all the nations of the world—has been generally disastrous. We now live in a world, in his view, "where we have a singular political and legal framework which is schizophrenically trying to realize two different purposes at the same time" (p. 122). The Charter of the United Nations, for instance, sets as its goal a series of objectives that, although no mention is made of civilization, are nonetheless, as Keene says, entirely in keeping "with how a nineteenth-century international lawyer or colonial administrator would have understood the concept" (p. 140). Yet at the same time, it insists that all member states are sovereign bodies with the right to develop whatever kind of political system they so chose.

To put it *verysimply*: The present administration of the United States holds (or claims to hold) that the people of Iraq have an inalienable and indivisible sovereignty over their own territory, and that it respects the will of the people to exercise this sovereignty in any way it chooses. It also claims that the United States and Britain have invaded their country in order to establish democracy or, in other terms, "civilization." Yet it is clear from

what is rapidly unfolding that these objectives are incompatible. Either the sovereignty of Iraq must be respected, which in all probability ultimately means either a return to something like the status quo ante or the creation of a fundamentalist Muslim regime, or the Iraqis must, in Rousseau's celebrated phrase, "be forced to be free"—and democratic and civilized. What the present impasse points to is that what we so obviously lack (among many other things) is, in Keene's words, "some way of articulating the idea of a civilized world that is fully cognizant of the need to tolerate different peoples and cultures" (p. 144).

Keene makes no pretence to have found a solution to this dilemma. But he has gone a long way toward unraveling the historical obscurity that has hitherto cloaked our understanding of what its full implications now are. *Beyond the Anarchical Society* is an important and timely book and should be obligatory reading not only for all IR theorists but also for foreign policymakers everywhere.

Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace. By Charles Lipson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003. 288p. \$32.50.

— Bruce Russett, *Yale University*

Here is the message of this important and engagingly written book: Democracies almost never fight one another. The evidence for the existence of a democratic peace is solid and persuasive. To date, no theory to explain this is satisfactory. But the explanation is that wars are caused by problems of incomplete information and states' inability to commit reliably to carry out their promises and threats. Contracts and transparency of behavior provide this ability, and democracies are uniquely suited to provide them. So, at least between themselves, democracies can overcome distrust and avoid war.

After Charles Lipson opens with a brief overview of the volume, he reviews the historical evidence in many "hard cases" of near wars between democracies during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, concluding that genuinely democratic elements are at work in their ability to settle conflicts without war. He then reviews a long list of theories that have attempted to explain this result, concluding that each is unsatisfactory or at best a partial explanation. His alternative, then, is a "contracting theory": Constitutional procedures make promises easier to carry out and harder to reverse by successor governments; public debates and relatively open decision making assure democracies' negotiating partners that the commitment is reliable. Democratic government is not totally advantageous to striking bargains, since its procedures are time-consuming and sometimes messy. But what is lost in simplicity is made up by the gravity of the commitment once made. In effect, democracies solve the problem of Hobbesian anarchy defined as the lack of higher authority to enforce binding commitments. The transparent structure of democratic institutions, coupled with the equally transparent transnational institutions they build for dispute settlement among themselves, provide the instruments for self-binding and thus the avoidance of military violence between them.

Throughout *Reliable Partners* Lipson melds theory with historical examples. Although he presents no new statistical analyses, he reviews existing studies in a confident and nontechnical manner. In good Lakatosian fashion, he extends his contracting theory with evidence for new related hypotheses, such as that when democracies seek agreements with autocratic states, they will require stronger and more extensive self-protecting conditions in the absence of the kind of secure contracting commitment that democracy can provide. He expects longer periods of democracy to produce more stable peace, and that the frequency and severity of militarized disputes between democracies will diminish over time as their contracting credibility rises. On the contested question of whether democratizing states will be more or less prone to disputes and war, he notes that even if they were, it is to be expected from his theory that such states, unable in the early stages to firmly establish the basis for making credible commitments, would for a while experience more disputes.

The author is less enamored with multilateral institutions than with the commitments democracies can make bilaterally. Consequently, he explicitly doubts the ability of Kant's "pacific union" in a weak confederation to act as a credible agent for deterring aggression against its members, especially if it lacks a single dominant member able to transcend the collective action problem. As he admits, the evidence on this is not very systematic, but he does not mention that part of the reason lies in testing that does not distinguish the game theoretic implications of the difference between some alliances' success in deterring attacks (manifest as the dogs not barking) and others' inability to defend collectively against an attack that occurred because the commitment was not very credible. Also, increasing evidence that democracies are more peaceful in general, not just with each other, cannot easily be explained by his contracting theory.

A more serious criticism is that his review of competing theories is incomplete, and thus overstates the power of his theory to explain better than its predecessors. He gives but scant discussion of the following chain of institutional reasoning: Democratically elected leaders must satisfy a very large segment of the populace in order to retain power in the next election. Long and expensive wars will alienate much of the electorate. Thus, democratic leaders will avoid wars they cannot expect to win easily. Leaders of other democracies will have the same incentives. Thus, both sets of democratic leaders are likely to settle differences with each other peacefully, sometimes by the weaker party making disproportionate concessions. Autocratic leaders, needing only to satisfy a relatively narrow circle of cronies, have more to gain from war and accept less risk of losing office from a war that goes bad. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow, in *The Logic of Political Survival* (2003), have laid out the reasoning and evidence for this in carefully elaborated form, as have Dan Reiter and Allan Stam (*Democracies at War* [2002]) in a variant. While it is unfair to expect a book published in the second half of 2003 to cite those particular works, both variants have been around for a while in articles, and a

discussion of institutional theory about the democratic peace without them misses a key piece.

More fundamentally, I still doubt that a single deductive theory is likely to explain satisfactorily all instances and varieties of the democratic peace phenomenon. In this I cling to the idea that several strains of theory, emphasizing aspects of accountability as well as transparency induced by institutions, and norms as well as institutions, will show different degrees of explanatory power in different contexts. In short, such a complex social phenomenon may be reached, equifinally, by multiple paths. Lipson has developed one of those explanatory paths with a detailed and balanced analysis. It is surely a big part of the picture, and scholars of conflict and of institutions should read it. Moreover, his presentation will be accessible to an audience of students and policymakers that too often finds formal theoretic or large-scale statistical analysis opaque. If you want a book that takes theory seriously yet will engage students on fundamental aspects of international politics, this is one on a short shelf.

Democracy's Dilemma: Environment, Social Equity, and the Global Economy. By Robert Paehlke. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. 304p. \$27.95.

— Robert T. Holt, *University of Minnesota*

Democracy's dilemma is how the nation-states of the world resolve the conflicting needs of significant economic growth, environmental protection, and an equitable distribution of the means necessary to have a good and satisfying life. Robert Paehlke argues for a balance among growth, the environment, and equity.

The author sets his argument in historical perspective, identifying three stages of capitalism: craft, industrial, and electronic, and he provides insightful comparisons among the three and between the transitions between craft and industrial and industrial and electronic. He has devised an intriguing set of two tables in which he identifies the "negative trends within electronic capitalism" (including job loss, family breakdown, and environmental degradation) and its "positive potentials" (including higher levels of living, better worldwide communication, and greater workplace flexibility) (pp. 69–70). Unfortunately, there is no comparable historical review of either environmental protection or attempts to alleviate inequality and inequity. In his characterization of electronic capitalism, the author emphasizes the information and communication revolution and the "media monoliths" that dominate. The free flow of information is the lifeblood of democracy, and if a few corporations possess the technology and organization that can control that flow, there is reason to be alarmed.

The book's major portion deals with how to achieve a world in which the economy grows, the environment is healthy, and there is social and economic equality. The first task is getting a "three bottom line perspective" (pp. 119–159). Once one has the proper perspective, the problem becomes how one measures each bottom line. Economic prosperity is satisfactorily measured by GDP per capita. Measuring well-being and equity is more difficult. The book contains an excellent discussion of

the use of the United Nations Environmental Program's human development index (HDI) to measure social well-being. The treatment of measuring environmental degradation is much less adequate. Significant sources and data are ignored.

Indeed, the major weakness of this book is its heavy reliance on authority and a neglect of reliable hard data and data analysis. Let me give some examples. Paehlke argues that an increase in international free trade leads to a shift of production from high-wage-rate to low-wage-rate countries. He refers to this as a race to the bottom. Recent data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Monetary Fund show that Germany in 2003 emerged as the world leader in the total value of exports. It outpaces the United States, whose economy is three times bigger, and Japan, whose economy is twice as big. It accounts for a full 19% of the total world value of exported machinery, the product of manufacturing. Yet Germany has close to the highest labor costs in the world. Another example: China is a country to which manufacturers in the developed world are shifting production to capitalize on low labor costs. They are in effect shipping jobs to China. China's export growth of about 240% since 1998 is a crude measure of jobs taken from the rest of the world. By the same token, Chinese imports represent jobs created in the rest of the world, and imports have grown by almost 300% since 1998. In just the first eight months of 2003, Japanese exports to China alone accounted for an increase in Japanese growth in GDP of 0.7%. That involves a lot of high-paid Japanese working on goods produced for China.

These examples suggest that Japan and Germany are not participating in the race to the bottom, and that there is data that, had they been taken into consideration, would have modified and focused the argument. Why cannot the United States with labor costs generally lower than those in Germany and Japan compete in the race to the top?

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reports that in the decade of the 1990s, the share of manufacturing in the world stock of foreign trade investment (over five trillion dollars) fell from 40% to 35%, and the share in natural resources from 10% to 6%. Are not these trends something to be considered by anyone concerned about the impact of electronic capitalism on the environment?

But these examples aside, we must recognize that electronic capitalism has enormous potential for good and bad. How do we eliminate the bad without destroying the potential for the good? Industrial capitalism also had potential for good and bad, and the bad was mitigated by the rise of the regulatory state. The Federal Trade Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the National Labor Relations Board were established in the United States (they had their counterparts in other countries) to oversee business practices, enforce environmental regulations, and help maintain fair labor practices. Is there not a need for a global government to regulate electronic capitalism? Paehlke has a good chapter on why this is not the road to take.

What, then, is the solution to the dilemma of growing economically but protecting, even enhancing, the environment

and improving the social well-being of all? One of Paehlke's answers is surprising and provocative. Write environmental protection and labor rights provisions into international trade treaties and give the World Trade Organization enforcement powers. Paehlke has a case. One of the major weaknesses of international organizations that have some governmental-type functions is that they cannot enforce their edicts. And giving them the instruments necessary to do so creates great potential for abuse. But if environmental regulations were in a trade treaty, the sanction for violation would be readily available and there would be enormous incentives to use it. Assume, for example, that the next version of the WTO trade agreement contained a provision that every member nation must impose the same tax on every ton of carbon released into the atmosphere. A country that did not impose this tax properly (in order to reduce its manufacturing costs) could be challenged before the WTO by any member country, and if the case were proved, tariffs could be levied against imports of any kind from the offending country. The result would be an international race to reduce carbon emissions. This approach would not work for every problem, but where the pollution is an external cost of production that is borne jointly by the rest of the world, it could be mightily effective.

Paehlke has produced a good, balanced, and indeed a brave book. *Democracy's Dilemma* deserves a sequel that is more data-rich and analytically intensive.

The Offshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, and Nomad Millionaires. By Ronen Palan. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 240p. \$29.95.

— Arvid J. Lukauskas, *Columbia University*

The explosive growth of the offshore world has been widely observed in recent years as tax havens, export processing zones, offshore financial centers, and flags of convenience have increased in number. Accounts of money laundering, tax evasion, and the flight of manufacturing to less regulated locales are common and largely attributed to the excesses of the offshore world. Social scientists have begun to examine the origin of the offshore and its implications for state and society, capitalism, and the international system. Ronen Palan's book addresses these issues in a theoretically sophisticated fashion, focusing particularly on the relationship between the development of offshore and state sovereignty. It makes important contributions to the literatures on globalization, state sovereignty, and the dynamics of the capitalist system, and the questions it raises are likely to be the object of research for years to come.

Among the book's strengths is its in-depth and comprehensive description of the historical evolution and current status of the offshore world; this material alone is sufficient reason to read the volume. The offshore, Palan demonstrates, is not a territorial space but a separate juridical realm created and maintained by states. States have divided their sovereign domain into two juridical spaces, "onshore" and "offshore," leaving activities in the offshore realm largely unregulated or untaxed.

Palan persuasively argues that the evolution of the offshore was not predetermined, and he identifies several structural features of the state and capitalist systems that enabled it and points where actors had the choice to foster or impede it. He effectively synthesizes a variety of theoretical perspectives in arriving at this conclusion, exhibiting an impressive command of the weaknesses and strengths of various relevant literatures, especially historical institutionalism and Marxism. This does give the book a certain literature review feel, which is exacerbated by an almost endless series of direct quotations from numerous authors. The presentation is complex, though lucid, but is likely to frustrate scholars who insist upon clearly stated, falsifiable hypotheses.

The best-known theory of the development of the offshore centers on the contention that it emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in response to sharply higher corporate taxation, more intrusive state regulation, and declining corporate profitability. Palan demonstrates that this argument cannot account for the creation of the offshore world, which he traces to the nineteenth century. In this period, jurists and policymakers created the offshore in their efforts to reconcile the sovereignty of territorially based nation-states with the expansion of market relationships across borders. In asserting their territorial sovereignty, states forged compromises among themselves and with key societal actors that accorded foreign nationals the same protection as citizens, thereby creating several mechanisms that would later allow states to offer foreigners privileges they would not give to their own citizens.

The "commercialization of sovereignty," in which states use their sovereign right to make law for commercial purposes, began in the 1920s, as a handful of states, notably Switzerland, sought to use their laxer regulatory environments for pecuniary gain by attracting business and capital to their lands. Other countries or dependencies, such as the Cayman Islands, emulated this strategy, and rapid growth of the offshore ensued, starting in the late 1960s when declining corporate profitability, higher levels of corporate and individual taxation, and improvements in communications and transportation technologies made offshore jurisdictions attractive alternatives to the heavily regulated and taxed onshore for banks, corporations, and high-wealth individuals. The United States opposed some dimensions of the offshore early on, but quickly joined in when it came to believe it could further its neoliberal agenda of globalization; indeed, international banking facilities located in the United States are among the most important worldwide.

As Palan details, the growth of the offshore has accelerated recently, and this is ushering in a new era of capitalism and the conception of sovereignty. Specifically, he claims that capitalism is adopting what he calls "nomadic" organization, in which actors move through smooth or open-ended space; nomadic forms are overlaying, not replacing, the principle of territorial organization. In addition to reordering systems of production and finance, this process will have profound effects on state and society. "What is the point in having territorial sovereignty over nonterritorial exchange?" Palan asks. "Such territorial sovereignty is obviously eroding" (p. 178). Indeed, he contends

that the growth of offshore is helping to undermine the legitimacy of the nation-state by destroying its ideological foundations. In particular, it weakens the bond between the territorial state and its citizens, which is based on a concept of identity founded on the ideal of “the people” or “the nation.” Nevertheless, the state is not withering away: “A different ideal-type form of state, more adept at handling globalization and even capable of surviving the relative decline of the territorial principle, is replacing it” (p. 182). One pending question, only touched upon briefly by Palan, is whether “global governance” might help to fill the void as the territorial state loses its authority.

One difficulty with the author’s analysis is that the offshore world is acknowledged to be only one of several factors contributing to the erosion of the territorial nation-state (or the creation of nomadic capitalism), but he fails to identify the others, how they interact with the offshore, or the relative importance of the different variables, making it hard to assess the impact of the explanation he advances. Another is that he does not indicate how we might operationalize and measure the degree of legitimacy and evaluate to what extent territorial nation-states are losing legitimacy and evolving toward a different type of state (and how exactly we would be able to recognize this new form of statehood). This is critical since even a cursory look at contemporary politics suggests that citizens still identify with a “nation” located within physical borders, even as the offshore deepens.

All told, Ronen Palan has written an important book that will influence our thinking about a variety of pressing topics, particularly the relationship between the offshore and state sovereignty. Though not an easy book, *The Offshore World* is a worthwhile one, and for any scholar interested in the development of the offshore and its ramifications, it is a must read.

A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive, Productive and Virtual Economies. By V. Spike Peterson. New York: Routledge, 2003. 256p. \$100.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

— Peter Lawler, *University of Manchester, UK*

At the outset, the author boldly declares her objective as no less than “to generate a methodologically plural, trans-disciplinary account of globalization” and to “rewrite global political economy (GPE) by demonstrating the interdependence of reproductive, productive and virtual economies” (p. 13). This is to be achieved through the deployment of “two conceptual innovations”—an “alternative . . . more expansive ‘RPV framing’” (the acronym referring to the three economies identified in the book’s subtitle) coupled with something called “triad analytics.” In tandem they will supposedly enable a “more inclusive relational and critical study of global political economy” (p. 2). The targets of the book are clear enough: globalized neoliberalism and all of its defenders and apologists, along with (nearly) all of their conceptual apparatus. In their place, V. Spike Peterson intends to offer the reader an “accessible and coherent (though not definitive or totalizing) narrative of ‘how

we got here,’ ‘what is going on’ and ‘what it means’” (p. 13). All of this is, moreover, to be packed within 173 pages.

Peterson offers us an “opening move” rather than the “last word” (p. 15) and acknowledges that because of the wide-ranging focus of the analysis, there are some glaring omissions, not least an “inattention to individual and collective agency” (p. 16). The omission is indeed glaring, but it is in part the product of a more troublesome failure to address overtly the normative subtext that runs throughout the analysis. In part, this seems to be the product of an overwrought preoccupation with identifying the contemporariness of the book’s intellectual credentials. It is certainly postpositivist in sentiment, apparently critical-theoretic, and, ambiguously, postmodern or poststructuralist in orientation. It is hard not to get the impression that, apart from the nasty folk at the top of the global economic pile, the author sets out to offend no one and to include not only every class of person but also every variety of postpositivist critique of the global status quo. An additional confessed omission is a focus on “forms of activism and resistance,” even though in politicizing the GPE, the analysis nonetheless “can inform resistance and opposition” (p. 16). This omission is defended on the grounds that the complexity of the subject matter precludes simple or universal prescriptions, as does the need for “plural strategies” to take account of “local conditions.” These are fair points. Nonetheless, Peterson seemingly shares, or at least appears to want to share, with many contemporary poststructuralist writers a peculiar aversion to politics in any normative sense. This is only partly masked by frequent but insubstantial references to the centrality of the “political” or a need to “politicize,” both of which appear at bottom to be little more than codes for engaging in a normative analysis that, paradoxically, is immediately ruled out methodologically. Some poststructuralists defend this position robustly and consistently. Peterson does neither.

The first two chapters of *A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy*, which introduce the author’s aims, objectives, and theoretical orientation(s), are the weakest. In particular, Chapter 2—“Theory Matters”—fails to deliver on the claims to novelty and novel synthesis made in Chapter 1, offering little more than a potpourri of contemporary analytical perspectives coupled with a residual nod in the direction of orthodoxy, a sort of poststructuralist-lite. The reader is offered painless, fashionably borderless, curiously tension-free “theory”: “The framing specifically rejects the separation of culture from economy, economics from politics, agent from structure, or domestic from international politics; it insists on understanding economic phenomena as *embedded* in wider social relations. By encouraging analysis of symbols and structures *in relation*, the framing merges interpretive (cultural, post-modernist) and empirical (material, modernist) commitments. In sum the RPV framing is cross-disciplinary, multi-institutional, multi-level and multi-causal” (p. 39; emphasis in the original).

Laying out the theory side of things leaves only 128 pages in which to survey the global economy in all its multiplicities and fulfill the multifarious analytical ambitions. Not surprisingly, this results in a rather breathless tour of multiple dimensions

of the GPE. Yet this is in fact where the book hits its straps. Although the much-heralded analytical framework ultimately seems to provide little more than a set of organizing subheadings, the three chapters on the “productive economy,” “reproductive economy,” and “virtual economy” work well as useful and comprehensive surveys of quite vast literatures. A lot of ground is covered and a number of key themes—notably the gendered dimension of GPE—are carried through successfully and with force. There is little that is novel in all of this, however, and the author’s critical engagement with the “critical” literature is virtually nonexistent beyond occasional recognitions of the contestability of several of the larger claims about global trends and shifts. Critiques of the various forms of the globalization thesis receive short shrift. There are also some especially weak patches; the discussion of “digitization as process and politics” (pp. 135–37) is very thin, failing, surprisingly, to engage with the considerable evidence of the politically empowering dimensions of the information technology revolution. Nonetheless, there is real value in the overview provided by the three core chapters, sufficient in fact to recommend the book as a very useful teaching text. The three core chapters alone would be manna to students struggling to meet a multiplicity of essay deadlines.

Although it struggles to raise its head above the white noise of overly declaratory yet curiously noncommittal theorizing, underpinning the descriptive core of the book is an often incisive critical take on GPE that resonates with old-fashioned progressivism and is none the worse for this. Thus, the decline of the welfare state is frequently bemoaned, albeit in often infuriatingly over-generalized terms (a comparison of child-care provision in the UK and Sweden alone would offer a critical take on this). Alone, this cries out for some kind of follow-through, perhaps on the revalorization of the state as a site of resistance, especially given the highly gendered consequences of neoliberal economic policy that Peterson convincingly points up. Unfortunately, the concluding chapter offers little more than a long-winded discourse on the normative underpinnings of the neoliberal global project (something most U.S. neoconservatives have been overtly and proudly declaring for some time) and the final observation that “the valorizing code of capitalist, racialized patriarchy is inimical to structural equality and a just global order” (p. 173). Most “critical” scholars worth their salt got that point quite some time ago as the author’s own survey frequently shows. The architects of the contemporary global order have no compunction about getting political. It is a pity that Peterson does not at least share that with them, as I would rather read the “longer . . . and different” book (p. 16) that she feels such a commitment would require.

The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the E.U. By Mark A. Pollack. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 512p. \$80.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

— Fabio Franchino, *University College, London*

This is the most systematic attempt yet at applying agency theory to the European Union. Mark Pollack’s enterprise consists of a

two-step strategy. First, he uses both Robert Keohane’s theory of international regimes and studies of congressional organization to predict the functions that are likely to be delegated to supranational institutions: monitoring compliance, filling incomplete contracts, providing expert and credible regulation, and setting the formal legislative agenda. He then reviews the various types of mechanisms adopted by the principals to control agency behavior and the ways in which their establishment is motivated by policy conflict and by underlying demands for expertise and credibility. The discretion that agents enjoy in the exercise of those delegated functions should vary with different degrees of informational and distributive pressures. Second, Pollack introduces propositions about the preferences of supranational actors and the conditions under which they are more likely to achieve their objectives.

The first part of the theory is tested in the next three chapters. Both cross-policy and issue-specific powers and control mechanisms of the Commission, the Court of Justice, and the Parliament are systematically reviewed. The expectations of principal-agent theory are strongly corroborated with regard to the first two supranational institutions, while only the Parliament’s supervisory power over the Commission could be explained in such terms (i.e., as an institutional check). Norms of democratic legitimacy account for the delegation of budgetary and legislative functions. However, the considerable cross-policy variance in the exercise of those powers reveals the careful calculation made by member states of the consequences of such delegating decisions.

These chapters consist primarily of theoretically informed and carefully argued literature reviews and of systematic and detailed analyses of Treaty provisions. Some of these reviews, such as the ones on comitology, administrative law, and budgetary powers, are particularly rewarding, with insightful comments, including those on the works of this reviewer. Others are more familiar, such as those on the Court of Justice and legislative powers. Novel techniques for measuring discretion and ranking procedural preferences are applied to the Treaty, and there is an interesting case study on the creation of the securities committee. Apart from the reviews, the empirical added value of these chapters is mostly a theoretically guided analysis of the Treaty. This is an extended application of the arguments in Pollack’s pathbreaking article, “Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Community” (*International Organization* 51 [Winter 1997]: 99–134). It may be less valuable for those who know the Treaty inside out.

In the second part of the book, Pollack investigates whether the Commission and the Court are “pro-European” or “competence-maximizers” and whether these institutions are more likely to achieve their objectives when they enjoy greater discretion. He selects six cases studies that feature open conflict between these supranational actors and the member states and that vary in terms of powers (i.e., agenda setting, implementation, and adjudication), the key independent variable (i.e., the degree of control and, consequently, of agents’ discretion), and issue areas (i.e., market liberalization and social regulation). He finds support for both claims. More specifically,

the Commission tries systematically to increase its own policy prerogatives and, generally, the Court prefers an expansive interpretation of legislative provisions. As shown in the *Cassis de Dijon* and *Barber* jurisprudence, the Court has indeed been very expansive in interpreting the Treaty, at least up to the times when the member states have managed to limit judicial discretion through Treaty amendments. If the procedures overseeing implementation are not too intrusive, the Commission can also influence policy outcomes considerably, as shown in the case of the merger-control regulation, the *de Havilland* merger and the RECHAR Community initiative of the structural funds. In this latter case, however, a sunset clause associated with the provisions delegating authority works in favor of member states wanting to curtail the Commission's activism. Finally, agenda-setting power, when combined with an oversight committee, as in international trade negotiations, and a norm of consensual decision making in the Council, as in the Uruguay Round and the working-time directive, allows the Commission limited room for maneuvering.

None of these claims is entirely new, and these case studies have already been the object of intense academic scrutiny (including, of course, Pollack's earlier works and, probably, with the exception of the analysis of the post-*Barber* Protocol jurisprudence and the working-time directive). Nevertheless, this should take nothing away from the theoretically informed and methodologically rigorous examination carried out by Pollack. Thanks to the careful research design, he manages to exert considerable leverage through within-case analysis, process tracing, and pairwise comparisons of similar cases. He could have taken his analysis two steps forward. First, he could have produced novel propositions on how the interaction among the Commission, the Court, and nonstate (or noncore executive) actors affects agents' behavior and choices of delegation. When are these supranational institutions more likely to support one another's actions? How does the strategic interaction with societal actors play out in the delegation-control game? Second, his theoretical framework is static but the empirical analyses are longitudinal. Pollack touches upon one frontier of this field of research, namely, the study of the dynamics of delegation. He could have introduced specific propositions about this dynamics, as those related to the asset value of agencies (i.e., on how past decisions of delegation necessarily condition new ones). For instance, in the case of the merger-control regulation, the Commission's existing competencies in competition policy have strengthened its agenda-setting power even with the requirement for unanimous Council decisions. This has not been the case with structural policy because, on top of the sunset clause, the implementation game played with subnational authorities differs substantially from the game played with companies.

This would probably have taken Pollack too far away from his project and, most likely, it would have been hard to produce hypotheses unifying both bureaucratic and judicial behavior. It should be the attention of future research. Nevertheless, *The Engines of European Integration* is a valuable starting point.

Anyone contributing to the study of the Europe Union should take serious notice of this book.

State Identities and the Homogenization of Peoples. By Heather Rae. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 372p. \$65.00, \$24.00 paper.

— Audie Klotz, *Syracuse University*

Human beings are capable of astounding cruelty as well as profound generosity. That Heather Rae can document four examples of extraordinary brutality across 500 years of history should not surprise us. This pattern deserves, as she points out, more attention than it has thus far received from observers of international affairs. In her able hands, we learn about the persecution of Jews in fifteenth- through seventeenth-century Spain, expulsion of Calvinists from France in the seventeenth century, genocide of Armenians during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century, and contemporary ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. Throughout, she focuses on how elites seek cultural homogenization to bolster the legitimacy of their rule.

Rae labels these examples of "pathological homogenization," by which she means the violent removal (by assimilation, expulsion, or death) of groups seen as "outsiders." The demands of state building, she argues, lead to this distinctive form of cultural conflict, in contrast to arguments of other scholars who associate such brutality with virulent nationalism or administrative centralization. This ambitious study offers a thoughtful alternative perspective that places the blame for brutality squarely on the shoulders of elites. The demonstration of similar forms of mass violence both before and during the age of nationalism, for example, downplays the image of unruly masses taking vengeance into their own hands. The exploration of the intersection of international and domestic dimensions of identity places leaders firmly in the middle of competing pressures that drive them to drastic measures to preserve their rule.

The question remains, however, whether these are indeed four cases of a single phenomenon. How representative are these four cases? Are they typical of a general pattern of mass violence, or might they be exceptionally well known precisely because they provoked moral outrage (either at the time, or with historical hindsight)? Rae offers no evidence either way. Rather, she selects cases that will challenge conventional explanations of mass violence that are based on nationalist extremism.

Because she accepts the comparability of the cases, Rae does not explain some of the critical assumptions at work in her use of the notion of pathological homogenization. For example, all four of her cases deal with religion, specifically conflicts between (and among) Christians, Jews, and Muslims. Does religion—perhaps monotheistic religion—create a particular dynamic of cultural conflict? Answers to this question would require exploration of non-European cases, for instance in Asia where Buddhism and Confucianism predominate but come into contact with Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Or what about states that reject the legitimacy of religion outright, such

as the Soviet Union, which also practiced violence against segments of its population? Societies can be diverse or homogeneous in a number of ways. Religion need not be the key characteristic that defines cultural identity and hence drives state practices of pathological homogenization.

Because Rae presumes that this type of mass violence is a feature of state building, she makes additional assumptions that preclude avenues of research that might help to explain why techniques of pathological homogenization get used sometimes but not always. All areas of Europe underwent state building, for example. Why do we see pathological homogenization in only some territories? A number of plausible explanations come to mind. Let us assume, following Rae's focus on elites, that leaders have alternative policy options. Under what circumstances do rulers pursue forced assimilation, for example, rather than expulsion or massacre? Maybe nonviolent assimilation proved more successful in circumstances where minority communities had the option of migration, precluding a downward spiral into violent techniques. Perhaps expulsion, in turn, sometimes forestalls slaughter. Is massive violence often perceived as a last resort, or is it always an option enthusiastically embraced? Rae acknowledges that rational leaders make such choices, leading at times to the avoidance of mass violence, as in modern Macedonia and Czechoslovakia. But her case selection based on evidence of mass violence precludes analysis of the conditions under which such violence does or does not occur. Alternatively, disaggregating the concept of pathological homogenization into its parts—assimilation, expulsion and slaughter—would enable us to test when and why certain types of mass violence become intolerable while other forms persist.

As a result of her focus on elites, furthermore, Rae underplays alternative explanations based on structural and populist perspectives. Rather than taking them as instances of state building, we might think of her cases as structural collapse—of the Catholic Church in medieval Europe (her Spanish and French cases), the Ottoman Empire (Turkey), and the Yugoslav federation (Bosnia and Macedonia). Does pathological homogenization ever occur in the absence of structural collapse? In circumstances of structural uncertainty, perhaps culture becomes an especially useful resource, both for those seeking to retain power and those challenging it. Indeed, few of Rae's elites actually carried out massacres with their own hands. What explains their followers' willingness to perpetrate acts of massive violence, as in the Holocaust? If we loosen the assumption that pathological homogenization is the result of state building, in other words, we open up other types of evidence that may be crucial for understanding how—or whether it may be possible—to end the use of mass violence.

Rae sees the solution in the evolution of international norms. She argues that the "international community" can intervene more effectively to prevent pathological homogenization, and the rewards of membership in "Europe" will moderate some leaders. Because of the outrage generated by extraordinary uses of violence (as defined for each historical era), we should see fewer uses of particular techniques of slaughter. However, that is no guarantee that political entrepreneurs will not invent new

ones, like airplanes crashing into buildings or suicide bombings. Are these the tactics of state builders, or are we witnessing the transition to a postnational era with new forms of mass violence?

The European Parliament: Moving Towards Democracy in the EU. Edited by Bernard Steunenberg and Jacques Thomassen.

Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. 224p. \$70.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

— Christopher Lord, *University of Leeds*

This book identifies the rise to prominence of the European Parliament (EP) as "one of the most remarkable developments in European integration" (p. 1). The EP is now a colegislator with the Council of Ministers across a wide range of the European Union's socioeconomic policies. As demonstrated by the resignation of the Santer Commission in March 1999, the EP has also upset the standard interpretation that its power of censure over the EU's main executive body is only theoretical.

In their introduction, Bernard Steunenberg and Jacques Thomassen explain the development of the EP's legislative power as "a result of two important factors: Parliament's persistence to gain more power in the Union's legislative arena and the Member States' handling of the Union's legitimacy" (p. 1). This is an encouraging starting point. It acknowledges the duality of parliamentary politics as part arena where actors pursue their individual preferences and part arena where they come together to satisfy normative preconditions for collective action (see esp. J. Habermas, *Between Fact and Norms*, 1996, p. 180).

The following eight chapters are organized into three parts. In the first section on representation, Thomassen challenges the argument that the problem of representation is one of "weak and incohesive" parties that do not compete on "European issues." The empirical evidence demonstrates that the EP party groups are adequately cohesive for the functions they are called upon to perform and that their alignments are by no means rigid or uncompetitive. It is by no means clear why the "left-right" issues on which they align are "not European" ones. Indeed, any substitution of a "pro-anti European dimension" for the left-right pattern would make little sense. First, it is Member States, and not the EP, that most directly decide questions of more or less European integration (through the treaty formation process). Second, the left-right preferences of the members of the EP (MEPs) who make up the party groups turn out to be well correlated with those of voters.

Turning to the other two contributors to the section on representation, Bernhard Wessels explains the preferences of MEPs for European solutions as being positively correlated with globalization and negatively correlated with confidence in domestic institutions. Luciano Bardi then updates his intriguing account of how the EP's party system is subject to a degree of fragmentation with each round of European elections, followed by concentration and consolidation between elections.

Tapio Raunio and Roger Scully make two neatly complementary contributions to a section on members and parties. Raunio presents the results of a useful survey into links between MEPs and their national parties. He finds that as many as

71.2% report no attempt to control their behavior, even though it is national parties that reward or sanction their careers either by controlling their reentry to domestic politics or by deciding whether they are to be selected again as candidates for European elections. Scully, in contrast, uses roll calls to analyze his chosen theme of political socialization among MEPs. He finds that few “go native.” Many are already native to the degree that they are self-selected from the pro-European sections of political elites. Yet few entirely leave the domestic arena for the European, since the role of the MEP is defined at the interface of the two.

The section on the EP as legislator opens with an important reappraisal by Stefanie Balier and Gerald Schneider of present theories of MEP behavior. Their conclusion is that argument and debate really do matter in “shaming” out certain positions. Transnational party disciplines with surprising supranational biases then inhibit backsliding. In contrast, George Tsebelis and Anastassios Kalandrakis cast a critical eye over the use of statistics on the acceptance of the EP’s amendments to make claims about its performance. Apart from deflating the EP’s claims to have been remarkably successful in comparison with the national parliaments (on the grounds it should compare itself with legislatures in presidential and not parliamentary systems), Tsebelis and Kalandrakis carefully unpick a number of shortcomings in the aggregate statistics. These make no allowance for the importance of amendments, for the degree to which they are accepted, or for cases where the MEPs table amendments they expect to fail in the short term, while shaping commission proposals in the long.

So does *The European Parliament* succeed in its aims? That part of the argument which attributes the development of the EP to the ingenuity and persistence of its members is admirably established. That part which attributes it to the “Member States handling of the Union’s legitimacy” disappears from all but Steunenberg’s own chapter, which questions whether it is enough to explain the strengthening of the codecision procedure by the Amsterdam Treaty as a strategic decision by governments that faced little marginal cost in conceding a change the EP had to all intents and purposes already forced unilaterally.

Not only is much more research needed on why actors see legitimation benefits in the empowerment of the EP, but the question also is unlikely to be answered without breaking down some of the barriers between analytical political science and normative political theory. Any decision about whether it is prudent or otherwise to “manage the legitimacy of the EU” by conceding powers to the EP is much more than a bet on the current state of sociological belief about the rightful exercise of political power. Where that belief is normatively indefensible on its own terms, it will soon unravel. Conversely, there are few normative justifications for the empowerment of Union institutions (especially consequential ones) that do not themselves contain empirical claims without which they are only contingent and provisional. Research into the empowerment of the EP is surely running into diminishing returns of what can be done from within a discipline that so perversely boasts an antinormative bias.