Varying methods of state violence
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At some point during 1991–92, something substantial changed in the way Israel's security agencies interrogated Palestinian detainees. The change was not in the number of detainees interrogated; on any given day in 1993, some four hundred to six hundred Palestinians continued to be interrogated by either the General Security Services (GSS) or the military (Israel Defense Forces; IDF). Overall, Israel interrogated some five thousand Palestinians every year from 1988 to 1994.[1] Nor was the change one of interrogation results: the conviction rate of Palestinians in the military courts remained above 96 percent, with most convictions based on confessions obtained during interrogation. According to official statistics, of the 83,321 Palestinians tried in military courts in the West Bank and Gaza Strip between 1988 and 1993, only 2,731, or 3.2 percent, were acquitted.[2] The security forces were still questioning a remarkable proportion of the adult male population, obtaining vast amounts of information on Palestinian social, political, and military activities.

The changes were in the type of interrogation techniques employed, the manner in which they were controlled by the state, and the way in which state representatives explained and justified their use. Early studies demonstrated that during the first years of the Palestinian uprising (1988–90) interrogators readily resorted to intense physical force, enjoying considerable leeway from their superiors. In the early years a majority of interrogation subjects were subjected to severe beatings, many of which

involved broken bones and hospitalization.[3] Under the new system, however, bones rarely were broken and the intensity of direct physical force had dropped. Interrogators introduced and refined a complex package of methods including beatings that left no marks, painful body positioning, and sensory disorientation.

The second change was in the level of state control over the process. The entire interrogation system was standardized, rationalized, and overseen by the political echelon, the judiciary, and the medical profession. The right to use violence was taken away from individual security personnel and was instead nested within a wider system of hierarchical control: some agents were authorized to use violence and others were not. Most important, a system of detainee classification evolved specifying which categories of suspects could be subjected to particular methods, in increasingly precise detail.

The third change related to the way in which Israeli authorities publicly discussed interrogations. Representatives of the government, the GSS, the state attorney's office, and the military made a concentrated effort to present a new, sanitized image of interrogations. They portrayed interrogation as a controlled humane process in which violence was admittedly used, but only in a calibrated and calculated manner.

It is clear that left to their own devices, Israeli interrogators would not have changed the system. The new methods require far greater investments of time and effort to extract the same amount of information. Whereas a prisoner's resistance was once broken within a week of arrest, as of this writing the process averages more than thirty days. GSS officials often complain that the new methods ''tie interrogators' hands'' and periodically call for a return to the earlier regime.[4] Thus although the security services have adapted to the new methods, they did so only under protest. The change, therefore, can be explained only by reference to factors outside the security establishment.

What happened during 1991–92 to prompt the Israeli state to alter its interrogation system? Why did the methods change in the ways they did? This article's answer demonstrates the importance of new institutionalism, sociological field theory, and a set of new global forces unleashed during recent years. The case of Israeli interrogation methods highlights an underlying global mechanism that has helped to determine the contours of state violence in the late twentieth century. I argue that repertoires of violence often are the result of complex interactions among the international system, the repressive state, and the repressed population.

I do this in four ways. First, I view states as organizations and analyze their interactions with theoretical tools borrowed from the sociology of organizations. Second, I analyze the role of social value mobilization at the international level independently from other forms of mobilization. States not only are locked in a battle

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3. See B'Tselem 1991; and Al-Haq 1988, 336–44. For a review of the relevant literature see Human Rights Watch/Middle East 1994, 66–71.

4. See, for example, *Boston Globe,* 25 August 1995, foreign section, 2: ''Following an upsurge in Palestinian suicide bombings . . . Israel's internal security service . . . has launched a campaign for greater leeway in interrogating suspected terrorists. . . .''

for greater material resources but also are engaged in a struggle for social worth, prestige, and identity, and these commodities cannot be reduced purely to economic or military concerns. Third, though ''legitimacy'' at both the international and the domestic level is an important resource, I view it as being simultaneously enabling and constraining. As states become more legitimate, new possibilities emerge while others are foreclosed. Legitimate states benefit from many kinds of support but are also constrained from engaging in certain kinds of violence, no matter how attractive those options may appear to military leaders. Finally, I recognize the contribution of official and unofficial nonstate global actors, including international agencies, and of political actors working outside established state structures. I apply sociological insights gained from the study of national social movements to transnational movements within and between national structures.

Varying state methods

Sociology's new institutionalism

Sociologists working in the new institutionalist tradition focus on the importance of ''organizational domains'' or ''fields.'' They argue that organizations of all kinds are embedded in fields of action that define appropriate organizational structures, goals, and methods of operation.[5] In fields strictly controlled by a dominant unit, legitimate blueprints are often passed down from higher- to lower-tier organizations in the form of instructions. In fields with no clear hierarchy, however, isomorphism takes place more subtly.[6] A field's boundaries are policed by auditors who monitor compliance by reporting on individual members, publishing progress reports, and setting standards.

Organizational fields are not simply held together by a shared culture or norms but are integrated by a combination of concrete resources and ideational elements. ''Hard'' resources such as the auditors and their staffs are intertwined with ''soft'' ideational elements such as world views and interpretation. In a highly institutionalized field, determining where the material ends and the ideational begins is difficult.[7]

In response to pressures for demonstrating legitimacy, organizations develop elaborate external structures and reporting mechanisms that respond to and fend off close examinations by field auditors. Over time, organizations learn what types of response to audits are legitimate and what types of external structure they should adopt to maintain the proper aura of respectability. The emphasis on proper procedure, or organizational structure, is especially pronounced in the case of bureaucracies, which produce no clear quantifiable product.

5. For a recent compilation of this perspective, see Powell and DiMaggio 1991.
6. For a description of the mechanisms leading to isomorphism, see Scott 1991, 176–78.
7. For a review of the relevant sociological literature and a new theory of fusion between material resources and ideas, see Sewell 1992.

The organizational field of states

Organizational field theory can apply even to states, some new institutionalists argue.[8] They view nation-states as organizations embedded in the largest of fields: what John Meyer and his colleagues term the world polity or international society.[9] This field has expanded dramatically since World War II to cover the entire globe, in varying degrees of intensity. It is bound together by an increasing number of international treaties, agreements, and norms, while its frontiers are policed and its members audited by a proliferating group of nongovernmental and intergovernmental bodies. The world polity has no clear physical core. Rather, its center is a "virtual" one revolving around the information production activities of bodies such as the United Nations (UN) and its agencies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Meyer argues that world polity agents constitute, construct, and legitimate nation-states through their various issue-specific discourses. They instruct states how to act and how to structure and express themselves in the guise of disinterested consultants. "We thus live in a world thick with consultants," Meyer says, with "economists who wander to the South and East to advise on the universal truths of the market economy; educators who propose to the world the universal validity of American educational models . . . [and] legal and moral inspectors advancing principles of the equality of the races."[10] In the last two decades, as world polity theorists have documented in quantitative studies, a virtual explosion of non- and intergovernmental bodies has taken place, together with a dramatic rise in the number of issue-specific consultants preoccupied with auditing member states. The world polity, as a field of organizational action, has become extraordinarily dense.

The nature of the world polity is such that states are pressured to assume greater control over social activity within their boundaries and to ensure that social action of all types conforms to the proper procedures. In most cases, world polity auditors are unable to directly enforce their notions of legitimacy. As Meyer argues, "the structures of the world polity are mostly . . . not actors. They produce talk—scientific talk, legal talk, non-binding legislation, normative talk, talk about social problems, suggestions, advice, consulting talk, and so on—not binding authoritative action."[11]

The auditors' talk influences states in a variety of ways. At times, stigmatization through critical reports is effective. At other times, the auditors infiltrate the organizational fabric of states, working with domestic collaborators to establish outposts within national bureaucracies. These outposts—including entities such as

8. For an application of sociology's new institutionalism to international relations, see Finnemore 1996 and forthcoming.
9. For an example of this view, see Meyer et al., 1987.
10. Meyer forthcoming, 11.
11. Ibid., 9.

women's agencies, environmental bureaus, or science offices—are supported by world polity counterparts through funding and legitimation.[12]

Cultural theorist Ann Swidler suggests a third method of diffusion.[13] Social actors, she argues, often voluntarily change their behavior—or at least appear to do so—in response to changes in public symbols. As the environment changes, some forms of behavior become stigmatized while others become acceptable. Actors seeking to boost their reputations will want to reflect the new criteria for evaluation, even if they do not believe in the substantive value of the new symbols themselves. "What governs action in this case," Swidler points out, "is not individuals' internalized beliefs, but their knowledge of what meanings their actions have for others."[14]

Swidler's approach appears particularly promising for explaining some isomorphism within the world polity, where similarities in state structures and rhetoric often coincide with variations in the private beliefs and actual behavior of political elites. Although elites may not believe in the new global norms, they also want to avoid violating them in too obvious a manner. Hypocrisy has real effects on actual behavior because in order to appear legitimate, some real changes need to be made. The consequences of those changes, however, may have little to do with the desires of world polity auditors.

Human rights: an emerging world polity subfield

Although Meyer often refers to the world polity as a single unified entity, it is in reality a loose grouping of numerous subfields, each of which has its own rules, resources, and legitimating myths. Although it has to date been neglected by world polity theorists, the realm of state violence, like trade tariffs or budget management, has also undergone a significant process of regulation, rationalization, and legitimation on a global scale.[15] A dense body of conventions, laws, and norms defining "legitimate" state violence as well as the structures states should adopt to control and supervise their coercive agents currently is in place. This field's fundamental principles are codified in human rights law and international humanitarian law (the "laws of war"). Among acts of state violence that are considered legitimate are individually oriented punishments, bureaucratic due processes, and acts against combatants as distinguished from civilians. Torture is banned in all instances. The most important criterion for legitimation is that state coercive agents must operate within a structure of accountability. The world polity demands that security force actions be transparent and open to inspection by official auditors such as the

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12. For a discussion of the world polity and national science agencies, see Finnemore 1993; for an analysis of global effects on national policies toward women, see Berkovitch 1995; and for a study of worldwide population policies, see Barret 1995.
13. Swidler 1995.
14. Ibid., 8.
15. For the suggestion that war should be analyzed with the tools of new institutionalist analysis, see Friedland and Alford 1991.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN, as well as private semiofficial auditors such as human rights organizations. Auditors often consider openness to scrutiny as proof of a state's willingness to conform to world polity standards.

As the number, skills, and resources of human rights agencies grow, this subfield has increasingly colonized other portions of the world polity as well as fractions of various national bureaucracies. To a remarkable extent, for example, UN agencies, European multilateral institutions, and U.S. government bureaus have been infiltrated by human rights concerns. This infiltration has not been uncontested, however. In Bosnia, to take one recent and very public example, the UN War Crimes Tribunal has constantly struggled with the more realist elements of European, UN, and U.S. foreign policy establishments, which have viewed its preoccupation with arresting and trying war criminals as a major impediment to resolving the conflict.

Additionally, the global media increasingly uses human rights terminology in their reports. This trend indicates a shift in shared symbols toward disputing the right of sovereign states to wage war or suppress internal resistance in the most direct manner.[16]

The sharpest increase in the number of stories containing the word "human rights" took place during the 1980s. In the 1982–94 period, for example, the Reuters World Service registered a 500 percent increase in its usage of the term, while the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) Summary of World Broadcasts reported a 600 percent increase in BBC usage. The most dramatic growth, however, took place outside the industrialized West. China's Xinhua news agency increased its usage of the term by 1,000 percent in the 1982–94 period, while the Current Digest of the Soviet Press, a selection of key articles, ran 300 percent more stories in 1994 than in 1982. My survey of the Federal Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), a U.S. government agency that selectively translates local media products in different regions of the world, showed dramatic increases in the use of human rights terminology over the last decade, particularly during the last five years.

This vast media product, backed by considerable organizational resources at both the global and national levels, is consumed by a thin stratum of cultural, economic, and political elites stretching across state borders. This elite international community has increasingly been drawn into a shared symbolic world in which the baseline for evaluating social worth is largely set by Western-influenced norms articulated by global auditors. The greater global transparency and interest in state violence forces state elites to recognize that actions by their security forces will affect their evaluation by significant others, especially in the richer regions of the world. To benefit from membership in the most privileged and legitimated of global circles, state elites must therefore increasingly concern themselves with human rights reports and monitor and rationalize the behavior of their own security forces.[17]

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16. The following data are based on a review of media sources located on the on-line Lexis-Nexis system.

17. For an argument about the impact of "issue-networks" such as human rights groups on notions of sovereignty, see Sikkink 1993.

Figure 1. *Change in shared symbols: human rights in the global media*

Realists who argue that individual states change only because of great power pressure do not offer a convincing alternative to the new institutionalist argument. Clearly, improvements in human rights behavior often does stem from direct bilateral pressure by more powerful states.[18] In other cases, however, even though powerful Western countries do not engage in focused, resource-intensive coercive bargaining, human rights behavior does change. If the human rights subfield were merely a tool wielded by powerful governments, we would not expect to see any improvements without great power activity.

The "great power argument," moreover, leaves a second important question unanswered: Why does the United States push for human rights improvements in the first place? If not for the growing relevance of the world polity and its associated rules, the U.S. government might apply pressure on states to conform to other

18. Martin and Sikknik 1993.

directives. As global rules of the game change, the desired ends toward which great power pressure is applied also vary.

The world polity and nation-states thus coexist in an uneasy relationship. Rather than viewing them as distinct entities engaged in a battle for control, we should see them as two fractions of a fluid and interactive process, in which each fraction helps to construct and legitimate the other.

The uneven influence of the world polity

The need for a modified new institutional theory

The effects of world polity norms on individual cases of state violence are still unclear. Some states enforce global norms in their daily military practices, while others do not; some states might apply norms in one situation but fail to do so in another. When will states violate global standards and when will they respect them, even to the detriment of their own security?

A modified version of world polity theory, based on detailed case studies, clearly is necessary to understand why and when structural isomorphism is significant. Through their use of innovative macro-level quantitative work, world polity theorists have shed light on an important arena of social action. In the process, however, they have neglected to emphasize that the world polity is a set of higher-order environmental rules, not an accurate description of reality itself.

Institutional theory and Israeli interrogations

Given Israel's deep involvement in the world polity, we would anticipate that its state security forces would be exposed to heavy scrutiny from world polity human rights auditors, as is the case in practice. Journalists and human rights workers enjoyed relatively free access to the Israeli-held Palestinian territories during the intifada, the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation, and generated a remarkably consistent stream of information about Israel's control policies. In many respects, the changes in the Israeli interrogation system conform to the hypothesis that over time, international auditing would force Israel to change its methods of interrogation.

The inadequacies of new institutionalism, however, leave several important issues unexamined. While new institutional analysis can explain the general contours of the change in interrogation behavior—the reduction of traceable violence, the increased emphasis on proper procedure, and the enhanced state monitoring and control—it cannot explain the specifics of the new methods. Why did the interrogation system move in the precise direction that it did? In this respect, as I shall demonstrate below, Michel Foucault's theory of the transition from punishment to discipline in the modern liberal state will prove valuable.

Second, new institutional theory encounters problems in accounting for the timing of the change. Within the broad constraints set by global auditors, states have

significant room to maneuver. Why did the changes take place in 1991–92? Why not in late 1987, when the intifada first erupted, or in 1994, when Israeli–Palestinian political negotiations began? In its current form global new institutionalism cannot account for actions that trigger examinations by world polity auditors and cannot explain when their efforts will be successful. As I shall demonstrate below, politics are still important, despite the power of the macrostructural currents identified by new institutionalism.

New institutionalism also cannot explain whether the changes are significant. If Israel began to use new, less traceable methods of violence during interrogation, would this be important? More discreet violence, after all, is still violence, and the interrogators continued to get what they wanted. What effects did the new measures have on Palestinian interrogation subjects and on the Israeli state?

Foucault and the world polity's concept of legitimate violence

Auditors often regard legitimate violence, i.e., coercion conforming to the laws of war and human rights law, as an unproblematic social good. Is that interpretation a fair one, however? What are the effects—intended or otherwise—of legitimate violence? New institutionalist theory provides a few hints, suggesting that legitimate violence will be professionalized, rationalized, and bureaucratized, but we must draw on another kind of social theory altogether to comprehend the essence of the world polity's model.

In his book *Discipline and Punish,* Foucault chronicles a crucial shift in methods of French state coercion.[19] Prior to the nineteenth century, states employed graphically spectacular violence such as dismemberment, in which the body of the condemned was subjected to visceral physical pain. The state branded offenders with a permanent scar as a symbol of its power and a warning to others. In the nineteenth century, however, ''a few decades saw the disappearance of the tortured, dismembered, amputated body, symbolically branded on face or shoulder, exposed alive or dead to public view. The body as the major target of penal repression disappeared.''[20]

The modern nation-state shifted from ''punishment''—the term Foucault uses to describe the infliction of awful pain on the flesh of condemned prisoners—toward ''discipline.'' Discipline involves constant surveillance, careful spatial ordering of prisoner populations, meticulous regimentation of body movements, and the erection of large carceral institutions where prisoners are held in carefully orchestrated regimes. Instead of the traditional sovereign's irregular but extravagant displays of savage cruelty, according to Foucault, the modern disciplinary state smoothly exercises control through the constant and even application of modest ''micro-penalties.'' Foucault suggests that these changes, which appear at first glance to be

19. Foucault 1979. In invoking Foucault I am selectively choosing from his work, since Foucaultian tradition offers little that would encourage the type of causal explanations herein.
20. Ibid., 8.

more humane, are in fact more economical ways of exercising social control; disciplinary techniques, as opposed to the premodern punishments, excite less opposition among spectators and are more comprehensive. The modern state thus maintains a social system with a dramatic ability to shape the lives of its citizens.[21]

The liberal state recoils in horror from the arbitrary use of excessive punishment. In its place, professional disciplinarians spin a web of laws and regulations that exercise violence in an economical, impersonal, and controlled manner. This shift requires the state to erect a network of legal, psychological, and medical expertise around the application of force. By dispensing advice on what should and should not be done, professional disciplinarians lend the process of state violence an aura of rationality, dispassion, and justice.[22]

This trend toward Foucaultian discipline has swept through virtually all Western industrialized states, as well as many others. More important for our purposes, the Foucaultian model is the blueprint diffused within the world polity by human rights agents. States deploying methods akin to Foucaultian disciplinary techniques can hope for acceptance into the realm of legitimated states. Those that spurn discipline, however, opting for methods that appear to belong more to the realm of punishment, will be denied access into the inner sanctum and to its accompanying benefits.

From punishment to discipline: empirical findings

Changes in techniques

In March 1991, B'Tselem, the most influential and credible Israeli human rights organization, published a study based on a sample of forty-one Palestinians interrogated during 1988 to 1990.[23] The study found that all but one were badly beaten, many with hard implements such as wooden or plastic clubs. Some were beaten while twisted into contorted painful positions such as the ''banana tie,'' in which detainees' hands were bound behind their backs to their ankles, leaving their stomachs and testicles exposed—a method immediately recognizable as torture. Testicle beating was widely practiced. Fifteen lost consciousness and eleven required hospitalization for injuries sustained during the interrogations.[24] B'Tselem's findings, which were based on Palestinian testimony and hospital records, dovetailed with other sources of information.[25]

Accounts supplied by Israelis close to the interrogation process reinforced B'Tselem's claims. According to AM, an interrogator's aide whom I interviewed about his 1988 experiences, interrogations were both brutal and straightforward.

21. Mann 1984 makes a similar observation in discussing the shift from ancient ''despotic'' to modern ''infrastructural'' state power.
22. Foucault 1979, 21.
23. B'Tselem 1991.
24. Ibid., 71.
25. Al-Haq 1988.

During his one month's reserve service, he and his colleagues used their fists and clubs to beat hundreds of Palestinian detainees until they talked. "Lots of people had broken arms, legs, teeth," he recalled. "We would keep on beating," and if the detainee fell down, "we hit him on the floor. If the beating didn't help anymore, because he was about to die and you just couldn't keep hitting him, they would pour something on the open wounds. It was like acid or something, I don't know. And when that happened . . . they just screamed and screamed."[26] Albert Rosalio, who served as a guard in an interrogation center in 1988, recounted that "there were lots of screams and sounds of beating, crashing from the interrogation rooms. Then the prisoners would come out, screaming and crying from pain. I would have to take them to the doctor to get fixed up after that."[27] In both cases the men said the detainees were "small fry," Palestinian youngsters suspected of minor offenses such as throwing stones, organizing demonstrations or painting nationalist graffiti. Militants suspected of using weapons against Israelis or fellow Palestinians were interrogated in different facilities.

In 1993 I began my own systematic study of interrogation methods and found that the nature of abuse had substantially changed.[28] I interviewed thirty-six Palestinians interrogated between June 1992 and April 1994, and obtained sworn testimonies from eight others still in prison at the time. The sample was nonrandom; a truly random sample would have required obtaining a list of interrogation subjects from the Israeli security services, an impossible task under the current political circumstances. I did, however, vary the sample by geographic location, political affiliation, interrogation agency, interrogation facility, and suspected offense. I made no attempt to locate individuals who were reputed to have experienced particularly brutal interrogations. All interviews were conducted in the privacy of respondents' homes or in their lawyers' offices. The only persons present during the interviews were myself, the respondent, and my translator. Interviews lasted, on average, between two and three hours, although several lasted substantially longer.[29]

In different interrogation facilities and among different agencies the bone breaking had all but stopped. Of my sample of thirty-six persons, twenty-four had been beaten, but only three were subsequently hospitalized and only two lost consciousness. Interestingly, the banana tie had all but disappeared. Although the beatings continued, they no longer led to lasting physical injury. Interrogators took care to leave no marks; they squeezed testicles and cut off prisoners' air supply but rarely bruised or broke skin, muscle, or bone.

26. Personal interview with AM, a thirty-five-year-old Jewish Israeli male, who served as an interrogator's aide in al-Fara'a military prison in 1988 while on reserve duty, southern Israel, 15 June 1993.

27. Personal interview with Albert Rosalio, Kibbutz Yizrael, Israel, 12 July 1994. Rosalio served his February 1988 reserve duty in the Gaza City "Beach Camp" facility.

28. I undertook the research on behalf of Human Rights Watch/Middle East and subsequently wrote their 1994 report based on interviews with former detainees, Israeli soldiers, transcripts from Israeli military trials, and other sources of evidence.

29. For a detailed methodological discussion and description of the interview sample, see Human Rights Watch/Middle East 1994, 24–43.

The shift in methods was substantial, and every detainee I interviewed remarked upon the difference. Rashid Abu Hilal, interrogated several times over the last decade, remarked that ''the Israelis have tried to convince people that beating is the worst torture of all, and that since they do this less now, things are better. This is not necessarily true.''[30] Ibrahim Ali Ahmad al-Tarsha, a thirty-five-year-old economist interrogated on several occasions during the last ten years, said that up until several years ago, ''beating was the main methods. Today, beating is only one many methods used . . . what they do now has psychological effects. Not to sleep for twenty-five days is terrible.''[31] Sleep deprivation, as al-Tarsha and others pointed out, left no lasting marks. Avshalom Benny, an Israeli paramedic who served in an interrogation facility in 1992, told me he was unable to find physical marks on detainees he knew were being physically abused: ''They would come out of the interrogation rooms and would tell me how the interrogators had hit them. When I took off their clothes and examined them, however, I couldn't find a thing.''[32]

My findings demonstrated not that torture had ceased but that its nature had fundamentally changed. All individuals in my sample, including those who were not beaten, had been subjected to a painful interrogation process. Detainees were immersed in a controlled and rigidly monitored environment, which included round-the-clock body position abuse, sensory disruption, sudden and drastic temperature changes, isolation, and extended bouts of sleep deprivation. Over time, the painful body positions induced depression, helplessness, and a sense of total dependence on interrogators. Although many of these methods had been used prior to 1992, their relative weight in the interrogation process had increased sharply. As another detainee explained, ''In the earlier period, they took you from a common cell to an interrogation session, beat you up, and then returned you to your colleagues. Now, in the new system, you are isolated in a closed interrogation wing from which you do not emerge until you've given them what they want.''[33]

Most important, detainees were emerging from interrogations with little physical proof of their experience. The few signs left on the prisoners' bodies evaporated after a shower, uninterrupted sleep, and standard prison rations.

Changes in state control and representation

In 1993, in response to a legal challenge by Israeli civil rights activists, the head of the GSS submitted an affidavit to Israel's Supreme Court explaining the new interrogation system. The agency chief said a new instruction booklet had been distributed to interrogators in April 1993 detailing when classified ''exceptional

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30. Personal interview with Rashid Abu Hilal, former detainee, Ramallah, West Bank, 7 March 1993.
31. Personal interview with Ibrahim Ali Ahmad al-Tarsha, Ramallah, West Bank, 6 March 1993.
32. Personal interview with Avshalom Benny, Jerusalem, Israel, 20 June 1993. Benny spent his April–May 1992 reserve duty in the Dhahariya facility.
33. Personal interview with a former detainee, a thirty-four-year-old Palestinian lawyer, Ramallah, West Bank, 7 March 1993.

methods" could be used against Palestinian detainees by authorized interrogators. Interestingly, the GSS director made no attempt to claim that the state had abolished coercion altogether during interrogations. On the contrary, he acknowledged using coercion but justified this apparent violation of legitimate procedure by arguing that the state itself was closely involved in monitoring the process at the highest of levels. In so doing, the Israeli state sought to bolster its legitimacy vis-à-vis global auditors and their domestic allies and also substantially changed the way in which it discussed the interrogation process.

The core of the GSS director's argument was that for each individual prisoner, unspecified interrogation methods would be carefully chosen so that they matched the nature of the suspected offense and the degree to which the interrogators' suspicions were grounded in reliable information. The "new procedure," the GSS director said,

> has determined that the gravity of the [interrogation] method to be used must be directly proportionate to the nature and to the extent of the anticipated danger that would result from a failure to obtain the information which the interrogatee is suspected of holding.

> Thus it has been determined that as a general rule, the more there is a suspicion of a grave offense, and the more that this suspicion is grounded in the information [held by interrogators], the more grounds there are for [interrogators] to suspect that the interrogatee is withholding dangerous information which must be obtained, and the more there is justification for using methods to obtain this information.[34]

In addition to instituting the new correlation between suspected offense and interrogation method, the GSS chief noted that four limitations on exceptional interrogation methods would also be applied. The methods (1) would be permitted only in certain categories of interrogations; (2) would be employed only at certain stages of the interrogation; (3) could be used only by agents of a certain rank; and (4) could be used only after interrogators had taken the detainee's health into consideration.

In effect, the GSS director was arguing that each case was considered individually on its merit by specially authorized professionals and that, in each instance, agents carefully debated the appropriate techniques to be used. The GSS chief thus suggested that the agency had created a special category of professional administrators whose task was to use violence in a controlled manner and whose existence was offered as proof of enhanced legitimacy.

Of equal importance was the GSS director's statement that interrogations would be medically supervised. Here, it was the medical profession, through its representatives in the prisons, that provided legitimation. Not long before the GSS chief's affidavit, a government minister responded to a parliamentary query by detailing the extent of medical supervision in the interrogation process. The minister stated that

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34. State of Israel, State Attorney's Office, Affidavit submitted by Israeli state attorney Dorit Beinish to the Israeli Supreme Court, responding on behalf of the General Security Services, Supreme Court case 2581/91, April 1983, para. 16.

each detainee is examined by a doctor before entering interrogation and that "a doctor goes through [the interrogation facility] once every 24 hours and sees . . . all the interrogatees. If, in addition to this visual check, a detainee or interrogatee complains and wants to see a doctor, he is taken for an examination."[35] The claims of medical supervision were partially borne out in reality. All the detainees I interviewed said they were checked by doctors or medics during and before interrogations, even if the checks were cursory affairs.

The process of acknowledgment and justification penetrated deeply into the judicial system, and both Israeli military and civilian legal experts became enmeshed in the process of legitimation. Detainees were regularly brought during the interrogation before military judges, who certified the interrogators' right to continue. Later, on rare occasions in which detainees challenged the methods used to extract confessions, judges listened but made no criticisms as agents acknowledged that they had bound detainees to small chairs for long periods of time, had used hoods, and had prevented detainees from sleeping. As long as agents stressed that the measures were controlled and proceeded according to predetermined criteria, judges rejected detainees' allegations of torture.

The Ministry of Justice sought to project an image of careful control and calm rationality when responding to allegations of torture. The ministry politely answered all queries, stressed that the interrogation in question had followed the proper procedures, and emphasized that, at all times, the interrogation had been carefully supervised by legal and medical professionals. In one case, the ministry acknowledged that persistent noise had been used as a method of interrogation, but explained that "it was not excessively loud."[36] In another case, Israel's State Attorney acknowledged to the UN Human Rights Committee that the GSS had kept prisoners hooded during interrogation but rejected allegations that the burlap coverings were intentionally covered in filth.[37]

The GSS chief's emphases on proportionality; individualization of each case; and supervision by senior GSS agents, doctors, and military judges were all aimed at rejecting the image of interrogations as somehow akin to the arbitrary punishment that had been stigmatized in the world polity. Under the new system, interrogations would be carried out efficiently and calmly through mechanisms of professional discipline.

The rationalized system described by the GSS director began to be reflected in the actual workings of the system. As mentioned above, some reductions in the most graphic and documentable forms of torture did occur. Although the sanitized public image of controlled coercion was by no means an accurate reflection of reality, a clear trend toward subdividing detainees into categories of "beatable" and "nonbeat-

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35. State of Israel 1993.
36. State of Israel, State Attorney's Office, Letter from Rachel Sukar, deputy to the state attorney, to advocate Tamar Pelleg-Sryck, concerning a complaint by Na'im Ibrahim abu Seif, 18 August 1993, para. 15–17.
37. United Nations 1994.

able'' persons had appeared. Beatable detainees appeared to be those suspected of having links to armed activities, while prisoners whose suspected offenses were more political in nature were subjected to the full range of nonbeating techniques.

Detainees reported that prison guards, as opposed to the higher-status interrogators, had strict orders not to use violence on their own accord. Twenty-three-year-old Ali Radaydeh, for example, said that while he was in his cell in the Hebron interrogation wing a guard had hit him but that a passing interrogator had reprimanded the guard. In both earlier and later interrogation sessions, however, Radaydeh was badly beaten by interrogators.[38] The ban did not encompass violence in general; it applied only to violence by unauthorized agents. Within a few years, the right to beat had been taken out of unauthorized hands and limited to specialized personnel.

Finally, the interrogation experience appeared to have been standardized across interrogation centers. Whereas in the past prisoners emerging from over ten different centers described dissimilar experiences, the new system treated detainees equally, no matter where they were questioned. One official of the ICRC, who in accordance with ICRC policy refused to comment on the substance of Israeli interrogations, expressed his amazement in 1993 at the conveyor-belt quality of the process: ''Today, if you are arrested by the Israelis, you know you will go through a pre-determined routine, no matter when and where you are interrogated. In other places individual cases of ill-treatment may be far, far worse, but the victims can always hope to somehow slip through the system. With the Israelis, that is statistically impossible. You always know exactly what is going to happen to everyone, down to the smallest detail.''[39]

In summary, then, the interrogation process had changed in several ways by 1992. The state had expanded its control over the interrogations themselves; had standardized methods across all centers; and had acknowledged using coercion, though justified its use by reference to standards of due process, individuality, proportionality, and medical supervision. These developments would clearly have been anticipated by new institutionalism, provided we realize the world polity's definition of ''legitimate violence'' strongly resembles Foucaultian discipline. Serious questions still remain, however, as to the significance of the changes and to their timing.

Toward a modified version of sociology's global new institutionalism

The forgotten actor: target populations

When, how, and why do international auditors of state violence choose to act? Why did they wait in the case of Israeli interrogations until 1991–92, over four years

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38. Personal interview with Ali Radaydeh, Abadiya, West Bank, 1 March 1993.
39. Personal interview with ICRC official, June 1993.

after the beginning of the Palestinian intifada? If only states and world polity agents were important causal factors, global variations in methods of state violence and the timing of specific changes would be difficult to explain. A modified version of new institutionalist theory suggests we take into account the role of targeted populations.

Although ignored by most new institutionalist analyses, populations operating outside established state structures are a key element in the struggle for world polity legitimacy. Populations differ in terms of the resources they wield, their internal makeup, and their own linkages to the world polity. Different populations can be controlled by the same state by very different methods of coercion. In new institutionalist theory, however, populations remain a residual category, leading to a substantial loss of explanatory power.

Were Palestinian linkages not a key factor shaping Israel's methods of control, we might be tempted to argue that the changes stemmed from developments within the Israeli polity, with emphasis on its liberal democratic tradition. At the most general level, adherents of the so-called democracy thesis argue that repertoires of state violence are natural outgrowths of certain regime types.[40] Liberal democratic states are more humane, while totalitarian, authoritarian, or other undemocratic regimes tend to be more brutal.

Regime theory encounters difficulties, however, when one recalls slavery in the United States, American military atrocities in the Pacific theater during World War II or during the Vietnam War, the French counterinsurgency in Algeria, or Israeli actions in Lebanon. Closer examination reveals that variations in methods do not occur only among different states but also in same state across different conflicts, even in the same general time frame. Much of this variation appears to be correlated with shifts in the identity of the repressed population. Differences in geographic location, ethnicity, social class, degree of incorporation into the state, or religion have significant implications for the type of treatment populations experience.

To the extent that populations targeted by democratic states are "socially distanced" or politically cut off from the government in question, they do not seem to benefit from the safeguards available to other citizens. Democracies do tend to respect human rights more readily, but only for those persons included within the symbolic or legal boundaries of the state. Foreign or otherwise marginalized populations cannot access domestic channels of representation and transparency and thus tend to be exposed to different forms of control. Repertoires of state violence are affected by a complex process, of which regime type is only one element.

In recent decades an increasingly dense world polity has offered an indirect form of representation and transparency for marginalized populations, provided they are able to take advantage of the opportunity. Though world polity structures are an imperfect alternative to the typical mechanisms of protection offered to full-fledged citizens in democratic states, by using international human rights bodies and human rights discourse as platforms for global lobbying, targeted populations can generate pressure on otherwise indifferent security forces and regimes. Global lobbying by

40. See Poe and Tate 1994; Henderson 1991; and Howard and Donnelly 1986.

Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza is a prime example of this method of gaining international protection.

The role of the Palestinian population in triggering world polity interest is best illustrated by examining what I believe to be the direct efficient cause of the 1991–92 change. The shift in interrogation practices coincided with several major reports by local and international auditors indicating that while Israel was presenting itself to international and domestic publics as a legitimate member of the world polity's inner sanctum, elements of its security forces were engaged in illegitimate practices.

The first significant report was published in March 1991 by B'Tselem and was crucial because it was the first detailed document on interrogations ever published in Hebrew by a relatively mainstream Israeli entity. Although the general Jewish public regarded B'Tselem as untrustworthy and inexcusably pro-Palestinian, the organization enjoyed limited credibility within the parliament, the security establishment, and the media, primarily because of its powerful reputation abroad. The report was widely reported in the local and international media, generating a level of debate that seems surprising, given that similar information had been available from Palestinian sources for years. B'Tselem, however, had broken an unspoken taboo; for the first time, a Jewish Israeli organization had spoken out in support of allegations that cut to the heart of Israel's international and domestic image. Parliamentary and public debate led to official probes of B'Tselem's allegations, and although a military commission never directly admitted to wrongdoing, its conclusions strongly suggested it had discovered something badly amiss within the interrogation system. Among other recommendations, the Vardi commission, as it was called, counseled the military to distance itself completely from the interrogation phenomenon, leaving it entirely within the hands of the more secretive and less accountable GSS.

At the beginning of 1992, a few months after the furor caused by B'Tselem's 1991 report, a second and far more damning report was circulated to key government ministers by the ICRC, which plays a crucial role in monitoring the Israeli interrogation process. ICRC delegates meet with detainees in private during interrogations. Its direct firsthand knowledge of interrogation techniques and the number of affected persons is rivaled only by the GSS itself. By interacting directly with senior political officials, the ICRC established a new channel of representation between Palestinian prisoners and the government. Until then, the GSS had acted as an information gatekeeper, framing all interpretations of the interrogation experience in accordance with its own needs and worldviews.

Due to its commitment to confidentiality, the ICRC never published its 1992 report, although it did issue a brief, unprecedented press release. (According to the organization's internal regulations, it does not issue reports publicly unless an abuse is systemic, grave, and has been witnessed directly by ICRC delegates.) Nonetheless, I learned that the report was based on a sample of some seven thousand Palestinian interrogation subjects and that it confirmed most of B'Tselem's allegations. The report's methodology and evidence were impeccable, since their sample included virtually every detainee interrogated during 1990–91. The ICRC's report made clear

to government ministers, in substantial detail, what state representatives were doing in the interrogation centers.

Once the ICRC report drove home to the government the fact that interrogators were engaged in illegitimate and potentially embarrassing activities—which directly violated the government guidelines drawn up in 1987, immediately prior to the uprising—the state was obliged to force interrogators to use methods of violence that fit more comfortably into the disciplinary paradigm.[41]

The question of what triggered the international auditing system remains: What was the impetus behind the ICRC and B'Tselem's moves to push the issue onto the forefront of the international debate?

Part of the answer lies with the sheer quantity of prisoners; by 1991, some eighteen thousand Palestinians had been interrogated, and the ICRC's field delegates were reporting a problem of massive proportions. Numbers alone, however, are rarely sufficient to spark attention by international audiences, since the valuation of human life varies wildly in the global arena. In Northern Ireland, for example, similar interrogation methods used against fourteen Irish suspects generated a storm of domestic and international criticism and their quick abandonment by the United Kingdom. While British interrogators never dealt with the numbers witnessed in the Israeli–Palestinian case, they were placed under effective pressure far more swiftly than their Israeli counterparts. Conflicts such as those in Bosnia, to take another example, generate more interest than those in Africa, even through the casualty rates in the latter region are far higher than in the former.

The process of ''value creation'' at the global level is determined to a large extent by traditional interests. Populations targeted in areas where powerful Western nations have significant political, economic, or cultural interests have a greater chance of triggering meaningful human rights audits than those languishing in globally ''insignificant'' arenas. Within the broad structures created by global interests, however, populations have considerable room for maneuver; by deploying public relations resources in key arenas, skillful victims can boost world interest in their plight.

It was Palestinian public relations skills, honed ever since Israeli rule first began in 1967, that provided ICRC and B'Tselem with the crucial push. By advancing their cause onto the world agenda, by accessing the international and Israeli media, and by presenting their grievances in world polity terms of human rights and legitimacy, Palestinian organizations eventually managed to trigger world polity scrutiny. Palestinian public relations power in turn stemmed from their long learning experience and the prominence of Palestinians in the international scene, grounded in decades of international significance, UN intervention, and ideological warfare in multiple locations.

The Palestinian public relations struggle was part and parcel of a more general media campaign against Israeli rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Palestinians made the most of their access to the international press and of the fact that they were

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41. State of Israel 1987.

a largely unarmed and civilian population facing military troops. The journalists were aided by the virtually unlimited access they received in the field from Israeli authorities and Palestinian activists alike, as well as by the two peoples' international prominence.

In 1991–92 the Palestinian global advocacy campaign finally penetrated the world of interrogations, the last Israeli security force redoubt against transparency. Palestinians had to trigger the exposure through Israeli and international mediators, however, because of their social distance from the Israeli public.

The timing of the change is evidence that the Palestinians needed to work through global human rights bodies. Had the changes in interrogation methods been the direct result of Palestinian lobbying they would have occurred much earlier, since Palestinian organizations had been pressing for an overhaul of the interrogation system for years.

Population political action can take place through a variety of world polity agencies. The most effective method is to gain direct access to human rights-related fractions of powerful governments. When, as was the case in Israel, U.S. interests are strongly weighted in favor of the offending regime, targeted populations have to work through less powerful mediums such as the relevant fractions of the UN, the ICRC, and private human rights organizations. In the Israeli case, the United States consistently refused to condemn publicly Israeli interrogation practices and would not link changes in Israeli control policies to the country's generous aid package. Given the importance of interrogations to the Israeli security apparatus, U.S. officials placed torture at the bottom of their wish list of Israeli improvements.[42] Despite increasingly harsh criticism by human rights agents of all types, Israel maintained its position as the foremost recipient of U.S. foreign aid. Thus, in the case of Israeli interrogations, the impetus for change clearly does not lie with tough bilateral pressure from the U.S. government.

World polity auditors: agents or structures?

Since the end of World War II, the world polity has gradually evolved to include dozens of subfields, including that of human rights and its various offshoots. As we have seen, Palestinian organizations were able to engage the world polity through sustained political action and to introduce global agents into their struggle. Are the world polity actors therefore mere pawns in a global game, buffeted by macrosociological currents and lobbying efforts? Contrarily, as Kathryn Sikknik argues, are human rights networks crucial agents in their own right, whose internal politics and decisions are of critical importance?[43]

The evidence indicates that organizations such as the ICRC and B'Tselem are in fact semiautonomous agents. Although they could not exist without the support of the world polity and would not have focused on Palestinians without prodding from

42. Personal interview with U.S. consular official, East Jerusalem, 17 June 1994.
43. Sikknik 1993.

the targeted population, they also had a choice in deciding whether and when to act against the Israeli interrogation system. The 1991 ICRC decision to launch a major, resource-intensive survey was a product of internal ICRC deliberations and was not solely determined by Palestinian pressures. Given the large number of conflicts the ICRC is involved in worldwide, it could have plausibly argued that its limited resources should be deployed elsewhere. Similarly, B'Tselem's decision to launch a politically risky investigation of the GSS and to pursue an aggressive advocacy policy was only partially determined by Palestinian pressure. B'Tselem staffers could have opted to avoid conflict with the powerful security services, concentrating instead on less sensitive issues. Internal politics and decisions within the different organizations comprising the human rights field are thus crucial components of the explanatory process.

Why do the changes matter?

Whether the changes discussed above are significant—whether they matter—is not yet clear. Is the new system mere window dressing with no substantive effects, as many human rights organizations argue?

The change in methods has, in fact, had three crucial results. First, the Israeli state and its security services, both of which were under pressure at home and abroad for their violation of world polity norms, have profited. For a state whose democratic image is crucial to its military and financial survival and to the loyalty of its citizens, the move away from punishment was important. Torture is difficult to justify and the persistent allegations of abuse, backed by hospital records, would ultimately have weakened the state's traditional international and domestic alliances. The Israeli security agencies, working with allies within the foreign, defense, and justice ministries, erected an elaborate formal structure of due process and control and changed their techniques so as to blur the gulf between appearance and reality. Detainees and their advocates were unable to effectively contradict the state's portrayal of the system, since any hard evidence had all but disappeared. By creating this structure, the Israeli state finally resolved a crisis that had been plaguing it since the beginning of the intifada in late 1987: how was a modern, transparent, and Western-leaning state in the late 1980s to combine repression and legitimacy?

The second consequence was the impact on the interrogation subjects themselves. The drop in long-term physical injuries has been in many respects quite beneficial for former detainees, since they now remain in relatively good physical health. Given the large numbers of persons subjected to interrogation—as many as thirty thousand during the 1988–94 period—this improvement is clearly important.

Nevertheless, as a Jerusalem-based UN psychologist explained, the lack of visible physical sequelae also has had negative effects.[44] When prisoners had clear markings indicating they had been tortured, she explained, ''the community understood why

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44. Personal interview with a senior mental health officer at United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) headquarters, East Jerusalem, 17 July 1993.

they broke down and implicated friends in real or imagined crimes.'' When released prisoners had no signs proving what they had experienced, however, they could not explain why they broke down and supplied interrogators with names. ''The associated feelings of shame, remorse, and guilt can cause severe mental trauma that would not have been experienced had the subjects been physically scarred,'' she said. Moreover, former prisoners had no clear justification for refusing to continue their nationalist activities, since they appeared physically capable of carrying on. In a society in which political struggle was a measure of social worth, withdrawal from activism yielded substantial complications.

One can understand the third result only when one places interrogations within the wider evolution of Israeli security force methods from unregulated violence toward a more calibrated rule-bound regime. When the intifada first erupted in late 1987, the army reacted with methods characterized by high levels of direct brutality, arbitrariness, and lack of formal due process. Later, as domestic and international criticisms mounted, the security forces moved toward more controlled methods of repression.[45] Most Israeli methods were regulated and bureaucratized prior to 1991–92; interrogations, the most clandestine among security force activities, was one of the last forms of social control to move into the ''legitimated'' mode.

Although the newer methods remained repressive, they allowed Palestinians greater maneuvering room and facilitated new opportunities for political action. As such, Israel's move toward enhanced legitimacy was simultaneously enabling and constraining for both the state and Palestinian activists. The effects of Israel's massive detention system are important illustrations of this trend. The security forces initially sought to bypass the prison system and to administer direct physical punishment through a policy of military street beatings. As international and domestic condemnation mounted, however, increasingly large numbers of Palestinians were instead sentenced to military prisons. By 1993, according to the IDF, over one hundred thousand Palestinians had been detained since December 1987.[46] At any given time between late 1987 and 1993 anywhere from ten thousand to fifteen thousand Palestinians were in Israeli military prisons, the highest per capita prison rate among all nations publishing relevant statistics.[47] The growing number and density of detainees, however, facilitated inter-Palestinian networking, aiding the growth of communitywide solidarity. The Israeli authorities recognized the dangers of mass imprisonment but were unable to find alternatives since the world polity had blocked other methods, such as direct physical abuse and deportation.[48] Thus the world polity negatively affected Israel by encroaching upon its sovereignty, freedom of action, and options, while simultaneously achieving a positive effect on Palestinian nationalists, who gained new opportunities for action. Those opportunities were

45. Al-Haq 1988.
46. Telephone interview with Captain Avital Margalit, IDF Spokesman's Unit, Jerusalem, 10 July 1993.
47. Human Rights Watch 1994, 2.
48. With regard to deportations, see author's record of General Ehud Barak's (IDF Chief of Staff) statement to the Israeli High Court of Justice, Jerusalem, 18 December 1992.

ultimately limited, however, by the boundaries created by Israel's position internationally and militarily.

A comparative test case: Israeli forces in southern Lebanon

If the modified version of new institutionalist theory offered above is correct, we would expect Israeli security forces to act differently when targeting populations with less robust world polity linkages. Alternative explanations, such as those based on regime type would be less persuasive, if we found differences in a state's repertoire of violence against populations differentially embedded in the world polity during the same time frame.

Israel maintains a significant military presence in southern Lebanon, both through direct troop involvement and through a local client militia, and is involved in a protracted low-intensity struggle with Shiite Lebanese militias. Methods of interrogation in Israeli or Israeli-linked facilities are, according to interviews with soldiers and international experts, far closer to punishment than in the occupied territories. "If you think interrogations in the West Bank are bad," said interrogator's aide AM, "you should just look at what goes on in Lebanon. It's a whole different story; there are no rules there."[49] AM's perspective is borne out in documentation supplied by international agencies.[50]

The variation in Israeli interrogation techniques in the two zones mirrors larger differences in security force activities. Israeli decisionmakers clearly distinguish between Lebanon and the territories in choosing military instruments. In Lebanon, the Israeli air force and artillery periodically bombard suspected guerrilla bases, often causing significant damage to residential areas.[51] Much as individual officers might have liked to use similar measures in the territories, few methods of indiscriminate destruction have been used since 1967.

A third key distinction is made between the rules of engagement in each theater. In Lebanon, Israeli forces regularly engage in shoot-to-kill ambushes aimed at suspected guerrillas or infiltrators. In the Palestinian areas, contrarily, the rules of engagement are extraordinarily detailed, even those against armed guerrillas. Since the beginning of the intifada, soldiers increasingly have been forced to justify their use of live fire to investigators from the army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID).

Most of a group of forty former Israeli servicemen I interviewed about their experiences in Lebanon and the occupied territories remarked upon the difference in methods. "In Lebanon, we would just shoot at whomever we saw walking along ravines at night," said NL, a former paratrooper. "When we went down to the [occupied] territories, however, all of a sudden it became really complicated; there were long and detailed 'open fire rules,' and all kinds of orders about what you could

49. Personal interview with AM.
50. Private communications with international humanitarian officials. See also Amnesty International 1992.
51. Human Rights Watch/Arms Project 1996.

and could not do. You can't just kill an Arab in the West Bank without at least being able to make up some kind of legal excuse."[52] MA, another Israeli infantryman, complained that in the territories, ''you need a lawyer right next to you all the time to interpret the open-fire rules.'' A soldier's life is easier in Lebanon, he said, since despite the greater danger posed by Lebanese militias: ''there aren't hundreds of regulations about when you can shoot."[53] Former Israeli infantry lieutenant Negev Ahimiriam had a more hard-nosed view of the same phenomenon: ''What you need to do in the territories, as opposed to Lebanon, is to kill someone in a way that can be legally justified. As long as you can manufacture a legal excuse, you are fine."[54] Even though Ahimiriam's cynicism may be justified, the scramble for legal justification has had a substantial cumulative effect on the type and number of security force killings.

At first glance, one might argue that since Israel's operations in southern Lebanon are defined as those of war and not of military occupation, the difference in repertoires of violence flows from the different legal frameworks in which Israeli forces operate. Although this is an important distinction, it still leaves unanswered why the Lebanese have been unable to force the international community to declare south Lebanon an occupied territory, since Israeli forces hold their areas just as they do the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although international law may dictate the two definitions, the larger point remains: on the whole, southern Lebanese have been much less successful than West Bank and Gaza Palestinians in consistently pushing their conflict with Israel onto the world polity's agenda.

The differential advocacy capabilities of the two populations plays a crucial role in explaining the difference in Israeli behavior. In the territories, Palestinian linkages to the world polity channel Israeli techniques toward discipline. Unlike the territories, in southern Lebanon the population is largely rural, uneducated, and has limited global-level lobbying capacities. As a result, Israeli freedom of action in the area is less circumscribed.

The difference in Israeli methods in Lebanon and the occupied territories calls into question the independent causal role of democratic regimes. Democratic structures facilitate the work of world polity agents at a later stage in the monitoring process. Clearly, it is easier for global auditors and targeted populations to change security force behavior if they can locate domestic allies within the repressive state, and such alliances are more likely in democracies. In the case of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, consequently, the actions of Palestinians and the ICRC were greatly aided by the efforts of B'Tselem and sympathetic Jewish journalists. The independent activity of world polity agents and Palestinian organizations was necessary, however, to spur Israeli civil rights activists into action. If, as is the case in Lebanon, no such action is forthcoming, transparency in the affected area will be low and political critics of the

52. Personal interview with NL, a twenty-four-year-old Jewish Israeli male who served in the Israeli army during 1989–91, Tel Aviv, Israel, 22 September 1992.

53. Personal interview with MA, a twenty-eight-year-old Jewish Israeli male, Ra'anana, Israel, 24 July 1994.

54. Personal interview with Negev Ahimiriam, who served in both Lebanon and the territories as an infantry platoon commander and deputy company commander, Jerusalem, 22 September 1992.

regime, no matter how great the level of internal democracy, will do little to reshape their state's behavior.

Conclusions

This article has attempted to explain variations in the ways states use violence. In the last few decades, I have argued, part of the answer can be found in a modified version of new institutionalist theory and Meyer's concept of a world polity. A notion of legitimate state violence—centered around themes of professionalization, rationalization, and bureaucratization—has emerged as a result of changes in the density of the global organizational field or the so-called world polity. These themes have prompted states seeking legitimacy to adopt, over time, methods of action that conform to general principles of rationality and bureaucracy. The articulators of these principles are a network of agents embedded in NGOs and international agencies scattered across the globe.

Unlike most theorists of the world polity, however, I have introduced a third variable into the model. Populations, situated outside of traditional state structures, are sometimes able to act successfully in global arenas and to substantially affect state behavior. To the extent that both a state and the population it targets are deeply embedded in the structures of the world polity, patterns of state repression will tend to be more bureaucratized, professionalized, and rationalized. Repressive states will cloak their activities in a mantle of pseudolegality that channels their techniques of repression into ways that appear, at least to the outside observer, to follow legitimate patterns of violence.

Legitimate repression, above all, eschews methods such as disappearances, massacres, arbitrary executions, and the most obvious forms of torture. These methods are easily picked up by global monitoring agencies and have become so reviled that they become a significant liability to their practitioners. Once these practices are no longer used, however, the monitoring and definition of illegitimate coercion becomes far more complex, as is currently the case with Israeli interrogations. Are the Israeli methods to be considered torture, deserving of our condemnation? Israeli officials have increasingly been able to argue that even though they are coercive, their methods do not constitute torture. If the methods were technically classified as torture, would the global media report on such seemingly benign forms of violence, given the presence of more graphic problems within the increasingly transparent world polity?

State security forces, global auditors, and targeted populations are involved in a complex negotiation process surrounding repertoires of state violence. By bypassing the controlling state and linking up directly to the world polity, targeted populations gain a measure of protection from grossly illegitimate violence, while exposing themselves to the ensuing new forms of coercion.

These new methods have substantial but ambiguous implications for all concerned. They simultaneously restrict the repressive state's freedom of action and

enhance its domestic and international legitimacy. They present the targeted popula-
tion with difficulties in their efforts to lobby against the methods but also provide
new opportunities for political action on the ground. For the world polity and its
auditors, the new methods imply new challenges of measurement, advocacy, and
information gathering. Most important, as populations, states, and world polity
agents negotiate the parameters of modern conflicts, they call into question tradi-
tional notions of state sovereignty.

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