

marks on the hygiene and medical treatment, Dr. Shuttleworth passes to educational training, which thus occupies nearly half the book. As the author observes, such training requires to be conducted by the physician and teacher going hand-in-hand, for idiocy is at once a disease, often complicated, and an incapacity, mental and nervous. Dr. Shuttleworth gives an account of the laborious investigations which he made in conjunction with Dr. F. Warner and others into the number and condition of the children in the London Board Schools who labour under nervous affections which render them less capable of learning than other pupils.

This book may be regarded as the sum of many previous contributions to the literature of the subject which have made Dr. Shuttleworth's name well known to the medical profession. The author shows throughout a conscientious desire to give due credit to fellow-workers in the same field. His remarks upon the moral and religious training of imbeciles show much judgment and consideration. The book is illustrated with plates of lithographs and woodcuts in the text which are well chosen and well executed. Altogether Dr. Shuttleworth's book may be recommended as giving a clear and connected account of our present knowledge of idiocy and imbecility, especially in its practical bearings.

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*Philosophy of Mind; an Essay in the Metaphysics of Psychology.*

By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD. New York and London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1895, pp. xiv. and 414. Price 16s.

In this book Professor Ladd has dealt with the philosophical problems which suggested themselves to him when treating of the subject of empirical psychology. A work of this description demands serious attention. Apart from the intrinsic interest of the subject itself, the author's long-continued researches into the facts and laws of scientific psychology render it particularly valuable to those who desire to obtain an open-minded and just estimate of the relations existing between empirical psychology and philosophy.

The author has made an earnest attempt to bring various speculative opinions face to face with the conclusions of the science of mind, and in so doing he presents to us a treatise which—in the more special meaning of the term—may properly be called metaphysical. The subjects selected for treatment are by no means exhaustive, but in the main

they are those of the greatest interest to the student of mental phenomena, and it is from the empirical standpoint that they are considered.

Throughout the work grave fault is found with those writers upon the scientific aspects of psychology who fail to keep consistently to the purely scientific point of view. The author, however, acknowledges that a certain form of metaphysics is the natural and necessary accompaniment of every scientific study of mental phenomena. "The study of psychology as a natural science is not really the pursuit of a knowledge of correlations between phenomena wholly *without any metaphysics whatever*. It is rather the pursuit of this science, with only *such metaphysics* as is naively assumed in all scientific inquiry. Psychology may then, for the time being—if one is willing to leave it so—be called 'a natural science,' but only as it is founded upon a natural, uncritical, and unreflecting metaphysics."

The metaphysical assumptions and implications which are woven into the philosophy of nature and the physical sciences are, and we think rightly, held as possessing no claims of superiority over those involved in the philosophy of mind or the metaphysics of psychology. Were we to strip the physical sciences of all metaphysical assumptions, how little of these sciences would be left! Their conservation would appear to depend more upon the structures the scientists have built as metaphysicians than upon what they know as mere scientists. Professor Ladd has legitimately dealt with the metaphysical questions involved in certain scientifically-established facts and laws of mind, and his speculations have no foundation other than in experience.

After dealing with Hoffding, James, and Flournoy as inconsistent rejectors of metaphysics, he concludes that the only legitimate choice left for the psychologist is between an uncritical dualism and the adoption of such a definite metaphysical point of view as Volkmann's and Wundt's.

The arguments as to the nature of the "concept of mind" are sometimes difficult to follow. The main point he desires to establish would appear to be that all consciousness, and every phenomena of consciousness, makes the demand to be considered as a form of functioning, and not as mere differentiation of content. "Every state of consciousness is not only capable of being regarded on the side of passive content of consciousness—it must also be regarded on the side of active discriminating consciousness." "Consciousness regarded as objectively discriminated, and con-

consciousness regarded as discriminating activity, are only two sides, as it were, of one and the same consciousness." The element of self-activity in all self-consciousness is laid great stress upon.

The alienist will find much of interest in the chapter on Consciousness of Identity and so-called Double Consciousness. The latter phenomenon is treated in an interesting and suggestive manner. In the main we agree that many of the current physiological and psychological theories are not only inadequate, but also misleading. The desire to observe and emphasise the rarer and more abnormal extremes of the reported cases of "double consciousness" has undoubtedly led to the neglect of many other phenomena which fitly serve to bridge the apparently impassable gulf between them and the most ordinary experiences. Even the most strikingly abnormal cases of double consciousness, when *all* the phenomena connected with them are carefully examined and duly estimated, seem likely to show that it is possible to interpolate an innumerable series of gradations so as to shade up to our ordinary experiences. Possibly in the future we may be able to fill up many of the gaps, and find that every contingency fits in with the possibility of the occurrences being within the realms of diffuse consciousness, or as reflex phenomena, without the direct concentration of attention or of self-consciousness.

The theory of the unity of mind is advocated strenuously. The reality of mind is supported on the assumption that knowledge implicates reality. Professor Ladd believes that the only and indubitable reality which belongs to mind is its being for itself, by actual functioning of self-consciousness, of recognitive memory, and of thought.

In the chapters which deal with the relations of Mind and Body the author challenges the principle of psycho-physical parallelism. He believes that even the simplest relations between the phenomena of the lowest order of consciousness and the concomitant cerebral processes are far too fluctuating, complicated, and changeable to be subsumed under this principle. "Of parallelism in time there is only an incomplete and broken analogy, and when one tries to think out clearly the conception of a complete qualitative parallelism, one finds the principle soon ending in inadequacy, and finally becoming unintelligible or absurd." That the proof of the parallelism is as yet inadequate and incomplete we assent; but our failure to demonstrate the complete quantitative and qualitative details of the two series of phenomena does not

furnish us with a direct negation of any parallelism whatsoever. The inadequacy probably exists in our own defective conception of the actual nature of the relations existing between mind and matter. In any case, our partial knowledge of that relationship does not warrant a direct negation of the possibilities and probabilities, nor does it form a satisfactory ground for any positive assumption as to psychological monism. Professor Ladd's acceptance of the latter doctrine appears to be based in great part upon the inability to imagine even a moderate dualism, which we hold to be susceptible of further definition and elaboration. The wiser course would appear to be to accept a moderate dualism until we know more about the body and the mind, and not to entirely negative possibilities by theories which cannot be verified.

The remaining discussions on the "Origin and Permanence of Mind" and the "Place of Man's Mind in Nature" are of considerable interest as bearing upon ethical and religious questions.

We may say of this book that it is written in the author's best style. The destructive criticism is in places markedly effective, and the book ought to be widely read as one of the most able and suggestive contributions of recent years to the literature of the philosophy of mind.

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*Thoughts on Religion.* By the late GEORGE JOHN ROMANES, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S. Edited by Charles Gore, M.A., Canon of Westminster (Fifth Edition). Longmans, Green & Co. London: 1895, pp. 184. Price 4s. 6d.

This is a story of transition from a carefully reasoned scepticism anent religious things, and a life of conscientious abstinence from prayer, to "(1) 'pure agnosticism' in the region of the scientific 'reason,' coupled with (2) a vivid recognition of the spiritual necessity of faith and of the legitimacy and value of its intuitions; (3) a perception of the positive strength of the historical and spiritual evidences of Christianity." But "pure agnosticism," as understood by Dr. Romanes, in his later years, is a phrase which should be explained to the general reader. It is, in fact, the agnosticism of Darwin and Huxley, as to whatever may lie beyond our sense-perceptions, and must not be confounded with the doctrine of the unknowable, the implied impossibility of revelation, the form of agnosticism attributed to Herbert