Long View, 1991) and its application by the U.S. intelligence community (e.g., see National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030*, 2013); traditional international relations theory (starting with Kenneth Waltz and Samuel Huntington, and more recently in post—Cold War assessments of the global order such as by Charles Kupchan); and U.S. grand strategy and policy planning (especially essays in Daniel W. Drezner, ed., *Avoiding Trivia: The Role of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy*, 2009). Oppenheimer is clearly more eager to apply mainstream lessons from these subfields than to challenge or explore the many distinctions between them.

Oppenheimer's most important practical contribution is his detailed explanation of the scenario-construction process, one he describes as part art, part science. His book includes sample discussion papers and agendas, pointers for how best to select participants, and recommendations for how to focus discussion on a handful of futures most likely to tease out lessons relevant to American policymakers. Here, he is commendably self-critical, noting, for instance, that "the most consistent process error has been a failure to push the group far enough beyond its collective comfort zone" (p. 202), in ways that could have forced consideration of seemingly less probable scenarios, but ones that with the benefit of hindsight were actually closer to reality.

Although few analysts outside the U.S. government would have access to the resources and expertise needed to replicate Oppenheimer's process, it is easy to imagine other academics and analysts attempting to tailor it to their own purposes. Scenario-based analysis holds particular allure as a teaching technique for advanced policy courses in international relations and U.S. foreign policy. The author, however, devotes little attention to this topic, clearly stressing the tool's analytical utility for policymakers over its pedagogical value.

Having personally participated in Oppenheimer's futures workshop on Pakistan, I would suggest that this emphasis is at least partly misplaced. In my experience, the participants of scenario-based and other sorts of group gaming exercises are likely to be the greatest beneficiaries. This is true for at least two reasons. First, as Oppenheimer observes, it is actually quite difficult to get policy experts into a frame of mind that permits them to depart from well-worn positions and to consider plausible but unlikely scenarios. Once there, however, those experts are well placed to factor their new insights into subsequent research and writing. By comparison, the readers of after-action reports from scenario workshops (whether they are policymakers or simply other experts who did not participate) are likely to be skeptical consumers if only because they missed the prior process of acculturation.

A second reason is related to the ways in which lessons from scenario-based exercises are packaged for outside audiences. Oppenheimer recommends write-ups in the form of stylized narratives, or "histories of the future," interspersed with explanations of "particularly important deflection points," "key driver interactions and events," and descriptions of "policy effects" (p. 177). Although it might be possible to construct a future history compelling enough to grab the attention of senior policymakers, the format is difficult to master. It probably requires a fiction writer's touch to spark the reader's willing suspension of disbelief. As a practical matter, it also ends up being a long-winded way to convey information. For both reasons, the format is ill-suited to senior U.S. policymakers, who tend to be time-pressed and skeptical consumers of information. The core insights derived from scenario-based analysis are probably better fed to even midlevel policymakers in other streamlined formats.

This, in turn, raises the broader issue of how to integrate Oppenheimer's methodology into the U.S. foreign policy process. I tend to doubt the likelihood of his preferred solution: establishing a futures office inside the fast-paced, operationally oriented, already bloated, and at times politically charged conditions of the National Security Council (NSC). Yet Oppenheimer is right that without "top level oversight and direct participation" (p. 221), the process would lack sufficient weight in the context of ongoing policy debates.

Perhaps a better solution is to teach the value of scenario-based analysis in academic settings, especially graduate schools of public policy. That way, senior officials within the NSC, State Department, and Pentagon would be more likely to encounter the method at earlier stages in their careers, just as many of them have become familiar with war games and red-teaming exercises. This seems a more realistic scenario for how Oppenheimer-style exercises could—over time—become more commonplace within the foreign policy agencies of the U.S. government.

Free Expression, Globalism and the New Strategic Communication. By Monroe E. Price. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 286p. $88.00 cloth, $33.99 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592716004047

— Jon R. Lindsay, *University of Toronto*

Political science as a discipline may not pay enough attention to communication technology, but the field of communication takes great interest in politics. In the tradition of Harold Innis's *The Bias of Communication* (1953), Monroe Price sets out to explain how innovations in social media and marketing practices can constrain or enable free speech and democratic values, and further, how the new technologies provide new opportunities for various actors to shape or contest these effects.

Although occasioned by the social media revolution, *Free Expression, Globalism and the New Strategic Communication* is not exclusively or even primarily concerned

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with technology. Price operates under a constructivist premise that "A state is, in part, a collection of stories connected to power" (p. 41), implying that anything that changes those stories has the potential to change or reinforce power. He is thus interested in how "narratives of legitimacy" are produced by states and challenged by other state or nonstate actors via the increasingly complex communicative and economic relationships that globalization has produced. Because "[n]arrative is interpretive, not merely or even objective" (p. 45), the profusion of ways and means for expanding or reducing the gap between myth and reality becomes a strategic tool. Scholars who find discourse analysis compelling may find that Price's synthetic focus on the means of communication, together with its content, offers some useful insights.

Price builds on an interesting premise that "the extraordinary phenomenon we call 'free expression' is not only a set of principles and practices but also a set of institutions" (p. 27). By institutions he means not only rules, norms, and governing arrangements in the sense familiar to positive political economists but also "the infrastructure of information flows" (p. 27) to include technical devices, software protocols, service providers, and so forth. The author argues that we cannot take freedom of expression for granted because its constitutive institutions are shaped by "strategic communication," which he defines as "a set of speech practices undertaken to reinforce, subvert, undermine, overwhelm or replace a preexisting discourse on a subject significant to both the audience and the speaker" (p. 19). Globalization and the information revolution, in turn, make strategic communication at once more attractive, contested, and anxiety producing for powerful states, which gain new means for surveillance and control, and social movements, which gain new means for challenging them. Price emphasizes that these developments have an ambiguous "double impact" (p. 7) that simultaneously decentralizes and disintermediates discourse through social media and consolidates information and power relationships through strategic communication.

The author covers a lot of theoretical and case material (perhaps too much) across the book's 12 chapters. The first half of the book attempts to triangulate the concepts in the book's title. After highlighting the sociotechnical foundations of expressive practices, Price goes on to discuss strategies by which actors shape the means and content of expression. These include the use of "diagnostics" or marketing and analytical technologies that enable actors to characterize the information environment of their competitors in order to target their messaging; the exploitation of "asymmetric contexts" available differentially to weak or strong actors; and efforts to shape "strategic architectures" like the networks and protocols of the Internet to promote one vision of order over another, notably China's Internet sovereignty challenge to the Western multistakeholder ideal.

The second half of the book turns to case studies of strategic communication, including the use of state propaganda for "soft war" in the U.S.–Iran relationship, the role of government support in the efforts of nongovernmental organizations to promote democracy, efforts to shape or hijack the narrative of China's rise during the 2008 Beijing Olympics, and the emergence of new satellite communications to literally go over national regulatory regimes and states' responses All of this material contains interesting insights, but the threads that connect chapters (or even ideas within chapters) are often elusive.

This book may appeal to scholars who have already decided that contests of ideas and discourse are the central problem(s) of politics in the twenty-first century, shining a light on material strategies that advance ideological agendas. It will not likely persuade those who are more skeptical about the role of ideas or attracted to explanations that appeal more to material incentives. Some might argue that the rhetorical drama of contested strategic narratives is largely epiphenomenal to the balance of power. To take the example of propaganda deployed in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, both mentioned by Price, it is one thing to assume that ideological narratives shape the willingness of people to rebel or support the government; yet research by scholars of civil war, such as Roger Petersen, Stathis Kalyvas, and Paul Staniland, suggests that affiliative networks and individual calculations of opportunity and safety are far more important than the ideological grievances targeted by "information operations" efforts.

Price does recognize that "It is difficult to evaluate what disciplining power can be attributed to the narrative itself as compared to the power structures that underlie it" (pp. 58–59). This is probably an understatement. Yet if "[t]here is a fragility" (p. 58), Price also asserts that "strategic narrative can be destabilizing as well as stabilizing, reshaping as well as unifying. . . . If narratives have this power, then the continuing process of producing them becomes a matter of deep transnational concern" (p. 61). He makes little effort to systematically compare his cases within a rigorous explanatory framework that might enable him to consistently specify the conditions under which strategic narratives shape the balance of material power or vice versa. This is in part a matter of methodological or conceptual preference that might not bother readers who are more comfortable thinking in reciprocal hermeneutic terms.

Free Expression, Globalism and the New Strategic Communication seems like the subtitle for a book without a title. This is somehow fitting for a text that struggles to pin down a central argument. This book is an extremely ambitious effort to simultaneously consider how "states think about their strategic narratives and how these narratives are affected by internal and external modes of expression; the balance or distribution among strategic

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communicators within and without a society; our changing understanding of the meaning of self-determination and its relationship to information and deliberation; the shape and nature of information infrastructures and their design and, in particular, the rise of social media; our sense of the reliability of 'law' or of law as a guarantor of free expression; and, finally, the shifting perceptions of the society's immunity to external or internal threat, invasion and catastrophe" (p. 40). This book has something for everyone. That is either its greatest strength or its tragic flaw.

Brazil On the Global Stage: Power, Ideas, and the Liberal International Order. Edited by Oliver Stuenkel and Matthew M. Taylor. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 228p. $100.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592716004059

— Kai Michael Kenkel, *Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro* and *German Institute for Global and Area Studies, Hamburg*

Over the course of the past two decades, the rise of new powers on the global stage has been the central focus of a now vast body of literature in international relations. This phenomenon has inspired numerous studies, from norm diffusion on climate and intervention issues to the development—security nexus to the putative renewal of a global liberal order under American leadership; the crosscutting topics for this field of study are myriad. Exemplified by one prominent rising power, Oliver Stuenkel and Matthew M. Taylor's *Brazil on the Global Stage* addresses a striking number of these issues, and will be of paramount interest to scholars of emerging powers, the global liberal order and America's role in it, international institutions, and Brazil itself.

One of the volume's defining characteristics is the tightness of its conceptual flow, especially as it combines topics as diverse as the domestic origins of Brazil's attitudes towards liberalism and multilateralism, selected foreign policy stances, and the role of the United States in both. While most contributors hail from, or are specialists in, Brazil, the foreword and afterword firmly frame the book in terms that are intelligible to those interested in U.S. foreign policy. Stuenkel and Taylor's introduction makes the strong connectedness of the contributions possible, and situates the volume as preoccupied primarily with Brazil's role as rising power in an American-led liberal international order.

The key commonality in Brazil's policy responses is the profound ambivalence created by the country's simultaneous acceptance of fundamental liberal precepts and rejection of the hierarchy present in the rules of the international order—and above all, in the process of their further definition. The editors briefly relate Brazil's policy positions to dominant IR theories such as realism and liberalism; here, the stage setting might have benefited from more attention to constructivist approaches to norm diffusion, which openly or implicitly infuse most of the book. The work of Amitav Acharya finds repeated and helpful mention in the volume; conspicuously absent is Antje Wiener's *Theory of Contestation* (2014), which is eminently suited in particular to the inclusion of emerging powers in the ongoing redefinition of the normative underpinnings of global order.

The first chapter by David Bosco and Stuenkel addresses the elephant in the room for analyses of Brazil that attribute all too much intentionality and consistency to its foreign policy in an effort to apply academic concepts: the occasionally daunting gap between its foreign policy rhetoric and reality. The authors draw out key elements of Brazilian rhetoric and compare these to the country's multilateral participation. In doing so, they highlight both Brazil's claim to be a distinctive, exceptional voice in international affairs and the tensions inherent in navigating between global player status and that of a voice for the Global South. Indeed, the pitfalls of successfully juxtaposing the responsibilities expected of a global power—particularly as they pertain to the provision of public goods in a liberal framework—and the subaltern position Brazil has adopted with regard to American and Western leadership are, as is to be expected, a common thread throughout the volume's contributions.

João M. E. Maia and Taylor turn to the domestic foundations of Brazil's seemingly ambivalent reaction to the international liberal order. They highlight the disconnect between a formal adherence to liberal principles in foreign policy and a significant failure of liberal precepts to take hold in domestic politics, where a strong central state has never relinquished its fundamental position. They characterize the ensuing ambiguity as a result of an instrumental approach: "Brazil would sign on to international law as a shield against the great powers, using international law as a weapon of weak state realism. But it would temper this belief in the rule-based order with a close eye to the biases and inequalities perpetuated by international institutions" (p. 49). Ralph Espach's chapter investigates this phenomenon in greater detail, focusing on the case of Brazil's security relationship with the United States as the core power in the global liberal order. Providing an overview of postwar bilateral relations, he outlines the prospects for the bilateral security relationship in the absence of a common threat perception or a shared view on the utility of coercive means.

Marcos Tourinho's chapter focuses on an area in which Brazil has had a prominent international role, and which is particularly conducive to contributing to the volume's mission of "locat[ing] exactly where Brazilian dissent from the contemporary international order lies" (p. 80): norms of humanitarian intervention. In analyzing diplomatic debates on the "responsibility to protect" principle, Tourinho states perhaps most clearly the finding shared by all the

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