Appearances and the Problem of Affection in Kant[1]

BRYAN HALL
Indiana University Southeast

Hans Vaihinger, in the late nineteenth century, posed a now famous trilemma for Immanuel Kant's theory of affection: (1) If things-in-themselves are the affecting objects, then one must apply the categories beyond the conditions of their application (space and time). (2) If one holds that appearances are the affecting objects, then one must hold that these appearances which are the effects of affection are themselves the causes of affection. (3) If one holds that things-in-themselves affect the noumenal self in parallel with appearances affecting the empirical self, then that which is a representation for the noumenal self must serve as a causally efficacious thing-in-itself for the empirical self's production of an empirical representation of the very same object (so-called 'double affection').[2]

The trilemma seems to be constructed upon the assumption that appearances are simply *particulars*.[3] In contrast, Rae Langton has argued that appearances are best understood not as particulars, but rather as *relations*. In the first section of this paper, I discuss Langton's interpretation as well as some objections to her interpretation. The second section distinguishes between two different ways in which one might attempt to implement the relational approach to appearances. Although Langton accepts an interpretation whereby the relations are extrinsic to the relevant relata, I argue for a view that takes these relations as intrinsic to the relata in question.[4] Whereas Langton believes that the relevant relata are things-in-themselves and human minds (arguably understood as noumenal selves), I believe that the relevant relata are phenomenal objects and phenomenal subjects. I argue that my interpretation allows Kant, but not Langton, to avoid the threat posed by Vaihinger's trilemma. In the third section of this paper, I use the transcendental deduction of the categories to support my interpretation of appearances as intrinsic relations between phenomenal objects and phenomenal subjects.

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Section One: Langton on Appearances

Langton's argument rests on a fundamental distinction between things-in-themselves and phenomena. As she puts it: 'things-in-themselves are substances that have intrinsic properties; phenomena are relational properties of substances'.[5] Substances, according to Langton, must be capable of a 'lonely' existence, i.e. existing independently of their relations to any other things. Since Kant rejects the idea of a bare substratum, substances must have some intrinsic nature that is non-relational.[6] This would suggest that substances must have intrinsic non-relational properties as a prerequisite for their lonely existence. Since phenomena are things-in-themselves in so far as the latter are related to other things, there is only one world of substances and that is a world of things-in-themselves. Even so, there are two non-overlapping sets of properties that things-in-themselves possess: (1) relational properties and (2) intrinsic non-relational properties.[7] According to Langton, phenomena as relational properties of things-in-themselves are not reducible to the intrinsic non-relational properties of things-in-themselves.[8] These phenomena are not substances, however, since they are not capable of a lonely existence.

Langton believes that appearances are a subset of phenomena. Whereas phenomena are relational properties of things-in-themselves generally, appearances are relational properties of things-in-themselves in so far as the latter are related to human minds.[9] Things-in-themselves are related to human minds through the causal powers of the former. Human cognition is receptive, which is to say that human beings can cognize objects only in so far as they are affected by these objects through their causal powers.[10] Consequently, human beings can only cognize the relational properties of things-in-themselves in so far as they are affected by them. This does not result in cognition of the intrinsic properties of things-in-themselves, however, given the fact that phenomena (relational properties of things-in-themselves) are not reducible to the intrinsic properties of things-in-themselves. This results in a kind of epistemic humility. Although human beings can have knowledge of the relational properties of things-in-themselves via appearances, and can know *that* things-in-themselves have intrinsic properties, human beings cannot know *what* these intrinsic properties are.[11]

Knowing that things-in-themselves are substances that have intrinsic properties, and that these substances affect us through their relational properties, requires deploying the categories of substance and causation.

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This might seem to raise the problem associated with the first horn of Vahinger's dilemma, viz. that the categories must be applied beyond the conditions necessary for their application (space and time). Langton hopes to obviate the problem of applying the categories beyond the bounds of sense by deploying the *unschematized* categories (i.e. the category prior to its transcendental time-determination) to the thing-in-itself.[12] Kant himself suggests such a use of the categories in the Schematism section of *CPR*:

> Now if we leave aside a restricting condition, it may seem as if we amplify the previously limited concept; thus the categories in their pure significance, without any conditions of sensibility, should hold for things in general, *as they are*, instead of their schemata merely representing them *how they appear*, and they would therefore have a significance independent of all schemata and extending far beyond them.[13]

Henry Allison raises a problem for Langton's use of the unschematized category of substance. Her use of the category, though minimal, still violates the *discursive* nature of human cognition which requires the *union* of concepts and sensible intuition.[14] Kant says as much throughout *CPR*, but to focus on the most famous of passages:

> Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is thus just as necessary to make the mind's concepts sensible (i.e. to add an object to them in intuition) as it is to make its intuitions understandable (i.e. to bring them under concepts). Further, these two faculties or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding is not capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are not capable of thinking anything. Only from their unification can cognition arise.[15]

Although one can *think* of things-in-themselves through mere concepts, this is far from *cognizing* these things-in-themselves. According to Langton, we can cognize *that* things-in-themselves have intrinsic properties, with the humility consisting only in our inability to know *what* these properties are. If Allison is correct, Langton's view is still not humble enough.

Even though Langton's discussion focuses on the unschematized category of substance, I believe that her account also requires deploying the unschematized category of causation. The latter, however, is a char-

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acterization that Langton would almost certainly resist. For Langton, affection is simply a causal relation. Subjects are affected by things-in-themselves through their causal powers (relational properties) where these powers are irreducible to the intrinsic properties of things-in-themselves.[16] Since appearances are constituted by these causal powers, which are a subset of phenomena, and phenomena are in space and time, Langton would hold that there is no problem applying the *schematized* category of causation to these phenomena. It is important to note, however, that receptive subjects are not affected by *properties* (relational or otherwise) on Langton's account, but rather by the *substances* that have these properties. The thing-in-itself affects the subject and so must serve as one of the relata in the affection relation. Assuming that the affection relation is a causal relation, this would require extending the category of causation to things-in-themselves. Since things-in-themselves are not in space and time, one would need to deploy the unschematized category of causation which affords only the ability to *think* and not *cognize* that things-in-themselves affect subjects through their causal powers.

Perhaps Langton could admit this while claiming that her account requires only the *thinkability* and not the *cognition* of things-in-themselves with causal powers. This could take the sting out of the first horn of Vaihinger's trilemma if it is viewed as precluding cognition of things-in-themselves while admitting their thinkability. At the same time, however, I believe this interpretation of Langton would remove much of her position's force. One of Langton's primary goals is to make consistent what seems to be an inconsistent triad of Kantian claims: (1) Things-in-themselves exist. (2) Things-in-themselves are the cause of phenomenal appearances. (3) We have no knowledge of things-in-themselves.[17] She attempts to resolve the apparent inconsistency by claiming: 'we can know *that* there are things that have intrinsic properties without knowing *what* those properties are' and a bit later on 'we can know that a thing has certain causal powers without knowing what its intrinsic properties are'.[18] The triad is consistent since can *know* (1) that things-in-themselves exist with intrinsic properties and (2) that things-in-themselves affect us through their causal powers, even if we are (3) *ignorant* of what the intrinsic properties of things-in-themselves are. Under the thinkability view, however, all she is entitled to claim is that we can consistently *think* that there are things that have intrinsic properties and that we can consistently *think* that things-in-themselves have causal powers. Although the triad might still be consistent, the first two

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claims of the triad are significantly weaker than the ones mentioned above. Under this view, Kant could no longer claim 'that things in themselves exist' and 'that things in themselves are the causes of phenomenal appearances'. But these are just the metaphysical claims that Langton attributes to Kant and attempts to defend in her book!

Do Langton's claims really require *cognition* of things-in-themselves? Are the unschematized categories simply limited to their use in *thinking*? At points, Kant suggests that the unschematized categories can be used to generate *knowledge* claims, so perhaps Langton can make the claims that she wants to make while avoiding the constraints that the discursivity thesis places on cognition. Although Kant does allow the unschematized categories to be used in generating minimal knowledge claims beyond the bounds of sense, these claims are far weaker than the ones that Langton requires. When trying to understand what kind of claims the unschematized category of causation might be used to produce beyond the bounds of sense, one should note that the unschematized category of causation reflects the hypothetical form of judgement from the logical table of judgements, viz. that of ground to consequent.[19] When discursive creatures like us use these unschematized categories to make theoretical claims beyond the bounds of our sensible intuition, they have 'only a logical significance' and are merely 'functions of the understanding for concepts, but do not represent any object'.[20] In other words, when one deploys an unschematized category beyond the bounds of sense in a theoretical context, one does nothing more than signify the corresponding function of thought represented in the logical table of judgements. Knowledge of things-in-themselves as causes, however, would seem to require both the representation of *objects* (viz. things-in-themselves) as causes, which is not simply the representation of the antecedent of a conditional judgement. It seems that Langton requires not merely the signification of the ground-consequent relation for which the unschematized category of causation would be sufficient, but rather cognition of the cause-effect relation for which the schematized category of causation is required. Of course, since the schematized category cannot be applied to things-in-themselves Langton cannot make use of it in this context. Even if the unschematized category of causation cannot provide cognition of any *cause* (at the level of objects), however, it can still signify a logical *ground* (at the level of concepts).[21] The latter is a point I will return to again below.

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Section Two: Appearances as Relations

Is there any reason to think that Kant viewed appearances as relations? In the Transcendental Aesthetic, he defines 'appearance' as the 'undetermined object of an empirical intuition'.[22] Kant seems to make himself very clear here. In line with the received view, appearances *are* objects, i.e. particulars. This is not Kant's final word on the subject, however, and in a section of the Transcendental Aesthetic added in the B-edition, Kant says much more about appearances:

> For the confirmation of this theory of the ideality of outer as well as inner sense, thus of all objects of the senses, as mere appearances, this comment is especially useful: that everything in our cognition that belongs to intuition (with the exception, therefore, of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the will, which are not cognitions at all) contains nothing but mere relations, of places in one intuition (extension), alteration of places (motion), and laws in accordance with which this alteration is determined (moving forces). But what is present in the place, or what it produces in the things themselves besides the alteration of place, is not given through these relations. Now through mere relations no thing in itself is cognized; it is therefore right to judge that since nothing is given to us through outer sense except mere representations of relation, outer sense can also contain in its representation only the relation of an object to the subject, and not that which is internal to the object in itself.[23]

From this passage, it seems that the appearances of outer sense are actually relations. In any case, for the sake of dialogue with Langton, and given the strength of her own argument for that conclusion, I propose to grant that this is so. But I primarily do so, because, as it seems to me, the crucial question is rather this: what *kind* of relations are appearances? Langton is emphatic, in particular, about certain ways in which she takes Kant's view to differ from Leibniz's. According to Langton, whereas Leibniz believes that appearances are reducible to the intrinsic non-relational properties of monads, Kant believes that appearances are irreducible to the intrinsic non-relational properties of things-in-themselves. And although Kant believes that things-in-themselves serve as the non-sensible ground of appearances, he disagrees with Leibniz's view that things-in-themselves (in his case monads) are a *part* of appearances in the way that men are part of a crowd.[24] Both of these Leibnizian views entail that appearances really *are* things in themselves. Kant plainly rejects this in the Amphiboly section of *CPR*:

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> Leibniz took the appearances for things in themselves, thus for *intelligibilia*, i.e. objects of the pure understanding (although on account of the confusion of their representations he labeled them with the name of phenomena).[25]

Leibniz attempts to reduce appearances as relations to the intrinsic non-relational properties of monads as things-in-themselves.[26] So far I would simply note, then, as an obvious extension of my earlier criticism of Langton, following Allison, that despite these efforts to adhere to Kant's anti-Leibnizian stance, her position has both Kant and Leibniz embracing a positive approach to the notion of 'noumena'. That is to say, analogous to Leibniz's positing of monads, her position involves a view of Kantian things-in-themselves as entities to which one is entitled to make a positive ontological commitment, despite the fact that there is nothing about them, as they are 'in themselves', of which we are able to form a positive conception. As Kant says:

> In the end, however, we have no insight into the possibility of such *noumena*, and the domain outside of the sphere of appearances is empty (for us), i.e. we have an understanding that extends farther than sensibility problematically, but no intuition, indeed not even the concept of a possible intuition, through which objects outside the field of sensibility could be given, and about which the understanding could be employed assertorically.[27]

There must be such an assertoric commitment, for Langton as for Leibniz, precisely to the extent that one is entitled to assert the existence of appearances in the first place. The problem runs even deeper for Langton, however, in so far as appearances are a special subclass of phenomena. Whereas the latter are relations between things-in-themselves, the former are relations between things-in-themselves and human minds. Since the latter relatum of an appearance relation (as a subclass of phenomena) must be a substance in its own right according to Langton, she must mean 'noumenal self' when she talks of a 'human mind' as being one of the relata in the appearance relation. Thus while I have argued that Langton is committed to the first horn of Vaihinger's trilemma, this would seem to commit her to something like the third horn of the trilemma in so far as an appearance is a relation between a thing-in-itself and a noumenal self productive of phenomenal experience. If this is right, Langton might well inherit more problems than originally thought. Instead of positing only an uncognizable *object* of affection, as the first horn seems to do, double-affection must posit a whole uncognizable *process* of affection.[28]

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How then shall we think about Kantian phenomenal objects, consistently with a relational approach to the notion of appearances? The crux of my proposal turns on Kant's claim that the inner determinations of phenomenal objects are nothing but outer relations and that a phenomenal object is the sum total of relations.[29] Kant contrasts what would be a *substantia noumenon*, or object of the pure understanding, with a *substantia phenomenon*, or that phenomenal object which we cognize through sensible intuition. And he says this:

> In an object of the pure understanding only that is internal that has no relation (as far as the existence is concerned) to anything that is different from it. The inner determinations of a *substantia phaenomenon* in space, on the contrary, are nothing but relations, and it is itself entirely a sum total of mere relations.[30]

In contrast to a *substantia noumenon*, there is nothing 'absolutely internal' in these relations. There are no intrinsic non-relational properties to be found, but rather only 'comparatively internal' properties where the latter turn out to consist of outer relations.[31] When distinguishing between phenomena and noumena, Kant even says a phenomenon is simply an 'object in a relation'.[32] Immediately after the above quoted passage, Kant says that 'we know substance in space only through forces that are efficacious in it'.[33] This suggests that appearances are, at least in part, causal-structural relations understood in terms of the attractive and repulsive dynamic forces of phenomenal objects. Since these forces are the only way in which the subject is acquainted with phenomenal substance, the passage also suggests that phenomenal objects affect the subject through these moving forces.[34] Although this might describe the matter of appearance, Kant holds, much as he did in the Transcendental Aesthetic, that these appearances have an *a priori* form.[35] Space and time are the 'form of dynamical relations'.[36]

Putting the Amphiboly section together with the other passages from *CPR*, a very different conception of appearances thus arises, one that stands in stark contrast both to the received view and to Langton's relational view of appearances. Namely, appearances are best understood on this view not as particulars, but rather as relations – but precisely as relations whereby the phenomenal *object* so related to the phenomenal subject possesses no intrinsic non-relational properties in addition to the relational properties in question. As Kant says, phenomenal objects contain nothing *absolutely internal* or non-relational, but rather consist

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solely of that which is only *comparatively internal* or relational. These relations are both causal-structural and spatiotemporal.[37]

These relations – both spatiotemporal and causal – are *intrinsic* in so far as both spatiotemporal as well as causal-structural relations are *essential* to the relata so related. Without the necessary possibility of cognitive subjects like us, objects could be neither spatial nor temporal since space and time are *a priori* forms of the subject's intuition.[38] Without causal-structural relations, these subjects would have no *a posteriori* cognitive content since all that is present *a posteriori* to cognition through sensible intuition are the causal-structural relations that obtain between spatiotemporal affecting objects and embodied receptive subjects. Without such representational content, however, there would be no way for the subject to become conscious of itself through the unity of apperception which Kant introduces in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories and which I will discuss in the next section. Before moving on to the Transcendental Deduction, however, and the completion of my case for this alternative version of the relational approach to appearances, it is important to deal with a few objections that one might raise at this point. Langton rejects the idea that phenomenal objects are genuine substances since they lack intrinsic non-relational properties and so are not capable of a lonely existence. She goes on to argue that relations (including causal relations) imply the existence of bearers that are themselves capable of a lonely existence. Assuming that affection is a causal relation, phenomenal objects can then not be the affecting objects, since they are not genuine substances and so are unable to bear causal relations.[39] Since Kant does talk about phenomenal substances and seems committed to empirical affection by these substances, it is important to respond to Langton's concerns.[40] As I have argued, the unschematized categories cannot offer cognition of either substances or their causal relations since this is the exclusive function of the schematized categories. To what, however, do the schematized categories apply? When it comes to the schematized category of substance, Kant defines it as 'the persistence of the real in time'.[41] Consequently, the schematized category of substance could have application only to phenomena since only phenomena possess the appropriate *temporal* characteristics for application of the schematized category. Kant's statement of the principle of the First Analogy in the A-edition supports this interpretation. There he says: 'All appearances contain that which persists (substance) as the object itself, and that which can change as its mere determination, i.e. a way in which the object exists.'[42] The object itself in this case is a

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substance which is characterized in terms of its *persistence* (temporal determination) and finally this substance is *contained* within the appearance. Nothing other than a phenomenal substance could serve all of these functions.

Although I have spent much time discussing the category of causation, I believe that the Third Analogy which deals with the category of community contains the clearest description of the kind of causal relationship that obtains between embodied cognitive subjects and phenomenal objects under my view since as Kant says:

> The relation of substances in which the one [e.g. the subject] contains determinations the ground of which is contained in the other [e.g. the object] is the relation of influence, and, if the latter reciprocally contains the ground of the determination of the former, it is the relation of community or interaction.[43]

This is not 'double affection', however, since only *one* process of affection is being described, reflecting the interdependence of subjects and objects in the phenomenal world as the real grounds for each other, and not *two* different processes of affection reflecting relations between subjects and objects in both a noumenal and a phenomenal world.[44]

This makes for a stark and fundamental contrast with Langton's view. Although appearances are *relations*, this does not entail that they are *extrinsic* or non-essential to the relata so related. And although appearances are constituted by *intrinsic* properties, this does not entail that they are *non-relational*. Appearances are *nothing but* a lawfully ordered set of causal-structural and spatiotemporal *intrinsic* relations.[45] Neither the phenomenal object nor the subject related through appearances is possible without the other. This is not the case for Langton, however, when one considers appearances as a subset of phenomena in her sense. Phenomena as a class and appearances as a subclass of phenomena are *extrinsic* relational properties between things-in-themselves. In the former case, these are relations between things-in-themselves *generally*, whereas in the latter case, these are relations between things-in-themselves and noumenal selves. These relations (either phenomena or appearances) are not *essential* to the relata so related, since the latter are substances with intrinsic non-relational properties and would exist independently of any relation to other things. Put slightly differently, whereas Langton believes that both phenomenal

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objects and appearances are merely relations, I believe that phenomenal objects are particulars which bear intrinsic appearance relations to phenomenal subjects.

At this point, one might object to my position by deploying Hume's dictum that there can be no necessary connection between distinct existences.[46] If there can be no necessary connection between distinct existences, then how can subjects and objects be distinct existences, given that they are necessarily connected? I think the best way for Kant to avoid this objection is to deploy his distinction between material and logical necessity from the Third Postulate of Empirical Thought. Whereas the former concerns 'only the relations of appearances in accordance with the dynamical law of causality', the latter concerns 'the connection of concepts'.[47] Although one cannot derive the existence of an object simply by examining the concept of a subject, just as one cannot derive the existence of a subject simply by examining the concept of an object, subjects and objects are nonetheless necessarily connected according to the dynamical law of causality as it operates in the appearance relation. This conception of necessity also fits well with Kant's discussion of causation in the Third Analogy, which, as I suggest above, is the best way of understanding the reciprocal relation that obtains between subjects and objects via the intrinsic appearance relation. If one views the Humean objection as directed at a logically necessary connection, then Kant can avoid the objection while still maintaining a materially necessary connection between subjects and objects. To put things somewhat differently, the relation between subjects and objects is one of *synthetic* not *analytic* necessity.

Returning to Vaihinger's trilemma, he claims that if one holds that appearances are the affecting objects, then one must also hold that these appearances serve as their own causes. I believe that this characterization of appearances relies on the assumption that appearances are particulars, where it is natural to ask how an object can be the cause of itself. Most commentators assume (either explicitly or implicitly) that appearances are particulars. Vaihinger's worry can be avoided, however, once one understands that the appearance is not a particular, but rather a relation. The appearance does not cause or depend wholly on itself. As an intrinsic relation, the appearance depends both upon the phenomenal object and phenomenal subject.

Although the distinction between appearance (relation) and phenomenal object (particular) plays an important role in avoiding the second horn, the intrinsic nature of the appearance relation also plays a role in

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avoiding this horn, in so far as the intrinsic nature of the appearance relation helps to clarify how Kant can avoid the Berkeleyan style idealism that the second horn seems to entail. For example, one might accept that the appearance is a relation while holding that the phenomenal object that enters into this relation is merely a virtual or intentional object. I believe that this simply returns us to Berkeleyan phenomenalism in a different guise, in so far as the phenomenal object would still depend entirely upon the mental activity of the subject to generate the object through acts of construction (virtual) or mental directedness (intentional). Under my view, however, the phenomenal object is not a mere intentional object or construction of sensible ideas, since the phenomenal subject is just as dependent upon the phenomenal object that affects it as the phenomenal object is dependent on the phenomenal subject that formally conditions it. For just this reason, the phenomenal object is not an independently existing thing-in-itself nor is it a mere intentional or virtual object. Instead of a one-way *dependency*, the phenomenal object and subject are *interdependent*, and this allows Kant to avoid *both* the first and second horns of Vaihinger's trilemma.

Perhaps there is a way, however, of understanding appearances as intrinsic relations within the context of Berkeley's system. Much as Kant claims that phenomenal subjects and objects are intrinsically related via the appearance relation, could not Berkeley claim that minds and sensible ideas are intrinsically related via the perception relation? If to be is to be perceived or to be a perceiver, would not a perceiver (mind) need something that it perceives in order to exist much as something that is perceived (sensible idea) needs something that perceives it in order to exist?[48] I believe this surface similarity, however, betrays a more fundamental difference. For Berkeley, ideas are inert and cannot be the cause of anything at all.[49] For Kant, however, phenomenal objects are required for empirical affection. Whereas the existence of phenomenal objects and subjects are interdependent (two-way relation) under Kant's view, the mind is ontologically primary for Berkeley and produces or can produce ideas through its will (one-way relation).[50] For Berkeley, the mind does not exist simply through the understanding by which it perceives ideas, but also through the will by which it produces or can produce them. Thus while the Berkeleyan view under consideration interprets perception to be a relation analogous to the appearance relation, perception is perhaps best seen for Berkeley as rather an intentional relation. For Kant, however, appearances are causal-structural and spatiotemporal relations between phenomenal affecting objects and receptive

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cognitive subjects, where the former are therefore not merely intentional objects.

Although Kant's view of appearances as relations is incommensurate with Berkeley's view of the perception relation, if one chooses to interpret Kantian appearances as particulars, comparing them to Berkeleyan sensible ideas brings into stark relief the problem that the second horn of the trilemma faces. If appearances are mind-dependent particulars, then how are they different from Berkeleyan sensible ideas? If they are not different and sensible ideas are causally inert, then how could appearances be the causes of affection, much less the causes of themselves? As I have argued, viewing Kantian appearances as intrinsic relations allows one to overcome this problem and in a way that does not commit Kant to any form of Berkeleyan phenomenalism.

Van Cleve would still object to my interpretation of appearances as relations, however, by claiming they are all 'structure with no stuffing'.[51] This objection has some force in so far as the phenomenal object does not possess any intrinsic non-relational properties in addition to its extrinsic relational properties. Is there not a distinction to be drawn, however, between the *appearing* object and those *appearances* through which it *appears*? In this case, I believe Van Cleve's mistake is to consider the relation 'in itself' apart from its relata. If I am right, however, Kant conceives of appearances as *intrinsic* relations (structure) between phenomenal objects and phenomenal subjects (stuffing). Much as it makes no sense to talk about either phenomenal objects or phenomenal subjects as existing in themselves independently of the appearance relation, so too does it make no sense to talk about the appearance as existing in itself independently of the phenomenal objects and phenomenal subjects that it relates. Although one can certainly think of certain kinds of *objects* as having a lonely existence (e.g. positive noumena with intrinsic non-relational properties), it makes no sense to think of *relations* as having a lonely existence.

I believe there is a distinction to be drawn between the phenomenal object (stuffing) and the appearance (structure), but the distinction requires attending to the other relatum of the appearance relation, viz. the phenomenal subject. In *CPR*, Kant claims that the determination of a phenomenal object requires that appearances be subsumed under the categories. As he says, 'appearances, to the extent that as objects they are thought in accordance with the unity of the categories, are called *phenomena*'.[52] The synthetic activity of the subject, subsuming appearances under the categories, is required for the possibility of phenomenal

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objects. Consequently, one can draw a distinction between phenomenal objects and the appearances whereby the former appear once one brings in the other relatum of the appearance relation, viz. the phenomenal subject and its acts of synthesis. I will return to this idea in the third section of the paper when discussing the transcendental deduction of the categories. There Kant argues not only that the phenomenal object is possible only through its relation to a phenomenal subject, but so too is the phenomenal subject only possible through its relation to phenomenal objects. Even though neither phenomenal objects nor phenomenal subjects are possible outside of the appearance relation, this is not to say that they are relations rather than relata. The phenomenal object acquires its objectivity by virtue of its relation to a phenomenal subject. Likewise, the phenomenal subject acquires its subjectivity by virtue of its relation to a phenomenal object. Finally, appearances are the intrinsic relations between these relata.[53]

Even so, it seems almost paradoxical to say that the phenomenal object could serve as one of the relata in the appearance relation while at the same time not possessing any intrinsic non-relational properties.[54] To its credit, Langton's view does not face this paradox. Whereas I take appearances to be relations between *interdependent* phenomenal objects and subjects, she takes both appearances and phenomena to be relations between *independently* existing things-in-themselves. Once one recognizes the *intrinsic* nature of the appearance relation, however, I believe the apparent paradox resolves itself. To say that the phenomenal object is exhausted by relations is not to say that the phenomenal object is not an object (or relatum of the appearance relation), but rather that the phenomenal object cannot exist outside of these relations. Failure to recognize the intrinsic nature of the appearance relation is what leads philosophers to search for relata beyond the bounds of sense. Once one recognizes, however, that the relata of the appearance relation cannot exist beyond the bounds of sense, one need not go beyond the phenomenal world in order to find the relata of the relation. I think this also helps to explain why Kant often talks about phenomena in both relational and objectival terms.

So to summarize: on my interpretation, appearances are not to be taken in themselves as *particulars*, but are rather intrinsic *relations*, where one must always give an account of the relata for which this relation is essential, viz. phenomenal objects and subjects. What remains to be shown, however, is that neither the affecting object of representation nor the cognitive subject of representation really is possible

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outside of the appearance relation, or that most fundamental way in which phenomenal objects and subjects are related. Although I have given some reason for thinking that Kant might subscribe to this view, the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories makes it clear that he does subscribe to this view, by giving an *argument* for it.

Section Three: How Objects and Subjects Make One Another Possible

Even admitting that appearances are relations, it is still right to wonder whether Kant has yet provided an argument for why these relations must be *intrinsic*. Can the affecting object have an existence independent of the relation it bears to the subject or not? If the former, the affecting object might still be a thing-in-itself, which could subject Kant to the problems facing the first horn of Vaihinger's trilemma. If the latter, the affecting object might simply be a creature of the mind, which could subject Kant to the problems facing the second horn. I have given some consideration above, as to how Kant can avoid these horns, but his most elegant argument against both positions comes in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.

In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant claims that appearances are the means by which subjects are immediately related to objects in empirical intuition, but such objects of representation are undetermined unless these representations are united in the concept of what it is to be an object (categories).[55] The unification of representations requires synthesis and the unity of consciousness (apperception) in the synthesis of them. Consequently, according to Kant, 'the unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations'.[56] For these unified representations, we think of some object of representation as corresponding to them. This is the 'transcendental object = X', which is always one and the same thing: a transcendental placeholder for the object of representation. The concept of a transcendental object is necessary, however, so that there is something to which cognition is related. As Kant says:

> The pure concept of this transcendental object (which in all of our cognitions is really always one and the same = X) is that which in all of our empirical concepts in general can provide relation to an object, i.e. objective reality. Now this concept cannot contain any determinate intuition at all, and

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> therefore concerns nothing but that unity which must be encountered in a manifold of cognition in so far as it stands in relation to an object. This relation, however, is nothing other than the necessary unity of consciousness.[57]

At this point, it might appear that Kant views the object of representation as a mere virtual object. It is important to point out, however, that although the object of representation is possible only through the subject's activity, the subject of representation is itself possible only through the representations of objects. Without the synthetic unity of these representations, one would not be able to represent oneself as an identical subject enduring throughout these representations. As Kant says:

> Therefore it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations *in one consciousness* that it is possible for me to represent the *identity of the consciousness in these representations* itself, i.e. the *analytical* unity of apperception is only possible under the presupposition of some *synthetic* one.[58]

Consequently, the subject of representation makes the objects of representation possible by unifying these representations, but the synthetic unity of these representations make the subject of representation possible.[59] Since the subject of representation makes the object of representation possible, the object cannot be a thing-in-itself as the first horn of the trilemma would have it. Contrary to Langton, it is not an independently existing positive noumenon equipped with intrinsic non-relational properties and so capable of a lonely existence. Instead, the object of representation is a phenomenal object that is possible only through the relation it bears to a subject of representation. Similarly, since the object of representation makes the subject of representation possible, the subject of representation cannot be a thing-in-itself, i.e. a noumenal self equipped with intrinsic non-relational properties and so also capable of a lonely existence. Instead, the subject of representation is the phenomenal self which is only possible through the relations it bears to phenomenal objects. Kant maintains his transcendental idealism with regard to all objects of representation given that they are nothing once one abandons the perspective of the subject of representation.[60] But since the objects of representation make the subject of representation possible, the objects of representation cannot be mere creatures of the mind as the second horn of the trilemma would have it. Kant

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maintains his empirical realism with regard to all objects of representation.

Before returning to the notion of the 'transcendental object' in Kant, and the use to which I intend to put it in this context, it must be conceded that there are a number of places in *CPR* where Kant seems to refer to the thing-in-itself as the affecting object.[61] Of course, it may be equally important to recall in the first place that there are two ways in which interpreters approach the thing-in-itself in this context. As Graham Bird puts it, although 'traditionalists' see Kant's commitment to the thing-in-itself as problematic, 'revolutionaries' deny or minimize such commitments.[62] Whereas Langton's interpretation of the thing-in-itself falls into this traditionalist camp, Bird for example defends the revolutionary option. In any case, it is also important to remember that Langton's account requires *positively* noumenal things-in-themselves for affection. At one point, Kant seems plainly to reject such a view of the affecting object on pain of empirical idealism:

> For in fact if one regards outer appearances as representations that are effected in us by their objects, as things in themselves found outside us, then it is hard to see how their existence could be cognized in any way other than by an inference from effect to cause, in which case it must always remain doubtful whether the cause is in us or outside us.[63]

Undeniably, there are a number of passages where Kant seems to take the thing-in-itself as some sort of ground of appearance. He even goes so far as to characterize the relationship between thing-in-itself and appearance as embodying a conceptual or analytic truth. Although there are many examples, perhaps the best comes in the Preface to the B-edition of *CPR*:

> Yet the reservation must also be well noted, that even if we cannot *cognize* these same objects as things in themselves, we at least must be able to *think* them as things in themselves. For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is an appearance without anything that appears.[64]

But what should we infer from this conceptual truth? Must the object possess some positive nature beyond what appears to the subject? Although this passage is operating squarely within a one-world context (viz. 'same objects as things in themselves'), it might be argued that Kant is committed to some transcendentally real aspect of the object in question, as relevant to its ability to appear, by way of affection, to a subject.

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However, it is important to note the contrast between 'thinking' and 'cognition' in this passage. Kant's point, I believe, is that we must make use of the *concept* of something that grounds appearance, even if there is *nothing* to which this concept refers. As Kant says in the footnote to the above passage:

> But I can *think* whatever I like, as long as I do not contradict myself, i.e. as long as my concept is a possible thought, even if I cannot give any assurance whether or not there is a corresponding object somewhere within the sum total of all possibilities.[65]

In line with this, one might still wish to interpret this passage as only claiming that no distinct transcendentally real *object* need correspond to the concept in question, while holding that it is analytic that some transcendentally real *property* of an otherwise empirically real object corresponds to it. One would reasonably suppose, however, that Kant's *scepticism* concerning any object corresponding to the concept should equally count against any *affirmation* of some transcendentally real property as corresponding to it. In any case, a more reasonable explanation is that passages of this sort suggest that, at least within the context of talk about affection, there need not be any transcendentally real object or aspect of an otherwise empirically real object that corresponds to our concept of a thing-in-itself. After all, in the Third Postulate of Empirical Thought, which deals with necessity, Kant claims that 'the necessity of existence can thus never be cognized from concepts . . . the mark of necessity in existence does not reach beyond the field of possible experience'.[66] According to Kant, mere conceptual truths (analytic) cannot have existential import.[67]

This is why I used the locution 'ground' above, instead of 'cause', to describe the relationship between the thing-in-itself and appearance. Whereas a cause would require *something* doing the causing, a ground can be merely *conceptual*. The 'ground' of appearance is not a transcendentally real thing or aspect of a thing, I therefore suggest, but rather something merely conceptual. This concept, I will argue, must be thought as corresponding to the phenomenal object as a synthesized collection of appearances. How then should we understand this concept within the context of Kant's theory of affection? My suggestion is that we return to Kant's conception of the transcendental object = X, which, as noted, plays an important role in the Transcendental Deduction, in so far as it serves as a transcendental placeholder for the object of

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representation. In particular, even though the transcendental object is only 'the concept of something in general' which denotes nothing in particular, when the synthesized manifold of appearances is related to this concept, the relation yields cognition of an empirical object.[68] As one might particularly note, furthermore, although Kant describes the transcendental object purely conceptually, he also characterizes it as the 'cause' of appearance in the Amphiboly:

> The understanding . . . thinks of an object in itself, but only as a transcendental object, which is the cause of appearance (thus not itself appearance), and that cannot be thought of either as magnitude or as reality or as substance, etc. (since these concepts always require sensible forms in which they determine an object).[69]

Even though we must possess the concept of a transcendental object in order to ground appearance, this does not entail that there is *anything* corresponding to this concept. This interpretation is consistent with the passage quoted above from the Amphiboly, where Kant claims that that the transcendental object cannot be thought of as possessing reality (e.g. as the transcendentally real aspect of an otherwise empirical real object) or being a substance (e.g. a transcendentally real object possessing intrinsic non-relational properties). Conjoining this view from the Amphiboly with Kant's discussion in the Transcendental Deduction, it then seems that the transcendental object serves two important functions: it is (1) the logical ground of appearance and (2) the transcendental placeholder for the object of representation or phenomenal object.

Earlier I discussed the differences between phenomenal objects (*substantiae phenomena*) and positive noumena (*substantiae noumena*). Although they are distinct kinds of objects, both phenomena and positive noumena are nevertheless viewed *substantively*. In contrast, the transcendental object is viewed as merely *conceptual*. Given this fact, is there any place for the transcendental object on either side of the phenomena/noumena divide? Immediately after the above passage from the Amphiboly, Kant goes on to explain how this transcendental object can be considered *noumenal*:

> If we want to call this object a noumenon because the representation of it is nothing sensible, we are free to do so. But since we cannot apply any of our concepts of the understanding to it, this representation still remains empty for us, and serves for nothing but to designate the boundaries of our sensible cognition.[70]

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Following Allison, one can understand the concept of a transcendental object = X from the A-edition Transcendental Deduction as the concept of a *negative* noumenon that Kant explicitly introduces in the B-edition of *CPR*.[71] Both should be distinguished, therefore, from positive noumena or *substantiae noumena*, which have full sets of intrinsic non-relational properties. Returning to the former, however, much as the transcendental object is something to which the understanding relates appearances but which is not itself an appearance, so too is the negative noumenon something to which appearances are related in intuition but which is not itself an appearance. Although Kant does not mention 'negative noumenon' explicitly in the A-edition of *CPR*, there is a passage that suggests identifying the transcendental object with the negative noumenon:

> All our representations are in fact related to some object through the understanding, and, since appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding thus relates them to a *something*, as the object of sensible intuition: but this something is to that extent only the transcendental object . . . it also follows naturally from the concept of an appearance in general that something must correspond to it which is not in itself appearance . . . Now from this arises the concept of a *noumenon*, which, however, is not at all positive and does not signify a determinate cognition of any sort of thing, but rather only the thinking of something general, in which I abstract from all form of sensible intuition.[72]

Here, one must focus on Kant's claim that the concept of a noumenon with which he is concerned in this passage is 'not at all positive'. Thus he seems to be drawing a contrast, which will only become explicit in the B-edition, between negative and positive noumena.[73] Whereas the former is simply the concept of something in general and so equivalent to the concept of a transcendental object, the latter possesses its own positive nature that could only be cognized by a creature with intellectual intuition. Although Kant characterizes both the transcendental object and the negative noumenon as *causes* of appearance at different points, if what I have said above is correct, either the transcendental object or the negative noumenon should be understood as the logical ground of appearances rather than as bearing a causal relation to appearances.

This is where my position differs markedly from Allison's position. Allison claims that the transcendental object (for him the empirical object taken under a non-empirical description) is what *causes* appear-

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ances and as such cannot be taken as spatiotemporal, on pain of assigning to the cause of appearance those features that only appearances themselves can possess.[74] In turn, Allison rejects the idea that the transcendental object is merely a logical *ground* (conceptual) of appearances on pain of Berkeleyan phenomenalism, since under this view there remains nothing beyond the appearances 'to be considered as it is in itself'.[75] By serving simply as a transcendental placeholder, however, I do not believe that the transcendental object should be taken as the non-spatiotemporal *cause* of appearances. Allison seems to conclude from the fact that, in so far as it affects the subject, the affecting object cannot be wholly *dependent* upon the subject and its epistemic conditions that the affecting object must be in some way *independent* of the subject and its epistemic conditions. This overlooks the possibility, however, that the affecting object and the subject are *interdependent*. As I have argued, the latter is Kant's position and follows from his view that appearances are nothing but *intrinsic* relations between phenomenal objects and subjects. And as I have also argued, this does not result in any form of Berkeleyan phenomenalism precisely because the subject is itself determined through the relations it bears to phenomenal objects, i.e. through the way in which it is affected by these objects.

Conclusion

Returning to Vaihinger's trilemma, I have argued that Langton is minimally committed to its first horn, in so far as she regards the thing-in-itself, understood as a *positive* noumenon equipped with intrinsic non-relational properties, as the object affecting the subject. Here I have agreed with Allison that, even though Langton admits that subjects cannot cognize *what* these intrinsic properties are, she still goes too far in claiming that subjects can cognize *that* there are things-in-themselves with intrinsic properties and *that* these things-in-themselves affect receptive subjects in sensibility.[76]

I have also argued that Langton may be equally committed to defending a version of the third horn of Vaihinger's trilemma. For Langton, appearances are a special subclass of phenomena, where the latter are constituted by the relations between things-in-themselves. These things-in-themselves are, in turn, substances equipped with intrinsic non-relational properties. In Kant's language, then, they are *positive* noumena. Consequently, it seems an appearance must also be understood as a relation between positive noumena. In so far as a human mind is one of

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the relata in an appearance relation, the human mind must also be understood as a positive noumenon, a substance equipped with intrinsic non-relational properties. The only candidate for such a thing under Kant's view would be the noumenal self. Appearances are then relations between things-in-themselves and noumenal selves which then give rise to phenomenal experience. This is at least quite close to the double-affection view, and thus to the disadvantage of not only postulating an uncognizable *object* of affection, as the first horn seems to do, but also postulating a whole uncognizable *process* of affection.

My solution to the problem of affection, by contrast, shares much in common with the second horn of Vaihinger's trilemma, in so far as I affirm that phenomenal objects (*substantiae phenomena*) are the affecting objects, while yet making no appeal to positive noumena (*substantiae noumena*). This solution attempts to avoid the problems associated with the second horn, however, by understanding appearances not as *particulars* of any sort, which could lead to Berkeleyan phenomenalism, but rather as *intrinsic relations*, both spatiotemporal and causal-structural, between phenomenal objects and subjects. By that very fact, of course, it avoids the first horn since the affecting object is not an independently existing thing-in-itself or *positive* noumenon. Even so, the thing-in-itself still has a role to play as the transcendental object or *negative* noumenon, namely, as a transcendental placeholder for the object of representation, which also serves as the logical ground of appearance. Finally, while my view thus retains the notion of a thing-in-itself as transcendental ground, and also involves a two-way relationship of interdependence between phenomenal objects and subjects, it obviously does not involve the 'double affection' of the third horn. The reciprocal relationship between objects and subjects occurs entirely in the *phenomenal* world and does not require appeal to parallel relationships occurring in both the *phenomenal* and the *noumenal* world. As Kant argues in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories: without objects of representation, there would be no subject of representation; without the subject of representation, there would be no objects of representation. To borrow a line from Billie Holiday, when it comes to appearances, it is all or nothing at all.[77]

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Notes

[1] I have identified Kant's individual works using the following abbreviations:

CPrR: Critique of Practical Reason
CPR: Critique of Pure Reason
MFNS: Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
OP: Opus Postumum

All Kant citations refer to the *Akademie* edition of *Kants Gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin: G. Reimer [now de Gruyter], 1902), 29 vols. Abbreviated Ak. The only exception is *CPR*, for which I use the A/B edition notation. All quotes from *CPR* are taken from Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[2] Hans Vaihinger, *Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft Vol. II* (Stuttgart: W. Spemann, 1892), p. 53.

[3] Most commentators make the same assumption and their interpretations break down into two main camps. The first defends a 'one-world' interpretation of Kant's distinction between appearances and things-in-themselves. For example, Henry Allison argues that one can consider the *same* object from two different standpoints or aspects, both as appearance as well as thing-in-itself. See Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*, second edition, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), pp. 52f. The second camp defends a 'two-world' interpretation of Kant where appearances and things-in-themselves are ontologically distinct from one another. For example, James van Cleve argues for a virtual object interpretation of Kantian appearances whereby they are constructed from noumenal subjects and their cognitive acts. See James van Cleve, *Problems from Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), especially pp. 5f and 150f. Although Langton adopts a one-world view, she understands appearances not as *particulars* but rather as *relations*.

[4] It is important to distinguish between the different senses of 'property' and 'relation' that I will be using. Monadic or non-relational properties are one place properties (e.g. X is simple). When intrinsic, these properties are essential to the objects that have them. Relational properties are multi-place properties (e.g. X is to the left of Y) which may or may not be essential to the objects so related. Extrinsic relations are inessential to the objects so related. Intrinsic relations are, however, essential to the objects so related. What this means, for my purposes, is that not all relations are extrinsic, nor are all intrinsic properties non-relational. As I will argue below, appearances are both relational (multi-place properties relating phenomenal objects and subjects) and intrinsic (essential to both phenomenal objects and subjects).

[5] Rae Langton, *Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 20. Although Langton also talks

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about phenomena as things-in-themselves *in* relations to other things, for the sake of simplicity I will use the locution of 'relational property' or 'relation' when describing phenomena (or appearances as a subset of phenomena). It is important to note, however, that phenomena are always relational properties *of* things-in-themselves for Langton.

6 See *CPR* A274/B330.

7 Langton, *Kantian Humility*, p. 12.

8 Langton spends some time discussing two arguments against the reducibility of relations. Although she admits that there are problems with both arguments, she adopts the version that rejects the bilateral reducibility of relations where the latter are understood as causal powers (i.e. causal powers that are irreducible to the intrinsic properties of the relata of causal relations), given the fact that God could have chosen natural laws that would not allow for causal powers even if the intrinsic properties of the relata were held fixed. See ibid., chapter 5.

9 Ibid., p. 19.

10 Ibid., p. 23.

11 Ibid., p. 13.

12 See ibid., p. 48f.

13 *CPR* A146–7/B186.

14 See Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 17f. Critics have posed a number of objections to Langton's humility thesis. For example, and in contrast to Allison, Van Cleve believes that Langton's thesis is far too humbling arguing that it precludes knowledge even of our own mental content. See James van Cleve, 'Receptivity and Our Knowledge of Intrinsic Properties', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 65 (1) (2002), 218–37, p. 232.

15 *CPR* A51/B75.

16 Langton, *Kantian Humility*, p. 13.

17 See ibid., chapter 1.

18 Ibid., p. 13.

19 For the logical table of judgements, see *CPR* A70/B95.

20 Ibid. A147/B186–7. Kant gives an example using the unschematized category of substance which he characterizes as signifying nothing more than the relation between subject and predicate, i.e. the first relation of thinking in a judgement from the logical table of judgements.

21 In *CPrR*, Kant suggests that practical reason can use the unschematized category of causation to generate knowledge claims which cannot be made from the perspective of theoretical reason alone, e.g. concerning the practical efficacy of the will. See *CPrR*, Ak. 5: 50–7. This addendum cannot help Langton, however, in so far as she is operating strictly within the realm of theoretical reason.

22 *CPR* A20/B34.

23 Ibid., B66–7. See also A251–2, A265/B321, B306–8, and A284–5/B340–1.

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[24] See Langton, *Kantian Humility*, chapter 9. In the third section of this paper, I will argue that the thing-in-itself can indeed be viewed as the ground of appearance though only as the logical ground.

[25] Ibid., A264/B320. See also A44–5/B61–2.

[26] Ibid., A264/B320.

[27] Ibid., A255/B310.

[28] Allison poses this objection to double affection in Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 66.

[29] It is important to note that outer relations need not be *extrinsic* relations. The concept of an extrinsic relation has nothing to do with spatial character. As I will argue below, these outer relations are, in fact, *intrinsic* relations.

[30] *CPR* A265/B321. For Kant's explicit discussion of '*substantiae noumena*' see A276/B332.

[31] Ibid., A277/B333.

[32] Ibid., B306.

[33] Ibid., A265/B321.

[34] See also ibid., A166. In the *MFNS*, Kant talks about phenomenal objects affecting us through their *motion* rather than their moving *forces*. See *MFNS*, Ak. 4: 476. Even so, in the *OP*, Kant returns to the idea that phenomenal substances affect the subject through moving forces. For example, see *OP*, Ak. 22: 300, 22: 318, and 22: 458.

[35] *CPR* A20/B34.

[36] Ibid., A276/B332. See also A267/B323.

[37] Appearances can be viewed as relations in a two-fold sense: (1) Appearances are ordered sets of causal-structural relations that obtain, in the phenomenal world, between affecting objects and receptive cognitive subjects. Affection is then one relational element within this ordered set of causal-structural relations, whose specific function it is to reveal structural features of the affecting object to the receptive subject. (2) Appearances are spatiotemporal relations that obtain between phenomenal objects (including embodied cognitive subjects). Spatiotemporal relations in this sense are a necessary condition for the set of causal-structural relations, in so far as receptive cognitive subjects can only be affected by objects in space and time.

[38] Robert Hanna describes this position as 'weak transcendental idealism'. This is the position that space and time can exist in a possible world (including the actual world) even if no cognitive subjects like us existed in that world provided that if cognitive subjects like us existed in this world they could correctly represent space and time. See Robert Hanna, *Kant, Science, and Human Nature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), chapter 6. One might still push the modal issue, however, claiming that, under my view, it makes little sense to talk about actual objects without reference to actual subjects (e.g. the actual world before cognitive subjects) since actual objects must bear intrinsic relations to actual subjects and vice-versa. At this point,

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I think it is important to note Kant's rather unique way of understanding modality. For Kant, the domains of the necessary, actual, and possible are *coextensive* and the difference between these modalities is simply *intensional*. The modal categories have different meanings in so far as they describe different cognitive relations or ways of considering objects. Consequently, regardless of whether you are talking about the necessity, actuality, or possibility of a given object, you are always presupposing some *relation* to the subject and, for Kant, it makes little sense to consider the modal status of some object without reference to some subject doing the *considering*. In the above example, Kant would say that one can consider actual objects in the distant past prior to the existence of cognitive subjects via the connection that the former have to perception in accordance with natural law. This is the upshot of Kant's Second Postulate of Empirical Thought describing the category of actuality. For Kant's discussion of the coextensive nature of the modal categories and their intensional differences see *CPR* A230–5/B282–7. See also Sebastian Gardner's discussion of the modal categories in Sebastian Gardner, *Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason* (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 197f.

[39] See Langton, *Kantian Humility*, chapter 2. One of the passages that Langton uses to support the idea that substances must have intrinsic non-relational properties is *CPR* A274/B330 from the Amphiboly section. An interpretative difficulty with this section, however, is that it is often hard to disentangle Kant's view from the Leibnizian view he is criticizing. When it comes to the passage that Langton quotes, Graham Bird argues that Langton mistakes the Leibnizian position that Kant rejects for Kant's own position. See Graham Bird, 'Review of Kantian Humility', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 50 (198) (2000), 105–8, p. 106.

[40] For different contexts in which Kant makes use of empirical affection, see *CPR* B124–5, A213/B260, and B520. One of the most thorough examinations of Kant's views on empirical affection can be found in Erich Adickes, *Kants Lehre von der doppelten Affection unseres Ich: als Schlüssel zu seiner Erkenntnistheorie* (Tuebingen: Mohr, 1929), chapter 1.

[41] *CPR* A144/B183.

[42] Ibid., A182.

[43] Ibid., A210/B257–8.

[44] This real ground should be distinguished from the logical ground of appearance. I will return to the latter in the third section of this paper.

[45] One might even want to go further and claim that appearances for Kant are *super*-intrinsic relations, since there are some cases where a relation can be essential to the relata in so far as each relatum would lack some *essential* property without the other but the relatum would still *exist* though without this property. A good example of this might be Robert Boyle's discussion of the first lock and key. Put simply, he claims that without the existence of the

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key, the lock is not really a lock, but rather just a hunk of metal organized in a certain way. The same thing goes for the key. See Robert Boyle, 'The Origin of Forms and Qualities According to the Corpuscular Philosophy', in M. A. Stewart (ed.), *The Selected Philosophical Papers of Robert Boyle* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), pp. 1–96, esp. p. 23. An example of a non-philosophical super-intrinsic relation might be the relation that obtains between points and line segments in the first postulate of Euclid's *Elements*. Whereas a straight line segment is uniquely determined by its two endpoints, these points are uniquely determined by the straight line that is drawn between them. Even so, a point is not reducible to a line or vice-versa. Although Euclid has a primitive definition of 'point' as 'that which has no parts' and 'line' as 'length without breadth', the geometrical objects that these terms denote are completely indeterminate without reference to one another. See Euclid, *The Elements of Euclid*, trans. R. Simson (Philidelphia: Desilver, 1821), Book I, pp. 7 and 11.

[46] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, P. H. Nidditch (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 636.

[47] *CPR* A226–7/B279–80.

[48] Berkeley's view on existence can be interpreted in two different ways: (1) to be is to be perceived or to be a perceiver, or (2) to be is to be capable of being perceived or to be capable of perceiving. The former interpretation is suggested by Berkeley's discussion in the *Dialogues* where he claims that all sensible things must be perceived by God in order to exist. See George Berkeley, *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, in A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (eds), *The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1949), vol. II, pp. 212–13 (II.18). The latter interpretation is suggested by Berkeley's discussion in the *Principles* where he claims that sensible things must only be capable of being perceived in order to exist (e.g. that the table in his study exists since it would be perceived if he were in his study to perceive it). See George Berkeley, *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge* from *The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne*, vol. II, Part I, §3. If nothing else, the second interpretation would pose problems for Berkeley's argument for God via the first interpretation. In any case, for the purposes of this paper, I assume the first interpretation.

[49] See Berkeley, *Principles*, Part I, §25.

[50] See ibid., §27–32. According to Berkeley although we can produce ideas of imagination through our own will, the ideas of sense are produced by the will of God. In either case, however, the ideas themselves are causally inert.

[51] Van Cleve, *Problems from Kant*, p. 170. It is important to note that although there is 'stuffing' according to Langton (intrinsic non-relational properties), this stuffing is *irrelevant* to the 'structure' (relational properties) in so far as the relational properties are irreducible to the intrinsic non-relational properties of the objects. Consequently, there is a certain way in which

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phenomenal objects (relational properties) are all structure without stuffing under Langton's view as well.

52 *CPR* A248–9.

53 Even if one admits that appearances are intrinsic relations between phenomenal objects and subjects, are there relations that phenomenal objects bear to one another *independently* of the relations they bear to phenomenal subjects? Although phenomenal objects are related spatially and causally to one another, phenomenal objects underdetermine the relationships they bear to one another. In order for these relationships to be determined, the subject must make judgements concerning these objects (e.g. causal). Consequently, determining the relations between phenomenal objects requires the subject's synthetic activity, much as determining the phenomenal objects themselves requires this synthetic activity.

54 Although the view may seem paradoxical, this has not stopped Langton's critics from entertaining it. For example, A. W. Moore considers the possibility that something could possess only relational properties. See A. W. Moore, 'Review of Kantian Humility', *Philosophical Review*, 110 (1) (2001), 117–20, p. 118.

55 *CPR* B146–7.

56 Ibid., A105.

57 Ibid., A109.

58 Ibid., B133.

59 See also Sebastian Gardner's discussion of how subject and object make one another possible in Gardner, *Kant and the Critique*, pp. 157f.

60 A recurring criticism of Langton's position is how it at best ignores, or at worst is inconsistent with, Kant's transcendental idealism. For example, see Moore, 'Review of Kantian Humility', p. 118. Whereas Langton downplays the formal contribution of the subject to the objects of experience and commits Kant to substantive claims beyond the bounds of sense, my position emphasizes the formal contribution of the subject in determining the objects of experience while not committing Kant to any substantive claims beyond the bounds of sense. It is thoroughly consistent with Kant's transcendental idealism while also overcoming the trilemma that faces Kant's theory of affection.

61 See, for example, *CPR* Bxxvi, A249, A251–2.

62 Bird, 'Review of Kantian Humility', p. 105.

63 *CPR* A372.

64 Ibid., Bxxvi–ii. See also A190/B235, A280/B336, and A283/B339.

65 Ibid., Bxxvi.

66 Ibid., A227/B280.

67 There are several places where Kant seems open to analytic judgments involving the *concept* of a thing-in-itself, e.g. ibid., B149, A433/B461, and A635/B664. Even so, as Kant makes clear in his criticisms of the ontological argument, such analytic judgments cannot have existential import. See

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A597/B625 as well as his comments at the end of the Phenomena/Noumena section at A258–9/B314–5.

[68] Ibid., A251. Gerd Buchdahl also recognizes the *conceptual* nature of the transcendental object. See Gerd Buchdahl, *Kant and the Dynamics of Reason* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 161.

[69] *CPR* A288/B344. See also A372.

[70] Ibid., A288/B345.

[71] Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 63.

[72] *CPR* A250–252. For other contexts in which Kant uses 'transcendental object' and 'noumenon' interchangeably, see *CPR* A358 and A288/B344–5. It is important to note that Kant claims in the paragraph immediately following the above quoted passage that the transcendental object *cannot* be called a noumenon. Buchdahl overcomes the seeming contradiction by noting that the distinction between negative and positive noumena is only implicit in this section of the A-edition. Once one has this distinction in mind, however, there is little problem seeing how the transcendental object could be equivalent to the negative noumenon while certainly different from a positive noumenon. See Buchdahl, *Dynamics of Reason*, 84f.

[73] In the B-edition, Kant characterizes the negative noumenon as 'a thing in so far as it is not an object of our sensible intuition because we abstract from the manner of our intuition of it'. See *CPR* B307. This might suggest that the object has a way that it is or some transcendental reality independent of the way in which we intuit it. It is important to note that this is an act of abstraction, however, and so results only in the concept of an object in general considered independently of any particular features in sensibility. This concept need not have a referent, however, in order to function as a concept. In fact, Kant describes the negative noumenon in precisely this way before the passage quoted above. See ibid., B306.

[74] See Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 64f.

[75] Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, p. 55.

[76] Considering Allison's criticisms of Langton's argument, it is ironic that he would adopt the first horn while rejecting the second. By adopting the first horn, he opens himself up to the same objections that he levels against Langton's own position. For his explicit endorsement of the first horn and rejection of the second see Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, pp. 68 and 73.

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