offering a facile generalization to reconcile this contradiction, Niehuss instead plunges into a detailed analysis designed to show how these patterns were the outcome of strategies and choices that were themselves conditioned by the complex of factors, which collectively constitute the basis of her structural history of the family. The most important of these factors was obviously the need to work, but this was itself conditioned by the impact of the war on the male-female demographic balance, the ability of returning husbands to work, the presence of children and/or other family members (who could be both an incentive and an obstacle to work), changes in the organization of production and the availability of different kinds of jobs, and the extremely complex correlation between the desire to work and the type and degree of education possessed by these women (which was itself influenced, but not determined, by yet another chain of factors).

While these kinds of analytical chains represent the real strength of the book, in places Niehuss limits her analyses to a greater extent than required by her material. In view of the growing number of works that analyze the cultural constructions of gender and family in the framework of the Cold War and that focus on the politics of social policy, Niehuss's comprehensive analysis of demographic and economic factors is both valuable and defensible. However, in places — such as her discussions of the postwar divorce rate and the new patterns of married women's employment — the reader waits in vain for the author to assess the significance of her own data for these broader debates. Similarly, Niehuss identifies the origins of important social trends in the 1950s, but she argues that, to the extent that these developments signal the end of those problems that were the constitutive features of the postwar era, they lie outside the scope of her book.

Familie, Frau und Gesellschaft may not be the definitive work on the history of women and gender in the postwar years, but it is an important one that will have to be read carefully by anyone who does not believe in a complete disjunction between historical discourse and historical reality.

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Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949–1969. By William Glenn Gray. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 2003. Pp. xiii + 352. $49.95. ISBN 0–8078–2758–4.

In late January of 1965, after revelations of West German arms shipments to Israel, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser retaliated by inviting East

German leader Walter Ulbricht to visit Cairo. "Stalingrad on the Nile," one newspaper called it — an indication of the perceived scale of this West German diplomatic defeat. Would the Federal Republic maintain its policy of diplomatic and economic sanctions against any state that trafficked with its rival? For ten years, this policy, up to and including the threat to break off diplomatic relations (the Hallstein Doctrine), had succeeded in confining recognition of the so-called GDR to only two additional states beyond the Warsaw Pact and the Communist parts of Asia. After Bonn had severed relations with the first of those two states — Communist but nonaligned Yugoslavia — in 1957, only Communist Cuba had dared to test the precedent. Meanwhile, Bonn had deftly parried efforts by a smattering of nonaligned countries to test its tolerance for relationships with the GDR that fell short of full recognition. West German officials now feared that a failure to act against Cairo would set a new precedent. Seeing Bonn's bluff called, additional noncommunist countries might take steps toward ending the GDR's diplomatic isolation. Yet, as Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder (CDU) noted, enforcing the policy might well boomerang. Given Nasser's touchiness and his standing in the Arab world, even limited sanctions might result in ceding all the "German" embassies in the Arab region to Ulbricht. In the end, after publicly threatening sanctions, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard failed to follow through. Instead, he halted the Israelis' arms shipments, but also chose this moment to take up diplomatic relations with Israel — whereupon Egypt and nine other states broke off their relations with West Germany.

Yet, "Stalingrad" turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory for the Soviets' German protégé. For another four years, neither Nasser nor any other foreign leader recognized East Berlin. By the early 1970s, Bonn's policy was in flux. Ceasing to threaten reprisals, it asked only that other states indulge it by not recognizing the GDR until Bonn completed the reconfiguration of its own German policy (the "Scheel Doctrine"). Even then, only a few noncommunist states recognized the GDR before the German-German treaty of December 1972. "The East German regime," writes William Glenn Gray, "had remained on the fringes of international life precisely as long as West Germans wanted it to" (p. 219).

On first glance, this is a startling conclusion. Throughout the later 1960s, the GDR did register incremental gains in consular and lower-level state-to-state relations. Even more via nongovernmental organizations, it advanced beyond the fringes well before "West Germans wanted it to." Just months after "Stalingrad," for example, the International Olympic Committee finally granted Ostdeutschland its own Olympic team. A year later, the IOC awarded the 1972 games to Munich only after having extracted a promise from the West German government that all teams would be permitted to use their state's symbols. Examples such as these are an indication of the extent to which West

Germany's eventual change of policy — from isolating to "embracing" the GDR, as Egon Bahr put it — came about because the old policy was producing diminishing, or negative, foreign returns. In other words, not only a rationale but also a set of circumstances recommended the change of policy. On one level, Bahr's rationale was his creative attempt to make a virtue out of what seemed to him to be a circumstantial necessity.

Even so, Gray's thrust is well directed. As he shows, Bonn was loathe to invoke its ultimate sanction: breaking diplomatic relations. Like nuclear weaponry, this sanction was better employed as a deterrent than as a weapon. As for lesser sanctions, the Foreign Ministry proved endlessly inventive in avoiding their use by combining threats and inducements. The result was a growing mound of special dispensations or "managed relationships" with third countries. Still, deterrence worked. What seemed to the West like a slippery slope seemed in East Berlin like a labor of Sisyphus. East German diplomacy advanced only by baby steps, and every seeming step forward was quickly dogged by the dissimulations through which otherwise inconsequential third countries like Ceylon and Guinea frustratingly took back most of what they had just given.

Bonn had diplomatic assets that East Berlin could not match. Although this leverage was in part financial, the use of such assets invited extortion, a reality that tempted third countries to try to raise the stakes by testing Bonn at every turn. In short, the Federal Republic's policy of quarantining the GDR encouraged ever-newer challenges. The benefits of those challenges, however, accrued to those that Bonn bought off, not to East Berlin.

Bonn's assets were more than financial. Among them were Washington's vigorous diplomatic support, Moscow's uncertain early German policy, the Kremlin's later reluctance to pressure the third-world states that it was courting to risk the loss of West German financial aid, and East Berlin's dilettantish and overreaching diplomacy. Konrad Adenauer's assiduous development of integrative Western European institutions placed his diplomats in the new third-world capitals before Ulbricht's; Bonn thereby profited from multinational institutional leverage while simultaneously offering newly independent states an alternative mentor to the former mother country. Partly as a result of these factors, the East and West German hard lines had globally asymmetric consequences.

As Gray points out, Bonn succeeded in countering the GDR's antiimperial rhetoric by deploying a favorite third-world ideal, national self-determination, to reinforce its superior claim to political legitimacy in Germany. Thus, even though the Berlin Wall ended the expectation that the GDR might prove ephemeral, it did not bestow diplomatic parity. Whereas one of the most influential nonaligned leaders, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, had considered heretofore that peace in Europe required international contacts with the East Germans, the post-Wall diminution of the crisis atmosphere actually

reduced his incentive to recognize a regime with so little domestic legitimacy that it had to lock up its own people. Moreover, far from being a blunt tool, Bonn's doctrine of sole representation could be creatively interpreted in such a way that Bonn itself could violate the letter of it much more easily than third countries could. First Adenauer in opening relations with Moscow, then Schröder with his "policy of movement" in Eastern Europe, later Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt, and finally Chancellor Brandt and Foreign Minister Scheel all devised corollaries or variations that enabled Bonn to extend its own diplomacy into those areas of the world that were supposedly rendered off limits by its own doctrine.

This story reinforces the view that Bonn had alternatives to the policies it eventually chose under Willy Brandt. As Gray indicates, the Soviet crushing of the Prague Spring led the two major parties to articulate those choices. Even if the policy of isolating rather than "embracing" the GDR was tattered, it was not dead until Bonn killed it. On this issue, writes Gray, Bonn was accommodated rather than pressured by its détente-seeking allies. Only after the Prague Spring did the relative priority of precluding East Berlin's penetration of the third world give way unambiguously in Bonn to facilitating its own penetration of the second world. While this choice of policy was primarily a matter of priorities, it also concerned strategies. For unlike the consistently anti-Hallstein FDP, much of the post-Godesberg SPD had long persisted in believing that the two goals remained compatible.

Buttressed by an international range of archival sources, Gray has produced a lively and erudite account of an area of West German diplomacy that is too often written off as wooden and one-dimensional. As he shows, Bonn's doctrine was neither rigid nor unimaginatively wielded. In the hands of Adenauer, it was one tool toward an end, not an unalterable principle. Erhard's use of it was considerably less sure-handed; yet, it was during the transition from Adenauer to Erhard that Schröder's effort to square the circle — to reconcile the policy of isolating the GDR with a policy of engagement with the Eastern bloc — began to make limited headway. That a choice eventually was made was due less to the imperfect effectiveness of the policy in isolating the GDR than to the recognition that isolation too was a means rather than an end.

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