decision in favor of surrender. But when, in the next chapter, the author wants to refute the argument made by others that Japan was on the verge of surrender, he says that "the second bomb did not alter the firmly held positions of the Japanese" (p. 97). Eventually we learn that Hirohito's interventions proved decisive. And Miscamble emphasizes that the emperor decided to end the war in response to Hiroshima, not the Soviet entry. Again, a few pages later, Hirohito's decision was apparently induced by all three events though the bombs weighed "most heavily" on his mind. The bottom line is that, no matter what the context, professor Miscamble tries to demonstrate that the American action (the two bombs) was justified and that it mattered far more than the Soviet one. Such interpretation, of course, ignores, for example, the massive literature on the Soviet impact as well as the doubts raised in regards to the necessity of Nagasaki (held even by scholars who otherwise recognize that Hiroshima was unavoidable). Miscamble's straightforward interpretations are not even upheld by the literature of the Japan experts he quotes. A fairer reading of these sources would have produced a more balanced narrative. It would have also resulted in a more honest acknowledgement that many of the A-bomb controversies cannot be adjudicated in the simple manner in which the book often proceeds.

The general reader might not notice the many ambiguities and contentions which are overlooked. Indeed, the book will probably impress as a well-written work based on an extensive reading of primary and secondary sources. The lack of nuance and the liberty in selectively using the research of others to support the one's own views, however, will not persuade the expert.

This book—merely 150 pages long—was published as part of the Cambridge Essential History series. The series seeks short, thesis-driven texts. This surely accounts for certain short-cuts professor Miscamble had to take in his exposition. We nevertheless find the same arguments and problems in his twice-as-long publication: *From Roosevelt to Truman* (2007). As a matter of fact, the book here under review "draws heavily" on the longer one, as Miscamble fleetingly mentions in the introduction. But what really should have been said is that large chunks of Chapters 2–9 are identical to the content published in 2007 (including the main text, footnotes, and pictures). I am afraid that those who have already obtained the earlier title will find little need to read this one.

Lastly, this work was written as a direct attack on the literature of the revisionists, especially Gar Alperovitz.[1] In my view, Miscamble's approach shares many of the flaws that have been attributed to Alperovitz's research including tendentiousness in interpreting evidence. Unlike Alperovitz's work, however, the present publication will probably not inspire a whole generation of new research, nor will it be the last word in this ongoing controversy.

NOTES

[1]See Gar Alperovitz. 1965. *Atomic diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster) and Gar Alperovitz and Sanho Tree. 1995. *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth* (New York: Knopf).

Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia: Middle Powers in a Troubled Region. Edited by Jan Melissen and Yul Sohn. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 283 pp. $ 99.00 (cloth).

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This edited volume helps the reader to better understand the cultural and rhetorical context of public diplomacy in East Asia and how the values and campaigns of public diplomacy in this region contrast with dominant Western-centric UK, US, and European models. It reinforces the regional focus

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by concentrating public diplomacy policy in Asia proper. Few books of public diplomacy analyze inter-Asian public diplomacy, and this volume makes a strong contribution to the literature. It also meets a demand for more scholarly inquiry into a part of the world where soft power, cultural diplomacy, and public diplomacy dimensions are becoming popular add-ons to interdisciplinary studies in communications, hospitality management, political science, international relations, and comparative public and cultural policy. To be sure, it is difficult to divorce Western dominance in public diplomacy from non-Western approaches. There is always the issue of primary custody of the "children," and in the case of public diplomacy, there is no avoiding the North American legacy of soft power as coined by Harvard professor and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye or the first use of the term public diplomacy by retired US ambassador Edmund Gullion at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

For all its focus on understanding, one cannot escape the subtitle of this text. East Asia, despite its wealth, integrated economy systems, and person-to-person movement in tourists and exchange students, is still perceived as "troubled" in its political leader encounters, historical legacies, and ongoing disputes. Culturally speaking, soft power projections here have never been stronger. The Northeast Asian "Big Three" countries of China, South Korea, and Japan are competing in reputation and image, but such competition is almost always zero-sum in orientation. The notion of collaborative East Asian public diplomacy is practically unheard of, since nation-states view public diplomacy campaigns as opportunities to expand the size of the revenue pie by attracting more tourists and exchange persons who will spend money in the host national country. The "Asia paradox" separates cooperative trade and economic interdependence from security and historical narrative clashes that pit one nation's public against the other. In that context, diplomacy to publics here is less active listening and mutual understanding and more consumerist and soft power competitive, what the editors have called a "zero sum commodity" approach. It isn't a stretch to say that East Asia has its own K-Pop and J-Pop version of "We Hate You But Send Us Your Baywatch."

Although not made explicit in the volume's title, the editors refer to their level of analysis as strategic public diplomacy in extended East Asia, comprising all ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, particularly Indonesia, as well as Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea. For those of us who live in East Asia, this is a much broader sweep of the region beyond the "Big Three" triangle of the Northeast: China, Japan, and Korea. There is value in such an extension. South Korea and Indonesia are East Asia's newest middle powers to join with Australia, and, in turn have established a values-based multilateral diplomacy platform called MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia). What the MIKTA lens offers is a nimble, entrepreneurial, and narrative-rich diversion from the back-and-forth vying for regional dominance of military, economic, and cultural giants China and the United States. This look beyond superpower public diplomacy is refreshing and invites the reader to think beyond today's headlines to the power of public diplomacy in relationship-building, developing intercultural sensitivity and peace-building over the long term. Too often public diplomacy is still seen as a necessary evil in explaining and engaging global publics to support narrow policy interests. Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia extends our understanding of public diplomacy beyond its power politics and cold war origins. This is not to say that one can at present escape power politics and competitive nation and soft power branding. For instance, in "Regionalization, Regionalism, and Double-Edged Public Diplomacy in East Asia," co-editor Yul Sohn adopts the sword metaphor to refer to East Asian competitive efforts that are designed to undercut each other's soft power. This approach defies the conventional thinking that soft power persuasion is inherently benign, as in Joseph Nye's notion that soft power competition is every nation's win–win gain, at least in building attraction. Melissen and Sohn set the conceptual framework for the case studies (China, India, Australia, South Korea, Japan) that form the bulk of this volume. Andrew F. Cooper's chapter offers up Canada as an exemplar of traditional middle power public diplomacy and

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compares its legacy to rising East Asian middle power, South Korea. Yoshihide Soeya's chapter about Japan's public diplomacy reinforces the zero-sum game that is public diplomacy in Northeast Asia. Craig Hayden's chapter offers critical examination of the Northeast Asian rivalry-based public diplomacy operating as it does in the shadow of that default East Asian power, the United States.

The case study focus of this book is enlightening and illustrative of what East Asian middle powers in particular can do to advance longer term, relationship-focused and values-led multilateral relations. Nevertheless, the editors sum up the image and reputation bugaboo for East Asian public diplomacy study and practice: "The average reader of the press could not be blamed for seeing East Asia as a booming but divided region." This is the conundrum of public diplomacy's lack of internal and external public relations. Public diplomacy is a growth market in the region, but more at the institutional level of the academy and governments. The "average reader" knows more about power politics and harbors negative public attitudes toward regional neighbors based on festering historical grievances, chronic stereotypes, and lack of intercultural communication beyond superficial interpersonal encounters. We need to reconcile the grassroots, neighborhood-based potential for public diplomacy as a mutual understanding and trust-building mechanism with the top-down, ministry-centered, and academic elite institutional inquiries into diplomacy to publics. This book is a step in that direction with its narrative-embracing accounts that show the flexibility potential of public diplomacy to go beyond cosmetic enhancement in policy objectives.

The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy. By Bruce Gilley. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. 336 pp. $55 (cloth).

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Gilley's *The Right to Rule* is an exploration into the concept of political legitimacy. While its theoretical scaffold is solid, where the book breaks new ground is in the issue of measurement of legitimacy. Its attempt to bridge the divide between political theory and empirical research makes the book engaging for a wide audience. Its implicit and explicit suggestions for future research make it a strongly recommended read for those who intend to cope with the challenges concerning the empirical measurement of the legitimacy of states.

Gilley deals extensively with the literature on the legitimacy of states, both from the domestic and the international viewpoint. The initial theory chapter is very compelling in its exhortation to operationalize legitimacy and to pull it beyond the realm of pure theory. For Gilley "a state […] is more legitimate the more it holds and exercises political power with legality, justification, and consent from the standpoint of all of its citizens" (p. 11). *Legality* and *justification* refer to the *rules* and *norms* of conduct, respectively, while *consent* concerns the direct expression of the citizens' recognition of a state's right to rule. The key idea is that legitimacy seems to depend on performance (many states survived with minimal legitimacy, i.e. Myanmar); this assumption is tested in the subsequent quantitative analysis.

The empirical analysis is Gilley's main contribution. It is among the first full-fledged attempts to operationalize a concept which previously belonged almost exclusively to the province of the political theorist. It is an analysis of seventy-two states, together with a discussion of a case study: Uganda. A reader may be surprised by the choice for the case study, given its prominence (in terms of pages, it is roughly 20% of the book) and the fact that Gilley's previous research has focused extensively on Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, Uganda is a "least likely" case for the

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