Recensions / Reviews

MADISON, G. B., PAUL FAIRFIELD and INGRID HARRIS, eds. *Is There a Canadian Philosophy? Reflections on the Canadian Identity.* By Marc Poulin 425

MACKLEM, PATRICK. *Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada.* By Janet Ajzenstat 426

DUPUIS, RENÉE. *Quel Canada pour les Autochtones? La fin de l'exclusion.* Par Édith Garneau 428

GAMMER, NICHOLAS. *From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis.* By Ann L. Griffiths 430

TIMPSON, ANNIS MAY. *Driven Apart: Women's Employment Equality and Child Care in Canadian Public Policy.* By Kathy Teghtsoonian 432

YOUNG, LISA. *Feminists and Party Politics.* By Brenda O'Neill 434

POWE, JR., LUCAS A. *The Warren Court and American Politics.* By Carolyn N. Long 435

BLAND, DOUGLAS L., ed. *Backbone of the Army: Non-Commissioned Officers in the Future Army.* By James H. Joyner, Jr. 437

BROSSARD, YVES et JONATHAN VIDAL. *L'éclatement de la Yougoslavie de Tito. Désintégration d'une fédération et guerres interethniques.* Par Dany Deschênes 438

BOWLER, SHAUN and BERNARD GROFMAN, eds. *Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote: Reflections on an Embedded Institution.* By Abraham Diskin 440

MARQUES-PEREIRA, BÉRENGÈRE et PATRICIO NOLASCO, coordinateurs. *La représentation politique des femmes en Amérique latine.* Par Stéphanie Rousseau 441

PARSA, MISAGH. *States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines.* By David Close 444

ELLIS, STEPHEN. *The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War.* By Larry A. Swatuk 445

SANTORO, MICHAEL A. *Profits and Principles: Global Capitalism and Human Rights in China.* By John Fuh-Sheng Hsieh 447

NORMAN, E. HERBERT. *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period.* By John S. Brownlee 448

KLEINBERG, ROMANDA BENSABAT and JANINE A. CLARK, eds. *Economic Liberalization, Democratization and Civil Society in the Developing World.* By Jorge A. Schiavon 450

PLATTNER, MARC F. and ALEXANDER SMOLAR, eds. *Globalization, Power, and Democracy.* By Erkki Berndtson 452

ERIKSEN, ERIK ODDVAR and JOHN ERIK FOSSUM, eds. *Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation?* By Antje Wiener 453

OFFEN, KAREN. *European Feminisms 1700-1950: A Political History.* By Penelope Deutscher 454

TOMASI, JOHN. *Liberalism beyond Justice: Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory.* By Alfonso J. Damico 456

DUFOUR, FRÉDÉRICK-GUILLAUME. *Patriotisme constitutionnel et nationalisme. Sur Jürgen Habermas.* Par Donald Ipperciel 458

https://doi.org/10.1017/S000842390277830X Published online by Cambridge University Press

O'NEILL, MICHAEL and DENNIS AUSTIN, eds. *Democracy and Cultural Diversity.* By Steven Roach 461
NEWELL, PETER. *Climate for Change: Non-State Actors and the Global Politics of the Greenhouse.* By Debora L. Vannijnatten 463
MAYALL, JAMES. *World Politics: Progress and Its Limits.* By Robert Jackson 465
GIDDENS, ANTHONY, ed. *The Global Third Way Debate.* By Phillip Wood 466

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Is There a Canadian Philosophy? Reflections on the Canadian Identity
G. B. Madison, Paul Fairfield and Ingrid Harris, eds.
Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2000, pp. vii, 218

One of the most critical political needs in today's world is the delicate balancing of the recognition of collective identities together with the preservation of individual human rights. To give either groups or individuals too much recognition will undermine the position of the other. For instance, the institutionalization of group rights could be used to undermine the human rights of individuals both outside and inside the group. Madison, Fairfield and Harris have added to the extensive literature that addresses this juggling act.

They claim that it is prudent to survey the Canadian experience in judging how to strike this balance. There is a Canadian philosophy that is based in tolerance and genuine respect for the diversity within Canadian society and culminates in a truly pluralistic multiculturalism, not an "illiberal multiple monoculturalism" which results from an undue emphasis on group recognition. The philosophy that they have in mind is not a series of unified doctrines practised by professional Canadian philosophers, however, nor one embodied in our public institutions, but rather exists in the minds and habits of ordinary Canadians. It is a sort of civic culture that marks the correct balance between group identity and individual rights. The overall theme of the book is that it is dangerous to afford too much recognition to the diversity of group identities.

The philosophy of Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka is examined as exemplary of this danger. It shows two things. One, these philosophers have written extensively on the recognition of groups, and claim to do so from liberal assumptions, but Madison, Fairfield and Harris conclude they have erred in giving too much emphasis to the recognition of groups. Traditional liberal theory is more concerned with the protection of individual rights than collective identities and, on their view, traditional liberalism possesses the resources necessary for the just treatment of such groups. Taylor and Kymlicka are attempting to fix something (liberal theory) that is not broken. Secondly, Taylor and Kymlicka are both well known Canadian philosophers and it follows that their work on group recognition reinforces the idea that the Canadian philosophy capable of dealing with claims for group recognition is not the domain of professional Canadian philosophers.

A chapter of the book looks at Canadian constitutional and institutional history. Both have accorded group recognition a roughly equal significance with the promotion and preservation of individual rights. This is a mistake for failing to give individual human rights clear paramountcy vis-à-vis group identity will end in the denial of basic human rights to insiders and outsiders alike. The authors are especially critical of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom for the ambiguous stand it takes on the relation between collective identity and individual rights. The desire to accord groups recognition is understandable, often born of a desire to treat these group members as equals (many groups have been subject to historic and systemic discrimination). However, the end result of granting these groups special status will deny the principles often motivating the awarding of special status to begin with. Both the group members and individuals outside the group will suffer. Members of the group will lose a part of their autonomy to follow group dictates, and those individuals outside the group will have to forego some of their human rights to accommodate the rights of the group.

Following three chapters cataloging the potential dangers of an overemphasis on recognizing collective identities, the authors devote their final two chapters to a discussion of the notion of spontaneous order. In their esti-

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mation, it is this concept that informs the Canadian philosophy and will strike the proper balance between collective recognition and individual rights. Spontaneous order is nothing more than an "extended order of human cooperation." Spontaneous orders are unplanned and emerge from the fulfilled expectations of citizens acting in accordance with the procedural rules of liberal democracy. Such an order has no predetermined end in mind, but allows for the maximization of individual autonomy, the ability to prescribe one's own ends. The antithesis of spontaneous order is state-controlled social engineering, destructive of liberalism and civil society in general.

Spontaneous orders are the political "cousin" of the invisible hand of the market notion in economics. The authors follow F. A. Hayek, Peter Boettke, and Gus diZerega in advancing the idea of spontaneous order. Accordingly, this notion is not particularly novel either. What does strike me as somewhat novel is their insistence that what they describe as the Canadian philosophy is appropriate to dealing with the group/individual conundrum. Two of the more salient issues in Canadian politics concern the provision of special status for Quebec and special arrangements for Aboriginal collectives. Both issues are discussed in their book but one senses that the manner with which these matters has been handled, and is being handled, is not in accordance with the need for the clear supremacy of individual rights. It is thus uncertain why Canada is touted as a model for dealing with pressing group recognition problems. It also strikes me as interesting that the desire to treat groups with respect and tolerance can sometimes end in the undermining of these and other traditional liberal principles.

The book is not startling in the claims it advances. There has been plenty of attention to the matters that they discuss but they add a perspective that does afford some insights into the Canadian way of dealing with its multicultural society. This perspective makes the book worth reading for those interested in the just treatment of formerly or currently disadvantaged groups while adhering to traditional liberal theory regarding the supremacy of the individual, especially in the Canadian context.

MARC POULIN *Concordia University College of Alberta*

Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada
Patrick Macklem
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001, pp. x, 334

On the assumption that rights depend on membership in collectivities, Patrick Macklem builds a case for the constitutional protection of Aboriginal collectivities and thus Aboriginal rights. *Indigenous Difference* is not a general text on Canada's First Nations. It does not describe the Aboriginal way of life, or discuss issues of policy or problems of political accountability. It is dedicated to one proposition and reads like a legal factum, proceeding step by step, precedent by precedent, to the conclusion that Section 35 (1) of the *Constitution Act, 1982*, interpreted in light of Section 25 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, describes "a unique constitutional relationship between Aboriginal people and the Canadian state," one "that does not exist between other Canadians and Canada" (4).

To support and illustrate his assumption about rights and "difference," Macklem describes four "social facts" peculiar to Aboriginal experience on this continent: Aboriginal prior occupancy of the land, the sovereignty of Aboriginal people before European contact, early and continuing participation in a treaty-making process, and the threat today of assimilation. From

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these facts he derives four dimensions of difference deserving of protection: territorial interests, the right of self-government, culture and the treaty process. The argument is not merely that "difference" defined in this fashion merits constitutional protection but that it trumps all other rights claims in the Canadian constitution.

In a short review it is impossible to do justice to the complete argument, but a brief account of Macklem on culture and membership may be of interest to the political scientist and will at least begin to flesh out his position on the equality of Aboriginal people. Macklem is remarkably unfriendly to the idea that gender equality be recognized in determination of band membership. He describes the revision of the *Indian Act* in 1985 (Bill C-31) to allow Indian women marrying non-Indian men to retain Indian status as a "dramatic threat" to indigenous difference (229-33). Under the old form of the Act, Indian men, but not Indian women, retained status on marriage to a non-Indian, and Indian women, or some of them, struggled for years to rectify the situation. Their success in 1985 is widely regarded as tribute to their determination and the justice of their cause. Macklem, however, insists that Section 35(1), "understood in light of its underlying interests recognizes and affirms the right of Indian bands to determine band membership" (229). Aboriginal membership, admittedly a determinant of culture and identity, must rest with the band leadership. He frowns on the idea that the off-reserve membership created by C-31 might come to control the outcome of band council elections (230). Indigenous difference trumps women's equality!

The conclusion appears to follow inexorably from the notion that rights properly understood depend on participation in a collectivity. Indeed Macklem contends that exclusion of the women's claim, far from demoting equality, in fact enhances it at the most important level, the level of relations between Aboriginal people and non-Aboriginals. True equality flourishes where and only where difference, especially cultural difference, is recognized. However the argument is not easy to follow because Macklem emphatically rejects a static definition of culture. Cultures "transform themselves." Individuals "are not locked into particular cultures but may express a plurality of cultural allegiances" (56). Thus he severely criticizes the judiciary in so far as it has attempted to find in the constitution protection for only those aspects of Aboriginal culture that conform to pre-contact practice. But if cultures transform themselves is it so clear that one should prefer the transformation favoured by band leaders over that favoured by the women and off-reserve Indians?

It reinforces the character of the book as legal factum that Macklem pays little attention to serious challenges. On page 5, for example, he notes that "many" think the ideal of individual equality threatens the constitutionalization of differences among citizens. But who are these "many"? They and others like them make an appearance from time to time throughout the book, but they are not named and their views are not explored. Macklem hews to one line: constitutionalization of difference promotes equality in every sense that matters. He can accept no definition of equality incompatible with what seems to him the overriding justice of protecting indigenous difference as he has defined it.

JANET AJZENSTAT *McMaster University*

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Quel Canada pour les Autochtones? La fin de l'exclusion
Renée Dupuis
Montréal : Boréal, 2001, 174 p.

Dans un essai politique sur la situation peu enviable des Autochtones au Canada, Renée Dupuis jette un regard critique sur les relations conflictuelles entre les Autochtones et les Canadiennes et Canadiens, sur l'exclusion des premiers et l'incompréhension des seconds. À ses yeux, un profond mécontentement s'est installé au sein de la population non autochtone qui est surprise et troublée par les revendications des Autochtones. L'auteure se sert de sa propre expérience pour éclairer le lecteur sur des positions autochtones qui ne trouvent pas toujours d'écho dans les médias. La thèse générale de l'essai est que le maintien du *statu quo* n'améliorera pas la situation socioéconomique désastreuse dans laquelle se trouvent beaucoup trop d'Autochtones, ni ne remédiera à l'incompréhension qui les sépare des autres citoyens et citoyennes (37). Il faut reconnaître notre responsabilité quant au sort des Autochtones et mettre fin à leur exclusion (assujettissement et marginalisation) séculaire. À cette fin, nous devons redéfinir une relation équitable entre les Autochtones et les Non-autochtones.

Avocate spécialiste des droits de la personne et du droit relatif aux Autochtones, Dupuis siège à la Commission des revendications des Indiens. Cet ouvrage, destiné au grand public, a reçu le Prix du Gouverneur général en 2001.

Dans le premier chapitre, l'auteure explique que le gouvernement canadien a contribué à marginaliser les Autochtones et à les désorganiser sur le plan social et politique. Il y a marginalisation lorsque le gouvernement isole et sédentarise les Autochtones (régime des réserves), contribuant ainsi à construire et à sauvegarder une identité culturelle différente de l'identité canadienne. Le remplacement de leur régime politique traditionnel et leur exclusion des institutions politiques canadiennes, ainsi que du droit de vote, ont également placé les Autochtones dans une situation de dépendance. Dupuis souligne aussi que les conditions de vie dans les réserves sont pitoyables et les difficultés pour en sortir, colossales. Même le suicide, phénomène répandu dans les réserves, est associé de près à la situation d'exclusion de la société canadienne et relève d'un problème d'identité collective. De plus, l'exclusion des Autochtones de l'Histoire « officielle » les confine à un rôle de second ordre et amène le Canada à nier cette mise à l'écart de longue date.

Au deuxième chapitre, l'auteure affirme que la position et le rôle marginal des Autochtones au Canada sont manifestes depuis des siècles. Encore aujourd'hui, ils sont considérés comme des citoyens de seconde classe. De la période de la découverte à l'assujettissement violent, aux contradictions de la *Loi sur les indiens* (qui tout à la fois assimile et protège les Autochtones sous l'autorité discrétionnaire du gouvernement fédéral), aux sources historiques qui ne s'appuient que sur un seul point de vue (celui des Européens), la colonisation du Canada a déstabilisé des sociétés qui existaient déjà en Amérique du Nord. La tutelle britannique, puis canadienne, représente une entrave à l'organisation politique, sociale et économique des Autochtones – et particulièrement des Indiens et Indiennes. Depuis lors, des droits fondamentaux leur sont refusés et une justice blanche décide pour eux. En outre, le gouvernement et certains conseils de bande (pure création coloniale) sont à l'abri de poursuites juridiques d'individus ou de groupes au sein des réserves pour cause de discrimination en référence à la *Loi sur les indiens.* Enfin, le déplacement de populations autochtones contribue aussi au dépérissement de leur identité collective.

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Dans le chapitre suivant, Dupuis insiste pour expliquer que les Autochtones ont toujours manifesté leur refus de se voir confinés à une position subalterne. Elle affirme que mettre fin au régime de tutelle est synonyme de souveraineté (interne) (118). Notons, cependant, qu'elle ne fait pas mention de la revendication au droit à « l'autodétermination » ou au droit à « l'autonomie gouvernementale» et propose plutôt l'usage de «souveraineté». Elle offre le point de vue des Autochtones, qui demandent une relecture de l'histoire, une reconnaissance et une réparation des torts causés, un respect des anciens traités, des recours judiciaires à défaut d'une reconnaissance politique et une reconnaissance des droits ancestraux. Finalement, elle affirme que les Autochtones doivent témoigner d'une volonté ferme de s'affranchir de la tutelle de l'État.

Au dernier chapitre, l'auteure conclut que des solutions « nouvelles» doivent être envisagées avec des objectifs précis et de bonne foi car, jusqu'ici, les objectifs des gouvernements ont été peu ciblés : « [o]n ne réglera rien si l'on continue de voler à vue dans ce domaine comme on le fait depuis longtemps déjà. » (125). Beaucoup de changements semblent nécessaires : il faut réviser dans son ensemble la législation et il faut aussi réévaluer l'option judiciaire qui, rappelle Dupuis dans le chapitre précédent, est la voie empruntée par défaut par les Autochtones, puisqu'ils se sont heurtés à une fin de non-recevoir de l'option politique (101). Dupuis propose aussi la création d'un forum politique et constitutionnel. Pour que le processus soit vraiment démocratique, il faudra une plus grande transparence et une plus grande responsabilisation des instances politiques canadienne, québécoise et autochtones, des institutions d'enseignement supérieur et de recherche ainsi que des médias. Elle souligne, enfin, l'influence des préoccupations internationales qui seront probablement de plus en plus présentes dans un contexte de mondialisation.

On peut tirer plusieurs enseignements de l'ouvrage de Renée Dupuis. D'abord, la situation est complexe mais cela ne suffit pas à expliquer l'impassibilité de notre attitude, car il en va de la cohésion sociale du Canada. L'auteure affirme que, depuis 1982, le gouvernement fédéral ne répond plus à ses obligations constitutionnelles. Il ne respecte pas ses responsabilités en tant que fiduciaire des Autochtones et il ne répond que sporadiquement aux besoins des Autochtones. Le gouvernement doit négocier en toute bonne foi. Pour un prochain livre, il y a lieu de poser quelques questions à Dupuis : Quelles sont les conditions de ce dialogue? Y a-t-il réellement une possibilité de dialogue? Est-ce que le dialogue pourra accommoder des différences fondamentales dans la conception des relations sociales et des droits collectifs et individuels?

L'auteure rend accessible un domaine encore peu étudié et infiniment complexe. Tant sur le plan pratique et juridique que sur le plan théorique, la problématique remet en question l'institution de l'État-nation et la conception même de la démocratie libérale. De plus, les affaires autochtones sont liées au phénomène de la globalisation, puisque certains principes fondamentaux des droits autochtones font désormais consensus sur la scène internationale. L'approche de Dupuis en réponse aux revendications autochtones chevauche confusément deux idées maîtresses : celle qui avance que le modèle de démocratie libérale peut être reformulé pour tenir compte des aspirations autochtones dans la limite des conceptions d'égalité et d'autonomie chères aux démocraties libérales; celle qui questionne la conception libérale d'un système démocratique, suggérant de revoir le cadre entier des institutions afin de rendre justice aux visions parfois différentes des droits des peuples autochtones.

Dupuis présuppose certains liens qui me semblent justes mais qui sont plus tributaires de son intuition et de ses observations que d'une analyse cir-

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conscrite. L'auteure rend compte implicitement de la problématique des droits collectifs par rapport aux droits individuels lorsqu'elle fait allusion aux protestations des femmes autochtones face à des organes de direction autochtones largement composés d'hommes. Cette problématique renvoie aussi à la protection des droits des groupes internes ou minoritaires au sein de groupes culturels. D'autre part, Dupuis effleure la complexité de la situation québécoise dans la compréhension de la nature dite « distincte » des revendications autochtones.

L'auteure rappelle, à juste titre, qu'il faut tenir compte des différences et des conflits qui existent entre les Autochtones eux-mêmes. Les membres d'une même nation ou d'un même conseil tribal peuvent avoir des intérêts divergents. Contrairement à mes propres recherches sur les femmes autochtones au Québec, l'auteure affirme que le sentiment d'appartenance à la communauté locale semble souvent plus fort que le sentiment d'appartenance à une nation (157). En outre, l'expérience de l'auteure est utile pour décoder les positions des gouvernements. Par exemple, elle précise que le gouvernement du Canada, en réponse aux propositions de la Commission royale sur les peuples autochtones, a adopté et annoncé une politique d'autonomie gouvernementale pour les Autochtones, alors qu'il s'agit simplement d'appliquer une politique élaborée dans les années 1980 (112).

On aurait souhaité que les termes et les concepts soient mieux expliqués. Par exemple, les conseils de bande et conseils tribaux sont parfois considérés sur un pied d'égalité (69). La définition d'autochtone aurait pu être donnée avant la page 68. Les Peuples autochtones constitués des Inuits, des Métis et des Indiens (Premières nations) n'ont pas la même relation avec l'État, ce qui ne permet pas toujours de généraliser. Seuls les Indiennes et Indiens sont victimes d'une exclusion séculaire par l'entremise de la *Loi sur les indiens*. L'emploi erroné ou inapproprié de termes juridiques et politiques peut porter à confusion. Par exemple à au moins deux reprises (10, 98) l'auteure utilise le terme « enclave » pour désigner les réserves, alors que la Cour suprême dans l'*arrêt Francis c. La Reine* [1988] a jugé que les réserves ne constituaient pas des « enclaves ». Cependant, je suis consciente de la complexité de la question et tiens compte des limites imposées à un tel exercice de vulgarisation qui, par ailleurs, réussit bien sa mission d'information. La valeur de l'ouvrage demeure inestimable puisqu'il permet de poser autrement le problème : la question n'est plus seulement de savoir comment l'État est né, mais comment il peut être moralement réhabilité, puisque sa source a déjà été illégitime.

ÉDITH GARNEAU *University of Chicago*

From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis
Nicholas Gammer
Foreign Policy, Security and Strategic Studies Series
Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001, pp. 243

Nicholas Gammer has three objectives in writing *From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking* (5). First, he wants to provide details of Canada-Yugoslavia relations in the second half of the twentieth century. Second, through the Yugoslav case he hopes to illustrate a shift in Canadian foreign policy from traditional non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states to a more interventionist policy on human rights and conflict resolution. Third, Gammer wants to show that this change in foreign policy was led by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Barbara McDougall when she was secretary of state for external affairs.

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Part 1 of "From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking" examines Canada-Yugoslavia relations from the post-Second World War period to 1989. Gammer points out that the two countries shared some characteristics and goals—both were federations, both were middle powers keen on forging a path that differed from their regional hegemon, and both supported the use of multilateral organizations to manage international conflict. During this period the Canadian government showed little inclination to push matters relating to human rights infringements, and Canadian foreign policy was conducted by the Department of External Affairs with little intervention from the prime minister.

In Part 2, Gammer discusses the shift in Canadian foreign policy to concern for human rights and a more interventionist international role. He argues that Canada pushed for reforms, especially at the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), that would reflect how the world had changed with the end of the Cold War. According to Gammer, the Conservative government under Mulroney played a significant international role in the immediate post-Cold War years.

The third part of the book begins with the arrival of Canadian peacekeepers as part of UNPROFOR in Yugoslavia in 1992. Among other things (for example, the recognition of Croatia, the role of Canadian troops in establishing the UN "safe haven" at Srebrenica in 1993 and regaining the Sarajevo airport), this section examines the initiatives undertaken by the Mulroney government to create institutional connections between international organizations, and to create the international war crimes tribunal and international criminal court. Gammer also examines institutional and societal factors in Canada to determine which were most significant in the foreign policy shift.

Part 4 looks at Canadian policy in Yugoslavia after the Liberal party under Jean Chrétien won the federal election in 1993. Gammer argues that the Canadian government under Chrétien and External Affairs Minister André Ouellet returned to the cautious and non-interventionist stance of pre-Mulroney Canadian foreign policy.

The book concludes that, rather than parliamentary or bureaucratic influences, societal pressures or international pressure, the most important factor in the change of Canadian foreign policy was the prime minister.

This book is an interesting study of the Mulroney government's policy toward Yugoslavia as the country imploded in the early 1990s. It has, however, several shortcomings. First, the author states in the Introduction that he will examine only to the end of 1995 and the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement which, he claims, marked the formal demise of that federal state as originally constituted (5). It is not clear why the Dayton Agreement marked the end of Yugoslavia as originally constituted—did not the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, and later Macedonia, mark the end of the country as originally constituted? Second, the author states that work on the book was completed in December 1999, yet the most recent source in the book is December 1995 and, more importantly, the book does not discuss Lloyd Axworthy's actions as Canada's foreign minister. Concluding that the election of the Liberal government in 1993 meant a permanent return to a traditional foreign policy stance ignores the role played by Axworthy in bringing human security and peacebuilding into the lexicon of Canadian foreign policy. Had this book been published in 1996 or even 1997, it would have been a valuable study of Canada's role in the former Yugoslavia and the change in Canadian foreign policy. As published in 2001, however, the fact that it refers to no literature written since December 1995 and does not discuss a very activist foreign minister means that the book is much weaker than it could have been.

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A number of factual errors also weaken this book. Thus, for example, in the Introduction Gammer refers to the "new Conservative government of 1983" (7) when it was elected in 1984, and later refers to Canada as being the "oldest federation" and Yugoslavia (as created in 1948) as "the newest" (117), neither of which is correct.

And, finally, the author is overestimating Canada's influence on international affairs and underestimating the importance of international events on Canadian foreign policy. Gammer concludes that it was Mulroney's influence that changed foreign policy in the early 1990s to support a more interventionist stance, and does not acknowledge that it was international events such as the end of the Cold War, for example, that provided room for Canada to take human rights considerations into account. Under the constraints of the Cold War, leaders did not have the luxury of meddling in other countries' affairs for fear that this would drive them into the arms of the Soviets. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Western leaders in general, not just Mulroney, could openly discuss shortcomings in the human rights regimes of other countries.

Despite these weaknesses, and given the paucity of literature on this subject, *From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking* is an interesting book which will provide the general reader with a good source to learn more about the Canadian role in the crises involving the former Yugoslavia.

Ann L. Griffiths *Dalhousie University*

Driven Apart: Women's Employment Equality and Child Care in Canadian Public Policy
Annis May Timpson
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2001, pp. xviii, 318

Annis May Timpson has written an insightful account of an intriguing public policy puzzle: why have successive federal governments been prepared to develop policy in the area of employment equity for women and yet unwilling to pursue a national child care policy of any significance? Why have these two policy areas been "driven apart" when the federal government has been advised repeatedly (through consultation processes it has itself established) that they should be taken up together? Timpson offers a clearly argued answer to these questions, drawing our attention to the multiple variables that have shaped federal employment equity and child care policies during the postwar period. While her principal purpose in the book is empirical in nature, she does establish at the outset two sets of theoretical debates that her analysis speaks to (the diverse, often incompatible elements within Canadian liberalism and competing conceptions of democratic citizenship) and notes throughout her book the ways in which these debates have shaped, and been expressed in, federal policy discussions and choices.

After setting the stage, both historically and theoretically, Timpson structures her argument around an account of two key public consultation processes—the 1967 Royal Commission on the Status of Women and the 1983 Royal Commission on Employment Equity—and the employment equity and child care policies pursued in response to their recommendations by the Trudeau, Mulroney and Chrétien governments. Her analysis of the testimony presented to the two commissions brings to light the efforts of activists to emphasize the crucial connection between women's caregiving responsibilities in the domestic sphere and the difficulties they have experienced in attempting to live up to the model of worker-citizenship that has

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dominated in the postwar period. Yet, as she documents, successive federal governments have failed to develop child care policies that would permit women to enjoy substantive equality in employment opportunities, and have developed approaches to employment equity that do not take into account key contextual features of the lives of women and members of other marginalized groups.

Timpson's discussion is enriched by her integration of a broad range of empirical material, carefully documented in her extensive footnotes and comprehensive bibliography. Her analysis of the concerns and policy preferences presented by individual women and activist organizations in their testimony before the two royal commissions is particularly interesting. By mapping the range and distribution of views presented in this testimony, Timpson is able to track the relationships between these and the terms of reference of the commissions, the recommendations formulated by commissioners, and the policies subsequently developed by successive federal governments. We thus see clearly the disjunctures that emerge between the views of Canadian women and the recommendations of the royal commissions to which they were presented, on the one hand, and the policy directions taken by Ottawa on the other.

One of the strengths of Timpson's analysis is her refusal to sidestep the complexity of the policy puzzle she has taken up. She explores the influence of federal-provincial relationships, the ideological commitments of governments, the institutional structure of the federal bureaucracy, and the goals and strategies of activist groups in shaping the ways in which governments in Ottawa have responded (or not) to the recommendations of royal commissions. There are some particularly welcome features of her analysis, for example, her attention to the nature and extent of disagreements among Canadian women about whether or not mothers should be engaged in paid employment, and to differences between the priorities and strategies taken up by women's movement organizations and those pursued by the child care movement.

Timpson arrives at some troubling conclusions. As she notes, a pattern of consultation processes which consistently result in public policies at variance with the views articulated by ordinary citizens and royal commissioners alike threatens to undermine citizens' willingness to contribute to or engage with public policy processes. Nevertheless, Timpson argues the value of the "civic spaces" created by royal commissions (215) and suggests that the connection between citizen input and policy results could be enhanced if governments were to develop improved mechanisms for taking up the recommendations developed by royal commissions, and if commissioners were to formulate their recommendations with a clear-eyed understanding of the institutional and political contexts within which they will be received. Although striving for an optimistic tone in presenting these possibilities, the weight of the analysis presented in her book provides grounds for skepticism that either suggestion will be taken up. Whatever the reader might conclude about likely future directions, Timpson has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the particular histories of federal employment equity and child care policies and of the potentials and limitations of royal commissions. Her analysis will be of keen interest to those seeking to understand the dynamic interaction between social movements and the state, as well as the public policy process more generally.

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Feminists and Party Politics
Lisa Young
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000, pp. xiv, 246

I recently overheard a Canadian scholar suggest that the study of Women and Politics was passé; examining women in the traditional institutions of politics had simply lost its shine. I remember thinking and (hoping) at the time that this could not possibly be the case as there remained so much to learn. Classic pieces such as Sylvia Bashevkin's *Toeing the Lines* (Toronto: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1993) and Janine Brodie's *Women and Politics in Canada* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1985) remain foundational but are becoming increasingly dated.

Lisa Young's *Feminists and Party Politics* demonstrates that the study of women in politics is anything but behind the times. This comparative study of the relationship between feminist movements and political parties in the United States and Canada between 1970 and the late 1990s is both theoretically sophisticated and rigorous in its research. It argues that feminists' ability to transform party politics depends on party ideology, internal party policies, the strategies of feminist movements themselves, and finally, on their ability to deliver electoral benefits (that is, money and votes) to political parties.

In short, if a party's ideological foundation is comparable to the positions taken by the feminist organization and electoral benefits are likely to be gained, then the party might open itself up to that group. Ideological compatibility is no guarantee, however, given that some political parties will strive to keep themselves from being overtaken by "special interest groups." This is, however, more difficult to control in the United States given the diffuse and loose nature of party structures; the cohesive and centralized nature of Canadian parties, in contrast, makes the likelihood of capture less likely. The greater the ideological distance, however, the less likely is an alliance given the high costs to be paid by both the party and the movement. Movements must also see some benefit come from their efforts in the partisan arena; as Young suggests, "it is the inclusion of the movement's issues in public policy that offers the greatest incentive for movement leaders to engage with political parties" (194). The relationship is characterized as one of exchange between the two groups; for each, the benefits of the alliance must outweigh the costs. The US-Canadian comparison illustrates the fundamental importance of political institutions, particularly electoral and party systems, in establishing the limits of available benefits and probable costs.

Two sets of questions set the stage for the inquiry: the first focuses on strategies that feminist movements adopt to make gains in the electoral arena. As such, Young's text advances our understanding of feminist movements' strategic choices—primarily the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC) in Canada and the National Organization of Women (NOW) in the US—both for the promotion of women within the parties and for the advancement of a specific policy agenda. Feminists in both countries have been somewhat successful in increasing the number of women in legislatures; success in advancing feminist policy prescriptions (at least as advocated by these two groups) through political parties has been more muted. The second set of questions targets the response of parties and party systems to the strategies adopted by feminist movements. The US party system became more polarized over the period under examination with respect to feminism as it responded to the strength of anti-feminist and Christian right groups within the Republican party and the alliance between the Democrats and NOW. The Canadian party system, on the other hand, revealed less polarization in

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response to feminism given the NAC's unwillingness to forge a close alliance with only one party and the parties' resulting inability to dismiss feminist voters in their electoral calculations.

One small quibble is that the author ignores somewhat near the end of the book the scope of feminist thinking in each country. Young is clear in admitting up front that the "full diversity of the Canadian and US women's movements is not captured in this book" (9). But in asking whether feminists can transform party politics, she suggests that a *transformed* party would include "feminist stances on policy issues in its electoral platform" (204). Given the historical divisions between Québécois feminists and feminists in the rest of Canada, it is not always clear what constitutes a feminist stance on policy issues. Feminist groups within a country, and within a single party, might be demanding policy positions that are at complete odds. On such occasions, parties would be hard-pressed to meet this condition due to nothing else than having opened their doors to feminists.

The book's comparative approach is one of its strengths; too little research on women and politics attempts to focus the lens beyond a single country, a practice successfully practised in policy research for example. Another is Young's use of archival, personal interview and survey data, an important model for researchers and students in every field of the discipline. This book should be on the shelf of anyone interested in feminist organizations in either country. It should also be required reading for those whose work focuses on political parties in Canada and the United States, who very often skip over books with the word feminist in their titles. Finally, its cogent, clear and straightforward approach to the topic means it can easily be adopted in undergraduate and graduate classes. I for one have shelved it among my classics on Women and Politics.

Brenda O'Neill *University of Manitoba*

The Warren Court and American Politics
Lucas A. Powe, Jr.
Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. xvi, 565

In his book *The Warren Court and American Politics*, Lucas A. Powe, Jr., takes a traditional approach to the study of the United States Supreme Court by placing the decisions of the Court of Chief Justice Earl Warren in their political, social and historical context. Powe presents a chronological review of over 200 cases decided between 1953 and 1969, covering issues of race, domestic security, malapportionment, obscenity, religious freedom and criminal defendant's rights. It was a particularly active period in Supreme Court history. During Warren's tenure, the Court reversed 45 previously decided cases, including 33 from 1962 to 1968 when President John F. Kennedy's appointee, Arthur J. Goldberg, replaced Felix Frankfurter to give "History's Warren Court" a solid five-vote majority.

Powe suggests that the decisions of the Warren Court reflected the efforts of politically motivated elites functioning as part of the "Kennedy-Johnson liberalism of the mid and late 1960s" (494). During this period, the Court often intervened to protect the majoritarian process when the political branches could not. For example, Powe describes *Brown v. Board of Education* as a courageous attempt to bring the recalcitrant South into the mainstream, and reapportionment cases such as *Baker v. Carr* and *Reynolds v. Sims* as an effort to shift power away from rural to urban America. This portrayal of the Court working to bring the country's "outliers" into the main-

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stream thus turns the primary critique of the Warren Court—that it acted in a counter-majoritarian fashion—on its head.

According to Powe, the Warren Court was a co-equal partner in a coordinated effort to make the country a better place. "The best description of the period" he writes, "is that all three branches of government believed they were working harmoniously to tackle the nation's problems. It was simply a matter of determining which institution was best suited to handle a specific problem, and each went forward in its own way knowing the others also were seeking complementary results" (214). It was not an easy struggle. Powe describes three Warren Courts: a Court that came into the nation's consciousness with *Brown* and domestic security decisions in the beginning between 1953 and 1956, a Court in stalemate and retreat, unable to enforce *Brown* and reversing previous decisions between 1957 and 1961, and "History's Warren Court" which aggressively moved forward to realize the national liberal values of Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson between 1962 and 1968.

Significantly, this book is not a dry recitation of Supreme Court decisions, as the author frequently describes how the justices were "influenced by the economic, social and intellectual currents of American society" (xiv). Furthermore, Powe, who clerked for Justice William O. Douglas, sprinkles his work with interesting anecdotes about individual justices and Supreme Court decision making. Some of his observations—such as the Court's conscious decision to use the word desegregation rather than integration when discussing the proper remedy to implement *Brown*—are apt, while others, such as his multiple references to Douglas' several marriages and pursuit of a young wife, are not.

Powe's book is an important contribution to the study of the Supreme Court. In addition to studying the Warren Court in the context of American politics, Powe puts a qualitative spin on the work of public law scholars Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth who use the attitudinal model to explain how Supreme Court justices decide cases based on their policy preferences (*The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993]). Powe describes a Court, which largely consisted of justices with political, rather than judicial experience, as consciously result-oriented, with a primary aim to improve America. His focus on the legislative quality of some of its decisions supports his contention that the Court saw itself as working partner alongside the nation's political leaders.

It is refreshing to read an account of the Supreme Court that looks beyond the doctrinal approach. One is reminded of the work of Supreme Court scholars such as Edward S. Corwin and Walter F. Murphy. One wishes, however, that Powe had gone even farther in his exploration of the historical and political context of these decisions. For the *Warren Court and American Politics* remains a Court-centred book, with the bulk of its pages dedicated to a review of Court cases from a legal, rather than political perspective. This work would benefit from fewer Court decisions and more political analysis. This approach would also allow Powe to consider, in the spirit of congressional scholars such as Louis Fisher, how the political branches of government, and society at large, play an important role in shaping the meaning of the Constitution *(Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as a Political Process* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988]). That said, this is an excellent book, and readers will be pleased with Powe's effort. His writing is confident, accessible, and at times, appropriately sharp. Powe's comprehensive study is a significant contribution to the literature on the Warren Court during this tumultuous time.

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Backbone of the Army: Non-Commissioned Officers in the Future Army
Douglas L. Bland, ed.
Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000, pp. xxvii, 126

From the time of the Roman legions, military forces have been divided into a hierarchical order, with officers at the top, common soldiers at the bottom, and veteran leaders who rose through the ranks in the middle. While commissioned officers have command and make battle plans, non-commissioned officers have the primary responsibility for discipline, training, tradition and the day-to-day care of soldiers. Social changes have brought this structure into question. Western societies no longer have a rigid caste system. Virtually all NCOs now have high school education and many have university degrees as well. Furthermore, operational changes in the dispersion of troops in the field, increasing technical and administrative functions, and the current emphasis on peacekeeping all combine to require the NCO to have far more autonomy, discretion and responsibility than ever before. Many modern military units operate in a collegial fashion in many ways like a civilian-sector office. The distinction between commissioned officer and NCO is therefore quickly eroding, which is problematic given the vast differences in pay, responsibility and prestige incumbent in military rank.

These concerns led to the Symposium on the Non-Commissioned Officer in the Future Army, held at Queen's University in June 1999, out of which this volume emerged. The contributors include four university professors, two senior officers and four senior non-commissioned officers. The volume is edited by Douglas L. Bland, who also writes the Preface. The essays cover a wide range of topics relating to NCOs, including historical developments, human resources issues, professional development, military culture, attitudes and speculation as to the future.

Mike Jeffrey notes how rapidly the role of the NCO has changed during his thirty-plus years of service and that, "As an army, we have not always articulated clearly what we expect of the NCO" (2). Ronald Graham Haycock calls the officer-NCO distinction "simplistic" (10) and observes that the younger cohort of non-commissioned members is even more educated, meaning the problem will be exacerbated. Further, the emerging "virtual battlefield" may cause the distinction to "disappear." Future NCOs must be more educated, exhibit socio-political skills, and have the abilities to deal with complex questions and think "outside the box" (20-21).

Al Okros predicts that demographic changes will present more challenges. The aging of the population will require additional funding. Immigration from outside Europe will increase diversity in language, ethnicity, religion and culture. One fifth of Canadians are expected to have a university degree by 2016. All of these trends portend a decline in the recruitment pool available for the military, which has drawn disproportionately from young, non-college educated men with a strong sense of nationalism. The most likely way to reconcile these competing realities is a drastic altering of the "employment contract" with young soldiers, including a less rigid hierarchy, more opportunity for individual reward, improved quality of life and more flexibility (39).

Stewart Mossop adds that the computer age means that "face-to-face contact and interaction is fading" and that "the NCO who is 'unplugged' is a dinosaur" (74). He believes it will take "at least a generation" for NCOs to adapt to the new environment (76). Terry Garand argues that a new professional development system is needed to train NCOs on this complex new

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environment, including safety, counseling, administration and law. Camille Tkacz also identifies similar deficiencies in NCO training but notes that a new system is under way to solve many of them.

The most forward-looking piece was Arthur Majoor's essay arguing that the "logical extension of existing trends" is the elimination of the NCO corps entirely (112). He cites many of the observations noted by the other authors and concludes that the future battlefield leader will have to act so rapidly and independently as to render the present hierarchy moot. He notes that "[I]t is not uncommon to find a reserve sergeant and lieutenant serving together, both of whom are enrolled at the same university, taking the same courses, and even living in the same fraternity house" (116). The fact that officers and NCOs in technical specialties work side-by-side doing essentially the same job, requiring the same training, further adds to this odd relationship.

Christopher Dandeker and Donna Winslow discuss the divergence of civilian and military cultures. While citing traditional reasons why the two must be different, they note that most Western militaries have adapted in significant ways. The Canadian Armed Forces has fully integrated women and gays and lesbians, and even created an ombudsman's office outside the chain of command to air grievances. The pieces by Wilbur Adams, Jr. and J. E. Le Feuvre simply reiterate that the world is changing and NCOs must adapt, using such boilerplate as, "We were given top-down directions to change. We knew we had a problem and we addressed it!" (100).

While very informative, the book is rather uneven. Some of the articles shed little light on the role of NCOs in the future army or were simple regurgitations of the party line by active military leaders. Nonetheless, the book is a valuable addition to the canon. Even knowledgeable readers will glean new insights, such as the notable differences in personnel management and career patterns across Western military systems.

JAMES H. JOYNER, JR. *Troy State University*

L'éclatement de la Yougoslavie de Tito. Désintégration d'une fédération et guerres interethniques
Yves Brossard et Jonathan Vidal
Ste-Foy : Presses de l'Université Laval/L'Harmattan, 2001, 365 p.

De tous les événements qui suivirent la chute du Bloc de l'Est, ceux qui ont ensanglanté l'ancienne Yougoslavie ont fait les manchettes le plus souvent. Il n'est donc pas surprenant que les politologues et les historiens aient réfléchi aux causes des affrontements et tenté d'expliquer le phénomène. Ce livre est issu des cours du professeur d'histoire Yves Brossard, maintenant à la retraite, et d'un mémoire de maîtrise de Jonathan Vidal, tous deux de l'Université du Québec à Montréal. Le livre se place essentiellement sur le terrain de l'histoire contemporaine (10).

Disons d'emblée que l'ouvrage ne vise pas un public de spécialistes mais s'adresse à quiconque veut comprendre le conflit avec « une information allant plus loin que la vulgarisation, mais [n'est] pas disposé à entreprendre la lecture d'un ouvrage hyperspécialisé et excessivement volumineux sur le sujet » (10). Autrement dit, l'ouvrage cherche à offrir une explication et une analyse claire du conflit yougoslave sans tomber dans les différentes grilles d'analyse développées par les sciences sociales pour comprendre le phénomène, comme la thèse *identitariste*, proche des constructivistes, ou celle de *l'ethno-réalisme*, dernière-née du courant réaliste, ces thèses ayant toutes deux été développées en relations internationales.

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L'ouvrage est divisé en sept chapitres en plus d'une introduction historique générale sur les Balkans et d'une conclusion. Il contient de très nombreuses cartes (24) à la fin de l'ouvrage. Celles-ci proviennent de diverses sources, mais leur reproduction laisse souvent à désirer et en rend l'utilisation difficile. La bibliographie est importante, mais on est surpris par l'absence de quelques ouvrages classiques: par exemple, ceux de Barbara et Charles Jelavich sur les Balkans, celui de Peter Sugar sur l'Europe du Sud-Est durant la période de 1354 à 1804, ou bien d'autres plus récents comme celui de Jasna Adler sur la position croate dans la formation de la première Yougoslavie ou encore l'excellent *Nations et nationalismes en Europe centrale XIX*e *et XX*e *siècles* de Bernard Michel, pour ne nommer que ceux-ci. Malgré tout, la bibliographie peut offrir une base intéressante pour ceux et celles qui souhaitent approfondir leur compréhension de ces événements tragiques.

La force de l'ouvrage est de présenter chronologiquement les principaux événements qui ont ponctué l'éclatement de la Yougoslavie post-titiste jusqu'en 1995. Malheureusement, la principale faiblesse de l'ouvrage, qui hypothèque le reste de la démonstration, réside dans l'introduction historique. Dans cette dernière, les auteurs font un rapide tour d'horizon de plusieurs siècles. Évidemment, couvrir une telle période en une quarantaine de pages est un exercice difficile et les auteurs ne s'en acquittent pas particulièrement bien. L'avantage d'un ouvrage de ce type est de montrer la part du passé et de la contingence dans les événements récents. Si l'histoire n'explique pas tout, elle permet cependant de comprendre une bonne partie des problèmes de la Yougoslavie titiste et post-titiste. Par exemple, les différences d'appartenance aux empires austro-hongrois et ottoman ne sont pas soulignées assez fortement. Les disparités économiques de la Yougoslavie titiste s'expliquent en grande partie par l'appartenance ou non à l'un des deux empires. La Slovénie et la Croatie étaient plus développées que la Serbie et les autres territoires du sud. De même, on constate des lacunes historiques; la période la plus problématique est celle de la Première Guerre mondiale.

Les auteurs semblent ignorer quelques faits essentiels. Tout d'abord, il y a, à la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale, trois groupes qui représentent les Slaves du sud. Le premier est le gouvernement serbe en exil. Son objectif est d'annexer des régions dites « yougoslaves » de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Le second groupe est celui des émigrés politiques de ces régions d'Autriche-Hongrie : le comité yougoslave de Londres est fondé en mai 1915 et vise la création d'un État commun aux Slaves du Sud. Enfin, un troisième comité va naître à la fin de la Guerre sur le territoire même de la monarchie danubienne des Habsbourg : le comité national de Zagreb (*Narodno Vijece*) reconnu par l'Empereur-Roi Charles. Si le gouvernement serbe en exil et le Comité de Londres signent l'accord de Corfou de 1917, l'accord est moribond à la fin du conflit. Il est abandonné par Pasic (chef du gouvernement Serbe) dès le début de 1918. C'est l'accord de Genève, négocié du 6 au 9 novembre 1918 par les trois groupes qui jette les bases du nouvel État. Cependant, les Serbes ne le respecteront jamais. De même, l'importance du rôle des États-Unis dans la fondation de ce premier État est passée sous silence. Pourtant, c'est le gouvernement des États-Unis qui va, le premier, reconnaître le programme d'unification des Slaves du Sud comme un but de guerre de l'Entente et des puissances associées, le 24 juin 1918. Le gouvernement américain ira plus loin : il sera le premier à reconnaître le nouvel État (proclamé le 1er décembre 1918 par le prince-régent Alexandre), le 7 février 1919. Lors de la conférence de paix de Paris, le président Wilson s'oppose à l'Italie dans l'application du traité de Londres de 1915. Cette prise de position conduit les représentants italiens à claquer la porte de la conférence . . .

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Notons aussi que certaines généralisations des auteurs sont à prendre avec un grain de sel. Par exemple, la possibilité que le conflit yougoslave déborde sur la Hongrie ou la Turquie était extrêmement faible (209). Par ailleurs, la structure générale de l'ouvrage est souvent déficiente. Les tentatives de comparaison entre la situation du Québec et de l'ancienne Yougoslavie frôlent le ridicule. Loin de rendre la situation yougoslave plus facile à comprendre, ces comparaisons sont souvent fastidieuses et inutiles (par exemple, aux pages 148 à 150). Le style enfin est souvent lourd et de mauvais goût (par exemple, à la page 258 sur Jimmy Carter)! Bref, sauf pour le déroulement chronologique des événements, ce livre n'atteint malheureusement pas les objectifs que les auteurs s'étaient eux-mêmes fixés.

DANY DESCHÊNES *Université Laval*

Elections in Australia, Ireland, and Malta under the Single Transferable Vote: Reflections on an Embedded Institution
Shaun Bowler and Bernard Grofman, eds.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000, pp. vii, 293

As far as intellectuals and academics are concerned, Single Transferable Vote (STV) has been one of the most popular electoral systems ever since its introduction by Thomas Hare and Carl Andrea in the nineteenth century. It has been used however—in its pure multimember-constituency form—in general elections only in Ireland and Malta. Andrew Inglis Clark introduced the system to Australia. It is used there in its Alternative Vote form of single-member constituencies. The system is also used in other elections, such as in the case of some Canadian municipal elections.

STV is a preferential voting system in which the voters are asked (or allowed) to rank individual candidates in an ordinal manner. "Redundant" votes of candidates, who have "enough" votes to be elected, are transferred to other candidates according to preferences mentioned on the ballot papers. This procedure is repeated until either all vacancies are filled or until no redundant votes of elected candidates are left. In the latter case, votes of the candidate with the lowest number of votes are transferred to other candidates. This procedure is repeated until all the vacant seats are allocated to individual candidates.

It has been argued that many of the voters do not fully comprehend the system, its many technical details and its subtleties. The same may be said about a number of previous professional discussions of this "embedded institution." Hence, Bowler and Grofman's volume is devoted to a subject that should have been treated in such a comprehensive manner long ago.

It may be claimed that each and every one of the 12 contributors to this volume is a leading expert in his field. At least half of the writers belong to the leading group of academic professionals on the question of "political consequences of electoral laws." Nevertheless, as is the usual case with edited volumes, the level—as well as the style—of different chapters varies.

The first three chapters of the book deal with the place of STV compared to other preferential electoral systems. The following three chapters are devoted to the celebrated Irish case. The concluding three chapters examine the employment of STV in Australia, Malta and Canada. In their introduction, Bowler and Grofman present another classification of the studies included in their volume. Some chapters examine the question of parties' strengths and their abilities to control the nomination process. Other chapters focus on the question of strategic behaviour by voters and parties. A third

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group of chapters deals with the impact of technical differences such as district magnitude.

It is interesting to note that some of the most intriguing questions associated with STV are not answered in spite of the rich investigation. Thus, the fact that STV is "candidate centred," does explain why it has not resulted yet in severe fragmentation—as suggested by previous "analytical" studies. At the same time, the question why the internal partisan race does not end in the level of internal party fractionalization that Japan has always had with its Single Non-Transferable Vote remains open.

An important conclusion is that similar political institutions—such as electoral systems—might result in completely different outcomes under different political and societal environments. This conclusion may seem trivial, but given the popularity of institutional-focused research in recent years, the book presents impressive evidence.

Obviously, a number of important issues, that could have been investigated, are not dealt with in the present volume. Thus, one could have expected that the rich data available would result in the examination of the frequency of cyclical preferences and other issues associated with the Borda-Condorcet paradox of voting. Likewise, it is well known that other paradoxes are typical to STV per se. Thus, the sensitivity to "irrelevant alternatives" and the fact that the very act of voting may result in consequences opposite to those expressed by voters who bothered to turn out. Related issues are elaborated only in Neal G. Jesse's outstanding chapter on "a sophisticated voter model of preferential electoral systems."

In their concluding phrase, Grofman and Bowler suggest that "in light of the findings of the essays in this volume, perhaps it is time for the electoral studies literature to move on from its emphasis on proportionality and to turn to wider concerns of the electoral process" (270). *Reflections on an Embedded Institution* takes an important impressive step. One can only look forward to future projects on similar subjects.

Abraham Diskin *Hebrew University of Jerusalem*

La représentation politique des femmes en Amérique latine
Bérengère Marques-Pereira et Patricio Nolasco, coordinateurs
Paris : L'Harmattan, 2001, 187 p.

L'étude des difficultés particulières que rencontrent les femmes en tant que participantes actives à la sphère politique institutionnelle et électorale est de plus en plus fréquente dans la science politique actuelle. Cet intérêt est relié à des initiatives telles que la parité en France ou autres mesures législatives adoptées dans d'autres pays au cours des dernières années et visant à accroître la présence des femmes au sein des institutions représentatives. Le principal intérêt de ce livre réside dans le fait qu'il est l'un des premiers ouvrages de langue française à porter tant sur les femmes dans la politique latino-américaine que sur la question plus spécifique de leur représentation politique. Les problématiques propres aux systèmes politiques des sociétés latino-américaines retiennent l'attention de la plupart des contributeurs de l'ouvrage, sans toutefois être traitées de façon très satisfaisante, en général. Seul un des chapitres tente une comparaison entre plusieurs cas latino-américains, alors qu'une approche comparative appliquée à l'ensemble du livre aurait pu mener à des conclusions plus solides et systématisées. D'ailleurs, un des reproches majeurs qu'on peut adresser à cet ouvrage est son peu de rigueur dans la présentation, l'organisation et le choix des chapitres retenus.

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De façon générale, plusieurs chapitres s'apparentent un peu trop à des travaux universitaires dans leur forme et dans leur style, plutôt qu'à des articles scientifiques prêts à être publiés. On note quelques répétitions entre certains chapitres, ce qui alourdit la lecture, de même que quelques erreurs sémantiques liées sans doute à la traduction de l'espagnol vers le français.

L'introduction de Bérengère Marques-Pereira résume les principales questions liées au problème de la sous-représentation des femmes dans les institutions politiques de façon concise et analytique, mais sans indiquer explicitement les orientations qui ont guidé le choix des textes. Elle propose un questionnement intéressant sur le rapport entre la sous-représentation des femmes et l'état de la démocratie, questionnement qui reste malheureusement peu exploré dans les chapitres suivants. Marques-Pereira affirme que des mesures, telles que les quotas ou la parité, visant à « féminiser les élites » ne règlent pas, en soi, la crise de la représentation politique dont souffrent les démocraties établies ou nouvelles. C'est plutôt en faisant appel à divers arguments, soit ceux de la justice, de la proportionnalité, de l'utilité et de la spécificité des intérêts et comportements, que l'on peut mieux défendre les différentes stratégies visant à augmenter l'accès des femmes au pouvoir politique formel. Cependant, Marques-Pereira rappelle aussi que l'entrée des femmes dans les institutions représentatives ne garantit aucunement qu'elles accèdent au pouvoir de façon égale, ni même qu'elles représentent effectivement des intérêts qui soient propres aux femmes. On touche ici aux limites des atouts que confère le statut de représentant du peuple tout autant qu'aux limites des stratégies de promotion politique des femmes.

Le texte de Patricio Nolasco, qui clôt l'ouvrage, est l'un des plus faibles. L'intérêt très limité de ce texte qui se dit rassembleur des différentes contributions de l'ouvrage, mais qui ne l'est pas, tient dans le commentaire avançant que l'entrée récente des femmes dans les institutions représentatives peut s'expliquer en partie par un processus parallèle de dévalorisation du politique. Il est évident que ce processus, accompagnant la reformulation du rôle de l'État dans le cadre de la mondialisation et l'application du modèle néo-libéral de développement, constitue en soi un problème pour l'avenir de la démocratie. On permettrait aux femmes d'occuper l'espace politique de façon plus importante parce que le pouvoir, législatif en particulier, a de moins en moins de poids dans la prise de décisions et dans l'orientation des politiques économiques et sociales affectant l'ensemble de nos sociétés.

On comprend mal aussi l'insertion d'un texte comme celui de Francine Mestrum, intitulé « "L'*empowerment*", le pouvoir et la capacité d'action », qui ne porte pas particulièrement sur la question de la représentation politique des femmes en Amérique latine et qui fait une trop brève analyse critique du concept de l'*empowerment* des femmes. En partant du double constat que, d'une part, ce terme est utilisé de façon bien différente selon les contextes et les objectifs poursuivis et, que d'autre part, il est habituellement mal traduit en français, l'auteure cherche à montrer les limites du concept, et surtout à lui substituer des termes qu'elle qualifie de « concurrents » tels que la citoyenneté, la lutte contre la pauvreté ou même l'émancipation, termes qu'elle souhaite réintroduire dans le vocabulaire des luttes des femmes. Sa discussion sémantique et théorique reste superficielle et rapide; elle ne propose que des définitions partielles et oscille entre la critique fondamentale du terme et celle de son acceptation dans certains contextes. S'il est utile de montrer qu'un même concept peut être utilisé à toutes les sauces et avec des conséquences différentes sur la façon dont on conçoit les rapports de pouvoir ou même le pouvoir, on comprend

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mal en quoi le concept d'*empowerment* subit un sort différent de celui de tous les concepts phares utilisés dans la science politique, la planification gouvernementale ou les organisations internationales.

« La représentation politique des femmes en Amérique latine : une analyse comparée » de Jacqueline Jimenez Polanco traite de l'entrée des femmes dans les partis et institutions représentatives en Argentine, au Brésil, au Chili, au Mexique et en République Dominicaine, en mettant en relief les obstacles culturels, mais surtout institutionnels, à l'élection des femmes. Jimenez Polanco montre aussi à quel point le modèle des quotas en Argentine a apporté un vent nouveau et des instruments inédits de promotion politique des femmes. Les tableaux de données et statistiques sur le nombre de femmes élues dans les cas étudiés ajoutent à la synthèse des jalons principaux de l'histoire des femmes en politique active. De plus, l'auteure saisit de façon intéressante les contrastes entre les différents cas, qui sont liés tout autant à l'évolution du mouvement des femmes qu'aux institutions et traditions politiques à proprement parler.

« Actions positives et citoyenneté en Argentine » de Patricia Laura Gomez présente le système politique argentin et l'évolution de la question de la représentation politique et de la citoyenneté en examinant aussi bien les grands débats théoriques que la pratique et les débats proprement argentins. Sa solide argumentation théorique repose sur la notion, proposée par l'auteure, de « l'inclusion excluante » qui caractériserait l'octroi des droits politiques aux femmes et révèle les limites de leur citoyenneté. Gomez fait également une fine analyse des contradictions et tendances exprimées dans la société argentine face à l'adoption des mesures d'action positive pour faciliter une plus grande participation des femmes aux élections. Critiquant tant les détracteurs que les promoteurs des quotas, puisque ceux-ci postulent une représentation d'intérêts féminins homogènes et découlant d'une appartenance à un genre, elle propose plutôt de se fonder sur l'argument de la justice et de l'inclusion de points de vue divers. Ce faisant, elle rappelle que le succès relatif des quotas en Argentine est surtout lié à son système électoral plurinominal à listes fermées et souligne la fragilité des institutions démocratiques argentines, ainsi que la nécessité de voir les mesures d'action positive comme constituant une partie seulement des réformes à mettre en oeuvre pour sauvegarder et approfondir la démocratie.

« La représentation politique des femmes au Chili » de Sonia Nunez Villaroel présente un bilan historique et politique des avancées et des limites du système politique chilien en regard de la sous-représentation politique des femmes, principalement à travers une courte présentation des partis et de la place faite aux femmes en leur sein. Une analyse des progrès effectués depuis la transition à la démocratie démontre que les gains restent assez formels et que la classe politique demeure relativement imperméable aux efforts et initiatives des organisations de femmes, de certaines institutions spécialisées et de quelques politiciennes pour instaurer des mesures sérieuses d'élargissement de l'accès des femmes au pouvoir politique.

« La citoyenneté politique des femmes en Uruguay » de Rosario Aguirre offre un traitement très descriptif de la question, bien qu'apportant une certaine lumière sur les phénomènes qui expliquent la très faible présence des femmes dans la sphère politique formelle. Leur absence est d'autant plus surprenante, comme le dit l'auteure, que l'Uruguay est le pays où les inégalités sociales et de genre ont été historiquement les moins grandes en Amérique du Sud. On peut déplorer le fait que l'auteure ait négligé de résumer les grands traits de l'histoire politique contemporaine de l'Uruguay ou d'expliquer les réformes institutionnelles adoptées au milieu

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des années quatre-vingt-dix, ce qui aurait permis une meilleure compréhension du contexte structurel et politique.

On lira cet ouvrage pour y trouver un portrait de la situation des femmes dans le système politique de quelques pays latino-américains. Il s'agit d'un portrait inégal et à faible portée théorique. Pourtant, dans ce domaine, les recherches sont encore trop peu nombreuses pour qu'on ait l'option de ne pas considérer cet ouvrage à sa juste valeur de pionnier.

STÉPHANIE ROUSSEAU *Université McGill*

States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines
Misagh Parsa
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. x, 326

Revolutions have nearly disappeared from the intellectual radar of Political Science. For the first time in a century, if not in the history of political analysis, the study of dramatic and violent political change lies at the margin of professional political inquiry. For this reason, Misagh Parsa's comparative analysis of three episodes of revolutionary, or quasi-revolutionary, politics is a welcome arrival.

In 1979, one could look at the world and think that a new age of revolutions had come. The Shah of Iran had been deposed. Grenadian strongman, Eric Gairy, had fallen to the New Jewel Movement. The 45-year family dictatorship of the Somozas ended in Nicaragua with the Sandinista revolution. Though we did not know it, this was the high water mark of twentieth-century social revolutions. Radical, violent political change, however, did not abate. Authoritarian states of all kinds crumbled throughout the world in the declining years of the last century. Seemingly impregnable dictatorships, like those of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, the Duvalliers in Haiti, and Suharto in Indonesia, are now subjects of historical inquiry. Even more unexpectedly, Soviet-style Communist states were thrown into Lenin's trashbin of history.

Parsa's volume presents the cases of Iran, Nicaragua and the Philippines as subjects in a project to build a theory of revolution. The author combines structural and processual perspectives to hypothesize that exclusive polities (ones that greatly restrict participation), with hyperactive states (ones that intervene constantly and deeply in the economy) are most vulnerable to revolutionary overthrow. However, Parsa insists that political process variables also be considered, and to that end analyzes the roles played by students, clergy, workers and capitalists in the three countries. Joining the two analytical streams allows the author to demonstrate that upheaval in the Philippines did not bring about social revolution, because the juxtaposition and interaction of structural and political factors permitted an elite-led coalition to oust the dictator Marcos. In Iran and Nicaragua, however, radicals led the coalitions that overthrew the Shah and Somoza, respectively, and gave rise to social revolution.

The author describes the cases examined particularly well. I am quite familiar with the Nicaraguan experience and found the material presented here to be both thorough and accurate. The treatment of roles played by students, clergy, workers and capitalists is very strong and will be useful models for senior undergraduate and graduate students to examine. Parsa's analysis is truly comparative and successfully marries thick description and theoretical sophistication.

Two sets of questions present themselves to the reader of *States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions.* First, is it important that all three countries were

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ruled by autocratic kleptocrats? If strongmen are particularly likely to set up exclusive polities and use the state as their personal preserve, then we still do not know if Parsa's contribution to revolutionary theory would apply to better institutionalized authoritarian regimes. As one of the consequences of globalization appears to be the recrudescence of personalized presidential rule, the issue is of some moment. The historical record should provide enough cases to permit a full consideration of this matter.

The other set of questions also uses Parsa's work as a point of departure. In 2002, the Iranian revolutionary state still existed. It has evolved from its original configuration, but it is still recognizable. Nicaragua, however, has practically dismantled the Sandinista state. One reason for these dramatically different outcomes is obvious: counterrevolutionary pressure from the United States was brought to bear more effectively in Central America than in southwest Asia. Yet, we should take the publication of this book as an incentive to examine more closely the fate of revolutionary political systems. Political Science gives substantial attention to the consolidation in liberal democratic regimes. It could usefully raise the same questions regarding revolutionary states.

Misagh Parsa's study of revolutions and revolutionary theory should find a place in a variety of advanced comparative politics courses. It is a well-conceived and executed analysis that will engage students with its detailed descriptions of political change and its attention to theory building.

DAVID CLOSE *Memorial University of Newfoundland*

The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War
Stephen Ellis
New York: New York University Press, 1999, pp. ix, 371

Stephen Ellis sets the scene for his chronicle of and inquiry into the Liberian civil war (1989-1997) by describing in vivid detail the capture and assassination of former President Samuel Doe. In some ways this scene mimics the content and style of international news reporting out of Liberia in the early 1990s. It depicts the anarchy, chaos and horrific violence that most Westerners associate not only with the Liberian conflict—Africa's first of the post-Cold War world—but with events on the continent generally (17-20). Ellis, however, does not simply leave off at the point of Western reportage. Neither does he discount the "reality" depicted by journalists and readily consumed by diplomats around the world. "It would be foolish simply to scoff at the opinions of correspondents who glean their impressions at first hand, no matter how superficial their analyses may sometimes be. . . . Their reports are consumed not only by the world's reading or viewing public, but also by policy makers and politicians who may take action in consequence of the information they provide" (18). Rather, he seeks a more nuanced answer to a very basic question: How is it that such things happen, not merely the civil war, but the way of the war itself? The result is a remarkable piece of scholarship, one I would encourage everyone (including journalists) to read.

The crux of Ellis' argument is contained on pages 275-80, but a clue to his objective lies in the main title (as opposed to the sub-title), for by the end of the book Ellis has convincingly removed the "mask of anarchy" to reveal something rather more intelligible: an unexceptional war conducted for many understandable reasons, none of which is *primus inter pares*: core-hinterland frustrations borne of "black colonialism" and exploitation (293); a legacy of African "bossism" and economic plunder substituting for "administration"

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and "development" in a "hollow" state (47, 188); social upheaval following "a century of rapid and profound change" (297) including the undermining of local traditions and institutions by Christianity, Islam (206, 247, 257, 300-01) and modernization (218); regional high politics (66ff); the settling of local scores (129); inter-ethnic rivalry and alliance (74, 86, 92-93, 216); avaricious foreign countries and firms (chap. 4); and a rogue's gallery of local notables (chap. 1 and 2). Yet, in his careful way Ellis states that the Liberian civil war was not an "historical inevitability" (289)—there were other options available to those with influence; other paths could have been taken but, in the end, were not.

How Liberia came to be involved in a decade-long civil war is detailed in part 1 of the book, "A Chronicle" (chap. 1-4). Ellis tells us that political activity, the exercise of violence and the accumulation of wealth are "related activities in all societies"; what differs are the "institutional arrangements made to regulate them" (290). In chapters 1 and 2, he focuses on "political activity," specifically how Charles Taylor came to be Liberia's "first warlord" and, a short decade later, the duly-elected president of Liberia. The final three pages of chapter 2 alone make the book worth reading. Chapter 3 examines the "exercise of violence," that is, why those involved in the war were motivated to fight. Chapter 4 details the "accumulation of wealth," that is, the many business opportunities (for example, rubber, diamonds, timber, gold, drugs) afforded by the war. Not one individual, institution, company or government emerges unscathed. All were complicit in the conduct and prolongation of the conflict.

The second part of the book (chap. 5-7) is "An Inquiry" into not only why the war was fought, but the specific way in which it was conducted. Chapter 5 examines the "state-building" process. Chapter 6 looks at the importance of religious institutions, in particular the Poro and Sande societies. Chapter 7 is a bit of a "mixed-bag," with the continuation of a discussion about the causes of the war begun in chapter 6, some lessons for "the wider world" (wherein he introduces Foucault's notion of "governmentality"), and a short analysis of what it is that keeps Liberians going in spite of it all (community, family, a "web-like" society).

So, what was all that grim reporting about? Why were men (most of them boys aged between 12 and 17) dressing in women's clothing? Why did some claim to have eaten the hearts of their enemies (117, 144, 146, 148)? Ellis' take on these events is important, for in casting the light of understanding on these highly specific phenomena he goes a long way toward disabusing the wider world of such notions as Kaplan's "Coming Anarchy," Huntington's "Clash of Civilisations" and Rufin's "new barbarians"—all owing an historical allegiance in some ways to Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* (16-22, 306-10).

Ellis often lets Liberians speak for themselves. With regard to the wearing of wigs and claims to have eaten the heart of your enemy, the message is clear: it is meant to frighten others, a common enough activity in all wars. In terms of Liberian tradition, eating is an idiom of power. To eat the heart of another is to take on their power. There were many documented cases, to be sure (146, 148). However, it is not the fact of cannibalism that most interests Ellis but what it symbolizes. In Liberian traditional religious practice, human and animal sacrifice played an important part in social organization. "The ritual control of violence . . . is one of the defining characteristics of a coherent political order" (296). Such events did not occur willy-nilly; they were performed by religious leaders called "zoes," who were ordinary members of society except when masked, and for specific reasons, sometimes as justice

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meted out, sometimes "as a form of communication between mankind and the invisible world" (221).

That boy soldiers "masked" themselves as women and publicly and whimsically performed the tasks of zoes signified, for Ellis, the utter breakdown of accepted social order in Liberia. The consequences of such actions are nicely captured in *The Dream* by Liberian writer M. V. Passewe (quoted by Ellis: 275-76): "Your fighters donned our secret masks and comically displayed our hidden secrets for all uninitiates to see. . . . No more are we revered. Because of you, we can no longer dwell among humanfolk but must linger in the ethereal world in the Forest of DenDen, doomed to ignominy. Who will beat the *sangba* when masked devils play? Who will revere DenDen when the dust of your senseless war settles?" In Ellis's words (275), "Everyone in the town is masked. . . . [I]f everyone becomes a masked dancer, who will beat the drum to which the spirits must dance?" In short, beneath an intelligible war lies a profound "spiritual anarchy" (302). How Liberia reached that point is a tale well told.

LARRY A. SWATUK *University of Botswana*

Profits and Principles: Global Capitalism and Human Rights in China
Michael A. Santoro
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000, pp. xix, 241

This book deals with the role of multinational corporations in promoting human rights in China. Michael Santoro argues that whether the multinational corporations are able to help the human rights conditions in China depends on their business strategies. If they take a cost-minimization strategy conducting large-scale, low-tech, low-cost production of labor-intensive goods that can be exported to existing markets around the globe, they may actually hurt the workers' human rights by being unwilling or unable to curtail the exploitations of workers by their subcontractors. Or if they adopt a market-building strategy seeking to create new markets for existing products within China, they may, as Santoro asserts, generate a human rights spin-off by bringing about economic prosperity, which may help to establish a fertile soil for democracy, and by changing the social and political values of the Chinese society through their formal worker-training program and informal on-the-job learning opportunities. The values which may be brought in by market-building firms include the appreciation of individual merit, the importance of information sharing and teamwork, and different styles of leadership and openness to change.

Although the author does, from time to time, caution the readers not to overstate the spin-off hypothesis, his argument may still sound overly optimistic. For instance, even if a market-building company may improve its employees' working conditions, whether the values it imparts to them will indeed be conducive to democracy is debatable. After all, efficiency rather than democracy is the key organizing principle for business firms. Many of the values discussed by Santoro (for example, individual merit) may contribute to efficiency but not necessarily to democracy. Take Singapore as an example. Its government is one of the most efficient in the world, and is organized very much in the light of business principles, emphasizing, among other things, individual merit, but it is not a liberal democracy. Thus, the causal links between many of such values and human rights are not that clear-cut. This is particularly true if we move away from the rights of workers to civil and political rights.

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After formulating the spin-off hypothesis, which refers essentially to the unintended results of the multinational corporations' pursuit of economic interests, the author goes on to talk about what can be expected of those companies in concrete human rights situations. The argument is that since there are many types of human rights, and various actors (for example, international institutions, nation-states, NGOs, business corporations, the press and so forth) are involved in promoting human rights, it is imperative that we take into account the relationships between the actors—say, multinational corporations—and the victims, the costs inflicted, and the capability of the actors in solving human rights problems. By so doing, we will then be able to come up with a fair share for multinational corporations or for any type of actors in enhancing the human rights situation in China. Thus, given the nature of business firms, what we can expect of corporate executives is improvement in the working conditions of the workers and protection of the employees should the Chinese authorities pressure executives to fire them for political or religious reasons. That is all. As the author maintains, "when it comes to human rights, the world is entitled to expect multinational corporations to do their fair share—no more and no less" (158).

This is probably too conservative. If, as argued by the author, human rights are moral rights, then practical concerns should not overshadow all other considerations. It is just like asking Chinese citizens as individuals not to advocate human rights because such activities will inevitably cost them dearly. At least morally, such a position sounds rather awkward even though few human rights advocates would condemn an individual for not taking any actions as a result of practical calculations. However, a moral argument should not be so circumscribed, and should make plenty of room for improvement. For example, the dilemma faced by an individual is a collective action problem: If all can come together, they may be able to move forward; otherwise, nothing or very little can be done. So the pressing need is to find a solution to this problem. Indeed, the author argues for collective effort of multinational corporations for improving the working conditions of the workers and resisting the pressure to fire their employees for political or religious reasons. If so, why not urge them to act collectively to make comments on China's human rights record?

JOHN FUH-SHENG HSIEH *University of South Carolina*

Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period
E. Herbert Norman
Lawrence T. Woods ed.
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000, pp. xxxiv, 302

E. Herbert Norman (1909-1957) was long revered in Japan, by scholars and others who considered themselves disciples, at least spiritually. They used to ask us Canadian scholars, "Where are the Norman disciples in Canada?" They were not organized until a conference on Norman at St. Mary's University in 1978, and now here they are, perhaps the majority among the 11 who contributed essays to this book. (It is always hard to tell who is Canadian).

The occasion is the 60th anniversary edition of Norman's classic *Japan's Emergence As a Modern State*, originally published in 1940 by the Institute of Pacific Relations, defunct since 1960, as one of its few historical publications. The book was a reworking of Norman's 1938 doctoral thesis at Harvard University. It is published here without revision or annotation, and thus is no different from the original work or that published in 1975 by John W. Dower,

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Origins of the Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman (New York: Pantheon), both of which are found in most university libraries.

There is no need to review here a book that has been out for 60 years. The value of this new edition must therefore lie in the Introduction by Lawrence T. Woods, and the 10 papers in the concluding section "Then and Now: E. H. Norman's *Emergence* Sixty Years On." These papers average three pages each, and I am sorry to report that most of them are not very illuminating, covering ground that has been well trod upon. More than three pages would not have helped.

Editor Woods, well aware that Norman was washed away by the modernization school of the 1960's, asked them all to respond to the question: What is the importance of *Emergence* for our understanding of Japanese political history and/or contemporary Japanese politics? (xvii). Only four did so, and Woods either let the rest go, or forgot that he asked the question. Herbert P. Bix discusses lacunae in the work, particularly concerning the emperor. This is not surprising, since he published a prize-winning book on Emperor Hirohito in 2000. Patricia L. MacLachlan asks the pertinent question—why is Norman largely ignored these days—and reports that his thinking was first too Marxist, then too big, and latterly did not fit into the Japanese uniqueness studies that dominated discussion in Japan and abroad in the 1980's. George M. Oshiro is not so clear on the reasons, but says *Japan's Emergence* is put unapologetically on his reading lists. M. William Steele argues for the inherent excellence of the work, and hence its relevance to contemporary problems in Japan and the world.

Most of the rest cover the usual things—above all, Norman's humanism and concern for the undercurrents of Japanese history, as seen in the common people, and also his sense that things could have turned out otherwise. Tsuru Shigetô, one of Norman's advisors on that long-ago thesis, takes a different tack altogether, presenting his own essay on economic aspects of the Restoration, and saying it supplements Norman's analysis.

There are several references to the 1998 National Film Board production, "The Man Who Might Have Been," sponsored by a Japanese automobile company, and designed to bring Norman back into public consciousness. It is described by Dower as sensitive, but actually it was superficial and sleep-inducing. Norman does much walking up and down hallways, obviously at the University of Toronto, while pondering his predicament. The film mainly covered the accusations of communism by a United States Senate committee, and portrayed Norman entirely as a victim, driven to suicide in 1957. It made no attempt to examine communism, its methods and purposes and organization, and the degree to which it posed a real threat. In the same vein, none of these writers even mentions *No Sense of Evil* (Toronto: Deneau Press, 1986) by James Barros. He wrote that while Norman was well-meaning, there are grounds for thinking that the accusations were essentially justified, and that only a parliamentary inquiry could settle the matter. That will never take place.

More important, not one of them addresses the serious charges of plagiarism levelled by George Akita ("An Examination of E. H. Norman's Scholarship," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 3 [1977], 375-419). Only Oshiro mentions the article, without attempting to refute it by discussing the text and its sources. He chooses instead to trump Akita with Japanese authorities such as Maruyama Masao (1914-1996) and Hagiwara Nobutoshi (1926-), who praised the work. Norman has not been well served by the hagiographic studies of these once prodigal disciples, now a generation or two removed.

John S. Brownlee *University of Toronto*

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Economic Liberalization, Democratization and Civil Society in the Developing World
Romanda Bensabat Kleinberg and Janine A. Clark, eds.
New York: Palgrave Global Publishing at St. Martin's Press, 2000, pp. xiv, 318

International Financial Institutions (IFIs), particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and International Aid Agencies (IAAs) see civil society—defined broadly as "those autonomous organizations that lie between society and the state" (1)—not only as playing a positive and necessary role in poverty alleviation, but also as essential to popular participation and democratization in the developing world. According to the editors of this book, IFIs believe that economic reform, political liberalization and democratization are mutually reinforcing processes, to the extent that structural reform programs are seen as compatible, even integral, to the introduction of political liberties and, consequently, democracy. IAAs, like USAID, base their programmes on the premise that there is an unproblematic association between a strong civil society, democracy and market-oriented reforms; each of them reinforces the others, while the lack of any of them threatens the success of the others.

IFIs and IAAs sustain the idea that the role of civil society in the process of transition to democracy is threefold. First, as the state is withdrawing economically, civil society associations help to meet the needs of the poor and reduce their demands on the state. Second, civil society constitutes a pressure point on the state to decentralize decision-making powers. Finally, it plays an important role in creating a more participatory civic culture. Thus, civil society organizations serve to foster participation, leadership skills, and democratic values, preparing society for democratic political activity and organizing citizens to demand democratic changes in different areas of their lives. In short, they assume that there is a positive causal relationship between economic reform and democratization: as the state implements a structural reform that transforms the economy from state domination and intervention to market domination, privatization and economic liberalization, civil society organizations slowly move from being corporatist, authoritarian and non-autonomous to semiauthoritarian corporatist, then to autonomous but non-effectual, and finally to autonomous organizations (figure 1, 4). The central point of the book is the authors' challenge to this assumption. They question whether structural reform translates into the withdrawal of the state at the grass-roots level, creating a space for more non-state actors to express their views and influence policy making directly. They explore the impact of macro-economic reform on micro-political processes—in the space called civil society—and, in turn, how the changes in these processes impact upon political liberalization and democratization at the macro-political level.

The book includes case studies of 12 countries from four regions of the developing world: Africa (Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda), Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines), Latin America (Argentina, Mexico and Nicaragua), and the Middle East and North Africa (Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia). The case studies include a broad range of types of civil associations in terms of area of interest, goal-orientation, level of political activism, use of political skills and degree of democratic behaviour within associations and between them. They argue that these variations affect the willingness and/or ability of civil associations to serve as agents of political mobilization, liberalization and democratization, thus producing a dramatic variation in the way in which they affect the nature of civic culture.

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The authors argue that the restrictions imposed by governments and domestic political dynamics affect the degree of commitment to democratization and the ability of civil associations to further political liberalization. In order to be able to implement economic structural reform, governments tend to use some form of state control over civil society to reduce opposition to the reforms, risking the erosion of the regime's political legitimacy and increasing the possibilities of political instability. Thus, the reduction of state domination and intervention in the economy was not accompanied by withdrawal from the political arena in which civil organizations flourish, reducing the possibilities for civil society-based pressures for increased political liberalization and democratization. In sum, the positive causal relationship between economic and political liberalization assumed by the IFIs and IAAs does not exist in a clear and absolute form. Instead, a more tension-filled relationship can be observed, one depicted by a curvilinear relation between economic and political liberalization—positive in the first stages, null in the medium run, and even negative in the final stages (figure 2, 19).

This book is an excellent compilation of case studies on how economic liberalization has affected state-civil society relations, and how this, in turn, has affected democratic transitions in the developing world. However, it is far from being a good edited volume: due to important methodological problems, the parts are more persuasive than the whole. Each chapter presents a deep, detailed and well-written grass-roots approach to the political transition within the context of economic reform in the country under study. Also, primary sources are well deployed throughout the chapters. Nevertheless, the volume suffers from the editors' vague definition of the central concepts (economic reform, economic liberalization and structural reform are used as synonyms even if the political economy literature has clearly differentiated them, and the definition of civil society is too broad to be useful). Moreover, the huge variation in the types of civil associations analyzed in each chapter, whether measured by their area of interest (human rights, environment, labour rights, women's rights, social-welfare, religious associations, business groups, and even political parties and trade unions), goal-orientation (defence of various rights, public policy implementation, pressure for democratization and so forth), level of political activism (low to high), and internal and external organization (degree of democratic behaviour within associations and between them), makes it practically impossible to sustain any systematic or specific claims other than the most general argument.

In sum, the central argument—that there is not a clear positive relationship between economic and political liberalization—is supported, but the most interesting questions are left unanswered. When, how and to what extent does the specific nature of the state and/or the reform process impact upon civil society? When, how and to what extent do the specific characteristics of the civil organizations shape the democratization process? If these issues had been addressed, the book would have been an extremely valuable theoretical contribution to the literature. As it stands, it is useful mainly for the individual chapters, which are excellent sources of information for area and country specialists interested in civil society in the developing world.

JORGE A. SCHIAVON *Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas*

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Globalization, Power, and Democracy
Marc F. Plattner and Alexander Smolar, eds.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000, pp. xx, 164

The book under review is based on papers at the conference on "International Relations and Democracy," held in Warsaw in 1998 under the joint sponsorship of the Stefan Batory Foundation (Warsaw), the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies (Washington, D.C.), and the Institute for National Policy Research (Taipei). As the NED's "Journal of Democracy" book, it is no wonder that its main problem is the nature of the post-Cold War international system and its impact on the prospects for democracy worldwide.

The book consists of an introduction by the editors, of nine articles divided into four themes and of an epilogue by Zbigniew Brzezinski. The first theme, "The International System After the Cold War," includes articles by Samuel P. Huntington, Jean-Marie Guéhenno and Robert Cooper. The authors for the second theme, "The European Dimension," are Philippe C. Schmitter and Jacques Rupnik. The third theme, "Promoting Democracy," offers articles by Adam Rotfeld and by Robert Kagan, while the fourth theme, "The International Economy," consists of articles by Kyung Won Kim and by Ethan Kapstein with Dimitri Landa.

It is difficult to review books consisting of conference papers. Most of these are collections of separate papers aiming to increase academic merit of conference participants. This book does not bear that sin, as its authors do not need to raise their scientific capital anymore. But the result is disappointing in another way. The book may have some interest to those who are interested in foreign policy thinking of Western elites, as many of its authors are or have been close to political actors. Scientifically the book, however, simply does not live to its title "Globalization, Power, and Democracy." Readers who expect the analysis of these three phenomena will not find it. Globalization is simply understood as a politico-ideological concept being equal to the post-Cold War international system or as a free trade economic system of last decades. Although there are references to the changing nature of the state through globalization, issues of foreign policy are still analyzed from the perspective of Western states and their political strategy. There is nothing explicit about power in the book either, and even democracy is mainly understood simply as free elections. Instead, the book offers two main political arguments: the need for close relations between the United States and Europe and the need for free-trade capitalism, but with a human face.

Although United States-Europe relations have been close since the Second World War, there are recent changes which worry many political analysts. As the only superpower today, the US has not felt the same kind of immediate need to stay in Europe than before. Especially among Republicans there exists a strong current of isolationist ideology. At the same time the European integration process has made many Americans suspicious of Europe. The book tries to remedy these attitudes. Europeans argue that although the European integration process may be messy, there is much to learn from it as an example of co-operation (Guéhenno). On the other hand, American authors, like Kagan, criticize the American realists (conservatives) who have stressed political realities more than democratic values in foreign policy. Kagan's message is clear, the isolationist tendency of the American conservative movement is not good for the United States.

The only real difference between the American authors is in the way they approach the need for the United States to promote democracy world-

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wide. Accepting the hypothesis on the "democratic peace," Kagan demands the continuing active participation of the United States in world affairs to influence the global democratization process. The two old US foreign policy activists, Huntington and Brzezinski, are somewhat more cautious, however, about that. It is wise to be careful with the democratization process, because although in principle the hypothesis on the "democratic peace" is valid, there is also evidence that "democratizing countries are more likely to engage in wars than either stable democracies or stable autocracies" (Huntington, 12). One must not be too optimistic about the future. Although Russia is not a real threat any more, its place is being taken over by a new emerging global power: China. Other dangers arise because of the clash of civilizations, nationalism (conflicts within states) and international terrorism.

For security reasons capitalism must have a human face. In the economic section of the book both Kyung Won Kim and Kapstein and Lanuda accept free trade as the best economic system, but it is above all domestic institutions and the allocation of capital within societies which "are the key to determining whether globalization helps or hurts democracy" (Kapstein and Landa, 133). The excesses of free-market capitalism must be controlled, because the triumph of democracy and the security of the world require the tackling of the problem of poverty, as both Huntington and Rotfeld also insist in their articles.

But what about theory and facts? Brzezinski, for instance, writes that "the proportion of humanity living in absolute poverty is steadily increasing and has done so for the last 30 years" (152). At least I would have liked to hear a little more about how this fact is compatible with theories which keep telling us that today's free-market economy is good for humanity.

ERKKI BERNDTSON *University of Helsinki*

Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation?
Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum, eds.
London: Routledge, 2000, pp. vii, 310

This book makes for dense reading with no easy answers. In 12 chapters some of the most distinguished contributors to the theoretical debate over democracy in Western Europe's supranational political organization, the European Union, discuss the role of deliberation in establishing *legitimate* integration beyond the nation-state. While the book's title leaves out the adjective, from all contributions and their normative thrust, it is clear that the contributors are not debating the question of *whether or not* to integrate and *why*, but *who* participates and *how* with a view to establishing legitimate processes and practices of governance, instead. Some of the chapters even take this enterprise a step further seeking to identify the EU's innovative capacity in accommodating cultural diversity and political equality, for example on the question of indigenous minority rights, or in assessing the constructive force of deliberation as an efficient and democratic response to administrative needs in the EU (see Broderstad chap. 11, and Joerges and Everson in chap. 8).

Despite styles of argument and organization that vary considerably among the authors, the editors have successfully brought together contributions to the debate about deliberation and democracy in the EU that offer a consistent focus on the pitfalls and advantages of a polity organized around the key principle of *pluralism.* From Jürgen Habermas' warning against systems theory and an ontologized notion of history and the subsequent plea to appreciate the chances offered by hermeneutic conflicts in pluralistic cultures

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which enable the key function of "rational justifications" as outcomes of deliberative processes for democracies (p. 40, chap. 2), to Broderstad's important and thorough discussion of the EU as a means to accommodate difference and plurality which would eventually prove key to indigenous minorities' support of integration (pp. 240, 250, chap. 11), the contributors offer different perspectives on the issue of plurality and pursue the respective intellectual avenues in handling them. The chapters offer, at times, conflicting positions on where to look for the most promising arenas for deliberation and how to evaluate them. Among others, they offer insights into the "normative turn" among scholars who study European integration (67) and the prospects of "value pluralism" (70) as a goal that matches the democratic change of the mixed nature of the EU polity best (Bellamy and Castiglione, chap. 4), the importance of adaptating the principle of subsidiarity—as an important space for deliberation—to a polity model which does not necessarily rest on states as subunits (p. 104, Føllesdal, chap. 5), the preference of deliberating rights as opposed to values or—even worse—legitimation through outcomes (Fossum, chap. 6), the potential of interparliamentary deliberation (Blichner, chap. 7) and the key role of deliberative processes in creating the comitology sector as an institutional response to unexpected administrative needs of European integration (Joerges and Everson, chap. 8).

In the concluding chapter the editors eloquently summarize the outcome of what is still the peak of the iceberg of an enormously broad range of discussions on democracy and European integration as "*arguing* is the glue of the integration process" (257; emphasis in original). With this emphasis, the book makes a refreshing, if not necessarily conclusive, addition to the often rather technical and less imaginative hard institutional approaches to European integration. The book is particularly recommended for graduate students and fellow academics.

ANTJE WIENER *Queen's University, Belfast*

European Feminisms 1700-1950: A Political History
Karen Offen
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000, pp. xxviii, 554

Karen Offen consolidates the arguments of Dale Spender and others that history has a congenitally defective memory when it comes to feminist thought and activity, unable to retain the facts with any longevity. Offen points out the irony of Simone de Beauvoir's claim of 1949 that women have no past and no history. Similarly, she notes that feminist activity of the 1970s was marked by the belief "in good conscience, that they were beginning from 'Year Zero.'" Back in 1889, Elizabeth Robins Pennell described Mary Wollstonecraft as "the first woman who braved public opinion and lifted up her voice to declare that woman had rights as well as man" (181), effacing the memory of Olympe de Gouges, Mary Astell, Marie le Jars de Gournay and many others. As Offen affirms, "One has to ask how the memory of such a significant movement, such action, such challenges in thought and action could be so obliterated and forgotten. How could women and men not know?" (3).

In particular, why have feminists themselves contributed to this forgetting? Offen offers a moral tale directed at feminist activists and theorists who neglect the history of women. She acknowledges that "the history of feminism fails to be taken seriously by professional historians" and is rarely taught (3). Of course this should be rectified. But the phenomenon of more

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polemical interest to Offen is that feminists have often compounded history's neglect rather than striving to correct it, though doing so requires little effort on our part. Feminist activism and women's writing, while once well-buried, are a "surprisingly well-documented aspect of the past" (394)—a claim born out by the extensive and invaluable bibliographic component of *European Feminisms*. "Herstories" have often been seen as giving women a greater sense of continuity, home or place. Offen takes this as a given: "Knowledge—as everyone knows—can often be empowering" (3). If it is, why do so many feminists prefer not to know? Offen asks a good question, a useful palliative to the stereotype of the feminist love of "herstory." It is assumed that a feminist philosopher, for example, would prefer to think of the history of philosophy as peopled by important and innovative female thinkers. Offen's book prompts us to reconsider. Perhaps de Beauvoir found her place by neglecting women's intellectual history. This highlighted her sense of being the innovative crusader, as does Pennell's account of Mary Wollstonecraft. What if de Beauvoir was empowered by deliberate negligence? This does not excuse her, but we need a more complex diagnosis of active forgetting than laziness or sheer credulity about history.

Offen's history of European feminisms since 1700 is a fascinating tale of the complex relationship between political, state and feminist pragmatics. It will contribute to debates about what counts as a certain gain for feminism. Surely the eventual access of women to education, employment and reproductive rights are the certain gains of a continuous and identifiable feminist politics. But some of Offen's historical material tells against this certainty, for several reasons. First, women's gains have often been swiftly lost again with changing historical, economic and political circumstances. For example, abortion in the USSR was legalized in 1920 but outlawed again in 1936. Prohibitions on German women's participation in public life were lifted in 1908, only to be reinvoked in the 1930s. Viennese women had earlier gained the municipal vote when they lost it in 1890. Despite Jacobin repression of feminists in the late 1770s, French women at least gained innovative divorce laws in the 1790s. But these were subsequently repealed. In 1837 Flora Tristan was arguing for them anew. Offen's work serves as a useful reminder of the discontinuities of feminist progress in addition to its forgetful self-repetition. Offen also analyzes the complex processes overdetermining an apparent "feminist gain." Right-wing support in France in 1944 for women's vote may have been encouraged by the belief that women would vote more conservatively (382). Giving women the vote because of their apparent voting patterns, or introducing free childcare when the national maternity rate needs to be raised, remains consistent with the forces that recriminalize abortion and discourage women's political participation when this is more expedient.

Offen is wary of those who, she thinks, undermine the achievements of such women as de Gouges, Jeanne Deroin, Hubertine Auclert and Madeleine Pelletier by depicting them as having had "only paradoxes to offer" (Joan Scott, *Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man*, [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996]). But although she emphasizes (as does Scott) the courage and innovation of these activists, she rarely depicts an apparent feminist achievement as simply won. Offen's account suggests that victories frequently had to be won three times over, and furthermore were the result of a complex cluster of forces, invariably connected to cynical state and political exigencies. Her history suggests that these changes are rarely introduced *as* "feminist gains." We can still appreciate the tenacity of the feminist activists who held out for them.

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In making this point, Offen distinguishes herself from Scott's approach with the mildly barbed acknowledgement: "in her treatment of French feminisms, in particular, I discovered what kind of book about European feminisms really needed to be written" (vi). But Offen's reservations about Scott are puzzling. Is there strong disagreement between them? Offen has no doubt about what constitutes feminist progress: enfranchisement, equal access to education and employment are not, she thinks, ambiguous gains. All in all, she does consider that broad historical periods represent eras of progress, seen both in the period from 1789 to 1889, and again one century on. But she also acknowledges that feminist activity is highly reactive and contextually determined: "Feminist claims" she argues, "never arise in—or respond to—a sociopolitical vacuum . . . all movements for sociopolitical change are deeply embedded in and responsive to their surrounding cultures" (xv-xvi). Women have been dignified as mother and familial moral educator by philosophers eager to subordinate then, by governments eager to stimulate the population level, and by feminists arguing for improved educational opportunities for women. As Offen astutely notes, "the more conventional expressions of the mother-educator idea were strategically important and appealing. It provided women, who were still held at arm's length from formal political life, with a role construed as civic or political" (100). In the long, conflicted relationship of women activists to the revaluation and reinterpretation of maternity and domesticity through the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, we are offered a vivid depiction of the paradoxes these women had to offer, as when Offen lists the many countries in which women staked their "claims to full citizenship on their sociopolitical utility to the nation as mothers" (101).

The historical detail offered by this book is fascinating. After three centuries of contextually specific, variously pragmatic, complexly overdetermined, ambivalent, undercut and backlashed feminist "advances," the conclusions leave one keen for more debate on the point Offen least thinks we should question: why history? On her view, it is vital to know the recurrent patterns of history, to avoid "mistakes in the future," to have "powerful tools for assuring that efforts to subordinate women are met with sustained resistance." "Amnesia," she says, is women's "worst enemy" (393-94). But does the historical detail of the book support this argument? Offen does not suggest an event, or a contextually important activity, or a feminist action that could have been differently negotiated with more foresight or hindsight. That is not how history works. And perhaps there are some fights one engages with force and vigor in the amnesiac conviction that it is for the first and last time.

PENELOPE DEUTSCHER *Northwestern University*

Liberalism beyond Justice: Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory
John Tomasi
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 159

In this remarkable and engagingly written book, John Tomasi makes a strong case for a more *social* account of liberalism so as to counter the preoccupation of *political* liberalism with the problem of justified coercion. For example, Tomasi fairly reads John Rawls's *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) as an effort to lower the threshold of legitimacy so that those whose views are at odds with comprehensive or ethical liberalism can freely sign on to the liberal conception of justice. While most other writers have engaged this liberal project on its own terms, finding for or

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against it, Tomasi opens up a new line of investigation. He is less interested in how political liberalism solves the problem of political justice than in its failure to consider the spillover effects of a liberal regime as these shape the background ethical culture of a liberal society.

To make his case for expanding the boundaries of liberal theorizing beyond its preoccupation with questions of legitimacy and justification, Tomasi asks his readers to imagine a society in which a liberal conception of justice has been fully realized. "Knowing only that this society has achieved justice in this way, do you think this would be an *attractive* society? For example, do you think this might be a society in which you yourself would want to live" (xiii; emphasis in original)? Tomasi understands how quickly many liberals would respond yes to his questions. But one of this book's great contributions is to show why the obvious turns out not to be so obvious after all. Even a Millian or Rawlsian liberal might pause before wanting to live among people who are "*just* just" (xiv; emphasis in original). One wants to know something more about the character of one's potential fellow citizens, including interpersonal attitudes and dispositions that might help determine whether or not you would feel at home among them.

The question of whether one could feel at home in a liberal society, although largely ignored by political liberalism, seems especially relevant to it. Liberal theorists affirm value-pluralism which forecasts a society composed of individuals divided by different world views. Conceptions of a liberal society as a modus vivendi or as a rational consensus might explain the legitimacy of such a society. But this foundational concern with political justice says too little about the wider civic life of a liberal society. Tomasi nicely enlivens the discussion of value-pluralism by using A, B, C and D "alphabet people" to represent a range of politically reasonable beliefs. Social liberalism takes up where political liberalism leaves off. "There are vital issues about human living-together under liberal institutions that are not reducible to concerns about justice but instead arise *after* justice" (34; emphasis in original). Even if all alphabet people subscribe to the legitimacy of a liberal regime, they still confront the question of how to manage the interface between their public and non-public lives. And liberal theorists should have something to say about how, for example, civic education can help prepare them to feel as though they belong.

Other liberal theorists, including Stephen Macedo and William Galston, have also discussed the spillover effects of liberalism and the implications of this phenomenon for the role of education in a liberal society. Broadly speaking, they argue that the liberal state should not demand more of citizens than is necessary for its own success. They work with a derivative model of the liberal virtues. In contrast, Tomasi proposes a more substantive model of civic education whereby the liberal state assumes responsibility for helping people to resist the homogenizing effects of liberalism. While his arguments here defy easy summary, the goal is to alert children to the fact that a liberal society, for example, the norms of liberal public reason, will subject many aspects of their religious and other beliefs to strain. A substantive civic education would prepare children to negotiate the demands arising out of this tension in ways that they find satisfying. It is not enough on this view to accommodate some expressions of religious life in schools. Rather, schools must teach Catholic children, for example, what it means to be a Catholic in a liberal society. They must be prepared to take up the task of negotiating a fit between their public life as a liberal citizen and their nonpublic life. For Tomasi, human well-being is located at the intersection of that fit.

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Readers need to discover for themselves the more specific and instructive discussions of culture, education and public policy that make this such a gratifying book. Like me, some may nonetheless wonder if it is possible for any political system to be as accommodating and capacious of diverse ways of life and beliefs as is hoped for here. I am not sure that we can devise a politics that equalizes the costs of signing on for all people. Nor is it clear to me that this should always be our goal. If a case can be made for encouraging people to adopt moral pluralism for non-strategic reasons (compare 104, 145, n. 38), the desire to control for all of liberalism's unintended effects may be misplaced. But these reservations in no way diminish the importance of this book. The discussion of liberalism has just moved to a new level.

ALFONSO J. DAMICO *University of Iowa*

Patriotisme constitutionnel et nationalisme. Sur Jürgen Habermas
Frédérick-Guillaume Dufour
Montréal : Liber, 2001, 230 p.

À n'en pas douter, cet ouvrage de Frédérick-Guillaume Dufour répond à un besoin réel quant à la réception en français de la pensée de Jürgen Habermas. Là réside son intérêt premier. À cela s'ajoute l'entreprise d'application de la philosophie politique habermassienne à une situation concrète, en l'occurrence, celle du Québec et du débat sur son statut de nation à l'intérieur de la fédération canadienne. Voilà un second trait qui rend l'ouvrage digne de considération.

Le propos de l'auteur est de cerner le concept de patriotisme constitutionnel tel que défini par Habermas, et de voir dans quelle mesure il peut se substituer en tant que ciment social à celui, caduc selon certains, de nationalisme. Avant de s'engager *in medias res* dans une telle analyse, l'auteur a l'heureuse idée de faire le portrait de ce qu'il appelle la « genèse sociopolitique » de la notion de patriotisme constitutionnel, c'est-à-dire d'expliciter le contexte historique, politique et social qui a permis l'émergence de cette notion. Une telle introduction est tout à fait pertinente, dans la mesure où elle permet de mettre en lumière l'ancrage éminemment allemand de la compréhension habermassienne des concepts de nationalisme et de patriotisme constitutionnel. Cette perspective pourra être différenciée d'un point de vue plus spécifiquement québécois et canadien dans le dernier chapitre du livre portant sur l'application du patriotisme constitutionnel en contexte canadien.

Lors de la description de ce *context of discovery*, l'auteur intègre les interventions publiques de Habermas relativement aux différents débats qui secouent l'Allemagne d'après-guerre. On retrouve ces interventions dans ce que l'on convient d'appeler « les écrits politiques » (*Kleine Politische Schriften*) de Habermas. C'est ici que se profile une première lacune de l'ouvrage de Dufour. On peut en effet déplorer l'absence manifeste de sources allemandes pertinentes. L'auteur s'en remet aux seules interventions traduites en français ou en anglais, et donc à un Habermas tronqué. Parce qu'il n'a pas accès aux quatre premiers écrits politiques de Habermas, qui contiennent des documents importants sur la période de la réforme des universités, des mouvements de protestation et du tournant conservateur, il doit se contenter des indications parcellaires de Rolf Wiggershaus, doxographe de l'École de Francfort. En outre, parmi les textes des quatre écrits politiques qui suivent, l'auteur n'a accès qu'à la sélection arbitraire qu'on retrouve dans les *Écrits politiques* (Cerf, 1990). L'insuffisance de ces derniers se révèle entre autres par ceci qu'ils ne comprennent pas les articles que Habermas range lui-même

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sous la rubrique «patriotisme constitutionnel» dans les septième écrits politiques. Pour un ouvrage qui se penche sur le patriotisme constitutionnel, thème éponyme par surcroît, ce n'est pas là une lacune insignifiante.

D'une part, cette lacune pourrait susciter la présomption d'un manque de maîtrise du thème, présomption exacerbée par de nombreuses coquilles dans les titres allemands, quelques erreurs matérielles sur l'histoire et la géographie allemandes (par exemple, Mölln et Solingen ne se trouvaient pas en RDA comme l'auteur semble le croire en page 61, mais bien en RFA) et par le traitement cursif de thèmes revêtant pourtant une importance non négligeable. D'autre part, il semble bien que cette lacune concourt à l'impression de manque d'unité que donne l'ouvrage. Le premier chapitre aurait pu préparer davantage les chapitres suivants si des liens explicites avaient été faits entre les écrits politiques et les écrits théoriques. En effet, par l'accès à un texte tel que « Über den doppelten Boden des demokratischen Rechtsstaates » (*Eine Art Schadensabwicklung, Kleine Politische Schriften VI* [Suhrkamp, 1986]), pour ne nommer que celui-là, l'auteur aurait pu établir un lien explicite avec *Droit et démocratie* qu'il aborde plus loin dans l'ouvrage. Ce manque de suite ou de cohésion d'un chapitre à l'autre trouve d'ailleurs son prodrome à la fin du premier chapitre, où l'auteur insiste sur les acquis de ce dernier : « D'abord, ses prises de positions au cours des années soixante et soixante-dix, que ce soit sur la réforme des universités, sur l'opposition extraparlementaire ou sur le terrorisme, sont en accord avec la conception procédurale et radicale de la démocratie qu'il développera de façon plus formelle à la fin des années quatre-vingt» (67). Le seul lien que l'auteur établit au chapitre suivant – qui traitera de la « conception procédurale et radicale de la démocratie », absente du premier chapitre – est l'« accord » entre les positions initiales et subséquentes de Habermas. Or, il n'a curieusement pas pris le temps de démontrer que la thématique de la réforme des universités se conforme à la conception procédurale. Il ne l'aurait pas pu, puisqu'il n'a pas accès aux textes allemands qui établissent explicitement ce lien (comme, par exemple, « Diskutieren – was sonst? » [1962], qui établit la discussion comme concept cardinal de la démocratisation). Qui plus est, la reconnaissance d'un simple « accord » entre les positions initiales et subséquentes de Habermas est un constat bien mince qui n'éclaircit en rien le rapport matériel qui unit les deux.

Malgré tout, cette lacune ne sera pas funeste à la visée de l'ouvrage puisque l'auteur réussit néanmoins à retracer un portrait général du Habermas « public ». Si l'on admet que le premier chapitre n'a, au plus, qu'une valeur introductive, il faut alors reconnaître que l'auteur se tire bien d'affaire. Ce qui est plus important, dans ce contexte sociopolitique, c'est bien la « querelle des historiens » dans laquelle s'est trouvé mêlé Habermas, querelle qui forme le sol nourricier du concept de patriotisme constitutionnel. Cet épisode de l'activité publique de Habermas trouve un écho satisfaisant dans la traduction française et dans la littérature secondaire, et l'auteur en trace clairement la silhouette, préparant de ce fait le débat en contexte canadien.

Le second chapitre de *Patriotisme constitutionnel et nationalisme*, portant plus proprement sur la théorie habermassienne, est plus difficilement défendable en tant qu'introduction. Mais il faut le dire : la tâche de résumer Habermas en une quarantaine de pages, dans une perspective tant synchronique que diachronique – comme cherche à le faire l'auteur – est un véritable tour de force. Malheureusement, il semble bien que le second chapitre – dans sa première partie, du moins – ne puisse échapper à la critique. En effet, il est ou bien inutile, ou bien insuffisant. Pour le lecteur qui n'est pas au préalable initié à la thématique habermassienne, il paraît insuffisant pour permettre une

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compréhension même introductive à la pensée théorique de Habermas. Pour celui qui la connaît bien, l'exposition théorique est inutile, d'autant plus qu'elle n'est pas essentielle au développement subséquent de la question du nationalisme et du patriotisme constitutionnel.

Au lieu de s'étendre sur la théorie de la société à deux niveaux, sur l'historique de la théorie de l'agir communicationnel qui remonte à la philosophie analytique, sur le retour à Weber, etc., il aurait été préférable d'insister plutôt sur les théories de la formation de l'identité individuelle et collective, et sur l'éthique de la discussion, lesquelles donnent tout son sens à la normativité inhérente au projet constitutionnel. Ce traitement « autonome », en quelque sorte, de la théorie habermassienne contribue encore une fois à l'impression de manque d'unité de l'ouvrage et au vague sentiment que l'auteur ne maîtrise pas pleinement son objet d'analyse.

À cela s'ajoutent, pour comble de malheur, quelques inexactitudes. Notons par exemple ce passage: « De la théorie critique de la société, [Habermas] reprend l'idée d'un concept de rationalité plus large que celui de rationalité systémique et de rationalité instrumentale et qui puisse être le noyau d'une théorie critique de la société » (72). Or, ce « concept de rationalité plus large » correspond à la rationalité communicationnelle, qui est le propre de Habermas, non pas de la Théorie critique. Ce que Habermas retient de cette dernière, c'est plutôt la critique de la raison instrumentale, ce que l'auteur reconnaît en page 82. Par ailleurs, son traitement de l'influence de la Théorie critique (76-78) est nettement insuffisant. Il aurait fallu faire ressortir la thèse communicationnelle (avant même son inflexion analytico-pragmatique) comme résolution de l'aporie dans laquelle s'étaient empêtrés Adorno et Horkheimer avec leur critique de la rationalité instrumentale. On se serait attendu ici à des références à la quatrième partie de la *Théorie de l'agir* . . . Ainsi, on a peine à croire que, si l'auteur avait « parcouru patiemment la *Théorie de l'agir communicationnel*» pour le paraphraser, il aurait laissé passer de telles erreurs. Curieusement, l'auteur tente de substituer l'argumentation de la *Logique des sciences sociales* à celle de la *Théorie de l'agir* . . . dans son « architectonique de la théorie ». Dans la mesure ou la *Logique* . . . contient des textes des *Vorstudien*, cette substitution est justifiable, mais lorsque l'auteur présente la critique habermassienne du behaviorisme, on se retrouve inutilement propulsé dans la querelle du positivisme du début des années 1960.

C'est vers la fin du deuxième chapitre que l'exposé gagne en pertinence et en assurance. L'auteur aborde alors la question de l'État de droit chez Habermas, sans omettre d'établir le rapport à la problématique du patriotisme constitutionnel. Ceci permet alors un passage tout naturel au troisième chapitre, portant plus spécifiquement sur les questions du nationalisme, de l'État-nation et de son obsolescence, selon Habermas, en contexte de mondialisation. Ici, les éléments que l'auteur tire de l'œuvre de Habermas – en particulier *L'intégration républicaine* et à un degré moindre, *Après l'État-nation* – n'ont rien d'arbitraire et contribuent à extraire l'essentiel de la pensée habermassienne sur cette question. Particulièrement intéressante est la reconstruction d'une « théorie du nationalisme» implicite chez Habermas, que l'auteur retrace à partir de *L'Espace public*, le premier ouvrage théorique d'importance du philosophe de Francfort. La position de Habermas est alors confrontée à celle d'autres penseurs de la nation et du nationalisme, dont Elias, Hobsbawm, Tilly et Anderson. Par cette confrontation, l'auteur réussit à brosser un tableau général de la question et à définir la place qui reviendrait au patriotisme constitutionnel, tout en se permettant de formuler quelques critiques ponctuelles à l'égard de certaines thèses habermassiennes. Une telle confrontation est inédite et permet de rapprocher des auteurs qui n'ont pas, au départ, une perspective, une visée ni un appa-

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reil conceptuel communs dans le traitement de la question de l'État-nation. Pour qui s'intéresse à cette question, ce chapitre représente un tour d'horizon notable.

Enfin, c'est sans doute le quatrième et dernier chapitre qui risque de susciter le plus de débats. L'auteur cherche à voir comment l'idée du patriotisme constitutionnel s'inscrit dans un débat autour de la nation québécoise. Il prend alors position et se permet une approche plus critique qui rompt avec le caractère foncièrement descriptif des trois premiers chapitres.

Avec une apparente impartialité tout à son honneur, l'auteur met en relief les lacunes argumentatives tant des défenseurs du patriotisme constitutionnel en contexte québécois, tel Bariteau, que des partisans de l'idée de nationalisme, tel Seymour. Il est d'avis qu'un nationalisme purement civique représente une construction abstraite qui, malgré elle, doit puiser parmi des éléments culturels pour éviter l'arbitraire de la délimitation territoriale. En ce sens, la position de Bouchard, qui allie républicanisme et données pré-politiques, serait à son sens plus cohérente. Il semble bien que cette inéluctable imbrication des droits civiques universels et des traits culturels porte l'auteur à croire que « les arguments qui visent à fonder la souveraineté du Québec en s'inspirant de Habermas ne sont pas sans failles » (183). Cependant, une telle conclusion critique n'est possible que dans la mesure où l'on associe sans condition ni réserve le nationalisme civique au patriotisme constitutionnel et que l'on considère ce dernier comme simple « théorie rationaliste » (178). Or l'auteur n'hésite pas à mettre lui-même le lecteur en garde contre l'assimilation de Habermas à Rawls (185) et à faire valoir le fait que le premier « essaie de concilier la particularité de la communauté selon Hegel avec l'universalisme des principes que l'on retrouve chez Kant » (186). Il semblerait donc que ce ne soit pas « les arguments [. . .] s'inspirant de Habermas » comme tels qui soient critiquables, mais bien les démonstrations de Bariteau et de Lamoureux. On comprendrait mieux, par ailleurs, ce qui distingue Habermas de ces derniers si l'auteur avait explicité clairement le concept d'imprégnation éthique, c'est-à-dire l'articulation habermassienne entre droits civiques universels et caractères culturels, au lieu d'énoncer simplement le rôle architectonique de la culture politique par rapport à la tradition culturelle (187). Par contre, il expose bien la raison pour laquelle Habermas n'insiste pas sur la question linguistique, pourtant essentielle à la réalisation d'une discussion publique sans déformation : le contexte allemand ne le rend pas sensible à une telle problématique.

Somme toute, la perspective habermassienne que met en jeu l'auteur, de façon certes plus nuancée que certains prédécesseurs, semble apporter une contribution significative au débat entourant la nation québécoise. On ne peut que saluer une telle intervention.

DONALD IPPERCIEL *Faculté Saint-Jean, University of Alberta*

Democracy and Cultural Diversity
Michael O'Neill and Dennis Austin, eds.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 228

This important and highly lucid edited volume consisting of 13 case studies and a theoretical chapter assesses the successes and problems of accommodating cultural groups in democratic states. At the core of the book's focus lies the profound tension between ethnic violence and democratic order. Understanding the nature of this tension requires us to recognize an important assumption regarding democracy: that it neither guarantees full ethnic representation, nor provides a clear-cut path for unifying ethnic communities. It is, rather, a permanent politi-

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cal experiment that entails further evidence to re-evaluate and rethink the complex relationship between the promotion of democratic principles (that is, mutual respect and tolerance) and the effects of implementing new democratic rules and procedures. From this notion then emerges a central question driving the book: to what extent has federalism succeeded in resolving the tension between ethnic loyalities and democratic order in nation states? As the editors point out in the introduction, "if a reasoned order is to exist, then the link between ethno-nationalism and parliamentary democracy is vital since . . . ethnic nationalism may run to excess" (4).

The editors provide a helpful analytical schema for assessing the effects of nationalism in various nation states. It is based on several empirical indicators, including the degree of ethnic integration, the inadequacy of elections, political leadership, constitutional arrangements, federalism and interference from abroad. Let us therefore assess three essential "effects" analyzed in the volume.

The first is the "patching over" of ethnic tensions to promote democratic order. This approach is perhaps most pronounced in developing countries, where governments tend to lack the economic and social resources to meet the cultural and political needs of the peoples. Dennis Austin, Darren Wallis, Donna Lee Van Cott, Martin Dent, David Seah, Andrew Rigby and Anirudha Gupta all argue that while constitutional reforms have provided short-term relief to ethnic and indigenous groups, they have also failed to reconcile adequately ethnic loyalties with democracy. A key issue here is whether the federal and regional governments have sufficiently served the political and economic interests of cultural groups (that is, securing greater control over local institutions and land), or if federal or regional government's democratic concessions have tended to filter into a smoke screen for promoting elite interests. It is perhaps fair to say, as these authors suggest, that democratic concessions on the issue of ethnic rights have yet to favour adequately the interests of ethnic/indigenous groups. Wallis, for instance, concludes—and rightfully so—that until the Mexican government adopts the key provisions of the San Andreas Accords such as cultural autonomy and the formal recognition of indigenous rights, there will be few assurances of ethnic peace in the Chiapas region.

A second effect is the continued fragmentation of the national character into two national identities: ethno-nationalism and civic/federal nationalism. In Canada, Belgium and Britain, for instance, where many federalist reforms have been implemented, there has been a strong backlash among and regional ethnic groups against federalist initiatives. As a result, Alain Gaignon, Michael O'Neill, Montserrat Guibernau, Desmond Thomas, and Clive Church conclude that while federalism has helped to accommodate more groups, it has also helped to contribute to ethnic conflict. Gaignon, for instance, argues that Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's adoption of universal principles of full equality and cultural freedom during the 1970's was a somewhat flawed proposal of ethnic conflict resolution, since it served "only to further processes of fragmentation already under way through an excess of universalism" (12). By comparison, O'Neill shows how an excess of devolution of power ended up emasculating the de facto authority of the federal government to mediate regional conflicts.

Finally, the third effect is the impact of globalization on the federal state's de facto capacity to manage ethnic conflict. There are two interrelated issues underlying this effect: (a) whether globalization can replace the state as the motor of local empowerment, or (b) if globalization can complement the state's diminished ability to regulate its own affairs. In EC countries, for

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instance, ethnic communities have increasingly appealed to the EC principles and new constitutional norms (of minority rights protection). Nowhere is this more evident than in Spain where the autonomous communities have adopted the Barcelona declaration, which calls on the Spanish state to shed its " 'unitary' character and to recognize the Spanish nation state as a multilingual, multi-national and multicultural nation" consistent with the EC Framework on Regional Autonomy (63).

Yet important as this international trend of the global/local is, its theoretical implications are not fully fleshed out in the book. For instance, if ethnic groups continue to rely more on international institutions or bodies of law for the recognition of their rights, what sort of critical challenge does this pose for the state? To be fair, however, the book's main analytical goal is not about reconceptualizing ethnic boundaries, but operating within traditional categories, such as the nation-state link, in order to assess the complex issues of ethnic conflict in democratic societies. Yet had the book contained a chapter or two that challenged the conceptual link between nation state, it might have shed further light on the normative difficulties of promoting a fair and equal share of national resources (that is, a unified national character). For it is precisely this troublesome issue of cultural and social inequalities that requires deeper reflection on the changing notion of sovereignty. And although I agree with Richard Bellamy's argument that the key to ethnic reconciliation is the negotiation of conflicts—as harnessed within the liberal principles of mutual recognition and tolerance—I do not think it gets at the heart of the problem, namely, that increased negotiation among cultural groups needs to be linked with new conceptions of sovereignty. This is not to say that territorial sovereignty will prove a relatively insignificant rule for sorting out the differing claims among different cultural groups, but rather that the more critical issue is whether local autonomous arrangements will end up serving local elite interests, thus depriving other local ethnic minorities a fair share of national resources.

Still, of the many lucid and intriguing chapters in the book, I found Gaignon's, and O'Neill's chapters on Canada and Belgium to be particularly instructive. On the whole, both helped to illuminate the different ways in which the promotion of universal democratic ideals have resulted in ethnic fragmentation in liberal democracies and the delicate tension between ethnic loyalities and democratic order. The important underlying message here is that more empirical and lucid studies of this tension will be needed if we are to construct more flexible democratic arrangements ordered around the normative ideals of cultural diversity, mutual recognition, equality and democratic peace.

Steven Roach *University of Southern Colorado*

Climate for Change: Non-State Actors and the Global Politics of the Greenhouse
Peter Newell
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 222

The primary aim of this book is to examine the impact of four sets of non-governmental actors—the scientific community, the mass media, the fossil fuel lobbies and environmental pressure groups—on international climate policy. Peter Newell's purpose is "to redress the imbalance in the international relations literature on global environmental politics towards state-centric analysis of 'regimes' as the key location of political outcomes" (1). He hopes to challenge

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conventional thinking about the loci of global environmental politics and to "embellish existing explanations" of climate change policy (2).

For analysts of global warming, international and domestic environmental politics as well as international relations more generally, this book will certainly be of interest. *Climate for Change* is a richly detailed, densely referenced work that brings together an impressive amount of information and engages diverse sets of literature. Newell has been ambitious in setting out multiple tasks to be resolved in the course of the book and is successful in breaking new ground on a range of theoretical and methodological fronts. However, this ambitious agenda does make the book less accessible to student audiences.

Newell begins with a multi-pronged critique of regime theory. He argues that this literature pays insufficient attention to the role of nongovernmental actors in regime maintenance, assumes state interests are given rather than learned (which allows little role for non-state actors), and "lacks a sophisticated understanding of power in global politics" (33). Newell calls for more attention to nongovernmental actors which, in turn, requires more nuanced analysis of the exercise of power—particularly in its less observable, "second dimension" forms (Barach and Baratz, Crensen, Lukes)—and at various stages of the policy process, especially early on when states' preferences are being formed. According to Newell, "the power to assert frames of interpretation and meaning upon problems, . . . to create expectations and organize preferences" is significant (35). Newell also argues that the political influence of the four different actors under examination needs to be thought about in distinct ways; he is not attempting to show which actors have more power, but to highlight how various groups of non-state actors can directly and indirectly change the behaviour of states.

In each of the four chapters devoted to a specific set of nongovernmental actors, Newell assesses "structural factors" (relations of dependency) and "bargaining assets" (points of leverage). He then examines NGO-state power relations at multiple levels of analysis (national, international and transnational), on two dimensions of power (observable and non-observable), in a contextual fashion (taking into account current events), and at various stages in the policy process (from agenda-setting, through negotiation and implementation). He also uses different analytical tools and methodologies in each chapter. For example, he employs insights and methods from the epistemic communities literature to analyze the scientific community and from the agenda-setting literature to examine the influence of the mass media.

While each chapter does an admirable job of highlighting the multiple and complex ways in which each set of nongovernmental actors exercises influence in global climate politics, the multilayered framework defies easy reference points across chapters. Moreover, some of the analysis is uneven. For example, the analysis of second-dimensional power is brought out forcefully in the chapter on industry lobbies, but remains implicit in the examinations of other actors. In addition, the NGOs are shown to be active to varying extents in the negotiation and implementation stages (the implementation stage discussion seems premature), and Newell probably could have confined his analysis to the prenegotiation stage which is in any case most important in terms of the second-dimensional power examination. Despite these observations, Newell deserves much credit for directly addressing the methodological challenges associated with detecting and analyzing such phenomena as "reputational" power and the "mobilization of bias."

Newell argues that the global warming case is unique. Indeed, he criticizes regime theorists for their pursuit of generalizable hypotheses that apply

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across issue areas, because this approach fails to recognize that different issues give rise to different sets of political relations. Yet, there is a tension within his own argument on this score; while arguing for case-specificity, he also appears to be using the global warming case to redress a general imbalance toward state-centrism in the broader literature on global environmental politics. If, in the end, Newell shows that the regime literature is wrong in this particular case (and he does, quite persuasively), this critique is mitigated by his own judgment of the limited generalizability of the case.

Climate for Change points to numerous avenues for future research—additional casework on NGO-state relations at the international level, the formal integration of NGO activities into regime theoretic accounts, and studies examining power interactions among NGOs themselves. No doubt others will pick up where Newell has left off.

DEBORA L. VANNIJNATTEN *Wilfrid Laurier University*

World Politics: Progress and Its Limits
James Mayall
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, pp. xi, 170

This impressive essay addresses some of the most perplexing normative questions that have arisen in world politics since the end of the Cold War. James Mayall offers a balanced and insightful assessment of the search for international solutions to three fundamental issues: (1) the tension between state sovereignty and ethnonational self-determination, (2) the attempt to export democracy by Western international efforts and (3) the propensity to contemplate and engage in armed humanitarian intervention in domestic conflicts of sovereign states. The volume also serves as an updated introduction to an approach to world politics known (not altogether accurately) as the "English School" and associated primarily with the names of Hedley Bull and Martin Wight.

The first part of the book re-examines the history and structure of modern international society with a view to identifying its main features and assessing the relative significance of its "pluralist" elements (based on state sovereignty) and its "solidarist elements" (based on common humanity and human rights in particular). Many contemporary commentators discern a shift of emphasis away from pluralism and towards solidarism in world affairs. The author points out the limits and even the failures of responsibility of states, particularly the great powers in the UN Security Council, in taking upon themselves the heavy burdens of bringing about a political world based on primarily solidarist values. Their language is more righteous than their conduct. The second part is an insightful essay on the troubled relationship of militant ethnonationalism and territorial independence, and a reappraisal of the often bloody conflicts associated with the striving for ethnonational self-determination in deeply divided societies. While this has prompted some very pessimistic studies, the author argues, with reason and conviction, that a reconciliation is possible based on a changing and more flexible notion of sovereignty that would involve the right to participate in international society, for example, by seeking and securing foreign investment, over against the demand for absolute national autonomy or autarky. The third part probes the international endeavour to expand democracy beyond its historical home in the West. The problem here is the frequently dogmatic ideological stance of its liberal proponents, what the author refers to as their "liberal utopianism." Although laudable in its wish to provide both prosperity and peace, as a foreign policy the liberal approach in practice turns out to be vulnerable to temp-

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tations of "quick fixes"—in the form of technical solutions to human predicaments that involve no real sacrifice or even discomfort for the Western democracies that espouse the doctrine. Lastly, the author assesses the recent inclination of Western states to entertain and engage in armed humanitarian intervention. Here he draws a similar conclusion: namely the unwelcome consequences that can arise, such as the threat of long-term instability and conflict that was inadvertently created by arming and legitimating irredentist-minded Kosovo Albanians who proved to be the "mirror-image" of their Serbian government protagonists that Western powers selectively came to demonize during the war over Kosovo.

This penetrating little book casts important doubt on academic studies that call without qualification for the promotion and pursuit by Western powers of democracy, armed humanitarianism and human rights in world affairs. Mayall's contribution is in locating and probing the moral awkwardness of such "progressive" arguments and showing that they do not take sufficiently into account the complexities and dilemmas of world politics: that is, they ignore, or they fail to comprehend, or they dismiss the underlying pluralism of international relations, with its many contradictory and noncomplementary values, which call for a self-restrained ethics of responsibility rather than a self-liberation ethics of absolute ends. That is the moral philosophy of David Hume and similar advocates of classical realism for whom there are no entirely straight or unequivocal answers to ethical problems. This timely and probing critique of the progressive international temper of our times should be read and pondered by anyone who takes an interest in the ethics of contemporary world politics.

ROBERT JACKSON *Boston University*

The Global Third Way Debate
Anthony Giddens, ed.
Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers, 2001, pp. xv, 431

Historical periods in capitalist development can be distinguished by patterns of accumulation, co-optation and control. Early in the postwar era, high profits and limited welfare and collective bargaining regimes secured relative social peace. By the 1970s, welfare states were plunged into political crisis by a combination of their own contradictions and foreign competition. The neoliberal counteroffensive of the 1980s used deflation and deregulation to discipline workers and restore profits, increasing inequality, disaffection and social decay in the process. When the recession of the early 1990s brought white-collar downsizing, threatened middle-class welfare and elevated crime rates, right-wing social democrats saw an opportunity and the search for a new formula began. The result of this triangulation is the "third way," whose mission is to counter what Polanyi saw as the inevitable consequence of marketization: social disintegration. In the words of Anthony Giddens, neoliberalism has "no effective theory of, or policies relevant to, developing a cohesive and integrated society" (18).

The Global Third Way Debate brings together 28 essays and a useful introduction. Since its purpose is to "help flesh out the third way approach," the editor has excluded essays questioning the third way's existence or "sweepingly critical" of it (21). The debate, in other words, is internal. With some exceptions (essays by Wolfgang Merkel, Thomas Meyer, Paul Dalziel, David Downes, Michael Allen and Hugh Collins), the authors are advocates.

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What they advocate has two broad components. First, it argues that traditional social democratic strategies have failed, and that competitive markets can promote economic efficiency and accommodate an increasingly individualistic, mobile and reflexive society. States must be active, since markets can also fail, but should regulate behaviour through incentives rather than command. A state that is lean, transparent, decentralized and market-friendly is expected to reduce the apathy and mistrust that plague Western democracies.

Secondly, to reconnect rights with responsibilities, a new social contract is needed. From the third-way perspective, passive social democratic redistribution intensified moral hazard and created a "culture of deceit" (8). In contrast, the third way proposes active "asset-based redistribution" through large-scale educational investment, to provide individuals with the opportunity to adapt to market change. Social and economic policy, long divided, can be reunited around work incentives, making work attractive, enhancing labour market flexibility, lowering taxes and creating jobs. In this way, given the dynamism of the new economy, long-term social exclusion can be reduced and social justice enhanced, even though shorter periods of poverty can no longer be avoided. This new "life-chances" image of equality is thought to be the key to renewed cohesion.

The Global Third Way Debate is more manifesto (and sometimes polemic) than analysis, and should be evaluated as such. As with any manifesto, its plausibility depends on its theoretical and empirical grounding. This is where the book is weakest. The third way's theoretical foundations—globalization, individualization, the knowledge economy, market primacy, the doctrine of competitiveness, the theory of moral hazard and the rest—are as contested as the third way itself. But they are nowhere adequately analyzed. Globalization is presented as an abstract process, without structure or agency, and demanding policy adaptation. We can interpret it variously, says Giddens, but its influence cannot be denied. Granted, but the nature of its influences, the force they bring to bear and the political strategies we develop will all depend on how we interpret its structure, history, logic and dynamics. If, for instance, globalization in its present form were the result of strategic action by globally powerful states, it would be naïve to expect these same entities to regulate it without a struggle.

The same considerations apply across the board. The programme's plausibility depends on our readiness to suspend critical disbelief and accept its *weltanschauung*. Beyond the inevitability of globalization, we must also accept the possibility of harmonizing capitalist social relations in an environment of unfettered markets and self-imposed resource limitations. We must take on an unexamined goal of export-oriented competitiveness despite the apparent incompatibility of that goal with human development, the damage it has inflicted on countries that cannot compete, and the growing role of the global arms trade. We must adopt a benign view of the information economy despite its social and environmental costs and its connections with military production and civilian surveillance. We must espouse a punitive, dangerous view of low-wage work as therapy for those thought shiftless and as a precondition for citizenship. We must ignore corporate welfare and the fact that tax credits for the working poor subsidize low-wage employers and strengthen the very conditions (social disintegration and moral hazard) the third way wishes to combat. Finally, we must accept that there is no alternative (384).

Events suggest that this readiness is not widespread. Several third-way parties have recently suffered reversals in European elections. In Britain, where rapidly declining turnout and a reduced popular plurality threaten to undermine New Labour, rebellious residents of several northern cities, both

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booming and deprived, appear to have missed the third-way message. The third way had no coattails in the 2000 election in the United States, and the new president went largely unopposed as he spent his third-way inheritance on tax cuts while ignoring America's education and health needs.

It may be too early for an obituary for the third way, but Giddens' assessment of neoliberalism—too socially corrosive to provide a lasting political formula—might one day soon come in handy.

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