

rather than through traditional command-and-control regulation. So there is nothing wrong with the use of market mechanisms in policymaking *per se*.

The problem arises, Brown and Jacobs argue, when this pragmatic approach gets hijacked by market dogmatists who seem blissfully ignorant of the myriad ways that markets in the real world can and do fail, and who are unmindful of government's essential role in correcting negative externalities and supplying the institutions and rules that permit efficient markets to function. When reformers inject free-market forces into sectors that lack the conditions (including low information costs) for a competitive equilibrium of demand and supply, the reforms may not only fail to deliver the efficiency gains initially promised, but they may also create a host of unforeseen problems that in turn generate calls for new government interventions.

Brown and Jacobs illustrate this argument through an analysis of market-based reforms in transportation, education, and health care. The historical and institutional contexts in which market reforms have been introduced varied substantially across the three sectors. For example, the government has long dominated the financing and delivery of education from kindergarten through grade 12 in the United States, while private practitioners and market forces have been paramount in health care. Despite inheriting very different policy legacies, market enthusiasts offered the same basic reform prescription in each sector: Give consumers the right to choose among competing providers, and use competition to motivate better system performance. In Chapter 4, Brown and Jacobs analyze what happens when market models confront the tough realities of policy implementation. Their central claim is that the outcomes of market reforms have been disappointing for consumers, citizens, workers, and businesses. Private actors have complained about unanticipated costs, service breakdowns, wage reductions, and unfair competition. Political representatives have often felt compelled to respond to these complaints with new corrective laws and market cushions. The paradox is that "the success of policy entrepreneurs in pushing market reforms ended up fueling political discontent and legitimating new government interventions to manage markets" (p. 85).

The authors identify many, but not all, of the factors that shape the evolution of market-based reforms over time. While they correctly emphasize the mix of costs and benefits in each sector, they fail to give adequate weight to the policy feedbacks generated by each reform. When market forces are unleashed, the configuration of interests, institutions, and ideas in a given sector may change. These policy feedbacks, in turn, shape how government responds (or does not respond) when concerns arise about the market's performance. In the airline deregulation case, for instance, politicians distressed about airline bankruptcies, flight delays, and the deterioration of service quality have found that efforts to reregulate inevitably generate fierce

opposition from public and private actors (including carriers, service providers, and business park owners) who have made long-term economic investments predicated on the continuation of the deregulated system. Government can still play a supervisory role in the airline sector, but its legal authority, bureaucratic capacity (given that the Civilian Aeronautics Board was terminated), and political incentives have been durably reconfigured. The authors are correct to argue that "pressure from voters and stakeholders is an unavoidable ingredient in sustainable and effective policy" (p. 126). But changing how markets operate, once actors have adapted to the new economic and political arrangements, is a far more complex task than simply learning from mistakes and clearing new space for pragmatism in public policy.

This caveat aside, Brown and Jacobs make three significant contributions to the literature on politics and markets. First, they show what can go wrong when the subtle ideas of policy experts meet the rough and tumble of democratic politics. Just as the academic version of supply-side economics was distorted by ideologues who never met a tax cut that they did not like, so the nuanced claim that well-designed, market-based solutions can improve economic performance was taken by some conservatives as an excuse for the wholesale elimination of government oversight mechanisms. (See the present financial crisis for a painful example). Second, they argue persuasively that institutional impediments to market-based reforms must be anticipated. Market-based reforms (like any policy design) need to be robust enough to withstand the inevitable trials of the implementation process. If they are not, the reforms probably should not be implemented in the first place. Disappointed market promoters who contend that their utopian reform visions were never given a fair test because "politics" or "unforeseen events" intruded lack a realistic understanding of how government works.

Finally, and most importantly, Brown and Jacobs provide an eloquent reminder that markets are means, not ends in themselves, and that the public and private sectors are institutional complements, not substitutes. There are many things that markets can do, but few that they can do well outside of an effective democratic framework. This lesson has been too often forgotten in recent years, and it is one that policymakers would be wise to keep in mind as they struggle to repair our economy.

**Sin, Sex, and Democracy: Antigay Rhetoric and the Christian Right.** By Cynthia Burack. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008. 224p. \$74.50 cloth, \$21.95 paper.  
doi:10.1017/S1537592709990491

— Alesha E. Doan, *University of Kansas*

Who can forget the fiery rhetoric of Jerry Falwell two days following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks? During a guest appearance on Pat Robertson's *700 Club*

television program, Falwell offered the following analysis of the moral decay of America that precipitated the terrorist attacks: “I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians who are trying to make that an alternative lifestyle, the ACLU, People for the American Way—all of them who have tried to secularize America—I point the finger in their face and say, ‘You helped this happen’” (p. 109). Falwell’s comments were roundly criticized and dismissed by political and media elites as “hateful” and “divisive” talk. But, as Cynthia Burack argues in *Sin, Sex, and Democracy*, dismissing this language as political spectacle represents a woefully incomplete understanding of the Christian Right’s pedagogical use of rhetoric, and understates the significance of the movement to American politics.

Burack argues that the “Christian right has become more and more effective at designing and deploying multiple modes of address, different rhetorical tones, emphases, or arguments directed at ingroup and outgroup audience” (p. xxiii). She introduces a theoretical model that challenges scholars to reconceptualize the purposes and outcomes of the Christian Right’s use of narratives in promoting its political agenda. Her model is organized along two axes that produce a typology of the four dominant antigay narratives used by the Christian Right. The first axis contains the intended audience for the message (either in-group or out-group), whereas the second axis contains the sociopolitical context of the message (a therapeutic or political narrative).

The author explores her theoretical model through an examination of the narratives embedded in three distinct arenas: Christian witnessing tracts, the ex-gay movement, and the evolving construction of gays as terrorists. She is interested in tracing both the thought and activism associated with these aspects of the antigay agenda. Throughout the book, Burack argues that the seemingly disconnected narratives used by the movement actually intersect in patterned and comprehensive ways. The narratives, in turn, provide the movement with a two-prong political strategy: shoring up support for its political agenda from ideological supporters and packaging its agenda in a rhetorically palatable form for secular society.

Burack’s investigation begins with a detailed analysis of political rhetoric. Christian Right rhetoric is steeped in historical and theological traditions. The Christian Right has been adept at mapping contemporary events onto its historical and philosophical understanding of the world. Through this process, the movement has packaged its long-standing agenda in a modern voice intended to deliver political sway in a secular society. The author traces the origin and evolution of many key concepts that form the bedrock of the Christian Right’s religious and political ideologies. She examines concepts such as tolerance, choice, and rapture, demonstrating how these ideas form the philosophical underpinnings of the rhetoric used by the move-

ment. In turn, these central ideological tenets are folded into a pragmatic political action plan.

Part of this strategy has been the movement’s co-optation and appropriation of progressive social concepts. For example, elites of the Christian Right have been able to use the language of choice and rights to shift political outcomes closer to their preferences. The changes in its messaging has provided the movement with the means to situate its political agenda in mainstream public discourse over “liberal values” and legitimately compete for support from the larger political arena. As the book unfolds, the scope and importance of Burack’s research—beyond the antigay issue—quickly becomes evident. She marshals evidence and weaves together an argument that focuses on the centrality of the Christian Right movement within American politics.

Burack also documents the reciprocal and recursive relationship between the different factions of the movement. She argues that extremists have more than a benign influence on the mainstream movement. This is a less developed section of the book, particularly in regards to the development of the Christian Right’s social construction of homosexuals as terrorists. For example, Burack discusses Fred Phelps (an antigay extremist who resides in Topeka, Kansas, and heads up the Westboro Baptist Church and God Hates Fags Websites). Phelps has managed to capture state and national media attention with his outlandish political antics, even though he does not represent an identifiable constituency and has been publicly disavowed by the larger Christian Right movement. The relationship between Phelps and the Christian Right is unclear. He has championed many conservative issues over the years without any obvious affiliation or link to the Christian Right. His antigay activism may undercut the antigay agenda of the movement, or his extremism may aid it. The nuanced relationship between extremists and social movements (even when extremists are operating autonomously) continues to be an area in need of more research. The author could have made a more compelling contribution to this area by contextualizing and discussing the dual role that Phelps and other extremists play for the larger Christian Right movement, even if the extremists are not affiliated with the movement.

This minor criticism notwithstanding, in the end readers are left with rich insights and a theoretical framework that provides direction for students interested in studying a range of Christian Right issues that expand well beyond the antigay politics of the movement. In her introduction, Burack aptly claims: “Political discourse is a form of pedagogy, and those of us who do not appreciate the complexities of conservative Christian pedagogy will have a more impoverished understanding of American politics than those who do” (p. xix). Through her examination of the movement’s use of rhetoric and messaging, Burack persuasively demonstrates that the Christian Right has

become extraordinarily sophisticated in its messaging, skillfully communicating the same message (albeit with different intent) to religious and secular audiences alike.

Through its attention to the specific dynamics of culture wars over sexuality and gay rights, *Sin, Sex, and Democracy* fills an important gap in the literature investigating the Christian Right. Many scholars, such as Clyde Wilcox, John Green, Ted Jelen, and Laura Olson, have written theoretically and methodologically rigorous and sophisticated books investigating the relationship between religion and politics. Such studies have done much to dispel the stereotypes and myths about the Christian Right by exploring the relationship between religious affiliation and political attitudes and beliefs. Other scholars have investigated the Christian Right's influence on local, state, and national politics. A common thread throughout this literature is the illumination of the diversity of intellectual, theological and political beliefs contained under the banner of the Christian Right. Burack's book makes an important contribution to this rich scholarship.

**Free Labor: Workfare and the Contested Language of Neoliberalism.** By John Krinsky. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 320p. \$58.00 cloth, \$23.00 paper.  
doi:10.1017/S1537592709991277

— Guian A. McKee, *University of Virginia*

More than a quarter century ago, Ira Katznelson's *City Trenches* (1981) showed that divisions between workplace and community identities constrained the development of a durable working class politics in the urban United States. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci's metaphors of trench warfare, Katznelson maintained that the ethnic and religious associations of the neighborhood and home created a separate "trench" from those of the class identities forged in the factory. In *Free Labor: Workfare and the Contested Language of Neoliberalism*, John Krinsky extends and expands this Gramscian framework to encompass the cultural, political, economic, and policy discourses surrounding workfare in New York City at the turn of the millennium. His efforts have produced an extraordinarily important study that is a worthy heir to *City Trenches*.

Krinsky seeks to explicate the "process by which political claims gain currency, policy debate agendas are set, and political identities bounded" (p. 31). He pursues this goal by integrating "political-economic, organizational, cultural, and cognitive" analysis based on the ideas of Gramsci, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Lev Vygotsky (p. 31). The core achievement of *Free Labor* lies in Krinsky's skillful interweaving of such theory with his detailed empirical investigations of workfare in New York.

*Free Labor* proceeds from a grounding in New York City's recent political-economic history. Krinsky shows that the city's mid-1970s fiscal crisis exploded both the welfare

rights model and the generous municipal employee contract settlements that emerged from the 1960s. From that point forward, New York's social policies required ratification by bond raters, a deep constraint that shapes Krinsky's analysis of workfare. Following the crisis, the city developed a series of "neo-corporatist" arrangements for the continued provision of social services through private groups. This created an organizational framework of advocacy groups in fields such as housing, anti-hunger, and legal services from which opposition to workfare would emerge. Initially, such organizations opposed WEP through "soft-assembled coalitions" that formed around networks of "personal acquaintance and shared information" and led to "coordinated actions" against workfare (p. 73). Soon, however, a "hard-assembled coalition" emerged around the specific goal of organizing workfare participants as workers, with rights to unionization, decent working conditions, and pay at prevailing rather than minimum wage rates (p. 156).

This coalition, however, failed to attain worker status for WEP enrollees, largely due to high rates of turnover, fears of retribution among workers, and weak "choral support" from unions—in particular, the failure of AFSCME's District Council 37 to reinforce the core claims advanced by the anti-WEP coalition. This led organizers to pursue legislative, legal, and morally based modes of resistance. Claims about workfare shifted as well, from a characterization of participants as workers to one based on their needs as *potential* workers, such as training and transitional jobs that would facilitate escape from WEP. Meanwhile, a "Pledge of Resistance" campaign forged nonprofits and religious organizations into a soft-assembled coalition that resisted WEP's expansion into the non-profit sector through claims about the program's moral failings. Krinsky argues that the pledge actually represented a miscalculation, as it allowed the Giuliani administration to evade confrontation "when it reduced the [welfare] rolls fast enough to meet the federal standards without expanding the program" (p. 112). Krinsky points out that, in Gramscian terms, the pledge constituted a "war of maneuver," designed to achieve a single decisive strike, but that the workfare struggle was actually a "war of position" that had to be fought across multiple trenches of city politics.

Krinsky next offers a series of models that explore the mechanisms through which actors shift dominant claims within particular configurations of actors, claims, and "context/objects." Through the construction of temporal blockmodels, Krinsky traces the discursive deployment of claims made about workfare in the *New York Times* and *Daily News* from 1993–2004. The results confirm the significance of DC 37's failure to support organizers' claims about the status of WEP participants as workers, as well as the capacity of "state executives . . . to secure hegemony precisely by picking multiple fights rather than by