

coinages of Sicily appear to be the area most in need of work, and it is a disappointment that so little space was given to their study in this work. Even so, this monograph will be of benefit to readers in the contextualization of hoard finds within their surrounding history. M.'s use of epigraphic texts to broaden the historical discussions is especially welcome, not least because this is another important avenue for exploring Sicily in this period.

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A. ALLÉLY, *LA DÉCLARATION D'HOSTIS SOUS LA RÉPUBLIQUE ROMAINE*. Bordeaux: Ausonius, 2012. Pp. 320. ISBN 9782356130761. €25.00.

The possibility of declaring someone a *hostis* (enemy) of the Roman state was available for a relatively short period of time, with attested cases from 88 to 40 B.C. Nevertheless, it was an important weapon in the civil wars of the period. This book is the first monograph dedicated to this concept, and therefore in itself a useful contribution to our knowledge of the late Republic. Furthermore, Allély's book gives a clear analysis of the legal and political aspects of the *hostis*-declaration. She starts out by investigating the origins of the concept. The Gracchan period had seen an important innovation in Roman politics, the *senatus consultum ultimum* (SCU). This, however, had no legal consequences for individuals who posed a threat to the state, and the possibility of declaring them *hostis* was therefore necessary to exclude them legally. Sulla was the first to use the *hostis*-declaration against Marius and his supporters in 88 B.C.; usually, the official declaration was made by the Senate, with confirmation from the *comitia tributa*. The connection between the issuing of the SCU and the *hostis*-declaration remained close: in about half the attested cases, both decisions were made together, as table 2 (151) demonstrates.

A. traces in chs 1–3 the various *hostis*-declarations throughout the first century B.C., including those against Sulla in 87 B.C., Lepidus in 77 B.C., Catiline in 63 B.C., Caesar in 49 B.C., Milo in 48 B.C., Antony, Lepidus and Dolabella in 43 B.C., Octavian and L. Antonius in 41 B.C., and Salvidienus Rufus in 40 B.C. The last case was an anomaly, since Rufus was accused of treason, rather than of bringing armed force against the state; probably Octavian used Rufus as a warning to others not to betray him. After this, the *hostis*-declaration was no longer used. Octavian presented the war against Antony and Cleopatra simply as a foreign war, which better served his purpose of 'restoring the Republic'. As ch. 3 discusses, the late 40s B.C. saw the 'banalisation' of the *hostis*-declaration: not only rebellious individuals, but their whole armies were declared enemies of the state. This clearly acknowledged the growing importance of the army in politics of the period: if it was the support of the armies that made warlords victorious, then the soldiers should also suffer the consequences of supporting someone who tried to attack the Roman state.

Ch. 4 discusses the 'view from the side of the *hostes*'. Being declared an enemy of the state had important legal consequences: the loss of citizenship, which brought with it the loss of magistracies, priesthoods and military commands, as well as the confiscation of property and the destruction of one's house, as a symbol of the end of one's *gens*. There was no automatic death sentence attached to the declaration, but anyone who killed an enemy of the state would not be punished. This meant that people with ambitions in politics, such as Sulla and Caesar, were no longer legitimate commanders and politicians when they were declared *hostis*. Sulla, who was in the East in 87 B.C., simply ignored the declaration and continued to behave as a legitimate proconsul; when he returned to Rome with his army, the Senate was quick to withdraw the *hostis*-declaration and ratify his acts in the East. In any case, especially in the 40s, the situation changed so quickly that in most cases not all the measures could be carried out, and many *hostes* did not lose their property. They usually retained their commands, because these provided the best possibility of military victory, which (in turn) allowed them to have the declaration withdrawn, as Sulla had done. Caesar similarly retained his army, marched on Rome and had the *hostis*-declaration annulled by the Senate. Since many *hostes* did not lose their property, they could easily be reintegrated into social and political life; furthermore, since a *hostis*-declaration did not apply to children (contrary to a proscription), the children of former *hostes* could also easily take up a political career — making the Lepidi the only father-son duo to both be declared *hostes*.

A *hostis*-declaration could be useful for those aspiring to honours, such as triumphs and trophies: since the defeated men were enemies of the state, it was easy to claim that the war was an external rather than a civil war. Cicero, for example, was given a *supplicatio* by the Senate, which was normally only granted in the case of external wars. He furthermore suggested that since Catiline had been declared an enemy, a triumph might have been appropriate as well. Caesar on other hand never declared the Pompeians *hostes*, probably because it did not fit his policy of *clementia*. The term *hostis* could also be used as a rhetorical tool, in order to emphasize the danger presented by certain people. Thus Cicero in his *Philippics* repeatedly called Antony *hostis*, in order to pressure the Senate into starting a war against him.

The book contains a useful catalogue of all known and supposed *hostes*, with detailed bibliographical details on each man. A. also investigates in each case why someone was declared *hostis* and the effects on their future career. This catalogue in itself shows the flexibility of the concept: in many cases the declarations were quickly withdrawn and the men reintegrated into political life. It is clear from this well-written book that the *hostis*-declaration was a useful tool in the civil wars, but that its usefulness was limited in periods of public chaos, and that other methods of removing opponents (for example, proscription or exile) were more effective. The book has a clear layout and only a few typographical errors; the modest price makes it well worth buying for anyone interested in the political and legal history of the late Republic.

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V. ARENA, *LIBERTAS AND THE PRACTICE OF POLITICS IN THE LATE ROMAN REPUBLIC*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Pp. ix + 324, illus. ISBN 9781107028173. £60.00/US\$99.00.

Valentina Arena's book examines 'the conceptualisations of the idea of *libertas* and the nature of their connection with the practice of politics in the late Roman Republic' (1). Ch. 1 defines the Roman concept of *libertas* as 'a status of non-subjection to the arbitrary will of another person or group of persons' (6). Ch. 2, 'The Citizen's Political Liberty' deals with specific arrangements ensuring political liberty: *suffragium*, the tribunes' powers, *provocatio*, and the entire legal and judicial system. Ch. 3, 'The Liberty of the Commonwealth', examines two different concepts of political liberty — the 'optimate' and the 'popular' one: these shared a common ground in accepting the need to protect the citizens' liberty from domination and arbitrary power, but offered different ways of doing so. Ch. 4, 'The Political Struggle in the First Century BC', examines the way *libertas* was invoked by both sides on three specific issues: *imperia extraordinaria*, 'the so-called *senatus consultum ultimum*' and agrarian laws. Ch. 5, 'The Political Response and the Need to Legitimacy', elaborates on the way *optimates* justified their positions in terms of *libertas* — especially on the 'emergency decree of the senate'. On this issue, the optimate rhetoric ended up undermining, according to A., the traditional notion of the rule of law as a bulwark of Republican liberty — in favour of a 'higher legality' of saving the commonwealth from grave danger. This, as she argues in the Epilogue, would eventually help pave the way for Octavian.

The book makes an important contribution to the elucidation of a concept central to Roman political culture; it, and its political rôle in the period in question, are analysed comprehensively, learnedly and with a good theoretical underpinning (ancient and modern). The essence of Republican *libertas* is defined aptly, which helps to analyse the way this notion functioned politically in the late Republic. *Libertas*, to which everyone had to appeal, was not, as the author rightly stresses and convincingly demonstrates, a mere empty slogan; it had a serious political content and imposed real constraints on participants in political debates. *Populares* and *optimates* are defined as two rival 'discourses', 'intellectual traditions', or 'families of ideas' (5, 7). A.'s treatment of this subject seems to strike the right balance, avoiding both the danger of presenting the Roman *partes* in a too-rigid, semi-formalized fashion, something that was more common in the past, and of minimizing the political significance of those terms or dismissing it altogether, as is sometimes done nowadays.

A. argues that in the optimate tradition, ensuring liberty required a 'mixed constitution' in which no political institution or social element would be fully dominant; in practice, the *optimates* upheld the authority of the senate while conceding the ultimate sovereignty of the people. For the *populares*, on the other hand, liberty required the preponderance of popular assemblies, with political equality