seem clear, however, that she agrees that tolerance too often is repression but she is clearly reluctant to follow Marcuse's suggestion that freedom's enemies should not be tolerated. Given that President Bush, as Brown points out, says pretty much the same thing, Brown's reluctance is understandable. Perhaps, one should not ask more of a book that already has done quite enough to demand a rethinking of tolerance and its place in a matrix of discourses about emancipation, equality, culture, and the state's legitimacy. I want, however, to suggest that the fact that Brown has relatively little to say about how to reposition and reconfigure tolerance within that matrix is a function of a different sort of reluctance on her part. *Regulating Aversion* is about the costs imposed by any complex political settlement. Membership in a tolerant society costs some more than others: Some identities are marginalized but not all; the norms of tolerance are more easily represented in some ways of life than in others. Nonetheless, choices still have to be made. *Regulating Aversion* makes clear that in privileging rationality, individuation, and autonomy, tolerance discourse costs us (or some of us) in other ways. However, because I cannot imagine a political settlement of which this is not always true, *Regulating Aversion* stings less than it might. It still stings enough.

To Restore American Democracy: Political Education and the Modern University. Edited by Robert E. Calvert. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. 288p. $75.00 cloth, $28.95 paper.

Power to the People: Teaching Political Philosophy in Skeptical Times. By Avner de-Shalit. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006. 224p. $85.00 cloth, $29.95 paper.
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707070867

— Sigal Ben-Porath, *University of Pennsylvania*

The authors of these two books are concerned with a similar question, namely, how can scholars support their students in becoming engaged citizens? Political theorists and philosophers often wrestle with this question as a personal and professional quandary. Many researchers, particularly those whose scholarship is concerned with political questions, wonder to what extent their ideas relate to political reality in a practical way. Can ideas influence, even alter, the processes or norms of behavior in the actual political domain? If what we do is *political* theory or philosophy, what is political about it? Both books reviewed here grapple with these questions in the context of teaching in higher education institutions.

Calvert's book begins with a concern about the viability of American democracy. Its worrisome state of affairs is exemplified by the story of a student, Brian, who expresses in the local newspaper his disconnect from the world of politics. Brian is committed to ignoring the public life and advancing only his own narrowly construed interests. Calvert sets out to use the tools of political theory and

other related disciplines to address the charge Brian brings against political engagement and thus to respond to the pressing challenges of disengaged youth and an environment of declining civic participation.

De-Shalit begins his exploration with his own students: He is worried about the skepticism of his audience about political philosophy and the detachment between the texts he teaches and the students who study those texts. He sets out to search for a way of practicing and teaching political philosophy that would enlist his audience to become more engaged citizens as a result of their involvement with the philosophical texts and arguments. De-Shalit is troubled by the disconnect of theory from practice; he is concerned that the theories he believes in, develops, and teaches are rendered irrelevant by academic pseudoneutrality, students' indifference, and the detachment of theoretical argumentation from political activity. The question that motivates him is intensely political: "how should political philosophy be conducted if at least one of its goals is to change or reform our political institutions and politics . . . and another is to empower citizens. . . ?" (p. 76). After entertaining and rejecting a series of arguments regarding the desirable relations between political theory and political practice, de-Shalit proposes that it is critical self-knowledge that can best provide the basis for a fruitful political dialogue (p. 69).

Thus, political philosophers should use the knowledge at their disposal, their methods of argumentation, and their critical capacities to support the development of political aptitude in their students. He suggests that political philosophers should always begin their inquiries from real problems of real people, and that both philosophizing and pedagogy should be focused on a dialogic relation with students and with fellow citizens. De-Shalit criticizes academic neutrality as "morally wrong" (p. 43) and suggests that the escape to the inner fortress of one's true self, absent an attempt to reflect this truth on the world, "is an apolitical move" (p. 68) that should be condemned.

The second part of de-Shalit's book, focusing on the implications of his perspective for the preparation of citizens, is based on the suggestion that reason is a communicative rather than an abstract, solitary activity. It offers application of the deliberative democratic approach to the political philosophy classroom. "A deliberative democracy approach in teaching would therefore educate students to apply self-criticism in their reasoning, to be sensitive and open to the other's views, and . . . to improve their own arguments . . ." (p. 145). Going beyond deliberative democracy, de-Shalit's argument almost echoes Tolstoy's adoration of the "simple man" who is assumed to possess a greater knowledge of what is important in the political realm, a knowledge that "experts" such as political philosophers should tap into. This can happen through more dialogic classes at the college or university, but also through open public forums where discussion and deliberation

occur. He calls for more listening and less preaching and argues for a public reflective equilibrium that is aimed at improving the consciousness of the public while enriching political philosophy with the complex and relevant views that members of the public hold.

Calvert's book seems to heed this call. He invites a distinguished line of scholars from diverse disciplines, including law, history, economics, and political philosophy to grapple with relevant, contemporary issues as those are reflected in campus life and in the wider political world. The book itself starts with Brian's challenge, and the rest of the authors too start their inquiries mostly with real problems of real people. Most articles are looking for ways to empower and support the development of engaged citizens, and all of them search for possible answers to pressing political issues. Jean Bethke Elshtain, Leroy S. Rouner, and Alan Wolfe all defend the incorporation of religion into character education by letting it be infused into the political discourse and support the process of civic education. Elshtain shares de-Shalit's impulse to incorporate actual public discourse into our theoretical discussions. "How do we talk?" she asks, and replies "just listen" (p. 183). She claims that Americans talk in heavily religious terms and their perspectives are loaded with religious views. This inclination, she suggests, needs to be incorporated into the debate on civic education and engagement for us to create a shared vision of the common good. In a similar vein but with a different perspective, James Stewart offers insights on the characteristics and motivation of individuals who commit supererogatory civic acts, such as the compelling story of Richard Rescorla's heroism and subsequent death on September 11.

Most authors in this volume practice some of the principles that de-Shalit endorses. They are pragmatic, realistic, and directly connected to the discourse and realities they examine and that they aim to change. They employ the tools of their diverse disciplines to tackle contemporary, real-world questions: Todd Gitlin considers the civic effects of the media; Roger Wilkins has a striking discussion of contemporary Black civic engagement; Michael Walzer suggests a revision of the college curriculum to expose every student to the basic aspects of moral and political philosophy. To preserve democracy, he claims, we need to live by our values; we must not shy away from teaching them to our children. Maintaining a commitment to the liberal democratic tradition is the only way to sustain democracy across generations. William Galston too offers a program for college-level civic education. His program aims to enrich students' knowledge through curricular changes, as well as to improve administrative transparency and civic inquiry at the institutional level, and broaden the range of links between the university and the political environment.

Political theorists should be worried about the relevance and efficacy of their methods, ideas, and arguments,

as both these books suggest. Anyone who cares about democracy should care about youth disengagement. Searching for ways to respond to this challenge is vital for preserving the basic values of democracy and for maintaining democracy as a way of life. The two books share the aspiration of educating college and university students to become active, engaged citizens by using the tools of political philosophy. Though de-Shalit offers a radical argument for reconstructing the methods and content of political philosophy to adapt it to the needs of contemporary society, the authors in Calvert's book exemplify this type of scholarship by starting with vital contemporary issues and using analytical and argumentative tools developed in various disciplines to respond to these issues. It seems that de-Shalit constructs his work as a radical take on political philosophy, and that he intends his perspective to shed a new light on the premises and practices of this profession. Calvert's book is structured with a similar sense of urgency and with a comparable critique of university teaching and its impact on students'—future citizens'—attitudes and actions. Whether either of them can fulfill their mission, that is, whether either can engage the general public, mobilize students to engage, or help scholars do a better job in engaging the public, remains to be seen. It is possible that books alone will not do so, although they offer one powerful tool among others in sustaining and advancing democracy.

Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson: Contesting Diversity in the Enlightenment and Beyond. By Daniel Carey. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 276p. $85.00.

— Eduardo Velásquez, *Washington and Lee University*

Daniel Carey rehabilitates a dispute among John Locke, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, and Francis Hutcheson "focused on the problem of diversity and the question of whether any moral consistency could be located in mankind" (p. 1). Shaftesbury and Hutcheson in distinct ways respond to Locke's attack on innateness, the idea that "God had implanted ideas or predispositions in the soul which guided the moral actions and beliefs of mankind" (p. 51). Shaftesbury and Hutcheson do so by evoking a "Stoic conception which saw nature as a fund of normative ideas, predispositions, or prolepses that embraced benevolence, sociability, disinterested affection, and the divine, explaining our attachments to friend, family, and nation" (p. 200).

Carey is not solely interested in ideas confined to time and place. By looking to the present in light of the past, Carey argues that "we not only *historicize* the present, but we also gain some added perspective on the powers and limits of current configurations, as well as an assessment of the strength and weaknesses of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century legacies to the present" (p. 201, my emphasis). In this light, he contends that the struggle