These are significant books that amply display the labor and intelligence of their authors. Rudolph covers an impressively broad terrain in painstaking detail. Alexseev devotes almost half his volume to laying out his theoretical and methodological framework. This review hardly does justice to the complexity and subtlety of their analysis. Yet, both leave the reader only partly convinced. Could one not argue contra Rudolph that geopolitical threat should be associated with restrictive immigration policy (the "red scare" in twenties America) not, as he contends, open policy? Would it not have been wise for a book called *National Security and Immigration* to devote more attention to how immigration itself can be problematic for security? Could one not argue contra Alexseev that dismissing as symptoms of phobia anxieties about cultural and economic takeover by migrants in Russia, Europe, and Los Angeles ignores the possible long-term consequences of migration that he can foresee no better than the individuals who are his subjects?

How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. By Ivan Arreguin-Toft. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 250p. $75.00, cloth, $29.99 paper.
DOI: 10.1017/S1537592707070624

— T. V. Paul, *McGill University*

The question of asymmetric conflicts or, more precisely, wars between two states of unequal power capabilities is an important one, but it has received scant scholarly focus, especially in the international relations field. More importantly, the subject of weaker actors winning wars against stronger adversaries has received limited attention. This is especially puzzling since during the Cold War, both superpowers experienced defeat or stalemate at the hands of weaker powers. In the case of the Soviet Union, an ill-fated asymmetric war in Afghanistan contributed to its demise as a state. America's failure in Vietnam had a major impact on U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy behavior for years to come. It affected American strategy regarding war in the developing world, encouraging the development of and reliance on new precision-guided weapons systems and strategies that would preclude ground combat. The failure of France in Indochina and Algeria also point to the significance of the phenomenon of asymmetric war. The Israeli and American withdrawals from Lebanon in 1982 and 1983 and India's pulling out from Sri Lanka in 1990 are other instances of stronger powers failing to make gains against their weaker adversaries. In the post-9/11 world, asymmetric conflicts have increasingly received the attention of military strategists as a result of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but they have not received commensurate attention from IR scholars.

The reason for this apparent lacuna is that most of the dominant IR paradigms rely on power capabilities that determine conflict outcomes. For realism, the powerful get their way most often, and the international system is largely defined in terms of great power politics and great power wars. Traditional balance-of-power theory argues that the weak will not challenge the strong if the relative capability balance is against it; for it is the strong that start wars when they expect victory on the battlefield. The logic of deterrence is also based on the idea that a challenger can be deterred if the costs of attack are high and the cost is largely, although not exclusively, a function of the military capabilities each side possesses, in addition to the credibility of the retaliatory threat.

A small group of scholars has written on the subject of asymmetric wars in general. In *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (1994), I developed an argument about why weaker powers start wars based on strategy, alliance support, offensive capabilities, and domestic politics, and I explored six cases of relatively weaker actors initiating wars against their stronger opponents. These factors compensated for overall material weakness in the calculations of the weaker initiator. The strategic variable emerged as the dominant factor that cut across all six cases. In his classic article "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars" (*World Politics* 27 [1975]: 175–200), Andrew Mack more specifically examined how the strong often lose, using two cases, the United States in Vietnam and France in Algeria. Some scholars who have studied Vietnam (e.g., Betts, Mueller, and Rosen) also tried to explain the U.S. loss without generalizing their theories to other cases. Today there is a plethora of work on terrorism, a form of asymmetric war, especially involving state and nonstate actors, although very few talk about how and why a weaker actor, be it a state or a nonstate actor, can win.

The work under review is one of the most sophisticated book-length treatments to date of the subject on the weak winning against the strong. While Mack's account of the phenomenon is based on the balance of interests, Ivan Arreguin-Toft's explanation is based on the strategic approach. His central thesis is that the interaction of particular strategies employed by the strong and the weak determines the outcome in asymmetric wars. Using historical and statistical analysis of cases spanning two centuries, he argues that similar strategic approaches (direct-direct or indirect-indirect) favor the strong while dissimilar ones (direct-indirect or indirect-direct) favor the weak. While in the nineteenth century strong actors won disproportionately (over 80% of the time), in the second half of the twentieth century, the weaker actors have won over 51% of conflicts. The author discusses competing explanations based on the nature of the actor, increasing dissemination of arms to weaker powers, asymmetry in the interests of the parties, and squeamishness of democracies to fight, but he finds his strategic interaction model superior. To substantiate his thesis, he analyzes five case studies drawn from different historical periods: the Russia-Murid

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conflict (1830–59), the British-Boer War (1899–1902), the Italy-Ethiopia war (1935–40), the U.S.-Vietnam War (1965–73), and the Soviet-Afghan war (1979–89). The concluding chapter offers theoretical and policy implications and findings on why the strong sometimes lose wars and why they lose the peace even after winning an asymmetric conflict.

How the Weak Win Wars is a nicely written, well-argued, and sophisticated treatment of a long-neglected subject with enormous policy implications. The book has much to offer to U.S. policymakers in particular on the need to develop creative strategies for war avoidance and peace preservation and on the dangers of relying on brute force for achieving foreign policy goals. One wishes that the book had been read by Bush Administration officials before they launched an ill-conceived war in Iraq in 2003. The trouble that the United States faces in Iraq shows that the strategic logic presented here is fairly accurate. The Iraqi insurgents are fighting a war based on urban hit-and-run guerilla strategy, while the United States is pursing a counterinsurgency strategy, relying on superior firepower. However, the chances of the United States succeeding are limited given the contradictory strategies of the parties. It is difficult to offer the precise strategy that the United States should employ to win such a war. This is an area where the author's analysis needs more finessing. The war in Afghanistan also demonstrates some of these difficulties. The initial U.S. victory is explainable using the model developed here. But it is puzzling why this victory could not be sustained.

There is much fruitful discussion in this book, and it ought to be read by IR theorists and policymakers alike. As conflict patterns in the world become more complex with the advent of transnational terrorism, the existing tools for understanding such conflicts remain inadequate. In the semi-unipolar world, there are bound to be more asymmetric conflicts occurring in the future. Here lies the importance of this work.

Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory.
By Simon Caney. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 319p.
$82.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.
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— David Chandler, *University of Westminster*

The author's aim in this book is the defense of a "cosmopolitan political morality" that pits cosmopolitan ethics against its communitarian competitors (e.g., realism, the "society of states" tradition, and nationalism) and finds them wanting in relation to a number of key issues: human rights, distributive justice, political institutions, war, and intervention. These issues are addressed in specific chapters, which outline the cosmopolitan positions and then negatively evaluate the alternatives. At the outset, we are informed that this is not intended to be a "neutral account" (p. 3), and the author consistently and methodically picks his way through the book at every turn seeking to reinforce his defense.

There is no shortage of ethical justifications for universal moral principles based on human dignity, human suffering, human needs, and so forth. Caney makes some useful points that the criticism of the historical (and current) use of moral universals, such as human rights, by self-interested powerful actors, is often not a critique of universalism as such, but rather of the abuse of universal moral standards. In fact, the defense of autonomy, pluralism, and democracy and opposition to hegemony and oppression demonstrate the adherence to universal moral principles (p. 56). The key argument, which the book fails to clearly establish however, is how universal moral principles can be meaningful guides to policy or practice in the sphere of international relations.

Caney wants to have his cake and to eat it too. Where the critics of assertions of global morality raise the issue of power relations invalidating claims of universality, as above, they are seen as enforcing the cosmopolitan argument. The argument that the global or international sphere is less open to moral universalist principles than the domestic sphere because there is no unitary authority and therefore no framework for establishing a representative or accountable universal moral view, let alone to enforce it against power interests, is also seen as enforcing the cosmopolitan argument—in this case, that new suprastate political structures are necessary (e.g., p. 121). Counterarguments based on ethics are seen as justifying universal moral values, and counterarguments based on empirical reality are seen as justifying political change away from the current framework of largely state-based rights.

The title of the book asserts that Caney's project is that of "global political theory," but it is clearly one of "global ethics." It is the ethical arguments that do the work in his critique of existing state-based frameworks of international law, especially the restrictions on war and assumptions in favor of nonintervention and state sovereignty. He asserts that current legal and political frameworks, and their reflections in realist and "international society" (or English School) international relations theorizing, assume that states are legitimate or an ethical good per se. This problematic "communitarian" assumption is best highlighted in Caney's questioning of states' having the "right of self-defence" (p. 194). Judged on the basis of cosmopolitan rights, states would have no right of self-defense if they were rights abusers, and concomitantly, they would have the right of intervention (or the duty, if they were powerful enough and could easily bear the costs) if they were upholders of rights.

The argument pitting global cosmopolitan rights against the arbitrary and restrictive community of the state is purely an ethical one about the moral status of states: Caney sees no good answer to the question of "why the existence of

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