POLITICAL THEORY

Levinas, the Frankfurt School and Psychoanalysis. By C. Fred Alford. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2002. 220p. $60.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

— Jane Flax, *Howard University*

In a world where people construct a dismaying variety of reasons to harm one another, from subtle variations in kinship to broad, binary categories, political scientists might reasonably ask if ethics (or which ethics) could foster less violent practices. C. Fred Alford engages this question by investigating Emmanuel Levinas's writings. Some theorists champion Levinas's extraordinarily elusive texts as formulating an ethics appropriate for a postmodern world. Alford tries to do justice to Levinas's "noble project" (p. 5) while simultaneously arguing that Levinas's etiology of the problem of violence and his solution to it are mistaken. To support his claims, he stages conversations between Levinas and himself, mediated by sequential partners. The most important include D. W. Winnicott, Theodor Adorno, Iris Murdoch, and classical Greek tragedy.

A wonderful aspect of *Levinas, The Frankfurt School and Psychoanalysis* is Alford's own voice; in contrast to much contemporary theorizing, one feels the presence of an embodied other who deeply cares about his topic. However, it is puzzling that the author does not situate the resulting wide-ranging and stimulating conversation within the context of contemporary debates on ethics, subjectivity, and justice. His disagreements with Levinas interestingly reenact a major division within the debates between those who advocate an impersonal or universalizing approach (for example, John Rawls or Jürgen Habermas) and those who endorse a situated or caretaking one (for example, Joan Tronto). Alford strongly supports a situated viewpoint. While the book productively provokes thinking about important dilemmas confronting modern subjectivities and polities, how persuasive the reader will find Alford's approach depends partially upon an evaluation of the partners he favors, especially object relations psychoanalysis.

Why do we humans so often fail to treat others as we would treat ourselves? Levinas answers that we fail to recognize difference. Difference means the absolute otherness of the other. Instead, we engage in totalization, by which Levinas means treating others as parts of ourselves. Intrinsic to totalization is a violent using or erasure of the other. Levinas's "noble project" is to ensure the protection of the other (subjects outside ourselves) against such violence. Depersonalization is the only solution. By encountering the other in such a way that its absolute difference is registered, the ego is shattered. This opens the subject to an experience of infinity. Such experience provides the subject with an exit from its own, claustrophobic subjectivity. It is enabled to register infinity's imperative—an obligation to serve the other, an obligation that is itself infinite. Under this injunction, the subject is transformed into the hostage/server of the other. Only thus will the subject abstain from violence. For this process to work, we must see the other not as a particular subject but as the face of infinity. This transformation is neither masochistic nor self-abnegating. Rather, infinity is the only exit from the horror of "there is," "the terrible burden of being" (p. 58). Being is the endless same, a faceless, going on indifference in which no difference is possible.

Alford is sympathetic to Levinas's project. He too thinks ethics is "as much or more about separation and difference as it is connection" (p. 71). In insisting on these, "Levinas has made a great contribution" (p. 71). However, he finds the human cost of Levinas's approach too high and unnecessary. Instead, he claims, "there are other, more humanly related ways to serve Levinas's noble purpose" (p. 5). These other ways require not erasure of the other's particularity but loving engagement with it. Alford employs Murdoch's idea of love and Adorno's negative dialectics with its emphasis on registering nonidentity of object and subject as supports. He further claims that the central problematic of ethics is finding ways to manage the tensions intrinsic to the human attachments through which all subjects and polities are constituted. To develop this claim, he calls upon object relations psychoanalysis, particularly Winnicott's account of "good enough mothering," and classical Greek tragedy. He interprets these tragedies as public enactments of pity and compassion that build "a house to keep the inhuman out" (p. 136).

Alford's reading of Winnicott emphasizes the complexity of attachment and its "dance" between separation and connection. Like Winnicott, he argues that humans are capable of attunement, an empathic but neither intrusive nor erasing engagement with others' experience. Attunement, not depersonalization, protects others against violence. These ideas underwrite an interesting alternative Alford proposes to the dichotomies of negative and positive liberty—freedom with. Yet, while I am sympathetic to his attention to what he calls the "interperson," his approach, too, has a high cost. The "intraperson (s)" gets lost. This term points to multiple dimensions of subjectivity very difficult to discuss, for language will necessarily fail to grasp them. They include what Julia Kristeva calls the "semiotic," Michel Foucault "pleasure," or Friedrich Nietzsche the "Dionysian." These intrapersons are often other to other aspects of the subject and to the subjectivity of others. They exist outside the dance of separation/connection. Lack of acknowledgment of these dimensions contributes to Alford's failure to do justice to central aspects of tragedy—the inescapable inability of subjects to reconcile themselves to themselves or others (for Sigmund Freud, the basis of civilization's perpetual discontents) or the reach that exceeds the grasp. It also helps explain Alford's curious underemphasis on the importance of the aesthetic for Adorno and his insistence that true art resists identity, identification, or reconciliation.

While I cannot follow Levinas's path of imagining these intrapersons as infinity, I do think Alford too readily transmutes the ineffable Levinas points toward into intersubjective experience. Accounts of subjectivity, ethics, and politics should confront the multiple, often incompatible, obligations arising from our variegated being—intra-, inter- and embodied subjects who are also only one species within complex ecosystems. How subjects manage such multiplicity within and between them often shapes the most horrifying or magnificent practices of our all-too-human world.

Aristotle's "Best Regime": Kingship, Democracy, and the Rule of Law. By Clifford Angell Bates, Jr. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003. 234p. $65.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

— Thomas W. Smith, *Villanova University*

This provocative book should stir controversy. Clifford Angell Bates argues against the reigning assumption that Aristotle's best regime is mixed, holding instead that Aristotle favors democracy limited by rule of law.

Aristotle's "Best Regime" reflects two currents in Aristotelian studies. First, it echoes those who claim that Aristotle is a timely alternative because liberal theory has difficulty both justifying democratic practice and reflecting on what to do with the freedom it celebrates. So Bates boldly asserts that Aristotle's account is "superior to all the contemporary approaches to either democracy or political life" (p. 6). Second, some contemporary scholars have realized that reading Aristotle's texts through a lens that seeks clear and distinct ideas set forth in encyclopedic treatises seriously distorts his teaching. On this emerging view, Aristotle is not as concerned with telling his readers what

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to think about politics as he is with helping them learn how to think about it. So Bates argues compellingly that Aristotle's *Politics* is at once a treatise and a dialogue. He delineates a complex structure in which Aristotle puts competing arguments in conversation with each other, teaching the reader how to judge well among them.

Bates first shows the centrality of the concept of regime in Aristotle's thought, illustrating how one cannot understand key Aristotelian terms like "citizen" or "law" without it. He then argues against those who hold that Aristotle's best regime is a mixture of aristocracy and democracy. Bates's most important constructive move is a detailed textual analysis of *Politics* III that aims to show why Aristotle favors democracy restrained by law. According to the author, Aristotle thinks that the many deliberate politically as well or better than the noble few. Then, in a series of incipient dialogues, Aristotle argues in favor of the rule of law over and against that of a single superior person.

Bates is best when he is carving out his own original account through lively criticisms of the secondary literature, offering arguments about political matters and sifting through Aristotle's dense, often ambiguous text. He should also be commended for his attempts to demonstrate why Aristotle has been misread. According to Bates, translators and readers alike have tried to clarify terms Aristotle purposefully leaves ambiguous in order to stoke the fires of thought. He argues that such well-meaning efforts at clarification have produced obscurity instead.

In the end, Bates's Aristotle believes that "democracy is the least bad of all regimes" (p. 162). We must understand the ground of this Churchillian conclusion. For Bates, Aristotle thinks that while the kingship of a superior person "is the best in theory" (p. 215), it is "not advisable because the best man cannot be evident" (p. 214). Nature "does not clearly distinguish who should rule and who should be ruled" (p. 215), insofar as the majority are not capable of discerning a superior person's wisdom. In other words, nature fails to provide the majority with the ability to recognize the just standard for rule. The inability of the many to see the differences between themselves and their betters leads them to believe in universal equality and thus to assume that democracy is just. Bates's Aristotle thinks nothing can be done to educate the majority out of these errors. For Bates, nature's failure to attain a genuinely just arrangement (the rule of the wise) makes democracy a likely outcome. Given this reality, the wise realize that democracy moderated by law is the least undesirable practicable outcome. In this sense, democracy under law is Aristotle's "best regime."

This kind of argument should be familiar to those acquainted with the tradition out of which Bates argues. It maintains that *the* political problem is how to reconcile wisdom and consent, implying that the wise know what wisdom is and what it requires so that the political problem is how to adjust the demands of wisdom to a given regime. However, in classical philosophy, what characterizes a wise person above all is an awareness of ignorance about wisdom. If the wise do not know what wisdom is, why should we expect it to be evident to everybody else? So when the many refuse to be ruled by someone who claims to possess wisdom, has nature failed or succeeded? It depends on what you think it means to be wise. One could argue that nature provides for wisdom partly by making us the kind of beings who must search for the good life through common deliberation in order to flourish. Perhaps this is one natural basis for politics, as well as for democracy understood in a certain way. However, this line of argument entails that everybody needs to love wisdom on some deep level, and that the main difference between the wise and the rest of us is that the wise person has more clarity about our need for wisdom.

In the end, Bates's argument raises important questions: Does making a case that nature fails to make the majority capable of recognizing the wise person's claim to rule them provide consolation on a cosmic scale to those who think they possess wisdom but do not have the power they think they deserve? If we construct such arguments for our consolation, do we love wisdom or power? If we love power rather than wisdom, do we deserve to rule according to Aristotle?

One might try to justify democracy by asserting like Locke or Rawls that we are equal in our rights; by claiming like Rousseau that people are naturally good; by arguing like Lincoln that natural differences are not so significant that one person deserves mastery over another; or by saying like John Paul II that all persons possess an infinite dignity and worth. But can one argue that democracy is the "best regime" because the many are incapable of wisdom?

Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed. By William E. Connolly. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002. 216p. $54.95 cloth, $19.95 paper.

— Stephen K. White, *University of Virginia*

William Connolly has perhaps no equal when it comes to gathering insights from poststructuralism and postmodernism and giving them an affirmative momentum. Over the last couple of decades, he has patiently articulated a distinctive approach to democratic imagination and ethos. He knows that radically new views do not succeed by discrete, knockdown arguments; rather, they gain ground, if at all, only slowly, on several fronts and in ways that do not conform to neat, logical demonstration. This does not, of course, mean that good radical theory eschews argumentation; it does mean that the processes by which we come to embrace or reject a position bear the imprints of much that goes on before, below, and around the force of better argument.

Neuropolitics brings the assumption that "there is much more to thinking than argument" (p. 73) directly into the foreground. It draws from contemporary neuroscience to highlight "the biological character of thinking, culture and identity" (p. 48). But the scientists Connolly attends to are not purveyors of mechanistic models; rather, their work has shown that an emphasis on the neural and chemical dimensions of thought must also remain open to unpredictability in "the complex relays and feedback loops connecting brain, body and culture" (pp. 5, 36). The resulting picture is one in which reflection and judgment are neither purely culturally constructed nor materially determined.

Our perception and judgment take place against an inner world of "affect-charged" (p. 28), preconscious dispositions and reactions. Obviously, attention to such things has been around at least since Freud. But the findings of neuroscience (as well as the insights of other scientists and philosophers, such as Ilja Prigogene and Isabelle Stengers) help us comprehend these phenomena in ways not tied to the urge to capture them in some deep structure of interpretation, Freudian or otherwise. What especially interests Connolly about the mixing of culture and body/brain processes is its speed and "wildness" (p. 113). It occurs faster than our conscious cognition and influences it in ways that often resist representation or control. Out of such mixing comes both perception of danger and creativity. There is an important connection here with Connolly's earlier work. In effect, he is deepening his understanding of our propensity to transform difference into "otherness" that is marked as hostile, suspicious, marginal, and so on. What becomes an "other" often reflects a layering of culture and biology that operates below and at the edge of consciousness. In taking this turn, he is also rendering the idea of self-artistry or "technique" (pp. xiii, 44)—that which might dampen such a propensity—more complex as well. Such efforts are now understood to be

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operating on a biocultural "zone of indiscernability" manifesting "artifice in nature and perdurance in culture" (p. 63). The underlying aim is to rework our perception of danger, while at the same time cultivating sensitivity to the "fugitive energies of becoming" (p. 48) that pulsate within this zone and constitute the basis of our capacity to respond creatively to the world.

Connolly reads a line of thinkers stretching back to Lucretius and forward to neuroscientists in such a way as to constitute a tradition he calls "immanent naturalism" (pp. 86, 104). Here, the "classical distinction *of kind* between culture and nature becomes translated into interacting layers of biocultural complexity" (p. 61). Unpredictability and novelty are read into all nature; and thought is no longer understood as raised up out of it. Perhaps the most fascinating upshot of all this is Connolly's challenge to Kant. He interprets him as, first, projecting an "inscrutable transcendental field into [the] temporal gap" between consciousness and the preconscious, virtual register that so deeply structures it, and then, second, interpreting that structuration as a moment of "incontestable apodictic recognition" (p. 84). Connolly would have us "translate the Kantian transcendental field into a layered, immanent field" (p. 85). In regard to morality, this would imply the need to better come to terms with the way our reactions and judgments are often effectively and inscrutably prestructured, without inferring a beyond-natural source with apodictic authority.

The wildness of this internal, "infrasensible field" and the "asymmetries of pace" (pp. 91, 142) between it and our conscious reflection are mirrored today *externally* in the way our perceptions and judgments are challenged both by the multitude of "micropolitical" strategies (p. 108) bombarding us with the aim of getting under our cognitive radar and by the increasing velocity of processes associated with globalization. Regarding the former, Connolly suggests an effort to educate ourselves by paying more attention to such things as the way films work on our visceral register; doing so helps us better understand when and how we are being worked upon by others and how we might creatively use such techniques on ourselves. Regarding the latter, the contrast between the rapidity of these processes—demographic, informational, financial, and so on—and the settled character of our traditional political categories often make the former seem "unnatural." Connolly's sensitivity to the internal and external parallels encourages us to see that such speed and wildness is not as alien as it appears.

If we can alter that prejudice, we may be able to respond more generously and creatively to democratic possibilities that present themselves in the new global context. The tack would press against several familiar ways of imagining today's political world. Although sympathetic to Sheldon Wolin's radical democratic energies, Connolly is uncomfortable with his almost exclusive emphasis on local struggles. How, for example, can the fight against substandard working conditions in a California community be envisioned without reference to, and encounter with, a multitude of transnational complexities and constituencies? Connolly also contests the form of cosmopolitanism associated most prominently with Martha Nussbaum. She is convinced that, with deep reflection, we can experience apodictic recognition that the universal circle of humanity trumps the validity of all lesser, concentric circles, say, national or religious. Against that, Connolly would have us attend more experimentally to the process and movements that continually cut through those circles in unexpected ways and open novel, transnational opportunities for enlarging the democratic imagination.

Connolly's mode of doing political theory will disappoint those impatient for institutional recommendations or universal principles. When he suggests that neuroscience and film theory are important to ethical-political imagination today, critics will see an avoidance of real politics or serious normative theory. But if he is right, our talk of liberal democratic norms and institutions will be increasingly deficient unless continually accompanied by some deep rethinking of the ethos by which we live those structures. *Neuropolitics* is an immensely creative contribution to that effort.

Liberalism and Value Pluralism. By George Crowder. London: Continuum, 2002. 276p. $29.95.

— J. Donald Moon, *Wesleyan University*

Isiah Berlin famously suggested a close link between value pluralism and liberalism: Because it provides extensive scope for individual choice, liberalism is able to accommodate value pluralism, whereas other major ideologies of modernity are not, as they presuppose that all values can be ordered in a rational, harmonious way. Although his statement of this argument is not rigorous, it is powerful, and has stimulated a great deal of commentary and criticism. George Crowder's book defends this broadly Berlinian position. He sets out the argument with great care, though without the power and passion of Berlin's rhetoric. Needless to say, his defense necessarily reformulates the key terms of the debate, and thus develops a new and original position. The book is written with exceptional clarity, offering frequent recapitulations of the overall argument and careful statements of how each section fits into the overall scheme.

Crowder conceives of value pluralism as an account of the objective structure of value, according to which there are a number of different but genuine values, some of which are universal, many of which are incommensurable, and some of which come into conflict with one another. The key is incommensurability, which is often taken to mean that no reasoned choices can be made among such values because there is no way of ordering or choosing one as superior to another. The puzzle for those who would argue from value pluralism to liberalism is to show why, in spite of incommensurability, liberal values (and liberal political structures) should nonetheless be ranked above nonliberal values (and political structures). Crowder's solution to this puzzle involves a two-step argument: In the first, he invokes value pluralism to reject alternatives to liberalism, such as anarchism and Marxism, that are based on some rational or harmonious ordering of values. In the second step, he attempts to draw substantive values out of the purely formal characterization of value pluralism. He argues that the plural structure of value itself gives rise to certain values, notably diversity and autonomy, and leads to reasonable disagreement about conceptions of the good. Diversity, reasonable disagreement, and autonomy are most effectively promoted or accommodated in a liberal political order, one that is mildly perfectionist (in that it promotes autonomy), and which includes a redistributionist welfare state, certain aspects of multiculturalism, and the constitutional entrenchment of fundamental rights.

There are any number of issues raised by this complex argument, but one of the key questions is the author's critique of Rawls's political liberalism, perhaps the major alternative to the kind of liberal theory Crowder advances. Crowder rejects political liberalism (in part) because he claims that it ultimately presupposes value pluralism, and so does not in fact offer a genuine alternative. Rawls proposes liberal principles as the basis for a just political order among people who seek to live cooperatively with one another but who have reasonable disagreements over fundamental philosophical and religious issues, including their views of the ends of life and the requirements of justice. Crowder zeros in on Rawls's account of the sources of reasonable disagreement, what Rawls calls the "burdens of judgment,"

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arguing that "the two burdens of judgment that crucially explain reasonable disagreement about the good . . . are in effect formulations of value pluralism" (p. 167), since they make reference to the conflicting normative considerations that apply in particular cases, and to Berlin's account itself. Crowder's argument rests on the supposition that moral disagreement must be explained by aspects of the burdens of judgment that specifically apply to moral or evaluative issues, but that is far from obvious. Disagreements among comprehensive views often concern fundamental metaphysical, ontological, and epistemological doctrines, and specifically moral disagreements are often rooted in these fundamentals, rather than being confined to the moral or evaluative realm itself. To his credit, Crowder acknowledges the possibility that reasonable disagreement might not rest "on the metaphysical claim that value pluralism is true," but he finds "something rather strained" (p. 170) about this idea. But that strain seems to reflect an unduly narrow account of the bases of reasonable disagreement.

A second key issue is the link between value pluralism and autonomy, which is central to Crowder's own defense of a perfectionist version of liberalism. The core of his argument "is that to choose among plural and incommensurable values is a demanding task that involves actively creating one's own plan of life, that is, it involves the exercise of personal autonomy" (p. 201). But this argument appears to conflate the idea of autonomy or self-direction and the exercise of critical reasoning to address moral questions. If one accepts value pluralism, then one must exercise critical reason in sorting out the different values (or aspects of value) that are implicated in specific choices or situations. But it is far from clear that one must see oneself as shaping one's own life in that process. One may, on the contrary, be trying to get the right answer, correctly applying the objective standards of a plural structure of value to the question at hand. And that does not require that one value autonomy, or think that there is a special good realized in making such judgments for oneself as opposed to relying upon the superior insight and wisdom of philosophers or teachers who, one may correctly believe, have more time and greater capacity to engage in such critical reflection.

Although the links Crowder finds between "value pluralism," as he conceives of it, and perfectionist liberalism may be weaker than he suggests, *Liberalism and Value Pluralism* represents an important exploration of these issues and a challenge to other forms of liberal theory.

Turning Operations: Feminism, Arendt, and Politics. By Mary G. Dietz. New York: Routledge, 2002. 287p. $19.95.

— Melissa A. Orlie, *University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign*

In political theory, the call for a return to politics as a matter of the practical and shared concerns of citizens is rather commonly made and far less commonly carried through. In *Turning Operations,* however, Mary G. Dietz makes good on her promise to reassert politics, action, and the common world of political affairs back into political theory (p. 3). Dietz is fond of quoting Max Weber and she thinks, in his telling words, that political theory has become "an unreal realm of artificial abstractions [whose] bony hands seek to grasp the blood-and-the-sap of true life without ever catching up with it" (pp. 2–3). In this sense, the state of academic political theory is symptomatic of our current political condition where citizenship and political engagement have become a matter of watching things on television, movie, and Internet screens. In this context, the task of political theory, as the author conceives it, is not to posit a unified theory or total worldview or to stake out an ideological position. Rather, the task of political theory is to provide the existential impetus for mere spectators of politics to become citizens whose mode of engagement is democratic action (p. 5).

Dietz undertakes her "turning operations" in order "to bring various concepts and vocabularies to bear on (and turn upon, turn against, turn about) each other" (p. 4). More specifically, she has three domains of concern—feminism, Hannah Arendt, and politics—each of which she uses to "problematize" the other domains. Her notion of problematization is adopted from Michel Foucault's aim of developing domains of acts, practices, and thoughts that pose problems to and for politics (p. 4). From Dietz's perspective, feminist politics and theory, democratic politics, and political theory are stuck—each has lost its political sense, and as a result, each provides at best anemic motivations and aims for action. It is difficult to quarrel with her judgment about the wan condition of feminist and democratic politics and the meager aid that much of political theory currently offers to each. The aim of her turning operations is to reanimate these enterprises. What this entails is an effort to revitalize feminist politics and theory by reorienting it toward a sustained commitment to citizenship and action (p. 40). At the same time, the author aims to infuse the practice of citizen democracy with new purpose and meaning by way of what feminist theory and practice have to reveal about the threats to and prospects for what Arendt called public freedom, public happiness, and public spirit.

The drawing together of these previously published essays reveals distinguishing concerns and the distinctive attitude of Dietz's work as a political theorist. First, for her, politics "is a complicated mix of the communicative and the strategic, of mutual understanding and pressure, of the force of the better argument and the manipulative exercise of rhetorical tricks in the service of specific interests" (p. 157). She not only makes this rough-and-tumble politics tangible to her reader. She reveals its attractions and makes our participation in it feasible because she represents it as an ordinary affair that involves the identification of a problem and the drawing up of political means and ends to address the problem. This representation of the instrumental practice and aims of politics underscores another, perhaps the most important, distinctive contribution of Dietz's work in political theory, namely, her articulation of a "methodical politics."

As an heir of Arendt, the author obviously values public speech as a distinguishing feature of specifically political ways of addressing problems, and so she looks to public realm theory as the most promising avenue for advancing understandings of politics and democracy that recover their emancipatory potential (p. 161). However, she judges Arendt's and Jürgen Habermas's understandable yet extreme aversion to strategic action to be debilitating. We need an action concept of politics that can do justice to politics as "a sustained, purposeful activity that meets obstacles and undertakes acts of transformation in the world" (p. 162). Dietz draws upon Simone Weil to advance an understanding of instrumental action that cannot be reduced to violence or pure manipulation. In this way, Dietz provides a much welcome possibility for shifting the terrain of debate between discursive and poststructuralist advocates of democracy, from narrowly theoretical arguments about the nature of political action, to a renewed sense of the practical purposefulness of political action oriented toward the identification of democratic means and ends for the solution of political problems.

Throughout this collection of essays, Dietz performs turning operations that recall us, in Vaclav Havel's words, to "the practical task of organizing a better world" (p. 161). Unfortunately, though, Dietz's effort to recover a truly political understanding of democratic action is hampered by her tendency to render explicitly normative concerns in philosophical terms. The most striking and, I think, deeply mistaken instance of this tendency comes in her claim that Havel's "politics of

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truth" finds its "most powerful theoretical vindication" in Habermas's discourse ethics (p. 144). To be sure, philosophical justification of political principles is still the dominant mode of specifically normative political theory. Part of Dietz's aim in the essay under question is to explain why Habermas's philosophical concerns are at least partly beside the point in the milieu proper to politics where working in half-truths is the coin of the realm. But equating Havel's principled politics with Habermas's philosophical enterprise is not only unconvincing because inapt. It also eviscerates Havel's profoundly political understanding of principle. So long as democratic political theorists leave normative concerns to the philosophers, I suspect that the existential impetus for democratic action will remain wanting. What Havel and other deeply principled political actors demonstrate is that a sense of the good, the better, and the just are among the most inspiring and redeeming motivations for political action. To fully realize the potential opened up by Dietz's compelling account of purposeful political action, we need to undertake another Arendtian turning operation, one that unsettles the philosophical occlusion of the nature and bases of political principle.

The Divided Mind of American Liberalism. By James R. Hurtgen. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002. 162p. $65.00.

— Robert C. Grady, *Eastern Michigan University*

Liberalism was America's public philosophy in the twentieth century, but it was a divided philosophy according to this brief study. Liberals are individualists, committed to the kind of civil order and government under which individuals can be liberated and flourish. Liberals, in other words, agree about the goals or ends of liberalism—at least general ones. Their division is over means: Should government's power be concentrated or dispersed? Should democracy be guided by elites or expanded to the masses? Agreement on ends, disagreement over means was once standard fare for interpretations of the American political tradition, and this rendition echoes earlier versions of the battles between Hamiltonian statists and Jeffersonian individualists, as well as Louis Hartz's liberalism and its battles over Whiggery. "Modernist" liberals place great faith in the power of national government to do good, particularly when guided by elites who share liberal values. "Decentralist" liberals distrust concentrated power, favoring scaled-down or local democracy to serve liberal ends.

The modernist–decentralist division provides the thematic framework for the book, a survey of twentieth-century American liberalism over four periods: the Progressive era, the New Deal, the Great Society, and post–Great Society reaction (1968–75). A chapter devoted to each is composed of historical narrative and explication of representative liberal voices (political leaders and intellectuals). James Hurtgen's framework works best with these periods, especially Progressivism and the New Deal. A fifth chapter departs from the historical narrative and assesses individualism and communitarianism as contemporary versions of the modernist–decentralist sides. A brief concluding chapter suggests that liberals will continue to negotiate over its divisions—over the proper balance between freedom and power.

Shared concerns link decentralists and modernists across the Progressive and New Deal periods. The models for Progressive liberalism's division are Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom for the decentralists and Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism for the modernists. Progressive reformers disagreed over what to reform and, sometimes, even why. For example, decentralists advocated political reforms (initiative, referendum, recall, direct primary, etc.) as measures to further democratize and empower ordinary citizens; modernists supported these as means for enhancing executive power and administrative efficiency at the expense of pork-barrel legislatures. The decentralists' economic reforms aimed to break up monopolies and enhance competition; those of the modernists, to enhance government's regulatory powers to better guide industrial production. The circumstances that birthed the New Deal period—the stock market crash and recognition that the modern corporation was a quasi-public institution wielding excessive power—refocused debates among liberals. Decentralists were antimonopolists but not advocates of laissez-faire, and they sought to restore competition and reduce the scale of firms. Modernists responded in two distinct ways. "Associationists" promoted business self-regulation; "planners," a system of regulation and national planning. In their quasi-corporatist business–government partnerships, associationists would make government the junior partner; planners, government the senior partner.

Neither side prevailed in the earlier periods. The Great Society, however, is a brief period of modernist dominance. The Kennedy-Johnson pro-business stance was based on a growth model designed to support their electoral coalition. Both Kennedy and Johnson abhorred the injustice of poverty, but their concerns were constrained by fiscal considerations as they attempted to manage growth with fiscal policy. With the election of 1968, the Great Society and its corporate liberalism were displaced by a decentralist reaction in the period up through 1975. Hurtgen relies on a host of academic and public intellectuals to draw out the contrasts between the Great Society and the reaction. As for his divided liberalism theme, it is debatable if 1968–75 represents a different period or the downside of the Great Society before its displacement by the Reagan years, and a chapter devoted to policy debates of these years (roughly Carter to Bush II) would seem a better alternative than one that shifts to academic debates. However that might be, Hurtgen uses the 1968–75 reaction to set the stage for consideration of communitarianism and individualism in Chapter 5.

Numerous theorists of individualism (John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Will Kymlicka, Iris Young) and communitarianism (Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, William Galston), as well as writings on marriage, education, and urban life, are surveyed in Chapter 5. Hurtgen situates individualists on the modernist side of the liberal divide; communitarians, on the decentralist side. In general terms, communitarianism may correspond to decentralism, and individualism to modernism (particularly individualism as a theory of rights). But not always. Intuitively, the association of communitarianism with decentralism seems obvious enough, but in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, some perfectionist or virtue communitarians have advocated national policing and security standards. Moreover, not all communitarians are perfectionists, and not all individualists are advocates of liberal neutrality. (Kymlicka and Young, treated here as individualists, are critics of liberal neutrality.) Similar anomalies about republicanism, deliberative democracy, and the like could be noted.

The main point of these quibbles is that different contemporary theories do not fit solely, or even chiefly, within one or the other side of the divide that Hurtgen has created. (Sometimes his representative voices in the historical chapters are also out of place; some Agrarian New Deal critics would feel ill at ease classified as individualist liberals.) If this book aimed to contribute to the discipline's theoretical debates over models of democracy, these kinds of comments would be damning. But it is not really designed as part of that debate, relying as heavily as it does on secondary sources and narrative description even in the assessment of contemporary communitarian and individualist theories. Instead, it stands out in its potential as a teaching tool where simplification of excessively complex theoretical positions—often seen as arcane by the literate public—can be a very good thing.

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Hurtgen's coverage of major liberals of the twentieth century is clear and lucid. He may not always support his modernist–decentralist framework, and it too easily suggests that liberalism pervades all public thought. But the framework and the clear expositions in each chapter enable students to grasp the major ideas and get a better understanding both of the historical materials and of the contemporary theoretical positions. *The Divided Mind of American Liberalism* could be a superb ancillary text for virtually any of the chronological readers for an American political thought course, or it could be used in conjunction with a number of other brief, thematic monographs. The price set by the publisher probably prohibits adoption as a text, however. And at this price, one should expect that the (at least) 11 textual errors in the chapters and 10 in the endnotes would not have escaped the publisher's copy editor. There is surely a lesson here; a book like this ought to be more accessible to a student audience.

Postcolonial Liberalism. By Duncan Ivison. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 214p. $65.00 cloth, $24.00 paper.

— Kevin Bruyneel, *Babson College*

This book is an impressive theoretical argument that advances the effort to address group claims in liberal democratic settings. Duncan Ivison moves past the tired liberal-communitarian debates regarding collective claims in liberal democracies by basing his theoretical framework on the idea that governmental decisions are more apt to be deemed legitimate by those subject to them when they reflect, rather than deflect, the dynamic constitutive relationship between group identity, norms, and institutions. Ivison captures the meaning of his postcolonial liberalism by frequently drawing on the phrase "liberalism going local" (pp. 5, 11, 71, 85), which refers to a liberal order that pays heed to the political "processes oriented by local practices" and "especially to the notion that the currency of liberal justice is 'irreducibly heterogeneous'" (p. 11).

At the book's outset, Ivison proposes to structure his argument by utilizing the insights of postcolonial theory to unearth and expand the value of liberalism for addressing group claims, with a specific concern for the self-government assertions of indigenous people residing amid settler states such as Australia, Canada, and the United States. One can usually find two consistent themes in postcolonial theory. First, postcolonialism refers not to a decolonized world free of colonial encounters but, rather, a world defined by the failure of decolonization. Secondly, an intense intermingling of peoples has produced hybrid identities that resist simple definition but do not preclude articulation, albeit ambivalent, contingent articulation. Chapter 2 is devoted to defining the "postcolonial" roots of postcolonial liberalism. Here, Ivison seeks to "isolate" the themes of postcolonial theory "relevant to liberalism's relation to colonialism, and especially with regard to the claims of indigenous people" (p. 39). For the author, postcolonial theory challenges liberalism to be more attentive to complex views of universalism, individualism, distributive justice, and identification (pp. 47–48).

Through the next four chapters Ivison answers these challenges with a close reading and critique of the slack in liberal arguments regarding the role of reason, debate, historical injustice, and the state in contemporary political life. These dense and sophisticated chapters will challenge and edify any serious reader of political theory. Through them, Ivison constructs a postcolonial liberal order shaped by three major components. First and foremost is the ideal of complex mutual existence, which bases the political order's legitimacy upon active engagement with the differentiated knowledges and moral sources people call forth in shaping their cultural and political worldviews. Secondly, a dynamic modus vivendi assures that political negotiation does not aim to permanently resolve disagreement, settle upon a fixed notion of justice, or achieve consensus. Any agreements or key conceptions articulated are understood to be "incompletely theorized" and thus "subject to scrutiny and modification over time" (pp. 86–87). Finally, a focus on capability sets is preferenced to one on primary goods because such goods are of little value if a group is unable to employ them to the benefit of their mode of living, and by extension, also to the benefit of the complex mutual existence of the postcolonial liberal order.

Ivison's overall argument is compelling. His ability to incorporate insights about the contingent and constitutive nature of identity, institutions, and norms into a framework for reimagining how we, as a complex pluralistic society, can engage in legitimate political decision making is a thoughtful expansion of liberalism's potentiality. I am also taken with the argument for shifting our language of distributive justice to one that emphasizes capabilities, as it seems a productive move, strategically and substantially, in a political environment increasingly hostile to claims for resource redistribution. That said, while Ivison establishes the value that a context-sensitive, dynamic field of engagement can have for indigenous people's politics—especially as it pertains to respecting local knowledges—I am not so sure that the capabilities argument is as useful to indigenous political actors. It is certainly true that securing an indigenous nation's "sovereign interests" contributes to their "capacity to improve the substantive material and social inequalities their communities face today" (p. 135), but this is a familiar discourse in the self-government debates presently engaged in by indigenous people, nonindigenous political actors, and settler states. Thus, the value-added of a capabilities approach for present-day indigenous politics is not clear.

Finally, there is one question that lingered with me by the end of the book: What is really so "postcolonial" about postcolonial liberalism? The source of my question is reflected stylistically by the fact that after Chapter 2, actual postcolonial theorists virtually disappear from the book. Instead, the voice of poststructural political theorists, such as William Connolly, tends to hold sway. This is no slight against poststructuralism or Connolly, both valued entities, but the symbolism of this displacement did raise the question of whether Ivison's challenge to liberalism was more poststructural than postcolonial. Ivison's impressive expansion of the boundaries of possibility for liberalism seems based more on poststructural insights regarding the contingent self, antifoundationalism, and the constitutive power of discourse than on postcolonial insights about the persistence of colonial domination and the effect of hybridity on subaltern agency. Of course, there is significant cross-pollination between poststructuralism and postcolonialism, but the two are still distinct fields of theory, and Ivison did not entitle his book "*poststructural* liberalism," so it seems fair to expect a more comprehensive postcolonial reading.

Ivison speaks eloquently about postcolonial theory early on, but as the chapters proceeded, I sensed a lost opportunity to offer a distinctly postcolonial reading of indigenous people's politics. This struck me in Chapter 7 on "Law, Land and Governance," when he refers to American, Australian, and Canadian sovereignty as "more complicated than usually assumed" and notes that these settler national identities "partly come into being through interchanges between aboriginal nations and settlers" (p. 151). Both observations are true, but understated. A postcolonial critic such as Homi Bhabha would intensify the relevance of these observations by asserting that settler populations could not negotiate in "good faith," which Ivison sees as their duty, unless these insights about coconstitutive relations upset the settler society's presumptive epistemological

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framework that determines how it knows the spatial, historical, and relational setting of indigenous/nonindigenous political encounters. It is in the presumptive status of Western notions of space, historical narrative, and the majority/minority binary that one witnesses the contemporary face of colonialism, which persistently frustrates indigenous people's efforts to assure the survival of their modes of living.

To say all this is not to deny the accomplishments achieved in *Postcolonial Liberalism,* which are many, and the value any student or scholar of political theory will find here, which is great, but rather to suggest that while I eagerly applaud the steps taken in the direction of employing postcolonial theory to broaden liberal theory's horizon, I am also compelled to envision the path still to be cleared with yet more strides.

Explaining the English Revolution: Hobbes and His Contemporaries. By Mark Stephen Jendrysik. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002. 200p. $65.00.

— Don Herzog, *University of Michigan*

The explosion of primary texts from seventeenth-century England continues to trigger an explosion of scholarly treatments today. For good reason, too: Lots of the primary texts are amazing, and not just those tired old warhorses, Hobbes's *Leviathan* and Locke's *Second Treatise*. As fun and challenging as the primary texts are, you are forgiven a touch of skepticism if you wonder just what the latest author has to add to our understanding. You might redouble your skepticism if you just glance at Mark Stephen Jendrysik's table of contents, offering chapters on Winstanley, Milton, Cromwell, Filmer, and Hobbes, and zeroing in on the spectacular years of 1649–53.

Those chapters are bracketed by two overview chapters on order and disorder that frame Jendrysik's interpretive or theoretical agenda—as does the title to the book, *Explaining the English Revolution.* Living through a civil war, the execution of Charles I, and the erratic and sometimes dotty rule of Puritan fanatics led by Oliver Cromwell, writers had a pressing need to define disorder and explain its causes. (One might add that even those writers believing, or wishing others to believe, that order was "natural," whatever that might mean, had to concede that nature seemed to be asleep at the switch.) And—you can imagine running a "discovery of the social" riff here, though Jendrysik doesn't put it that way—they figured out that there could well be more wrong with the world than the blundering decisions of particular political figures. Maybe the church needed further reformation; maybe the English needed more providential guidance; maybe the very language of morals and politics needed restructuring. Once writers had their pet explanations for how things went so badly awry, they could make sensible proposals for what to change to get things back on a decent footing.

Jendrysik's official agenda is promising, even if he claims more for it than he needs to. Sometimes it begins to feel like a straitjacket or Procrustes' bed, or worse yet an imperialist agenda: "All political theory in these years was definitional, educational, and historical" (p. 7). I have my doubts. Take the wondrously weird raptures of Abiezer Coppe, published in Jendrysik's chosen time frame. You can get a sense of what Coppe was up to just from his delicious, delirious titles: *A Second Fiery Flying Roule* or (a partly shamefaced, partly belligerent retraction of his earlier ecstatic flights) *Copp's Return to the Wayes of Truth: in a Zealous and Sincere Protestation against Severall Errors; and in a Sincere and Zealous Testimony to Several Truths: or, Truth Asserted against, and Triumphing over Error; and the Wings of the Fiery Flying Roll Clipt, & c.* The only way to save Jendrysik's claim is to adopt an invidiously narrow conception of what counts as political theory or an implausibly expansive conception of what counts as "definitional, educational, and historical." It is enough, surely, to say that his promised focus will illuminate some stuff, even if it cannot get everything we care about into sharp focus.

When Jendrysik turns to his chosen authors, the agenda wobbles, or comes in and out of focus; sometimes he seems to be lapsing into mere plot summary of what they say. What he says is always lucid and, in registering his points of disagreement with previous interpretations, always sensible (even if, curmudgeonly reader that I am, I am not always persuaded). But I am afraid he purchases his lucidity at the price of making things too elementary, of refusing to pursue some of the mischievous complications and nuances that his own agenda demands. So, for instance, he rightly insists that Winstanley's searing indictment of contemporary England focuses on covetousness, manifest, for instance, in the oppressive behavior of landlords and legislators. But this attempt to explain contingent political developments by appealing to ongoing psychological traits raises familiar difficulties. People did not suddenly become covetous in the 1640s, and Winstanley did not think they did. So how could covetousness explain civil war or regicide? There are materials in Jendrysik's account that one could enlist to assemble an answer. Yes, the imposition of the Norman yoke was an infamous moment in English history. But, Winstanley might be arguing, it was also just the same old same old—and the crushing accretions of covetousness over the centuries finally reached some tipping point. Maybe that is what Winstanley argues, and maybe the argument is plausible or even true: but Jendrysik himself does not assemble the argument and probe its textual and logical credentials.

Or again: Jendrysik generously adopts a stumbling formulation of my own about what is wrong with the fact/value gap in political theory (pp. 5, 16). But his focus on explanation might well trigger a commitment to just that picture in his readers: "Ah, I get it, these political theorists weren't just being normative, they were also fledgling political scientists with descriptive accounts of causation." So Jendrysik needs to say something sustained in his own voice about the philosophy of science, about what sorts of critters the explanations on offer here are, and precisely how they link up with criticism and justification. Perhaps he does not want to be skeptical about the fact/value gap. Perhaps the picture is as simple as this: Filmer, say, thought that intoxicated talk of natural liberty produced disorder; if you dislike disorder, then get rid of that talk; then the dangerous means will no longer produce the repulsive end. Perhaps. Perhaps not.

I do not mean to sound like the churlish reviewer who complains that the author did not write the book that he, the reviewer, would have written on the subject. My worry is, rather, that Jendrysik did not write the book he promises, that his interesting material remains tantalizing but underdeveloped.

From Noose to Needle: Capital Punishment and the Late Liberal State. By Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. 251p. $54.50 cloth, $21.95 paper.

— Leslie Paul Thiele, *University of Florida*

This book is not for the faint of heart. Its author extensively reviews the details of the hangman's slow strangulations and unintentional decapitations, not to mention the electric chair's sizzling mishaps. But, then again, to do otherwise might be disingenuous. Sanitizing our intellectual confrontation with capital punishment would effectively mimic the late liberal state's own effort to sanitize its machinery of death. And that effort is Timothy Kaufman-Osborn's target.

From Noose to Needle is not party to the now-voluminous "pro and con" scholarship on

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capital punishment. It does not debate the morality of the death penalty, its efficacy as a deterrent, its inherently racial/discriminatory nature, the quality of legal representation of those sentenced, the legitimacy of retribution as a motive, or the relative expenses of incarceration versus execution. Rather, Kaufman-Osborn argues, by grounding historical research on an eclectic mix of theoretical foundations—from the writings of John Locke and Max Weber to those of J. L. Austin and Michel Foucault—that the phenomenon of capital punishment illuminates the Sisyphean pursuit of legitimacy by the modern state.

Locke informs us that political power is defined by the right to make laws with a penalty of death, and hence with any lesser penalties. Kaufman-Osborn explores Weber's formalization of this definition. He posits Foucault as offering a friendly amendment to Weber's thesis that the state secures its identity by way of its claim to monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. Yet Kaufman-Osborn suggests that Foucault's project of highlighting the development of a productive, pastoral, biopower underplays the enduring force and function of the state's apparatuses of repression.

Kaufman-Osborn provides a well-documented account of hanging, from its origins in the absolutist state's effort to consolidate power to its inheritance by the liberal state. Until the nineteenth century, public hangings were a frequent display of a sovereign's power. Then gallows were moved behind penitentiary walls. While the more public venue might have better maintained the role capital punishment played as a deterrent, the state effectively settled on a different lesson. Those condemned to death would no longer be paraded to a gibbet in a carnival-like atmosphere that invited public participation. Rather, they would be quietly dispatched out of sight.

In time, the "barbarity" of hanging would give way to the technical efficiency of other forms of execution—in the United States, the electric chair, in 1890, and lethal injection beginning in 1977. Lethal injection leaves no marks on its victim, and, given the narcotic that is administered to the condemned before the poison ends his or her life, it allows no acknowledgment of pain. Lethal injection creates a corpse in medical fashion—efficiently, aseptically, rationally. In what amounts to a clinical operation, the state reasserts its claim over the body politic, effectively performing the medical service of painlessly excising a malignant tumor. In this respect, one might suggest that Foucault had it right after all. The movement to lethal injection, notwithstanding its repressive potential, highlights the further development of pastoral power, with the state donning the garb of the medical professional. Kaufman-Osborn does not expand on this line of thought, perhaps because of his attachment to Weber.

But the reliance on Weber bears its own fruit. Instrumental rationality may undermine the substantive rationality it was originally designed to serve, Weber maintained, when it becomes an end in itself. With lethal injection, which is now employed in more than 90% of all U.S. executions, the technical feat of producing corpses in the most effective manner becomes something of an end in itself. While the hangman's strangling or breaking of the condemned graphically highlighted state power, the recalcitrance of the human body thwarted the state's pursuit of flawless, sovereign control. That control was regained by technical means with the development of lethal injection. But the populist blood lust that ostensibly sustains capital punishment is insufficiently satisfied by this sanitized method of execution. Hence, Kaufman-Osborn speculates that the clinical nature of lethal injection may hasten the end of all forms of capital punishment. As humanitarian principles and the state's commitment to technical mastery forbid its reversion to other, more gruesome ways of killing, what is left is an efficient *means* that is no longer sufficiently justified by an *end*.

The modern state's long road from the noose to the needle, from carnivals of death to medicalized acts of euthanasia, is littered with victims. And the most noteworthy victim is the liberal state's own identity, an identity wrapped up in the claim to both humanistic rationality and the monopoly of legitimized violence. Behind the clinical machinery of technically perfect executions, the modern state hopes to absolve itself of any hint of inhumanity while reasserting its sovereignty. It is, we are told, a vain effort. The "political institution" of capital punishment, and lethal injection in particular, is "beyond repair" (p. 9). Yet the author acknowledges that well over half of all Americans—some surveys indicate up to 80%—support capital punishment. We are left to assume that it may take some time for practice to catch up with theory.

Kaufman-Osborn provokes us to reflect deeply about the meaning of capital punishment in late modernity. And he provides much in the way of historical and theoretical guidance for our reflections. On the downside, *From Noose to Needle* is a repetitive book, even beyond what might be viewed as the useful recitation of gory details. In turn, the author's efforts to give theoretical depth to his investigation occasionally fall short. For example, he cites Nietzsche's charge that out of a grammatical penchant for linking predicates to subjects, we invent a doer behind every deed and hence create identity when there is really only performance. Kaufman-Osborn exploits this antimetaphysical perspective to cast doubt on the justification for capital punishment, which hinges on the assumption of "autonomous selves who can be deemed unequivocally culpable for the (mis)deeds they freely commit" (p. 97). But, of course, from the Nietzschean perspective, every subject is deconstructible—not only the murderer but also the jaywalker, not to mention the judge, daughter, musician, university professor, and civil rights activist. Not only capital punishment, but law in general (and most of daily life) can be challenged by Nietzsche's truth about the fiction of identity. Kaufman-Osborn squarely lines up his Nietzschean sights on capital punishment. But he's holding a shotgun (or perhaps a grenade), rather than a rifle.

Perhaps the major shortcoming of the book is the absence of an international and comparative perspective. Kaufman-Osborn speaks expansively of the late liberal state. Apart from a vivid account of merry old England's torrid love affair with the hangman, however, the author never leaves the shores of the United States of America. He briefly observes that the legitimation crisis of the modern state is compounded by processes of globalization that further erode its sovereignty. In the wake of this crisis, capital punishment is employed to "substantiate its mythical claim to sovereign authority" (p. 172). Yet the author neglects to ask the obvious question: Why does the United States, in distinction from almost every other industrialized nation, maintain capital punishment in the twenty-first century? Is this anomaly to be explained in cultural terms? Is it a historical legacy? Or is it rather the product of the current hegemonic status of the United States in economic and military affairs? And, perhaps most intriguing, does it intimate the last gasp of a superpower—a desperate attempt to maintain the vestiges of sovereignty before the juggernaut of global interdependence? Kaufman-Osborn does not address these questions, but there is much food for thought in the story he tells that prompts us to ask them.

Eros and Polis: Desire and Community in Greek Political Theory.
By Paul W. Ludwig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 398p. $65.00.

— Zdravko Planinc, *McMaster University*

The ancient Greeks have what we want, and Paul Ludwig's ambitious project is to get it for us. He sets out to "build a theory" that is a

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"synthesis" (p. 319) of the best of Greek theory and practice and apply it to our times. Aristophanes' speech in Plato's *Symposium* and sections of Thucydides' *Peloponnesian War* are his main texts, and most of the book is given to their philological analysis, historical contextualization, and interpretive elaboration. When all is said and done, however, the five chapters spent in the effort do not produce something that is "fully in the spirit" of his authors (p. 319). As well, the two chapters applying the theory are anticlimactic: Ludwig addresses a collection of unrelated and peripheral political phenomena—a chapter is given to Greek civic nudity and such things as American nudist camps—and his main concern is less to develop a critique of modernity than to position his theory within current debates on communitarianism. By the end of the book, the theory and practice of the ancients have been brought around to modern understandings and the Greeks have been dressed in today's fashions once again.

The core of Ludwig's book is his account of the nature of *eros* and the rhetorical uses of eros in political discourse. The *Symposium* is discussed at length, but it is a *Symposium* without Socrates and Plato: "Diotima's dream [of] a generic erotic language that extends to any object under the sun" (p. 152) is dismissed out of hand. The philological parts of this project yield interesting observations at times, but they are inconsistently rigorous: The value of studying an author's usages is compromised if significant sections of his text are ignored; and Ludwig's notion of a "discourse of political *eros*" (p. 68) that can include anything in Greek literature even if it does not "explicitly [use] the term *eros* or its cognates" (p. 122) is so ambiguous as to be interpretive license. The resulting theory is selective: Some things that are not eros count as eros, and some things that obviously are eros do not.

In Homer, eros is desire of any kind, and of any intensity. In the poetry, prose, and oratory of later centuries, the term tended to be used more narrowly to mean sexual passion. Euripides, in particular, frequently uses it to make trivial things sexy—a familiar enough sales technique. The term's semantic range, for Ludwig, thus has three categories: the "specific" (sexual passion), the "generic" (akin to "liking" something), and the "specific-transferred," which relates the passion of the specific to any generic or inherently unerotic object (pp. 126–28). He claims to take his categorization from Plato's Diotima, the first to note the synecdoche, but also the first to argue against it (pp. 145–46). Much of Ludwig's presentation is a demonstration of his ear for subtle distinctions in shading between generic and specific-transferred usages (p. 150); however, it is his rejection of "Diotima's dream" that goes to the heart of things. Ludwig rejects the understanding of the nature of eros shared by Homer and Plato, despite their other differences, in favor of the understanding shared by sophists, political orators, and uninspired poets.

Ludwig's analysis of the serviceable part of the *Symposium,* Aristophanes' comic eulogy, cuts it in half, emphasizing the significance of the different conditions before and after the development of eros as we experience it. This interpretive strategy allows him to read a sophistic distinction between nature and convention in the story, including an account of the conventionality of the gods. It also permits illuminating parallels to be drawn with Rousseau's understanding of the human longing for a lost natural wholeness and its relation to the historical development of society, polity, and civil religion (pp. 82, 92–96). In the end, however, Aristophanes is more Hobbesian or Freudian for Ludwig, and the charming tale becomes quite dark: "Human nature is inhuman in Aristophanes' account. Only nomos confers on man the human *eidos*" (p. 99).

Insofar as a theory that Ludwig would defend in his own name might be extracted from his partial and widely dispersed exegeses—an "Index of Passages Cited" is a necessity for such a rambling book—it would seem he thinks that eros is nonerotic until it is properly formed. There is a primitive, natural *"Ur-*eros" (p. 105) that only becomes eros proper when it is somehow disciplined, sublimated, or mixed with some other nonerotic quality. The Ur-eros is *thumos,* the acquisitive, angry, selfish, and prideful spirit of human nature—experientially, one's "sense of self." Its opposite is "self-forgetting," which Ludwig describes as the "nonerotic desire" for nonerotic ends, such as Plato's abstract universals, "the beautiful" and "the good" (p. 378). The "love of one's own," therefore, is a limit case of a mixture: very thumotic, but not all thumos. And yet Diotima's account is unacceptable to Ludwig because it attempts to synthesize or mix the selfishness of one's own and the contemplative universality of the beautiful, two things that he insists must remain "unsynthesized and . . . at the opposite poles of a spectrum" (p. 331). The poles of Ludwig's spectrum are themselves nonerotic (p. 378). They are possession and abstraction, the desires of the body and the mind in the modern understanding of human nature. This is eros without *psyche.* And in the place of a Greek erotics, there is instead a mixture of Rousseau and Auguste Comte: Ludwig argues that the acquisitiveness of eros "makes one forget about oneself" by concentrating on its object, and so human beings are fooled into being "other-directed" and "altruistic," and their qualities "become social, useful" (p. 337).

Perhaps Ludwig's boldest claim is to have identified "an important, qualitatively different political motivation" that it is necessary to include in any complete "political psychology of empire," a motivation that has been overlooked by modern theorists who focus "exclusively" on the thumotic aspects of imperialism (pp. 319, 365). It emerges from his interpretation of the erotic terminology in Thucydides' presentation of three episodes: the pederastic relation of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and the tyrannicide that follows from it; Pericles' Funeral Oration; and the Sicilian expedition. Ludwig paraphrases Pericles' Oration as saying to Athenians: "Fall in love with the abstract entity of the city and court her as you would a human beloved" (p. 321). The Sicilian expedition is similarly an instance of "specific-transfer" in the discourse of political eros. Thucydides' account "describes a new mode, *eros*, in which profit, for example, can be experienced," an intensification of "ordinary motives in an abnormal, atypical manner" (p. 358). But it also describes a new motive: an "imperial gaze" (p. 364). Ludwig takes this to mean that a cosmopolitan or touristic interest, a contemplative desire, a love of spectacle, consumerism, and the desire to conquer and dominate foreign lands are all somehow the same thing, originating in a Greek excess. One might take issue with any part of this claim, but it is hardly a new one: When Ludwig writes that imperialism is "an insane altruism" (p. 371), he is much closer to the arguments of modern continental philosophy than he would admit.

In the battle between the ancients and moderns, *Eros and Polis* is modern-transferred. Readers interested in studies of the relevance of the *Symposium* for modern times written on the other side of the battlement should turn to Mark Lutz's *Socrates' Education to Virtue* (1998) and James Rhodes's *Eros, Wisdom, and Silence* (2003).

Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy. By Susan Mendus. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 168p. $44.00.

— Virginia Held, *City University of New York*

Should the claims of impartial justice always trump loyalty to our own families and groups? If not, how can government claim legitimacy for its power to enforce? But if justice demands that we ignore the claims of those we care about most, why should we heed the call of justice? The problem was troublesome for the ancient Greeks and has been so since. It has

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received new attention with recent critiques of Kantian moral theory and of Rawlsian theories of justice.

Susan Mendus reconsiders the arguments for impartial morality. She effectively shows why the solutions offered by Brian Barry and T. M. Scanlon are unpersuasive. Barry maintains that the seeming problem evaporates since, at a higher level, impartial rules can approve of our particular acts of giving gifts and special attention to friends and family members while not to strangers. He tries to dissolve any conflict between justice and partial concerns by a two-level approach upholding the priority of justice. To Mendus, this merely evades the issues.

She cites an example dealt with by Marcia Baron, who wrote that "where there are very long waiting lists for medical treatment, some may be able to pull strings to schedule (e.g.) surgery [promptly]. . . . On the one hand, it seems patently unfair to pull strings. . . . Yet how can one, in such a situation, weight the considerations and decide [concerning one's child in grave need of treatment] that would be wrong. He has to wait his turn—even if it costs him his life" (Mendus, p. 60). Baron concludes that fairness ought to prevail, but that people are torn in such situations, and we would think less well of them if they were not tempted to pull strings.

Mendus thinks this shows how Barry's position is unsatisfactory, since on Barry's view, the rules of impartiality would simply prevail, and we could not make sense of our thinking less well of those who felt no conflict. Mendus shows how, for the person involved, Barry's view leaves open the question: Should I be guided by impartial morality, or by such other considerations as my love for my child? The question needs to be answered not just from the higher-level third-person perspective; it needs to motivate from the perspective of the person making the decision.

T. M. Scanlon, like Barry, thinks the conflict between impartiality and special concern for our friends and families can be dissolved. He thinks reasons of friendship are compatible with reasons of justice, and that friendship is a model for partial values generally, so there is no problem. Scanlon holds that "the conception of friendship that we . . . have reason to value involves recognizing the moral value of friends *qua* persons, hence the moral claims of nonfriends as well. . . . Compatibility with the demands of interpersonal morality is built into the value of friendship itself" (Mendus, p. 66).

Mendus thinks this reductionism fails to take into account how we might be torn, as parents, between upholding fairness and seeking special advantage to save our child: "Indeed, some would say that to be moved by my friend's interests only when those interests are consonant with impartial morality is not to be a true friend at all" (p. 74).

She agrees with such critics of impartial morality as Bernard Williams and Michael Stocker that the attachments we have to particular people and projects can be directly motivating, and that the possible conflict between partial concerns and impartial morality is serious. But she goes on to argue that an impartialism "grounded" in the partial concerns of what we care about has a good chance after all of having moral priority *and* of motivating us.

At this point, the argument becomes less than clear. Mendus shows how an impartiality based on our concern for the things and people we care about would solve the problem of providing motivation, but not quite how it could be achieved. She claims that just because a friend will be reluctant to submit a request from us to moral scrutiny, we should be reluctant to ask a friend to do anything in conflict with what morality seen from an impartial perspective requires. Thus, "impartial considerations flow from and are implied by the partial concerns we have for particular people" (p. 88). Presumably, then, the mother who might pull strings could reason: My child, if he knew, would not want me to pull strings to save him, so out of love for him I will refrain from doing so. Although she might not be motivated directly by impartial justice, she would reach impartiality through her special concern. Here, the reader must wonder if this is a more plausible interpretation of how to arrive at the priority of impartiality than are the ways Mendus subjects to criticism.

To "get morality off the ground" from our partial concerns, she explores the notion of care, accepting Harry Frankfurt's view of what it is to care about something. It is disappointing that although care is such a central concept in her argument, she offers no discussion at all of the ethics of care, which by now has a substantial literature. In this literature, care is the practice, and value, of caring for or taking care of those whose needs make them dependent. This is different from Frankfurt's individual caring about something, and more promising as a source of morality.

Mendus notes how caring about something makes us vulnerable to loss. She thinks that if we care about that which is corrupt, or vulgar and sordid, we lose moral status, and so caring involves evaluation. But this is questionable; one can care about what is corrupt while keeping one's moral distance. As long as caring is seen merely as an individual's caring about, rather than as a valuable relation of caring between, persons, it is unclear how care gets beyond a mere preference, and how any morality, let alone impartial morality, can get off the ground from our partial concerns.

Mendus aims in *Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy* to establish the priority of justice based not on a comprehensive conception of the good that not all in a pluralistic society will share, but on our concerns for particular persons. She frequently summarizes what she has argued and will argue; some may find this repetitious, others helpful. Whether or not she succeeds in making her case, the book is an admirable treatment of the issues of justice and impartial morality in the light of recent critiques.

Gender in the Mirror: Cultural Imagery and Women's Agency. By Diana Tietjens Meyers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 248p. $55.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

— Catriona Mackenzie, *Macquarie University*

In a series of important contributions to feminist philosophy spanning two decades, Diana Meyers has been at the forefront of feminist efforts to rethink philosophical conceptions of agency, selfhood, and autonomy. One of her central concerns has been to develop a relational, competency-based account of autonomy that can explain the role of an agent's social environment in fostering or impeding agency. Another concern has been to explore the relationship between dominant cultural metaphors or images and the constitution of individual subjectivity. This book brings these themes together in an investigation of the effects of entrenched cultural imagery on women's capacities for self-determination.

The central argument of *Gender in the Mirror* is that in patriarchal cultures, women's subordination is perpetuated, among other means, by internalized cultural imagery that effects various forms of self-subordination. Such imagery takes hold at the level of women's desires, self-conceptions, and body images, and shapes their relations to themselves and others. Feminist attempts to redress inequality by challenging social, economic, and political structures that disadvantage women, while important, are nevertheless insufficient to counter the powerful effects of this imagery on women's psyches. Genuine autonomy for women requires the articulation of compelling, alternative cultural imagery, or what Meyers calls "counterfigurations."

The central five chapters focus on two domains—maternity and the family, and appearance and the body—in which dominant

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cultural imagery holds powerful sway over women's psyches in Western countries. In Chapter 2, Meyers argues that despite the contemporary voluntarist rhetoric of reproductive freedom and choice, an analysis of women's actual motherhood decisions reveals the extent to which these decisions are shaped by a ubiquitous and almost unquestioned pronatalist discourse. The effect of this discourse, which represents motherhood as essential to women's fulfillment and voluntary childlessness as deviance, is to undermine women's capacity to make genuinely reflective choices with respect to maternity.

Chapter 3 explores representations of the mother–child relationship in the context of the ethics of care. Some feminist theorists have suggested that rethinking social justice through the metaphor of the mothering relationship can highlight inadequacies in the dominant metaphor of the social contract and hence reorder political priorities. Meyers argues that despite the effectiveness of this metaphor in focusing political attention onto issues of social responsibility to care for the vulnerable, the power of prevailing tropes of the mother–child relationship—as fusion, debt, or Oedipal love—undermines its plausibility as a metaphor for social justice.

To challenge these tropes involves not only rethinking how caregiving and child rearing are conceptualized; it also involves radical revisions to conceptions of family relations. Chapter 4 grapples with the difficult issues of sexual abuse, recovered memory, and multiple personality disorder, in relation to Freudian narratives of the emergence of gender identity as structured by (real or fantasized) incestuous desire. Meyers urges that the displacement of these narratives of family relations is essential if the dynamics of psychosexual formation are to be disentangled from sexual abuse. Given the link between early sexual abuse and multiple personality disorder, she also advises feminists to be cautious of models of selfhood as multiple.

Chapters 5 and 6 shift the focus onto cultural metaphors of women's relations to their appearances and aging bodies. The central motif of Chapter 5 is the mirror. Meyers traces the historical transformation of the idea of narcissism from the story of the male Narcissus to the equation of narcissism with femininity, and she explores the role of mirror imagery in European and American art and culture in representing women's self-conceptions and relations to others. The internalization of such imagery, she argues, subverts women's agency by conflating identity and self-knowledge with appearance. The devastating effects of this conflation on women's psyches haunts them into old age, as the aging feminine body becomes a metaphor for bodily dissolution and death. The question posed in Chapter 6 is how women can authentically come to terms with the aging process in a culture in which loss of appearance is figured as loss of self-esteem and identity.

Each of these chapters is provocative, inventive, and rich in detail. Meyers draws on a range of sources to construct her readings of cultural imagery and includes within each chapter a sampling of alternative, feminist images that could function as counterfigurations. Whether or not one always agrees with her readings, or finds these alternatives compelling, Meyers's overall thesis, that cultural imagery functions as entrenched schemas that organize perception, direct the imagination into stereotyped patterns of thinking, and close off consideration of alternative possibilities, provides an important explanation of how women's capacities for self-determination can be compromised by their own desires and self-conceptions. It also explains why gender enculturation cannot be countered simply by rational argument or by institutional change.

Framing the central chapters, Chapters 1 and 7 situate Meyers's analyses of cultural imagery within the context of current debates about identity, autonomy, and sexism. The defining theoretical questions she seeks to address are, first, how to theorize gender oppression without presupposing a false universalism about gender and, second, how to respect women's choices while accounting for the ways in which these choices have been structured by internalized oppression. Meyers couches her answer to these questions in the language of authenticity. Gender, she argues, is not merely a matter of external social structure; it is incorporated into the constitution of identity. This does not mean, however, that all women incorporate gender identity in the same way—the process of internalization is also a process of individualization. Nevertheless, since gender enculturation involves the incorporation of culturally entrenched, and normalizing, images of subordination into agents' cognitive, emotional, and motivational structures, its effect is to undermine women's capacities to speak in their own voices. This raises the question of how to distinguish authentic from inauthentic voices. Meyers does not attempt to provide a criterion of authenticity. Instead, she focuses on the kinds of skills and capacities that agents must possess if they are to be able to develop what she calls "authentic self-portraits."

My general concern about Meyers's answer to the book's defining theoretical questions is that the encapsulated, condensed answer provided in the first chapter is not elaborated in sufficient theoretical detail in later chapters, since these function rather as a series of examples or case studies. Thus, Meyers's account of the psychological processes by which gender identity is both internalized and individualized, although of central relevance to the overall argument, is only sketched out briefly. A more specific concern relates to Meyers's proposal to understand autonomy in terms of authenticity. A virtue of this account, Meyers argues, is that it steers a middle path between value-neutral and normative conceptions of autonomy, thus providing a way to respect women's choices while accounting for the ways in which these choices have been structured by internalized oppression. However, I would suggest that the notion of authenticity is more normatively structured than Meyers acknowledges and that her critiques of cultural imagery confirm this. The problem with subordinating cultural imagery is that in limiting women's capacities to articulate their own voices, it also undermines self-esteem, self-respect, and the capacity to live a flourishing life. To disconnect autonomy from these values on the ground that there is no universal agreement about their interpretation blunts the critical edge of feminist critique, which is inescapably normative.

These issues aside, this book is a thought-provoking, insightful exploration of the way in which women's identities and choices are shaped by images that are so fundamental to our conceptions of who we are that they seem natural.

No Escape: Freedom of Speech and the Paradox of Rights. By Paul A. Passavant. New York: New York University Press, 2002. 240p. $38.00.

— Jeff Spinner-Halev, *University of Nebraska*

Paul Passavant provocatively argues that an examination of twentieth-century America shows that the conflict many find between nationalism and liberal individual rights does not exist. The United States is supposed to be one of the great defenders of individual rights, but at the same time, these rights are not given to everyone. Rather, they are granted to U.S. citizens. "When one claims a constitutional right like freedom of speech," Passavant argues, one gains the right if one is an American since "such rights are reserved for the American people" (p. 3). This raises the question of who can become a citizen, and he readily finds a strong strand of American belief that it is only the "civilized"—often white and European,

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sometimes North European—who should become citizens. Since liberal citizenship is defined in exclusive and nationalistic ways, he argues, we should rethink the standard view that there is a tension between liberalism and communitarianism, or between liberalism and nationalism, and recognize how the two "may function to intensify each other" (p. 3).

They intensify each other because the construction of American identity partly defines free speech. What is seen as American, decent, and civilized is allowed; what is viewed as un-American, indecent, and uncivilized is not. The first chapter looks at the American founding, the second at Woodrow Wilson and an early-twentieth-century American legal scholar, John Burgess, and the third at John Stuart Mill. In each, Passavant finds the idea of individual rights readily coexisting with the idea that only the civilized deserve these rights. The last three chapters shift a bit to look at the rhetorical strategies surrounding controversies in recent American life. These chapters examine Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights movement, the Salman Rushdie affair, hate-speech codes on university and college campuses, and pornography law. The themes of nationalism and liberalism fade away in these chapters, although these chapters emphasize the idea that American identity and individual rights (particularly, but not only, free speech) are intertwined. King appealed to American values, and contrasted them with communism, in his efforts to gain free treatment for black Americans. In the Rushdie affair, Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters were painted as living in medieval times and violating Western values. And so, too, those who supported campus speech codes were painted as anti-American. This rhetoric is also used to restrict speech when the issue is decency, as those who try to peddle material considered obscene or put on nude dancing are considered indecent or uncivilized. Hovering through much of Passavant's arguments in both halves of the book is what he calls "moral geography"—the idea propagated by some that free speech and other individual rights are reserved for those of us in the West, and are rightfully denied those elsewhere.

The key idea in *No Escape,* however, is that free speech is not limitless or abstracted from the political community, but is constituted in part by how the community defines itself. Passavant is very good at examining the rhetorical strategies employed by the self-appointed defenders of liberty, showing how they consistently and constantly deploy the civilized and uncivilized dichotomy. Yet at the same time, the thesis of the book's first half, the intertwining of nationalism and liberalism, is underexplored. So, too, is the related idea that rights are given only to citizens, not to foreigners, an issue that has taken on more urgency since September 11, 2001. Indeed, that there are liberal and exclusivist strands in American history has long been noted by scholars. Oddly, there is no mention here of Rogers Smith's *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History* (1997), which discusses three strands of citizenship in the United States: liberal, republican, and ascriptive American (the idea that American citizenship is best reserved for white, Anglo-Saxon men), and is directly related to Passavant's arguments. The question that Passavant's book raises, but does little to answer, is whether the liberal and exclusivist strands are separate strands (as Smith suggests) or whether they are inherently intertwined. That they existed side by side in American history is certainly true, but whether this was necessary or simply contingent is not addressed by Passavant.

Similarly, many scholars have argued that liberalism and nationalism, or liberalism and communitarianism, can coexist quite happily. In recent years, many political theorists—Will Kymlicka, Yael Tamir, Margaret Moore, Charles Taylor, Michael Walzer, and Richard Dagger, to name only a few—have discussed the matter at great length, though all are absent here. Here, too, Passavant misses an opportunity to discuss whether liberalism and nationalism can combine readily, as these theorists suggest, or whether the nationalism pushes liberalism into a dark corner.

Part of the problem here is that Passavant's narrative about American nationalism ends in the early 1920s, with the passing of restrictive immigration laws. These laws, however, were eventually reversed, something that he says little about. Yet it is unclear if the opening up of America's gates means that there is no inherent connection between liberalism and nationalism. Similarly, international law has taken on increasing importance in Europe, though not necessarily in the United States, which prods another of Passavant's arguments: that rights are embedded in the national political community. The distinction between citizen and noncitizen, which is clearly important in the United States these days, is noted here, but its implications are not teased out as they should be. Again, one wants to know whether this distinction is a contingent or necessary one: Are the rights of citizens inherent in the idea of a sovereign political community, or does international law show otherwise? This is a thought-provoking and well-written book, but many of Passavant's intriguing arguments stop short of what they should.

Neglected Policies: Constitutional Law and Legal Commentary as Civic Education. By Ira L. Strauber. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002. 267p. $64.95 cloth, $21.95 paper.

— Jon B. Gould, *George Mason University*

In this recent book, Ira Strauber challenges teachers and commentators of constitutional law to rethink "their self-image as civil educators in an interpretive community" (p. 1). Devoted as they are to the law's formalism, Strauber believes that these observers ignore the "context-specific, circumstantial, and consequentialist social fact considerations that are at the core of colliding political perspectives and controversies in pluralist politics" (p. 2).

In place of abstract, formal truths, Strauber advocates an approach called "agnostic skepticism," which carefully scrutinizes all legal reasoning and arguments. Agnosticism embraces the complexity and ambiguity of legal discourse and abandons the false comfort of absolutism in legal arguments and reasoning. In place of blind devotion to certainty in jurisprudence, he claims that agnostic skepticism will bring greater tolerance and civility in law and politics, within public and private affairs alike.

Strauber, has clearly thought about these questions at length, and his book is an interesting contribution to constitutional jurisprudence. Yet, while the book is broad in its claims, it is narrow in proposed remedies, leaving the reader to question the actual application of his insight. The writing is also complicated and abstract, thereby limiting the audience that might benefit from his work.

Much of the book shows how judges, teachers, and critics miss the true bases of judicial decisions by hiding behind formal or abstract assertions of law. Strauber is at his best when he reasons through cases as proof of this point. For example, in *Texas v. Johnson,* the 1989 Supreme Court case concerning flag burning, he argues that the majority and dissent share similar but unstated assumptions about the interests of free expression. He skillfully identifies three separate interests at stake—audience interests, participant interests, and sovereignty interests—claiming that Justice Brennan's majority opinion and Justice Rehnquist's dissent "elevate sovereignty interests above the other two," differing "only about whether the Court or state legislatures ought to have the authority to safeguard society and morality" (p. 58). Strauber finds their unexamined presumptions all the more troubling since neither side truly engaged the facts of the case. *Johnson* was not originally a case of political debate, he says; rather, the plaintiff was intending to be offensive.

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Strauber's thesis should not be mistaken for critical legal studies. Although he acknowledges that agnosticism has its basis in sociological jurisprudence, legal realism, and critical legal studies, this book is not about judges with political agendas that perpetuate hegemony. (Indeed, as he says, "the best that agnostics can do is to construct a range of scenarios that address the relative strengths and weaknesses of what it means to include the excluded in commentary" [p. 181].) Court decisions *do* reflect the assumptions and preferences of judges, but here the insight is not so much that actors are working from ideological aims as that their understandings of, and commitments to, a certain framework of government and civil society influence their decisions in a way that neither they nor commentators truly appreciate. As a result, Strauber says, both courts and commentators misinform the lay public about law, politics, and civil society. This is the ultimate attack on current civics education, not because participants are mean-spirited or strong partisans but because they are in denial or unable to see the true presumptions that undergird their arguments. In response, he urges teachers and critics to advance what he calls a "Jeffersonian civic culture," one in which "an elite of properly educated citizens" appreciates that law and politics are more often gray than black and white (p. 4). He also recommends that educators emphasize private relations over public ones, since "for most citizens, daily private relations are more conspicuous and important than public ones" (p. 221).

Strauber's analysis is useful, but *Neglected Policies* is very dense, and more distressingly, difficult to read. This will not be a book that undergraduates understand, and only the best graduate students will parse the writing and appreciate the author's points. Consider the following selection where Strauber addresses Ronald Dworkin's objections to legal pragmatism: "If, in hard cases, abstractions readily identifiable with political morality are not maintained as primary and essential for reasoning about the Constitution and its precedents, then something like the amended originalism of the previous chapter can be dismissed as a mere polemic for personal policy predilections about democratization" (p. 162).

Strauber aims to present Dworkin's case against agnosticism. If there are no bedrock moral criteria to evaluate constitutional decisions, then originalism becomes a smoke screen for judges' personal preferences about the issues at hand or society's structure. Strauber answers this charge, but again the claim can be made more clearly. He says: "The point . . . is not to deny the possibility or even the plausibility of commentary that demonstrates the 'correctness' or propriety of specific legal, or political commitments. Quite the contrary, . . . in agnostic commentary it is appropriate to advocate [such views] as long as that advocacy is suitably qualified by the tentativeness and suspicion that skepticism and relativism require" (p. 174).

What Strauber presents, then, is not so much a theory of law or politics as it is a method of interpretation and commentary. His analysis is certainly helpful in teasing through judicial opinions to uncover the real motives or beliefs behind decisions and orders, but it is unclear how far his admonition gets us, except for the useful warning not to bind ourselves blindly to absolute poles or positions. Will an appreciation for complexity and ambiguity in law help to promote a Jeffersonian civic culture? It is hard to say, although it is difficult to argue with a more tolerant and civil society. But missing here is a sense of the bases on which legal decisions may properly be made. Strauber says his method is agnostic, focusing on the means, not the ends, of legal discourse, but there are normative implications to his approach. If, as he acknowledges, it is possible to evaluate the relative strengths and weaknesses of legal arguments and reasoning, then how should we weigh the ultimate bases of legal decision making? Or, put another way, what norms or beliefs might a democratic society advance, even as it conscientiously scrutinizes the arguments and reasoning of its members?

Locke and the Legislative Point of View: Toleration, Contested Principles, and the Law. By Alex Tuckness. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 224p. $49.50 cloth, $17.95 paper.

— Ingrid Creppell, *George Washington University*

In this enlightening, well-crafted book, Alex Tuckness develops a new reading of Locke's theory of toleration, and in the process provides an alternative—distinctly Lockean as opposed to utilitarian, contractualist, or perfectionist—perspective from which to view contemporary debates about disagreement, deliberation, and liberalism. His reconstruction of Locke is highly convincing and makes a great deal of sense of Locke's unique approach to law and coercion. I found the book's contribution to the debates about toleration less substantial; he rightly makes short work of the proverbial toleration paradox but still leaves unresolved how principles might be used in deciding hard cases of the limits of toleration. Still, his concept of a legislative point of view is of great interest.

The idea of a "legislative point of view" (LPV) is built upon Tuckness's unearthing of a neglected argument Locke makes primarily in the *Third Letter Concerning Toleration*. Here, Locke argued against Proast's contention that natural law obligates the magistrate to use force in support of true religion. To interpret natural law is to establish a general rule applicable to all relevant actors, even those magistrates or princes who may be mistaken in their religious beliefs. If we enact a general rule "enforce true religion," it must be implemented by those mistaken princes, thus bringing about the opposite of the intended result, a world in which God's truth is realized. God would already have foreseen this and, therefore, as the legislator of the law of nature, would not establish an irrational framework of this sort. God's general rules—the law of nature—are necessarily set up with human fallibility in mind. Thus, there are two branches of natural law, that which applies to the person in relation to God and that which justifies political enforcement.

Our natural law duty is to act as moral agents created by God, and in situations of a specific sort—political ones in which general rules must be made and force used—we are called on to remind ourselves of this God's-eye perspective—in other words, to put ourselves in the legislative point of view. The LPV will direct individuals and political leaders to implement principles in favor of toleration: One can continue to believe in the truth-value of one's principles (hence, toleration is not based on skepticism) while also holding that it is nevertheless not the place of government to use force to implement deeply held principles. Tuckness reads Locke primarily as a natural law theorist rather than a social contract theorist on questions of the ends of government (leaving aside, for the most part, issues of political obligation), and along these lines, he develops a useful distinction between contractual and legislative consent that nicely ties together Locke's arguments for toleration and his discussion of the ends of government in the *Two Treatises*.

Tuckness shows how Locke's argument can be used analogically by persons today who would reject its natural law foundations. On the one hand, each of us holds political-moral principles we believe in. On the other hand, there are rules we would want people to act on. In abstraction, these two would be identical or at least follow directly. However, given disagreement, the recognition of human fallibility, and the need for coercion, we cannot assume a direct translation of the two types of principles: Rules of evaluation are not equivalent to rules of action because others will enact

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the former in ways we may find unacceptable. In any situation in which state power is to be applied on the basis of contested principles, we (as citizens, legislators, or judges voting on or interpreting "public good," justice, public policy, etc., including tax, civil, and criminal laws) are necessarily called on to recognize this structure of reasoning and thereby take up a legislative point of view. For example, we might approve of the principle "government ought to support family values" when we agree with a specific rendering of "family values," but not when gay rights activists insist on interpreting family values in their way. The logic of the LPV would tell us to modify or reject vague, controversial principles for political implementation. By using normative ideas now widely accepted in liberal democracies—moral agency, moral equality, generality, and publicity; taken together he calls this "juridical equality"—we can outline the framework in which disputes should take place. A virtue of the book is Tuckness's application of this rubric to such contested issues as hate speech, the public good, and Martin Luther King's civil disobedience, and quite imaginatively to debates on the proper role and functions of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, and of persons who fill institutional roles.

If we take disagreement seriously, then we cannot logically or morally ignore that some points of view seem to resist becoming "reasonable." Does the LPV provide a better response to this problem of how to motivate protagonists to adopt joint moral reasoning, or must we be Lockeans to adopt it? Tuckness argues that contemporary religious fundamentalists could find an affinity to Locke's theological, natural law roots and be moved to take up a LPV, which I find implausible. Pointing out shared "religious" or "theological" premises would not seem to provide a persuasive enough language to bring in religious groups. It is, however, a beginning to insist that irresolvable disagreement is itself a moral fact about the world that ought to be a focus of core theoretical significance, not merely a background constraint.

This raises the obvious comparison to John Rawls. Although Tuckness attempts to draw sharp distinctions between them, I think he exaggerates these, and if the distinction is significant, it raises another problem. Tuckness claims that in an LPV, we never have to bracket our comprehensive doctrines but always engage each other's views without attempting a resolution (pp. 98–99). Still, some sort of judgment must take place. What kind will it be? Presumably, a level of political-moral consensus on action or enforceable laws. With Rawls, neither the overlapping consensus nor public reason stand for the resolution of substantive differences, but as agreement to stipulate some politically enactable rules that we find a way to ground in our own primary principles. Perhaps the difference is in how much of the self is located in those political rules, but both authors indicate a metasphere of agreement on action. This sphere is Rawls's main concern, while for Tuckness it remains for the most part underspecified. On the whole, the judgments resulting seem to be negative, veto judgments, or guidelines to choose the more cautious over the more proactive versions of law. Tuckness admits, for example, that adopting a legislative point of view leads to a "restrictive understanding of the public good that would be less subject to conflicting interpretations" (p. 109). In the end, the LPV functions mainly as a filter for law making, setting standards of what it would not be wise to pursue. While it models a legislative assembly with the necessary exchange of views, it does so mainly in a deliberative, not in an innovative or constructive, mode. Nevertheless, Tuckness outlines a highly suggestive ideal and set of arguments to employ in our interminable cycle of contestation.

God, Locke, and Equality: Christian Foundations in Locke's Political Thought. By Jeremy Waldron. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 276p. $60.00 cloth, $22.00 paper.

— Steven Forde, *University of North Texas*

Jeremy Waldron has written a book that does a service to two sets of scholars. With feet in the camp both of Locke scholarship and of contemporary political/moral philosophy, it provides insights that will stimulate thinking in both areas. In the process, it shows how Locke's political thought can be relevant to the most current philosophical debates.

Jeremy Waldron's surprising conclusion (surprising to himself, first of all) is that Locke's argument for equality cannot stand without the theology he proposes to back it up. Since Waldron sees equality as the most fundamental of Locke's moral/philosophical commitments, this raises the question, in Waldron's view, of whether our own commitment to this principle is sustainable given our equally strong commitment to secularism. That Waldron presents this as a serious issue, but does not resolve it, is a good indication of the approach and the tone of this book.

As befits his thesis, Waldron takes on a good share of controversy. He attacks the Cambridge School for claiming that Locke's political writings are not meaningfully connected to his philosophical works. This approach would reduce the political writings to occasional, ad hoc pamphlets with little or no philosophical background or significance. He also defends Locke, at great length, against charges that he believed "men," but not women, to be equal. In this and other matters, Waldron firmly rejects the view that Locke might have been an unthinking transmitter of the prejudices of his age: There are too many respects in which Locke broke radically with his contemporaries, and even when he concurred with them, it was, reflectively, on his own terms. Waldron assails the view, espoused most memorably by C. B. Macpherson, that Locke was an apologist for the monied classes of his own day, and did not think the working classes capable of rationality or worthy of rights. Waldron argues, to the contrary, that most of Locke's barbs about intellectual failings are directed to gentlemen who lazily accept inherited ideas, and that none of the passages read by Macpherson as disenfranchising the lower classes will bear that interpretation.

The heart of *God, Locke, and Equality,* however, as its title indicates, is its theological-political argument. Locke's theology has long been recognized as the most vexing part of his intellectual project. He makes repeated claims that morality requires a theological grounding. If morality is encompassed in a "natural law," this means it must be complemented by a "natural theology." Locke claims that such a theology is possible, and he even develops portions of it, but despite prodding from his friends (and enemies), he never produced a fully adequate product. Scholars have responded to this situation in different ways. There is what Waldron calls the "standard" interpretation, championed by John Dunn (p. 53). This is that Locke tried to produce an adequate theology but failed, leaving his system a shambles and forcing him to retreat to biblical faith. Another interpretation is that Locke's system does not depend on theology, despite his explicit statements, and that his moral and political teaching will stand without it (though this may entail that that teaching is different than it appears on the surface). Waldron confesses that the second is the interpretation he originally adopted. He later decided that theology is indeed essential to Locke, but disagrees with Dunn in finding a whole and consistent Lockean teaching. He proposes a series of novel thoughts concerning Locke's theology.

First, Waldron argues, Locke's claim that a natural theology is in principle possible does not necessarily mean that it will ever be achieved by mankind (pp. 94–96). This would explain some of Locke's more pessimistic statements regarding reason's capacity in theological matters, as well as his own unfinished

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theology. Whether a perpetually incomplete theology can adequately support natural law is more open to question. To address that issue, Waldron points to the sallies in natural theology that Locke did make, and argues that these are enough to vindicate the enterprise (p. 97). In particular, Waldron seems satisfied that Locke attained a proof of God's existence, which is the critical point (p. 106). But it is not clear from his presentation whether the God thus arrived at is the providential, rewarding, and punishing God that Locke's theory requires. This is too critical a nuance to be glossed over.

Waldron does conclude that Locke's natural theology was incomplete enough that it ultimately needed supplementation by revelation (pp. 104, 106, 207). This requires us to accept that Locke's theology and morality are identical to those of the Bible, the New Testament in particular. There are enough statements in Locke to this effect (especially in the *Reasonableness of Christianity*), but what of the fact that important aspects of Locke's moral teaching—its basis in self-interest and rights, and its devotion to this-worldly comfort, to mention only two—seem to sort very ill with Scripture? There may be no perfect solution to this problem, but one might have expected at least an acknowledgment of the difficulty in the midst of what is otherwise such a thorough treatment. He might have found interesting suggestions among some of the scholars influenced by Leo Strauss, though he apparently did not consult them. It is strange that an author so ready to question the "standard" interpretation of Locke, and the Cambridge School of interpretation, should fall prey to the *jihad* they have prosecuted these many years against a particular line of interpretation.

One puzzle Waldron forthrightly takes on is Locke's argument in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* that natural species do not exist. This is a threshold issue because if "humanity" is merely an arbitrary construct of the mind, it would seem incapable of grounding any stable moral theory. How can we say that humans are equal, or have rights, if humanity is not a natural kind, has no natural essence? Waldron correctly laments the dearth of serious discussion of this issue, though again he might have found some astute discussions among authors he does not consult. His ingenious resolution of the problem is that the trait that defines humans as moral subjects is their ability to form abstract ideas. This allows them to ascend to knowledge of God, which in turn makes them knowing subjects of divine/natural law (pp. 75–80).

This is but one of the ways that, in Waldron's interpretation, Locke's liberalism rests on a theological commitment. Whether or not we agree with this claim about Locke, or about liberalism, these are issues that need to be addressed more forthrightly than they have been in contemporary philosophies of liberalism. Waldron's claim needs to be seriously considered, that equality, and with it liberal morality, need a transcultural, even transcendent grounding if they are to do the work we want them to do. A purely "neutral" grounding in John Rawls's sense will not work if rival understandings of the basis of liberalism cause its different adherents to strike out in incompatible directions. Is it possible that liberalism requires a theological foundation after all? Liberalism would benefit from a serious debate on the question.

Publics and Counterpublics. By Michael Warner. New York: Zone Books, 2002. 334p. $30.00.

— Eileen Bresnahan, *Colorado College*

The meaning of public and private is the central concern of Michael Warner in this challenging but ultimately disappointing book. In eight essays—half new, half written as long ago as 1989—Warner brings public-sphere theory and queer theory together to bear on the question (p. 8), "What is a public?" The book's jacket blurb dubs the enterprise "revisionist," though much of its theoretical burden is borne by such figures as Jürgen Habermas, Hannah Arendt, and various feminists. Not that new insight is absent, but as is often the case with books comprised significantly of essays written for other purposes over considerable time, the most potentially fruitful reconceptualizations are more suggested—often more than once—than ever rigorously and thoroughly pursued. The result is a book that promises more than it delivers.

Warner defines a public as a "cultural form, a kind of [self-creating] practical fiction" (p. 8). Only "a certain kind of [modern] person—inhabiting "a certain kind of social world," "motivated by a certain normative horizon," and able "to speak within a certain language ideology"—is able to "address a public or to think of [her]self as belonging to a public" (p. 10). "The notion of a public enables a reflexivity in the circulation of texts among strangers who become, by virtue of their reflexively circulating discourse, a social entity," though one whose meaning is never finally clear. That is because "when people address publics, they engage in struggles . . . over the conditions that bring them together," which cannot be explicit, yet bear "fateful consequences for the kind of social world to which we belong and for the kinds of actions and subjects that are possible in it" (pp. 11–12).

The basic argument of *Publics and Counterpublics* is probably also sufficient to convey an idea of the sort of world of discourse one engages in this text. Warner's arguments, most systematically elaborated in the first two chapters, interestingly expose some of what is certainly wrong, especially today, with liberal views of the public and the private. Yet a frustrating refusal to pursue arguments rigorously or to suggest causality is evident. One characteristic example occurs in the first essay, when he makes an important point barely noticed in the huge literature on public–private: the "visceral force" often unleashed against those seen to have violated norms of publicity, as by "unacceptable" (queer) displays of public sexuality or, as in the case of some women of a not-so-distant era, merely by engaging in public debate. The sense of shame (or even physical danger) that is visited on such people, as a way of coercing them back into an invisible privacy, is a vital issue for anyone concerned about participation, democracy, and social justice. Yet for Warner, this becomes a question of one's relationship to one's body, rather than to power, a word one would have to look very long and hard to find anywhere in this text. Though he does refer to "domination," he does not clearly specify its source or mechanisms, as in (passively) describing identity politics as a means by which the dominated construct an "affirmative concept of identity [which] seems . . . a way of overcoming both the denial of public existence that is so often a form of domination and the incoherence of the experience that domination creates" (p. 26). Denial by whom, and by what means, we are left to wonder. Incoherence in what sense? We think we may know, but want to be sure. The author is not disposed to be of much help.

Later, considering the American temperance movement through Walt Whitman's participation in it, Warner points to the "mass-mediated self-understanding" (p. 270) that leads people to form a "sense of membership" in social movements (p. 276). He suggests, though, that even when people think they are entering into a public out of concern with things like the evils of alcohol, they are really concerned with something else, like controlling the body. Are we then to presume that Warner is arguing that all participants in social movements are motivated by their sublimated sexual desires, acting to repress what they fear in themselves? It is not a point that has not been made before, but what does it have to do with self-understanding? The author's argument offers no account of agency, and he seems perfectly happy to lump together publics,

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social movements, and counterpublics into one big category of self-creating cultural formations, participation in which performatively constitutes the identities of individuals. Also underlying his related objection to identity politics—that it requires a "fixity" of identity in order for one to engage in politics that entails giving up on the possibility of "real" transformation, which must include a transformation of identities—is Warner's view of the political actor as lacking any stable notion of who he is before entry into action, conceiving a self that cannot have any basis to choose at all and a political world in which a repressive social movement such as temperance becomes as indistinguishable from a progressive one, like gay rights, as one "subversion" becomes from any other.

This haziness continues in Warner's treatment of counterpublics, which would seem to be integral to his concerns, though they are so little theorized as to become scarcely more than specters that haunt the text. "Defined by a tension with a larger public," counterpublics are formed of participants who are marked as different, who are aware of their subordinate status, and who participate in discussions "understood to contravene the rules obtaining in the world at large . . . making different assumptions about what can be said or what goes without saying" (p. 56). Warner contends that counterpublics "of sex and gender" can, by enabling "collective world making" (p. 57), create a "conception of citizenship" profoundly different from "the one prevailing in the bourgeois public sphere" (p. 58). But while that sounds very nice, what exactly does it mean? We find few extended examples: "camp" as represented by John Waters (p. 179) and "queer culture," with its "opinion culture" and "development of kinds of intimacy that bear no relationship to domestic space, to kinship, to the couple form, to property, or to nation" (p. 199), as an illustration of which Warner offers public "erotic vomiting" (pp. 205–8).

I may be as desperate as the next lesbian for better concepts of citizenship, but if this is the new queer version, I think I will pass (pun intended). Given history's ample provision of notions of citizenship far worse for people like me than the "bourgeois" one, until we can get to a substantive account of a new citizenship that connects it affirmatively to human flourishing, I will stick with the liberal version. Its deficits may be legion, but at least it can offer me good reasons why I never want to find myself on a stage in my underwear, being force-fed by another human being, in brave expression of our mutual "citizenship" in some new world of queer public selves.

The Political Geographies of Pregnancy. By Laura R. Woliver. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002. 238p. $34.95.

— Rachel Roth, *Ibis Reproductive Health*

In this book, Laura Woliver brings together many of the subjects that have concerned her over the past 15 years to launch a passionate protest against the "enterprising up" of human reproduction and its dire implications for "women's power over their own bodies" (p. 9). "Enterprising up" refers to the extensive high-tech trappings of conception and pregnancy care today—from in vitro fertilization to the routine use of ultrasound, genetic testing, and fetal monitoring—as well as the profits generated by what has become a very big business: "Women are monitored and controlled in a manner that doubts their birth powers, pathologizes all their pregnancies, and seeks to control, manage, and profit from what could be a woman-centered and affirming experience" (p. 157). The apparent proliferation of reproductive "choices," she argues, commodifies human processes and life, benefiting a privileged few at the expense of poorer women and women as a group.

Woliver explores this "enterprising up" through the apt and evocative metaphor of political geography, which has two crucial meanings. First, it emphasizes that pregnancies happen in individual women's bodies, even though medical imagery, popular culture, and antiabortion campaigns often depict fetuses as free-floating and independent. Second, a political geography framework highlights the international, national, state, and local politics that determine women's access to a range of reproductive services, from abortion to neonatal intensive care units for premature babies. Her study of abortion politics in two South Carolina cities, for instance, illuminates how the decisions of Congress, state legislatures, and courts play out in specific local contexts. In Greenville and Columbia, supporters and opponents of abortion continually invoke federal court injunctions, state regulations of clinics, and municipal zoning ordinances to push their agenda. An organization called Pastors for Life escalated this tug-of-war when it bought the building adjacent to a clinic that provides abortion services in Greenville. Because the two buildings share a driveway, Pastors for Life ensured a constant negotiation over use of the common space that takes "an inordinate amount of local officials' time" (p. 105).

The book examines many such examples, including divergent state responses to pregnant women who use drugs and adoption politics, about which Woliver observes, "the flow of adopted children is in one direction: from the less affluent to the more affluent groups within any society, from less affluent countries to the middle and upper classes in more affluent countries, and from minority groups to majority groups in the United States" (p. 117). One sustained example woven throughout the book concerns disability as a social and political issue, not simply a medical or diagnostic matter, with which Americans must come to terms, especially in the era of the Human Genome Project.

Several classic feminist themes run through the discussion of these various topics: the dangers of increased medicalization and professional control of women's lives, a critique of abstract individual choice, women's trustworthiness to make reproductive decisions, and the related concept of an ethic of care. The theme which has the most direct implication for public policy is what Woliver calls the "deflective power" of reproductive technologies, that is, the ways that medical and scientific perspectives obscure the social and political dimensions of reproductive health. Focusing on individual, technological fixes to breast cancer or infertility, for instance, leads to expensive medical procedures and exploitation of poorer women to bear children for wealthier ones, instead of research on environmental causes, let alone efforts to restructure the workplace. Similarly, the punitive focus on individual women who use drugs when they are pregnant deflects attention from systemic problems that affect the health of women, fetuses, and children, including violence against women, poverty, and a health care system that leaves millions without access to services. Driving home this point, the author reminds readers that "the strongest single indicator of a baby's health is still the mother's zip code" (p. 153).

Woliver believes that language matters in politics, and yet her own language can undermine her arguments. Although she persuasively critiques the dominant terms of political discourse, such as egg "donation" and "surrogate mother," she uses these expressions herself (see critiques on pp. 75, 120–21). She also undercuts one of her central claims when referring to pregnant women as "mothers" (e.g., pp. 24, 50, 103). Woliver's use of the word "mother" obscures what she calls the "real" (p. 37) geography of pregnancy, because mother connotes the counterpart child, not fetus, and a child *is* a physically and legally separate person to whom women who are parents have enforceable responsibilities. To be sure, this particular phrasing is quite common, including in Supreme Court decisions on abortion. But since the author's goal is to challenge the prevailing discourse that displaces women and

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erases their experiences of pregnancy, she would do so more effectively by making it crystal clear when she is analyzing situations involving pregnant women. Chapter 6 examines the negative consequences that arise when the state treats pregnant women as if they were mothers.

Woliver's initial framing of her project is also somewhat confusing. Her central concern is a "power shift," "with decision making concerning reproduction moving toward professionals, policy makers, genetic counselors, and others, and away from women as agents of their bodies, themselves. The maps and boundaries of women's reproductive powers are being redrawn" (p. 26). This formulation seems to hark back to a golden age of women's reproductive autonomy, when pregnancy was still "natural" (pp. 8, 30) and women called the shots, instead of spelling out the more precise argument that today's mechanisms of control, presented so often as progress for women, are more insidious and harder to challenge, which is the case that *The Political Geographies of Pregnancy* ultimately makes. Because the boundaries Woliver charts are in constant flux, her survey of the landscape at the dawn of the twenty-first century will provide a vantage point from which to analyze the inevitable future shifts awaiting us.

Beyond Rawls: An Analysis of the Concept of Political Liberalism. By Shaun P. Young. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002. 228p. $59.00 cloth, $36.00 paper.

— Mark S. Stein, *Dartmouth College*

Political liberalism seeks a liberal political order that can be supported by adherents of different moral and religious doctrines. The most famous political liberal is John Rawls, who passed away in November 2002. In this book, Shaun P. Young critiques the work of Rawls and two other contemporary political liberals, Charles Larmore and the late Judith Shklar. Young's aim is to cast doubt on the very concept of political liberalism. He claims that political liberalism is unconvincing in its aspirations for stability and inadequately deals with the problem of abuse of political power.

In general, the book is well done. Young's choice of authors is a good one, and he sets forth their views fairly. Along with his critique of contemporary political liberalism, he offers a good brief survey of liberal thought. For the most part, his writing is admirably clear. I disagree, however, with Young's wholesale rejection of political liberalism. He makes some good arguments, but they are better as arguments against Rawls than as arguments against the concept of political liberalism. To a large extent, Young's approach is to engage Rawls directly and then impute to Larmore and Shklar aspects of Rawls's theory. Sometimes these imputations are convincing, sometimes less so.

All three of Young's exemplars of political liberalism seek some sort of overlapping consensus (the term is Rawls's). Young actually understates his argument by granting that Shklar disavows the search for an overlapping consensus (p. 127). In fact, Shklar writes that "Kantians and a utilitarian" could accept her position on different grounds, "and liberalism need not choose between them" ("The Liberalism of Fear," in Nancy Rosenblum, ed., *Liberalism and the Moral Life,* 1989, p. 30).

But while all political liberals seek an overlapping consensus, they differ in the content of the consensus they seek. There is an especially great difference between Rawls and Shklar. Young accurately conveys this distinction, but it recedes from view as his analysis progresses. Rawls envisions an overlapping consensus in support of his own highly demanding liberal egalitarian principles of justice. He seriously imagines a stable political order in which Rawlsian "justice as fairness" is taken for granted and political debate concerns how best to apply the Rawlsian principles. Shklar, on the other hand, emphasizes a consensus that already exists in liberal democracies, an opposition to cruelty shared by mainstream religions and political philosophies.

The more ambitious one's vision of an overlapping liberal consensus, the harder it is to achieve and maintain. Young questions the ability of political liberalism to maintain a stable overlapping consensus. He focuses on problematic aspects of the concept of reasonableness, which is a key element in Rawls's theory and in Larmore's (but not in Shklar's). He repeats, with attribution, arguments others have made about the precariousness of a Rawlsian consensus, and offers some good arguments of his own.

These arguments have purchase against Rawls. In my opinion, they even concede too much to Rawls, as they assume that a Rawlsian overlapping consensus can be established in the first place. But while Rawls is utopian, Shklar is not. On the one hand, the Shklarian overlapping consensus against cruelty is more stable than a Rawlsian overlapping consensus could ever be; on the other hand, Shklar herself is not sanguine about maintaining liberal stability: She preaches vigilance.

Young also stretches too far in arguing that political liberalism is insufficiently attuned to the danger that political power will be abused. On the face of it, this is an odd criticism to make of political liberalism. It is always possible that power will be abused, but political liberals would seem, in general, more attuned to this danger than others. They are, after all, liberals.

Ironically, however, there is an illiberal streak in Rawls's writing, which makes him in particular vulnerable to the charge that his theory could lead to the abuse of power. He would use a demanding liberal standard not only to evaluate the behavior of governments but also to evaluate the political behavior of ordinary citizens, including the arguments they choose to make for their favored policies. In the initial hardback edition of *Political Liberalism* (1993), Rawls opined that it was acceptable for the abolitionists to argue that slavery was against the will of God, and it was acceptable for Martin Luther King, Jr., to argue that segregation was against the will of God, but it is not acceptable for contemporary opponents of abortion to argue that abortion is against the will of God (pp. 249–51, 243–44). In the introduction to the paperback edition of *Political Liberalism* (1996), Rawls retreated somewhat from this position (pp. li–lvii), but his insistence that liberalism places moral limits on the arguments and voting behavior of ordinary citizens definitely creates the potential for abuse. As to Rawls, Young is convincing that there is a danger of "forced doctrinal homogeneity, necessitated and legitimated by the political conception of justice" (p. 170). He is unconvincing that political liberalism in general presents any particular danger of such a stifling result.

What would Young support in place of political liberalism? In a brief section, he suggests that he would support a more assertive version of liberalism, one that "publicly supports and protects" liberal values (p. 186). However, he does not clearly explain how his approach would be different from political liberalism, or how it would be better at maintaining stability and preventing the abuse of power.

Despite my disagreements with Young, *Beyond Rawls* is worth reading for those who are interested in debates about political liberalism.

Democratic Distributive Justice. By Ross Zucker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 336p. $70.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.

— Joseph M. Schwartz, *Temple University*

In *Political Liberalism* (1993), John Rawls abandoned the "difference principle" as one of the two basic principles of liberal justice. No longer were equal civil and political liberties

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accorded lexical priority over principles of just economic distribution; the securing of civil liberties now became the sole priority of political liberalism. This transformation may have implicitly reflected Rawls's belief that the philosophical principles of a society should be in "reflective equilibrium" with popular conceptions of justice. Rawls may have covertly been admitting that the more than 20 years of conservative political dominance since the publication of *A Theory of Justice* (1971) had severely weakened popular support for social equality. For those who lament Rawls's "retreat" from egalitarian distribution as a prime principle of liberal democracy, Ross Zucker's ambitious book comes as a welcome, rigorous, analytical philosophical return to the defense of egalitarian principles.

Zucker holds that the wealth of a capitalist society is produced by complex, interdependent relations among capitalists, labor, and consumers. The products corporations make, the skills laborers acquire, and the demands consumers make are all developed through the social processes of the "capital-market" system. From this social analysis, Zucker develops an "ethic of dueness" and an "ethic of community" that argue for an equal sharing of the proportion of wealth that is produced socially (rather than through identifiable individual efforts and skills): "Total social income should be distributed unequally to the extent that it is produced by distinct individual actions, and it should be distributed equally to the extent that it is created by the joint activity of people shaped by social conditions" (p. 4).

Zucker's distributional ethics eclectically and skillfully synthesizes Locke's individualist labor theory of value, Hegel's social conception of the formation of individual will, and Marx's analysis of the organic interrelationship between capital and labor in the production of capital. The author rejects Marx's exclusive focus on production by recognizing the role consumers play in realizing productive value. On the other hand, he rejects the neoclassical economic concept of the individualistic, exogenous formation of consumer preferences in favor of a Hegelian, social conception of the creation of consumer demand. This socially constituted consumer demand reaches well beyond the realm of bare necessities and thus contributes to growing social wealth.

Zucker says that it will have to be left to future theoretical work to determine the proportion of income to be equally distributed versus that left to the distribution of the capital and labor market. Yet precisely because of the interdependent nature of capitalist production, it may be impossible to theoretically or "objectively" determine the distinct productivity of capital versus labor, let alone society versus the individual. As Piero Sraffa and Joan Robinson argued years ago in the "Cambridge School" controversy over the rate of return to capital, it is political and social struggle over the share of national income that goes to capital and labor—rather than theoretical analysis—that determines the "productivity" of capital and labor, respectively (see Philip Arestis et al. eds., *Capital Controversy: Post-Keynesian Economics and the History of Economic Thought,* 1997). And it is a political process that determines the distribution of income.

The second half of *Democratic Distributive Justice* argues that the capitalist economy is a form of community. Zucker holds that the capital-market economy endogenously and socially constitutes the individual consumers and producers who create society's wealth. These actors, he argues, constitute a community because they share "in the common end of the preservation and expansion of capital" (p. 177). Community exists in the capital-market economy because, contrary to neoclassical dogma, economic health does not result from the mere unintended external result of self-oriented behavior, but by individuals internalizing by their very behavior the well-being of the economic system.

Zucker then goes on to make two arguments that not only are controversial but also have no purchase unless embraced politically by a democratic majority. First, he holds that individuals who constitute a community need not be conscious of their common action; if their actions are shaped by the system and act to preserve that system, then a community of action exists and all members should benefit from such action. That is, the capital-market system socially constitutes consumers, producers, and laborers who act in ways that enable each constituency to achieve ends that they could not achieve by themselves. But absent a *conscious* public understanding of the communal aspects of capitalism, egalitarian forms of distribution are unlikely to be politically achievable.

Second, Zucker contends that "individuals who form a union for the sake of some end held in common ought to share in the attainment of that end"—equally (p. 157). But there exists no "objective" or "theoretical" answer as to what portion of wealth a democratic polity will deem as "socially" rather than "individually" created. Nor can there be a trumping theoretical proof (as Zucker seems to believe) that a democratic society must judge that everyone makes an equal contribution—and thus is due an equal reward—to the creation of this communal wealth. Ian Shapiro's argument in *Democratic Justice* (1999) that democracy is best conceived of as a "subordinate foundational good" because it does not yield a unique theory of (distributional) rights strikes this reader as more historically sound than Zucker's faith that theoretical arguments can yield a theory of rights that must be logically—and seemingly universally—accepted.

Zucker's conception of distributive justice focuses almost solely on the distribution of income, whereas most radical democratic conceptions of justice also tackle the democratization of the mode of production. The author treats labor primarily as a means to acquiring income and commodities. But those readers who also value creative labor as a primary moral good might also advocate the reconstruction of the capitalist division of labor so that it enhances the discretionary and creative aspects of the labor process, as much as possible. He also might have considered that the hierarchical authority of the corporation is in tension with the commitment of democracy to democratic deliberation decisions—such as investment—that have a binding effect on the members of society. A profound virtue of Zucker's work is that it tries to appropriate the logic of consumption for democratic purposes. But it is worth noting that the more individuated logic of "consumer choice" stands in some tension with the value of democratic collective deliberation—and democratic regulation of the economy.

Theoretical conceptions of justice are best viewed as intellectual heuristics that can help us make more rigorous (and, it is hoped, effective) political arguments. There is no one "right" theory of justice, but rather various conceptions of democratic justice that can be deployed politically. Since the 1970s—and globalization's weakening of the possibilities of social democracy-in-one-nation—the nostrums of "free market" deregulation and "just" market distribution have supplanted the commitment to social equality as the "common sense" of liberal democracies. The political purchase of both egalitarian and democratic arguments is tenuous in an era when there is little faith either in the feasibility of democratic regulation of the economy or in democratic collective action being able to ameliorate the human condition. But unless a majority of the citizens of advanced industrial democracies embrace a conception of social solidarity that says we "all are in the same boat," even the cleverest of theoretical arguments on behalf of equality will go unheeded.

The major task for theorists committed to democratic and egalitarian politics is twofold: to comprehend the sociological and cultural reasons that such politics has been in a defensive, minoritarian position for over a

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generation; and to discern those political values, programs, and strategies that can restore democratic egalitarian politics to governing status. Zucker provides us with a rigorous theoretical analysis of how crude Lockean justifications of market-based distributional outcomes as "just" misrepresent the social nature of capitalist society. But how we convince democratic polities that interdependent forms of social organization justify more egalitarian forms of distribution, well, that is the rub—and the challenge for left theory and practice.

AMERICAN POLITICS

The President's Cabinet: Gender, Power, and Representation. By MaryAnne Borrelli. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. 279p. $59.95 cloth, $26.50 paper.

— Laura van Assendelft, *Mary Baldwin College*

In her book, MaryAnne Borrelli effectively bridges the gap between presidential scholarship and gender studies, utilizing gender as a robust analytical tool in studying the president's cabinet. The nomination and confirmation process of cabinet secretaries speaks volumes about representation from the perspective of the president, the media, and lawmakers. Borrelli carefully studies these perceptions in an analysis of the role that gender plays in establishing expectations for the performance of secretaries-designate following their appointments. Her work contributes to our understanding of presidential decision making, the confirmation process, and the influence of women in politics.

The larger issue Borrelli raises in her work is what "difference does it make" that women are cabinet members? Does the presence of women indicate a change in how gender is viewed in cabinet politics? Have women merely been accepted into this historically male-dominated institution (regendering), or are they being viewed as equally capable players (transgendering)? Answers to these questions provide insight to the president's perceived constituents and their salience, reflected by the type of representation provided by the president's choices. The author draws on the complex assessment of representation developed by Hannah Pitkin (*Concept of Representation,* 1967), including substantive, formal, descriptive, and symbolic representation. The quality of the representation provided by women secretaries is dependent upon the extent to which they are viewed as legitimate players. Borrelli's introduction delineates the theoretical framework and classification schemas used in the analysis throughout the book, drawn from both presidential scholarship and gender studies. The subsequent chapters focus on the different players in the process: the president, the secretaries-designate, the media, and lawmakers. Borrelli argues that "[t]oo often, the women nominees have contributed more to the image than to the practice of gender inclusivity, the mechanisms for decisionmaking reinforcing the harsh dictates of masculinism" (p. 214).

In Chapter 2, the author examines the timing and status of nominations for secretaries-designate and finds evidence of both regendering and transgendering. Initial appointments gain more attention than midterm appointments, and insiders (those with prior national government or cabinet/subcabinet experience) have an advantage over outsiders (those lacking insider experience). Likewise, policy specialists and liaisons (those with strong relationships with their department's issue networks) are stronger secretaries-designate than policy generalists. Almost identical percentages of women and men are classified as insiders or outsiders (47.4% of women vs. 47.3% of men were insiders; 52.6% of women and 52.7% of men were outsiders). Yet regendering is evident in the disparity between the experiences of the women and men. Whereas 43.5% of the men were generalists, an overwhelming 84.2% of the women were categorized as generalists. Borrelli argues that as generalists, women are more dependent on the president for political advancement, and as a result, their strength as representatives is diminished. The recent nominations of women liaisons indicate a change in the president's recognition of women as a significant constituency.

Borrelli's profile of the secretaries-designate acknowledges the elite status of both women and men secretaries-designate. Women had educational credentials that were equal to or exceeded the men, but their professional experience was less diverse. The primary careers of women centered in government service. The women were also younger, and a few were unmarried at the time of their nomination.

The argument becomes even more interesting in Chapter 4 as Borrelli's content analysis of *New York Times* nomination and biographical articles reveals subtle gender bias. While women and men receive comparable coverage in terms of quantity and placement, Borrelli did reveal gender bias in the language used to acknowledge successful leadership traits. A "heroic" male standard emphasizing assertiveness and strength prevailed as more desirable than feminine qualities. The few references to women as strong, competitive, or assertive were qualified (p. 160). She argues that the consequence is that women are presented as weaker descriptive representatives.

Likewise, the analysis of the confirmation proceedings in the Senate revealed differential treatment of women versus men. Senators were "markedly less supportive" of the women, treating them as outsiders even when they were insiders (p. 185). Borrelli's analysis of the hearings revealed that expertise is necessary but insufficient for success as a cabinet member. Prior political experience within the government is also required. Because Senators do not view women as equally capable as men, women face additional barriers in developing the necessary working relationships with lawmakers following their confirmation.

In summary, Borrelli describes women as "routinized tokens" (p. 214). While the president clearly recognizes women as a constituency, the media and the Senate perceive only men as fully qualified to lead. She implies that the expectations set during the nomination and confirmation process constrain women's opportunities for leadership as cabinet secretaries. Limited credibility in turn diminishes their role as representatives.

The President's Cabinet deserves to be widely read. My concern, however, is that the use of terminology contested within numerous subfields of political science may confuse the reader and thus marginalize the important contributions of this study. The analysis is also complicated by the use of four categories of representation when only two categories, substantive and descriptive representation, are emphasized consistently throughout the book. The terms "substantive" and "descriptive representation" are more recognizable to a general audience. The detail of Borrelli's work is admirable, but the complexity of the classification schemas used may detract from the significance of the findings.

What I view as the strength of the book, and why I so thoroughly enjoyed reading it, is the long list of intriguing questions it raised. What does the pool of eligible secretaries-designate look like? Is the number of women liaisons and specialists increasing, or are generalists the primary option for presidents seeking to appoint women? Will there be a new standard applied to women, or will they only be accepted when they embody male leadership traits? Are women able to overcome the disadvantages of marginalization and lower

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expectations for effective representation? What are the public perceptions of the representation and leadership provided by women cabinet secretaries? Scholars of the presidency and gender studies will benefit from adding to their research agenda these and additional questions generated by Borrelli's work. I highly recommend this book to all scholars of the presidency, the executive branch, and women in politics, as well as to an advanced general audience.

Trumping Religion: The New Christian Right, the Free Speech Clause, and the Courts. By Steven P. Brown. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2002. 208p. $35.00.

— Duane M. Oldfield, *Knox College*

Trumping Religion provides an important contribution to the scholarly literature on the Christian Right. Although Christian Right protest, lobbying, and electoral efforts have been the subject of extensive analysis, the growing Christian Right presence in the nation's courts has not received the attention it deserves. In this well-researched work, Steven P. Brown examines the emergence, growth, and actions of the five main Christian Right public interest law firms.

After a brief introductory chapter, Brown neatly places the rise of these public interest laws firms in historical perspective. The emergence of the Christian Right was, in many ways, a reaction to the legal activism of opposing social movements and the Supreme Court victories, such as *Roe v. Wade,* that those movements helped win. Not surprisingly, the early stages of the Christian Right were marked more by hostility to the courts than by activism within them. However, by the 1990s, these law firms had become a significant presence on the legal scene.

The next two chapters document that presence. By 1999, the five major Christian Right public interest law firms commanded a combined budget in excess of 24 million dollars a year, 37 staff attorneys, and a network of more than five thousand affiliated attorneys. Brown introduces the reader to these firms, the key players within them, and the underlying philosophies that drive them. The firms use a variety of strategies to advance their agendas, ranging from the direct sponsorship of test cases and the filing of amicus curiae briefs to the less direct, and usually anonymous, intervention characteristic of what Brown calls "legal overseer" approaches. Finally, he focuses on a key element of these firms' legal strategy: the use of the free speech clause of the First Amendment as a means of advancing their agenda in religious liberty cases.

The focus on the free speech clause dominates the next several chapters and, indeed, the book as a whole. As the title indicates, Brown believes that the free speech clause has come to "trump" the First Amendment's religion clauses in the legal strategies of Christian Right law firms. Instead of convincing courts to rethink their interpretation of the free exercise and establishment clauses, these firms advance their vision of religious liberty by arguing that religious expression deserves the same sort of protection as other forms of speech. In chapters on the Supreme Court and on lower federal courts, Brown meticulously goes through religious liberty decisions of the last two decades and finds that free speech arguments have been the basis upon which Christian Right success has been built. In his words: "The most important result of New Christian Right activity in the Court has been the highly successful string of precedent-setting cases in which free speech arguments have successfully warded off traditional establishment clause concerns regarding state-sponsored recognition or acknowledgment of religion" (p. 84). The greatest success has come in the area of education, where in cases such as *Widmar v. Vincent, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,* and *Rosenberg v. Rector,* the Supreme Court has ruled in favor of Christian groups asking for the same access to school facilities and funding granted to their secular counterparts.

Brown concludes with a consideration of the advantages and disadvantages that come with Christian Right legal firms' reliance on the free speech clause. Free speech arguments have often received a favorable hearing in the Supreme Court, and the defense of religious speech fits neatly with these groups' commitment to spreading the Gospel. On the other hand, legal success with this strategy has been limited. Christian Right law firms have had little success in convincing the Court to extend its free speech defense of religious liberty beyond the educational realm. More importantly, Brown contends, the free speech approach potentially conflicts with the religious values these law firms are committed to. It denies any special status for evangelical religious expression. Whereas the religion clauses are premised on the idea that religion is a particularly significant activity that warrants special constitutional consideration, the free speech approach argues that religion is no different than any other sort of expression. Furthermore, this approach opens the way for free speech claims by groups that the Christian Right finds offensive. If it is impermissible on free speech grounds to deny access to school facilities because a group's speech contains religious content, it is hard to deny access because a group's speech contains gay content.

The main weakness of this book does not involve what is in it but, rather, what is left out. Brown confines his attention to five public interest law firms and their legal strategies concerning religious liberty issues. This narrow focus is problematic in two ways. First, while religious liberty issues are undeniably crucial for the law firms he studies, they are not the only issues these firms deal with. For example, as he notes (p. 42), 43% of the Alliance Defense Fund's (ADF) grants go to support religious liberty litigation. That leaves 57% dedicated to other legal issues. A look at the Web pages or literature of the ADF and other Christian Right legal firms, such as the American Center for Law and Justice, reveals that they are active on a wide variety of issues that can go well beyond the protection of religious liberty, including abortion, pornography, gay marriage and adoption, and school vouchers. While Brown does, on occasion, mention that Christian Right legal firms deal with issues beyond religious liberty, the reader is likely to come away with the mistaken impression that this study of one area of Christian Right legal activism is, in fact, a comprehensive study of Christian Right legal activism as a whole. Also, his narrow focus probably overplays the centrality of free speech arguments to Christian Right legal activism. On issues such as gay marriage, abortion, and pornography, these firms are likely using different, even conflicting, lines of reasoning.

Second, the author does not explore the relationship between the legal strategies of these law firms and the political strategies of the broader Christian Right. He notes the financial support they receive from other groups, as well as these firms' use of evangelical media outlets to publicize their activities. Given the movement of money, ideas, and strategies between the legal and political realms, however, more needs to be done. Many of the controversies that Brown discusses in the legal realm parallel those seen in political organizations such as the Christian Coalition. In the 1990s, for example, the Christian Coalition put forward arguments that portrayed "people of faith" as an oppressed minority being silenced by a hostile government and media, arguments very similar to the free speech arguments analyzed here (see Justin Watson *Christian Coalition: Dreams of Restoration, Demands for Recognition,* 1997). Examining the interplay between Christian Right legal and political activism would have been interesting in its own right and would

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have helped place the movement's legal activism in proper context.

What *Trumping Religion* does, it does extremely well. It provides a firm foundation on which further scholarship can build. Brown's book fills a significant gap in the scholarly literature on the Christian Right and should be on the reading list of anyone who studies that movement.

Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government. By Barry C. Burden and David C. Kimball. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. 176p. $52.50.

— Sean Q Kelly, *Niagara University*

When Gary Jacobson (1990) published his book *The Electoral Origins of Divided Government,* he identified an important research puzzle for students of American politics: Why had the Democrats so consistently maintained control of the Congress while Republicans had proven so adept at winning the White House in the post–World War II period? His explanation rested on the political dynamics produced by divided institutions; voters could protect popular government programs by continuing to elect Democrats to Congress and enforce fiscal discipline by electing a Republican to the White House.

Evidence from the states, where divided government was also common, suggested that Jacobson's generalization was not applicable to the states where the government was divided between a Democratic governor and Republican legislature. In *Divided Government,* Morris Fiorina (1992, 1996) offered a "policy balancing" explanation in which individual voters seek to moderate Democratic liberalism and Republican conservatism by electing one party to control the legislature and the other to control the governor's mansion. This model, Fiorina claims, can explain both the modal pattern of divided government at the federal level (Republican president and Democratic Congress) and in the states.

Both explanations of divided government focus on voters consciously choosing to produce divided government at the ballot box; they require elaborate assumptions about voters' cognitive processes, and are largely devoid of political and contextual considerations. Jacobson's explanation was pressed to its limits by the Republican takeover of Congress in the wake of the 1994 congressional elections. Focusing on the policy-balancing model and employing survey data, a number of studies sought to examine the linkage between voter choice and divided government, with little success. Despite the parsimony and intuitive attractiveness of the policy-balancing model, the *data* simply did not support the theory.

Divided government is possible in the United States for two reasons: the natural institutional fissures created by the Constitution and the widespread use of the Australian ballot, which began to replace party ballots during the progressive era, allowing voters to split their votes for Congress and the president between candidates of opposing political parties. Barry Burden and David Kimball rightly focus their analysis on ticket splitting as epiphenomenal to divided government.

In contrast to Jacobson and Fiorina, Burden and Kimball argue that divided government is a function of political contextual variables that shape the decisions of individual voters to split their tickets, thereby producing divided government. Their model is a breath of fresh air in the literature insofar as it brings politics back into the divided-government equation. The result is a relatively parsimonious explanation for the occurrence of ticket splitting and divided government. The authors focus on campaigns (incumbency), candidate quality (campaign spending), and ideological positioning as the primary variables influencing vote choice: "Voters choose candidates from opposite parties not because of the different parties per se but because reasonable reactions to local candidates produce such behavior" (p. 15).

Burden and Kimball rely primarily on district-level voting results to test their theory of ticket splitting. Testing hypotheses using aggregate data is generally considered ill-advised, given the specter of the ecological problem. Gary King's "solution" to the problem of ecological inference provides Burden and Kimball with a powerful tool for analyzing these aggregate data. In addition, the authors, to their great credit, test several of their hypotheses using individual-level National Election Studies survey data, providing additional support for their aggregate-level findings; this is especially important when using a relatively new method of analysis.

According to Burden and Kimball, the major factor behind ticket splitting is the influence of incumbency. Most incumbents face anemic challengers who are poorly funded, causing vote defections among voters who might otherwise cast a party vote: "Rather than reflecting a full expression of voters preferences, divided government is driven partly by the constraints of the limited choices facing voters. Even if voters wished to balance their congressional and presidential votes, the absence of serious competition in most House elections limits opportunities to do so" (p. 159). They conclude that the cause of split-ticket voting is congressional elections.

Contrary to Fiorina's model, which implies that as the parties become more polarized voters are more likely to engage in ticket splitting aimed at policy balancing, Burden and Kimball contend, and their results support the contention, that increasing ideological polarization produces straight ticket voting, because candidates present more clear choices for voters; split-ticket voting is more common in those cases where candidates *blur* their issue positions: "Our robust finding is that ticket splitting is more frequent when candidates' positions are nearer to one another and nearer to the ideological center" (p. 162).

Burden and Kimball also consider the special dynamics of midterm elections and Senate elections. In midterm elections, the authors find, incumbents in marginal districts who are more supportive of the president's positions are more likely to be defeated, thus providing some support for the policy-balancing model. As incumbents depart from constituency preferences to support the president, they become more vulnerable. This helps to explain the tendency for the onset of divided government during midterm elections, evidenced by the 1994 elections, while the above arguments help to explain the persistence of divided government in subsequent elections. In Senate elections the authors have the perfect testing ground for the policy-balancing model. Yet again, they do not find evidence that voters seek to use their votes to produce moderate outcomes; rather, voters seem to simply prefer moderate Senate candidates.

The authors' discussion of data and methodology in Chapter 3 deserves special mention for two reasons. First, they discuss Gary King's ecological inference methodology in terms that are accessible to readers who have some familiarity with statistical methodology but lack specific knowledge of King's solution to the ecological problem. Second, they take great pains to discuss their dependent variable, addressing the issue of reliability in particular, something that is exceedingly important but often missing in such works.

I offer two criticisms of this fine work. First, Gary Jacobson's original work on divided government was vulnerable because it failed to take into account patterns of divided government at the state level. This work would be stronger had the authors taken the model to the states by considering state legislative and gubernatorial elections. Such an approach in the future might focus on a few well-chosen states to make the data-collection problem tractable. Second, projecting the work back in time and analyzing changes over a longer

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period might give some additional insight into how ticket splitting, and the nature of divided government, has changed, and might provide more insight into the decline of political parties in the electorate.

Despite these minor criticisms, *Why Americans Split Their Tickets* should be in the collection of every political scientist interested in electoral behavior and should be required reading in graduate courses on electoral behavior. Unfortunately, the University of Michigan Press has not chosen to offer the book in soft cover, making it unaffordable for many faculty and the vast majority of graduate students. One hopes that Michigan has plans to release the book in paper very soon.

Lawyers, Lawsuits, and Legal Rights: The Battle over Litigation in American Society. By Thomas F. Burke. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. 288p. $29.95.

— Susan E. Lawrence, *Rutgers University*

Thomas Burke's book is an engaging and innovative argument about the structural, or institutional, determinates of "America's uniquely litigious public policy style" (p. 4). It has important things to say to students of social welfare policy and American exceptionalism, to historical institutionalists, to critics and defenders alike of the American courts' role in public policy, to reformers, and to those interested in civil litigation, law, and lawyers.

Burke's argument begins with a "Constitutional Theory of litigious policy making" that emphasizes the role of constitutional structures: federalism, separation of powers, and judicial independence and the "distrust of centralized government that is at the core of the American constitutional tradition" (pp. 13–14). These create three incentives for activists to favor litigious policies: cost shifting, insulation from political enemies, and control over states and localities. Through litigious policies, activists can address social problems without appearing to increase the size and power of government, while still overcoming the barriers to activist policy creation and implementation erected by Madison et al. Social welfare policymaking and implementation is farmed out to litigants and the independent judiciary—and, as often as not, private actors foot the costs through compensatory damage awards and implementation is accomplished by injunction. Meanwhile, litigation horror stories and calls for reform are exploding faster than litigation itself.

Why, Burke asks, given the American enthusiasm for criticizing lawyers, the alleged litigation explosion, runaway verdicts, pervasive rights claims, and frivolous liability suits, have federal-level antilitigation movements been so *un*successful? Why do we persist in relying on adversarial legalism to address social policy problems in spite of its obvious cost, uncertainty, inequity, and inefficiency?

In explaining the failure of antilitigation reform, Burke distinguishes between four types of efforts: discouragement, management, replacement, and resistance. He focuses on replacement reform campaigns because their cost-benefit comparisons between litigious policies and alternative mechanisms—usually some type of bureaucratic approach—is likely to tell us the most about the causes of America's litigious public policy style. Overcoming the structural incentives to litigious policy leads the author's list of barriers to replacement reform, followed by the American disinclination to recognize individual conflicts as systemic social problems; the difficulty of bringing plaintiff groups and defendants together; and the complexity of predicting the results of untried reforms, which allows for easy distortion by opponents.

Burke presents three case studies of antilitigation campaigns: 1) a failed effort to defeat enactment of a litigious policy—passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); 2) a failed effort to replace a litigious policy—the defeat of no-fault auto insurance proposals in California; and 3) a partially successful attempt to replace a litigious policy—establishment of the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program. Burke concludes that "the prominence of litigation in American life results not from the litigiousness of individual Americans but from the structures created by American public policy" (p. 171). And, our litigious policies "frequently result from the collision of two forces: a demand for public action on social issues . . . and a constitutional tradition premised on curbing this demand," creating incentives to insulate, cost shift, and control. Reversing his original question about antilitigation reforms, Burke concludes that reformers may succeed in overcoming the incentives when plaintiff-defendant alliances develop; when reform is stimulated by the perception of a crisis in production; and when the unpredictability of adversarial legalism can be effectively used to mobilize and motivate antilitigation reformers (p. 189).

However, while Burke's case studies are consistent with these conclusions, I am not sure that the campaigns he has chosen best make his points. The message of his ADA chapter is that rights consciousness is quite important in explaining the success of the ADA, turning to the three incentives of his Constitutional Theory only to explain why the civil rights model was so readily accepted. The chapter on the failure of no-fault in California is baffling. Burke does not use his Constitutional Theory to explain why a system of adversarial legalism emerged as the American solution to car accidents; nor, by his own admission, can he use his Constitutional Theory to explain the defeat of no-fault reform. He is left with little to say except that the constitutional tradition explains why other government-based solutions were not considered—the incentives to adopt litigious policies also act as a constraint on the attractiveness of other types of policy tools, such as bureaucratic solutions. In considering the success of the antilitigation reformers in the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program chapter, Burke finds that the usual suspects in explaining the persistence of litigious policy—lawyer interest groups, lawyer policymakers, and rights consciousness— were not present and therefore did not need to be overcome; and that there was less than full success in overcoming his three Constitutional Theory incentives. Meanwhile, the causes of success he identifies—the perception of a crisis in vaccine production; an alliance among the parents, the doctors, and the pharmaceuticals companies; and the close fit between the problems motivating each group and the proposed solution—do not address the incentives posited in his theory. Given the freshness of the author's structural approach, there would have been considerable merit to including a case study that allowed a straightforward explication of the incentives to litigious policies outlined in his theory.

In the end, I am left unsure whether Burke seeks to discover the causes of our uniquely litigious public policy style or explain why antilitigation reforms fail. These two obviously interrelated questions are analytically distinct. By merging them, we miss the difference between a path-dependent accretion of adversarial legalism as a policy tool in some areas and its sticking power (e.g., personal injury and product liability) and a conscious legislative choice of a litigious policy model in other policy areas (e.g., ADA, employment discrimination, sexual harassment) and the parallel difference between trying to disrupt the status quo and competing tabula rasa.

In *Lawyers, Lawsuits, and Legal Rights,* Burke's argument about the structural, or institutional, determinates of America's reliance on litigation as a policy tool is innovative and important. By focusing on how litigious policies meet the incentives of our constitutional tradition, the author forces us to confront the paradox of our distrust of activist government and our demand for "total justice." By moving

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us away from defining American litigiousness as a national character defect, he allows us to see the policy choices that inhere in our use of adversarial legalism as our social safety net.

The Opposition Presidency: Leadership and the Constraints of History. By David A. Crockett. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002. 386p. $39.95.

Groupthink or Deadlock: When Do Leaders Learn from Their Advisors? By Paul A. Kowert. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. 265p. $65.50 cloth, $21.95 paper.

— Charles E. Walcott, *Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University*

Presidency scholarship has vacillated over time between admiration of the president's vast power resources and reminders of the factors that constrain presidents. These two recent books fall mostly within the latter tradition, though each strives to show presidents a way out of the thicket. David Crockett's *The Opposition Presidency* examines the leadership problem faced by presidents whose programmatic and party affiliations place them against the "grain of history" (p. 4). It seeks to fill a gap in Stephen Skowronek's (*The Politics Presidents Make,* 1993) sweeping theory of presidential regimes in "political time." Paul Kowert's *Groupthink or Deadlock* looks at the dynamics of presidential decision making, especially the role of advising. It seeks to supplement and modify Irving Janis's work (*Groupthink,* 1982) on the social psychology of executive decision making. Despite obvious dissimilarities in the level of analysis and theoretical background, these two books have much in common. Both employ theoretically grounded case studies to test their propositions. Both draw upon their empirical findings to provide normative advice. Most importantly, both challenge conventional wisdom in important ways.

Crockett focuses on "opposition" presidents, a category that includes but goes beyond Skowronek's "preemptive" president. An opposition president is defined as one elected by a party "opposed to the reigning governing philosophy" (p. 20) of the time. In examining them, Crockett undertakes two basic tasks. The first is empirical: to establish, by careful analysis of their administrations, that such presidents, because they face broadly similar circumstances, actually share a sufficiently similar leadership challenge for "opposition president" to be a useful analytic category. The second task, more crucial in Crockett's view, is to formulate sound advice for such presidents on how, strategically, they should approach their job.

On the former point, Crockett is generally persuasive. The "grain of history" is in most cases clearly identifiable, especially in the nineteenth through midtwentieth centuries. The most recent case, Bill Clinton, is somewhat more problematic. Had Al Gore won the Electoral College as well as the popular vote in 2000, one might argue for either a regime of reconstruction or an end to "political time." Nevertheless, at least through Gerald Ford, opposition presidency proves to be a viable category, inasmuch as presidents in that circumstance have repeatedly faced similar political obstacles and partisan frustrations, even while enjoying, on occasion, personal political success.

While the circumstances of opposition presidencies may be roughly constant, however, the opposition presidents themselves have proven to be a varied lot, including two who were originally members of the dominant party (Tyler and Andrew Johnson); three relatively nonpolitical generals (Harrison, Taylor, and Eisenhower); one of whom died almost immediately; an appointee (Ford); and a consensus "near-great" (Wilson); along with Fillmore, Cleveland, Nixon, and Clinton. Clearly, generalizations about the purposes, strategies, and skills of this group would be difficult. Crockett recognizes this, preferring instead to focus on the differences in their approaches and the degree of success associated with alternative strategies. Almost without exception, he finds that the circumstances of the opposition presidency reward those who seek the middle ground and focus on governmental competence rather than policy innovation. The only exception he finds is Cleveland, who, in his second term, might have pulled off a reconstruction but failed to seize the opportunity—or did not choose to, for principled reasons.

Crockett translates such evidence into advice. Opposition presidents, he argues, will do well to be moderate in their policy aims, work within the ideological framework of their political opposition, focus on sound administration, and eschew efforts to overturn the established regime or aspire to greatness. It is advice that Clinton's guru, Dick Morris, would applaud. It is, of course, also relatively general advice. And it does not apply under circumstances when the putative opposition president might have a chance to become a reconstructor. The problem, as the cases of Cleveland, Nixon, and Clinton seem to show, is that it is not always obvious at the time whether such an opportunity really exists.

That difficulty aside, this is a valuable book. It not only fleshes out but adds importantly to Skowronek's scheme. It provides a nuanced exploration of the contextual challenges, both political and institutional, that U.S. presidents face. Most refreshingly, it makes a strong, explicit case for evaluating presidents with regard to their context, as opposed to the embarrassing tradition of holding each to what is essentially the standard of Franklin Roosevelt. Thus, Crockett's book is, more than anything else, a triumph of reasonableness and common sense.

In *Groupthink or Deadlock,* Paul Kowert focuses on the advice presidents receive. His point of departure is an inquiry into learning styles. Drawing on a range of psychological literature from Jung through Barber to experimental studies, Kowert argues persuasively that decision makers vary in their learning styles, from relatively "closed" to relatively "open." The latter should benefit from the free flow of ideas and information, that is, from the kind of advising that Janis has recommended as the antidote to groupthink. However, the closed decision maker not only will not benefit from a plethora of ideas and options but also will be paralyzed by them. Such people should actually eschew what Alexander George (*Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy,* 1980) termed "multiple advocacy," seeking instead a less stressful environment of limited options and information.

Kowert creatively examines these propositions through case studies of decision making by Presidents Eisenhower and Reagan. He convincingly argues that Eisenhower had an open learning style and Reagan a closed one—this despite similarities in personal background and political philosophy. He then provides four case studies, two for each president, illustrating each president's reactions to multiple advocacy and to consensus. The cases cover a broad range of topics, from Eisenhower's support of Alaskan statehood to Reagan's withdrawal of troops from Lebanon. Well written and relatively brief, these narratives trace the advising process that led to each decision. In each case, the president fared best when the advising process was consistent with his learning style. When it was not, the consequences were those described in the book's title. Eisenhower, the more open decision maker, deprived of adequate multiple advocacy, succumbed to the symptoms of groupthink. The more closed decision maker, Reagan, overstimulated by advocates, shut down and refused to choose, with deadlock as the consequence.

Effective as Kowert's cases are overall, they suffer from a problem in his operationalization of the dependent variable, learning. In ordinary

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language, learning most often refers to the acquisition of new information, understanding, and insight. Since data limitations virtually precluded a full assessment of learning in that sense, Kowert elected to employ a somewhat different approach, defining learning as policy change. Presidents are deemed to have learned if, in the face of information, they change course. If they do not, no matter how great an increment in understanding they might have achieved over time, they are deemed not to have learned. Although learning in this sense has the virtue of being more readily observable, the definition tends to compromise the clarity of the conclusions drawn from the cases. More than once, the reader will wonder what the conclusion might have been if, somehow, a more satisfying definition of learning had been employed.

Nevertheless, Kowert is persuasive. His central empirical argument—multiple advocacy does not help all decision makers, and in fact confounds some—is well grounded theoretically and is at least convincingly illustrated. The recommendations that flow from the analysis are obvious and important. First and foremost, presidents should know themselves as decision makers. Then they should create structures and processes that best serve them, remembering that one size does not fit all.

The book concludes with a discussion of the structuring of presidential advising, employing Richard Tanner Johnson's (*Managing the White House,* 1974) distinctions among formalistic, competitive, and collegial arrangements. While this is not the cutting edge of organization theory, even in presidency research, it serves well enough for his useful discussion of power distribution among advisors, and the roles of hierarchy and formalism in the construction of advising systems. A limitation of Johnson's scheme, however, is that it tends to obscure the fact that advising is often something other than face-to-face advocacy. Thus, Kowert notes that Richard Nixon's tightly managed, hierarchical system was appropriate because it was a closed system. Yet the essence of that system was not control but systematic solicitation of information and opinions—in written form, for a reclusive president. Nevertheless, Kowert makes a good start toward a contingency theory of advisory structures. This is a much-needed amendment to Janis's central arguments, which have become conventional wisdom not only among scholars of presidential decision making but also among those who advise presidents on the construction of advisory systems. For that reason, this is an important book that deserves a wide audience.

Who Qualifies for Rights? Homelessness, Mental Illness and Civil Commitment. By Judith Lynn Failer. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002. 224p. $29.95.

Overseers of the Poor: Surveillance, Resistance, and the Limits of Privacy. By John Gilliom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. 186p. $39.00 cloth, $16.00 paper.

— Alice Hearst, *Smith College*

Both of these books explore how state efforts to intervene in the lives of disadvantaged groups and individuals may be counterproductive or coercive. John Gilliom's is a compelling inquiry into the problems faced by poor women caught in the web of an intrusive welfare surveillance system. It is an elegantly written, nuanced account of the struggles of welfare mothers to retain a modicum of dignity and control while enmeshed in a welfare system that monitors their every move. By bringing the reader directly into the lives of women who must live under the thumb of this "overseer," the book provides a powerful account of the everyday politics of resistance. Judith Lynn Failer tries to understand how the "good citizen" is configured in public discourse by examining how the mentally ill are denied access to the "bundle" of rights typically accorded such good citizens (p. x). She explores that question through the case of Joyce Brown, a homeless woman in New York City who, in 1987, engaged in a very public battle to resist involuntary hospitalization, which she utilizes to examine how the state defines who qualifies for the "regular rights" of citizenship (p. xi). Failer ultimately wants to engage in a conversation about what constitutes "the ideal picture of moral personhood implicit in U.S. law and politics" (p. xi). The scope of that project is enormous—Failer acknowledges that hers is only a first step in initiating that dialogue—but for that reason, the book is less successful in making its case than Gilliom's. Moreover, arguing that the images of the normal citizen embedded in laws and policies work to allow the mentally ill to be too readily stripped of rights is a difficult position to build from Joyce Brown's case.

Overseers of the Poor is a book about the politics of struggle in its most mundane, and for that reason, perhaps most poignant, manifestation. Gilliom understands that chronicling the lives of women who oppose the power of the state at such a limited level leaves the work open to criticism: "[J]ust as both the poor and opponents to increasing surveillance are in most desperate need of organized action, works like this [may be seen as an] attempt to gild the opposite—that we seek to make something grand out of the daily, tiny, and often quite sad struggles of people in apparently hopeless circumstances" (p. 13). But understanding these stories, Gilliom argues, imparts important lessons about how contemporary forms of surveillance get imbricated into public and private life, and she notes that debates over surveillance can be informed by listening to the voices of those individuals whose lives have been most affected by these technological advances.

The stories of the welfare recipients recounted in this book arise against the backdrop of a welfare system that has long sought to distinguish the worthy from the unworthy (able-bodied) poor. In the last 30 years, the bar for eligibility has risen higher and higher at the same time that technological changes have developed all-encompassing systems of surveillance that become modes of domination in themselves. Gilliom's book draws attention to how individuals locate the "blind spots and back alleys" (p. 42) in such systems that allow them to function while under intense scrutiny.

To this end, Gilliom and his associates conducted open-ended interviews with some 40 welfare mothers in Ohio to determine how they have perceived and lived within the system. These women revealed a sophisticated understanding of the levels of surveillance to which they are subjected, as well as a sophisticated understanding of how to get around that system when necessary. Many of the women interviewed noted how being on welfare made them "feel like a dog . . . a low life" (p. 63) through constant scrutiny and reevaluation. Many of them respected the need of the welfare agency to police against fraud, but did not see their own actions as amounting to fraud. They admitted routinely circumventing the system to make ends meet, from baby-sitting to selling drugs to doing housework, and understood the importance of shielding those paltry sums from caseworkers' radar. As one recipient noted, "I mean, every little penny counts when you don't have it. And when you get it and you have something like a birthday coming up for your kids [you don't think] 'oh, I should call and tell [my caseworker] about this.' . . . [If] you are doing it to get by and as long as it's not hurting anyone . . . I don't see anything wrong" (p. 61).

When asked why they did not work with other recipients to mount formal challenges to the system, the answers were not surprising: Most felt that they had no formal rights to call upon. They had signed waivers consenting to the agencies' surveillance as a condition of receiving benefits, they were operating in isolation and worried about being reported by friends and other outside actors, and they were

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fearful of losing what few benefits they had. In that context, they "grumbled and avoided trouble, while turning to quiet personal strategies of resistance through which they f[ound] ways to get a little extra money each month" (p. 91). These forms of everyday resistance allowed the women, Gilliom concludes, to meet some day-to-day material needs, to maintain some sense of autonomy and control, and perhaps most importantly, to provide for their families. Moreover, although engaging in these struggles in a particular and individualized fashion, the women often cooperated with each other in their small dodges and thus were drawn into a community of sorts.

Overseers of the Poor sheds light on a broader set of questions about privacy in the contemporary world. The problem with surveillance, Gilliom notes, lies perhaps less in its intrusion into an imagined state of solitude than in its real impact on everyday life: "the worried sleepless nights, the senses of guilt and fear, the desperate rationalizations of necessary rule-breaking, the near-paranoid concern for what others see" (p. 122). Examining the lives of welfare mothers whose lives are constantly gnawed by such concerns tells us something about what is in store for everyone in this brave new world of surveillance: Welfare mothers may simply be the canaries in the mine.

Failer, on the other hand, explores how willing society is to deny formal rights to the mentally ill in the name of granting them "paternal rights" that may ultimately deny individual liberty. Persons subjected to involuntary civil commitment often find their wants and desires articulated by professionals who have little interest in listening carefully to their claims. *Who Qualifies for Rights?* asks the reader to think carefully about the concept of rationality that undergirds the extension of rights to citizens, and it argues that inadequate attention has been paid to articulating how the capacity to reason can and should be related to the recognition of rights. Failer argues that the vague standards for civil commitment are troubling, given that commitment so dramatically alters the legal status of the committed individual.

Chapter 5 is particularly interesting for its discussion of the legal images of a person in need that are invoked to justify commitment in involuntary commitment proceedings. An individual may be categorized as needing commitment because the person appears to be economically deficient, handling finances erratically; because the person is characterized as a bad family member, "unwilling to act appropriately in his role in his family" (p. 98); because he or she appears unable to survive, in the sense of being able to sustain him- or herself in the community in normally acceptable ways; or because the individual appears to be suffering in his or her present circumstances. Alternately, an individual may be portrayed as "dangerous," either because he or she poses an imminent danger or is a "danger waiting to happen" (pp. 104–6). Failer then discusses how any one of these images may be utilized out of context to deny the right to liberty and facilitate commitment.

Ultimately, Failer argues, limiting the rights of the mentally ill through involuntary commitment often turns on an inadequately developed conception of what capacities the polity presumes its citizens ought to possess. That point is persuasive and contributes to the author's call for a public conversation about what capacities should and should not be relevant in determining the rights extended to the mentally ill. Her observation, for example, that an individual's failure to be economically self-sufficient should not, of itself, justify a denial of rights makes a good deal of sense. But Failer also pushes the case too far. She asserts that "we sometimes qualify rights for the mentally ill for problematic reasons. . . . [and] tend to deprive the mentally ill of their rights for reasons that we cannot connect closely to the person's qualifications to hold the rights at stake" (p. 134), and this assertion presents cause for concern. At the same time, the composite picture of Brown developed throughout the book presents an equally compelling argument for the exercise of the "paternalistic" rights of which Failer is suspicious. Brown's life consisted of a composite of behaviors that by any definition reflected serious mental illness; Brown defecated in her clothes, ritualistically destroyed and urinated on money, and threatened neighbors and passersby. While Failer makes an interesting case for the internal logic of Brown's actions and points out how such external factors as the inaccessibility of public restrooms worked to frame Brown as perhaps more impaired than she was, the facts also suggest that Brown was in serious need of assistance and undercuts the argument that she was unfairly denied her liberty. What is perhaps needed in the conversation that Failer wants to initiate is a discussion as well of the meaning of liberty under such circumstances.

Special Interest Politics. By Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001. 364p. $40.00 cloth, $22.95 paper.

— Gary J. McKissick, *Tufts University*

Political science's great schism is typically characterized (and, true, caricaturized) as a war between the abstractions and formalized models of the game theorists and the nose-in-the-data empirics of their more inductively inclined colleagues. The best contemporary scholarship gives the lie to such loose characterizations, finding ways to bridge these two camps; Keith Krehbiel's exemplary blend of theoretical and empirical rigor comes to mind. More commonly, though, scholars speak only to one side or the other in this battle. Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman's *Special Interest Politics* is that latter sort of book, one so rooted in game theoretic analysis and terminology that it stands little chance of finding a broader audience across the intellectual divide.

That is a shame because interest-group scholars have much to gain from a dialogue across the deductive versus inductive chasm, and formal theorists much to contribute to that conversation. Interest-group actors, after all, traffic in information, tend to be self-consciously strategic, typically play multilevel "games" with (endlessly?) repeated iterations, and face the sort of resource constraints that make choices meaningful. They also happen to occupy an intrinsically interactive, or relational, place in the political food chain; their lives, more than most, are defined by the need to anticipate and respond to the actions of others. Many of their actions are public, many others private, and still others somewhere in between. These actors are, in short, ripe with the qualities and variation that make game theoretic modeling so appealing as an analytical tool. Surely, even the most game theory–phobic among us can concede that interest-group actors often look a lot like the "rational actor" of lore.

Grossman and Helpman hold interest groups up to the rational-actor light. The authors, both economists clearly at home with the positivist traditions of their discipline, use the three sections of the book to demonstrate the analytical leverage this perspective can provide, deploying the tools of game theory to explicate a very wide range of interest-group activity. Section I reviews the by-now extensive formal literature on voting and elections. It serves, in effect, to establish baseline expectations about what might occur in a political environment devoid of interest groups. In Section II, they turn to informational issues and how interest groups might use information to realize political gain. Here, the authors' analysis draws from and adds to the burgeoning scholarship on interest-group lobbying as informational exchange. Section III takes up interest groups' campaign contributions, incorporating both electoral- and influence-based motivations in the analysis of groups' contribution strategies.

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Throughout their book, Grossman and Helpman organize the analyses to build from simplified and highly restricted setups to more complex games. This progression is helpful, as it lends the different chapters a welcome continuity across the varied substantive foci of the models. It also allows the authors to anticipate the most obvious objections to the simplifications inherent in formal theorizing; models that begin with an unrealistic single special interest inevitably expand to incorporate multiple groups (sometimes with similar interests, sometimes opposed). A similar progression characterizes the chapters in each section. So, for instance, Section III's analysis of campaign contributions moves from groups only trying to influence legislators' policy decisions with campaign money (Chap. 7) to a model that incorporates both electoral and policy consequences of groups' contributions (Chap. 10).

The modeling has much to recommend it. Parties and politicians get saddled with both fixed and pliable positions; group leaders can be tightly or loosely constrained by their members. The various permutations along these and other dimensions add up to an impressive attempt to incorporate complex preference profiles and institutional arrangements into the analyses. Grossman and Helpman make creative use of many existing findings from formal models of interest groups, voters, and legislators.

These issues of organization and comprehensiveness earn deserved praise. Still, the book on balance is bound to frustrate many readers. True to its game theoretic pedigree, *Special Interest Politics* is a place where equilibria rule. Always, the goal is to characterize some equilibrium. For readers not predisposed to formal theory, that enterprise often can seem rather loosely tethered to the task of explaining observable political behavior.

I do not mean to criticize Grossman and Helpman for abiding by the principles of their analytic methodology; game theory has its rules and established practices, and the authors cannot be blamed for employing these as the methodology requires. Rather, the disappointment here is that the authors do not do much *besides* doggedly pursuing equilibria. Real-world referents rarely crop up in this book, nor do the authors devote much attention to discussing (let alone demonstrating) empirical implications of their models. Instead, for the most part, the analysis stays stubbornly in the stylized world of their models and the attendant assumptions. Even those few instances where the authors try to illustrate particular cases (e.g., pp. 256–65; 270–79) turn into exercises in further modeling, complete with assumed economies and economic actors, rather than, say, opportunities for testing even rudimentary hypotheses with real data. In this regard, the book falls short of recent works, such as Ken Kollman's *Outside Lobbying* (1998) and Fred S. McChesney's *Money for Nothing* (1997), which use empirical analysis to enliven and make more accessible their formal theorizing.

Despite the impressive modeling on display in this book, the limits of game theoretic analysis are also likely to grate against the sensibilities of scholars used to contemplating the varied environment of contemporary interest groups. Whole facets of everyday life for these groups—the increasing prevalence of coalitional campaigns, the constant search for (not simply dispensing of) accurate political intelligence, the building (or fraying) of alliances with parties that transcend particular issues, the ambiguity of information and the way its meaning depends on one's audience—are effectively absent. Grossman and Helpman cover a lot within the framework they have chosen to employ here. However, it may be that much of what drives interest-group political activity defies the constraints of equilibrium-producing formal models.

Ultimately, this is a book written by game theory true believers for game theory true believers. Judged on those terms, it is likely to be a useful read for its narrow audience. For the broader community of interest-group scholars, though, this book feels like an opportunity missed. One can only hope, at least, that any future work this book inspires will take up more directly the task of bridging the schism between deductive and inductive scholarship. Research on interest-group politics needs good theorizing, but that good theorizing also needs to be anchored in the (admittedly messy) real world of these groups and the scholars who study them.

The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States. By Jacob S. Hacker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 464p. $55.00 cloth, $23.00 paper.

— Joe Soss, *American University*

Over the past quarter century, employment-based benefit plans have played an important role in American welfare retrenchment. Since 1975, the balance of U.S. social spending has tilted away from public social programs and toward private benefits. At the same time, private health and retirement plans have become less equal, less extensive in their coverage, and less likely to absorb the long-term risks that confront workers. With the Bush administration now pushing for further privatization of federal health-care and retirement programs, Jacob Hacker's new book could hardly be timelier.

The Divided Welfare State is an incisive piece of historical scholarship that challenges readers to rethink the welfare system's boundaries and political logic. Reaching beyond the conventional limits of welfare state research, Hacker uncovers a dynamic, hybrid system of social provision made up of interdependent public and private benefit plans. In this system, social provision depends not only on the subset of government actions we label "social policy" but also on private benefit providers and the tax and regulatory policies that structure their choices. The politics that surround public and private benefit plans differ sharply, and the author foregrounds the ways these politics have collided and shaped one another. Tracing their interplay over the past century, he constructs an innovative analysis of policy development that contests prevailing beliefs about how and why the U.S. welfare state is exceptional. His analysis marks a significant advance for theories of path dependence and policy feedback. His book deserves to be read by social scientists in a wide variety of fields.

Welfare scholars have long recognized that employment-based health-care and pension plans are important sources of social protection in the United States. Until Hacker's book, however, it is fair to say that we have never quite grasped the political or analytic significance of this fact. Focusing narrowly on government social policy, most analysts have concluded that the United States is a welfare laggard and have sought to explain why this country does so little to pool the risks of modern life. By contrast, Hacker shows that once private benefits are taken into account, social welfare spending in the United States is comparable to what one finds in European welfare states: "What is most distinctive about American social welfare practice is not the *level* of spending but the *source*" (p. 7). Thus, he suggests, the real question of American exceptionalism is not why the U.S. welfare state does less than its European counterparts; it is why the United States relies on a different mix of policy tools and provision strategies.

America's heavy dependence on employment-based coverage is important, Hacker argues, partly because public and private benefits follow different political dynamics. Relative to public programs, private benefit plans tend to be less inclusive, less compulsory, and less likely to redistribute risks and resources from the well-heeled to the vulnerable. Partly for these reasons, the champions of

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private benefit plans have often included business leaders and ideological conservatives—the very groups that have traditionally fought the growth of public programs. Perhaps most important, the key decisions that structure private health and pension plans tend to emerge from a "subterranean" politics in which vested interests are less likely to be checked by public visibility or governmental control. The tax and regulatory decisions that shape these benefits rarely arouse affected publics, and the complex chains of action that produce their effects often shield relevant public officials from accountability. "These conditions," Hacker suggests, "allow policies to pass that would not survive if subjected to the bright light of public scrutiny or the cold calculations of accurate budgeting" (pp. 43–44).

This would be an important book even if its only aims were to demonstrate the centrality and political distinctiveness of private benefits within the U.S. welfare regime. The most analytically rewarding aspect, however, is the book's lucid elaboration of how social policy trajectories get constrained by "path dependent" political dynamics and how policy choices create "feedback" at later points in the political process. Hacker makes important strides in clarifying the meaning of these concepts, first through a careful theoretical discussion and then by using them as tools of comparative historical analysis.

During the twentieth century, organized interests pushed to establish private benefits for both health and pension coverage. Today, however, retirement coverage in the United States is built around a "core" public program (Social Security) supported by "supplemental" private plans; health coverage rests on a core of private plans supplemented by public programs (such as Medicaid and Medicare). These divergent outcomes, Hacker argues, cannot be explained by the factors usually emphasized in works that analyze the U.S. welfare states in comparative perspective (fragmented political institutions, a liberal political culture, and so forth). After all, the institutional and cultural characteristics are shared by his two policy cases. Instead, the divergent outcomes reflect differences across the two policy domains in the timing and sequence of policy actions and the ways these policy actions defined "the subsequent landscape of political conflict" (p. 277).

The Social Security Act of 1935 was passed *before* pension plans became a common employment benefit. Once in place, Social Security benefits influenced the construction of private plans and, more broadly, the adaptive development of institutions, interests, and expectations that lie at the heart of pension politics. Businesses, for example, designed their retirement plans so that a substantial proportion of their costs would fall on Social Security—and in the process, employers developed significant interests in public retirement benefits. By contrast, in the health-care area, "first mover advantages" fell to private benefit plans. Subsidies for these plans "created an expensive, fragmented system of health care finance and delivery that undercut the constituency for reform while raising the political and budgetary costs of policy change, eventually pressing reformers to focus on residual populations left out of private coverage" (p. 278).

Hacker has written a superb piece of comparative historical analysis. By exploring the parallel and contrasting elements of his two policy narratives, and augmenting this discussion with brief comparisons to other liberal welfare regimes, such as Canada and Britain, he builds a persuasive empirical case for his major theoretical arguments. The book makes important contributions to theories of welfare provision, and it demonstrates the analytic power of an open-ended historical institutionalism that seeks out constructivist political processes and the agency of political actors.

I suspect that undergraduates will have some difficulty with Hacker's writing style and the density of his historical presentation. In addition, some scholars will rightly wish that he had paid more direct attention to mass politics. (Like many historical institutionalists, Hacker seems more interested in the agency of elites than the agency of mass publics.) But these are minor concerns. *The Divided Welfare State* is well conceived and well argued. It makes important contributions to the literature on social welfare policy. And it raises critical questions about what happens to social politics when members of society receive social protections, not as full citizens participating in shared public programs but as individual workers covered by segmented and unequal private employment arrangements. It is a must read for students of welfare policy and American political development.

Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs About How Government Should Work. By John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 285p. $60.00 cloth, $22.00 paper.

— William A. Gamson, *Boston College*

"Stealth democracy" is the authors' term for a system in which public-regarding officials quietly go about making decisions in the public interest while citizens go about their lives without providing input or even monitoring what these officials are doing. If people want to know, they can find out and can make an input, but they do not feel they need to. Decisions are made by empathetic, public-regarding officials "efficiently, objectively, and without commotion and disagreement" (p. 143). Controversy and disagreement, which call attention to the messy nature of politics, is a sign that the system is not working right.

John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse make a compelling case, on the basis of systematic evidence from their own survey and focus group data as well as many other studies, that stealth democracy is what most people want. Part of their argument, as they readily concede, has been well documented by others. It is no news that a lot of people hate politics and politicians and think the whole business is a dirty game of greed and special interests. The authors add their own gloss on this, emphasizing that the natural diversity of interests underlying political conflict makes people uncomfortable. Politics, by exposing and expressing difference, inevitably fuels the belief that politicians are self-serving.

Their real challenge to students of politics is their argument that people do not *want* to participate and that efforts to encourage a more participatory or strong democracy are unrealistic in their failure to recognize this antipathy. Given a choice of procedures that limit the power of officials, people will go for it because they hope that it will put some constraints on self-serving politicians who are playing them for suckers. But this does not mean that they want more responsibility for themselves in a distasteful arena where there is conflict, diversity, and disagreement.

The authors confront a wide array of counterarguments and systematically ground the case for people's stealth democracy preference in a careful data analysis. They ask for poetic license to use the phrase "the people want," but they pay attention to variation and present distributions of opinion where these are relevant. Their main story, though, is about central tendency, not variations.

Advocates of participatory democracy would do well to take this public preference for stealth democracy as a starting premise for their efforts and to deal with its implications, rather than to challenge its truth. The authors do this to some degree, but most of what they offer is discouragement and caution to those who would encourage various forms of civic engagement. Nor do they fully develop the ways in which this desire for stealth democracy makes people vulnerable to various kinds of manipulation by self-serving elites. Granted

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that people want a Capra-esque set of Mr. and Mrs. Smiths—the authors call them ENSIDs for "empathetic, non-self-interested decision-makers" (p. 216)—to go to Washington and look after the public's interest so that they do not have to worry about it. This desire can be exploited in two ways, one of them more subtle than the other.

First, Jimmy Stewart is not the only actor capable of playing Mr. Smith. Other, non-professional actors can play him under their own names, using a variety of scripted devices to convince people that they are different and not part of the game. This is, as the authors point out, a somewhat perilous path for a politician because people are skeptical and ready to believe any evidence that this latest Mr. Smith is just like the others and only faking it. And since part of politics is raising the negative ratings of one's rivals, and since this can be easily enough accomplished with the willing collusion of the mass media, acting the part of an ENSID promises short-run gain for some individuals but ultimately reinforces a broader antipolitics.

The more subtle vulnerability lies in the increased opportunities that this popular preference for stealth democracy provides to self-serving elites. Favors for special interests are best handed out stealthily and off the screen. If they come to light, the impulse to demand anything different is undercut by a cynicism that sees those who want change as just another set of politicians playing the same special-interests game. The authors implicitly recognize this vulnerability by calling for efforts that increase people's understanding that diversity, disagreement, and compromise are a legitimate part of politics and not a pathology. But they really do not address effective antidotes to the cynicism that is inevitably produced by the wishful thinking implicit in the preference for stealth democracy.

Is there an antidote? I recently had an occasion to review two books that, while they do not contradict the central premise of *Stealth Democracy,* suggest a more active and positive alternative to an antipolitics. One of them, Paul Osterman's *Gathering Power* (2002) describes the ways in which Valley Interfaith and its sister organizations in the Southwest have involved normal stealth democrats in local efforts at school reform, public health, and living wage campaigns. While these efforts have their limits of scale and other problems, they address diversity issues through interfaith and interracial coalitions, and some stealth democrats become transformed with their engagement in a more broadly conceived idea of politics.

The second book, Carmen Sirianni and Lewis Friedland's *Civic Innovation in America* (2001) describes a broad range of efforts across the country that they label a "movement for civic renewal." Again, many participants find new and, perhaps, unexpected forms of satisfaction in a sphere of activity that held no particular attraction for them.

There is a hint in the Epilogue of *Stealth Democracy* that the authors sense this antidote to the vulnerabilities produced by people's antipolitics. Involvement in social movements, they concede, might be "a positive personal experience for the participants. But this type of activity differs dramatically from involvement in day-to-day politics, which has been our focus" (p. 234). Participants are not pushed to get involved but drawn into it by their own volition. But the authors are right to caution those who would engage people in politics through social movements from jumping "to the erroneous conclusion that getting people to be involved in day-to-day governing will be a similar positive experience for the vast majority of Americans" (p. 234).

Black Power in the Suburbs: The Myth or Reality of African-American Suburban Political Incorporation. By Valerie C. Johnson. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. 227p. $68.50 cloth, $22.95 paper.

— Brady Baybeck, *University of Missouri, St Louis*

The 2000 census revealed that suburbs are becoming more diverse, or at least that more minorities are moving into them. This book poses some interesting questions that expose a gap in the urban/suburban literature regarding these changes. What happens when a suburb (or more accurately, suburbs) become majority African American? As a suburb becomes majority minority, does the system work to incorporate minorities with minimal conflict, or do we see conflict similar to that of the central city? Although there are many unanswered questions, *Black Power in the Suburbs* does provide a useful beginning point as political scientists (and sociologists and demographers) struggle to understand the broader changes occurring in a mobile metropolitan society.

The focus of the study is Prince George's County, Maryland, a suburban county that lies directly to the northeast of Washington, DC. Like many inner-ring suburbs, Prince George's County is experiencing demographic change as the black middle class moves out of the central city to more promising middle-class enclaves of suburbia. Valerie Johnson focuses on the period of 1971 to 1994, when Prince George's County went from 14% black to 52% black (a 2000 update is included in the epilogue). The primary question is, did the white governing structure incorporate African Americans into the local political process as these demographic changes occurred?

Although not crystal clear, the working definition of African American incorporation appears to be three things: electoral representation, representation through political appointments, and "the ability to become an integral part of the policy making coalitions that promote the interests of a particular constituency" (p. 5). Operationally, Johnson measures this in three specific ways: the number of black elected officials, the number of black political appointees, and the extent to which African American interests were accounted for in the education policy arena. By means of semistructured interviews of African American civic and political leaders, and reviews of journalistic and public record sources, she attempts to measure the degree to which black interests are incorporated in the suburban political system; she also attempts to identify the factors that lead to incorporation or lack thereof.

As demographics shift and the population majority changes from one race to another, it seems logical to expect incorporation of the incoming group to increase. Curiously but perhaps unsurprisingly, Johnson finds that demographic power does not lead directly to political influence. In explaining this disconnect, she identifies two broad factors—internal (where incorporation or lack thereof depends upon group size, socioeconomic demographics, and organizational resources of the group) and external (where the strength of the governing coalition and its willingness to work with the group are important, as well as other circumstances such as court decisions and federal mandates). Each of these factors, Johnson argues, can work for or against incorporation in the political system.

Why the disappointing results of African American political incorporation in the political context? Although the possibilities are many, the author seems to place the largest amount of blame on one internal factor: divergent class interests of black suburbanites. As her analysis of census and qualitative data indicates, there are in reality two types; there are those African Americans who are old and poor and live near the central city (the true "inner ring") and those African Americans who have made it and live just as any other suburbanite does, in a nice house in a nice neighborhood with nice services.

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According to Johnson, this split, and the ability of the white power structure to exploit it, suppresses African American incorporation into the suburban political system. This is the key finding—blacks in the suburbs are not monolithic, and they do not all want or need the same thing from local government. Scholars should remember this as they work to understand the new dynamics of the multicultural suburbs.

Although the book does have much to offer, three flaws limit its applicability to a more general understanding of local politics. First, the selection of a single county for analysis is troubling. By itself this is not a problem, but Johnson implies that black suburbia is different from, say, white suburbia. But in any large, predominantly white, suburban county, many of the same conflicts would emerge, primarily because they are class conflicts, unspecific to any single race. Similarly, and second, many of the same problems of minority incorporation have been well documented in the urban literature. Focusing on one *suburb* limits the applicability to the *urban* literature—are suburbs with an emerging African American majority different from central cities that have undergone (or are undergoing) the same process? The author makes some comparisons to Baltimore, but they are very perfunctory and raise more questions than answers.

All of which gives rise to the most glaring flaw with *Black Power in the Suburbs.* There is a general air of research carelessness that severely hampers the reader's ability to evaluate the analysis. For example, Johnson has only two references to the interview methodology; on page 16 she mentions that she engaged in semistructured interviews with various officials, and the survey instrument is included in an appendix. There is no discussion of the sampling method, or the number of interviews, or even of how the interview process worked. Thus, the reader is left wondering if Johnson obtained a broad representation of the black elite, or if she only interviewed personalities with some sort of political ax to grind. The case studies also appear to be haphazard, with the examples ranging in detail from one four-sentence paragraph to an in-depth analysis of three and a half pages. Finally, the last chapter, which chronicles the changes in Prince George's County from 1994 to 2002, seemed tacked on and shallow. A better integration of the (important) changes as African Americans increase their majority in Prince George's is definitely warranted here.

These problems are not fatal, and anyone interested in the implications of suburban change needs to read this book. The urban/suburban distinction is becoming less acute as demographics shift; this study of black suburbanization in Prince George's County, Maryland, forces us to question what we think we know about suburbia and race in the United States.

Making Law in the United States Courts of Appeals. By David E. Klein. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 180p. $55.00 cloth, $20.00 paper.

— Christopher P. Banks, *The University of Akron*

David Klein's thoughtful account of circuit court lawmaking is a noteworthy contribution. Using "semi-structured" interview evidence (p. 18) and statistical methods, Klein tests hypotheses relating to specific goals that judges sought to obtain where circuit court or Supreme Court precedent failed to offer much guidance in deciding search and seizure, antitrust, and environmental appeals between 1983 and 1995. He utilizes a self-generated database of 62 cases creating 81 new legal rules, which then are adopted or rejected in 300 "codable subsequent rule treatments" (p. 46) in 225 appeals.

Four goals structure Klein's analysis and hypotheses. Judges try to promote policies that square with their policy preferences; reach legally sound decisions; maintain coherent and consistent federal law; and limit the time spent adjudicating specific cases. Regarding policy preferences, he surmises that judges are less likely to adopt a rule if the ideological distance between the rule and the judge decreases. With reaching legally sound decisions, the likelihood of adopting a rule increases if the judge creating it is prestigious or considered to be an expert in the field; but a dissent in the rule-creating case produces less chance of adoption. Regarding uniformity, the probability of rule adoption increases if it enjoys strong support from other circuits. With efficiency, the chance of rule adoption is a function of prestige, expertise, and the extent to which other courts have endorsed the rule. Notably, Klein isolates these hypotheses from two other propositions about circuit court anticipatory behavior regarding the effect Supreme Court precedents may have on rule making: The adoption is influenced by trying to decide the case in the same way the high court would or, alternatively, with the fear of reversal.

While there are a number of ambivalent findings, most hypotheses are validated by his research. Klein's generalization that circuit courts are largely autonomous actors that use goals to become significant rule makers is arguably the most persuasive. Readers might find it interesting that the author posits as one goal the quest to reach legally sound outcomes (especially as affected by a rule creator's prestige, and expertise or whether there was a dissent). He also, somewhat grudgingly, admits (pp. 141–42) that the law is a critical element of politically motivated judicial behavior, more so than what the attitudinal school (e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, *The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model,* 1993) might concede. He is less candid, perhaps, in accepting that his work might be an affirmation of strategic policymaking (p. 143). It appears to go in that direction by suggesting that decisions about the rule are weighed against the reputation and extracompetence of the judge who writes it (pp. 67–69, 81–83, 141). Klein, for example, describes strategic conduct as "tak[ing] into account the possible behavior of others in deciding what actions are most likely to further their interests," and remains noncommittal about its place in his research (pp. 13, 143). It will be up to the reader to decide if his methods establish that rule adoption is not really a strategic calculation, either at all or to a degree that the author is unwilling to acknowledge (p. 143).

Klein maintains that there is a clear distinction between pursing a legal goal and taking into account legal considerations, and that the literature overstates the perception of the law as more of a constraint on achieving a judge's policy preferences than its being an "active pursuit of solutions" (p. 141). It is debatable whether these distinctions are meaningful, since a judge making law under either scenario is using the law actively to calculate whether a rule from a certain judge is worthy of adoption. The point is that the judge is employing the law, and whether one conceptualizes it as a factor, a consideration, or a goal does not diminish the significance of acknowledging that it plays a key role in affecting outcomes. It would seem, too, that the law itself would make a difference in striking the balance between law and policy, especially as facts or lower court precedent shape it. These are two elements that Klein fails to address, however.

In sum, what Klein does in *Making Law in the United States Courts of Appeals* is impressive since his approach is innovative and thorough, and it uses quantitative analysis to suggest that the law is far more relevant to determining outcomes than previously believed. Although his use of interview data might have been more valuable if it had been more formally structured or conceptualized, law and courts scholars will

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enjoy reading what judges have to say about the decision-making process. While Klein is not as clear as he could be in characterizing his methodological approach, his basic claim that decision making is about the pursuit of legal goals is worth paying attention to since it gives due credit to the key role that law invariably plays in affecting behavior at the circuit court level.

Recreating the American Republic: Rules of Apportionment, Constitutional Change, and American Political Development, 1700–1870. By Charles A. Kromkowski. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 486p. $70.00.

— Jasmine Farrier, *University of Louisville*

Charles A. Kromkowski's ambitious book argues that apportionment is a revealing and underappreciated lens on constitutional creation and change. As rules of apportionment are fundamentally distributional and informational in nature, he argues, they merit attention as the foundation of intragovernmental legitimacy, in addition to being both the channel and target of political conflicts. By means of historical-institutional analysis with a large twist of formal theory, Kromkowski boldly reexamines such U.S. representative theory and arrangements from the pre-Revolutionary period through the Civil War amendments.

In the American Revolution chapters, Kromkowski argues that changing expectations about institutional power and representation explain the conflict better than the reigning theories surrounding various socioeconomic, ideological, and political-institutional confrontations between Britain and the colonies. While apportionment can be read into all these perspectives, he argues that the Revolution occurred primarily because the colonies and Britain dramatically diverged on how to balance localism, national issues, and institutional change. He then presents prewar issues, preferences, decision sequences, and possible outcomes through formal models to show how these larger institutional conflicts affected micro-level conclusions to go to war rather than to compromise.

The author then turns to the creation of the Articles of Confederation, defined by equal state representation and limited national powers, which he calls "the definitive experience of the founding of the American political order" (p. 182). While discussing the various sectional, demographic, and economic interests of the states behind the first constitution, Kromkowski argues that apportionment was the most heated subject and thus "architectonic" to the creation of the new union. He details other internal and external pressures behind the Articles, such as regulation of common expenses and western lands, as well as threats to the economy and international legitimacy of the new nation, but concludes above all that the equal apportionment rule was the foundation of this complex "calculus of consent."

So why did the Articles of Confederation not work? Kromkowski critiques the "interpretative canon" of Founding-period historians who separately emphasize socioeconomic forces, ideological conditions, and the inefficacy of the national government. He faults these reigning theories for not simultaneously explaining constitutional changes "that ultimately yielded *both* an increase in national governing authority *and* a change in the national rule of apportionment" (p. 206, emphasis in the original). After surveying economic, demographic, institutional, and ideological conditions between the ratification of the Articles and the 1787 Constitutional Convention, Kromkowski concludes that the inherent weaknesses of the Articles begot more weakness as the delegates themselves lost interest in reporting to the Continental Congress and more power naturally devolved to the states. Constitutional change became eminent when new political and representative expectations emerged, on both the macro and micro levels, "fundamentally dissonant" with the Articles. The result was the new "double" rule of House and Senate apportionment, born after apportionment battles dominated the Convention of 1787.

Finally, Kromkowski revisits the causes and consequences of the Civil War and argues that a similar trend is visible in this history as in the Founding period: A breakdown in apportionment consensus is followed by a breakdown of constitutional consensus, and new apportionment rules form the bases for a new constitutional order. First, he offers a variety of historical data and formal models to demonstrate how this conflict, like the Revolution, was much more surprising than conventional wisdom and scholarship suggest. Then, he argues that the Civil War was essentially and ironically a conflict over the apportionment structures of the Constitution, which were forged through sectional compromise in 1787, but as early as 1820 started to favor the North in the House and Electoral College. Ideas, economics, and demographics surrounding slavery are all subsumed into this apportionment perspective on the war.

Despite this interesting, if somewhat cold, new angle on the causes of the Civil War, it is unclear why this case marks "the End of Representation" as is stated in the final substantive chapter's subtitle. Other than briefly mentioning the apportionment controversies surrounding the abandonment of the three-fifths clause and other aspects of the postwar constitutional amendments, Kromkowski does not explain at length what exactly "ended" and what, if anything, should be mourned as the Constitution evolved into a new, yet still extremely contentious, system of representation.

In this way, while the author's fascinating case studies show that apportionment *was* a crucial and underappreciated component of these crises in American political development, its relevance today is left largely for the reader to sort out. He mentions a few lingering controversies related to representation after the Civil War in his Introduction, such as the post-1920 failure to reapportion the House and the Supreme Court's landmark 1962 ruling *Baker v. Carr*. But this work would make a more convincing argument for the central place of apportionment in the American political order if it touched upon more current controversies and scholarship surrounding representation, including, but not limited to, census politics, race-based redistricting, and the role and structures of the contemporary Senate, all of which have some relationship to this book's premise and cases.

But the real controversy will likely surround what *Recreating the American Republic* includes, rather than what it omits. It claims to be a far-reaching and innovative contribution to the social sciences, both substantively and methodologically. Kromkowski's conclusion that he has presented "a unifying theory that accounts for the creation and recreation of the American political order from 1700 to 1870" (p. 422) may strike some readers as a tad overstated in light of the rich and diverse political science scholarship on early-American political development, some of which is included in footnotes but not overtly challenged in the text.

In addition, Kromkowski invites methodological attention through his self-conscious discussions of the possibilities and challenges of combining different research approaches and methods. In Chapter 3 and elsewhere, he launches into the difficulties of uncovering institutional history and ascribing motives and goals to individual actors, even while doing both. In addition to the book's substantive merits, these interesting digressions on the problems of "doing" social science would make this text a lively addition to a scope and methods–type graduate course in history and political science.

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The Politics of Cultural Differences: Social Change and Voter Mobilization Strategies in the Post–New Deal Period. By David C. Leege, Kenneth D. Wald, Brian S. Krueger, and Paul D. Mueller. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 304p. $60.00 cloth, $21.95 paper.

Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment, and Party Polarization. By Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Mark D. Brewer, and Mack D. Mariani. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002. 208p. $65.00 cloth, $22.00 paper.

— Jeffrey Kraus, *Wagner College*

For more than 30 years, scholars and political analysts have been discussing the coming of a new electoral alignment in American politics. Beginning with Kevin Phillips's (1969) *The Emerging Republican Majority,* there have been works predicting, and eventually analyzing, the collapse of the Democratic Party's "New Deal Coalition." The two works reviewed here are the most recent of this genre.

In *Diverging Parties,* Jeffrey Stonecash and his coauthors examine realignment through the increasing partisanship of the parties in the House of Representatives. While "party votes" in the House declined during the 1970s and 1980s as candidate-centered campaigns seemed to emerge in response to the rise of the "ticket splitter" in the electorate, the authors argue that the increasing party polarization of the last decade is the result of the changing composition of congressional districts.

With the congressional district as the base for their analysis, the authors demonstrate that the employment of racial gerrymandering (which saw an increase in the number of African Americans in the House from 25 to 38 after the 1992 election) after the 1990 census has resulted in congressional districts being more homogeneous. This has led to the election of more African Americans from urban/liberal districts that tend to vote Democratic, but has also resulted in the creation of suburban districts that tend to be predominantly white, conservative, and more inclined to elect Republicans (pp. 74–76).

As a result, the authors find greater polarization in the House of Representatives. They write that "[m]embers from districts that are more rural and primarily white have more conservative records. . . . Members from districts that are more urban and with a greater percentage of nonwhites have more liberal voting records" (p. 109). Therefore, while racial gerrymandering has led to the election of more nonwhites (overwhelmingly Democratic) to the House, it has led to a diminution of their political influence within the institution as the Republicans have become the majority, and therefore dominant, party in the body. The authors go on to suggest that their research has even greater implications than party voting in the House by asserting that a "greater congruence has developed among House elections, House members' votes, and presidential election results" (p. 118). They believe that "a broader realignment is occurring" (p. 118).

Yet while suggesting that a realignment is occurring, they also assert that "the future of each party is far from clear" (p. 122). They suggest that the increase in the number of nonwhites in the electorate presents dilemmas for both parties. For the Democrats, who prior to Bill Clinton's victory in 1992 had come to be perceived by white middle-class voters (especially southern whites) as indifferent to their needs (Peter Brown, *Minority Party: Why the Democrats Face Defeat in 1992,* 1991; Thomas Byrne Edsall, *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights and Taxes in American Politics,* 1991), the challenge is to attract nonwhite votes without losing the white voters necessary to remain competitive in national elections. For Republicans, who have cultivated support among whites (while alienating many Latinos and African Americans) by their stands on illegal immigration, social welfare benefits for resident aliens, and affirmative action, the need is to increase their support among nonwhites. Failure to accomplish this would consign the Republican Party to minority status in a polity that will, if the demographers are right, become a majority-minority society by midcentury.

In *The Politics of Cultural Differences,* David Leege and his coauthors ask how the Republicans, despite never constituting a majority of party identifiers and only being competitive with Democrats for non-Latino whites, have managed to hold the White House throughout most of the "post–New Deal Era" (1968 to the present). Their answer: by being able to keep Democrats home.

The authors argue that the Republicans have developed a campaign strategy that is designed to repress voter turnout or appeal to conservative Democrats by emphasizing cultural issues—patriotism, gender, race, and religion. As the "minority party" (more voters identified with the Democratic Party during the period in question, although that percentage has declined from its peak during the New Deal Era (from 1932 to 1968), Republicans emphasized "morality," contending that the Democrats had embraced immoral positions—soft on communism, abortion rights, affirmative action, tax and spend, and so on, and in doing so were able to energize their base and, more important, keep Democrats home on election day. Indeed, the Republicans managed to make "liberal" into a term that virtually all Democrats would shun, notably Clinton, who ran for President in 1992 as a "New Democrat."

The authors cite the Republican Convention of 1992 as an exemplar of what they call "The Political Mobilization of Cultural Differences" (p. 13), quoting Patrick Buchanan's speech where he urged Americans "to take back our culture and take back our country" (p. 13). Ironically, this convention would actually work against the Republicans by making the party appear too extreme.

The book is divided into two parts, with the first part (Chapters 1–5) presenting a theoretical perspective on cultural politics, suggesting that the manipulation of psychological mechanisms rooted in primary group attachments allows issues to be framed in ways that mobilize some voters while demobilizing others. The second half of the book (Chapters 6–10) examines how the Republicans were able to manipulate issues like race, gender, patriotism, and religion to become dominant in presidential politics during the last third of the twentieth century. The final chapter offers a summation and some concluding points.

While focusing on the Republican Party's success, the authors do note how the Democrats were able to turn the tide in 1992 and 1996 by using the same strategy. By emphasizing the prominent role of evangelicals in the Republican Party (many of whom were once Democrats), the authors observe that this "visibility provided Democrats an opportunity to steal pages from the Republican playbook, creating anxiety within the Republican coalition. The Democrats effectively manipulated the electorate by negatively outgrouping evangelicals as religious zealots within the Republican coalition, attributing to them the party's apparent preference for social over economic conservatism. Mainline Protestants, business and professional Republican women, and other educated groups became anxious, often defecting or staying home on election day" (p. 263). The authors suggest that both Bush and Gore, in their own ways, embraced cultural politics in 2000. This may help explain, at least from their perspective, the closeness of that election.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of this work is the thesis that campaign strategies can be developed that intentionally demobilize voters. While they are not the first to articulate the view that campaigns can suppress turnout (Karen S. Johnson-Cartee and Gary A. Copeland, *Negative Political Advertising: Coming of Age,* 1992 contended that negative political advertising, though targeted against specific candidates, tended to suppress voter turnout generally), their analysis is significant in that it is used to

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apply to a campaign's global strategy, rather than confined just to its political advertising.

While examining the question of realignment from different perspectives, both works seem to suggest that the future of our parties is not clear-cut. Can the parties appeal to a demographically changing electorate? Can they continue to devise strategies to mobilize some voters while keeping others home? Stay tuned.

Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre. By David R. Mayhew. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. 192p. $24.00.

— Robin Kolodny, *Temple University*

I want to express my personal thanks to David Mayhew for writing this book. It is, as much of his work is, an elegant, straightforward work that brings an enormous degree of balance to a subject area badly in need of it. Every graduate student of political science living in the United States should read it (regardless of field), and every scholar engaged in teaching any aspect of American politics needs to read it as well, if not assign it in their classes.

Realignment has been in trouble as a theory for explaining party identification and electoral behavior for some time. The most obvious problem is that there has been no full realignment since 1932, and no consensus has emerged on what, if any, partial realignment has taken place in 1968, 1974, 1980, or 1994. While others have questioned the appropriateness of the realignment framework for specific elections and wondered if the argument that realignments happen every 36 years withstands scrutiny (the periodization argument—see the essays by Everett Carll Ladd and Byron E. Shafer in Byron E. Shafer, ed., *The End of Realignment? Interpreting American Electoral Eras,* 1991), Mayhew has taken an important step beyond these critiques by confronting the realignment establishment and asking what, if anything, the realignment genre has brought to our understanding of voting behavior, elections, and political parties in America. What value do we gain from this theory? Ultimately, Mayhew suggests that realignment may not be appropriate for explaining *any* of the elections commonly associated with it (1860, 1896, and 1932). Though not denying that important changes happened in these elections, he wonders if alternative explanations may do as well or better in explaining those events, while also raising the important question of why other elections that seem to meet the criteria established by realignment scholars remain largely ignored in their scholarship.

Mayhew begins by explaining the central ideas offered by scholars of realignment theology (V. O. Key, E. E. Schattschneider, James Sundquist, and Walter Dean Burnham), the specific contributions and assertions they made, and how those arguments have been passed on to the last several generations of political scientists. I must confess feeling relieved by Mayhew's discussion at this point. We have all read these works as undergraduate and graduate students and in turn assigned much of it to our own students. Eventually, many of us dropped them from our reading lists, or relegated them to one lecture in a semester since we had plenty of other good material to fill the semester. Mayhew's analysis demonstrates multiple reasons for this unease, and then proceeds to thoroughly and convincingly offer evidence for the shaky ground on which realignment rests.

The author identifies 15 elements to realignment theory that he wants to test. Once those points are raised in Chapter 2, the rest of the book is dedicated to pursuing these propositions in great detail. Through a number of measures, he finds that several major tenets of realignment theory do not add up. First, he confronts the cyclical dynamic in Chapter 4, investigating evidence of the magnitude of changes in the electorate during the ideal realigning elections of 1860, 1896, and 1932. He finds that with the exception of 1932, the other "ideal" elections do not exhibit the most remarkable deviations in voter alignments. The elections of 1880, 1920, and even 1972 seem to fare better. This evaluation brings several other major tenets of realignment into question, including the periodization argument and the explanation of historical events building up to stress points that cause significant changes in voter identification. As Mayhew states, "neither statistics nor stories bear out the canonical realignments calendar of 1860, 1896, and 1932. Something like faith seems to be needed to keep it in place" (pp. 58–59).

Not content to stop there, Mayhew then evaluates other significant claims of realignment scholars, including the magnitude of voter turnout in these elections, the turmoil found in presidential nominating conventions of those years, the timing and influence of third-party activity in the realigning eras, evidence of issue cleavages between the parties, ideological polarization of the electorate, and the nationalization of issues. While the "big three" elections may perform well on some of these indicators, none exhibits all these qualities and, more importantly, other elections may fare better. Finally, Mayhew takes on the significance of policy changes surrounding the big three realignments, focusing on how poorly 1896 fares on all the specified indicators. He finds more evidence for impressive policy change around the Progressive Era than during the 1890s, but without the 1890s, most of realignment's elegance evaporates.

Mayhew does not deny that major shifts take place between parties and among voters. He believes that our acceptance of realignment theory has prevented us from considering alternative explanations that could be as or more robust. In the concluding chapter, he reassesses the 15 claims of realignment that are based almost exclusively on economic-dualistic explanations, and offers three broad thematic interpretations of electoral change that have not been considered fairly because of the hegemony of realignment: bellicosity (the effect that wars have had on domestic voter alignments), race, and economic growth. If we abandon realignment, then we might find these alternative lines of inquiry more fruitful for explaining the performance of political parties and the behavior of voters.

As impressive as *Electoral Realignments* is, there are two omissions worth noting. First, Mayhew seldom refers to midterm congressional elections, even though some specific ones (1874 and 1974 in particular) are singled out for discussion. An exclusive focus on presidential election years tells only half the story about several of the major indicators discussed (even more curious to me because the 1994 elections are only mentioned once and in passing). Second, the life cycle of important third parties should be given more of a role in explaining changes in party and voter alignments. Although Mayhew acknowledges that realignment theorists may be on to something here, he shows that the timing of these movements is all wrong according to the theory. Significant third parties or independent presidential candidates should become an investigative theme in and of themselves for exploring alternatives to realignment. Why do they emerge and how do their significant "disruptions" alter the behavior of parties and voters?

Ultimately, these points are just quibbles. They suggest that Mayhew's provocative book has been successful in suggesting future research avenues and should help current scholars get beyond trying to rationalize realignment and move on to more illuminating work.

Unfinished Business: America and Cuba After the Cold War, 1989–2001. By Morris Morley and Chris McGillion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 264p. $60.00 cloth, $18.00 paper.

— Jorge I. Domínguez, *Harvard University*

Should U.S.-Cuban relations have changed substantially in the years following the end of

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the U.S.-Soviet Cold War? Morris Morley and Chris McGillion write on the assumption that the answer to this question is yes. They look for reasons that this outcome did not occur and find it principally in the domestic politics of the United States.

Democrat and Republican politicians, including Presidents George H. W. Bush, William Clinton, and George W. Bush, competed for the support of the militant anti-Castro Cuban-American organizations, seeking their votes and their considerable campaign contributions. Cuban-American voting power was enhanced by geographic concentration in key states (Florida and New Jersey). Cuban-American clout was bolstered by the capacity to raise large sums of money for political purposes and to disburse it liberally to politicians of both major parties who supported their cause. The Bushes and Clinton, Republican Jesse Helms and Democrat Robert Torricelli, and many others received votes and generous campaign funds in gratitude for their support for Cuban-American causes. The White House repeatedly caved in, argue Morley and McGillion, to such domestic political incentives. At times, the authors provide a second reason for the trajectory of U.S. policy toward Cuba: the ideological commitments of U.S. politicians, who are characteristically described as still wedded to a Cold War framework with regard to Cuba.

This book's principal strength is its presentation of extensive material that documents the domestic politics of the making of U.S. policy toward Cuba from the start of the Bush I presidency to the end of the first year of the Bush II presidency. The authors present a vigorously written text with more than just a whiff of polemics. They are persuasive in arguing that domestic U.S. politics is a major explanation for the course of U.S. policy toward Cuba. Readers will also be able to locate a great deal of empirical information through the help of a good index.

A better book would have been more analytical, however. The authors never consider, for example, a plausible neorealist hypothesis, namely, that in 1990 and subsequent years, the United States logically pressed its advantage on Cuba once the latter was deprived of its Soviet alliance. Evidence for the logic of such U.S. policy appears at times in this book (the repatriation of Cuban troops from Africa, the termination of Cuba's active support for revolutionary movements, the departure of all Soviet troops from Cuba, and the shutdown of the Soviet electronic eavesdropping facility, etc.), but never to assess the intellectual utility of alternative hypotheses.

Nor do the authors help us to distinguish among three variations of "domestic politics" explanations on the book's pages. Their dominant explanation is the politics of electoral votes and campaign money. A different domestic politics explanation is the beliefs of U.S. politicians: the ideological concerns to which the authors at times make reference. They never explain how much of the outcome they observe may be attributed to the ideas of politicians and how much to an electoral connection.

Moreover, a third domestic politics explanation focuses on relations between President and Congress. A good illustration of such an interbranch explanation for the making of U.S. policy toward Cuba is the enactment of the Cuban Democratic Liberty and Solidarity Act of 1996, the so-called Helms-Burton Act. The authors' account (especially pp. 83, 89) can be read to mean that the electoral connection, that is, the role of Cuban-American lobbies and incentives, mattered little. Instead, Helms-Burton exemplifies the attempt of the Republican majorities in both chambers of Congress to put their stamp on U.S. foreign policy during the Clinton administration. The beliefs and institutional responsibilities of the chairmen of the international relations committees were decisive; their staffers, not the Cuban-American National Foundation, conceived, drafted, and enacted the legislation.

At the book's opening, the authors mention that some might think that U.S.-Cuban relations could be explained in part by Cuban government behavior. They dismiss this possibility cursorily and never explore it. It may be that Cuban foreign and domestic policies explain nothing about the subject that this book announces in its subtitle, but that would have to be demonstrated, not peremptorily waved away. In the 1990s, the Cuban government did promote undocumented migration to the United States (1994), did shoot down two unarmed airplanes in international waters (1996), did run a single-party regime and own and operate all the mass media, and did jail hundreds of human rights and opposition activists, among other examples. Some such behavior could have explained something about U.S. policy.

Finally, a reader of *Unfinished Business* would need to work hard to realize that the very guts of the Helms-Burton Act (Title III, on property expropriations and compensation) has never gone into effect, waived away during both the Clinton and Bush II administrations. The next most important element of the Act (Title IV, on visas to international executives whose firms operate in Cuba) has been implemented only in a few exemplary instances. In fact, a better book would have explained why this alleged centerpiece of U.S. policy toward Cuba has gone unenforced. Was it because of the exigencies of statecraft and the "balancing" behavior of the European Union, Canada, and the Latin Americans, as neorealists are wont to believe? Was it because of the beliefs of presidents in presidential prerogative and the quotidian due deference to such prerogative by most members of Congress, notwithstanding their occasional grandstanding in enacting laws that they hope the president will not enforce?

The same reader would also have been surprised to read on page 104 that the U.S. and Cuban armed forces engaged in confidence-building measures. This fact is never developed. The puzzled reader would never learn that in the middle of the Clinton administration, the United States unilaterally extirpated thousands of mines once deployed around the perimeter of its base at Guantanamo. That reader would also be unprepared to learn that in the late Clinton and early Bush II administrations, the United States was Cuba's number one international partner for academic and cultural exchanges, the second most important source of donations, and the fastest-growing trade partner. U.S.-Cuban relations is an intriguing subject, yet so little time was accorded in this book to its most puzzling aspects.

The Not So Common Sense: Differences in How People Judge Social and Political Life. By Shawn W. Rosenberg. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002. 448p. $40.00.

— Kathleen M. McGraw, *The Ohio State University*

This volume is a substantial extension of Shawn W. Rosenberg's earlier book, *Reason, Ideology and Politics* (1988). As in the earlier book, Rosenberg proposes a developmental account of sociopolitical reasoning, rooted in a broad consideration of social and cultural forces. He sets the stage for the theoretical development and subsequent empirical research by identifying two "puzzles." The first is the failure of many people to learn and to adapt to new circumstances, a failure that he links to the "crisis of postmodernity," as well as more mundane examples such as undergraduate college students. The second puzzle is that when people do learn, they seem to make sense of the same situation in fundamentally different ways. The theoretical solution to these puzzles is the theory of *structural pragmatics,* reflecting the pragmatist (William James, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey) and structuralist (Ferdinand de Saussure, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Claude Levi-Strauss) traditions that Rosenberg draws upon.

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The structures that are at the heart of the theory are not simply or easily defined; they exist at both the personal and social level, and they are dynamic, rather than static, entities. As elements of individual cognition and reasoning, Rosenberg is clear to differentiate structures, which are "formal and general" as well as "generative" (p. 381), from schemas, which are substantive and specific. Schemas, in his view, are produced by the generative structures, and so schemas mediate between structures and thought in specific situations.

Two specific charges against contemporary liberal institutional (i.e., economic and psychological) and macrosociological theories form the basis of Rosenberg's structural pragmatic approach. The first is the level of analysis problem, that is, the failure to fully recognize that both the individual and society are structuring forces, necessarily linked to dually determine social thought and action. The second charge is that both theoretical traditions assume "that people reason in basically the same way" (p. 371). These charges at times border on caricature, and one can easily point to contemporary developments that Rosenberg ignores (for example, the growing literatures on "socially shared cognition" and contextual theories of politics in response to the first charge, and the enormous bodies of research concerned with "dual processing models" and cross-cultural differences in cognition in response to the second). Nevertheless, his basic critique rings true and is important for advancing political psychological approaches to cognition and reasoning because the standard research paradigm too often rests on the presumption of methodological individualism, ignoring how psychological processes are engaged in specific social and cultural contexts.

The three middle chapters are devoted to detailing the three modes of reasoning. Their explication is lengthy and complex, and so they defy easy summary. Briefly, sequential reasoning, the most primitive of the three forms, is focused on immediate circumstances apprehended in isolation from other events; Rosenberg argues that the world of politics is not easily grasped from a sequential perspective. Linear reasoning focuses on specific actors and actions that are understood and evaluated in terms of causal sequences, categorical identifications, and concrete norms. The most sophisticated form of thinking, systematic, is an active, interpretive mode that recognizes the relationships among elements, and that is characterized by inductive or deductive reasoning. Each of these chapters considers how each mode of reasoning produces understanding and evaluation in both social and political reasoning, as well as how the thinking modes are linked to value and the resolution of value conflict.

Chapter 6 addresses methodological concerns and provides a defense of the specific instrument and methods used in the empirical research. Given the early stage of theory development, Rosenberg rightfully rejects the use of close-ended survey questions and experimental techniques to explore structural differences in cognition and instead relies on intensive individual interviews. Forty-eight subjects participated in the study, selected to vary in level of education, income, and occupational responsibilities. Semistructured interviews were conducted, consisting largely of open-ended questions about three distinct issues or domains: 1) a personal issue [helping a significant other]; 2) a domestic political issue [the dilemma posed by the Robert Mapplethorpe exhibit of homoerotic photography at the Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Center]; and 3) a foreign relations issue [American involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina]. The interviews were coded according to the three-stage typology, and an impressive intercoder reliability rate of 86% was attained. This chapter is an exemplary model for how intensive interview research studies of this sort should be presented. The author provides a great deal of information about the structure of the interview and the coding scheme, thus providing the critical reader with sufficient information to gauge the reliability and validity of the work and also providing a framework for replication and extension by other researchers.

The aim of the empirical research was to evaluate two hypotheses. The first proposes cross-situational consistency within individuals—simply, that individuals make use of the same general mode of thinking across different types of situations. In support of this hypothesis, Rosenberg reports that 42 of the 48 interviewees (88%) evaluated the three issues in the same way (and so the book's subtitle is somewhat misleading, as people reasoned about social and political issues in identical ways). The second hypothesis predicts differences across individuals, and so suggests that all three modes of thinking should be exhibited in the interviews. Support for this hypothesis was also obtained, with 11 of the interviewees responding in a sequential manner, 27 in a linear manner, and 10 in a systematic manner. Rosenberg makes an unorthodox, but ultimately successful, decision in presenting the interview results, beyond these summary statistics. Rather than adopting the common practice of presenting brief excerpts from different interviews to illustrate differences in reasoning, he presents in Chapter 7 most of the full text of three interviews (one each of sequential, linear, and systematic interviewees), annotated with coding notes and interpretive comments.

The final Chapter 8 summarizes the theory and empirical results, and situates the work by linking it, and distinguishing it, from related research on political, social, and moral reasoning, including Rosenberg's earlier work. Some of the liveliest writing occurs here. He makes a strategic error in reserving this material for the end of the book, as readers familiar with the relevant research and theoretical frameworks may find themselves frustrated by the absence of explicit links to important bodies of work earlier in the book.

There are some aspects of *The Not So Common Sense* that are not as fully developed as one might like. For example, the most serious weakness of the book is the failure to clearly demonstrate how the three modes of reasoning are implicated in the failure to learn and adapt to the demands of (post)modern life, the "first puzzle" that motivates the structural pragmatic theory. Rosenberg clearly views systematic thinking as the most sophisticated mode, but it is not at all obvious if and why systematic thinking would ameliorate the failure to learn and to adapt. Phil Tetlock's work on integrative complexity is relevant here, as Tetlock has established that integrative complexity (arguably sharing some similarities to systematic thinking) can both amplify and attenuate biases in judgment and decision making. In addition to scant argument or evidence about the consequences of the thinking modes, there is too little discussion of the developmental progression among the three modes of thinking, and how these structures evolve and respond to changing social circumstances. Rosenberg notes that the relationship between level of education and reasoning is weak at best, but he fails to articulate other causal antecedents—qualities of the social context or the individual—that might influence the adoption of different modes of thinking.

The reservations expressed here—links to other literatures, clearer specification of antecedents and consequences—are largely those of a middle-range theorist. I suspect many readers with that orientation will not be terribly surprised by Rosenberg's primary research conclusions (i.e., systematic underlying structure and individual differences in reasoning). However, the author is engaged in theory development on a grander level, and for that he is to be congratulated, because it is an endeavor to which too few political psychologists aspire. And it is at that larger theoretical level where the substantial contributions of *The Not So Common Sense* are to be found.

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This is a provocative work that should force scholars of sociopolitical reasoning to grapple more seriously with individual differences in cognitive structures and the role that collective phenomena—society and culture—play in shaping these structures.

Democrats, Republicans, and the Politics of Women's Place. By Kira Sanbonmatsu. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. 328p. $47.50.

— Gretchen Ritter, *University of Texas at Austin*

What impact has second-wave feminism had on electoral and party politics in America? According to Kira Sanbonmatsu, much less than one might think. Indeed, in the view of this author, the only lasting and defining political issue to emerge from feminism has been abortion. Despite massive shifts in public attitudes about gender roles over the last three decades, the two major political parties have remained ambivalent in their positions on gender equality, preferring to assert a woman's right to equal treatment in the public realm, while still celebrating and cherishing the commitment of women who choose to be stay-at-home mothers. Sanbonmatsu acknowledges that there are differences between the parties on gender issues—in their overall policy dispositions, and about which gender-interest groups associate themselves with which parties. Yet she nonetheless argues that with the striking exception of abortion, at the presidential level at least, the parties have given very little attention to gender issues in politics and have failed to clearly distinguish themselves on the question of gender equality. The story behind this apparent failure of feminism within politics says as much about the party system and electoral structure as it does about the women's movement.

Sanbonmatsu seeks to simultaneously bring into focus the shifting views and political preferences of the public with the activities of political elites, both in the parties and in interest groups that operate in relation to the parties. Her book is organized into three parts. Part I examines public opinion on gender issues over the last three decades. Part II considers the positions of the parties on gender issues. Part III offers a more comprehensive view that explains the disparities between the parties's positions on abortion and on gender-role issues. This section also refines our understanding of the interaction of party elites and the voting public on political matters. The book combines findings from original research (including an in-depth study of the 1996 party conventions, and content analyses of presidential addresses and party platforms) with more synthetic accounts of previous work done on gender politics as it relates to public opinion and national electoral politics.

Several significant insights emerge from Sanbonmatsu's work. One concerns the complexity of abortion as a political issue. This is the one issue that has clearly divided the parties since the mid-1970s. It is also an issue that has mobilized both pro- and antifeminist organizations in defense of or attack upon the legal standard of abortion rights established in *Roe v. Wade.* Yet contrary to popular wisdom, and to the influential work of Kristin Luker, Sanbonmatsu contends that abortion is only partially understood as a gender-role issue. On the basis of her study of prolife and prochoice activists, Luker argues (in *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood,* 1984) that the debate about abortion is really a debate about the proper social roles for women—particularly about motherhood. While broader ideological differences about gender may indeed be present in the views of abortion activists, for the many Americans who are moderates on abortion (advocates of legality with some restrictions), abortion does not necessarily correlate with their beliefs about gender equality. Further, despite their clear differences on whether abortion should remain legal, both political parties have effectively isolated abortion as a political issue and have diminished its connection to other gender-political matters.

Regarding the broader failure of the parties to take clear stances on gender roles or gender-equality issues (at least since the failure to adopt the Equal Rights Amendment in the early 1980s), Sanbonmatsu suggests that this is due to the nature of electoral competition, the more complex nature of gender roles and gender equality as political issues, and the shifting and ambivalent structure of public opinion on these issues. While this explanation may not appear to be entirely adequate, the author has done important work in raising the question of the separation between abortion and other gender issues, and has moved us some distance in the direction of understanding this phenomenon.

Democrats, Republicans, and the Politics of Women's Place is not without flaws. One weakness concerns Sanbonmatsu's conceptualization of gender politics. Gender issues are defined here as "issues that affect women as a group and/or affect the traditional division of labor between women and men" (p. 10). Further, the term "gender issues" is used interchangeably with "women's equality" and "gender equality" issues, which include "but [are] not limited to, women's formal legal rights" (p. 10). While Sanbonmatsu goes on to list some policies that "have implications for gender equality," no more specific definition of gender equality is provided. In contrast to the overly inclusive use of the term "gender equality," the phrase "gender roles" is defined more narrowly as involving only the "subset of gender issues" concerning "the traditional exclusion of women from the public realm" (p. 12). The public realm is presented as the realm of paid work and formal politics, meaning that by definition, "abortion, women's health research, child support, [and] domestic violence" (and other matters related to sexuality, reproduction, parenting, and marriage) are not regarded as gender-role issues. These definitions seem problematic, either because they are too general (in the case of equality) or because they are contrary to commonly understood conceptualizations (in the case of gender roles). At times in her analysis, the author appears quite sensitive to the ways in which conceptualization and framing matter to the politics of gender. But elsewhere, and in her theoretical formulations, there is less consideration given to the way that particular rhetorical or policy formulations may reflect the deep-rooted structure of gendered politics within the American liberal political order. For instance, the division between public- and private-realm understandings of women's roles, the difficulty with perceiving women as fully autonomous individuals, and the dominance of abstract and procedural understandings of rights and equality for women all speak to the way that liberal philosophical tenets have been encoded into the American constitutional structure and political institutions.

Nonetheless, this book makes an important contribution to our understanding of the place of gender in American electoral and party politics in the last three decades.

Praxis for the Poor: Piven and Cloward and the Future of Social Science in Social Welfare. By Sanford F. Schram. New York: New York University Press, 2002. 320p. $55.00 cloth, $19.00 paper.

— Robert C. Lieberman, *Columbia University*

A generation ago, political science was centrally concerned with questions of power and inequality. Regrettably, these themes have all but disappeared from our professional discourse. With their decline, the possibilities for politically engaged, policy-relevant scholarship in the discipline have diminished considerably. Political knowledge, Sanford Schram argues in this eloquent and impassioned book, has been divorced from political practice and activism,

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much to the impoverishment of both. Social science, he argues, has become too technical and too reliant on austere scientific standards of neutrality and general applicability to be of use for policymakers and advocates. At the same time, activism and policymaking have been deprived of the kind of critical, accessible scholarship that might inform policy debates and help shape political practice.

Schram is particularly concerned with social welfare policy, a research field to which he has himself made an estimable contribution. In particular, he laments the capture of American welfare policy research by a perspective that features welfare dependency as its central organizing concept. Within this frame, reducing welfare dependency becomes both the paramount goal of policy and the critical evaluative standard for policy research. This approach, Schram shows in a devastating methodological critique, systematically submerges other considerations, such as poverty or inequality, that might equally well serve as criteria for measuring and evaluating policy outcomes. This stance, moreover, leaves both activists and scholars who aim to challenge dominant policies and paradigms with weak ground on which to stand.

Schram's attack on this research program is multifaceted. He shows, first, how the emphasis on welfare dependency imposes an often invisible frame of reference on social policy research. Although it is a conceit of much policy research—especially when it relies on the analysis of quantitative data—that "the facts speak for themselves," Schram deftly illustrates some of the ways in which this appearance of scientific neutrality can mask a distinct political perspective, often biased toward the powerful. Moreover, he argues (particularly in a chapter coauthored by Joe Soss), the discourse of welfare research often creates its own political dynamic, which can reinforce this underlying bias. Much of this argument is couched in the language and conceptual apparatus of postmodernism, although he is clearheaded enough as a thinker and a writer to avoid the more egregious faults of this analytical genre.

The book is not, however, a simpleminded and blusterous broadside against quantitative methods in political science or policy research. Schram knows whereof he speaks. An accomplished policy analyst himself, he has published excellent quantitative research in leading mainstream political science journals. (Some of this research forms the basis for one of the book's chapters.) His concern is to expose some of the limitations and biases of a mode of analysis, not to dismiss it or undermine it completely.

The fundamental problem with policy research, in his view, is that it is so thoroughly disconnected from any kind of actual application. A political scientist who teaches in a school of social work, Schram offers a useful and interesting discussion of contemporary conflicts in the field of social work between research- and practice-oriented approaches, which seem largely to be talking past each other. The question he poses is how to produce policy research that is usable for activists and advocates who often find themselves thrust into novel and rapidly changing circumstances in which they must improvise and innovate.

Schram's answer to this question revolves around the concept of "radical incrementalism." This apparent oxymoron seems to denote a stance toward both policy research and policymaking that accepts the conditions that regular garden-variety incrementalism imposes on policy change—small piecemeal changes, rather than big comprehensive ones—but only as a tactical maneuver in the service of a strategic vision in which incremental changes can cumulate into radical transformation. He derives this concept largely from an examination of the careers of Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, who have combined scholarship and activism in a particularly fruitful way and who serve as the book's animating spirits. But beyond explicating (and defending) Piven and Cloward's research methods and political tactics, it is not always clear exactly what analytical purpose the notion of radical incrementalism serves.

The main shortcoming of *Praxis for the Poor* is that it does not hang together particularly well. It reads more like a loosely connected series of essays on a set of disparate topics—Jane Addams, race and welfare, globalization, among other things—than a sustained argument. Each chapter is interesting and instructive on its own terms, but even a careful and sympathetic reader will have trouble finding the thematic thread that connects them.

Still, Schram poses an important challenge for those who would like to restore to political science its sometime concern with power and inequality. At a moment when a cluster of social problems revolving around power and inequality are becoming more acute in the United States and around the world, these same issues are simultaneously growing increasingly invisible both in the mainstream political discourse of our time and in social scientific analyses of politics and policy. How can political science contribute to the task of addressing these challenges? I am not sure that Schram has the answers, but few others in the discipline are even posing the question.

The New White Nationalism In America: Its Challenge to Integration.
By Carol M. Swain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 556p. $30.00.

— Mark Q. Sawyer, *University of California, Los Angeles*

In the wake of the tragedy of September 11, Carol M. Swain's book captures an important moment in American politics. Racial and political tolerance are challenged by white nationalism, which might drown out the forces of democracy and tolerance. This book raises important and prescient questions about the origins and nature of white nationalism, but is too weighed down by ideology to be illuminating. This begins in the preface when Swain states, "I have reserved for myself the right to explore hunches and draw upon personal intuitions as I interpret and evaluate data" (p. i). She argues that this is necessary to produce normatively driven political science. While I laud this break with convention, frequently these hunches either lead to faulty conclusions or foreclose the opportunity for consideration of alternative explanations in this work. One can disagree with Swain's normative vision, but when that vision triumphs over social scientific evidence and fails to live up to its claims for social justice, it is legitimate to critique that vision itself.

In her preface, Swain states her antipathy toward affirmative action, immigrants, and especially the black middle class. For example, she writes: "Many affluent African Americans I have encountered in academia act as if all academic positions and awards should go to their groups as some kind of special entitlement. They also seem to be made uneasy when minorities from lower-class backgrounds achieve more than individuals from their more privileged backgrounds" (p. xxi). She gives no attention to organizations like the United Negro College Fund, or the long history of "racial uplift" engaged in by the black middle class. She also makes no mention that economically disadvantaged and isolated blacks are more likely to support separatism, a politics not in keeping with her political vision. While scholars like Michael Dawson, Dianne Pinderhughes, Adolph Reed, Cathy Cohen, and Mary Patillo have explored cleavages in the black community in a sophisticated fashion, Swain prefers to use her interpretations of her personal experiences in place of these more careful works. In her experiences, middle-class blacks are not only lording their accomplishments over less fortunate blacks but also inciting white nationalism. But what is "new" about white nationalism?

Swain contends that the "New White Nationalism" is characterized by a new set of

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strategies and tactics. These groups use technology like the Internet and have eschewed many of the old rituals and symbols of racism. Thus, they are able to court a mainstream constituency. Swain's work on the strategies and tactics is interesting and provocative but does not deal with the core beliefs of these groups. Arguable racist beliefs have changed little, but she invokes newness to imply something much more ominous. Her argument suggests that what is new is contemporary racist ideology that is legitimized by the bad behavior of blacks, middle class and criminal, and the threat immigration (Latinos) and affirmative action pose to whites. Thus, she finds the New White Nationalism even more dangerous than the old.

Again the preface is instructive. Swain notes that since her first book, she has moved from a "Pollyanna" to a "Cassandra" on matters of race. Her conversion to Cassandra is driven not by scorn for the strident racism but by her perception of out-of-control immigration and racial double standards that currently characterize American racial politics. Thus, her criticisms are not lodged at racists and mainstream white politicians for promoting intolerance, but are aimed at those who support affirmative action, immigration, and multiculturalism. Politicians and institutions that have been successful in promoting tolerance and respect receive no hearing in this text—perhaps because many of them believe in affirmative action and multiculturalism and support immigrant rights.

Affirmative action is a central point of contention for the author. She argues that it creates racial double standards that hurt blacks and incite whites. Swain treats public opinion data curiously. She ignores statistically significant results between blacks and whites and argues that they agree on items where there is almost a 23% point difference (some of the largest gulfs in American politics) in their opinions. As a testament to her incorrect interpretation of the data, she makes a Polyanna, agreement argument, despite the overall Cassandra spin on the affirmative action debate. Her negative interpretation of affirmative action rests almost entirely on anecdotal evidence and personal accounts. A strikingly unrepresentative Latino focus group where all opposed affirmative action (despite 70% support in public opinion polls) leads the way. Swain argues that middle-class blacks abuse affirmative action and rarely engage in mentorship. In her opinion, the existence of affirmative action has either made her feel inferior to whites or has encouraged blacks not to work as hard. These major points are supported only by the author's personal beliefs and those of linguist John McWhorter. She does not entertain the idea that many successful blacks do not share her anxiety and have been mentored by other African Americans. In Swain's world, blacks who benefit from affirmative action are both overconfident and demanding, yet discouraged from achievements. All of these cannot be true.

Swain fails to carefully delineate between symptoms and causes, perceptions and realities, throughout the book. Negative perceptions of immigrants and black criminality are interpreted as both "real" and a causal factor for white racism. She argues that white nationalism is driven by very real threats of black crime, displacement by affirmative action, and job competition from Latino immigrants. Concerns about deaths and human rights abuses of immigrants at the borders and in American towns and cities are replaced by concerns for whites. White fears of no longer being the majority or about black crime are standalone reasons for white racism. Swain never considers that the causal arrow may face in the other direction and she ignores evidence to the contrary. For example, although she notes in one section that transformations in the global economy may drive some white anxieties, this discussion is strangely absent in the account of attitudes about immigration. Despite unclear data as to whether immigrants displace whites or create white flight, Swain blames immigration for these problems and does not pursue the possibility that these perceptions and the responses of white nationalists are a product of preexisting racism, xenophobia, and globalization.

The author cites conservative talk-show host Larry Elder on the issue of black-on-white crime and makes sweeping and unsubstantiated claims about black crime, for example, that "the media has consistently failed to report or emphasize the large numbers of rapes and murders committed by blacks against Asians, many of which look suspiciously like hate crimes" (p. 102). Swain never stops to quote the equally powerful statistics that the majority of blacks are not violent criminals, and that most victims of violent crime—including whites—are most often victimized by members of their own race. It is here that we realize that despite claims of a normative focus, Swain is largely on the side of the white nationalists.

In her recommendations, Swain says nothing about promoting tolerance among whites. She never seriously considers that there may be nothing new about white nationalism. Her own evidence, the Southern Poverty Law Center map, demonstrates that racist organizations are clustered in the Old South, not California and the Northeast, bastions of immigration and multiculturalism—Swain's favored cause of racism. She also never addresses the anti-Semitism of these white nationalist groups. Since most Jews are not immigrants, and Jews neither receive affirmative action nor are perceived to be criminals, her causal explanation cannot account for anti-Semitism. It is notable that Jews were one of the main targets of racist violence by a member of the World Church of the Creator, a group that she chronicles in the book.

Swain raises an interesting and powerful question: Why has racism failed to disappear and could be getting worse? She offers little in response. Her own personal scorn for affirmative action, the black middle class, and immigrants drives *The New White Nationalism in America* and her apology for racist beliefs and practices. Ultimately, this book is more interesting as a testament to Swain's own peculiar politics and personal anecdotes than as a work of political science.

Just Elections: Creating a Fair Electoral Process in the United States. By Dennis F. Thompson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. 256p. $27.50.

— Steven E. Schier, *Carleton College*

The problem of "separate tables" in political science, as described by Gabriel Almond, is strongly evident in studies of the American political system. Recent years have seen the publication of many valuable empirical studies of political participation and institutional behavior that have strong but largely undeveloped normative implications. Empirical political scientists do not "do" traditional political theory, and so their works seldom address broader questions about the quality of American democracy.

Into this void steps political theorist Dennis Thompson, proposing a new sort of "institutional political theory" that draws upon empirical research but operates with the principles of traditional political theory. This approach involves three "precepts." First, "interpreting political principles requires attending to institutional context" (p. viii), meaning the realities of current institutional practice. Second, the "context of political theory" should be broadened "to include that arguments that citizens and their representatives present in public forums" (p. ix). Third, institutional political theory "favors a level of analysis that lies in the midrange of political argument" below comprehensive theories such as libertarianism or egalitarianism (p. ix).

This approach promises much for political science. By narrowing the range of discussion

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of broad political principles, it can incorporate and evaluate the wealth of empirical findings about political participation and institutional behavior. It also promises a discussion of democratic principles in a form accessible to ordinary citizens, political practitioners, and political scientists who are not political theorists.

Thompson helpfully organizes his discussion around several central principles: free choice, popular sovereignty, electoral deliberation, and equal respect. He discusses current electoral controversies concerning these principles. Any scholar of American elections will benefit from exposure to his discussion—particularly scholars who do not approach the topic as political theorists. Theorists, conversely, will discover a congenial mode of analysis that relates more directly to current political practice and controversy.

Although Thompson's broader project is wholly laudable, his execution of it is a bit uneven. Not all of the central "principles" of his book are equally clear. The concept of "equal respect" is a particularly slippery one: "[T]he electoral process should provide citizens with equal opportunities to have their votes equally counted, unless respectful reasons justify unequal treatment" (p. 20). Determining a "respectful reason for unequal treatment" is a problematical undertaking; how do we find agreement on the proper forms of inequality in a liberal regime of equal rights? In his discussion of this principle, Thompson's treatment of its empirical implications is not as thorough as it could be. For example, although he ably and at length assesses arguments for and against simplifying voter registration, he dismisses the practice of barring felons from voting in less than a paragraph (p. 26).

Thompson's discussion of his principles ably employs court decisions and the arguments of public officials in discussing such controversies as campaign finance, voter registration, and term limits. He would receive a wider readership among political scientists, however, if he had more thoroughly examined the vast empirical literature that relates to such controversies. Hamilton and Madison properly receive much attention in the book, but contemporary political science is comparatively slighted.

One would think, for example, that any evaluation of the American electoral system would focus extensively on the phenomenon of legislative incumbency. This huge impediment to accountability and competitive elections is virtually nonexistent in parliamentary regimes. Yet the topic appears infrequently in the book and is nowhere in the index. Thompson does not ignore incumbency, but he fails to give its empirical consequences adequate attention as they relate to the fulfillment of his desired principles.

The author's focus on current electoral controversies is variable. Term limits, racial districts, the electoral college, campaign finance, and voter registration receive extensive and able discussion. The important issue of ballot initiatives and direct democracy receives some attention here, but merits more, given its growing vogue and the increasing number of empirical studies of these practices. Thompson's discussion of battles over the 2000 presidential election is a bit spotty, focusing heavily on the roles of the Supreme Court and Florida's state legislature and very little on the curious behavior of the Florida Supreme Court.

Given these shortcomings, Thompson still delivers much useful analysis throughout *Just Elections*. His identification of principles and scope of analysis are original, and the book is accessible to political scientists regardless of their specializations. He insightfully suggests the commission form as a way to promote more disinterested electoral reforms. In conclusion, he unobjectionably calls for deeper public deliberation about electoral justice. The irony in that—unacknowledged in the book—is that recent empirical studies, such as *Stealth Democracy* by John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (2002), reveal that the public has very little taste for such deliberation.

A bit more attention by Thompson to such evidence might have produced more useful recommendations. This limitation reveals that students of American democracy are, sadly, still very much at "separate tables." Thompson, in this work, invites empirical scholars to pull up a chair for normative discussion. It is an invitation worth taking.

Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America. By Daniel J. Tichenor. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 392p. $65.00 cloth, $22.95 paper.

— Louis DeSipio, *University of California, Irvine*

From its first days, the United States has confronted two questions that have profoundly shaped its growth and the nature of American democracy. These are how many immigrants the nation should admit and what rights they should have. In this book, Daniel J. Tichenor analyzes the breadth of U.S. immigration policymaking from the nation's first days through debates in the 1990s. In his analysis, he seeks to identify the role of institutional arrangements within Congress, the executive branch, and interest groups that shape the policy regimes guiding U.S. immigration policy.

Tichenor provides his readers with a relatively simple model that captures the dynamics of immigration policymaking over the past two hundred years. This model has two dimensions. The first emerges from the question concerning how many immigrants should be admitted. He proposes a continuum from restriction to, depending on the era, expansion or maintenance. The second grows from the question concerning immigrant settlement and ranges from expansive to restrictive. For Tichenor, the resulting two-by-two matrix offers a theoretical hook that connects disparate elements of immigration policy history. The four cells contain "Cosmopolitans," advocates of expanded immigration and expansive rights for immigrants; "Nationalist Egalitarians," who would limit immigration and provide rights and services to immigrants in the United States; "Free-Market Expansionists," who support expansive immigration and few rights for immigrants; and "Classic Exclusionists," who neither support immigration nor rights for immigrants. Undergirding these elite understandings of immigration and immigrant settlement is a relatively consistent position at the mass level opposing large-scale immigration.

Within this model, Tichenor explains change by examining the institutional dynamics of Congress, the executive branch, and interest-group advocates. The primary locus around which coalitions form is the question of the volume of immigration. He demonstrates that, although somewhat debated by the nation's founders, the initial openness of the nation to immigration created a political coalition that prevented restrictions from being placed on immigration for nearly a century and provided for a naturalization law—little changed today—that ensures the speedy opportunity for immigrants to naturalize. This pro-immigration political coalition included support both from immigrants and their children and from economic interests that depended on immigrant labor. Tichenor demonstrates that presidents of this era were particularly concerned about alienating the immigrant/ethnic vote, a fear that crossed party lines and gave naturalized immigrants considerable power in national politics.

After several failed challenges to this policy regime early in the nineteenth century, restrictionists were more successful later in the century by adding groups that had previously supported open immigration to its core of long-term opponents. This new coalition included organized labor, particularly the

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skilled trades, southern Democrats, and progressives. While restrictionists were able to tap racism to impose initial restrictions on Chinese and Asian immigration, institutional structures in Congress and presidential opposition considerably slowed more draconian restriction on European immigration. Immigration opponents had to organize both within Congress, using the committee system to undercut a more pro-immigration leadership, and the executive branch. They also created an interest-group structure to provide intellectual support for restriction that was able to make economic as well as racial arguments. Finally, in what became a recurring theme in the twentieth century as immigration and immigrant settlement policy became more contentious, they made use of the opportunity created by the formation of an "independent" immigration commission designed to take the political heat off of elected policymakers. The Dillingham Commission offered a pseudoscientific justification for limiting immigrants to those from Northern and Eastern Europe (while protecting some economic interests by allowing largely unfettered immigration from Mexico and the Americas).

Once in place, this immigration restrictionist regime had to be similarly chipped away at by those advocating more expansive immigration (and, to a lesser degree, expansive rights for immigrants). In some sense, advocates of expanding immigration in the twentieth century faced a more difficult task than had restrictionists in the nineteenth because popular opinion remained opposed to large-scale immigration. Expansionists worked on multiple levels, but ultimately the battle, according to Tichenor, focused on undercutting institutional structures in Congress that blocked consideration of more expansive immigration bills. Again, the executive branch was generally more supportive of immigration than were congressional leaders. Also paralleling the earlier era, independent commissions offered the intellectual justification for change (in the late twentieth century, for expanding legal immigration). Rights of immigrants were much more the focus of debate in the contemporary era than they had been in the previous century.

Tichenor succeeds in his objectives. The history of legislative design and administrative implementation of immigration is richly drawn. The turning points between expansive and restrictive immigration policies (and back again) are carefully analyzed and the roots of the changes convincingly argued. The continuing intellectual tensions in U.S. understandings of immigration policy and immigrant settlement demonstrate continuity from the nation's earliest days to today.

I have two concerns, neither of them critical. First, some of the discussions of legislative debates offer so much detail that it is hard to follow the evolution of the smaller policy areas that collectively form immigration policy, such as the evolution of employer sanction policies for employment of undocumented immigrants in the 1980s and 1990s. This problem is most evident in the discussions of policy debates in the period since 1965. In a sense, this may be a backhanded compliment because Tichenor relies on a rich combination of interview data to supplement hearing transcript and print archives as sources for his analysis of policymaking in this period. At times, though, the detail, particularly about policy proposals rejected by Congress, is overwhelming. Second, *Dividing Lines* ends rather abruptly. Considering the rich effort to identify long-term trends in U.S. immigration policy throughout the book, I was disappointed that there was no effort to prognosticate about the near-term future of immigration and immigrant settlement policymaking.

These concerns, however, are minor relative to the many contributions of *Dividing Lines*. It offers a richly nuanced policy history that is of great value to scholars of immigration and ethnic politics and a case study that contributes to the building of theories of national policymaking in the United States.

The Moral Foundations of Trust. By Eric M. Uslaner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 298p. $65.00 cloth, $23.00 paper.

— Samantha Luks, *University of Minnesota*

In recent years, many scholars have questioned how the decline of interpersonal trust has affected American political life. Eric Uslaner adds to this literature by explaining the causes of the decline of generalized trust in America and the political importance of having a trusting society.

One of the more important contributions Uslaner makes to the study of trust is the thorough distinction between "strategic trust" and "moralistic trust." Many accounts in the trust literature have focused on knowledge-based trust (e.g., Claus Offe's "Trust and Knowledge, Rules and Decisions: Exploring a Difficult Conceptual Terrain," in Mark A. Warren, ed., *Democracy and Trust,* 1999). In other words, actor A expects actor B to behave in a certain fashion because of previous experiences with that individual. In more extreme versions of this theory (such as in Russell Hardin's *Trust and Trustworthiness,* 2002), one can develop trust only on a one-by-one basis through specific interactions with an individual and cannot generalize to a larger group of people through his or her experiences.

Uslaner demonstrates that the strategic account of trust can be problematic in studies of social capital. For instance, Robert Putnam in *Bowling Alone* (2000) asserts that participation in social organizations can improve trust and that it is the secular decline in participation that has led to reduced trust in other people. However, Uslaner is quick to point out that the kind of people one meets in these sorts of activities are likely to be similar to oneself. How then do we learn to trust people with whom we have nothing in common? Clearly, such "trusters" exist, but their decision to trust people *in general* cannot be based on a strategic calculation, because people lack the necessary experience to make such an evaluation (Hardin's "Trusting Persons, Trusting Institutions," in Richard J. Zeckhauser, ed., *Strategy and Choice* [1991] makes a similar point about the difficulties of strategically trusting the government).

It is here that the importance of understanding moralistic trust emerges. Unlike strategic trust, moralistic trust generally is not based on recent experiences and does not require a calculation of risk. Additionally, moralistic trust is not altered by a few bad experiences with individuals; a single bad experience does not destroy one's faith in mankind. In fact, faith is a good way to describe moralistic, or generalized, trust. Generalized trusters trust a wide range of people, not just people like themselves or who share their own values. Furthermore, generalized trust exists in many contexts. As Uslaner states, "*A* trusts, rather than *A* trusts *B* to do *X*" (p. 27).

Despite the differences between moralistic and strategic trust, both have experienced a decline in recent decades. The question then is that if generalized trust is unrelated to organizational participation, what has caused its decline? Uslaner presents two main foundations for moralistic trust: optimism and economic equality. The two most important components of optimism are the belief that the future will be better than the past and that we as individuals can control our environment. It is this type of faith that allows people to overcome setbacks.

What is more provocative is the connection Uslaner makes between economic inequality and the decline of generalized trust in America. The perception that one is worse off than others has contributed to the decline of trust. While some perceptions of inequality do come from television images of the extremely wealthy, most come from viewing the world

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around oneself. When objectively measured economic inequality is high, people are less likely to be optimistic about their ability to overcome hardship through hard work.

Through his analyses, Uslaner directly challenges many arguments made by Putnam (2000). For example, contrary to the picture of American small-town life as communities of trusting citizens, people who live in small towns are likely to be particularized trusters of their own kind, but distrustful of strangers and outsiders. Moreover, he shows that trust did not begin to erode with the advent of the baby boom generation and the television age. Rather, the early baby boom generation (born 1946 to 1955) is actually the most trusting, because this generation has experienced the least economic inequality and is the last generation to do better than the generation of its parents.

Given that Uslaner focuses on a different conception of trust than has been used previously, it is important to address the question of why generalized trust matters. He shows that generalized trusters are more likely to hold a host of political attitudes many would consider beneficial. They are more likely to give positive evaluations of groups that have traditionally faced discrimination and are more supportive of the legal order in society. These types of attitudes translate into a greater willingness to serve on juries and to contribute to causes that help the less fortunate (he notes that particularized trusters, while more participant in activities that may benefit themselves, are not more likely to help the needy). At the aggregate level, while declining trust has no apparent relationship with civic engagement, it has hindered collective action where a high level of cooperation between disparate groups is required.

The scope of the arguments in *The Moral Foundations of Trust* is impressive. Uslaner consults a wide variety of survey data sources (regrettably, some of these sources are somewhat dated) and uses a number of statistical approaches in this pursuit. It is here that the book would benefit from more explanation of the reasoning behind the models and statistical techniques he uses. For example, he does not explain why he imputes data in Chapter 7 or the choice of the imputation method. More seriously, because many of the findings rest on testing causal ordering between variables through simultaneous models (e.g., the relationships between trust and optimism and between trust and volunteerism), Uslaner should have devoted more time to how he developed and tested the specifications of his models. These criticisms notwithstanding, this book provides a careful treatment of why we should consider generalized trust separately from specific trust. It is a significant contribution to the trust and social capital literatures.

Reclaiming Public Housing: A Half Century of Struggle in Three Public Neighborhoods. By Lawrence J. Vale. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. 496p. $39.95.

— Lana Stein, *University of Missouri-St. Louis*

Lawrence J. Vale, an urban planner, has woven a wonderful history of the birth, the decline, and the possible reclamation of three housing projects in Boston. His narrative is compelling and allows the reader to experience project life at various phases. His most important contribution perhaps is to tie the destiny of a housing project to the condition of its surrounding neighborhood. The more isolated the project and the more decaying the surrounding area, the more likely the project is to suffer crime, vandalism, and neglect that cannot be overcome.

Vale makes few allusions to public housing in other major cities, housing that also experienced lack of maintenance, high vacancies, and crime. His history of three Boston projects—D Street/West Broadway, Franklin Field, and Commonwealth—are, at least in part, emblematic of factors almost unique to this New England city. As World War II ended, Boston's minority population was very small. The original tenants at the three projects were largely white, and most were employed. The residents were not very dissimilar from neighborhood residents. It is interesting to note that none of these projects was federally funded. Rather, they were financed by the state of Massachusetts for returning veterans.

In major cities, public housing projects changed fundamentally, beginning in the 1950s. Female-headed families receiving public assistance began to dominate the waiting lists. Two-parent families, with the father employed and the mother a full-time homemaker, began to vacate the projects, often for homes in the suburbs. Municipal housing authorities had little success in keeping up with the preparation of vacant units or in responding to tenant requests for service. Breakdowns in heating or plumbing often were not dealt with.

A further factor was racial change. Public housing had been segregated in many locales, and local authorities now faced mandatory integration. This caused considerable conflict in South Boston's D Street, an area marked by turbulence during school integration in the 1970s. Minority families moved in but were driven out by hostile whites. Franklin Field, located in Dorchester, became predominantly African American, as Jewish families living in the project and the area fled. Commonwealth, in Brighton-Allston, integrated but retained a significant white population.

The three projects were all selected for considerable modernization in the 1980s. In each instance, designers attempted to create greater tenant ownership of space, separate the elderly from large families, and enlarge living quarters while decreasing project density. Residential involvement was stressed. D Street became less separated from South Boston and its exteriors were no longer as stark. It became a fairly successful integrated public neighborhood. Franklin Field could not overcome its isolation, the extensive crime correlated with crack, or a very decayed surrounding area. Commonwealth thrived as an integrated low-income neighborhood at least in part because it was able to hire a private management company that set firm rules and responded quickly to service requests. In addition, its multifamily structures resembled private housing in the area.

These tales provide some reason for hope. Low-income housing could be well managed and maintained. Integration could prove durable in certain locales. Yet the reasons are not fully explicated. Is the Boston experience unique? Most would say that the same changes in tenancy occurred in many cities. Increasing numbers of vacancies, unmet maintenance needs, and growing crime problems were not unique to the three developments Vale chronicles. He attributes a good part of the problem in his three developments to Boston Housing Authority management failures. He is chary of attributing problems directly to residents, speaking instead of outsiders who came to rob and plunder at Franklin Field. Although he notes failures in housekeeping and vandalism to buildings, he does not take on problems associated with high concentrations of poor in inappropriate structures. Nor does he address the housing authority as an organization inadequate to handle everyday services. Boston's housing authority went into federal receivership in 1980, a number of years before takeovers in other cities by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The department was clearly part of the problem and often delayed and impeded physical revitalization at the three projects. Needless to say, its history of dealing with low-income tenants could be linked to a more general pattern of treating the poor in the United States.

Could Boston's demographics and economics also play a role in the outcomes Vale documents? Boston experienced a considerable

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economic boom as the twentieth century came to a close. Rents rose astronomically. Dwelling units in the private sector became largely unobtainable to housing project residents. Perhaps this influenced the continued integration and relative stability in D Street and Commonwealth. The city's racial composition could have played a role, too. Vale's narrative makes clear the importance of design and location on project failure or success. His research validates the work of Oscar Newman on defensible space. More important could be the original siting of developments. In city after city, many projects were built apart from commercial areas or, as in Chicago, were located in existing ghettos already victim to the systemic disinvestment endemic to racially changed neighborhoods. D Street and Commonwealth raise questions of race and class that the author answers almost by default.

Vale's work is without peer. Few have delved into the stories of projects from inception to the present day. His work gives an intimacy to tenant lives and problems that scholars often never penetrate. He was able to interview many of those involved in project rehabilitation, as well as present and former residents. The case studies in *Reclaiming Public Housing* illuminate factors that could guide researchers in further comparative work. At a time when many housing projects have been demolished to make way for mixed-income housing, Vale shows us situations where original projects can be viable. The major question remaining would be whether there are similar locations and management in other cities that could sustain public housing in its original form or whether the relative success Vale depicts in Boston is unique to that city.

Polling, Policy, and Public Opinion: The Case Against Heeding the "Voice of the People." By Robert Weissberg. New York: Palgrave, 2002. 232p. $39.95.

— John F. Camobreco, *Christopher Newport University*

Polling the American public on matters of public policy has become quite common during the last several decades, whether it be carried out by academics or the media. This has continued despite the fact that the possible impediments to gathering "true" information (e.g., the impact of altered question wording on results) have not disappeared. Nevertheless, there is a sense in the discipline that reasonably accurate views of public opinion can be gained through a carefully constructed survey or poll. Robert Weissberg's book calls into question the usefulness of polls for determining citizens' views on public policy issues. In doing so, Weissberg not only grapples with the issue of the proper role of polls in a democratic society but also forces a reassessment of how public opinion should influence policymaking.

The author starts by arguing that polling has become a ubiquitous part of the American political landscape, and that there is a general acceptance in the discipline that polls can reveal accurate truths of the public policy desires of the citizenry. He further notes that since democracy requires at least some basic following of the populations' desires, polls have been elevated to the status of democratic instrument. But this development is actually pernicious for democracy, Weissberg contends, because most polls that inquire into the public's views on policy matters do not distinguish wishes from hard choices, and therefore cannot provide adequate policy guidance for lawmakers. In other words, most polls merely supply a "wish" list for respondents of a simplistic variety that is far removed from the complexity of an actual "hard choice" policymaking process that is constrained and complicated by budgets and numerous other policy alternatives. In his words, "In analyzing the opinion-policy nexus, the *politically* pertinent data are citizen responses to situations closely corresponding to actual political choices, not fantasy menus. . . . Citizen wants are irrelevant, even in a democratic Utopia: *only what they can have under difficult, realistic circumstances is germane*" (p. 13, emphases in original).

But for Weissberg, poll construction is not the only or even the most significant problem. He claims it is quite unlikely that citizens have the ability to make hard choices on complex issues, despite the wealth of literature claiming that they do. The empirical core of his book is the testing of this very proposition. Specifically, he polls citizens on two of former President Clinton's proposals: assistance to hire more public school teachers, and a program to provide child-care assistance. In both instances, the polls were designed in order to estimate whether respondents could accurately assess program costs and whether they possessed the ability to calculate basic budget trade-offs. Additional questions were designed to assess whether support for the programs changed significantly as cost estimates varied and potentially negative consequences of the programs were revealed. The author's results are not encouraging for those who look to polls for democratic guidance on policy issues; many respondents were not able to estimate program costs accurately or make reasonable budget trade-offs, and support for the stated programs eroded when potential liabilities and other possible alternatives were broached.

Weissberg's conclusion is that simpler polls showing strong public support for the policy alternatives in question are deceptive, and that this support breaks down when the public is forced to make hard choices, a conclusion that might be extended to other policy questions as well. This does not mean that the public is incompetent, according to the author. Rather, it shows there are limits to the information that can be gleaned by most polls, as well as limits on the ability of the public to come to lucid and reasonable conclusions about complex policy issues. These issues are best addressed through the institutions of representative democracy, he argues; elections serve as more accurate guideposts of the popular will than do polls.

Like any good piece of research, Weissberg's findings raise as many questions as they answer. For example, what is the proper role of polling, and public opinion itself, in a democracy? His answer is that not all polls are suspect: "The *vox populi* assuredly has much to pronounce politically, and present-day polling mechanisms can certainly capture these sentiments accurately. Even a bewildered public can legitimately assert their fears, economic satisfaction, reactions to events, and untold other readily grasped items" (p. 136). It would have been beneficial to the book had Weissberg elaborated more on this point, given his critique of policy-related polls. Although he does make it clear that public opinion should not be ignored, his findings do lead him to be skeptical of mechanisms of direct democracy and other institutions that are intended to get the public more directly involved in policymaking. Again, in light of the importance of the initiative process in the United States, his critique of this process probably deserves more than just the few pages it receives. Additional questions arise here: Is the initiative process just a simplistic and flawed means of translating public opinion into policy? Or is it possible that certain issues, perhaps those of a more straightforward nature, such as "moral" issues, are more appropriate for the initiative process?

Indeed, Weissberg does not directly address the question of how his findings relate to public opinion on cultural or moral policy issues (e.g., abortion). Given the prominence of some of these issues, it is a question that begs answering. Yet another question surrounds the author's contention that legislatures are the appropriate place for public policy to be made, because it is here that alternatives and costs are realistically considered. What of the citizen legislatures employed by numerous states? Conceivably, Weissberg's findings may indicate that more professionalized legislatures are in fact a much better cure for democracy's ills

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than citizen legislatures or term limits. Yet he occasionally takes his argument for representative democracy to too great an extreme. This is especially the case when he argues that the less powerful are best protected by interest groups and legislatures, suggesting, for example, that the homeless can hire a lawyer to represent their interests in the legislative arena (p. 168).

These findings should be of interest to both academics and elected officials, especially given the important position both groups assign to polls. For academics, the findings raise questions about the legitimacy of measured public opinion on complicated policy questions, while for elected officials, they serve as a warning that polls may not be able to convey accurately "true" opinion on such issues, if indeed any exists. Although Weissberg has written an intriguing and provocative book, it is slightly marred by some poor editing, and nagged by his persistent underlying theme that most polls "egregiously distort, and this distortion, ninety-nine out of one hundred times, is systematic in a liberal ideological direction" (p. 5). This is an interesting contention but, unfortunately, little substantiation is provided for it, and it detracts from Weissberg's much more convincing major argument. However, deficiencies aside, *Polling, Policy, and Public Opinion* has a valuable message and should become recommended reading for graduate and upper-level undergraduate students taking courses on public opinion.

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Civil Society and Democratic Theory: Alternative Voices. By Gideon Baker. London: Routledge, 2002. 208p. $80.00.

— Andrew T. Green, *Johns Hopkins University*

The explosion of interest in civil society has resulted in a paradox: strong consensual embrace of civil society without due reflection on the concept. This book attempts to renew discussions marginalized in the rush to study democratization, in particular, the "democracy in civil society" orientation of "radical" civil society arguments that stands in opposition to the state-centric procedural democracy found in mainstream scholarly literature.

Baker seeks "to chart the ways in which the resurgent idea of civil society has been, and continues to be, articulated in radical ways which require us to reflect more fully on our taken-for-granted understanding of civil society" (pp. 1–2). Animated by antagonism toward the hegemony of liberal democracy and state-centric perspectives, Gideon Baker locates democracy in civil society itself, not in relation to the state; note that he also subjects radical civil society to considerable questioning.

While Baker's analysis of the intellectual development of civil society in Eastern Europe and Latin America is quite good and his shift to the international level well worth reading, efforts elsewhere to restore the standing of radical civil society are weakened by vague references to the state, simplistic notions of civil society, and a poorly executed analysis of the Zapatista conflict. Large portions of the book consist of lengthy quotations, leaving the reader to wonder how much the author is adding.

After sketching out the book's purpose and some key conceptual developments, Baker analyzes the concept's evolution in Eastern Europe and Latin America. His discussion of communist-era debates in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary clearly demonstrates convergence on a state versus society dichotomy. He then dissects philosophical evolution in Latin America, pointing to the post-Marxist rediscovery of society and the rise of social movements to explain how the concept also came to be understood in terms of the state–society dichotomy. In short, Baker demonstrates that dissidents in both regions came to similar understandings of civil society as the only venue for democratic self-management; the state may have been authoritarian, but all states crowd out self-management. The author's tracing of intellectual connections in Eastern Europe is a valuable resource for scholars of communist-era dissidence, while his discussion of Latin America helps one to comprehend political change there better. Pairing the two treatments makes it a unique resource.

Civil Society and Democratic Theory falters after this. Baker argues that marginalization of the "democracy in civil society" perspective and the state–society dichotomy since democratization began stems from the hegemony of liberal democracy and the rise of republican views of civil society's instrumental role. This hegemony and republicanism, he asserts, are driven by an elitist fear of too much democracy (p. 111). Thus, radical arguments disappeared with the old regimes because Western-style democracy deliberately and cynically demobilizes society. While the author correctly notes that dissidents were responding to more than just a repressive state, it is also true that these arguments developed outside of actual democratic experience: The complex interaction among the state, civil society, and society that former dissidents saw in their nascent democracies was in deep conflict with their theoretical models.

Baker sees no such conflict, but that is a result of inadequate reflection on the concepts he uses. Despite complaining about the state, he never defines what the state is or does—no demonstrable knowledge of legislatures, executives, decentralization of authority, and so on, which are clearly important for understanding state–society relationships. Nor is it clear what "democracy in civil society" means for the state: Would it wither away or become completely subordinate? Baker never addresses how societal self-management would resolve conflict in the absence of consensus, let alone recognize, implement, and enforce consensus. His much-admired Zapatismo provides an example of self-management creating something resembling a state, including a monopoly on coercive force, but this goes unnoticed.

Nor is civil society defined, although Baker states that, "[f]rom the standpoint of the democracy of civil society, of course, if associations are not democratic (understood in terms of self-management), then they are not part of civil society" (p. 95). More importantly, he makes the key mistake of assuming an overwhelming degree of societal consensus. Curiously, while he looks favorably upon Gramsci's argument that civil society is contestable territory for norm promulgation, Baker misses that society will therefore exhibit differentiation. In addition, ethnic divisions are inarguably sources of differentiation, but in the Zapatista discussion, an ethnic group name appears only once (p. 140). Finally, besides statelike activities that societal self-management would be engaged in, he seems oblivious to the potential problem of oligarchy.

The shift to the international level is of mixed success. The author's critique of global civil society perspectives follows smartly from the anti–state-centrism argument, in that the perspectives focus on the state, and Western norms inevitably shape discussions. His use of the Zapatista conflict as an example of "democracy in civil society" simply does not work—in addition to the above problems, the reader must slog through excessive quotations from Subcomandante Marcos and communiques (21 lengthy quotations in 14 pages) to learn that it is only here that Baker discusses neoliberal economics as the ultimate culprit (pp. 142–44).

I agree with Baker that the instrumental role assigned by mainstream scholarship does violence to the abstract concept of and real potential for civil society. What theorists lack is

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a more complete understanding of how society interacts with the state. First, the dynamism of ideas about relationships among the state, the economy, and society is what drives societal differentiation and even the dynamic process of regime change. Second, policymaking is the key venue for state–society interaction—not episodic electoral activity and not simplistic pluralist competition or subgovernments, but a complex process of interaction among groups, institutions, and ideas. Civil society can and does play a stronger role than is generally recognized, but one that still relates to the state.

Baker provides a solid analysis of the concept's development and points to the problem of state centrism in mainstream scholarship, but lack of attention to basic concepts is a serious shortcoming. In general, increasing diversity of discussion about and sharpening focus on civil society is good, but he needed to seriously consider what mainstream scholarship had to say, too.

Why Women Protest: Women's Movements in Chile. By Lisa Baldez. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 234p. $65.00 cloth, $23.00 paper.

— Liesl Haas, *California State University, Long Beach*

This book is a welcome addition to the growing literature on women's movements and women's political participation. Empirically rich and theoretically rigorous, this study promises to advance our understanding of the precise conditions under which independent women's organizations unite to create a women's movement. Drawing from the literatures on social movements and political institutions, Lisa Baldez identifies two primary factors that will "tip" a collection of groups into a movement: timing and framing.

Timing refers to partisan realignment, which the author defines as "the formation of new coalitions among political parties" (p. 4) and as "fundamental changes in the issues that political parties represent" (p. 7). At moments of partisan realignment, political parties seek new bases of support. Baldez argues that if "female political entrepreneurs" can frame their protests around women's exclusion from political power, this will resonate with parties seeking to legitimize emerging political alliances. Parties' desire to appeal to a spirit of national unity complements women's claims to neutrality and their call for male politicians to rise above partisan difference in the interest of the national good (p. 3). By framing women's protests as nonpartisan, movement entrepreneurs can simultaneously attract a wide range of women to the movement and present an attractive constituency to political leaders. Politicians' desire to gain support leads them to acknowledge and encourage the women's movement, which in turn provides movement leaders the opportunity to push for the inclusion of women's rights issues on the political agenda.

Baldez employs a "most different cases" approach to examine ideologically opposed movements in a single country, Chile. Within each case, she examines failed and successful attempts to form a women's movement. The qualitative data includes extensive interviews with activists in both movements, as well as party leaders, government officials, and academics. Archival material and a thorough review of existing research on social movements and political institutions undergird the development of the theory. The author's careful attention to research design enables her to advance our understanding of a phenomenon that has been widely researched but undertheorized.

The six central chapters of *Why Women Protest* contain the richly detailed case studies that illustrate the author's theory. Three chapters are devoted to the conservative women's movement that emerged in opposition to the Allende government. Women began to protest the government immediately after Salvador Allende's election in 1970, framing their protests in distinctly gendered terms, but in the absence of support from opposition parties, this early, isolated activism failed to result in a widespread anti-Allende women's movement. By late fall 1971, the conservative National Party and the centrist Christian Democrats had agreed to form an alliance against Allende, and at the same time, protests by conservative women coalesced into an anti-Allende women's movement. Baldez argues that it was precisely this combination of gendered protest activity in a context of partisan realignment that created the conditions allowing independently operating women's organizations to coalesce ("tip") into a broad-based, coherent women's movement (the famous "March of the Empty Pots" campaign).

The following three chapters discuss the second case—that of the anti-Pinochet women's movement which arose in the 1980s—a more familiar case to students of women's movements. The author's theory sheds new light on the dynamics of the movement's emergence, expansion, and eventual decline. Baldez convincingly argues that in the absence of organized party activity, the women's organizations that formed in the late 1970s and 1980s around issues of human rights, women's equality, and poverty were unable to move beyond sporadic protests to the creation of a unified women's movement against the regime. However, in 1983, the formation of two competing opposition party alliances created the political opportunity that tipped these disparate groups into a unified women's movement that crossed class and partisan lines.

Despite the ideological differences between the two movements, Baldez concludes that in both cases, women saw these moments as "uniquely gendered opportunities" and "framed their mobilization in terms of their status as political outsiders, in response to what they perceived as men's characteristic inability to overcome narrow partisan concerns" (p. 2). Each movement also coalesced "amid a context of partisan realignment, as the political parties of the opposition formed a new coalition against the regime in power" (p. 2).

Among the many contributions of this engaging book is that it refuses to dismiss conservative activists as suffering from false consciousness. By taking seriously the perceptions of women in the anti-Allende movement, and comparing them to those of their strikingly different counterparts under the military government, Baldez contributes a significant advance to our understanding of women's movements. Comparing such different groups is the ideal empirical testing ground for investigating why women mobilize *as women*. This is a logical and useful complement to studies focusing on the myriad differences among women. Her conclusion that women's common experience of political exclusion creates the potential for broad-based, cross-partisan women's movements helps explain both the emergence of these movements and their inevitable dissolution.

The case studies themselves (as well as the brief comparisons to other Latin American cases and to Russia and Eastern Europe in the concluding chapter) highlight both the model's explanatory power regarding a wide range of cases and the overall difficulty of predicting movement emergence. A key contribution of the theory is to highlight the interactions that occur between an incipient movement and parties in the midst of renegotiating alliances—interactions that often prove crucial to helping cement both the movement and the partisan realignment. The difficulty in predicting movement emergence stems from the fact that the author defines partisan realignment to cover the entire process of realignment, beginning with the decision by parties to focus on new issues and seek out potential new alliances to the formal recognition of new partisan coalitions. The author demonstrates that it is precisely during this

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period of flux when political entrepreneurs in the women's movement can exploit politicians' need for constituency support by calling political attention to women's rights. While this definition avoids mechanical or overly deterministic conceptions of realignment and acknowledges the precariousness (and the politics) of this process, it is difficult to know, except in retrospect, when a particular process of realignment was sufficiently advanced to serve as a catalyst for a movement. Nevertheless, the case studies make clear that, in the absence of some level of partisan realignment, a women's movement will not emerge.

The author's deep engagement with the topic, the careful crafting of a theory that acknowledges empirical complexity, and the potential for comparison across a wide range of cases, make this required reading for researchers interested in women and politics, democratization, and the interplay of political behavior and institutions.

Welfare Hot Buttons: Women, Work, and Social Policy Reform. By Sylvia B. Bashevkin. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002. 196p. $19.95.

— Vicky Randall, *University of Essex*

Sylvia Bashevkin's subject is the fate of "Third Way" social policy commitments in the three Anglo-American democracies: the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. Making clear in the process her own "progressive" political leanings, she starts with a puzzle: "If conservative political executives in these nations endorsed a serious rethinking and retrenchment of welfare programs through the 1980s, and faced eventual electoral defeat partly because of the stances they adopted, then how did their 'postconservative' successors end up pursuing fundamentally similar or even more regressive policy directions?" (p. 3). Bill Clinton in the United States, Jean Chrétien in Canada, and Tony Blair in Britain were all brought to power on platforms that criticized the harshness of the preceding welfare regimes and advocated greater moderation and compassion. But Bashevkin argues that in many ways they have been *more* punitive and work fixated. They have introduced or expanded social benefits linked to paid employment; increasingly delivered these in the form of tax credits administered either by the tax authorities or by employers, rather than as social assistance; and thereby contributed to a narrowing of the basis for "social citizenship" and in particular diminished recognition of the value of unpaid caring work.

The object of Bashevkin's study is both to relate and to explain these developments. Succeeding chapters focus on the policies of Conservative governments in the 1980s, the pledges of new Third Way governments in the early to mid-1990s and what they had actually achieved by the century's end. Within the broad concern with welfare policy, there is a particular emphasis on the treatment of lone mothers.

Bashevkin's explanation for Third Way government outcomes points in the first instance to the combination of pragmatic political leadership and the continuing pressure of resurgent Conservative interests. Underlying this, she argues, is the crucial but often neglected impact of ideology or discourse (meaning Conservative or New Right discourse), as opposed to more narrowly political institutional factors. There is no denying the force and enduring imprint of the moral crusade waged in the 1980s against welfare "scroungers," vividly invoked by Bashevkin and typified by Ronald Reagan's famous denunciation of the Chicago "welfare queen." This permanently shifted the terms of the debate, and the Third Way itself would be inconceivable without it.

But this can only be part, albeit an important part, of the explanation. First, one needs to know *why* ideas change, which makes consideration of interests and context unavoidable. Despite greatly sympathizing with the author's political position, I would have welcomed fuller recognition and discussion of the ways in which the demands on and expectations of the welfare state had been growing and shifting through the 1960s and 1970s, as in the dramatic growth of single-parent (read mother) families, and to which New Right ideas, however unpalatable, were in part a response. Then again, Bashevkin's analysis makes clear that institutional factors could be extremely relevant; for instance, federalism in the United States and Canada provided national government with the option of decentralizing as a means of "copping out" of apparent responsibility for harsh policies, while the separation of executive and legislative powers confronted Clinton with intransigent opposition in Congress to his pivotal health-reform proposals.

The significance of ideology is also more ambiguous if one considers the case of Third Way thinking itself. To the extent that there was a gap between leaders' pledges when first taking up office and the outcomes several years on, does this indicate an inability to be true to Third Way ideology, thereby showing the limitations of ideology as a political force? Or do we conclude that Third Way ideas were too flimsy and contingent to count as ideology, that indeed pragmatism was their defining characteristic, in which case the ideology argument holds up?

A major strength of this study is its sustained comparison among the three countries. It is refreshing, from a British perspective, to see British welfare policies favorably compared with North America's, rather than shown up against those of its European neighbors. It is in Britain that Third Way ideals, in the sense of more active support and generous funding to get people off welfare and into work and a concern with social inclusion, have come closest to being realized. This is partly because, Bashevkin suggests, there has been much less effective pressure on government from right-wing interests and parties. But it also because 18 years of Conservative rule meant more time to incubate and cost the New Labour project, and, perhaps as a consequence, Labour's leadership is more committed than its North American counterparts.

Although it is not a centrally defining feature, Bashevkin also provides a feminist perspective, especially through her focus on policy toward lone parents. She presents a depressingly familiar account of the dilemmas of feminist groups forced to defend policies they never liked, such as America's Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), as the least worst option. And while in all three countries, policymakers paid lip service to the need for improved child-care provision if measures to get lone mothers into work were to be meaningful, both the United States and Canadian governments failed to follow up at all, whereas in Britain, more generous individual child-care allowances (as part of Working Family Tax Credit) have failed so far to translate into effective supply.

Although clearly analytical, Bashevkin's concern is with making sense of empirical patterns rather than with theoretical or conceptual innovation. The main exception is the concept of the "duty state" whose gradual emergence she sees as an underlying long-term trend: "[T]he post-war, rights-oriented but still residual liberal welfare state is gradually being transformed into a responsibility-obsessed duty state that demands specific quid pro quo undertakings from individuals seeking support" (p. 133). This offers a promising topic for debate, although arguably going too far in extrapolating from welfare developments and ignoring other trends, such as the growing demand for public service accountability to "customers."

All in all, *Welfare Hot Buttons* is an excellent read, fluently written, and carefully researched. Through its sustained comparative approach and original recent-policy analysis, it substantially expands the scope of policy debate.

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Guardians of the Nation? Economists, Generals, and Economic Reform in Latin America. By Glen Biglaiser. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002. 256p. $45.00 cloth, $23.50 paper.

— Paul W. Zagorski, *Pittsburg State University*

Despite the book's merits, if readers expect it to provide either a sustained analysis of the virtues and vices of military rule or an evaluation of neoliberal economics, they will be sorely disappointed. Thus, the book title appears to be false advertising or even question begging. This criticism might seem petty and capable of being easily brushed aside with the obvious rejoinder that to address these questions adequately would require another book. After all, Glen Biglaiser's stated objective is to account for why some military regimes succeeded in implementing neoliberal reforms while others did not. Yet, he is, in fact, interested in larger issues as well. And the bait-and-switch character of the title is symptomatic of a serious lacuna, a failure to provide the proper context for both his narrower conclusions about Southern-Cone military regimes and the broader implications he sees for policymaking in democracies. This failure to provide context makes the study's conclusions appear more significant and more broadly applicable than they actually are.

Biglaiser's thesis is straightforward enough: Institutions shape policy outcomes. While he describes various contributing factors, the key among them the presence (or absence) of a sufficiently large cadre of U.S.-trained economists, his primary explanatory factor for economic policy under a military government is the nature of that particular country's armed forces themselves. On the one hand, factionalized militaries and/or military regimes with a collective leadership promote, at best, halfhearted or inconsistent neoliberal reform. On the other hand, a military regime under what the author terms "consolidated one-man rule" (the only operative instance being Chile from 1975 to 1990) produces successful, thoroughgoing neoliberal reform. He skillfully uses theories of interest-group behavior, state autonomy, and the ideas and institutions literature in presenting case studies of Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay under military government in the 1970s and 1980s. Of the three, only the Pinochet regime succeeded in choosing a homogeneous and committed economic team, insulating these economic policymakers from civilian and military interest-group pressure, and moving forward for the long haul. The others ran afoul of interest-group pressures and intramilitary competition. The conclusion that neoliberal reform required a Pinochet-like figure is persuasive to this reviewer.

However, the book fails to tell anything like the whole story about the economic policy under the military regimes it analyzes. This is important precisely because Biglaiser has bigger fish to fry than merely pointing out the uniqueness of Augusto Pinochet. Specifically, he presents international factors, interest groups, and the threat from the political Left, pivotal to other accounts, as of minor importance compared to the institutional factors he himself emphasizes. Further, he wants to provide advice that is useful for democratic governments. In the final chapter, he considers the policy success or lack of it of democratic governments in Argentina, Uruguay, Colombia, and Mexico in the late 1980s and 1990s. He draws a conclusion that parallels the one drawn from the military-regime case studies: Elected governments with a strong president supported by legislative majorities of his own party succeed in neoliberal reform, while weaker presidencies and/or presidents with factionalized legislatures do not.

But by making neoliberalism and Chile the de facto centerpiece of his account, Biglaiser ignores what is, perhaps, an even more significant question about Latin American economic development during the era he studies, specifically, why state-led development strategies succeeded in East Asia and failed in Latin America. Instead, the discussion in *Guardians of the Nation?* presupposes that the neoliberal model is the proper prescription for Latin America's economic malaise. This objection to a pro-neoliberal bias is more than just an ideological quibble. The robustness of Biglaiser's conclusion about military governments depends, in large measure, upon the assumption that neoliberalism is the correct choice. If the policy choices of the other four military regimes (he brings Peru and Brazil into his account in Chapter 3) were clearly viewed as dysfunctional at the time they were made, then the supposed paramountcy of the institutional explanation would be unchallengeable. But if the policies these four chose were the most agreeable to them because of institutional factors *and* were arguably as good as or better than their strict neoliberal alternative according to the economics of the day, then institutionalism would be only weakly supported. In other words, there would be no way of telling which factor, institutions or the dominant ideology, was the key causative element behind Chile's choosing neoliberalism while the others did not. And contrary to Biglaiser's pro-neoliberal supposition, Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, and Brazil, in fact, chose an economic model that had real credibility and historical roots dating back to the nineteenth century. The author, in part, admits this by noting the popularity of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) among the region's economists. Given the intellectual climate in the 1970s, three or five countries and only one successful case of systematic neoliberal reform is too limited a sample to prove much. The limited range of cases fails to demonstrate that consolidated one-man rule is a sufficient or even a necessary condition for the successful implementation of neoliberalism, since the presence of University of Chicago–trained economists, the "Chicago boys," was also unique to Chile. The story Biglaiser tells is compelling, but the cases available cannot establish his general conclusions with any certainty. The logic is flawed.

In summary, readers of *Guardians,* whether Latin Americanists or not, will learn much about the politics of military regimes and the institutional differences of Chile's, Argentina's, and Uruguay's armed forces. However, those not particularly well informed about political economy may make inaccurate inferences about the suitability of neoliberalism throughout the region. Moreover, organizing the chapters by topic instead of country-by-country adversely affects the readability of the book for the general audience and may limit its use as a supplementary text. In short, Biglaiser successfully accounts for the Chilean anomaly by marshaling evidence about the importance of General Pinochet and the "Chicago boys," but his single-mindedness in attempting to prove his thesis undermines what might otherwise have been a richer, more nuanced, and more broadly useful account of the economic policies of Southern-Cone military dictatorships.

Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century. By Mark Blyth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 296p. $60.00 cloth, $22.00 paper.

— John Kurt Jacobsen, *University of Chicago*

Do ideas matter? Do they even (or ever) supersede material interests? Or is this a misleading question inasmuch as ideas often help to guide the ways in which actors define and achieve their material interests? To say that ideas "construct" interests, however, is a trickier proposition. The needs of human communities for food, clothing, shelter, nurturing, and cooperation in order to provide for themselves are not simply notions or perceptions, although ideas surely affect the manner of their fulfillment. So how far can one plausibly go in ascribing power to economic ideas?

In this comparative study of "embedded liberalism" in twentieth-century Sweden and the United States, Mark Blyth offers a bold

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analysis of economic policy that aims "neither to reduce ideas to interests nor treats them as simple adjuncts to existing explanations" (pp. 6–7). He "investigates ideas as explanatory factors in their own right" (p. 17) in order to assess the "value added of ideational theories of change over materialist theories" (p. 262). Economic ideas "not only reduce uncertainty, set the ends of collective action, and facilitate the dismantling of existing institutions," he argues. "They also dictate the form and content of the institutions that agents should construct to resolve a given economic crisis" (p. 40). Blyth, in short, is making a case for the intrinsic power of ideas to effect change.

The author begins by asserting that "from every conceivably materialist position possible" the role of ideas is ignored or slighted, which is a curious contention. According to at least one notorious nineteenth-century theorist of that bent: "The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringings, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that it is essential to educate the educator himself" (Karl Marx, "Third Thesis on Feuerbach"). As theses about the complex role of ideas in social change go, this one remains fertile, as various scholarly traditions acknowledge, whatever else is thought about the entirety of Marx's work. The point is that there is nothing necessarily reductionist or anti-ideational in a materialist theory, at least no more so than any other theory.

Blyth draws his title from Karl Polanyi, whom he believes overlooked the possibility that in the "double movement" of market and protective countermovement, there might be a clawback, a reversion. In this insight, Blyth seeks to go Polanyi one better, although Polanyi, much influenced by Georg Lukacs, beheld the corrective countermovement as a hopeful trend, not as an inevitability (for countermovements do not always succeed).

Blyth's two case studies, which examine ideas "as weapons" in contests over the distribution of power and wealth, are admirably well researched but hardly support his ideational argument, which is a slippery one (p. 39). In some passages, Blyth sees "ideas and interests together as essentially embedded elements of institutional change" (p. 7), which is a reasonable, if unexceptional, formulation of the "mutual constitution" of ideas and interests prevalent in the ideas literature today. The trouble is that once this mutual constitution is accomplished, amnesia seems to set in, and ideas are treated as if they did all the work all along. Every social scientist who tries to detach ideas from the interests of sponsors and institutions with which those ideas clearly have "elective affinities" invariably commits this error.

Blyth offers a compelling summary of critiques of methodological individualism, rational choice, public choice, and warmed-over monetarist theories. Yet exactly like many of the schools he criticizes, his analysis becomes a victim of its own logical apparatus. In employing Frank H. Knight's concept of uncertainty—"unique events where the agents are unsure as to what their interests actually are"—Blyth posits abstract actors who must have no clue about their interests. Yet where has this ever happened in reality? (Later, we are informed, to the contrary, that "while agents always have interests, ideas make them collectively actionable" [p. 39], which is a very different claim.) In neither case study were capitalists so confused that the profit motive was in danger of being abandoned, or workers so addled that they forgot they needed a living wage, or politicians so baffled that they gave their power away without a fight. One readily agrees that "ideas go all the way through social reality" (p. 30, n. 56), but that does not make interests infinitely or subversively malleable, as implied here.

Do ideas really "tell agents what to do and what future to construct" (p. 11)? Not just any old idea will do; only those that preserve or enhance the power of the choosers, while meeting the exigencies of the moment, are chosen. Nothing in Blyth's book refutes that proposition. Blyth portrays "quiet" among business groups as inactivity or acquiescence. Yet laissez-faire, which Polanyi saw as a "militant creed," never went away, for it was a utopian justification of unfettered business power. Business and financial associations were "passive observers" only in the sense that birds of prey are. The first palatable self-aggrandizing scheme to come along—for example, the table napkin economics of the Laffer curve—would be seized on as a panacea for the first crisis that arose. Elite or structural theory traditions would not be surprised that schemas that embrace upward redistribution are "cognitively locked" on by wealthy strata, nor, given the deeply skewed imbalance of resources among social competitors, would such analysts have trouble explaining why other groups rancorously or resignedly go along with them.

Blyth decries a "doctrinaire adherence to the ideas of business" (p. 230), but who is being what he calls "naive" (p. 231, n. 102) when market-conforming solutions fail miserably at immediate tasks but serve the long-term goal of disembedding social democratic institutions and instruments? Blyth credits Swedish shifts to a new "homogeneity of economists and economic opinion in Swedish public discourse"—but what about dissenting trade union economists, who are a big exception to this portrayal of homogeneity (p. 230)? Why were they not heeded? Perhaps because, as he shows, from the 1970s onward, Swedish and American business dispensed overwhelming financial resources to press for friendly agendas, which unions could not remotely match. It is at least as good an explanatory hypothesis as the power of putatively pure ideas. Whatever happened to mutual constitution, anyway?

Great Transformations is a lively, if fundamentally flawed, attempt to show how ideas matter. It likely will stimulate parry and riposte volumes, and so will be quite useful for honing a debate that to date has been remarkably narrow in its range of reference.

Militarization, Democracy, and Development: The Perils of Praetorianism in Latin America. By Kirk S. Bowman. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002. 289p. $55.00.

— Anthony W. Pereira, *Tulane University*

What is the impact of militarization on democracy, economic development, and equity? The answers are not obvious. Militarization appears to have spawned citizen armies and enhanced democratic rights as well as praetorianism; welfare-enhancing growth as well as devastation and ruin; and greater equality of income and status within populations as well as widening inequality and oppression. The precise nature of these linkages seems to depend considerably on the particular way that militaries are founded and evolve, and their connections to other social forces and organizations.

Kirk Bowman examines the consequences of militarization within a particular universe of cases, the "developing" world. In a useful second chapter, he surveys the theoretical literature on militarization in developing countries, arguing that Latin American militaries are unique for their long, almost two-hundred-year histories as relatively autonomous organizations within independent states and for their primarily internal focus (p. 37). In this respect, he also complements the recent argument of Miguel Centeno that Latin American militaries do not follow the European pattern of warmaking and statemaking as laid out by Charles Tilly, Michael Mann, and others. (See Miguel Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America,* 2002.)

Bowman then goes on to display various kinds of statistical findings. He uses pooled time series to test the relationship between military participation ratios (soldiers per capita)

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and average democracy scores (as measured by Freedom House) for 18 Latin American countries in the period 1972–85, finding that the effect of larger militaries on democracy over time—in Latin America, although not necessarily elsewhere—is robust and negative (p. 65). Claiming that cross-national quantitative work on developing countries finds a positive relationship between militarization and both economic growth and equity, Bowman finds the opposite in Latin America. Using military participation ratios and military budgets as measures of militarization, he employs regression analysis to test the relationship between militarization and caloric intake, on the one hand, and economic growth, on the other. He finds both relationships to be significant and negative for the period 1963–89 (p. 204).

Chapters 4 and 5—the best parts of the book, for this reviewer—are qualitative case studies contrasting Costa Rica's demilitarization in the post–World War II period with Honduras's militarization during the same era. While rebutting alternative explanations, these chapters persuasively argue that the abolition of Costa Rica's army in 1949 made a crucial difference to its political development during the Cold War, not least because it eliminated the factor of U.S. military aid, which rose substantially in the 1950s and bolstered the relative autonomy of militaries in the rest of Central America.

Bowman's statistical contributions are impressive but leave unsettling questions. The first concerns the fit between the study's key concepts and the indicators used to measure them. The author is concerned about the tendency of the political power of the military to grow at the expense of other, civilian interests—his preface describes his shock at watching forced conscription in Honduras in the early 1980s (p. ix). However, military participation ratios and budgets are crude measures of militarization conceived in this way. Larger armies are not necessarily more autonomous or powerful armies. Similarly, official government data about budgets often omit substantial military assets, especially in Central America. Similarly, how well do Freedom House scores capture the qualities of democracy? Political scientists are divided on this, with this reviewer decidedly skeptical about their use.

There are other problems with how and what to count. If Latin American militaries are assumed to be especially pernicious for democracy because they largely concentrate on internal control, then it might make sense to count members of police forces—many of which are directly or indirectly controlled by militaries in the region—as well. In addition, six of the 18 Latin American countries analyzed (Colombia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Argentina, Peru, and Nicaragua) had a significant internal conflict in the 1972–85 period (p. 57), and the sizable nonstate armed forces involved in these conflicts were not included in Bowman's measures.

Aside from measurement problems, one must be careful in interpreting Bowman's data. The author himself admits that it is difficult to establish high levels of statistical significance with only 18 Latin American cases (p. 18). Where he works with more cases, as when he tests the relationship between military participation ratios and economic growth in 72 developing countries, arguing that it is positive, it appears that the regression line is strongly influenced by just a few cases (p. 197). Finally, the causal mechanisms by which militarization negatively effect economic growth and caloric intake are not really spelled out, which leaves a gap in our understanding, because unlike the impact on democracy, the links between militarization and these other two variables are not obvious.

The most controversial aspect of the book might be its prescription. The author champions former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias's call to curb U.S. military aid to Latin America and to work toward the elimination of militaries throughout the region. This is admirable, but brings up complicated analytical and normative issues. First, if the consequences of militarization are area-specific, might they also be time-specific—that is, might the consequences of militarization be different in the post–Cold War world than they were during the Cold War? The case of Chile—an arguably healthy democracy, at least compared to its Andean neighbors, with a relatively large defense budget and military—is intriguing in this regard. Second, how likely is substantial demilitarization in Latin America in the context of a world order in which the unilateral use of military force now seems to be more, rather than less, important? The United States invaded and occupied Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, while the only Latin American countries to have followed Costa Rica's lead are Panama and Haiti—also invaded and occupied by the U.S. military. Latin American armed forces may still have a largely domestic focus, but that does not mean that they do not take their role as guardians against external threats seriously. Some might argue that in the present international context, with the United States assiduously boosting its own military capabilities, it is a particularly inauspicious time to push for Latin America's unilateral demilitarization.

Combining many different types of analysis, *Militarization, Democracy, and Development* is a considerable accomplishment. Despite some limitations and ambiguities in the statistical findings, Bowman grapples with theoretically important issues, presents skillfully conducted and original empirical work, and provides a clear explanation for disparate patterns of political development in Cold War Central America. This book will not end the debates about the causal relationships it explores, but it is a solid contribution to them.

Beyond Post-Communist Studies: Political Science and the New Democracies of Europe. Terry D. Clark. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2002. 192p. $54.95 cloth, $21.95 paper.

— Erik S. Herron, *University of Kansas*

Not long after perestroika failed to salvage the socialist system, communist authority collapsed in East Central Europe, and regional leaders formally dismembered the Soviet Union, area scholars were confronted with a dilemma: how to study the newly postcommunist Europe and Asia. In the region, previously closed societies faced an invasion of advisors, observers, and opportunists from the West. These outsiders were initially embraced as they brought new information, ideas, and skills that could be mutually beneficial. The warm welcome faded in much of the region when expected rapid progress inevitably failed to materialize.

In the scholarly world, the parallel influx of researchers with ideas developed and tested in other parts of the globe was not so warmly received. Many regional specialists who held a monopoly over communist studies resisted the theoretical and methodological approaches that dominated political science. The birth of postcommunist studies prompted scholarly soul-searching about how to study the region, as well as spirited debate teetering on the edge of incivility. The debate has continued, unresolved, with advocates of competing approaches often caricaturing their perceived opponents.

Terry Clark's book is a thoughtful addition to this controversy. Clark makes the case that rational choice approaches are not incompatible with the study of postcommunist societies. His sympathies initially rested with the area studies tradition. But he experienced a "conversion" (p. ix). While converts are often characterized as the most zealous proponents of their new "religion," Clark does not fit this cliché. He does not reject other approaches but convincingly argues that postcommunist states should not be exiles from theoretically driven political analysis.

Clark's book has more than one goal. It evaluates the application of the consolidation

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"paradigm" to postcommunist states, generating a new research agenda for postcommunist politics. It assesses the democratization literature generally, presenting a theory of consolidation. It also provides an introduction to a rational choice approach, illustrating how the approach contributes to the study of politics in Lithuania.

The author begins with an extensive review of the literature on postcommunist politics in order to identify questions that have been addressed and those that have fallen through the cracks (Chapters 2–3). He argues that scholarly obsession with the assumptions of the consolidation paradigm has substantially influenced the evolution of postcommunist studies. He notes that scholars have vigorously pursued research questions that address institutions, political economy, and public opinion. Yet they have not adequately investigated civil society, social movements, judicial institutions and the rule of law, the civil service, and local governance. He is generally on the mark, although some of the "missing agenda" has been reasonably well explored, especially individual values that underlie the development of democratic political culture and a vibrant civil society. Nevertheless, he points to so many substantive questions of interest that many postcommunist scholars could build successful careers based on the missing agenda he outlines.

The assumptions of the literature on democratization have recently come under greater scrutiny, and Clark joins in on this trend in Chapter 4. He criticizes the "predisposition to view all political systems as forever transitioning to democracy" (p. 58), a theme that has permeated recent publications. (See, for example, recent issues of the *Journal of Democracy*.) Clark asserts that the problems of the consolidation literature are caused by the lack of a theoretical framework; he proposes a theory of consolidation based on the work of Adam Przeworski. He casts the challenge for the theory of consolidation as the discovery of "an essential equilibrium in which no salient political force can calculate with any acceptable degree of certainty that it can gain more by defecting from the negotiated constitution than continuing with the rules that it establishes" (p. 68). Again, following Przeworski, the challenge is to create uncertain outcomes, but certain rules. Under the assumption that elite forces are fragmented and competitive, Clark navigates the potential paths of institutional design leading to one of four possible outcomes: consolidated democracy, unstable democracy, zero-sum game, or hegemonic elite. While his model conforms with the paths of postcommunist states, it requires modification to be generalizable beyond the region. The model assumes that transition states are undergoing political and economic transition; postauthoritarian states are not inevitably centrally planned or autarkic. Further, it implies that democratic consolidation is a rare outcome and impossible in pure presidential systems. But democratic consolidation has arguably occurred in presidential systems outside of the postcommunist world.

This book also provides a basic introduction to the assumptions of rational choice and spatial analysis. In Chapters 5 to 7, Clark presents various puzzles derived from Lithuanian politics and develops potential solutions based on rational choice approaches. He discusses how spatial analysis provides insight into voter choice, legislative behavior, party systems, executive-legislative relations, and cabinet formation. Because he clearly defines terms and develops examples based on contemporary Lithuanian politics, the book would serve as a fine addition to a course on postcommunist politics. Accompanied by a more in-depth introductory text on rational choice (such as Kenneth Shepsle and Mark Bonchek's [1997] *Analyzing Politics*), it would provide students of postcommunist politics an excellent introduction to the approach and how it can be applied in the region. The focus on spatial analysis provides a gateway to another important new book, George Tsebelis's (2002) *Veto Players*.

To say that *Beyond Post-Communist Studies* asks more questions than it answers is not a criticism. Rather, it summarizes the ambitious agenda Clark places before scholars of postcommunist politics. While the book unevenly accomplishes the many goals it sets forth, it is a valuable contribution to the literature. Rather than emphasizing the unique qualities of postcommunism, Clark challenges us to move beyond idiosyncratic explanations of politics, embrace comparative politics, and advance to a post-postcommunist world.

Pollution and Property: Comparing Ownership Institutions for Environmental Protection. By Daniel H. Cole. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 226p. $60.00 cloth, $22.00 paper.

— David Vogel, *University of California, Berkeley*

By almost any objective criteria, environmental protection represents one of the most important domestic policy successes of the last quarter century. Yet few areas of public policy have been subject to such sustained criticism by scholars and policy analysts. One such criticism is that much environmental regulation is misdirected: It wastes scarce resources by devoting inordinate attention to addressing marginal or even nonexistent problems. Accordingly, policymakers should place greater reliance on cost–benefit analysis and risk assessment.

A second body of criticism challenges not so much the objectives of environmental policy as the means employed to achieve them. These scholars, many of whom work in the area of law and economics, have claimed that the objectives of environmental protection could be achieved both more efficiently and more effectively if regulators placed greater reliance on markets and the institution of private property. At one level, this approach proposes substituting pollution taxes or emissions trading for uniform emission standards or mandatory abatement technologies, and converting commons areas to private ownership. A more extreme version is free-market environmentalism, which posits that private owners are more likely to be responsible stewards of natural resources than are government bureaucrats or politicians.

Daniel Cole's book is a sophisticated critique of private property and market-based approaches to environmental regulation. The author begins by noting that all environmental policy involves decisions about the ownership and control of property. But he quickly adds that property ownership is never absolute; it always entails a complex bundle of rights and responsibilities. Thus, "there is no such thing as a pure or unadulterated public or private property system" (p. 13). All existing property regimes involve complex mixtures of individual, group, and public rights. Accordingly, the issue in designing environmental policy "is not whether to adopt a property-based approach but which property-based approach(es) to adopt" (p. 17).

Consider, for example, the issue of public versus private land ownership. An axiom of free market environmentalists is that the latter is preferable because it is in the self-interest of property owners to use their own resources wisely. But in fact, private ownership of the commons has frequently not precluded the "tragedy" depicted in Garrett Hardin's famous essay. For example, by 1919, Britain, thanks to its ubiquity of private land ownership, had the smallest proportion of forested lands of any country in Europe. It was only after the government began to purchase private land that Britain became reforested. And in the United States it was omniscient private entrepreneurs who ignored the advice of agricultural experts and created the dust bowls of the Midwest. For all the well-documented abuses of federal land management policies, public ownership in the United States has been far more successful in maintaining large areas of pristine wilderness than has private ownership.

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Cole argues that while one can make many claims for the virtues of private property, improving environmental protection is rarely among them. Thus, the "rationality" of private versus public owners is contingent on such factors as their respective discount rates, their relative levels of environmental information, and our particular policy goals. If, for example, we want to preserve species that require large contiguous land areas to thrive, then the high costs of coordination make private land ownership impracticable. Because of the communist regime's decision to keep large amounts of land in the public domain, the forests of Poland are the only place in Europe where there are free-roaming herds of bison. More generally, Cole repeatedly demonstrates that high transactions costs make many of the proposed market- or property-based "solutions" to improving environmental regulation unrealistic.

In actuality, the distinction between public and private ownership is often one of degree rather than of kind. The public sector can employ market mechanisms to ration access, while private owners can agree to restrict development though conservation easements or land trusts. Cole tells a fascinating story about the complex ownership history of Stonehenge, in which he shows that neither public nor private ownership has been noticeably more effective in responsibly managing this unique resource.

Other sections of *Pollution and Property* explore the respective virtues and shortcomings of common versus private ownership of renewable resources, command-and-control regulation versus transferable pollution rights, and various kinds of mixed property regimes. These case studies demonstrate that the environmental problems we face are rarely the result of placing too much or too little reliance on either private or public property. Rather, in every case, there are more complex factors at work.

For example, one reason that policymakers in the United States have historically relied on mandatory abatement technologies rather than emissions trading—even though the latter is more efficient—is that the former is much easier for regulators to monitor. It was only after continuous monitoring technologies for particular pollutants were developed that emissions trading became possible. This observation also explains why international environmental agreements rely almost exclusively on command-and-control regulatory strategies: Few countries possess credible monitoring systems.

After systematically comparing different kinds of property/regulatory regimes, Cole concludes that "there is no universal first-best property-based solution for environmental protection in this second-best world" (p. 130). He is particularly critical of scholars whose work compares the textbook world of rational property owners and frictionless markets with the real world of public policy.

This clearly argued and informative study makes a major contribution to our understanding of the factors that affect the viability of different regulatory and property-rights approaches to environmental protection. Cole's work combines an extensive analysis of the theoretical literature on property rights and regulatory regimes with a wealth of fascinating comparative and historical empirical studies. Instead of continuing to fruitlessly search for or argue over the most efficient or effective regulatory strategy, the author urges us to acknowledge the complexity of the legal and economic challenges that environmental protection poses for public policy. He sensibly advises us to regard environmental regulation as a social experiment, one in which we are continually challenged to better understand the myriad strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches to an endless series of problems whose optimal "solution" will always elude us. This is an important insight from an important book.

Presidents Without Parties: The Politics of Economic Reform in Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s. By Javier Corrales. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002. 364p. $55.00.

— Mark P. Jones, *Michigan State University*

The publication of Javier Corrales's excellent book is very timely. It examines the evolution of economic reform in Argentina and Venezuela during the 1990s, thereby providing those concerned with the present crises in these two countries with an invaluable analysis of the relationship between politics and the economy during the past decade.

The ability of a country to implement policy reform is crucial for its development and the quality of its citizens' lives. Yet in spite of the widespread need for reform throughout the world, more countries fail to engender the necessary changes than actually implement them. It is therefore crucial that scholars develop a better understanding of those institutional and political factors that are conducive to reform, and those that are not. With this need in mind, Corrales seeks to explain the differential success of economic reform efforts in Argentina and Venezuela during the 1990s.

The author's choice of cases is superb. Whereas in Argentina economic reform was both successful and profound, in Venezuela reform efforts were relatively unsuccessful and short-lived. Furthermore, Corrales wisely restricts his analysis to two countries. In doing so, he avoids the errors that are all too common in work that examines several countries. Especially when a single author does not have a formal or rigorous econometric model guiding the work (and hence the reader, for all intents and purposes, is relying to a much greater extent on the author's ability to interpret facts and events), the analysis of more than one or two countries is often a recipe for superficial analysis and misleading or incorrect conclusions.

Following the lead of such scholars as Barbara Geddes, Stephan Haggard, and Robert Kaufman, Corrales focuses on the influence exercised by democratic institutions (and specific institutional configurations) on economic reform. He extends this body of literature by identifying executive–ruling party relationships as the key factor explaining the differential fate of reform efforts in Argentina and Venezuela. He considers executive–ruling party relationships to be a crucial determinant of reform success that hitherto has been neglected in the large literature on economic reform. In particular, Corrales highlights the prominent role played by political parties as institutions, and the powerful effect that variation in party institutionalization, internal structure, and electoral support can have on the policy process.

In Argentina, under the leadership of President Carlos Saúl Menem (1989–99), the relations between the executive (Menem) and his political party (the Justicialist Party [PJ], colloquially known as the Peronist Party) were relatively harmonious during most of the 1990s. This positive relationship facilitated the dramatic economic reforms implemented in Argentina during this period, reforms that transformed the Argentine economy and society.

In Venezuela, at the time of the most serious attempt to implement profound economic reform under the leadership of President Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989–93), the relations between the executive (Pérez) and his political party (Democratic Action [AD]) quickly became very acrimonious. This negative relationship blocked economic reform efforts and eventually also resulted in President Pérez's forced resignation. This conflict also foreshadowed the collapse of the political system that had helped make Venezuela one of Latin America's most consolidated democracies, as well as ended (for some time at least) any possibility of enactment of many of the types of reforms that occurred in Argentina.

Corrales provides a detailed analysis that explains the sources of the differences in

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executive–ruling party relations in these two countries. One important aspect was a greater receptivity to economic reform within the PJ than was the case within AD. The PJ's greater receptivity to reform was in part the consequence of the lack of a tradition of interparty cooperation between the PJ and its historic rival (the Radical Civic Union [UCR]). This contrasted with the comparatively common practice of interparty cooperation in Venezuela between AD and its principal rival (the Independent Committee for Political and Electoral Organization [COPEI]).

A related component of the explanation of the variance in ruling party receptivity stems from the different degrees of institutionalization possessed by the PJ and AD. The PJ of the 1980s and 1990s was a relatively decentralized and flexible institution. Furthermore, having been shocked by its loss of the 1983 presidential election, and in the unaccustomed position of playing the role of a democratic opposition between 1983 and 1989, the PJ was particularly flexible during this period. In contrast, AD was an extremely centralized and rigid institution. Additionally, as AD had controlled the presidency for two-thirds of Venezuela's democratic history (as well as enjoyed a privileged status when in the opposition due to the COPEI presidents' common need to obtain AD congressional support to pass legislation), the AD leadership felt no particular need to be flexible.

The analysis of executive–ruling party relations in Argentina would have been strengthened by a more complete discussion of the federal nature of Argentine politics. The book's coverage of this very important aspect of Argentine politics was limited, and, therefore, also incomplete. I would like to have seen a more extensive discussion of the link between provincial politics and national politics, with a particular focus on the relationship between the PJ governors and President Menem, and between the PJ governors and their provinces' PJ members of congress.

In *Presidents Without Parties,* Javier Corrales has provided an excellent analysis of the distinct outcome of economic reform efforts in Argentina and Venezuela. His cogent work highlights the vital importance of political institutions for the public policy process, and suggests that scholars of policy reform who ignore political institutions do so at their peril. In the case of Argentina, harmonious executive–ruling party relations paved the way for the implementation of much needed economic reforms, while in Venezuela, acrimonious relations blocked similar efforts. All scholars working on the topic of policy reform should read this outstanding book, as should all students of Argentine and Venezuelan politics and economics.

Post-Communist Democratization: Political Discourses Across Thirteen Countries. By John S. Dryzek and Leslie T. Holmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 312p. $65.00 cloth, $23.00 paper.

— James Alexander, *Northeastern State University*

Traditional democratization scholars generally take an "objective" approach to explaining the prospects for democratic development. For many of these scholars, claims of objectivity can be a bit disingenuous as their frequently not-all-too-well hidden preference is supportive of democracy. In their analysis of political discourse across 13 socialist and formerly socialist countries, John Dryzek and Leslie Holmes remove any such pretense. They are unabashed advocates of democracy and explicitly search for positive signs of democratic development. In taking such a subjective approach, this monograph is not a naive evaluation of political development, however. Instead, it is a powerful and sophisticated depiction of the undercurrent of democracy and democratization.

The authors explicitly challenge the minimalist, or electoralist, model employed by many democratization scholars. They contend that such an approach misses the subtleties of democratic development that more accurately reveal a country's potential. The dominant approaches dismiss complex popular perceptions to gain a certain parsimony that is "bought at the unacceptable price of insensitivity to the variety of forms that democratic political development can take" (p. 9). Dryzek and Holmes instead delve directly into popular discourse(s) of democracy to comprehend the political prospects for each country. Although the methodological approach is explicitly inductive, this book is firmly grounded in democratic theory.

The project design is quite sophisticated, employing Q methodology to model subject reactions to a set of statements about democracy and democratization. The project had several stages in each country: First, the authors drew approximately 300 statements regarding democracy from project-oriented discussion groups and the local press. By means of a form of discourse analysis, this number was reduced to 64 statements distributed across types of claims and discourse elements in a 4-by-4 table. Second, approximately 40 subjects were interviewed in each country in the mid-to-late 1990s (most in 1997–98). With depth of understanding the goal, rather than statistical generalizability, subjects from different locations were nevertheless purposively chosen to maximize variety. Subjects were asked to assign statements along a 13-point Likert Scale into a Q sort template organizing 64 cells into a normal curve. Third, Q factor analysis identified patterns of democratic discourse that were presented as country-specific narratives.

It is difficult to generalize this book's findings as each country has unique qualities. Yet the authors do classify the countries into five categories on a mixture of their political development and popular discourses: pretransition countries (China and Yugoslavia), halting transitions (Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine), transitions torn by war (Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova), late developers (Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria), and trailblazers (Poland and the Czech Republic). While there is some minor variance, each analytical chapter is similarly organized. A brief introduction of a country's political development is followed by a presentation of its political discourses. This latter section includes two tables displaying, first, the statement scores in terms of factors/narratives (2–4 in number) of each of the 64 comments and, second, the individual "subject loadings" on the country's factors/narratives. Each discussion concludes with a brief assessment of that country's political prospects.

The Russian case serves as a good example. The first section describes historical processes from the 1905 Revolution to the post-Soviet era, while including a brief discussion of expectations for democratic development. In detailing "Russia's discourses of democracy and reaction" (p. 95), Dryzek and Holmes identify three factors/narratives: Chastened democracy describes a liberal democratic vein that is disappointed in Russia's evolution and future prospects; reactionary antiliberalism regrets the collapse of the USSR, particularly as it compares with contemporary Russia; and authoritarian development calls for a strong state to economically develop society àla the Chilean model. In the assessment of Russia's prospects for democracy, there is a sense of pessimism that is interestingly counterbalanced by optimism emerging from seemingly minor signs of democratic potential.

It is perhaps this commitment to seeing the glass 10% full as opposed to 90% empty for some countries that exposes the authors' agenda. Yet rather than some unconscionable bias undermining the book, this is part of its strength. Dryzek and Holmes are searching for what is beneath the superficialities of minimalist conceptions of democracy. In doing so they expose the complexities of popular hopes and preferences that underlie formal institutions. Rather than accept the historical determinism

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of some political culture arguments or a Pollyanna view that sometimes emerges from mass surveys, their findings indicate that the paths toward democracy differ from one country to another, just as the very endpoint, democracy itself, may look quite different across societies. Western attachment to liberal democracy both denies, even obstructs, the potential for democratic development in some societies and obscures the analytical lens of many Western scholars who miss the nuances of democracy in being too tightly bound to one model. The authors' contentions gain impetus when the discourses found in Romania and (especially) Bulgaria are surprisingly democratic in light of the pessimism regarding these two countries in much of Western scholarship.

Even with its strengths, *Post-Communist Democratization* has some areas for improvement. Particularly evident was the limited discussion of previous scholarship regarding each country. As a Russia specialist, I expected to see Nicolai Petro's (1995) *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy*—and other recent literature—appear in the discussion; I can only assume that important literature is missing from the exploration of the other cases. It is almost as if each case is a tabula rasa, although this is not the authors' intent. It is somewhat defensible that significant literature discussions would have overloaded an already lengthy monograph or that the authors' methodology and assumptions are sufficiently unique to make direct comparisons across studies difficult. Yet I would like to have seen a greater attempt made to place this study's findings in the broader stream of literature, if for nothing else than to help me better appreciate its strengths.

Also apparent was a similarly limited attempt to compare across cases. As the book moves forward, there are some brief cross-country comparisons, but these almost help to highlight the sense that each case is isolated from the others, even as they have been lumped into the five categories described. Unlike Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan's excellent *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (1996) that disappoints the reader without an overarching, cross-regional concluding chapter, Dryzek and Holmes do provide an interesting if underdeveloped conclusion. My concern lies in the brevity of the discussion, for they do develop a taxonomy of discourses tying back to the dimensions of democracy outlined in the introduction, while assessing each country's potential for political development along four democratization roads. They contend, however, that "to contemplate further the causes of cross-national differences and similarities [they] have found . . . would remove [them] from the interpretive and possibilistic epistemological commitments [they] set out in chapter 1" (p. 268). Be that as it may, the reader still emerges from the book hoping for more extensive analysis.

It should be understood that these last two concerns do little to diminish the value of this excellent example of comparative research. Even the "weaknesses" of this study are indicative of how good this work truly is: The engaged reader can only hope for more to come out of something so well conceived and executed. Scholars studying democratization across the world would be well advised to read this volume.

Struggles for Social Rights in Latin America. Edited by Susan Eva Eckstein and Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley. New York: Routledge, 2002. 352p. $90.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

— Katherine Hite, *Vassar College*

In order to fend off charges of unevenness and incoherence, anthology editors typically zero in on a subdisciplinary niche, like electoral systems, presidentialism vs. parliamentarism, or social movements. While such an approach lends analytic clarity to a collection, it limits the reach of academic readership (something we can hardly afford) and contributes to ongoing internecine struggles among a very small "n." For social movement theorists, it may also risk continued relegation of the importance of the subfield of the "voiceless" by those who concern themselves with studies of the powerful.

Susan Eva Eckstein and Timothy Wickham-Crowley's edited volume bucks the subdisciplinary/thematic focus approach and offers instead a welcome and fairly cohesive sampling of a year's "greatest hits" in Latin American studies. While each of the chapters addresses social rights, including class-, gender-, and ethnic/racial-based rights, they do so from markedly distinct disciplines and methodologies, ranging from economics to literary criticism. What makes the volume important is that the distinct analytical lenses are used in ways that are fluid and accessible, as well as informative and convincing. In addition, virtually every contribution provides fresh, nuanced empirical research on topics ranging from NAFTA and the local to "NGOization," transnational labor niches, the meanings of indigenous autonomy, the relationships between female employers and their maids, and others. Taken as a whole, the volume exposes us to leading issues and innovative interdisciplinary analytical approaches.

In the tradition of Eckstein's earlier, excellent anthology, *Power and Popular Protest in Latin America* (1989), the editors begin with a substantive analytical review of struggles for social rights across the region, from eras in which state-centered, import substitution industrialization models were acceptable, to the prevailing era of neoliberalism. They make several provocative points, including the notion that grassroots struggles have profoundly focused on social *consumption* rights (i.e., education, health, housing, clean water) rather than social *equality*. Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley give a skeptical nod to select post-colonial analytical currents as applied to Latin America, yet the volume includes chapters that draw sympathetically and productively from such theorists as Pierre Bourdieu and Homi K. Bhabha.

The case studies move easily across national and international borders to capture elements of each that frame social struggles on the ground. Donna L. Chollett's chapter on the consequences of free markets (at least for the United States in Mexico) for Mexican sugar production is a skillful presentation of how NAFTA, the Mexican state, and regional sugar cane production and milling dynamics play out for a local Mexican community. Though sympathetic to her subjects, Chollett neither romanticizes nor renders as passive victims the local citizenry, as she details painful stories of betrayals, factionalization, and murder within the community, as well as collective action for the common good. Nora Haenn's chapter on "risking environmental justice" (p. 81) in Mexico strikes a similar vein in the context of the new privileging of environmental discourse. With a nod toward readers' skepticism of trash pickers as contented environmental entrepreneurs, Martin Medina's chapter on scavengers who transport cardboard across the Mexico border addresses the range of global realities about garbage and the families who depend upon it.

Mark S. Anner's chapter on labor rights in Central American garment assembly plants and Alejandro Portes and Patricia Fernández-Kelly's chapter on transnational migrant communities are interesting complements: The first emphasizes the continuing vulnerabilities of Third (and First?) World laborers in the global economy, while the second provocatively suggests a more autonomous—albeit comparatively tiny—Third (or Third/First?) World labor sector discovering entrepreneurial opportunities in the interstices of this new economy. Anner's field research in the assembly zones primarily in the 1990s hearken back to conditions Fernández-Kelly related from the Mexican *maquilas* of the early 1980s, well before

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comparatively successful northern antisweatshop consumer campaigns and campus movements. Anner's chapter acutely cautions against too much back-patting regarding transnational movement contributions, particularly in the absence of sustained local organizing.

Both Amalia Pallares's account of profound changes in Ecuadoran indigenous identity and Susan A. Berger's analysis of the politics of gender and democratization in Guatemala are historically and conceptually synthetic. Mario Pecheny reports on the evolution of gay movements and AIDS politics in Argentina, emphasizing the founding ethical and political spaces afforded by the Argentine human rights movement. Cynthia A. Wood provides a thorough investigation of the World bank's failures to consider gendered analyses of structural adjustment programs and, therefore, of the bank's utter failure to address in any meaningful sense the kinds of damage these programs exact from women.

Perhaps the most intriguing methodological contributions to this social science volume are Judith Morganroth Schneider's "Literary Representations of 'Maids' and 'Mistresses'" and Catherine Héau's chapter on popular Mexican ballads. Schneider deftly weaves analyses of women's fictional accounts with feminist theory and ethnographic and survey research on domestic service in the United States and Latin America. In the absence of popular written historical accounts of late-nineteenth-century Mexico, Héau analyzes Mexican *corridos* to convey social justice struggles for indigenous village autonomy.

The two methodological extremes of the volume are represented on one end by a quantitative study of the effects of macroeconomic policies on inequality (Jaime Ros and Nora Claudia Lustig's "Economic Liberalization and Income Distribution in Mexico"), and on the other by a hermeneutic analysis of a late-colonial-period Andean intellectual (Alcira Dueñas's "Social Justice and Reforms in Late Colonial Peru"). These two chapters may, in fact, constitute the two outliers of the volume, as they are written for audiences necessarily more familiar with the languages and debates of their expertise, made even more apparent when the authors attempt to situate themselves by detailing the work of their colleagues in these areas. Nevertheless, Dueñas's use of Bhabha illuminates the ways Andean subalterns appropriate and subvert colonizers' discourse toward subaltern projects, and Bhabha could constructively inform the chapters by Haenn and Pallares. While one always wishes that authors in a broad-gauged anthology would cross-reference one another a bit, *Struggles for Social Rights in Latin America* has cross-disciplinary appeal and should be useful to an array of both undergraduate- and graduate-level courses.

The Time of European Governance. By Magnus Ekengren. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002. 182p. $74.95.

— Carolyn Rhodes, *Utah State University*

The audience for this book is difficult to characterize. Methodologists, especially those interested in public administration, will find the examination of the concept of time quite illuminating. It is a dimension of inquiry, particularly with regard to institutional character and function that is often overlooked. European Union scholars will benefit from the case studies illustrating member-state civil servant roles in the Council, as well as from the general observations about the impact of time constraints on the decision-making process. The writing style in the theoretical sections is sometimes cumbersome, and the vocabulary is highly specialized, and yet the case studies are straightforward and easily accessible. Therefore, it is not clear-cut who should be advised to read this book.

On the one hand, it is definitely written for the specialist, and the theoretical chapters are particularly complex, drawing from international relations theory, sociology, linguistics, and epistemology to develop different interpretations and applications of the concept of time. These discussions are at times somewhat obtuse, as Magnus Ekengren attempts to develop the reader's appreciation for what he calls "the temporal dimension of European governance" This is largely due to the fact that theoretical observations are often left hanging, rather than being grounded in concrete examples. The author also explores a number of dimensions of the time concept—linear or cyclical, past, present, or future, and so on. Yet how these different concepts of time truly affect institutional character is not well developed, and why this is important to our understanding is left unclear. In general, the writing style and logic in these sections is a challenge to follow.

On the other hand, the case studies are quite insightful and more clearly written. Here, Ekengren utilizes his own experience, as well as numerous interviews and official documents, to illustrate the "rhythm" of European governance at the Council level. For scholars of the EU, these illustrations are revealing and interesting, especially if one has little experience in Brussels. From his case studies one can get a sense of the pace of work, the immediacy and importance of deadlines, and the sheer enormity of the tasks at hand for member-state representatives. His focus on time and the typical calendar—dictated mostly by the six-month cycles of the Council presidency—provides an interesting window onto the day-to-day functions and roles of member-state policymakers preparing for Council deliberations.

Ekengren concludes that the very timetable of EU governance is so demanding, and the need for coordination among member states so imperative, that the concept of time in EU governance is unique. Much occurs simultaneously, or nearly so, making EU governance very "present" oriented. Strategies for the Council meetings are geared toward effecting the best negotiating position for one's member state from one deadline to the next. This requires considerable anticipation, which in turn requires careful study of other member-state positions, constant tracking of incoming communications, and little time for preparing and consolidation of an individual member state's position. Although he did not use this term, one is struck by how much his illustrations of EU governance in the Council resemble crisis management situations rather than the rhythm of "normal" governance at national levels. Crisis management is characterized by circumstances in which policymakers frenetically attempt to absorb new (often conflicting) information and reconcile it with existing knowledge and circumstances as they make decisions and prepare positions under serious potential penalty and severe time constraints. Ekengren's cases appear to describe EU governance in the Council as ongoing crisis management punctuated by negotiation and legislative deadlines. If this is an accurate depiction, it raises a number of serious questions about the quality and sustainability of current patterns of policymaking at the Council level. These particular issues are not explored by the author.

Ekengren focuses instead on the shortsighted character of governance. He argues that not only do the demands of EU governance force everything to be very "present" oriented, but the character of the "future" is affected as well. The future, under these circumstances, cannot be predicted in any meaningful way, he claims, because too many different inputs (from the 15 member-state positions) and the chemistry of their combination create unknown outcomes. In comparison with national government, which he finds more linear and predictable (in terms of moving from proposals to law), EU governance holds little assurance that "progress" from well-defined proposals to codified outcomes will occur. Therefore, both the time constraints associated with the pace and demands of Europeanizing the member states,

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and the fact that the character of governance includes so many variables and unknown factors resulting from negotiations, makes the direction and content of EU law very difficult to prognosticate.

The case studies, however, are limited to descriptions of timetables and the use of time. Missing are explanations of how everything fits together, why the language of the EU has developed uniquely, and why time has had to be such a different commodity within the EU framework than elsewhere. Such contextual explanations would make the author's case clearer and *The Time of European Governance* stronger as a cohesive and compelling analysis.

Shaping Abortion Discourse: Democracy and the Public Sphere in Germany and the United States. By Myra Marx Ferree, William Anthony Gamson, Jürgen Gerhards, and Dieter Rucht. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 370p. $60.00 cloth, $23.00 paper.

— Raymond Tatalovich, *Loyola University, Chicago*

This volume extends the logic of social mobilization theory by studying abortion discourse through the prism of what the authors call "discursive opportunity structures." As a component of the larger political opportunity structure, its impact "is limited to the framework of ideas and meaning-making institutions in a particular society" (p. 62). Similarly, where social movement theorists view triggering events as catapulting an issue onto the public agenda, here "critical discourse moments" are "events [that] sometimes change the discursive opportunity structure and . . . require the would-be players to interpret the event in terms of their preferred frame and, in some cases, to reevaluate their discursive strategy" (p. 24).

By "frames" are meant the thematic content of pro and con arguments over abortion, and to be effective, framing must take account of the cultural and institutional biases of a society. Context matters, as evidenced by the German embrace of positive government, its Nazi experience, a weakened religiosity but strong class consciousness, and feminism, but also important are the institutional linkages (e.g., especially between Catholics and the Christian Democratic Party). In contrast, the antistatist, libertarian tradition in the United States, its feminism grounded in demands for equality, and heightened religiosity but a class politics muted by individualism offers a different playing field for abortion adversaries.

The coding of roughly 12,000 American and 7,000 German "idea elements" yielded eight distinctive frames: two anti-abortion (fetal life and social morality), four pro-abortion (women's rights, individual and state, pragmatic consequences, and social justice), and two neutral (balancing and effects on society). The empirical results are expressed as propositions. The most noteworthy finding is that the rhetorical advantage is enjoyed by anti-abortion frames in Germany but pro-abortion frames in the United States. What will seem most paradoxical to American observers is their finding that German discourse is "more 'rights' oriented" (p. 114) than U.S. discourse and, moreover, that Germans express more agreement that the core abortion issue "is human life and its protection," whereas American discourse "shows less agreement on what fundamental values" are at stake (p. 116). This finding, the authors argue, casts doubt on the presumption that the U.S. abortion controversy was precipitated by the irreconcilable claims of women's rights versus fetal rights. I am not persuaded because whenever U.S. abortion discourse is framed in "rights" terms, Americans show "less consensus about which rights [women's or fetal] are central," whereas the "Fetal Life frame is its dominant frame for rights talk" in Germany (p. 116).

The "single most important" explanation for the predominance of the fetal life frame in Germany was the 1975 ruling by the German Constitutional Court that overturned a liberalized abortion statute (p. 120). That ruling closed the debate over the meaning of life, whereas U.S. abortion discourse "became more strongly contested" after *Roe v. Wade,* to suggest that the constitutional principles (privacy) of *Roe* did not come to dominate in the way that the German high court's logic is prominently displayed in German abortion discourse (p. 125).

The concept of "standing" is operationalized by the authors to mean those categories of political and social actors who are deemed relevant to the abortion controversy by the media, and thus are represented in media coverage. State actors, political parties, and the Roman Catholic Church enjoy greater standing in Germany, whereas social movements and ordinary individuals are more privileged in the United States. Women speakers are more prominent and gendered framing of abortion is higher in Germany, meaning that abortion is more a women's issue there than in the United States. The Catholic Church and also Lutherans in Germany succeeded in framing abortion in terms of fetal life, but because religion here is more ecumenical and less institutionally connected to the party system, the greater religiosity of Americans yields a "diversity in the religious meanings given to abortion" that "makes the U.S. debate so difficult to resolve" (p. 178). Much less salient in both countries is social justice framing of the Left, in the United States because advocates have focused primarily on abortion rights—not social needs—and in Germany because there already exists welfare measures supportive of women and children.

The dissimilar discursive opportunity structures in Germany and the United States are evaluated according to four democratic theories: representative liberal, participatory liberal, discursive theory, and constructionist/feminist. The criteria included for judging the social norms of rhetorical participation are inclusiveness, civility, dialogue, argumentation, narrative, empowerment, closure, and consensus. By almost any standard, the United States is a much more democratic society than Germany.

My chief concern is that these empirical findings are not generalizable toward theory building in ways analogous to the rich literature on political opportunity structures (access is affected by the existence of unified or competitive elites, for example). Undoubtedly this study captures the essential dynamics of abortion discourse in both countries, but the propositions reported are more factual statements than testable hypotheses. While the abortion debate is perfect for discursive analysis, I feel uneasy about the choice of Germany—not because Germany has very different regime attributes or because abortion has a similarly long history there, but because abortion taps unique cultural sentiments. Its intimate experience with fascism has embedded in the German psyche an antipathy toward anything tinged with Nazism, including abortion.

Teasing apart the cause and effect between cultural or institutional variables and the dominant fetal life frame is not obvious, and only begs the question of whether the deference enjoyed by German authorities is a function of Germany's authoritarian ethos or its parliamentary regime. Comparing the U.S. presidential system against a parliamentary regime is a brilliant stratagem for unearthing a mother lode of theoretical insights. Great Britain or France should have been included, as well as Germany, meaning that we will have to await a replication study of another parliamentary system before we can draw firm conclusions about which discursive frames in what contexts offer the best prospects for political success. With this minor caveat, *Shaping Abortion Discourse* will come to be regarded as a leading paradigm in discursive analysis for its massive empirical foundation and its normative lessons about democracy.

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Markets and Medicine: The Politics of Health Care Reform in Britain, Germany, and the United States. By Susan Giaimo. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. 328p. $60.00.

— Daniel Cohn, *Simon Fraser University*

In the 1970s, the industrial democracies of Western Europe and North America suffered a macrocrisis that called into question not only specific socioeconomic policies but also the entire relationship between the individual, the market, and the state. In the wake of this crisis a consensus emerged, which was shared across a wide intellectual spectrum, that at least part of the blame had to be placed on the preference that had been allowed to develop for social expenditures over returns to investment. Not only did tax-financed government spending have to be restrained, but constraints in the labor market and systems for delivering health and social services that forced up money wages and benefit costs also had to be overcome. As a result, governments throughout the Western world have been under pressure to contain health-care costs for much of the last 25 years, regardless of the historic bargains previously struck among payers, providers, and the state to govern health care.

The central argument of *Markets and Medicine* is that there is a relationship between these different arrangements for health-sector governance and the success or failure that governments have realized while attempting to steer market-based reforms, aimed at reducing costs by curbing the autonomy of medicine, through the political institutions of different countries. While researchers are well advanced in the study of how political institutions shape both decisions to build and retrench welfare states, program-specific variation in the success or failure of these efforts in different polities is often ascribed to behavioral or sociological factors. Interest in offering an institutional explanation for this variation has come to focus on the concept of policy legacies, the idea that some policy options appear more feasible and some actors enjoy more power as a result of the existing shape of public policy. However, policy legacies can often become a poorly structured catchall. Susan Giaimo's recognition of the institutions of health-sector governance as the salient aspect of policy legacies represents a credible effort at offering a more complete institutional explanation of variation across both different policy sectors and different countries.

In this case, the different countries are Britain, Germany, and the United States. These countries were chosen for inclusion by the author as each is seen as being representative of one of Gøsta Esping-Andersen's ideal-type welfare states (*The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism,* 1990). Consequently, social policies in each of the three countries, such as health care, are seen to be the product of different histories, as serving different purposes, and to be facing different challenges in adjusting to today's socioeconomic circumstances. While students of comparative politics will easily recognize Germany as an ideal-type conservative welfare state and the United States as the liberal case, the choice of Britain to represent the ideal-type social democratic welfare state might be surprising. The author defends this choice by noting that while Britain's overall welfare state has elements of both the liberal ideal-type and the social democratic one, the governance structures of its health-care system, characterized by universal provision, state administration, and funding through general taxation, place it in the social democratic category for the purposes of her study (p. 14). Her judgment in this regard is further reenforced by the corporatist state–medical relationships seen in the governance of British health care.

The book highlights both the strengths and weaknesses of the "small n" comparative method. The author presents us with a rich and nuanced discussion of the major health-policy events in the three countries and a convincing explanation for the variation in outcomes. However, this explanation is purchased to some degree at the cost of reduced generalizability in dealing with the wider question of policy change in the industrialized democracies as they confronted the macrocrisis that began in the 1970s. This is a difficulty that emerges when we consider one of the true strengths of this work: the impact that existing structures of governance in the health sector are said to have. One of the most important ways these are said to influence future policy is by reinforcing "different expectations about the proper place of the state, the market, or interest groups in health care provision and governance" (p. 27). Looking at the three examples, the author concludes that "the statutory, universal health care systems of Britain and Germany reflected and reinforced broad solidarities that defined equity as equality. . . . Policymakers in both countries could ill afford to ignore such expectations; therefore they carefully controlled the play of market forces" (p. 197). Meanwhile in the United States, "health care systems based on voluntary fringe benefits and private insurance, by contrast, erected formidable legitimacy barriers to public intervention" (p. 197). However, this hypothesized legitimizing effect of the existing structures of governance in a given policy sector only makes sense if the existing arrangements are judged by important segments of the population in a society to be a success at some level or another. Health care is somewhat unique in this regard among welfare state policies. This might help explain why, unlike other policy sectors, health care is so difficult to reform, regardless of its structure of governance in a given society, the given stripe of the government trying to reform it, or the strength of said government's position as a result of the political institutions within which it operates.

Nevertheless, it must be reiterated that *Markets and Medicine* is a solid book. Specialist readers will appreciate the useful contributions that this volume makes to the further development of the institutionalist literature on health-care politics and policymaking. Meanwhile, those with a more general interest will appreciate the clarity with which events in the three countries are described and compared.

Asian States, Asian Bankers: Central Banking in Southeast Asia. By Natasha Hamilton-Hart. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002. 240p. $35.00.

— Richard Robison, *Institute of Social Studies, The Hague*

This is an analysis of the highest quality as well as a highly engaging study. The dramatic events of the Asian economic crisis are used to provide a unique window into the inner workings of the financial and political systems of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and into the power relations in which they are embedded. This is not to say that a book about banks and regulatory governance in the context of the crisis could not have produced just another narrow account of the efficiency of banks in promoting specific financial or economic outcomes. What makes this study different is that it explains the evolution of these systems and their capacities to deal with crisis and global forces in the context of wider institutional and political factors and is able, therefore, to exploit the insights into power and conflict provided by the crisis. It is a study not only of banks and financial systems but also of theories of institutional change and reform well anchored in broader theoretical debates about the nature of institutions and power.

The central research questions are developed in the first two chapters, setting the scene for case studies of Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. Here, the author develops arguments about the critical importance of regulatory capacity in processes of policy and institutional reform. The last three chapters assess the impact of the eco-

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nomic crisis on banking and financial systems in the three countries, engaging with the perennial question of convergence and the specific challenges of governance in open economies.

Specifically, Natasha Hamilton-Hart asks why stable financial systems emerged in Singapore and, to a lesser degree, in Malaysia but hardly at all in Indonesia, and why the former two have been most able to cope with increasingly open and global financial systems. She takes issue with established neoliberal assumptions that policy choices, especially the adoption of free market agendas, are the decisive factors in assuring effective outcomes. Instead, she argues that the governing and regulatory capacity of the state to enforce consistent policy may be more important. This is perhaps most starkly illustrated in the case of Indonesia. Here, the author makes the astute observation that "it didn't seem to matter whether financial policy . . . revolved around heavy government subsidies through a government banking system or followed a much more deregulatory path; neither policy orientation produced a financial system that was both stable and efficient" (p. 6).

Arguing that effective markets and financial systems very much depend upon the existence of an organized, legal-rational state structure, the author argues that successful financial-sector reform is contingent upon the regulatory capacity of the banks themselves and of other areas of the state apparatus in which they are embedded. This proposition is illustrated in the different experiences of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia in the context of the Asian economic crisis. While Singapore's well-regulated banks proved to be rock-solid, Malaysia's central bank had to deal with fluid organizational structures in other areas of the state apparatus that opened the door to political interventions and compromised its own governing capacity. Indonesia's central bank, in contrast, was more directly the possession of particularist interests and had little capacity to resist predatory demands.

Whereas institutional analysis sometimes reduces questions of power and conflict to timeless and universal game-theoretic abstractions, it is an essential strength of this study that social interest and political conflict are an integral part of the explanation of how banking and financial systems evolve. Yet Hamilton-Hart argues that it is the very organizational capacities and structures of institutions that lend themselves to particular routines of interaction with government and private actors. But it is unclear where such organizational capacities come from. Is the author suggesting that predatory interests might be eliminated through the voluntarism of better institutional planning and capacity building? She herself has observed that in the case of Indonesia, its central bank and its staff had been subjected to the most intensive process of training and reform in the years before the crisis. This did not prevent the most scandalous plundering of its resources and powers by Indonesia's corporate moguls and their political accomplices.

Surely this suggests that it is not institutional design, in itself, that determines routines of interaction with private and government actors. Instead, it may be the capacity of the latter to organize their interests politically that determines how institutions work and what routines of institutional/social interaction occur (see Andrew Rosser, *The Politics of Economic Liberalism in Indonesia: State, Market and Power,* 2002). As Hamilton-Hart points out, state capacity in itself determines no specific outcome; these are decided by the relative power of particular individuals and groups (p. 7).

One of the strengths of *Asian States, Asian Bankers* is the author's exploration of how institutions might change in her nuanced and thoughtful consideration of the postcrisis debate about convergence. Here, neoliberals argued that the crisis was nothing less than a blessing in disguise whose lessons would enforce good policy and institutional reform (Michel Camdessus, "Asia Will Survive with Realistic Economic Policies," *Jakarta Post* [December 8–9, 1997]: 5). Or that all would now be swept into the disciplines of global capital markets (Thomas Friedman, "Quit the Whining, Globalisation Isn't A Choice," *International Herald Tribune* [September 30, 1997]: 10).

By contrast, Hamilton-Hart makes some telling contrary observations. She notes that "if globalization empowers forces that are antagonistic to the core principles and practices of Weberian states [because it requires states that are flexible, adaptable, and responsive to the demands of financial markets], then it may indirectly promote a new kind of patrimonial, patronage-based state" (p. 27). This is an interesting complement to Kanishka Jayasuriya's thesis about the emergence of authoritarian liberalism in the context of postcrisis neoliberal ascendancy ("Authoritarian Liberalism, Governance and the Emergence of the Regulatory State in Post-crisis Asia," in Richard Robison et al., eds., *Politics and Markets in the Wake of the Asian Crisis,* 2000).

In the end, Hamilton-Hart argues that countries like Singapore and Malaysia, with resilient state organizations, were able to ride out the shocks and preserve existing regimes in the face of more open economies. By contrast, in Indonesia, the weakness of governing capacity meant that established regimes could not be preserved. For the same reasons, ironically, neither could neoliberal reform agendas be established. These propositions constitute an important critique of neoliberal ideas about change and an intelligent reconsideration of institutionalist approaches.

Inventing the Needy: Gender and the Politics of Welfare in Hungary. By Lynne Haney. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. 351p. $60.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

— Mitchell Orenstein, *Syracuse University*

Lynne Haney's work is an outstanding and much-needed assessment of the welfare state during and after communism in Hungary. The author uses archival, ethnographic, and interview techniques to study three phases of welfare state development and the ways in which they define social need, from a gendered perspective. In the early communist period, from 1948 to 1968, the Hungarian welfare state had limited resources but ambitious goals. State institutions viewed women's welfare holistically, treating them as workers, mothers, and family members. In the late communist period, the Hungarian welfare state began to place far greater emphasis on women's role as mothers, in an effort to boost fertility rates. In the post-communist market period, need began to be defined solely in economic terms. Haney's focus is on the different ways welfare regimes conceptualize need, particularly from the perspective of gender, and how these differences affect resources available to the needy. She takes a "bottom-up" approach in her research in order to understand how state policy shaped social resources of needy women in two districts of Budapest over time.

Haney's major contribution is to demonstrate the value of analyzing Hungarian and, by extension, other Central and East European welfare states as having passed through three distinct welfare regimes since 1945. By contrast, most analysts of West European welfare states have emphasized continuity of welfare state regimes over the postwar period. Second, she makes a strong case that the central differences between regimes concerned their treatment of gender, particularly women's roles in family and society. By contrast, most prominent analysts of West European welfare states define welfare regimes as reflecting underlying political philosophies and party preferences, namely, "social democratic," "Christian democratic," "liberal," and so on. Third, she demonstrates the value of taking a bottom-up

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approach to analyzing these regimes by looking at case files and by using ethnographic techniques to uncover the ways that state welfare offices interact with and shape resources for those in need.

Viewing the state as a multilayered system, Haney attempts what few have done before in Central and East European studies: to show how the welfare state apparatus actually works at the local level. She uses a wealth of data from case files to substantiate her claims. In particular, she shows that different state definitions of need create different resources that women are able to mobilize. These resources are typically available only when women adopt, or appeared to adopt, prescribed gender roles—as good workers/mothers in early communism, and as good mothers in late communism. Women who fail to meet these criteria are vulnerable to a range of negative consequences.

One emerges from *Inventing the Needy* with a strong sense of the reality of welfare state operations in Hungary in each of the three periods in which the book is organized: two chapters on what she calls "The Welfare Society, 1948–1968," two chapters on "The Maternalist Welfare State, 1968–1985," and two chapters on "The Liberal Welfare State, 1985–1996," framed by a theoretical introduction and conclusion. The substantive chapters are admirably organized to provide corroboration of her main theoretical points.

Given its strong theoretical agenda, excellent research design, and strong writing, Haney's work will undoubtedly make a major contribution to the study of Central and East European welfare states, providing a careful analysis of both communist-era and postcommunist developments. It should also attract a wider audience concerned with European and other welfare states more broadly. The book, however, is less than successful on three points: 1) convincing us that the communist/postcommunist divide is artificial and less important than Haney's threefold periodization; 2) providing a coherent account of the reasons for change between regimes; and 3) showing that her bottom-up approach is superior to traditional macropolitical approaches.

The author makes a major point of counterpoising her threefold periodization to the standard communist/postcommunist dichotomy. As evidence, she cites major differences in approach between early communist and late communist welfare states, and the fact that liberal policies began to be adopted in Hungary in 1985, not 1989. Neither of these arguments is particularly persuasive. Many scholars have noted strong differences between early and late communism, notably Grzegorz Ekiert (*The State Against Society,* 1998) and regime theorists Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (*Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation,* 1996), who labeled late communist regimes "post-totalitarian." This does not negate the disjuncture between communism and postcommunism, nor render it less important. What is decisive is the extent of change, and here Haney presents ample evidence to suggest that transition to the "liberal" regime was far more radical, effectively abandoning state commitment to most women's welfare.

Haney also fails to present an adequate explanation for the shifts among the three welfare regimes she so brilliantly describes. She argues that change was driven in Hungary by social policy elites whose reinterpretations of social need caused these shifts. However, she studiously ignores debate within the Politburo and other national political venues, or the effect of real economic and demographic change. Yet shifts in welfare state regimes coincided with major political changes throughout the former communist world, suggesting that macro-level political or economic explanations might be useful. For instance, the decision to move toward a maternalist welfare state after 1968 appears to be linked to both increasing wealth and declining birth rates under early communism. Decisions to adopt a liberal approach were part of a broad package of economic competitiveness measures. Welfare regimes need to be analyzed in relation to broader production regimes and strategies, the real economic situation, and political choice, as for instance in Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephen's *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State* (2001). This brings us to the third criticism, that Haney's bottom-up approach, while a valuable corrective to current studies, leaves important elements out of the picture.

Despite these shortcomings, Haney makes a strong case for the importance of a bottom-up and gendered account of welfare regimes. She has produced a well-constructed study that is a must-read for those interested in European welfare states and a potent model for future research that challenges standard emphases, methods, and practices in the field.

Models of Capitalism: Lessons for Latin America. Edited by Evelyne Huber. University Park: Penn State University Press, 2002. 528p. $65.00.

— Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz, *University of Maryland*

The overall aim of this extensive book, according to Evelyne Huber, is to address the "challenge of growth with equity," or more specifically to identify, through comparison, "why some societies are more successful than others in achieving growth and social integration" (p. 1). The underlying premise is that economic and social policies in advanced industrial democracies, as well as in Northeast and Southeast Asia, constitute successful models for promoting both growth and equity, and thereby might offer guidelines for policymaking in Latin America, where relevant actors have had difficulties in promoting *either* growth or equity, let alone an effective combination of the two. Despite the aims of the editor, most of the chapters in the book avoid any systematic comparison among the three regions in question, and several are openly skeptical about whether successful growth experiences offer any relevant lessons for the future design of economic and social policies in Latin America.

The first six chapters focus on Latin America. In a general overview, John Sheahan provides a typology of liberal (traditional liberal, neoliberal, and mixed liberal) and state-centered (activist developmentalist, activist inclusive, and populist) models of development, to argue that the region has been characterized by both a great instability of models and persistent poverty and inequality. He concludes that "Latin American countries need to build up stronger protections against destructive forms of profit-seeking," but avoid "misdirected protectionism, erratic intervention, and frequent disregard of the necessary conditions for macroeconomic balance" (p. 49). Sheahan suggests that many paths are open for pursuing these goals, probably through some combination of "mixed liberal," "activist developmentalist," and "activist inclusive" models.

More specific policy areas are addressed by Renato Baumann (trade), Wilson Peres (industrial competitiveness), and Robert Grosse (foreign direct investments). These descriptive chapters review the regional trend toward growing liberalization, with both Baumann and Grosse arguing that this trend appears to have been accompanied by deepening labor market inequalities (although not much original data are rallied to explore this hypothesis).

Carlos H. Filgueira and Fernando Filgueira (focusing on social benefits) provide one of the strongest chapters in the book. They argue that the main weaknesses of social benefits systems in Latin America have been "centralized authoritarianism, general inequality, rent-seeking political elites, and the bureaucratic weakness of states in coordinating and distributing services" (p. 129), and that recent reforms (decentralization, privatization, and targeting) have reproduced and even exacer-

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bated these problems. The authors are skeptical about lessons drawn from other experiences (particularly in Asia and the United States), although they indicate (without pursuing the comparison in any detail) that the most relevant parallel models might be found in the "conservative-corporatist tradition of Europe" (p. 150). Victor Tokman concludes the section on Latin America, evaluating recent transformations in the region's labor market and related policies.

The next three chapters focus on Asia. Ha-Joon Chang argues that the success of the "big three" (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) model involved effective regulation of markets (e.g., infant industry promotion and strict regimes of capital control). In a strong chapter, Bridget Welsh contends that success in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand) is explained by "specific economic and social policies, the developmentalist orientation of their states, and a regional proximity to models of success and capital" (p. 237). For Welsh, these same variables also explain the eventual collapse of the model, insofar as success developed into "an unchecked dependence on foreign capital; a close, collusive relationship between domestic business groups and states, a dependence on a weakening regional hegemon; and a growing incompatibility between private-sector-led growth and poverty reduction" (p. 237). T. J. Pempel provides an overview of patterns of development in Asia, emphasizing the importance of the exclusion of organized labor, the role of a small but highly trained technocracy (although Chang warns against too heavy an emphasis on the uniqueness or centrality of Asian bureaucracies), and the political autonomy provided by the absence of populist/democratic demands in the initial implementation of the relevant policies. These three chapters each conclude by seeking to provide an explanation for the region's crisis in the late 1990s.

The next four chapters focus on social policies in advanced industrial democracies. John Stephens indicates that the notion of "models/types of capitalism" is intended to capture the interacting relationship of "welfare state/labor market/production regimes" (p. 303). His chapter provides a thorough evaluation of the characteristics and impacts of various types of welfare state regimes (in a partial reformulation of alternative typologies, Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, Liberal, and "Wage Earner" welfare states). John Myles discusses social policies in the United States and Canada in order to emphasize the importance of political and institutional path dependencies. Thomas Janoski and Antonio Alas evaluate labor market policies in Germany and Great Britain, and David Robertson focuses on the same issue in the United States.

In the introductory and concluding chapters of *Models of Capitalism,* Huber attempts to provide the explicit comparative perspective that is missing in most of the chapters (some limited, substantive, comparative remarks can be found in the chapters by Sheahan, Filgueira and Filgueira, and Stephens, and a few other authors include a paragraph that draws comparative conclusions, but these are rather minimal). She acknowledges that there is "a tension in our intellectual enterprise, the tension between seeing models in a holistic way as integrally related sets of policies and institutions in a given historical context, and seeing them as analytically separable and potentially transferable institutions and policy designs" (p. 439). Taking the latter perspective, and emphasizing the region's lack of "coordination and trust among government, business and labor" (p. 441), the conclusion outlines possible areas of future policy reform in Latin America (e.g., the provision of high-quality education and health care, protection for the unemployed, strengthening universalistic policies rather than targeting, and instituting an effective and progressive tax system).

Drawing on Sheahan, Huber argues that an important advantage of the region in undertaking such reforms is that the previous instability of alternative models of development has left fewer entrenched institutional practices and/or actors there (many readers will find this line of argument rather unconvincing). She argues that to be effective, such reforms will require centralizing power by strengthening institutions and making policymakers more accountable, measures that might best be achieved by the democratic Left (such as the PT [Partido dos Trabalhadores] in Brazil). Whether such alternatives will provide an effective path for promoting "growth with equity" in the region, and what the content of such a path should entail, will certainly continue to be important topics for future research and debate.

Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany.

By Riva Kastoryano. Translated by Barbara Harshav. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 248p. $55.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

— Erik Bleich, *Middlebury College*

The politics of immigration, race, and integration are becoming increasingly important concerns in the European context. This book adds to our understanding of these issues by focusing on the interactions between important minority groups, such as Muslims and Turks, in two of the largest European countries. Going beyond case studies, Riva Kastoryano seeks to identify a common dynamic between immigrants and states that applies beyond France and Germany, while at the same time remaining sensitive to national differences.

Kastoryano's core argument has several dimensions. From her perspective, immigrant groups formulate identities in order to open negotiations with the state for recognition and benefits. The state enters the game by laying down the rules for recognition that favor some groups and discourage others. By dictating the terms on which immigrant minorities are eligible for negotiations, the state thus shapes the types of identities likely to succeed in the national arena. This back-and-forth between immigrants and states is the heart of the "negotiation" over identities that the author highlights.

In addition to this dynamic, several other points emerge. For example, when immigrants lobby for their seemingly particularistic positions, they appear to be challenging the national model of social cohesion that prevails in each country (based on principles such as *laïcité* in France, and the ethno-cultural nation in Germany). However, Kastoryano points out that the state itself plays a central role in encouraging the identitarian claims of minorities by recognizing and conferring benefits on certain groups. It does this primarily out of pragmatic concerns, such as buying social peace, diminishing exclusion, or promoting integration. Thus, the challenge to (and negotiation over) national values is directly abetted by the state itself.

Moreover, Kastoryano contends that the very act of organizing an identity and making claims on the state helps immigrants assimilate into the national culture of democratic participation. However, the same act also has the pernicious effect of directing immigrants' claims toward material benefits the state can provide, thus reducing the state in immigrants' eyes to its "utilitarian" function.

The arguments advanced in this book are rich and intricate. Especially noteworthy is the author's effort to move beyond "national models" perspectives on immigration, integration, or race relations (which tend to highlight static differences between countries) and her effort to model dynamic processes common to many countries experiencing immigration. She bases her arguments on evidence that French and German states pragmatically acknowledge and encourage ethnic identities, even as they rhetorically reconfirm their commitment to national models of ethnic relations.

In addition to this fundamental insight, there are interesting details that emerge in the

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empirical discussion, such as her emphasis on the role that association leaders play as ethnic entrepreneurs and pivots between the state and the groups they claim to represent. There are, however, certain elements to the argument that are not as fully developed as some may desire. Historically and empirically minded readers might be disappointed that the book's structure breaks up the narrative of the identity negotiations into theoretically organized sections, somewhat undercutting the forcefulness of the evidence. And although the author devotes a chapter to the European Union, she concludes that "states constitute the only identity frame of reference with enough . . . legitimacy to allow dialogue and citizenship, the only political power that allows identities to be negotiated" (p. 185), reinforcing the desire for more information about national negotiations.

Theoretically minded readers may want the model to be more precisely specified. It is not clear, for example, what forces start the negotiating ball rolling. Must these negotiations happen in every country with immigrants? What are the factors that trigger the negotiation dynamic? If these can be identified, the model is potentially of great interest to scholars trying to understand immigrant–state relations in other countries.

The model is also somewhat less predictive and concise than it first appears. For example, immigrant minority identities at times are portrayed as "determine[d]" by the state (p. 182), and at times as constructions of minorities themselves (or their leaders), who are divided by ethnic, religious, or other affiliations that the state has a hard time overcoming (pp. 123–25). Just how much power the state has in shaping identities is thus unclear. Moreover, as much as the author wants to move away from a national models approach, in the end, national models do a lot of work to dictate such things as the issues around which immigrant minorities organize (religion in France, citizenship in Germany) and the groups that are seen as particularly problematic (Muslims in France, Turks in Germany).

Finally, several of the outcomes the author identifies as paradoxes may be just that, or they may reflect underlying inconsistencies or incomplete information. Do immigrant minorities want recognition of their identities, or do they want economic and power benefits for themselves? They may want both, and this may be a paradox, but more can undoubtedly be said about how salient different goals are at various times. Answering this question would help with the second paradox, namely, that immigrant minorities' participation in politics helps them assimilate democratic values, while at the same time reducing their view of the democratic state to that of a resource to be tapped for personal (or group) benefits. Assessing these different effects in more depth would help societies and political leaders gauge the merit of undertaking negotiations on these terms, and may lead to insights about how to maximize the benefits of group interactions with the state while limiting their pernicious effects.

In conclusion, Kastoryano's *Negotiating Identities* is a useful book for stimulating reflection on when, how, and why immigrants and states interact in ethnically diverse societies. It contains several important insights that should be reckoned with. It also opens up additional lines of inquiry into pressing concerns, and thus may prove to be an important building block for further theoretical and empirical studies of France, Germany, and beyond.

The European Parliament and Supranational Party System: A Study in Institutional Development. By Amie Kreppel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 280p. $60.00 cloth, $22.00 paper.

— Roger Scully, *University of Wales, Aberystwyth*

The fiftieth anniversary of the creation of the institution now known as the European Parliament (EP) came and went in September 2002, almost entirely unnoticed by the population and news media of European Union member states. The EP was marginal to the early manifestations of European integration, and in some ways it remains so, having little profile or diffuse support among the European citizens it putatively represents. Yet in other respects, the chamber could celebrate its golden anniversary with an impressive record of achievement. Campaigns (largely, though far from exclusively, led from inside the EP itself) to make the parliament directly elected, to give it greater prerogatives over European budgetary and law-making processes, and to provide for a substantial parliamentary role in EU policy oversight have been highly successful. In the successive waves of constitutional reform that have occurred in the EU, with increasing frequency, since the 1970s, the EP has been a conspicuous "winner," and is now firmly established as one of the more important and influential legislative chambers in Europe.

Amie Kreppel has been a leading figure within the group of (mostly junior) scholars who, in recent years and in response to the development of the EP, have in turn transformed the study of the chamber. This excellent book takes these developments in the powers of the European Parliament as a point of departure for examining how such externally imposed changes have induced institutional change within the chamber. Kreppel's specific concern is with how exogenous changes affecting the EP have been partially endogenized by the multinational party groups that operate within the Parliament. The general pattern, she observes, is of "movement away from egalitarian internal structures and strongly ideological coalitions toward increased internal centralization of power and ideological moderation" (p. 10). Although the argument that an external-induced challenge to the Parliament's modes of functioning has prompted an internal response is hardly surprising, the study as a whole is far from pedestrian in its clarity of argument and use of systematic empirical evidence. Regarding the latter, Kreppel's study is a laudable exception to a general tendency: All too frequently, political scientists advocate the use of multiple data sources and alternative methods by others, but fail to follow their own sermons. Her analysis, however, examines the evolution of Rules of Procedure within the EP as a whole and among the major party groups, as well as deploying Correspondence and Logistic Regression analysis of rollcall vote behavior. The weaving together of these diverse sources of data, alongside theoretical arguments, is accomplished with great skill.

This book does more than simply tell us a lot about the European Parliament. It should also be read as a significant contribution to ongoing debates about the further development of theories of institutional reform. Kreppel links coherently a "macro" perspective (concerning the importance of exogenous political change as a stimulant to institutional reform) and more detailed "micro" hypotheses that specify the character of such reform. In relation to the party groups, Kreppel observes that "[w]hen the EP was without direct legislative power and unable to effectively influence policy outcomes, the party groups had little need or desire to exert strict control over their membership. . . . However, as the EP acquired the power to impact legislative outcomes, the political groups could no longer afford ideological dogmatism if the EP was to maximize its new powers" (pp. 46, 36). How far the theoretical framework she develops can "travel" remains to be seen in further research. But after this study, scholars are left with little excuse for failing to make the necessary effort.

As a study *The European Parliament and Supranational Party System* does have some flaws—both of omission and commission. Regarding the latter, Kreppel's commitment to combating the insularity of theories of institutional reform that often take the U.S. political system as their automatic frame of reference is entirely to be applauded; however, her own

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efforts are rather undermined by references to an understanding of the British House of Commons as a legislative chamber that owe far more to an outdated American caricature of Westminster than to contemporary reality. And missing from her study is sufficient attention to national party delegations within the EP—entities that, notwithstanding the development of the multinational party groups, are of considerable and probably growing importance to the politics of the chamber.

These, however, are relatively minor criticisms of what is a potentially significant contribution to our general understanding of the development and reform of parliamentary institutions, and undoubtedly a major landmark in the study of the European Parliament. Students of the EP have for some time benefited from some very good introductory texts; in recent years, there have also been high-quality studies of elections to the chamber. Kreppel's study seems sure to stimulate further research that will extend and refine the arguments developed here. But for now, this book is undoubtedly the leading work to have been published on the internal politics of the European Parliament. Anyone with a serious interest in the chamber will have to engage with it.

Active Social Capital: Tracing the Roots of Development and Democracy. By Anirudh Krishna. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. 192p. $45.00 cloth. $18.50 paper.

— Subrata K. Mitra, *The University of Heidelberg*

Why do some Indian villages succeed in building public works crucial to economic growth, maintaining peace between communities, and achieving high political participation while others continue to wallow in misery? Other things being equal, Anirudh Krishna argues in this book, leadership makes the main difference between the village taking off into sustained peace and prosperity or remaining stuck in fractious poverty. This will come as no surprise to those familiar with India. Long before survey researchers descended on the scene, political anthropology, as one can see from Frederick G. Bailey's (1959) *Politics and Social Change: Orissa in 1959,* had already analyzed the emerging leadership and competitive elections. The significance of *Active Social Capital,* however, lies in another domain, for it touches, though obliquely, a highly charged and sustained debate on social capital and public goods that Anirudh Krishna elegantly sums up as a quarrel over temporality. While few question the importance of states, laws, bureaucracies, and reforms or, for that matter, the process of negotiation, intermediation, and conviviality, the issue is one of temporal precedence and causal sequence. Although the book ultimately disappoints in this particular respect—for rather than rescuing the argument from the arid cul-de-sac in which it finds itself currently, it cleverly skirts around the issue and offers a fuzzy compromise solution—it still has many other strong features that should draw the attention of specialists of Indian area studies as well as students of comparative politics and public policy.

Based on fieldwork in North India, the book provides a wealth of opinions, attitudes, statistics, and narratives, gleaned from cross-section and elite surveys of a sample of 69 villages. Multivariate analysis of this rich data helps isolate and compare the independent explanatory powers of structural, social capital, and agency variables. The quantitative analysis is ably complemented with analytical narratives of a smaller number of case study villages and samples of elite discourse, leading to a well-reasoned conclusion: "Collective action in support of shared goals is more likely where social capital is high. However, effective collective action and superior goal performance are achieved only where—in addition to high social capital—capable agents are also available" (p. xi). As a whole, the agents help transform the "stock of capital into the flow of benefit" (p. 12), with the younger leaders of generally lower-caste origin being more active in transactions relating to the economy and the older social notables of higher social origins being the preferred agents for communal peace.

Despite a few minor factual errors, Krishna, with his imaginative design and ingenious tools of measurement, makes Indian data accessible to the polarized debate on social capital. Indian economy no longer stagnates at "less than one percent per annum in real per capita terms" (p. 142), nor does the prediction of a crisis of governability any longer reflect reality. His reference to Atul Kohli's (1990) *Democracy and Discontent: India's Growing Crisis of Governability* on page 223 has in fact been superseded by his recent findings (in Atul Kohli, ed., *The Success of India's Democracy,* 2001). Finally, some would probably demur at statements pertaining to "the working of Indian democracy" (p. 163) being made on the basis of a "sample" drawn from two adjacent North Indian states, a choice that appears to pay scant regard to India's continental diversity. Still, Krishna's general observations about India's resilience are consistent with the main thrust of the literature (Arendt Lijphart, "The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation," *APSR* 90 [no. 4, 1996]: 258–68; and Ashutosh Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India,* 2002), which makes it possible to nail larger questions of theory and method to the empirical findings.

In measuring associational activities, how far can one take informal, traditional networks into account as a proxy for voluntary, associational activities? Is a caste-based religious ritual synonymous with civil society? Community and diversity are warm and fuzzy categories that are as hard to define as they are to refute. Explanations that include such categories run the risk of making sweeping generalizations. Krishna's allusion to village communities ("Village helps village in raising crops, in training children, in combating disease, in any number of tasks that are associated with life in these agrarian settings," p. 5) glosses over the relentless pursuit of individual gain at the margins of legality that sometimes underpins such projects. Many of the semieducated, unemployed persons whom Krishna describes as a "leadership pool" (p. 10) are actually criminals and extortionists who should arguably be behind bars. The problem of his model is that it makes no allowance for this eventuality and falls into the same functionalist trap as previous scholarship in this domain (such as Ram Reddy and G. Hargopal, "The Pyraveekar: The 'Fixer' in Rural India," *Asian Survey* 25 [no. 11, 1985]: 1147–62).

Krishna's main contribution consists in pointing to the possible synergy that successful agency can create by bringing both the political structure and social capital into an optimal combination. But, for this important finding to become an effective bridge between structure and process, the concept of agency needs to be firmly pegged to the rule of law and a responsive state. Local democracy, like local elites, is not self-generated nor self-sustaining. The absence of a responsive state committed to the rule of law, and associations crosscutting rather than cumulating community boundaries, can be fatal, as one can see from the collapse of Weimer and the bloodbath marking the end of British rule in India (Anita Inder Singh, *The Origins of the Partition of India, 1936–47,* 1987; Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimer Republic," *World Politics* 49 [April 1997]: 401–29).

The Costs of Coalition. By Carol Mershon. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002. 328p. $55.00.

— Lanny W. Martin, *Florida State University*

Following from William Riker's pioneering work, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (1962),

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coalition politics has developed over the years into one of the richest subfields in political science in terms of its theoretical and empirical depth. Carol Mershon's new book is faithful to the tradition of Riker and further deepens our understanding of coalition government. The book is indispensable for scholars engaged in the study of parliamentary democracy and would also be useful reading in general seminars in comparative politics and comparative methodology.

The book begins by drawing our attention to an empirical anomaly in the literature on coalition behavior. In four decades of research in this area, coalition theorists have tended to treat cabinet instability and turnover in government membership as two sides of the same coin. Thus, legislative bargaining environments expected by theorists to be conducive to frequent government collapses were also expected to be conducive to constant alternation in the parties participating in government. As Mershon points out, however, such theoretical expectations do not satisfactorily match up with the empirical reality of coalition governance. For instance, Italy (1946–92)—the most prominent case in her study—has experienced the *highest* number of short-lived governments among postwar parliamentary democracies (save for the now-defunct French Fourth Republic) but at the same time the *lowest* rate of government turnover (as the Christian Democratic Party always managed to maintain a place in the cabinet). Other countries, such as Finland, Belgium, Israel, and Portugal, have had similar (though less extreme) experiences with coalition government. The rest of the book is devoted to understanding how apparent instability can coexist with apparent stability in this way.

Mershon makes several original contributions to the study of coalition politics. The first comes from her observation that all coalition theories to date—from the early "institution-free" theories to the current neoinstitutional approaches—make the implicit, and heretofore unquestioned, assumption that there are costs associated with building and bringing down government coalitions that derive from party goals to hold office, make public policy, and/or win parliamentary elections. Further, these theories generally assume that the costs of coalition are *invariant* across parties, governments, time, and institutional settings and *exogenous* to coalition bargaining.

The assumptions of invariance and exogeneity in the costs of coalition, Mershon contends, are what give rise to the "puzzle" of short-lived cabinets dominated by perpetual incumbents. She goes on to argue that these rather stringent assumptions fail to hold under certain conditions. In particular, her claim is that the costs associated with assembling and dismantling governments should generally depend upon the types of parties involved in bargaining, patterns of party competition, and the institutional setting. Moreover, she argues that parties can actually work to lower the costs of coalition through their strategic actions within a given institutional and political context.

To explore these arguments empirically, Mershon pursues the two-pronged strategy of providing an in-depth study of the Italian case, as well as a cross-national statistical analysis of coalition politics in 10 European democracies for the postwar period. In her examination of the Italian record of coalition government, she finds that the Christian Democrats, due partly to their size and position in the policy space, could make or break coalitions at relatively low cost. Intriguingly, this party also appears to have pursued a variety of strategies over the years to curb the costs of coalition bargaining, such as progressively increasing the number of cabinet posts when additional parties were brought into the government, which served to decrease the office-related costs of building oversized coalitions. The cross-national analysis further highlights the importance of party and party-system characteristics in determining the costs of making and breaking coalitions, and further reveals that institutional rules (such as the investiture requirement) have a significant role to play as well.

Mershon's justification of her two-sided empirical approach, and then her careful execution of it, are the real gems of the book. The in-depth study of the inner workings of coalition bargaining in Italy, as she points out, provides special leverage for understanding the causal mechanisms behind the combination of government instability and stability—namely, the purposive actions of politicians in their pursuit of cost-reduction strategies. In contrast, cross-national statistical analysis, while less useful than case studies in ferreting out causal mechanisms, provides much greater leverage in assessing the impact of different patterns of party competition and alternative institutional arrangements on coalition bargaining. Too often, students in comparative politics choose one or the other of these approaches in their empirical work, rarely both. While Mershon is hardly the first scholar to employ this dual design, she does provide one of the more thorough (and lively) explanations of its virtues. Given this, as well as her careful attention to theoretical concerns throughout the text, this book would make an excellent choice for general graduate-level seminars in comparative politics and comparative methodology.

Whether the findings from *The Costs of Coalition* eventually translate into dramatically different theoretical predictions and empirical findings in the literature on government formation, portfolio allocation, government survival, and parliamentary politics remains an open question. Mershon does not provide much speculation on this point. Of course, a full analysis of coalition politics that incorporates the idea of variable and endogenous bargaining costs will probably take several more books and articles to complete. What becomes clear from her study is that such work needs to be done if we wish to continue toward developing a deeper understanding of coalition government in parliamentary democracies.

State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another. By Joel S. Migdal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 304p. $65.00 cloth, $23.00 paper.

— Dennis Galvan, *University of Oregon*

Joel Migdal's career, in some sense the subject of his newest volume, has centered on his fascination with the state, how it is simultaneously rooted in social processes yet has the power to build institutions, restructure relations, make meaning, and in so doing reconstitute society itself. From time to time in this book, Migdal cannot help but reveal his wonder, even awe, at that entity, so emblematic of modernity, uniquely able to "sequester . . . children for thirty hours or so a week in a state institution" and "garner from people's yearly earnings a share equivalent to all their work performed through April or May or, sometimes, even June" (p. 233).

This new volume is in effect a testament to what Lawrence Dodd, the scholar of the U.S. Congress, calls "intellectual passion": Migdal's elemental wonder integrates the otherwise potentially disparate chapters, animating the book's journey from the depths of modernization theory, through the various moments of "bringing the state back in," into Migdal's latest, Bourdieu-inspired notion of "mutual constitution and transformation" of state and society. The various chapters, each a review of sorts, hang together and form a coherent intellectual enterprise because they let us follow an inquisitive, open mind building an intellectual apparatus from a decades-long struggle to make deep sense of fundamental questions of authority, power, and participation.

From the outset, Migdal emphasizes that his main concern in this book is to present his

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state-in-society approach, a model of how state and society are locked in historical dynamics of mutual constitution and mutual transformation. Adapting sociologist Pierre Bourdieu's notions of field, habitus, and their mutual reproduction, several chapters (especially the first) reveal how social organizations influence, dominate, and sometimes constitute state authority, and how, at the same time, the state is a crucial player in the consolidation and reformulation of class structures, civil society institutions, and even cultural identity.

This idea of the "mutual becoming" of state and society stands theoretically betwixt, and seeks to subsume the structuralist traditions of, Migdal's own training, "newer" forms of institutional analysis, and, of course, agency-culture debates. This is best exemplified in Chapter 5, when he reviews literature on the law, public rituals, and informal behavior in the public sphere in order to argue that these are specific institutional sites where the "idea of the state" gains social naturalization, resulting in both state consolidation and the transformation of society and culture.

State in Society is most effective in this mode: Looking back on his decades-long commitment to the topic, Migdal synthesizes a wide range of approaches and analyses of state–society relations as he seeks to supplant these with a new and comprehensive framework. Each chapter both reviews a major thread of the state–society literature and weaves it into the mutual constitution (state-in-society) framework that he articulates most clearly in Chapter 1 and the latter passages of Chapter 8 (pp. 250–62). Some chapters read more fully as reviews of antecedent literatures and influences that helped form the author's optic (Chapter 2, largely on Edward Shils; Chapter 6 on the linkage between individual and social change; Chapter 7 bringing in postmodernization theory emphases on corporatism, bureaucratic-authoritarianism, dependency, the developmental state, and institutionalism). In other chapters, he adds flesh to the state-in-society approach itself. This is most effective in his exploration of the "politics of survival" of authoritarian regimes (Chapter 3), comparative historical analysis of the social construction of the state in Western Europe (Chapter 4), and most creatively, the naturalization of state authority in specific institutional sites (Chapter 5, mentioned earlier).

This volume thus makes for an impressive review of state-centered and state–society literature in comparative political analysis, with a strong sense of the intellectual genealogy out of modernization theory and a useful clarification of the resulting family tree of approaches to state–society relations, from Samuel Huntington to historical institutionalism of the 1990s. As such, the book would easily anchor the "nature of the state" and "state–society relations" sections of an introductory graduate seminar on comparative politics, fruitfully read between Huntington's own *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968) and a more empirically rooted assessment of the state like James Scott's *Seeing Like a State* (1998).

But the volume's usefulness for review also suggests its two principal weaknesses. First, while the author's state-in-society synthesis is tantalizing (not least for its courage as one of the rare political science efforts to operationalize Bourdieu's notoriously opaque ideas), this volume tilts too far toward review of antecedent influences to fully explicate Migdal's proposed new approach. For example, he captures, via Suzanne Berger, the historical and cultural embeddedness of state formation in Western Europe (pp. 204–5), yet does not extend this logic to the developing world, as do Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum (*Sociology of the State,* 1983), to argue, as Migdal's own framework would suggest, that postcolonial political crises result from the disarticulation of imported state structures from local social organizations and systems of meaning.

Second, the review and synthesis in most chapters take us through the mid-1980s, occasionally as far as literature of the 1990s. Sometimes this leaves the reader with a sense that further engagement with more recent work (from Scott to Robert Bates et al., in *Analytic Narratives,* 1998) might have enriched and altered Migdal's proposed syntheses. Sometimes, important empirical developments are noticeably absent: Given the historic stability of twentieth-century state structures, one could argue that theory building depends on close analysis of empirical variation, especially the moments, rare in 1990 but more commonplace by 2000, of state collapse (ex–Soviet Union), fragmentation (Somalia), implosion (Sierra Leone), divorce (Czech Republic), or possible obsolescence (European Union). These events and processes make cameo appearances in several chapters, but do not emerge as central empirical puzzles to challenge and refine theory.

But in this kind of work, by an author with Migdal's unusual perch and perspective, reservations are minor quibbles. What we are getting in *State in Society* is a rare opportunity to see the development of a major subtheme in comparative politics through the eyes of a key architect of that theme. No other recent work on state–society relations offers the reader such a comprehensive vision of the intellectual history of the topic, and few offer a synthetic framework as potentially influential for future research as Migdal's notion of the mutual constitution of state and society.

Shifting States in Global Markets: Subnational Industrial Policy in Contemporary Brazil and Spain. By Alfred P. Montero. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002. 253p. $45.00.

— Kathleen C. Schwartzman, *University of Arizona*

Nations encounter many quagmires as they undertake the dual transitions of democratization and economic restructuring. Alfred Montero's book analyzes how two states (one in Brazil and one in Spain) successfully met those challenges.

The author persuasively refutes several claims that have appeared in the literature. He refutes the claim that globalization prevents nations from fashioning their own industrial policies. He shows that under some circumstances, nations and states (subnational units) have important roles in promoting industrial development, higher productivity, and technological innovation. He demonstrates the folly in asserting that government intervention is always detrimental to economic growth; in fact, he documents the absolute necessity of a certain type of government intervention. His study also demonstrates the inaccuracy of concluding that only autonomous states are successful. And he shows that by itself, the devolution of powers to subnational units cannot guarantee good government.

Montero's research design incorporates two positive cases (Minas Gerais and Asturias, states which promoted synergy), several negative cases (Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo in Brazil and Andalusia and Madrid in Spain, and briefly, Mexico). The pairing of Brazil and Spain allows the author to control for some factors and examine the variation in others. On the one hand, both undertook the "dual transition," replacing their authoritarian regimes with democratic ones, and restructuring economic policymaking from state-centered to decentralized. On the other hand, Spain received an infusion of European Union capital while Brazil experienced an economic and debt crisis. Nevertheless, such national-level processes are insufficient for explaining the variation in subnational policies and successes.

Shifting States in Global Markets is informed by the development and institutions literature. Montero elaborates the notion of embeddedness (linkages between firms and governmental agencies) made social science friendly by Peter Evans. Montero's main conclusion is that when

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subnational governments encourage cooperation between public agencies and firms, synergy blossoms. Synergy—the ability of subnational governments to generate policy networks that are embedded, horizontally with multiple state-level agencies, and vertically with businesses or clients—is good for economic development because it reduces transaction costs, lessens uncertainty, and leads to an industrial policy of enhanced productivity and growth. Embedded public agencies in Minas Gerais facilitated the expansion of auto parts and assembly firms, chemical industries, and small and medium enterprises. Likewise in Asturias, public agencies formed partnerships with business associations and unions to promote productivity-enhancing adjustments. The author provides abundant illustrations of "vertical and horizontal embeddedness" along with typologies of synergy.

Synergy is the centerpiece. This leads to two questions: 1) What are the conditions that create synergy? And 2) Is synergy positively associated with economic growth? On the first, Montero examines factors whose explanatory power is not supported by his data. Wealth does not produce synergy. The between-country difference (Spain with EU funding and Brazil with a debt crisis) cannot explain the within-country variance. All Spanish states did not have more synergy, and some like Andalusia received more national funding than Asturias, yet the latter developed more. The author shows how elite conflict and/or unresolved conflict with unions are obstacles to embeddedness/synergy. Instead, they foster a populist/clientelistic model, in which the major parties will eschew delegation of authority and allocate resources along populist lines to guarantee their electoral survival (such as happened in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo).

Montero is more silent on the consequences of synergy. There are no bivariate tables that show that states with embeddedness/synergy are more economically successful than others. He offers anecdotal accounts of success. In Minas Gerais, the state wooed Fiat, got auto parts firms to move to Minas, and in the 1980s during restructuring, wooed other firms away from the state of Sao Paulo. Finally, they got Mercedes to build its new facility in Minas. The successful cases seem successful, but how much more so, and was it due to synergy?

Montero offers excellent descriptions of synergy and embeddedness. Chapter 2 is a nice portrait of the dual transitions as experienced by Brazil and Spain, and it provides an excellent context to two cases. I enjoyed most the chapters on Brazil, perhaps because I already have some familiarity with the case. However, I wonder if what is fascinating for a moderately informed reader wouldn't be tedious for others. It is a great challenge (often failed at the dissertation level) to package case studies to keep their idiographic richness and simultaneously allow the reader to follow the inductive process of the author. The introductory theoretical assertions roar like a lion but the conclusions seem weak. And I don't think Montero answered the two questions.

Certainly a theoretical approach that focuses on institutional forms would make synergy the centerpiece. Nevertheless, there is evidence for alternative models. For example, in Montero's description of Minas, he writes that state-led development was reinforced by the weakness of entrepreneurs who had been linked to agriculture. Labor was also weakened; it lacked the immigrant experience that propelled worker movements in Sao Paulo. In short, Minas had a legacy of a traditional elite with control over its working class. If we want to understand the causes of synergy, perhaps we have to understand the historical conditions that gave rise to a lack of elite conflict and the powerlessness of the working classes.

The author affirms that participation of a nonautonomous state is absolutely necessary for development. Now is that not curious? All that past literature (Marx, Gramsci, Poulantzas, Mills, Domhoff, etc.) describing how the state was "captured" by capital was dissolved into the solution of the "state autonomy" literature. It has now been reconstituted in the form of "embeddedness." Yet in this reconstitution, capital "intervenes" in the state without any motivation or initiative. Further, that earlier scholarship on the state–capital relationship was attentive to a problem identified by Marx, namely, that capitalists were inherently divided (by short-versus long-term interests, by destructive competition, and by different sectoral interests, to name a few), and therefore they had to be organized into a coherent and self-conscious class. Curiously, embeddedness and synergy appear as a "theoretically sanitized" way to create this class. Unfortunately, because the embeddedness discussion focuses on institutional forms, we miss the opportunity to understand those social forces that drive its emergence and influence its consequences.

Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. By Pippa Norris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 304p. $65.00 cloth, $23.00 paper.

— David S. Meyer, *University of California, Irvine*

Like tales of democracy, the myth of the Phoenix is recounted in different ways. There are, however, common elements: Only one Phoenix lives at a time; it perishes in flames; and it resurrects itself in exactly the same form. Pippa Norris's Phoenix of political activism is, of course, more complicated: Different varieties flourish in different contexts and, as it emerges from the ashes, activism reconstructs itself in very different ways. Norris is unusually attentive to the broad range of political participation that might enliven democracies, and exceptionally ambitious in considering these forms in an extraordinarily broad range of settings. Essentially, she considers every country for which there is data—nearly two hundred for some issues.

Of course, political participation plays an essential role in any democracy, although citizens and political theorists alike differ on whether democratic legitimacy and stability rest on engaged participation or on a somewhat less engaged consent. Like the Phoenix, there is a great deal of scholarly myth surrounding political participation, stories that circulate around data but are based more on belief. Thus, we can read about wholesale increases in participation following from modernization, or secular declines based on fatigue, alienation, the atrophy of civil society—the result of, uh, modernization; we hear about declines in voting along with increases in protest participation—at least some forms of protest. And we read, hear, and watch discussions about the decline and/or reconstruction of civil society. Rather than advance another metatheory of political participation, Norris rigorously examines the data that would speak to any of them. Her findings suggest less a Phoenix than a broad and diverse aviary of birds flitting in a number of different directions. If this news undermines broad global theories, it nonetheless paints a fuller picture of political participation than we have yet seen, one that will inspire and enliven a great deal of subsequent research.

Norris frames *Democratic Phoenix* as an examination of global trends in political activism, defined broadly to include the range of political behavior from voting to institutional political participation to various forms of political protest. She considers, in turn, the effects of the structure of political institutions, the nature and resources of mobilizing agents (including political parties), the vitality of civic life, and the technologies of mobilization, offering a window into change over time over the past half century or so, with particular focus on the last 30 years. In addition to mapping broad trends, she is attentive to how these contextual factors influence who participates and how. By design, she offers a synthetic approach to understanding the differential

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effects of institutional contexts in which participation takes place, the nature of mobilizing structures and efforts to engage and activate publics, and the individual-level factors that affect the propensity to respond to such appeals. Everything matters.

Norris first leads the reader through a schematic view of the debate about the observed decline in some kinds of political participation, mostly focused on voter turnout and civic engagement. Without taking a position on the consequences of such a decline, she examines the premises on which it is based, first through voter turnout and conventional political participation, then through participation in parties and civic organizations, and finally through social movements.

At the risk of oversimplifying a range of countervailing trends, the summary findings are provocative and pose important questions for scholars interested in a broad range of political behaviors, as well as democracy more generally. On electoral participation: the decline in voter turnout over the past half century, observed in some countries, has been overstated and counterbalanced by dramatic increases in participation in other countries. Political institutions and rules designed to encourage participation work; institutional rules that maximize the influence of one vote, particularly proportional representation, increase the likelihood of high turnout. (Governments that actually want to increase participation can do so!)

On mobilizing agencies: organizations, particularly political parties, are important in generating and directing political activism, but the patterns of membership, mobilization, and participation vary tremendously around the world, affected by national institutions, economic development, and culture. It is interesting to note that party membership is higher in countries with more limited access to television; party membership has declined in wealthier, more wired, countries, where candidates have other means for accessing supporters and voters.

On social capital, the holy grail for students of participation in the last decade or so: a composite measure explains less than Tocquevillians and Putnamites would suggest, at least when comprised of trust and associational ties, although social trust seems to correlate with participation. At the same time, participation in religious organizations and trade unions does correlate with other kinds of social and political engagements, and the decline of both religious belief and organized labor in wealthier countries could explain, and perhaps foreshadow, some decline in participation.

On the new social movement society: participation in social movements and in nonconventional political activity, including petitions, boycotts, and protest demonstrations, has increased globally over the past 20 years, as has tolerance of extrainstitutional politics. For the most part, protest politics comes as an addition to more conventional means of participation, rather than as an alternative. And protestors increasingly come from the ranks of the well educated and at least moderately well heeled, in other words, those who would be expected to be able to exercise influence through more conventional means of participation.

That protest is no longer the province of the politically excluded, and that the mobilizing agents of protest are generally ad hoc issue-based coalitions, rather than more permanent civic institutions expressly concerned with class or morality, raises critical questions for the content, as well as the process, of democracy. Norris's investigation provides a foundation for subsequent research on such issues, and inspires us to figure out what kind of bird will emerge from this one's ashes. Important books generally find a place on the shelves in a scholar's office; Pippa Norris's comprehensive empirical examination of political participation is more likely to end up on the desktop, dog-eared from use.

Inklings of Democracy in China. By Suzanne Ogden. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. 425p. $49.50 cloth, $19.95 paper.

— Ralph A. Thaxton, Jr., *Brandeis University*

Building on Western social science giants who have crafted various theories of democracy, Suzanne Ogden has written a powerful book about China's democratic prospects. Penned with a thoughtful, imaginative stroke, this work is a must-read for all students of democracy.

In the opening chapter, Ogden argues that Western constructs of democracy often underplay the processes of war, conquest, appropriation, and domination that enabled liberal-democratic systems to achieve power and hegemony. She contends that although the Chinese would prefer democracy, their historical experience has made them cherish basic family security and fairness as much as, if not more than, the French democratic tradition of equality or the Anglo-Saxon understanding of democracy as freedom. Moreover, China's political leaders and its citizens have reason to be skeptical of imported notions of democracy, for in the twentieth century two different regimes, those of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, promoted democratic experiments that ended in brutal dictatorships and disaster for millions of Chinese. Ogden contends that this "experiential historical knowledge" (p. 26) makes rulers and ruled think twice about Western democratic virtues, which they nevertheless take seriously.

Chapters 2 and 3 examine why liberal democracy failed to take root in China, emphasizing a traditional Chinese political culture in which the institutional and philosophical foundations for individual rights are weak. The author's discussion extends from the Confucian period, during which China developed an elaborate system of hierarchically structured sacrifice and governance, to the May Fourth Movement of 1919, in which the thinkers and activists turned away from liberal democracy, focusing on socialism and the recovery of a strong welfare state.

Chapter 4 provides an interesting argument on why China might gradually move toward a democracy with its own native characteristics. Finding that China still has many of the key elements of an authoritarian political culture, Ogden notes that a host of variables, including the Chinese elite's memory of the costs of collectivization, the Communist Party's commitment to democratic reform, the deconstruction of the old command economy, education efforts, the rise of a middle class, and political and legal reforms, make for "inklings of democracy," that is, a protodemocracy that coexists with and chips away at the antidemocratic authoritarian culture of the past.

Chapter 5 focuses on the growth of individual rights and imagined democratic community. Drawing on Amartya Sen, Ogden argues that the Chinese government, even in the Maoist era, made strides in helping people achieve certain basic capabilities, including peace, education, medical care, marriage and divorce, work, and housing, many of which had been fragile in the precommunist era. Ogden reflects on the development of new freedoms, including greater freedom of speech and expanded access to information, such as Internet cafes, publications, television, radio, and films, all of which has been accepted, if not endorsed, by the Communist Party–led state. She finds that China's government reformers are committed to the steady expansion of such rights, even in light of an antirural bias and in the aftermath of the Tiananmen troubles and the suppression of the early l990s.

Chapter 6, the pathbreaking chapter, covers the institutionalization of procedural democracy. Its findings are striking. Ogden shows that the coming of village elections and self-governance was in part a response to a violent popular attack on local Communist Party leaders after the collective era, and that the reformers at the center supported rural elections and democratization as a means of "bringing better leadership to rural areas" (p. 185). To her

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credit, she understands that this crisis was acute at the township level, whose leaders "lack legitimacy in the eyes of country people" (p. 187). While the institutionalization of democratic elections and voting is uneven, and the rural areas still face problems of party interference, Ogden shows that China has made great strides in fostering democratic elections.

But the process of democratization is complex and fraught with danger. For one thing, villagers have used violence against unpopular, abusive, and corrupt party cadres; this has made some potential candidates for elected village leadership positions think twice about running, while, ironically, the central government Ministry of Civil Affairs pushes harder for institutionalization as a way of defusing rebellion in the countryside. For the most part, local leaders seem opposed to the institutionalization of village elections, and attempt to monopolize the administration of elections to preserve their power—a serious problem now being discussed by top-level reformers. According to Ogden, the problem is that the Ministry of Civil Affairs is apparently one of the weaker administrative organs of the central government, so that a host of other forces work to counter its ability to initiate and institutionalize elections at all levels. But the struggle goes on, and is part of the dynamic of China's democratic prospects. That is, China is not a dictatorship pure and simple: There is contention within the state, as well as protest from society, over the pace and progress of democracy. The author also musters evidence to show that in some important respects there is more support for democracy in the countryside, an area with which observers are less familiar, than in the cities.

The chapter on China's developing civil society (Chapter 7) offers an interesting hypothesis—not the growth of relatively autonomous associations, the coming of the global market, the development of a multiparty system, nor a strong middle class can guarantee democratic success. Ogden finds a boom of associations and interest groups under the reform government, but she also shows that many of these groups are tethered to the state in both symbolic and practical ways. Whether China has a strong civil society remains to be seen.

Chapter 8 stresses the clientelist relationship between intellectuals and the state, arguing that most intellectuals are part of a state-educated elite, leading them to serve the state and themselves. Yet intellectual criticism of party policies and practices thrives. Scholars and thinkers are recapturing the tradition of loyal, honest intellectual advice and dissent that was lost to Mao's savagery. Yet the intellectuals are not the agents of democratic contention, which is limited by and large to marginalized rural people and religious associations and movements. What would drive intellectuals back to the countryside to align with these more contentious folks? Ogden does not get into this issue, but apparently the party's fear of such a possibility is one among many reasons that it has moved to soft authoritarianism vis-à-vis intellectuals.

The work concludes with two propositions: One is that China is moving at a good, rapid pace toward democratization, so that a democratic breakthrough under the leadership of a reform-led center is possible. The other is that despite the catastrophic consequences of the Great Leap Forward, the overall course of development in China under *both* revolution and reform has been more beneficial for ordinary people than that of post-1947 democratic India. Relying on the HPI (Human Poverty Index) ranking, the author finds that the People's Republic of China ranked higher than India on longevity, knowledge and literacy, and standards of living. Yet the gaps between rich and poor in China, addressed during the Mao era, have opened up again, so that a reform process that ignores the basic rights of the poor will surely court disaster. Striking in its range, conceptual clarity, and originality, *Inklings of Democracy* can be used for both China-centered and comparative politics classrooms.

Going Global: Unions and Globalization in the United States, Sweden, and Germany. By James A. Piazza. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2002. 186p. $65.00.

— Alan Draper, *St. Lawrence University*

Going Global examines whether unions are still viable in an increasingly footloose and integrated capitalist system of production. James Piazza asks whether the globalization of production will erode union bargaining power and thus the value of union membership across the West, from Milan to Manchester and from Detroit to Dresden.

Piazza's able review of the literature indicates that a race to the bottom has, in fact, not occurred. Some national union movements have been able to withstand the pressures of globalization better than others. Indeed, if anything, divergence in union density rates has actually increased among countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, even as trade and investment between them intensifies. Union density in countries where it was already low has declined, while it has increased in countries that previously enjoyed high union density rates. Analysts have traced these divergent outcomes to different institutional features. National union movements that engage in centralized bargaining and offer selective incentives, such as management of publicly funded unemployment insurance programs, fare better than those that do not.

But analysts who attribute different union outcomes to different institutional features looked only at national union membership rates. Piazza takes a different cut at the same question. Instead of looking at aggregate data, he examines changes in union density rates in the apparel and metalworking industries in three different settings, the United States, Germany, and Sweden, from 1965 to 1995. Using a pooled time-series regression analysis of changes in union density in two industries in three countries, Piazza tests the claims of those who believe that global economic pressures will produce union decline across the West and those who believe that such pressures are mediated by institutions to create different outcomes in different countries.

Piazza found that country-specific effects on union density rates for the apparel and metalworking industries were profound, confirming the significance of domestic institutions for union resilience. In the United States, which lacks the requisite institutional bulwarks, economic pressures resulting from globalization undermined unionism in both the apparel and auto industries. In Germany, the results were quite different. Globalization did not affect union density rates in either the apparel or metalworking industries. The most interesting results were for Sweden. Here, Piazza found that results prior to 1984—when Swedish collective bargaining institutions began to change fundamentally—resembled those in the United States. Neither decentralized bargaining in the United States nor centralized bargaining in Sweden provided much protection against the gales of globalization, albeit for different reasons. Only after 1984, when a dose of decentralization was injected into what employers viewed as Sweden's inflexible bargaining structure, was that country's results more similar to those found in Germany. Borrowing heavily upon the work of Kathleen Thelen, Piazza argues that Germany's domestic institutions get the mix right. Union-bargained sectoral agreements provide the rigidity to prevent whipsawing by employers, while works councils at the level of the firm provide the flexibility that permit workers to provide concessions to employers who need them. German institutions bend but do not break. Piazza's admiration for German collective-bargaining institutions may be well earned in terms of the strong defense they create against the pressures of globalization. But he fails to consider how those same institutions contribute

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to other problems, such as insiders versus outsiders, which beset the German labor market more than other countries.

Piazza's analysis is thorough, and he does not stray or venture far from the territory he has staked out. He is content to add his stone of sectoral analysis to the case for divergence. But he does not help himself, nor does the publisher help him, by the manner in which he goes about doing so. Some of the tables in the book do not correspond to the text explaining them. For example, "Germany," Piazza writes, "fits well between the United States and Sweden" (p. 55). But in the accompanying chart, Table 4.1, Germany is attributed higher union density rates, corporatism, and centralization of bargaining scores than the United States and Sweden, which for the latter is certainly wrong. In addition, the text is marred by numerous editorial errors that should have been caught in the editing and proofreading stages. Piazza can ill afford such distractions because the text proceeds with little pace and tends to be repetitive. Moreover, sentences that begin on one page sometimes continue on to the following page in a way that makes no sense. One has the suspicion that entire lines of text were expunged accidentally in the production process. Piazza may not have helped himself editorially but he deserves better from the publisher.

Going Global, which runs only 136 pages of text including notes, fulfills its small ambitions, if not always in the most elegant way. It adds to the case that institutions matter and that some national union movements are better positioned than others to meet the challenge of globalization.

Pattern and Repertoire in History. By Bertrand M. Roehner and Tony Syme. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. 432p. $45.00.

— James Mahoney, *Brown University*

Two or three decades ago, one might have decried the lack of methodological work in the field of comparative history, but this concern can no longer be seriously voiced. There is now a substantial body of literature on comparative-historical methods and a growing number of researchers in the field who have tried their hand at methodology. In this book, Bertrand M. Roehner and Tony Syme develop what they argue to be a new and powerful approach for comparative-historical analysis.

The authors call their approach "analytic history" in order to underscore its orientation toward both theoretical generalization and historical particularity. The approach embodies two main features. First, analytic history is concerned with discovering and describing major regularities across seemingly dissimilar events. As the authors put it, "The main objective of this book is to show that seemingly unrelated events in fact follow common patterns, so that behind an apparently chaotic collection of events there is in fact a hidden order" (p. 50). Second, analytic history seeks to break down complex phenomena into simpler phenomena called "modules," and to use these modules as the basis for comparison across cases. For example, rather than compare the French and Russian Revolutions as whole cases, the scholar using analytic history would compare the smaller modules that made up these revolutions, including particular events, such as mounting state debts and price increases for grain.

To illustrate the utility of this approach, Roehner and Syme offer empirically grounded chapters on the French Revolution, the American Revolution, general strikes, and wars for territorial expansion. The goal of these chapters is to uncover patterns and regularities in the modules that make up these macro phenomena.

Although Roehner and Syme present analytic history as a new method, their approach has strong roots in previously employed and discussed research strategies. Students of comparative history will recognize it as the methodology of the "natural historians" of the 1960s and 1970s. As in this research orientation, the authors seek to use comparative history for the purpose of developing concepts and illuminating modal patterns of event sequences that apply across different cases. Thus, for the case of the French Revolution, they show how its events follow a general pattern that can be found in other revolutionary situations. Likewise, their exploration of wars for territorial expansion highlights certain strategic regularities (e.g., common patterns of invasion and encroachment) and tactical regularities (e.g., providing generals with great freedom of action).

The approach advocated by Roehner and Syme has been abandoned by most comparative-historical analysts in favor of other enterprises, especially the effort to identify the specific causes of macro outcomes in small numbers of comparable cases. Like the authors, contemporary comparative-historical researchers are centrally concerned with systematically analyzing macro phenomena in light of concrete processes and events at different levels of aggregation that correspond to Roehner and Syme's "modules." However, the goal of comparative-historical analysis is to systematically use comparisons between and within cases to identify the causes of key outcomes. By contrast, the authors' project has an ambiguous stance toward causality, concerning itself primarily with describing recurrent patterns. Yet events such as revolutions or wars need not be descriptively similar in their underlying processes from one case to the next. This is true even if these events can be explained in light of a similar set of causal variables.

Pattern and Repertoire in History offers useful advice for scholars who seek to describe historical patterns. For example, some of Roehner and Syme's strategies for moving down levels of analysis from highly aggregated events to more concrete events can help researchers better structure their narratives. More generally, the attempt to locate "modules" is consistent with broader efforts by such scholars as Charles Tilly to identify robust "mechanisms" across different contexts. Empirically, the authors present factually rich analyses of a number of crucial events in world history that could stir further investigations.

Yet the book suffers from organizational problems, and some of its arguments are not clearly presented. A case in point concerns the more than one hundred different tables and figures that are presented. While some of these tables and figures are well constructed, they often appear without any corresponding discussion in the text, making it difficult to link them to the authors' argument. In the empirical chapters, the goal of the authors' narrative is not always clear. Many interesting facts about specific cases are presented, but the take-home message of the analysis does not necessarily emerge. This can be seen in the chapter summaries, which sometimes lack a key message.

Beyond presentational problems, I would call attention to two other shortcomings. First, the book omits some of the most important works in the field. For example, key contributions by David Collier, Charles Ragin, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers are ignored or discussed only very briefly. The consequence is that certain ideas in this book have been more carefully and systematically developed elsewhere. Second, the conceptual definitions and distinctions are often not clear. For example, the key concept of repertoire—found in the book's title—is never clearly defined. Likewise, the book does not provide well-developed distinctions between different kinds of analysis, such as problem-oriented approaches, case-oriented approaches, comparative history, comparative methodology, and historical sociology. This is problematic because these categories play an important role in *Pattern and Repertoire*'s characterization of particular authors' works.

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As debates about method continue to animate political science and sociology, it is likely that more scholars will choose to write about methodology. This is a welcome development, and these authors should be applauded for the specific ways in which they advance the discussion. At the same time, I ultimately find the book's presentational problems and lack of firm grounding in the most sophisticated literature on small-n methodology to be important shortcomings.

Capitalist Restructuring, Globalization and the Third Way: Lessons from the Swedish Model. By J. Magnus Ryner. New York: Routledge, 2002. 288p. $90.00.

— Tim Tilton, *Indiana University*

J. Magnus Ryner has written a compelling political history of Swedish social democracy from its ascent to power in the 1930s to the present. He places this history within a polemic against Anthony Giddens's proposal for a "third way" for European social democracy. Ryner's story describes a tragic fall from grace: From the thirties to the midseventies, the Swedish Social Democrats constructed a robust labor-oriented welfare state based on a distinctive economic theory. Then over a period of years its leadership succumbed to neoliberal interpretations of the emerging global economy. They diluted the principles of universalist welfare statism and of "de-commodification" (protection against the effects of markets) with neoliberal measures. In Sweden these neoliberal policies remained more "compensatory" (of social inequality and insecurity) than in other advanced industrial societies, but Ryner argues that even these accommodations to neoliberalism were unnecessary. The highly touted necessity of adjustment to an increasingly "postindustrial" and "global" capitalist world order was spurious. The Swedish model of the welfare state had developed a feasible alternative strategy based on the work of the labor union economists Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner. Sadly, the Social Democratic leadership rejected it, choosing instead to accept the increasingly prevalent neoliberal analysis of Sweden's economic difficulties. Ryner stresses that this choice was contingent, not necessary. This conclusion allows him to draw the moral of the story—"the continued latent potential of this legacy of the Swedish model for the European left" (pp. 186–87).

The author constructs a powerful and coherent argument. He begins by arguing that Giddens's critique of the welfare state may apply to "residual" welfare states, those that aim to compensate the casualties of a modern capitalist economy ex post facto, but it does not indict "integral" welfare states like the traditional Swedish model. Contrary to Giddens's claims, Ryner contends that Swedish social democracy did develop a "supply-side" model that promoted economic rationalization at the same time that it promoted redistribution. Much of the remainder of the book describes the elaboration of this model, its anchoring in policy, and the argument for its continued relevance. Ryner's richly supported argument largely follows the "power-mobilization thesis" advanced by Ulf Himmelstrand, Walter Korpi, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, and John Stephens. He weaves this account of a labor-based Social Democratic hegemony together with a lucid and admiring presentation of the work of Rehn, Meidner, and the labor union economists. Even those who have read widely in this area will appreciate the clarity and sophistication of the author's narrative.

Ryner does not limit his analysis to a purely domestic account of the Swedish case. He places the Swedish experience squarely in its international economic context, demonstrating how the Bretton Woods system permitted the Swedes to pursue distinctive policies. He describes the decline of this system and the transition to a neoliberal global capitalist framework, but denies that globalization ineluctably demands neoliberal domestic policies. This skillful situating of the Swedish economy within its changing international setting is one of the most original features of the book.

Ryner believes that the Social Democrats could have chosen to adopt a radical wage-earner funds proposal and implies that such a choice would have proven successful. He regards the deregulation of Swedish financial markets in the mid-1980s as a critical capitulation. He attributes this capitulation to the fact that the Ministry of Finance interpreted the inflationary crisis of the 1980s as a falsification of Keynesian ideas and that "neoclassical monetarism was for the Ministry of Finance the only available remedy to address the problem of inflation" (p. 185). This conclusion, though subtly and comprehensively assembled, is problematic. First, the Ministry of Finance was thoroughly familiar with the logic of Meidner's wage-earner funds plan; they rejected it not out of ignorance or a lack of courage but for two good reasons. They thought it lacked the broad popular support necessary for sweeping reforms, and (as Ryner notes) they felt pressured by the outflow of investment funds by Swedish business.

One can reasonably disagree about the leeway the Swedish Ministry of Finance had in the mideighties and still admire Ryner's effort to breathe new life into the radical version of the Swedish Social Democratic model. What one cannot dispute is the care and thoroughness of Ryner's argument. *Capitalist Restructuring, Globalization and the Third Way* is a brilliant illustration of the vitality of neo-Marxist social science, and its argument will be of interest to all students of political economy, not merely scholars interested in modern social democracy or Swedish politics. His methodological appendix constitutes a manifesto for a social science approach that is relatively rare in the United States, but eminently deserving of attention. The book is laden with a fair amount of jargon and is densely, even turgidly, written, but those who overcome the sloppy editing will be rewarded with a challenging and thought-provoking treatise. Readers skeptical of the ultimate conclusion (as this reviewer is) will nonetheless find a host of fascinating insights and interpretations to justify their efforts.

Linking Civil Society and the State: Urban Popular Movements, the Left, and Local Government in Peru, 1980–1992. By Gerd Schönwälder. University Park: Penn State University Press, 2002. 244p. $50.00.

— Moisés Arce, *Louisiana State University*

Recently scholars of democratization have become more interested in exploring the quality and substance of democracy across Latin America. By providing an in-depth case study of popular participation in local governments in Lima, Peru, Gerd Schönwälder's book makes an important contribution to this literature. The analysis takes us back to the decade of the 1980s, precisely the time when civilian rule was reestablished. At that time, the country was also crippled by protracted political and economic crises.

A central assumption of the book is that urban popular movements can become important agents of social change, either by democratizing other political actors or by making democratic practices at the local level more meaningful. The book thus seeks to specify the conditions under which this democratic potential is likely to bear fruit. More specifically, because popular movements lack organizational strength, it is necessary for these movements to establish ties with other actors, in particular political parties. However, the need for a minimum of organizational coherence provided by political parties or other sets of actors is not without cost. Such alliances can seriously challenge the autonomy of these popular movements, not least turning into old forms of political co-optation and

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clientelistic practices. As a consequence, the author advocates multiple and simultaneous alliances with various actors so that popular movements can maximize their access to resources, while preserving their collective identity and autonomy. Also critical are the presence of institutional openings for popular participation at the local level and a process of effective decentralization.

Chapters 1 and 2 lay out the theoretical framework for analyzing popular participation in local governments. After distinguishing urban popular movements from other forms of collective action, Chapter 1 probes the democratic potential of urban popular movements by emphasizing, among other things, their proximity to the population and their capacity to serve as bridges between the state and civil society. Chapter 1 also identifies leftist political parties as the most likely ally of popular movements because of their shared political objectives, such as greater democratization of public life, stronger emphasis in policymaking on the needs of the poor and economically disadvantaged, and administrative reform and devolution of powers away from the center (p. 48).

Thereafter, the empirical chapters, 4 through 6, explain how urban popular movements interacted with local governments, revealing their own weaknesses while at the same time underlining the barriers posed by the political, economic, and institutional environment in which they operate. Together, these chapters provide a telling discussion about the effects that different central administrations have had on local participation. During the 1980s, for instance, the Peruvian Left secured important electoral victories across low-income districts in Lima. But the unity of the Peruvian Left was rather fragile. As Chapter 4 documents, leaders of the Left wrestle with two competing strategies of governance. The so-called revolutionary approach, which was common in the early 1980s, predicated an antisystem stance and viewed local governments simply as platforms in its revolutionary project. In contrast, the radical-democratic approach that was present in the mid-1980s emphasized the capacity of the Left to govern and sought to provide space for greater popular participation. This rift within the Left grew larger over time, and by the end of the 1980s, the Left's unity had broken down. While the analysis focuses more on the interaction between leftist parties and urban popular movements, the book also examines political developments after the Left's electoral defeat in 1986. The author notes that when the center-left party APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) took control of local governments, it adopted a more clientelistic approach toward popular participation. Subsequently, Schönwälder suggests, the political opportunity structure present during the Fujimori years was less conducive to popular input given the government's centralist and anti-institutional bias. The Fujimori regime effectively derailed the regionalization drive initiated by the previous government.

The empirical chapters also suggest that local politics in Peru were and continue to be largely shaped by "bread and butter" issues. As Schönwälder writes, "urban popular movements are willing to throw their support behind actors that promise to tend to their concerns—or to withdraw it from those who do not deliver on their promises" (p. 183). These movements "were more concerned about tangible improvements in their dismal living conditions" (p. 181). On the whole, one of the most interesting findings that emerges from this study is a political landscape characterized not by the widespread dissolution of the Peruvian social fabric, but rather by the absence of effective intermediaries between the state and civil society, and in particular, political parties.

Before concluding, a couple of observations are warranted. First, Schönwälder notes correctly that a decree imposed by the Fujimori regime (known as D.L. 776) seriously damaged the financial autonomy of local governments and made them more dependent on central government transfers. While the decree was politically motivated, it undercut funding only for municipalities at the provincial level, which incidentally were and are administratively more capable to survive financially vis-à-vis other municipalities. In contrast, municipalities at the district level have been receiving greater funding than under the previous arrangement. Otherwise stated, the bottom tier of municipalities—the ones that have probably greater proximity to the population—are economically better off than in the past. In addition, in 2002 the government of Alejandro Toledo decentralized the national administration by creating regional governments, a process that as indicated above had been reversed by the Fujimori regime. Curiously, it was Toledo's left-leaning government that would provide greater spaces for political participation, only to be slaughtered at the polls. The radical-democratic approach outlined earlier also experienced a similar fate. Taken together, however, the increased funding for municipalities at the district level and the creation of regional governments appear to present a new political opportunity structure for the revitalization of urban popular movements, a theme that is central to Schönwälder's analysis.

Overall, *Linking Civil Society and the State* provides us with a well-articulated road map for studying popular participation at the local level. The ways in which democracy can become an effective mechanism for exercising political influence remain an ongoing task for future scholars, who can build on Schönwälder's empirical contributions.

The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela. By Kurt Weyland. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 336p. $39.50.

— Luigi Manzetti, *Southern Methodist University*

In this book, Kurt Weyland addresses a series of questions that have been at the core of the political economy debate with regard to market reforms throughout the past decade. Why did presidents in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela decide to enact harsh market reforms in the early 1990s that most had considered tantamount to political suicide in the 1980s? How can we explain why despite their harshness, such reforms met with strong popular support to the point of allowing Carlos Menem, Alberto Fujimori, and Fernando Henrique Cardoso to win a second consecutive term? Why then did Fernando Collor and Carlos Andrés Pérez fail miserably? Lastly, why did successful presidents become complacent and fail to carry out the institutional reforms necessary to strengthen the early economic success?

Weyland analyzes in painstaking fashion previous institutional, ideational, and rational choice explanations, and though valuable in many respects, he finds them incomplete. Thus, he proposes an alternative theory that not only complements previous findings but, according to the author, can appreciably improve our understanding of the events in a more comprehensive and sophisticated fashion. Drawing upon the works of psychologists, in what is generally labeled as prospect theory, Weyland's application to the politics of market reform is as stylistically simple as it is persuasive. It is not confined to the preferences just of policymakers but also to society at large and the ways in which people react to their politicians' initiatives. In this way, his theory is much more dynamic than institutional or ideational theories and overcomes the oversimplifications of rational choice.

In a nutshell, Weyland contends that when people perceive their situation as producing personal losses, they will be inclined to take unprecedented steps to overcome what is a helpless situation. Translated into politics,

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severe socioeconomic and political crises drive leaders into what they perceive as being the domain of unbearable losses and force them to take unprecedented risks typified by harsh measures. This is more likely to happen under new leaders than incumbents (or their handpicked successors), as the latter are tied down by a status quo bias. New leaders can actually manipulate the reforms to their advantage by using them to weaken the constituencies loyal to the opposition while sheltering their own. Under the same circumstances, citizens facing unprecedented losses are willing to go along with drastic reforms, endure tough times, and reward their leaders if market reforms work, at least in the medium term. Conversely, when leaders and people alike are in a more or less comfortable situation (the socioeconomic crisis may be building up but not in dramatic fashion) and an alteration of the status quo may create possible losses, they tend to be risk-averse and avoid meaningful change. Lastly, if reforms succeed in promoting macroeconomic stability, and if their benefits affect many sectors of society, leaders and important sectors of society may become risk-averse as the initial achievements bring them back to the domain of gains. Thus, ironically, early success may impede further progress on the road to reform because the continuation of a market reform program demands sacrifices that produce potential new losses.

To test his theory Weyland uses multiple indicators, from public opinion polls to economic data and a wealth of personal interviews with key policymakers, as well as pundits. Methodologically, the study employs a most-similar-system-design approach focusing on Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela.

The empirical analysis lends support to Weyland's predictions. Menem and Fujimori were able to push through draconian programs with substantial popular support in Argentina and Peru, respectively, precisely because the old import substitution development model had caused long periods of stagnation. Both the political leadership and the bulk of the population at that point judged the rampant hyperinflation as tearing apart the fabric of society. Within this context, the hyperinflation bouts in both countries were instrumental in inducing a risk-taking attitude. Eventually, the reform effort succeeded in defeating inflation and was instrumental in the reelection of both presidents. This was possible because, at that point, people saw their confirmation into power as safeguarding the economic accomplishments of the initial reform effort. Yet it was precisely this early success that turned Menem and Fujimori to a risk-averse approach during their second terms, which would explain why the second wave of economic and institutional reforms failed to materialize. By contrast, Brazil and Venezuela faced less dire situations. Inflation built up slowly, convincing politicians and citizens alike that harsh reforms were too risky. Some of the boldest reforms in Brazil took place indeed during the 1993–94 period when economic instability was most acute and put people in the domain of economic losses. However, once the Real Plan succeeded beyond anyone's expectations in defeating inflationary expectations, market reforms proceeded in an uneven fashion as risk aversion solidified again. In Venezuela, Pérez confronted a public hostile to his market reforms since people perceived his reform agenda as bringing losses, not solving problems. Rafael Caldera's own effort was short-lived as well, as the increase in oil prices in 1996 took away the sense of urgency, bringing politicians and citizens alike into the domain of gains, which hampered any meaningful reform.

Some country specialists may have problems with several of Weyland's interpretations of the facts and the strength of his evidence, depending on the country. As for rational choice scholars, they may find his psychological approach as not being rigorous enough. Lastly, some methodologists may contend that the most-similar-system design used in the analysis limits the potential generalization of the whole argument. Notwithstanding these possible contentions, I find Weyland's theory very persuading. *The Politics of Market Reforms in Fragile Democracies* stands out as being by far the most comprehensive and theoretically insightful work on market reform to date. It is an example of first-class scholarship in breadth and scope. It challenges existing theories and provides a brilliant explanation that in many ways is able to integrate previous findings in a simple yet parsimonious way. This book will be a point of departure for anyone who is interested in market reforms in the years to come.

High-Intensity Participation: The Dynamics of Party Activism in Britain. By Paul F. Whiteley and Patrick Seyd. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. 264p. $57.50.

— Iain McLean, *Nuffield College, Oxford University*

This is an important book, but in some ways a disappointing one. The authors have gathered three sets of survey data that are unique to their kind. They have analyzed them in extremely useful ways, but they have done some things they ought not to have done and omitted some things they ought to have done.

The data come from three surveys of members of the two main British parties. Labour Party members were surveyed in two panels covering 1989–92 and 1997–99, Conservative Party members in a panel covering 1992 to 1994. The earlier panels have already been reported in a book on each party, namely Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley, *Labour's Grass Roots* (1992); and Whiteley, Seyd, and J. Richardson, *True Blues: the Politics of Conservative Party Membership* (1994). Those books are well-established monographs. The authors quote Clare Short, a Labour frontbencher and now cabinet minister, as telling party colleagues in 1992: "There is an important new book that I hope many comrades have looked at, by Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley, which . . . shows very clearly that where we have a strong and active local party, we do better electorally" (p. 122). Connoisseurs will love that "comrades." New Labour seems light years away, 10 years on. The new panel covers the first two years of New Labour in government. So the added value of this book over the previous two should lie in the analysis of the new (New) Labour panel, and in the comparative analysis of all three.

The previous work showed that both big parties had withering grass roots. Membership was in long-term decline, and the mean age of Conservative members was in the 60s. Spurred partly by those books themselves, both parties, especially Labour, renewed their recruitment efforts. For a time, Labour was highly successful, although its membership is now on the slide again. The second panel enables the authors to test for differences between old Labour and new (those who joined the party before the recruiting drive and after), and between exiters (15%) and loyalists (85%) in 1999. New members were more likely than old to say that they joined "to show my support for Labour" (oddly coded as instrumental—surely it is expressive) and much less likely than old to say "to make a commitment to socialism." However, the differences between the groups are not huge. The model for exit shows that the predictors are negative scores on "process incentives" (being in the party helps you to meet fun people), on expressive attachment, and on performance of the party. Performance of the leadership was not significant.

By their title, the authors show that they have focused on the right research question. *Why does anybody bother?* Party membership is costly and not a lot of fun except to those who like canvassing and party meetings (those jolly process incentives again). To win elections, a party has to capture the heart and mind of the median voter, who may be, and probably is, in

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a very different place than the median party member. Therefore, party members will always and everywhere tend to be disappointed by the instrumental returns from joining, unless they join for the spoils (unlikely in a modern mass party outside Doncaster). It follows that the action must lie with the expressive benefits. Why do fewer people than in the 1950s contribute to show their solidarity with Labour or the Conservatives? And why do fewer people show their solidarity with a political party than with the National Trust or with the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB)? Those are likewise bodies that it is costly to join and from which the member gets few material benefits. People join because they love castles or birds.

An easy answer might be that socialism and conservatism are not so lovable as castles or birds. But the research design means that the authors cannot answer their core question adequately. For they *have selected on the dependent variable*. You cannot find out how people who join differ from those who do not if you interrogate only the former. True, they can compare those who leave with those who stay, but that is a lopsided comparison within a single panel. A better research design would compare those who were members with those who were supporters but not members of the same party. The instrument for this comparison exists, in the national British Election Survey (BES). The authors have a chapter on BES data. But instead of using it for their research question, they ask the apparently unrelated question, "What predicts a Conservative (respectively, a Labour) vote?" Hundreds of other people have asked that question. Far fewer have systematically compared members with supporter nonmembers. Whiteley and Seyd have missed an opportunity here. Alternatively, they could have compared members (and nonmembers) of the parties with members (and nonmembers) of more successful nongovernmental organizations.

High-Intensity Participation comes at a crucial and painful time for the British parties. Until recently, the fact that they had nothing to offer most of their members beyond the warm glow of satisfaction did not matter to them. As they canvass by e-mail and phone nowadays, they no longer need the troops on the street. They used not to need their members' money either, because they were bankrolled by would-be suppliers of the factors of production—of labour to Labour, and of capital to the Conservatives. But after a series of (minor, compared to most democracies) funding scandals, the parties have made rules that cut themselves off from big money. Therefore, they do after all need their members' money. So they are like less-successful versions of the RSPB. Their task is to turn themselves into more successful membership charities. This book contains some of the keys to that door. But a differently designed study could have shown much more.

Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages. By David Zweig. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002. 320p. $45.00 cloth, $22.50 paper.

— Margaret M. Pearson, *University of Maryland, College Park*

David Zweig's book is a fascinating empirical and theoretically informed effort to understand the forces and detailed processes driving China's "internationalization" across multiple dimensions. The vast majority of books written on this topic focus on economic internationalization narrowly defined, and then concentrate on a small number of economic sectors, rural *or* urban. In contrast, Zweig's analysis covers both rural and urban economic industrialization, plus two noneconomic forms of internationalization: distribution of foreign aid and overseas educational exchanges at the university level. This is an ambitious undertaking, and it is largely successful.

The book has two major strengths. The first, as already suggested, is the empirical contribution of the well-researched and thoughtful case studies. Zweig shows the nitty-gritty processes of how international influences came into China and, working through domestic institutions and actors, became diffused in ways that have fundamentally changed the country. The chapters on urban and rural industrialization (consistent with such work as Jean C. Oi's *Rural China Takes Off,* 1997) highlight the incredibly important role of local entrepreneurial officials, driven by desire for personal or community gain to grab the opportunities offered them by internationalization. The case chapters on educational exchanges (which are crucial to both the inflow of knowledge and outflow of talent) and the distribution of overseas governmental and nongovernmental aid are exceptionally enlightening. Zweig's work on these two topics might initially seem esoteric, but it is deeply valuable for reminding us to look further than exports and industrial efficiency when trying to understand the variegated nature of China's "opening." The focus on Canadian aid to China allows the author to reveal the local responses to internationalization more purely than if the topic was U.S. aid, analysis of which necessarily veers off into the sui generis security-focused, great-power dynamics of the Sino–U.S. relationship.

The second strength of the book is Zweig's attempt to push forward our theoretical understanding of the overall process of internationalization. Although most scholars writing about China's opening acknowledge that both exogenous and domestic factors are important for explaining internationalization, their works tend to focus on one or two variables—for example, exchange prices, foreign capital, policy cycles, domestic political conflict, or regional pressures. (Zweig's introduction provides a useful sketch of these competing approaches.) His research takes a substantial step forward in trying to weave together the broader picture, including the role of domestic and external pressures, as well as central and local forces within China. He does not produce an elegant argument, but when looked at carefully, it is convincing. He argues (p. 18) that the central state in China played an initial crucial role in shaping the impact of international forces—both by inviting them in and then using preferential geographic policies and other forms of distributive politics to channel the benefits of internationalization (e.g., designating which universities could pursue exchanges, channeling foreign aid through specified government counterpart agencies, etc.). The inflow of goods under a system of bureaucratic constraints and preferential policies (the author terms the pattern "segmented deregulation") created "a new political economy that reconstituted the incentives to which bureaucrats, local officials, ordinary citizens, enterprise managers, collectivities, and foreign investors responded" (p. 23). Rather than taking China immediately from autarky to liberalism, bureaucratic interests in extraction and rents led it to embrace a mercantilist (developmentalist) pattern. Only later, over the course of the 1980s, did China's internationalization begin to approximate a more liberal model.

Once international forces were admitted, they became the focus of bureaucratic competition between central and local officials, between localities, and between various other actors (such as university administrators and enterprise managers) who stood to gain or lose from international linkages. Massive, if uncoordinated, efforts to circumvent official channels in order to control international resources were made by entrepreneurs willing to go directly to the source of external benefits—such as to export markets themselves, foreign universities, and nongovernmental organizations. A key result was the strengthening of local state capacity. When local linkages with the outside outstripped what was intended by central policy, the central government often ended up in post hoc accommodation/rationalization of the

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system, but at a deeper level of international linkage. All this paints a picture of internationalization not as a neutral absorption of things from outside, but as a highly politicized competitive process mediated by policies, institutions, and structures of the central and local Chinese state.

A great strength of the analysis is that it suggests how the process of internationalization has evolved over time, with the central state initially being the key domestic player, followed by bureaucrats designated as conduits ("channels") of internationalization, and finally the actors on the ground who lobby for further opening once they experience the benefits. Zweig implies that at each stage, an equilibrium established between control of internationalization and benefits of it is broken by others wishing to get in on the act. One can hope that in the future, he will more precisely model this temporal dimension, showing what forces create and then break an unstable equilibrium at critical junctures, and why at one point and not another. In this sense, his analysis only further whets the desire for a formal understanding of the processes that have been unleashed in China, and application of this model to other countries.

Ultimately, moreover, a puzzle about the role of the central state remains. Zweig is convincing in his account of how internationalization strengthens and builds the capacity of local governments and other local actors, often at the expense of the center. Yet at the same time, he is careful to avoid bald claims that the central Chinese state is "weak" or has seriously declined in the way some "globalization" scholars might predict. Thus, he implicitly recognizes the puzzle: How are we to understand what remains a strong state, with continued mercantilist leanings, that is remaking itself in the face of internationalization, which it had a major part in initiating and shaping? Zweig's final chapter correctly points to the ongoing efforts by the Chinese government to rethink its regulatory capacity. This element of the story remains to be more fully explored.

Internationalizing China is exceptionally well researched, and is well written. It could use a list of abbreviations, as the acronyms occasionally get too thick to follow easily. Overall, however, it is well worth the time put into it.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features. Edited by Muthiah Alagappa. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003. 628p. $85.00 cloth, $34.95 paper.

— Raju G. C. Thomas, *Marquette University*

The collection of chapters by several authors in this book is the outcome of an ambitious project initiated and conducted in two phases between 1995 and 2001 by the contributing editor and director of the East-West Center, Muthiah Alagappa. The first phase produced a book in 1998 entitled *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences.* This long-term project is intended to explore Asian security in the context of the comparative strategic literature and the larger global security environment. Much of the conceptual framework and theoretical analysis in this volume, some 145 pages of it, are set out by the editor in his preface, his two introductory chapters on the "international order" and the "Asian security order," and his concluding chapter on "Managing Asian Security."

The book is rich in substance and analysis, interrelating strategic theory and the regional practice of Asian security. However, the subtitles of the earlier and current book, namely, "Material and Ideational Influences" and "Instrumental and Normative Features," reveal what the reader may expect—difficult reading in many parts, especially in the conceptual and theoretical sections. These incomprehensible subtitles were probably best dropped so as not to deter those uninitiated in the jargon from picking up the book where, in fact, most of the chapters are quite readable by the layperson.

While the preface acknowledges, by custom, the assistance provided by other scholars and the patience of family members, unusually it also incorporates some of the key a priori propositions that the subsequent chapters are expected to explore or test in some methodological manner. These propositions would have been better included in the introductory chapter lest they are missed by the reader. Except for the editor's first two chapters, not all the subsequent chapters make a conscious effort to substantiate or reject these predetermined propositions in the preface. They tend to do so randomly by default. The initial set of general propositions are as follows (pp. x–xii): 1) Contrary to the prevailing beliefs, "security order exists in Asia." 2) The security order in Asia "is largely instrumental in character but it also has normative-contractual features." 3) "Multiple pathways sustain the security order," namely, "hegemony, balance of power, concert, global and regional multilateral institutions, bilateralism and self-help." 4) "Security and stability in Asia rest on several pillars, not just the U.S. security role and forward military presence." 5) "The present security order is likely to persist for another decade or more."

These five propositions in the preface are more briefly contested and/or elucidated in the following chapter by the editor, namely, "Introduction: Predictability and Stability Despite Challenges." This approach is somewhat puzzling since the introductory propositions and the concluding assessments are both known in advance. Therefore, why are such innocent propositions put up front at all if we already know the conclusions? Additionally, there may be a temptation or a compulsion toward empirical selectivity in this approach to bring theory and reality in line, or to make the analysis more interesting than necessary.

Irrespective of such advance propositions, Alagappa's conceptual and theoretical exploration in the preface and first two introductory chapters are deep and expansive, although at times complex and involved. Part I of the book, "Conceptual Perspective," also includes a chapter by Chung-in Moon and Chaesung Chun entitled "Sovereignty: Dominance of the Westphalian Concept and Implications for Regional Security." This pertinent and incisive chapter sets out one of the fundamental differences in the security directions of Asia and Europe, namely, the insistence on the territorial integrity of the state in the former, and the total collapse of the traditional Westphalian order in the latter as Europe unites into a single state to avoid the conflicts of centuries past. Alagappa's concluding chapter, entitled "Managing Asian Security: Competition, Cooperation and Evolutionary Change," then makes some references to the intervening chapters written by the other participants in the project to substantiate or discount the initial set of propositions that he set out.

The chapters in between are divided into two parts: "Pathways to Order" and "Management of Specific Issues." In the first part (abbreviated titles follow) Michael Mastanduno discusses the "Incomplete Hegemony" of the United States in Asia; Avery Goldstein examines "Balance of Power Politics"; Amitav Acharya, "Regional Institutions"; Brian L. Job, "Track 2 Diplomacy"; Ming Wan, "Economic Interdependence"; and Rosemary Foot, "The UN System." In the second part, David Kang compares "Acute Conflicts in . . . Kashmir, Taiwan and Korea"; Jianwei Wang, "Territorial Disputes"; Jean-Marc F. Blanchard,

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"Maritime Issues"; Victor D. Cha, "Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense"; Arun R. Swamy and John Gershman, "Managing Internal Security"; and Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Human Security." There is considerable consistency in the analytical quality of these specialized contributions. In particular, Goldstein's analysis and application of balance of power theory to Asian security in Part II, Kang's well-researched study of three major perennial crises in Asia and Swamy and Gersham's comprehensive analysis of internal conflicts in Part III are especially instructive.

In sum, *Asian Security Order* encompasses a formidable and comprehensive array of the multifaceted issues of Asian security, making it a useful explanatory and reference work. The book is recommended for graduate-level courses in international and Asian security and for general international relations courses. It will be of considerable value to policymakers as well.

Human Rights and the Borders of Suffering: The Promotion of Human Rights in International Politics. By Anne M. Brown. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002. 288p. $74.95.

— Sonia Cardenas, *Trinity College, CT*

As the promotion of international human rights norms intensifies, it becomes increasingly important to assess the effectiveness of these efforts. *Human Rights and the Borders of Suffering* joins a burgeoning research program in this area. Adopting a critical perspective, Anne M. Brown questions the efficacy of conventional policy tools in this arena. She asserts provocatively that human rights pressure tends to be confrontational and patronizing, while human rights debates are often rooted in simplistic dichotomies (e.g., universalism versus relativism) that can do more harm than good. For Brown, attempts to promote human rights also exclude the powerless and overlook the structural sources of violence; and through their more sinister effects, existing approaches can even replicate patterns of abuse. In the end, the author offers most convincing evidence for the first of these effects, or the exclusionary dynamics of promoting human rights internationally.

In the opening theoretical chapters, Brown reviews dominant approaches to human rights issues in international relations, joining scholars who draw largely on political philosophy. Her starting point is Lockean social contract theory, which she criticizes rather predictably for differentiating too rigidly between the individual and the state and for excluding (or making invisible) certain categories of the "human." This, in turn, informs her assessment that contemporary notions of human rights are linked intimately to the international state system, a claim that she traces to ongoing debates about universalism versus relativism and the viability of an "Asian Way." According to Brown, today's international human rights goals are often "liberal in principle but realist in method," a contradiction that limits their effectiveness (p. 203). The theoretical discussion is not entirely new, but she does link typically disparate bodies of writing, and her emphasis on "suffering" for understanding human rights internationally is somewhat novel.

The second half of the book is devoted to three case studies: the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square, East Timor since the 1970s, and health issues among Australia's indigenous peoples. These far-flung case studies may appear unconventional, but the author's rationale for selecting them becomes more persuasive by the end of the book. Despite their apparent differences, these prominent Asian cases all illustrate how exclusionary politics have failed at least to some extent. As she concedes, moreover, these cases do not test systematically her argument; they are intended only to shed light on the book's central contentions.

Brown's argument builds constructively on dominant perspectives in the human rights field. She acknowledges that existing international measures are sometimes useful and even necessary, while offering a complementary course of action. Her proposal is to adopt inclusive, participatory, and communicative policies. And while the eventual effects of such a shift are uncertain, that is precisely Brown's point: International politics should emphasize open-ended human rights procedures over substantive certainty. This is not simply a principled argument, she contends, since excluding those who lack formal power from political participation can have deleterious practical consequences. She shows how this exclusion was evident in the tacit international consent given to Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Timor, just as it is in the ongoing dispossession of Australia's indigenous peoples.

True to the book's title, the theme of borders is pervasive and compelling. Brown questions above all the borders separating human rights concerns in international politics. For example, why did the massacre at Tiananmen Square evoke enormous moral outrage, compared to the seemingly mundane abuses committed against Australia's Aborigines? More specifically, why were Chinese student activists elevated to the status of heroes and martyrs despite the greater abuse of Chinese workers? Her answers to these questions hang on the concepts of identity and mythmaking, which structure to a large extent the book's case studies. Perhaps more conventionally, Brown calls for dismantling other borders that segregate the world into polarizing units: state and society, perpetrators and victims, good and evil.

Her critical and transformative efforts notwithstanding, the author stops short of developing one of her central claims: Existing human rights approaches obscure the structural and systemic causes of abuse. What are these structural and systemic causes, and how are they related to the promotion of international human rights norms? Brown takes to task existing approaches for not considering why human rights abuses occur in the first place—certainly an underappreciated insight in international human rights research—yet it is unclear how her own participatory approach follows logically from this crucial premise. How will an inclusionary politics overcome historically entrenched and institutionalized patterns of abuse? And how can the political roadblocks obstructing this new international approach to human rights be circumvented? Given Brown's focus on inclusiveness, moreover, it is surprising that she does not cite some highly relevant scholarship on international human rights issues (e.g., Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds., *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change,* 1999).

Generally, however, *Human Rights and the Borders of Suffering* should interest any student of human rights, especially those working within the framework of international relations and Asian politics. The book's greatest contributions to emerging research on international human rights are the use of political philosophy to critique dominant approaches, the call for inclusive and participatory international procedures, and a pragmatic appeal to broaden existing notions of human rights. Even scholars employing very different methodologies and theoretical paradigms will benefit from this book's powerful critique and intriguing argument about contemporary human rights.

Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture. By Mlada Bukovansky. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 255p. $39.50.

— David Armstrong, *University of Exeter*

This is a hugely ambitious book with several interrelated objectives. It aims, first, to examine the transformation in domestic and international notions of legitimacy in the late

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Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture. By Mlada Bukovansky. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. 255p. $39.50.

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This is a hugely ambitious book with several interrelated objectives. It aims, first, to examine the transformation in domestic and international notions of legitimacy in the late

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eighteenth century from a dynastic to a popular principle. To that extent, the book is located within the larger field of studies of legitimacy that was provoked, in large part, by Max Weber's famous typology. However, Mlada Bukovansky is not primarily concerned with further investigation of the idea of legitimacy as such, and she does not engage with several significant works on this subject (e.g., Rodney Barker, *Political Legitimacy and the State,* 1990; David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power,* 1991; Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis,* 1975; or Bogdan Denitch (ed.), *Legitimation of Regimes: International Frameworks for Analysis,* 1979). Rather, she seeks to conceptualize legitimacy in terms of what she describes as the "international political culture"—the shared ideas, assumptions, and practices about the constitutive and behavioral norms that relate to interstate relations.

The emphasis here is on ideas and discourse and their influence on events, a focus that enables the author to challenge neorealist, historical materialist, and liberal theories of international relations. This, broadly speaking, places her within the growing constructivist camp in IR, although her nuanced and sophisticated approach refuses to allow her to venture into the postmodernist far reaches of constructivism, where all is fluid and contingent (see pp. 57–59). Similarly, she is well aware of the many insights of the approaches she seeks to challenge and, indeed, is concerned throughout her case studies to show the interaction between what she terms "strategic" factors and political culture, as the following passage on Kenneth Waltz's emphasis on the distribution of capabilities demonstrates: "The relative distribution of capability is not always obvious; it requires analysis. If it requires analysis, then it requires discourse, and some common understandings about the nature and purposes of power. If discerning the distribution of capability requires discourse, then the calculation of that distribution is 'cultured'"(p. 19).

The theoretical chapters are packed with ideas, some of which are innovative and potentially of much wider significance. One example is Bukovansky's notion of a hegemonic international political culture in which "a specific mode of legitimating authority is dominant, shared by, and institutionalized within the major powers in the system" (p. 26). Another is her use of Margaret Archer's sociological theories to develop an understanding of the international political culture in terms of relationships of complementarity as well as contradiction. A third is her discussion of how domestic and international legitimacy are coconstituted but in a highly complex manner. Each of these suggests an entire research agenda, and it is a major achievement in itself to have been able to present so many diverse ideas in a coherent and well-integrated way.

Bukovansky's empirical chapters consider, in turn, the Old Regime political culture and the American and French revolutions. The French Revolution, in particular, has generated so many controversies among historians and political scientists that anyone seeking to use it to prove some broader analytical point needs to tread very warily, since it will always be possible to dispute the particular interpretation of the revolution being employed. Similar caveats are in order in respect of the American Revolution, where historians dispute the precise impact of the European Enlightenment on the revolution, the influence of the American experience on Europe, and indeed whether the war of independence may even be considered a true "revolution." To engage fully with all of these controversies would require a book at least twice as long as this, and Bukovansky's approach, essentially, is to indicate in the most important instances (e.g., the importance of ideology in the French revolutionary wars) precisely where alternative interpretations would challenge her thesis and why she is standing her ground.

Once again, it is a considerable achievement to have been able to weave together the countless historical and theoretical complexities of this period into a sustained, multilayered, and subtle argument about the nature and impact of political culture. Her aim throughout is to show that explanations that emphasize material factors like power or wealth are incomplete when they ignore the ways in which such motivations are formulated in cultural terms. For example, the balance-of-power games played incessantly by Old Regime Europe were shaped in part by many intangible factors, including the monarchs' need for prestige and glory and the highly mannered maneuverings of courtly politics, so that, in her words, "Monarchs and ministers engaged in cost-benefit calculations, but based on a different scale of values and system of rationality than we are familiar with today" (p. 76). Similarly, she demonstrates clearly how such attributes of the American outlook on the world as exceptionalism and nationalism are ideological constructs, not simply reflections of material interests.

Realists will probably remain unpersuaded by the author's insistence on the importance of ideas rather than material interests at key moments in the early years of the United States and in other contexts. Interests, they will argue, have always been rationalized by the use of acceptable and comprehensible symbols and slogans. Ultimately, there can be no final answer to this conundrum, but if *Legitimacy and Power Politics* helps to check the seemingly irresistible hegemonial progress of rational choice perspectives in American IR, it can be praised on that ground alone. In fact, its potential importance goes far beyond that, since legitimacy contests of the kind she describes so well are key elements in any fundamental transformation of the international system. Her own concluding pages, which link her analysis to the possible legitimacy crisis arising from globalization and American hyperpower, are particularly thought provoking in this regard.

The African Stakes of the Congo War.
Edited by John Frank Clark. New York: Palgrave, 2002. 304p. $55.00.

— Kisangani N. F. Emizet, *Kansas State University*

In August 1998, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) became the scene of what many commentators called "Africa's first world war." It is this conflict that the edited book by John Clark focuses on. Clark, who has written extensively on Africa, provides an excellent analysis that reveals the interconnectedness between national interests of the countries involved in the war and Congo politics. The book contains an introductory essay and 13 chapters. The introduction states that the contributors deal with three major theoretical issues that include the causes of the Congo war and international relations of Africa, the state-building process, and the nature of states in Africa. How well did the contributors fare in helping us understand these theoretical issues?

Chapter 2 by Crawford Young is an outstanding summary of conflicts in Africa and helps situate the Congo war in its historical context. Although state failure, which was caused by a prolonged economic crisis, emerges as a major cause of the Congo war, Kevin Dunn and Osita Afoaku also indicate that Laurent Kabila's erratic behavior, "lack of political skills," "inexperience" (p. 61), autocratic rule, and failure to take a principled stance on the Banyamulenge nationality question (p. 110) paved the way for conflict. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the virtual withdrawal of American support played a major role in the war as well. This withdrawal left a political vacuum that was filled by neighboring armies. The Congo's weakness and inability to prevent its neighbors' insurgents from having sanctuaries in its territory propelled foreign intervention in the Congo's politics. Thus, security-driven

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intervention remains paramount for Angola (Thomas Turner) and Rwanda (Timothy Longman), while the need to support an ally is behind the intervention of Uganda (John Clark) and Zimbabwe (Martin Rupiya).

The role of foreign intervention in the Congo's politics brings me to the second theoretical issue, state building. State building is the process of strengthening state economic strength, administrative capacity, and military power vis-à-vis society. Except probably for Angola, which has been able to secure oil rents to finance its security and maintain its patronage system, all the states intervening in the Congo seem to have incurred huge costs that have lessened their extractive, coercive, and incorporative capacities so critical for state building (see Chapters 6, 8 and 9). In Congo, Laurent Kabila totally compromised the state's sovereignty and the state-building process by relying on foreign armies and a restricted base of domestic support. In Chapter 12, Mungbalemwe Koyame and Clark demonstrate that the exploitation of Congo's resources has further undermined its extractive capacities and posed major obstacles for state building.

The third theoretical issue is the nature of the state in Africa and the increasing role of nonstate actors. As Young rightly puts it, "democratic weaponry" (p. 24) is becoming a challenge to the state itself. This is echoed by Augusta Muchai's chapter on arms proliferation. I agree with her view that the Lusaka Agreement represented the culmination of remarkable diplomatic efforts, but these efforts remained incomplete because they did not address the very pertinent issue of arms proliferation. Unless some type of arms control regime is established across African subregional groupings, state building will be compromised in many parts of Africa.

In Chapter 13, Jude Murison discusses the issue of some 330 thousand Congolese refugees and 2.34 million internally displaced peoples in 2001. She contends that the low international response to this crisis results from the fact that "those forced to move because of the war have remained within the DRC rather than move outside" and "the safety of their physical locality changes with the changing political nature of the war from which they are fleeing" (p. 233). I disagree with such blaming of the victim. First, it overlooks the fact that the closest countries for escape are those same countries that occupy the Congo, and this occupation has created resentment among Congolese (p. 110). Second, the argument is apologetic of Western bias toward Africa. Third, blaming the victim ignores Western responsibility, colonial and Cold War legacies (see Chapters 2 and 3) that created conditions conducive to such complex humanitarian emergencies in the first place.

Clark's overall assessment is that the war has inflicted costs to Congo's neighbors and southern Africa. Only an end to the fighting and a restoration of internal political order to Congo can provide any hope for the success of new development initiatives in the region, especially for South Africa (Chapter 10).

The book has, in fact, met its ambitious goal of explaining the Congo war and its impact on state building. The underlying assumption of the book is rooted in the realist tradition in which state power remains central. Accordingly, states involved in the Congo war seem to pursue power as a means of survival by using internal and external means to increase economic capability, to enhance military strength, to develop clever strategies, to strengthen one's alliance, and to weaken an opposing one. An important question for the future is whether these efforts will enhance state building at a time when criminal activities by nonstate players are increasing. This issue is critical in order to understand the third theoretical question, the nature of states in Africa. But the question remains unanswered. If we are to further our understanding of civil wars and the nature of states in Africa, then this theoretical question should be pursued with the utmost diligence.

On balance, the chapters are well integrated and complement each other. However, a piece on "Land Tenure and Demographic Pressure in Kivus" would have filled a missing link between Rwandan lateral pressure and the colonial legacy.

Overall, the book extends some of the empirical work on collapsed states in Africa that begins to make some theoretical generalizations. Another strength lies in its joining the current debate between "grievance and greed" by showing that the greed approach hardly explains the Congo war. Furthermore, individual chapters take very little for granted. They provide historical background before launching into detailed analysis of institutional issues. The book's reliance on historical accounts is both a strength and a weakness. Its strength is the abundance of detailed and rich new information. Its weakness is that several chapters tend to be descriptive rather than analytical.

My short review cannot adequately capture the nuanced historical analysis of the trends now shaping the Congo and many other African states. Thus, I strongly recommend *The African Stakes of the Congo War* to all readers because it is written in language that should appeal to academics as well as lay readers. Therefore, Clark's edited volume is a rich analysis and a worthwhile read for anyone interested in gaining a deeper understanding not only of Congo but also of the international politics of Africa in the post–Cold War period.

Political Space: Frontiers of Change in a Globalizing World. Edited by Yale H. Ferguson and R. J. Barry Jones. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. 296p. $71.50 cloth, $23.95 paper.

— M. J. Peterson, *University of Massachusetts, Amherst*

The editors seem of two minds in presenting this volume. They vigorously assert the superiority of analysis based on the concept of "political space" developed among geographers over a state-centric analysis of the contemporary "globalizing world" in prose suggesting the advent of a rival conceptualization (pp. 2–3), but they soon warn readers not to expect any uniformity of approach from the authors (p. 10). Openness to new ideas and readiness to diffuse them to others are intellectual virtues worth encouraging, but ambitions to replace a widely shared conceptualization with another one face the situation summed up in the political campaigners' tactical maxim "you can't defeat somebody with nobody." A conception as clearly crystallized as state centrism will be displaced only by an equally clear and comprehensible rival conception.

How far advocates of basing analysis on conceptions of political space are from having such a conception is demonstrated in the chapters. As developed in this volume, the concept of political space is partly an ideational (focusing on how people think of themselves and the relations of power in which they are engaged) and partly a physical (focusing on the different ways power relations can be extended over oceans and landmasses) composite. John Agnew, Ken Dark, Robert Latham, and Ronen Palan give more emphasis to the physical components, though differ considerably in the details of their definitions. (Agnew and Dark even offer rival categorizations of the types of polity that have existed in human history.) Richard Little and R. B. Barry Jones give more emphasis to the ideational components. Although the individual expositions are clear, together the chapters leave readers with a fuzzy impression of the concept. The fuzziness may stem simply from the stretching that results when a concept is transferred from one scholarly discipline to another and altered on the way in order to accommodate a different set of analytical concerns, but it does suggest that concepts

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borrowed from one academic discipline often need a good deal of trying out and refining before they can serve as viable challengers to previously elaborated concepts in another.

The chapters outlining ambitiously broad-scale ways of looking at the world are very mixed. Some leave little impression because they only lay out the high points of more extended arguments being developed or already presented in longer works. Saskia Sassen's chapter is a schematic diagram of her concepts; those desiring substantiation of claims have to await its more extended presentation. Dark's argument that the "information revolution" will trigger a massive reconfiguration of political space loses momentum because his presentations of the literatures on information processing in organization and complexity theory are so condensed that readers unfamiliar with either or both will be lost. Others are more rewarding. Agnew neatly summarizes his model of four distinct "spatialities of power" (pp. 118–19) and draws out some implications. Some readers may not like the teleological flavor of his chronological chart of the relative prevalence of different spatialities of power (p. 120), but they will understand and should take seriously his claim that failure to attend to the many ways power relations can be extended across geographical space, all advantaging some and disadvantaging others, seriously weakens analysis of the contemporary world. Palan makes a good case for the pervasiveness and multiple forms of market dependence on coherent political authority (pp. 216–18), while Barry Jones offers a nuanced conceptualization of tasks and forms of governance (pp. 232–37) on the way to a pessimistic view of the near future.

Readers willing to shift mental gears and consider the volume as offering conceptual tools rather than a rival to state-centric analyses will find many suggestive ideas. K. J. Holsti's review of the concept "change" usefully distinguishes between "markers of change" (events or developments that indicate change has occurred) and "kinds of change" (pp. 25 and 28). Much international relations scholarship would be clearer if others took up his suggestion that scholars specify what kind they mean when they say change, and his distinctions among additive, dialectic, transformation, and replacement (pp. 28–31) make a good start on the classification of kinds. Latham suggests that there are at least three modes of cross-border interaction—"convoking" (bringing together of delegates of states), "transmission" (conveying values, things, skills, or information from one network member to another), and "transterritorial deployment" (dispatching agents to take up residence and perform defined functions in another locale) (pp. 132–33). His attention to the wide variations in the tasks and impact of such deployments provides a fruitful way to tease out and understand the varying impacts outsiders have on societies. Mark Boyer suggests that we could improve our understanding of how and when multiple intergovernmental organizations will be mutually reinforcing or mutually debilitating by applying an extension of economists' "club theory" of public goods provision and analyzing them as "overlapping clubs," including at least some of the same members but pursuing distinct goals (pp. 251–57). James Rosenau reminds us that authority can take many forms (identifying five on pp. 271–75) in the course of suggesting how nongovernmental organizations acquire one or more of them and thereby strengthen their influence over political processes and outcomes. The core of Rey Koslowski and Antje Wiener's chapter brings the debates about "democratic deficits" toward earth by identifying some specific democratic practices (p. 285) and suggesting how they—and others—might be extended transnationally to private as well as public entities.

In sum, the volume as a whole does not offer a "political space"–based conception of world politics that will replace lingering state centrism, but the individual chapters provide conceptual tools useful to scholars of various theoretical persuasions seeking to better understand and explain contemporary developments and trends.

All International Politics Is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization. By Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. 280p. $47.50.

— Paul Huth, *University of Michigan*

This recent book represents an ambitious effort to convince international relations and comparative politics scholars that political behavior is heavily conditioned by the larger regional context within which states are located. As such, fundamental patterns of war and peace, democratic development, and political stability are shaped by regional relationships and strategic interactions.

The layout is as follows. In Chapter 1, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch argues that patterns of military conflict and democratic development cluster regionally and that primary causal influences on these political outcomes are to be found within regions as well. As a result, a regional perspective is critical to improving theoretical analysis and empirical testing. The author then introduces spatial statistics as a tool for empirically measuring and determining the extent of regional patterns and relationships. He then utilizes spatial statistics to demonstrate empirically that there is substantial evidence of regional clustering in terms of international conflict, trade relations, democracy, and regime change. In Chapter 2, the author reviews existing scholarly literatures, on international integration, the democratic peace, and the causes of democracy and regime change. In a thoughtful survey and critique of the theoretical literatures, he recasts existing arguments and hypotheses in regional terms. For example, the conflict behavior of individual states within regions should be strongly influenced by how many neighboring democratic states there are, or by patterns of regional trade. In Chapter 3, he carefully discusses the operational measures for the variables to be tested and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the data sets relied upon.

In the next three chapters (4–6), the author presents a series of statistical tests and, in the process, compares and contrasts his findings to important bodies of existing scholarship in order to clarify which findings are new and how they relate to existing debates. In Chapter 4, the analysis centers on the impact of democracy and democratization on war, while in Chapter 5, the author examines the importance of regional integration on conflict behavior. Finally, in Chapter 6, the empirical analysis concludes with tests on the causes of democracy and regime change.

Across these three chapters the author reports a number of interesting findings that highlight the importance of the regional context. For example, patterns of state involvement in war and conflict are influenced much more by the number of democratic neighbors than by how democratic individual states are. He also finds that democratization is only associated with increased civil war, but even that relationship is conditioned by the number of democratic neighbors in the region. Interestingly, he argues that bilateral trade relations have much weaker effects on conflict behavior than do regional trade relations. Finally, in an analysis of democracy and regime change, the author finds once again that the extent of democracy within the region is strongly associated with how democratic an individual state is. He also reports that transitions to democracy are unlikely to succeed unless most neighboring states are democratic as well. In the concluding chapter, he draws out the contributions of his regional perspective to existing scholarship, as well as some broad policy implications.

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There are several strengths to this book. On the theoretical side, the author is to be commended for integrating the study of comparative and international politics. For example, democracy is argued to be a central cause of regional conflict and cooperation, but in turn, democracy and regime survivability are shaped by patterns of regional conflict and the extent of regional democratization. The author also presents a smart and sophisticated effort to recast democratic peace, trade interdependence, integration, and democratization literatures in a regional context. He generally makes a persuasive case that dependent variables are best conceptualized regionally and that causal relationships are likely to operate in powerful ways within regions.

On the empirical side, the book is an excellent example of the higher standards now employed in the best quantitative studies of international relations. The author gives particular attention to the fit between theoretical concepts and their operational measurement. An innovative feature is the use of spatial statistics to measure variables in a regional context. Another strength of the empirical work is the systematic attention given to the robustness of estimated results. For example, through a series of careful reanalyses, the author in Chapter 5 determines that the strongest impact of trade on war and conflict is clustered among European states. Finally, in Chapter 6, he presents a thorough reevaluation of prior statistical studies on democracy and regime change, which points toward the important conclusion that domestic-level influences on democratic transitions and survivability are strongly conditioned by the larger regional political context.

There are, however, some weaknesses in this book, too. Conceptually, the role played by actors outside regions, such as major powers or international institutions in influencing conflict, integration, or democratization, is not addressed very well. As a result, the impact of outside parties that provide extended deterrence, intervene in regional wars, or conduct peacekeeping or peace-building operations is not accounted for. Similarly, the importance of the economic and financial ties of states to such global institutions as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank is left out of the analysis. A second point is that while the author's recasting of existing theoretical literatures in regional terms is well done, more attention could have been devoted to explicating the causal mechanisms linking the regional context to state-level behavior and then devising more specific tests of those causal links. For example, how does having more democratic neighbors promote democracy within individual states? How does more democratic neighbors in the region reduce the conflictual behavior of individual states? In the absence of more fully developed theoretical arguments and tests, the strong empirical findings on the importance of the regional context are intriguing but call out for more research.

On balance, this is an excellent piece of work that combines theoretical synthesis and integration with first-rate statistical analysis. There is much to be learned by picking up *All International Politics Is Local* and carefully reading it.

Banking on the Environment: Multilateral Development Banks and Their Environmental Performance in Central and Eastern Europe. By Tamar L. Gutner. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002. 281p. $62.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

— Valerie J. Assetto, *Colorado State University*

This book addresses a timely, relevant, and interesting subject. The transformation of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) provided a rare laboratory for the testing of numerous economic and ecological assumptions and policies, and the major multilateral development banks (MDBs) under investigation in this analysis were at the forefront of these efforts. Tamar Gutner asserts that her analysis examines the relative "greenness" of the three major multilateral financiers in the region: the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the European Investment Bank (EIB). Her final ranking of the three institutions places the World Bank at the forefront of environmental sensitivity and policy innovation and the EIB last. As might be expected, economic priorities in the region, in both the banks and the recipients, trumped the environment almost every time.

The central argument of the book combines factors drawn from a variety of institutionalist-oriented approaches to the analysis of international organization to explain differences in bank greenness. This is actually an organizational analysis; environmental lending in CEE is merely the case study. In short, Gutner concludes that the strong environmental priorities of the World Bank's major member, the United States, and the Bank's proactive, less banklike mission combine to push the World Bank to incorporate environmental objectives in its lending priorities to the CEE region. She combines a number of concepts: agenda setting, organizational mandate and mission, organizational structure, intraorganizational bargaining, and shareholder commitment, in a rather diffuse argument that seems to continually accrue new variables and literatures until the reader is left with the belief that everything matters, almost equally. It might have been useful, as much to the author as to the reader, if the author had diagrammed the argument and then reduced the discussion to its essentials. What I found most interesting, the notion of organizational porousness (see especially p. 78), or transparency and receptivity to new ideas and claims, was only briefly addressed in the discussion of the banks, yet its effects appeared continuously in the final, regional chapter. Here was something new that could have been more vigorously explored.

Additionally, given the importance of the World Bank and its regional counterparts for development and environmental project financing in most of the world, the focus of this analysis is of critical importance and, thus, this book is poised to make a valuable practical, as well as theoretical, contribution. The author employed an unusually rich set of sources, including interview data with most of the major participants in the banks, recipient agencies, and nongovernmental organizations. She was also fortunate to be present during an epiphany within the banking community regarding transparency and the provision of project information to the public. Thus, the book benefits from a richness of data that must be applauded.

Unfortunately, the author does not make the best use of the data she had at hand. The first half of the book (through p. 129) is essentially consumed with the rather unfocused discussion of the argument cum literature review that could have been drastically reduced and focused. While I applaud Gutner's attempt to organize the book around the policy process, the result was to fragment the discussion of the three banks into three chapters. Thus, critical information on World Bank environmental lending is found on pages 48–59 (Chapter 3, Bargaining and Delegation) and 86–106 (Chapter 4, Policy Process), and finally in the regional case (Chapter 5, MDB environmental policies). It was difficult to retain organizational continuity for each bank as one progressed through the book. Perhaps if the regional case material had also been integrated into Chapters 3 and 4 as illustrations of the theoretical points, rather than segregated into a single chapter (Chapter 5), this organizational scheme might have worked.

This structure also gave valuable case material the appearance of being part of a secondary literature review. More details and emphasis on information drawn from the author's interviews would have dispelled this image. For example, in discussing World Bank Executive

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Board voting procedures, it would have helped the credibility of the analysis to have some examples of particular cases in which the board has and has not been influential (pp. 85–86). In part, I believe that this organizational problem ultimately stems from the fact that the book suffers from an inability to decide whether it is fundamentally a theoretical exposition about international organization, a case study of MDB greenness, or a case study of MDB lending in CEE.

Finally, the case study chapter (Chapter 5) contains some quite valuable information about actual MDB projects in the region, particularly those in the Baltic states and Poland. The level of specificity in these examples varies greatly, however, leaving the reader hungering for more. It is apparent that the author knows a great deal more than she provided in this chapter about the actual field details of MDB environmental lending in the region. For those scholars whose interest in *Banking on the Environment* centers on the CEE region, this chapter is only a signpost, not a thorough investigation of the subject. As mentioned, the true focus of the analysis was the MDBs themselves, and this is its contribution.

The Price of Indifference: Refugees and Humanitarian Action in the New Century. By Arthur C. Helton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 314p. $65.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.

— Peter H. Koehn, *University of Montana*

This volume offers timely insights for students, scholars, and practitioners concerned with refugees, humanitarian interventions, state building, and the contemporary challenges facing international organizations. With support from the Open Society Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations, Arthur Helton visited conflict and postconflict sites and interviewed officials involved in humanitarian and peacekeeping activities. Primarily on the basis of these personal visits and interviews, official documents, and earlier professional experience as a lawyer representing asylum applicants, Helton first assesses recent humanitarian-assistance crises—including Haiti, Cambodia, East Timor, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda—in considerable depth. The evidence amassed leads the author to conclude that fundamental organizational, conceptual, and financial shortcomings exist in prevailing bilateral and multilateral approaches. The identified gaps and flaws provide background for specific reform recommendations that merit close attention, debate, and refinement.

At the level of discovery, *The Price of Indifference* can be used to gain insight concerning challenges of interorganizational coordination in fragmented state, interstate, and nonstate systems, as well as insight into the frustrations and confusion experienced and contradictory views held by those involved in humanitarian operations and state building. At best, the lessons to date have been "sobering" (p. 34). For instance, Major General John Abizaid, who commanded U.S. forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti, northern Iraq, and Kosovo, reported that international efforts have suffered from three erroneous assumptions: 1) that military force provides long-term security for host populations; 2) that early elections advance democracy; and 3) that security is the same thing as economic prosperity. With complex and unrealized state-, nation-, and social-capital-building undertakings in Afghanistan and Iraq now added to the agenda, many readers will share Helton's early concern that these and other lessons have not been learned.

In addition to the wider political issues that surround "humanitarian" intervention, including pretext violations of state sovereignty that mask other ambitions, the book treats refugees, internally displaced persons, international migration, safe areas, resettlement, and asylum seeking. Although the point is not linked to specific training projects, Helton appreciates that refugee and asylum situations offer opportunities "for systematic investments by the international community in developing the human resources of refugee populations with a view to voluntary repatriation" (p. 164). He also unmasks recent European asylum practice, whereby most applicants are denied asylum status but never forcibly removed and, thereby, face an enduring struggle to cope with adaptation liabilities and an uncertain future. These treatments primarily are informed by official U.N. and U.S. sources. In presenting the "Last Decade's Refugee Story" (Chapter 2), for instance, the author relies on U.N. sources for 14 of his 20 footnote citations; none of the others reference independent scholarly research. Though informative, readers should treat this work as an inside, top-down view. Conspicuously absent in this volume are bottom-up and research-based analyses of participatory development, transnational migration, partnerships among northern- and southern-based nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the role of transnational competence and intercultural communication in multinational endeavors, intercommunity dialogue as a means of constructing "bridging social capital," the long-term value of historical witnessing, and so on.

At the policy-application level, the book should be consulted for the provocative structural-reform recommendations set forth in the interest of advancing proactive and effective humanitarian actions. The most interesting proposals call for institutional consolidation and coordination within the U.N. system (Chapter 7), creation of a separate civilian Agency for Humanitarian Action (AHA) reporting to the U.S. Secretary of State (Chapter 8), and establishment of an intergovernmental policy-research center for Strategic Humanitarian Action and Research, or SHARE (Chapter 10). Although the author affirms the continued importance of asylum, resettlement, and repatriation as policy options, he shows particular interest in early, decisive, and comprehensive preventive measures. In order to fill knowledge and action gaps in existing arrangements and approaches, Helton proposes designation of a "consolidated UN humanitarian agency with a fully integrated budget and programme" (p. 225), profiling a coordinated civilian and military "humanitarian voice" within the U.S. executive branch (AHA), and introducing a new international agency (SHARE) outside of the U.N. system that would devise, advocate, and participate in implementing proactive approaches.

The U.N. component is the least developed of these proposals. On the one hand, the author calls for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to assume new oversight responsibilities for internally displaced persons. On the other hand, UNHCR is a "buffeted," "tired," and severely underfunded agency (p. 281). Helton misses an opportunity here to add his voice to those who have called for the creation of a Global Refugee Corps, mainly staffed by youthful exiles themselves, that could infuse UNHCR with new energy, vision, insight, and commitment.

The book confirms the need for humanitarian considerations to be integrated as a central component in pre- and postwar military and political planning and decision making within the U.S. executive branch. The current administration's predilection for preemptive strikes and its willingness to engage in unilateral military action underscore the importance of this reform. Civil society (re)construction and state/nation building require a measure of stability, but stability guarantors typically are not trained or inclined to cooperate effectively with international and indigenous NGOs and private contractors in development activity (see pp. 216–17) and/or in efforts to bring about consolidated, or even transitional, democracies. Thus, Helton suggests that the

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AHA and the State Department, rather than the military establishment, be responsible for integrated planning and project implementation. However, the proposed AHA is unlikely to exercise substantial influence over decision making so long as the Pentagon is authorized (and funded) to remain in control even in postwar situations—as in Afghanistan.

Although Helton presents a strong case for the proactive scenario (p. 268) and for establishing SHARE, flaws in his proposal remain to be addressed. Structurally, how can SHARE be organized outside the U.N. system and simultaneously serve "as an advisory mechanism" to the U.N. Secretary-General (pp. 287–89)? How can its staff be expected both to devise independent, context-specific "preventive strategies" (p. 289) and to act in a field capacity to plug gaps in "peace operations" (p. 287)? It also is difficult to understand how the suggested initial budget of $10 million (p. 289) would suffice for either responsibility. Clearly, the more feasible role is for SHARE to fill the anticipatory and advocacy think-tank void. In the multifaceted and underdeveloped area of state building, for instance, Helton's predesigned "international criminal-justice system service package" (pp. 294–96) merits elaboration and comparative evaluation by SHARE researchers.

Two deep-seated and unresolved constraints threaten to undermine Helton's ambitious reform proposals. First, there is little likelihood that the three postreform institutions would relate effectively to one another. For instance, if SHARE, an independent and international body, calls attention to a policy and/or action gap, anticipates a need, and formulates a proactive multilateral response, why should we expect that its voice would be heard and respected within AHA or by key Bush administration decision makers? Second, the costs of long-term civil administration and of meaningful social, economic, and political reconstruction dwarf even military spending. With Iraq coming on line, moreover, critical resources are bound to be diverted from unfinished operations (Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, etc.), valuable development projects, and efforts that might assist "friendly" states with stalled democratic transitions.

Price of Indifference raises critically important twenty-first-century issues and proposes responses that merit serious consideration. Overextension, ignorance, the perpetuation of human suffering, immense unfulfilled needs at home as well as abroad, and economic limitations underscore the urgency of finding effective and internationally supported ways to include anticipatory humanitarian considerations in policy and military actions.

Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms. Edited by Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002. 366p. $68.95 cloth, $24.95 paper.

— John Boli, *Emory University*

Part of the University of Minnesota's series on "Social Movements, Protest, and Contention," this book's 15 chapters add to the rapidly growing literature on transnational and global movements, or the activist dimension of global civil society. An overview chapter, in which the editors frame the book theoretically, is followed by a quantitative description of transnational social movement organizations (mostly international nongovernmental organizations) for the period 1953–93, by Kathryn Sikkink and Jackie Smith. The bulk of the book is divided into three sections of case-study chapters that consider issues related to human rights, development and the environment, and labor. The final chapter by Sikkink returns to theoretical issues and conclusions that put the case studies in context, giving particular attention to the role of transnational social movements in world politics.

Restructuring World Politics bears considerable resemblance to a number of other works in recent years (e.g., *Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements,* edited by Jackie Smith and Hank Johnston, 2002; *Activists Without Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics,* by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998; *Globalizations and Social Movements: Culture, Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere,* edited by John Guidry, Michael Kennedy, and Mayer Zald, 2001). One feature that sets it apart is the work of several practitioners (current or former activists and experts involved in transnational movements), who offer their reflections to complement, critique, and extend the analyses by academicians. In Chapter 11, for example, one of the key figures in the movement opposed to the Narmada Valley dam in India, Smitu Kothari, responds to and expands on the detailed analysis of that movement in Chapter 10 by Sanjeev Khagram. Chapter 13 finds Thalia Kidder, a policy adviser for Oxfam Great Britain, using August Nimitz's discussion of Marx and Engels as "prototypical transnational actors" (highlighting their role as leaders of the First International and other early transnational labor organizing) as a launching pad for her treatment of recent transnational labor activities. This meeting of the scholarly and the practical, a deliberate goal of the workshop and projects that led to the book, is a welcome feature that enriches the case studies significantly. It also shows that, as the editors note, the distinction between scholar and practitioner is fluid—activists move into academics and scholars become movement participants with some frequency these days.

The substantive chapters are consistently revealing and informative, though some of them motor along well-traveled roads. Human rights chapters study authoritarian Chile (Darren Hawkins), U.S. foreign policy with respect to the Helsinki process and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Daniel Thomas), and the international women's movement's successful effort to present women's rights as human rights (Karen Brown Thompson). In the next section, Paul Nelson explores the relationship between transnational social movement networks and the World Bank; Elizabeth Donnelly studies the Jubilee 2000 campaign to reduce poor-country debt and ease hardships due to structural adjustment programs; James Riker brings his expertise to bear on the question of whether Indonesian NGOs can substantially improve democratic governance in their country; and Khagram and Kothari discuss the Narmada Valley dam case. The last substantive section, on labor, has the Nimitz and Kidder chapters plus a short essay by policy expert Mark Ritchie. I especially liked Donnelly's work on Jubilee 2000, which provides interesting detail on the history and expansion of the debt-reduction movement; Kidder's work on newer, small-scale international labor groups arising in the Americas, partly as a result of NAFTA; and Nelson's review of the increasingly complex relationship between NGO networks and the World Bank. My preferences are largely arbitrary, though, since virtually all of the chapters are well done.

Like most of the work in this area, including the volumes mentioned above, this book is thus strong on the empirical side. Like most, it is also less strong theoretically. The two theory chapters do a nice job of explaining key concepts and issues in the study of transnational movements, but they make little headway regarding explanations: The "why?" question is not often asked, and theoretical assertions that could be evaluated by systematic evidence are few in number. The opening chapter includes some discussion of the international political opportunity structure (POS), describing it as relatively open and thus conducive to social movement activity that can "boomerang" back to help movements in countries with closed opportunity structures. However, in-depth analysis of the international POS and how it has changed over time is lacking. This is unfortunate, for these scholars are well equipped to

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explore this still uncharted territory and fill one of the most important gaps in the literature regarding transnational movements. This gap is particularly apparent in comparison with the progress that has been made in studying national social movements.

Despite the book's concern with transnational issues, the theoretical discussions are also stubbornly reductionist. International norms are "standards of appropriate behavior held by a critical mass of states," and "approximately one-quarter to one-third of the actors [states] must support and accept new standards of behavior before we can speak of the existence of new norms" (p. 15). International norms are contrasted with "collective beliefs" or "transnational norms" accepted by transnational movements, and a key initial task for activists, we are told, is developing collective beliefs or action frames for their movements. Thus, norms are largely deliberate creations of goal-oriented actors (states, movements, coalitions), and they come into being when a "critical mass" of relevant actors accept them. This is the dominant, conventional view that we find throughout the social movement literature, and its problematic nature is clearly noted by the authors when they introduce the puzzle of norms that do not appear to serve the interests of powerful actors. I suggest that greater willingness to take the Durkheimian leap—to recognize that sociocultural reality operates at several distinct levels beyond that of the actor, and that, for example, organizational or transnational reality is not reducible to that of individual actors—would be of much help in solving this and related puzzles. It would also help to recognize that norms are based not only on values and legitimacy but also on fundamental cognitive assumptions about the being and properties of individuals, states, nature, and so on. These moves would lead to a better understanding of the institutionalization of normative structures that help produce and shape social movements at the several levels of social reality.

Theoretical concerns aside, this is an enlightening volume that expands our understanding of the emergence, development, and effects of transnational movements in world society. It is a welcome addition to this growing literature.

War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution. By William J. Long and Peter Brecke. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003. 224p. $57.00 cloth, $22.95 paper.

— James P. Bennett, *Syracuse University*

In a slim but substantial volume, William J. Long and Peter Brecke advance two principal descriptive claims. First, explicit acts that signal reconciliation between belligerents after both civil and international war tend to promote subsequent stable bilateral relations. This, they claim, is compatible with a rational choice interpretation of the relation between belligerents as a bargaining game with a range of potential outcomes. Second, explicit attempts to express forgiveness also contribute to stable future relations. The key to this claim is an explicit analogy with small-group human and primate dynamics. That analogy is applicable not only in its behavioral correlates but also in the reasons that participants find it efficacious. It is difficult, if not impossible, as the authors demonstrate, to reconcile the second claim with only a rational choice model of the belligerents' interactions.

If we are persuaded by the two models and the evidence amassed in their support, we are left with a significant puzzle that goes to the very heart of our beliefs about the character of international violence and its significance for a broader range of international relationships. Long and Brecke carefully construct a stronger-than-presumptive case that, at least in the later part of the twentieth century, the effects are real and that the models offer reasonable ways to make sense of the effects. One expects that their research will stimulate theoretical extension of both models and empirical inquiry into the circumstances that strengthen or attenuate the effects of reconciliation efforts to normalize subsequent relationships. Their findings suggest practical importance at least as great as that of the "democratic peace."

Surprisingly little attention to postwar relationships is reflected by the larger data sets on international conflict. (Kristine Eck offers an annotated inventory at http://www.pcr.uu.se/pdf/conflictdataset2.pdf that demonstrates this point.) In order to ask Long and Brecke's questions, ingenuity is required to piece together information from several sources. In an era in which very little financial support is available for macropolitical quantitative research, the willingness of investigators to share data is crucial. The authors thank, as should we all, Doug Bond, Phil Schrodt, and Rodney Tomlinson for sharing events data. From this information, Long and Brecke first perform separately for civil conflict and international conflict a large-n exploratory analysis of the relations between reconciliation attempts and subsequent relationships between the parties. To sharpen assessment of causal relationships, they comparatively analyze, separately for civil conflict and international conflict, a smaller number of cases. Other investigators will want to expand the period of study, to reconstitute cases on somewhat different bases, and—perhaps most informatively—to operationalize differently the "reconciliation event." About the last, I wonder whether reconciliation events delayed a couple of years might not also be influential. Additionally, small-scale graduated efforts, not deemed newsworthy by most media, might constitute "reconciliation processes" of some importance. This is certainly believed by such nongovernmental organizations as Search for Common Ground. The chapters of analysis and interpretation of data constitute the bulk of the book. The authors are particularly impressive when qualifying the available evidence.

Long and Brecke's forgiveness model requires that the would-be-forgiver understand that it is attempting to create elements of reconciliation, and that the target-of-forgiveness similarly understand that it is the object of such an influence attempt. The dyadic relationship is thus quite analogous to that in strategic theory between would-be-deterrer and party-to-be-deterred. At base, the forgiveness model expresses a condition of reciprocated understandings. It is thus fundamentally incommensurate with the explanatory theory of (rational) utility maximization. For this reason alone, their findings challenge our discipline, for they caution that both explanation and understanding are essential but not additive modes required to make sense of the consequences of warfare.

The findings provoke additional questions. One wishes to investigate further the impact upon reconciliation of prior efforts to terminate conflict, by the belligerents themselves and by interested third parties. One wishes to know the contexts in which reconciliation efforts cannot succeed. The forcible displacement of large numbers of civilians would seem to be a limiting condition, particularly if there is little chance for their return. The current Palestinian-Israeli conflict comes to mind, as does the Greek-Turkish war circa 1920–23. In the latter case, subsequent respectful and even friendly interactions between Venizelos and Ataturk in the late 1920s had no chance of overcoming the resentments of 1.5 million persons affected by the Exchange of Populations in 1923–24.

The authors close with a short discussion of possible policy relevance. The recent war against Iraq prompted me to reread with benefit Fred Ilke's *Every War Must End* (1971). Its relevance was, however, quickly overtaken by events. The fifth chapter of *War and Reconciliation* remains relevant, especially its cautionary remarks (p. 153) about the naïveté of transferring a forgiveness model that works in civil conflicts to the international context.

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No Exit: America and the German Problem: 1943–1954. By James McAllister. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002. 304p. $39.95.

— Edward A. Kolodziej, *University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign*

This carefully researched, closely argued monograph has three objectives: to explain postwar U.S. policy toward Germany and Europe; by that token, to challenge neorealist explanation of the origins and early evolution of the Cold War; and to delineate a rationale for the permanent presence of American military forces on the Continent.

James McAllister's painstaking examination of the U.S. archival record accomplishes the first objective quite handily. Scholars interested in postwar diplomacy, notably the early period of Western Europe's reconstruction and Germany's integration into NATO, will find this a useful volume to consult.

McAllister's more ambitious aim is to rely on his reconstruction of the thinking of American decision makers regarding Germany and Europe to challenge neorealist theory. Two propositions, endemic to neorealism, are addressed. First, there is the neorealist claim that in a bipolar system, neither big power need be concerned with the material power of its allies, nor will it spend its resources to increase their power. The superpowers are alleged to be so powerful relative to third states that they balance each other by drawing on their own resources.

The author presents a strong case, bolstering scholarly opinion in this area, that the United States violated this neorealist law. Washington built up its half of Europe and pressed for a united Europe, potentially a third force that might well challenge American power in the future. In pursuit of these objectives, it pumped billions of dollars in economic and military assistance into Western Europe, led the way in rearming Germany, and unstintingly supported West Germany's integration into a united Europe. Why bother, McAllister suggests, if third states are not significant in bipolar politics? Why bother, indeed, if the end result is to create a third force that would fundamentally change the logic of power and calculations of a bipolar system that favors the interests of the superpowers? That should not happen under neorealist assumptions and expectations. But it did.

McAllister also attacks the neorealist view that superpowers need not consult allies. He shows that through the period of his study, Washington was very solicitous of European opinion on security policy. It responded to entreaties for the abandonment of American isolationism in signing the North Atlantic Alliance and in committing troops to Europe. The Eisenhower administration proved more pope than the pope in pressing for the European Defense Community (EDC). With British assistance, it quickly improvised Germany's rearmament and integration into NATO after the EDC's defeat—all this less than a decade after its second grab for European dominion had been decisively defeated. Constrained by the West European Union and entangled, as Robert E. Osgood explained, in the NATO alliance, West Germany was disciplined to a coalition of democratic states to which it owed its security and economic well-being. From what Dean Acheson and others would describe as a position of strength, German reunification could be negotiated with the Soviet Union, a prophetic surmise.

McAllister also usefully reminds us that American policymakers and keen observers, like Walter Lippmann, however much they may have disagreed over U.S. containment policy, were unanimous in their belief that American troops should be withdrawn as soon as possible from Europe and that their permanent stationing was inconceivable. The Korean War changed all that when Washington's perceived threat to Europe shifted from one of political subversion and economic dislocation to a direct security threat by Soviet forces. American policymakers finally accepted what Europeans, like Jean Monnet, already knew: that Europe's security depended on the commitment of American troops to Europe to deter and defend against a Soviet attack and to ensnare Germany into multilateral security and economic obligations, permanently tying Bonn to a coalition of democratic market states. In other words, as Lord Ismay candidly noted, NATO was needed to keep the United States in, the Germans down, and the Soviets out. The alliance worked so well that a Deutschian security community now extends from Vancouver to Warsaw and, if the recent NATO-Russian accord on security flourishes, it may well cross the vast reaches of Russia to reach Vladivostok. None of this should have happened if neorealist theory and policy expectations are relied upon to postpredict the past or explain the present configuration of power in Europe.

McAllister has successfully written the book he and his advisors wanted written. If he chooses to bring his historical analysis forward through the Cold War, the implosion of the Soviet Union, and the collapse of the bipolar system, he may wish to begin at a different starting point than neorealism, traditional realism of the Hans Morgenthau kind, or efforts to reestablish the relevance of realist thinking by appeals to balance by intentions, not capabilities (Stephen Walt) or by reference to perceptions of power (Jack Snyder, William Wohlforth, et al.), or by bandwagoning with the powerful (Randall Schweller). These ad hoc adjustments to this capacious tradition have something to say about the Cold War, but almost nothing about its end, unless the explanatory power of classical realism and neorealism, resting squarely on real, objectively observable, material capabilities, is abandoned in favor of the virtual power for the *real* thing.

The key conceptual and methodological issues still revolve around power, but power understood in more complex and differentiated ways than the realist tradition, whatever its reformulations, allows. Why do we not have a Cold War? Why did the Soviet Union dissolve? No persuasive answer to these questions can be found by remaining within realism's confining conceptual straitjacket, even when enlarged to include psychological states of mind, perceptions, intentions, calculating bandwagoning moves, and imaginative reinterpretations of the historical record.

A rereading of George C. Marshall's Harvard address announcing the Marshall Plan is a better starting point for an explanation for why we are now in the post–Cold War era. Marshall argued, "[I]t is logical that the United States . . . assist in the return of normal economic health in the *world* [italics mine] without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace." He further stipulated that "the revival of a working economy in the *world* [would] permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."

Marshall's vision of world politics and his rationale for peace and war rest on a lot more than military balances, Hobbesian endgames, insurmountable anarchy, self-help systems, and isolated, egoistic rational actors. If we must use, de rigueur in such critiques, the Darwinian language of neorealism, then the Soviet Union was "selected out" as a state not because it lacked the capacity to eliminate the United States and the West—the Russian Federation still has that capability—but because it could not solve two other imperatives of global power: solutions a) to the world's or its own economic welfare needs and b) to the demands of populations everywhere for a greater say about how they should be ruled.

These latter two power structures rest, respectively, on techno-scientific knowledge and innovation, driven by global markets, and on willful democratization, whether through identity politics or through liberal universalism. Soviet power solutions to these imperatives

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were progressively at odds with the evolution of these global power structures, erected by the coalition of Western democratic, market states after World War II. The Soviet Union imploded and, accordingly, the Cold War collapsed because the Soviet Union failed to adapt to these power realities. A reconceptualization to explain the rise and demise of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the ascendancy of the Western coalition has to take the latter's success into account, however fragile and provisional its post–Cold War prospects after 9/11.

No Exit is a useful start. Broadening realism's conceptual foundation is a step in the right direction, critics like John Vasquez to the contrary notwithstanding. But not the sources, evolution, or end of the bipolar Cold War system can be explained solely by reconstructing neorealism or by the ad hoc revisions of classical realism currently circulating in footnotes today. A broader and deeper foundation that takes account of the demands of populations for "more now" and for their own, even perverse, political regimes (Taliban included) is needed to advance theory in international relations and world politics in the post–Cold War era.

The algebra and plane geometry of realism is not enough to map a world no longer flat and the complex politics that it generates. We need to graduate to dynamic spatial models of hard and soft power to plot their shifting causal impact on human choices, as a consequence of their mutual contingency "shoving and shaping" those options. We also need differential equations to measure our changing times in order to glimpse, however dimly, our futures. Otherwise, our bounded and static paradigms will provide us "no exit" to understand the challenges we face as a species.

Technology, Governance and Political Conflict in International Industries. By Tony Porter. New York: Routledge, 2002. 192p. $80.00.

— Geoffrey L. Herrera, *Temple University*

Tony Porter's book makes a unique and valuable contribution to the study of international political economy and international relations theory. Porter is interested in the manner in which international industries are governed. Traditionally, international political economy would address the question by focusing on trade and industrial policy, bilateral and multilateral agreements between states, and international institutions and organizations—all falling more or less comfortably under the rubric of regimes. He argues, however, that we cannot explain the way in which global industries are managed by reference to state activities alone. He looks carefully at the entire life cycle of six prominent global industries: textiles and apparel, steel, electrical, chemical, automobiles, and semiconductors. He found these industries to be partially to mostly self-governed by the activities of and institutions constructed by firms themselves. Moreover, the content of the governance "regimes" was principally determined by each industry's particular technology—understood as a specific kind of codified knowledge, not simply material stuff. More typical international relations factors (such as the distribution of power, the prevalence of international institutions, or the presence or absence of transnational knowledge communities) were insufficient to explain regime emergence and content, and offered little explanatory value-added to the author's technological approach.

The argument deserves broad attention from students of international political economy (IPE) for two reasons. It suggests a way out of IPE's excessive statism and near-exclusive focus on comparative foreign economic policy. By showing how public and private governance in the international political economy are intertwined (and in some cases the former subordinated to the latter), Porter's book shows how studying global political economy more broadly conceived can work. Second, the book is an excellent reminder that markets are institutions—composed of authorities, norms of proper behavior, and mechanisms of reproduction—not just goods, prices, and transactions.

This volume also makes a useful contribution to international relations theory. Porter's critiques of regime theory and hegemonic stability theory correctly blame the theories' failure to explain market governance on their unnecessary attachment to the state. Instead, the author points to what should be an obvious and important area of international politics where private governance is at least as important as state activity. Lastly, while somewhat underdeveloped, the book makes an important contribution to the theorizing of technology in international relations. Following on the work of Michael Talalay et al. (*Technology, Culture and Competitiveness,* 1997), Porter avoids the standard tendency to treat technology unthinkingly as just material stuff. By instead seeing technology as sets of institutions, norms, and knowledge practices, he helps us understand technology as part of the structures of international politics.

The organization of *Technology, Governance and Political Conflict in International Industries* is straightforward, but the execution introduces some confusion. The opening chapter sketches the argument, reviews the literatures in regime theory and industrial organization, and provides definitions of technology and industry governance. This is followed by six case-study chapters, and a penultimate chapter comparing the cases and engaging the alternative explanations. A brief conclusion repeats some of the themes from the introduction and revisits systems-level change—the strongest of the alternative arguments. The structure engenders confusion because the relationship between industry-specific technology and governance regimes that Porter deploys is very complex, and there are six cases to keep track of. Yet the book lacks careful use of the same questions and same variables for each of the cases and comprehensive summaries. There is one useful table (p. 19), but not all of the variables are present and it does not really summarize findings.

Firms try to govern their industries for many reasons: to maintain or build market share, to block competitors from entering the market, to leaven out boom-and-bust cycles, and/or to prevent or forestall the obsolescence of the industry. Governance includes all activities to structure the industry that fall outside typical definitions of competitive behavior, including cartelization, price-fixing, dumping, and knowledge monopolization (through patents, licensing agreements). It also includes the construction of interfirm institutions to pool skilled labor, manage market share, transfer knowledge, and market the industry's product as well as the traditional bag of state policies for managing markets. Porter operationalizes technology as territorial embeddedness (the extent to which an industry is tied to a particular location by natural resources or a skilled labor pool or linked to a specific infrastructure), capital intensity, product scientific and technological complexity, and production process complexity. The industrial product cycle provides a second set of variables: the early phase where firms from a single location dominate; the growth phase where the industry diffuses globally and new competitors challenge the dominant firms; and the maturity and decline phase where the industry becomes atomistic and competitive and is either replaced by another leading industry (e.g., synthetic textiles for cotton) or retains its position.

With at least seven variables and six cases—or four variables, three phases, and six cases, if you like—the number of possible permutations is quite large. Speaking very generally, the less technologically complex an industry and the more mature, the more likely governance is performed by state intervention (textiles); the more complex the industry and the more capital intensive, the more likely governance is provided by the firms themselves via interfirm

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collaboration and the more likely the industry is to forestall obsolescence (electrical). There are plenty more like hypotheses. That is the point, but the book does not provide a neat way of cutting through the clutter to the underlying relationships.

One more note of complaint. The introduction argues that the study is consistent with constructivist approaches in international relations. True enough as far as it goes, but as the book pays no attention to the social construction of the preferences and interests of actors, it fits better elsewhere. Given its focus on historical specificity, periodization and life cycles, and institutions, the book would have been better served if it had been positioned as a contribution to the growing literature in historical sociological approaches to international relations. These notes of criticism, however, should not obscure what is a fascinating and valuable contribution to a growing body of literature in IPE that is historically sensitive and nonstatist in its concerns.

APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism. By John Ravenhill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 306p. $70.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.

— Takashi Terada, *National University of Singapore*

The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum was established in 1989. It was the first intergovernmental institution in the Asia Pacific region, and its establishment was ambitiously aimed at providing a consultative framework for promoting regional integration through trade and investment liberalization in East Asia in partnership across the Pacific with North America. The Bogor Declaration, from the APEC summit in Indonesia in 1994, was a bold and innovative step in that direction, setting targets for trade and investment liberalization in 2010 for developed and 2020 for developing countries in the region. The organizing idea of APEC was "open regionalism," or the promotion of trade liberalization on a *most favored nation* or nondiscriminatory basis, distinguishing APEC from other regional arrangements within Europe or North America.

This book is one of the most comprehensive studies of APEC to date. There are works that set the rise of APEC in its proper context and there is a growing literature on the challenges faced by APEC in recent times. But there are few authors, like John Ravenhill, who seek to comprehend both aims within a single work.

This is a daunting task for at least three reasons. The story is far from finished, and so any conclusion must be a tentative conclusion. This is a large and complex contemporary story of economic policy and diplomacy throughout the Asia Pacific region and hence not easily accessible. And the story is one that is difficult to analyze and interpret using the constructs that have been traditionally brought to bear on international relations and international economic diplomacy. Telling this story in a way that throws new and useful light upon it requires new analytic insight.

Ravenhill first traces APEC's history over a decade (Chapters 2 and 3). He seeks to draw theoretical implications from APEC's establishment and evolution, identifying the differing interests and policy priorities of founding members, especially between developed and developing economies. In Chapter 4 he focuses on APEC's organizational features, outlining the policy priorities and approaches that were developed to achieve them and the ways in which they distinguish APEC from other regional institutions, like those in Europe and North America.

The author draws on the constellation of concepts that have been used in international relations theory to inform his story, providing reviews of the literature on interdependence, hegemony, ideas, or epistemic communities and attempting to demonstrate their relevance to the issues that surround the story of APEC. His theoretical interests converge on how and why nations collaborate. He explores familiar concepts and seeks to apply them to the account of the establishment, development, and characteristics of Asia Pacific regionalism. There is no new analytic insight here, but there is a thoroughgoing deployment of all the tools of the international relations trade.

Ravenhill is among those who think that APEC has failed to deliver on its promise. He identifies as key weaknesses its emphasis on nondiscriminatory trade liberalization, concerted unilateral liberalization, and a peer pressure system. He says that "the decision to adopt a voluntary, unilateral and flexible approach to integration has provided governments with an excellent excuse for inaction" (p. 197), and he suggests that an enforcement mechanism is necessary for effective regional integration.

Ravenhill's conclusions about the ineffectiveness of APEC's "loose" form of regionalism may appear to have been borne out by the proliferation in recent times of proposals for, and the negotiation by some APEC members of, bilateral and regional preferential trade arrangements. These arrangements, with their legally binding provisions for the reciprocal exchange of preferences, which discriminate against nonpartner countries, are a distinct departure from APEC's approach to nondiscriminatory, globally oriented regional cooperation, despite the limited impact the negotiation of these arrangements has had so far.

The author argues that APEC has failed to deliver on its core trade liberalization goal. This failure he assumes rather than demonstrates. Whether this failure is rightly or wrongly taken for granted, demonstration of it would require some benchmark or some measures whereby failure or success could be judged, and certainly more extensive reference to the economic literature and analysis that might inform an answer to the question. The targets for trade liberalization are still down the track, and there is some time before they have to be met. By some measures, APEC is still on course to get close to achieving them. There is little acknowledgment of these questions in Ravenhill's argument. This failure-by-assumption he attributes to a number of factors.

An alternative view might be that APEC provided the linchpin for the most significant trade liberalization and internationally oriented economic reform since the opening up of industrial countries after World War II. Initially there was substantial unilateral trade liberalization and reform in East Asia and Australasia under the aegis of APEC in the early 1990s, beyond commitments in the GATT. But this liberalization was later dwarfed by the importance of China's initiatives within APEC, as, following the example of other East Asian economies, China framed its trade liberalization and reform agenda and progress toward accession to the World Trade Organization explicitly on the peg of APEC's open regionalism. If this achievement can in significant degree be attributed to APEC's existence, it is a considerable achievement in the field of trade liberalization and reform by any measure.

A central question in the book is "to what extent has APEC itself had an impact on the way in which states conceive of their identity" (p. 4). Ravenhill actually argues that "APEC has played an important role in popularizing this new Asia–Pacific identity" (p. 173), but has contributed little to "the reinforcement of an Asia–Pacific identity" (p. 214). He says that APEC has played a role in the "fostering of a trans-Pacific community" (p. 173), arguing that APEC is not based on a coherent Asia Pacific region but on a transregion with its diverse interests among developing Asian and advanced Western countries.

Here is just one of several areas in which Ravenhill appears trapped in a literature that is not quite geared to the question at hand. A more interesting question is how APEC has shaped the interaction between the states that comprise its membership, but he gives it scant consideration. He might usefully have looked

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at the gradually expanding array of meetings, working groups, and cooperative linkages within APEC. He might have examined whether they are producing circles of officials in charge of APEC in relevant ministries such as trade, industry, or finance within member economies and the ways in which they are associated with their counterparts in other member economies. These intra- and intergovernmental interactions and networks between government agencies have steadily become entrenched among members, and have been instrumental in nurturing a sense of Asia Pacific identity among those officials. The book lacks this type of careful "constructivist" analysis. The notion of a "Pacific Rim" identity, incorporated in the title, is not so relevant to the Asia Pacific economic cooperation enterprise and symbolizes the awkwardness in the book's argument.

Despite these analytical deficiencies, *APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism* is rich in information about this unique institution. It introduces a wide range of theoretical issues, although it might have been more selective and directed in their application. And it represents a commendable initial assault on an intellectual challenge that, by its nature, is not going to be easily or soon resolved.

Good Judgment in Foreign Policy: Theory and Application. Edited by Stanley A. Renshon and Deborah Welch Larson. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. 320p. $65.00 cloth, $28.95 paper.

— Martha Cottam, *Washington State University*

As the title implies, this is a collection of articles about decision making, the goal being to begin a discussion leading toward the development of a theory of good judgment in foreign policy. The chapters are organized into five sections: In Part 1, chapters explore the nature of good judgment; the chapters in Part 2 claim to examine the dynamics of good judgment; Part 3 has three chapters with case-study illustrations of judgments and misjudgments in foreign policy decisions; Part 4 has three chapters that examine ways to improve the quality of judgments in foreign policy; and Part 5 has some concluding points. The chapters vary a great deal in quality. Among the highlights are the chapters by Barbara Farnham on Ronald Reagan, Bruce Jentleson and Andrew Bennett on policy planning, and Alexander George on judgment and policymaking.

There are two central problems with this volume. The first is an uncertainty as to what good judgment is. The second is the question of whether distinguishing between good and bad judgments leads to any particularly new, useful, or insightful analyses. Confusion regarding the meaning of good judgment as a concept begins in the first section. The initial essays should set forth a clear definition of good judgment, one that presumably will be shared by the authors in subsequent chapters. But the first article, "Good Judgment in Foreign Policy: Social Psychological Perspectives," by Deborah Welch Larson, does not provide the reader with a straightforward definition. However, the reader is told that "good political judgment entails integrating and balancing competing values and considerations to come up with a practical course of action" (p. 6) and that "good political judgment entails balancing the need for public support with achieving foreign policy objectives" (p. 12). From this, as well as from the illustrative examples in the chapter, it appears that good judgment produces policies that "work," in the sense that the president achieves his goals, or is not criticized, or receives public support. But why one should consider these to be the criteria for a "good judgment" is never explained. Indeed, on this basis, George Bush's decision to invade Iraq will be considered a good judgment because the United States "won" the war and Bush's popularity soared, regardless of the impact of the war on future political developments in the Middle East, on the international reputation of the United States, or on the viability of the United Nations.

The next chapter, "Psychological Sources of Good Judgment in Political Leaders: A Framework for Analysis" by Stanley Renshon, does not help. He defines judgment as "*the quality of analysis, reflection, and ultimately insight that informs the making of consequential decisions*" (p. 26, his italics) and examines the psychological criteria for making a good judgment (pp. 31–32). Much of the chapter is devoted to an exploration of aspects of "character" that enable a leader to understand political problems. The chapter is therefore about how leaders judge, not what constitutes a "good" judgment. While it is implicit in this chapter that a good judgment is one that produces a successful outcome, Renshon ends with a series of important questions that should be answered about good judgment, the first of which is "What is good judgment?" (p. 49). In Part 4, on the other hand, Richard Haas rejects the idea of equating good judgment with successful outcomes and quite correctly argues that "there is an element of tautology in equating good judgment and successful outcomes" (p. 249). Moreover, by the conclusion, Larson's depiction of good judgment appears to have changed when she argues that "it is easier to say what good judgment is *not* than to define what it is, especially in a usable way. Above all, we should not evaluate the quality of past judgments by their outcomes" (p. 311).

The chapters in Part 2 take the reader on a perplexing path. One is an analysis of Gore and Bush on the campaign trail in 2000, which has nothing to do with foreign policy judgments, and the other is about demonizing opponents, which has very little to do with presidential judgment but describes the consequences of demonizing opponents in politics.

Two of the three chapters in Part 3 are analyses of "good" or "bad" judgments, and they show that analyzing cases in terms of good or bad judgment does not yield any new insights about good judgment. Larson examines Truman's judgment during the Berlin crisis, which she regards as an "exemplar of good intuitive political judgment" (p. 127), but at the end of the chapter, she concludes with a description of the decision making as "messy, politicized, and disorganized" (p. 146), which would indicate it was not particularly good, and asks if Truman exercised good judgment or was just lucky. The chapter on the Falklands war, by David Welch, provides a good explanation of the judgment of Argentina's ruling generals that led to that war, which, in his view, was bad. He explains their behavior as a product of their perceptions of Britain and the United States, Argentine nationalism, and emotions. I agree with his analysis—these factors led Argentina into a war that they lost. But why was that bad judgment? Because they lost. If one looks at the components of British and American judgment, one finds patterns paralleling those of the Argentinians. Both countries failed to understand Argentinian nationalism and perceptions, and both were influenced by their own nationalism and a rigid perception of Argentina. Apparently, to the victors go the spoils and the mantle of good judgment.

Other chapters bypass the issue of good versus bad judgment and simply examine aspects of the decision process. Farnham's chapter is an interesting study of change in Ronald Reagan's beliefs regarding the Soviet Union. Jentleson and Bennett provide a competent and comprehensive examination of policy planning and bureaucratic/organizational issues, as well as the histories of post–World War II administrations. The chapter by George, which would have served very well as the book's lead article, explores types of judgments that policymakers must make and some of the dilemmas policymakers face with each task.

While some of the chapters are quite interesting and worth reading, as a whole, *Good Judgment in Foreign Policy* is not convincing in its premise that good judgment is a useful analytical concept or a clear dependent variable.

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Perhaps a useful way to proceed would be to follow George's suggestion that future research ask decision makers about decisions they made that they consider good and bad.

Pathways After Empire: National Identity and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-Soviet World. By Andrei P. Tsygankov. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. 254p. $69.00 cloth, $26.95 paper.

— Ronald Grigor Suny, *University of Chicago*

In this study of the different foreign economic policies of post-Soviet successor states, Andrei Tsygankov argues that the strength of national identity provides the best explanation for whether a state integrated into the "free-market world" or remained in its traditional trading area, namely, the post-Soviet space. The usual explanations of international political economists emphasize international market conditions, relative security threats among states, or particular domestic political institutions that influence decision makers. Without nullifying the more familiar arguments, Tsygankov contends that power and markets are an insufficient explanation and that the cultural norm of national identity "that reflects emotional or affective orientations of individuals toward their nation and national political system" (p. 6) gives us the most effective indicator of the pathway of newly independent states toward or away from the former metropole. If states had an experience of political independence and, therefore, a quite coherent sense of national identity, they gravitated away from the former empire (e.g., the Baltic states), and, conversely, if states possessed no historical record of independence, they had less of a sense of threat from the imperial power and maintained economic ties with it (e.g., Kazakhstan and much of Central Asia). Domestically, within each state a political struggle occurred, pitting nationalists against "empire-savers," and in those states in which national identity was strong, the nationalists won out in the competition.

Tsygankov, who is Russian-born and now teaches in the United States, is an exemplary young scholar who combines deep local knowledge and the tools of Western social science to give us at one and the same time a textured analysis of a complex picture and a persuasively parsimonious explanation. To demonstrate how economic policies varied depending on the strength of national identity and the consequent sense of threat to the nation's security, he selected for detailed case studies three republics—Latvia, Ukraine, and Belorus—that demonstrated the range of potential variation from high to low national identity. Using a small-n statistic study of all 14 non-Russian republics, he tests his hypothesis, noting both its significance and its limitations. Finally, he deals with two deviant cases, Turkmenistan and Armenia.

Tsygankov holds national independence as a kind of proxy for strong national identity. For him, empire is the enemy of national identity (even though in most historical cases, national identities developed within modern empires, and in at least one, the Soviet, the state positively, institutionally fostered them). He links length of (modern) national independence with a sense of threat from the metropole, as in the Baltic republics. This works less well for the Caucasus. True, all three republics—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—had only a few years of independence in the last two centuries. But while Azerbaijan had never been an independent state before 1918, the Armenians had enjoyed long periods of statehood in the ancient and medieval periods, up to 1375, the memory of which was integrated into their discursive traditions. Georgia as well was independent or autonomous for much of its history, though most often fragmented among various rulers, and was relatively free of imperial domination until the Russian annexation of eastern Georgia in 1801. Yet it is Azerbaijan, with weak national identity, and Georgia, with stronger national identity, that feel the threat from Russia, while Armenia, with strong national identity, remains one of Russia's most constant allies.

But Tsygankov does not propose that his model is all-explanatory. In his statistical analysis of the foreign trade policies of the 14 non-Russian republics, he shows that in most cases, neither geographic proximity nor natural resource endowment are significant predictors. Political variables, on the other hand, are more suggestive, and one in particular—eagerness for sovereignty—explains 56% of the variance. This political variable is connected, claims Tsygankov, to the cultural variable of national identity. Linking national identity to experience with independence, relative stability of geopolitical borders, cultural distinctness, and cultural resistance to assimilation, he shows quantitatively how identity correlates with policies leading away from the imperial metropole. The two outlying cases are then subjected to a qualitative analysis. By the author's model, Armenia ought to have less close economic ties with Russia than it actually does. The affiliation of Russia and Armenia is explained by the particular geographic location of the small republic and its proximity to perceived enemies, Azerbaijan and Turkey. It looks as though security trumps national identity, until one considers that content of Armenian identity and its perceptions of "Turks." Turkmenistan, on the other hand, ought to have closer ties with Russia than would be predicted if the national identity variable is considered. But here geographic location, as well as an exportable natural resource, is important. Turkmenistan sells its natural gas and oil to its closest neighbors, Iran and Turkey, and the weak national identity of the Turkmens proves no obstacle to President Saparmurat Niyazov's decision to reorient trade to the south.

Tsygankov makes a strong case for a moderate constructivist approach to understanding foreign trade policy and, by implication, foreign policy more generally. His judicious tone throughout *Pathways After Empire,* the care of his research, and the generosity with which he treats alternative explanations all contribute to a convincing account. His argument is not meant to "imply that the post-Soviet nations neglected economic considerations in their external policies. Rather it suggests that these nations' economic considerations turned out to be embedded in varying cultural contexts and it is only in these cultural contexts that economic interests could be formed and meaningfully function" (p. 194). Although it might seem to be the furthest concern from economic decision makers, culture, it turns out, is significant in policy formation and should not be reduced by analysts to material or other interests.

The Social Construction of Man, the State, and War: Identity, Conflict, and Violence in the Former Yugoslavia. By Franke Wilmer. New York: Routledge, 2002. 368p. $90.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.

— Ted Hopf, *Ohio State University*

Franke Wilmer has written an unusually rich book about one of the more bloody chapters in recent international history. She argues that the violence in Yugoslavia should be understood from three constructivist levels of analysis simultaneously: how the individual constructs its identity in relations with others; how the state constructs itself in relationship to prevailing narratives of identity and history in society; and how international politics constructs the relationship between nation and state in modern times. After developing this framework, she applies it to the Yugoslav wars with great elucidatory effect. The great value of this book is that the theoretical explorations are significant and interesting wholly independent of the empirical work on Yugoslavia's wars, while the latter provides solid empirical material in which one can assess her theoretical take.

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Language matters because it "structures our thinking" (p. 3). Indeed, it is the stories that Croatians, Serbs, and Bosnians tell about themselves that provide the daily lived world in which the violence of the 1990s becomes possible. It is in these narratives of naturalized ethnicity and victimization, recovered by Wilmer in her empirical work, that conflictual, often violent, relationships are constructed and objectified in daily practice in Yugoslavia. It is in these stories that the affect, emotion, and trauma of the stylized past are lived in daily life. These narratives are part of daily social practice, but only one part of quotidian interaction on the street, in school, at work, in church, around the kitchen table, conversing, arguing, drinking, and singing. This everyday life is the objectified, structured, structuring lifeworld with which individuals, the state, and its elites interact. The empirical recovery of this intersubjective reality is essential to any constructivist account of social violence.

The state is the most important institution Wilmer theorizes, and she does so in a most productive fashion. In her view, the state is an authorized agent of inclusion and exclusion. Those within the boundaries form a kind of moral community with obligations of reciprocity; those left out have neither obligations nor protections. The state has been socially constructed as a nation-state, entailing the necessary predominance of some nations over others in the official national state narrative. Regardless of how liberal or civic the nation-state construction project, there will be some national narratives privileged over others. This ensures a constant tension, a constant potential for resistance and violence between the state and these groups, even, as Wilmer repeatedly stresses, in the heart of modern Europe and North America, not just in Rwanda or the Balkans.

And here is the critical problem buried in Tito's Yugoslavian project. Officially a socialist supranational state, where ethnonational differences were subordinated to a South Slav identity, daily lived practices and social narratives telling a blunt ethnonational story did not cease under Tito. The stories people told, the songs they sang, and the languages they spoke were the constant social carriers of potential disruption to the official state project. Still worse, from Wilmer's standpoint, the Yugoslav state repeatedly repressed any efforts to have a discussion of these issues. Therefore, when the exogenous events of international political reordering and domestic economic disruption unsettled the objectified certitudes of post-Tito Yugoslavia, there was a robust discursive terrain available for ethnonational conflict.

Wilmer puts a fair amount of confidence in democracy and pluralism as solutions, albeit only partial, to the inherent violence in any nation-state project. She points out that in the Yugoslav case, and in authoritarian places in general, the absence of parties, interest groups, and other social institutions eliminated the possibility of multiple channels of identity expression. Moreover, there was never any opportunity for a daily, ongoing debate over issues of ethnonational difference. Instead, there was compulsory silence as if the issue had been resolved, and so not even ameliorative policies could be adopted to address resource allocation issues, for example. Although Wilmer repeatedly points out that democracy in the United States and Western Europe has not solved these issues either, I still was left with the feeling that, faced with the depressing outcome in Yugoslavia, she was trying to find some solution, any solution, and liberal democracy was the most appealing. Necessary, if not sufficient.

Prevailing societal narratives and the one-party federal state gave Yugoslav elites unique opportunities to purvey their noxious ethnonational programs. The lack of a free media ensured that Serbian and Croatian television and radio, for example, would be dominated by the vicious hate speech chosen by Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman to mobilize support for their new states along a binarized ethnonational dimension. Meanwhile, the narratives of ethnonational victimization provided a fertile discursive fit between elite manipulation and popular culture. The televised wedding of turbo folk-singing sensation Ceca and the war criminal Arkan embodied this sanguinary marriage.

Wilmer introduces affect and emotion to a constructivism that has been bereft of both. She embeds it into her very sophisticated and lucid discussion of relations between the Self and significant Others. She combines constructivist, poststructuralist, and psychoanalytic accounts of the construction of the Self. Selves need Others to generate their own identities. These identities are arrayed on a continuum, from identification with to differentiation from these Others. Anxiety arises from recognition of difference in infancy. It is more traumatic and consequential for males, who recognize their caregiver mothers as both different and separate, whereas females see sameness and separateness. Applying Nancy Chodorow's conclusions about the consequent importance of child rearing for gender construction, Wilmer moves on to a discussion of the importance of social context more generally in exploring a broad range of possible identity relationships. She links this back up to her tentatively optimistic projections on democratic institutions as a partial solution to the dichotomized, binarized identities associated with violent conflict.

War and conflict, with their attendant agony, grief, terror, and rage, produce intense affect that has clear cognitive effects on identity construction. Where ambiguity or tolerance for uncertainty was likely under "normal" conditions of daily life, in the face of threat, "individuals are more likely to abandon ambiguity in favor of the sense of control that simple explanations seem to offer" (p. 155). And where do these "simple" binary identity relations come from? Both from the daily narratives and, most importantly, from elites purveying these relationships from privileged institutional sites in the state and its media resources.

Wilmer often wonders aloud whether or not different relations between Self and Other might exist in different cultural or historical contexts, hoping to find a place where the universal experience of alienation might be constructed differently. One literature in which answers to this question might be found is in experimental cross-cultural psychology. Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama over the last 15 years have been demonstrating that the relationship between the Self and Other is a variable, not a constant. In short, there is a more relational Self predominant in East Asia, while the autonomous (and hence anxious) Self assumed in the West predominates in North America and northern Europe only. This finding has been reproduced in dozens of experiments on attribution theory, causal heuristics, group psychology, and others, often reversing findings robustly replicated in North American undergraduate labs. This branch of psychology also sidesteps universalizing assumptions about psychoanalytic accounts of gender differentiation.

Wilmer much too modestly writes that she has only "explained a little with a lot," rather than a lot with a little (p. 244). In fact, what she has done is explained a lot with a lot, but more importantly, she has provided a satisfying account for a vexing set of events. And she has done so without bracketing what might prove inconvenient for her theory. Moreover, her theoretical analysis should travel well to other cases of violence, both domestic and international. It should behoove each of us at a minimum to begin our understanding of war with a reconstruction of the social narratives that make such violence thinkable in the first place, and unthinkable at some other time and place.

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