

and David Miller. These views are more different than many people recognize (including some proponents of academic nationalism), but Barry holds that neither is compatible with cosmopolitan principles. Because we have strong reasons to accept these principles, whereas we have little reason to regard the nation as an object of independent value, he argues that both kinds of nationalism must be rejected.

At the end of the essay, Barry turns to a different kind of nationalism—"cosmopolitan" (or "civic") nationalism, which he says is "essential to the operation of a liberal democratic polity" (p. 53) because it helps to motivate social cooperation. Unlike the blood and soil and academic varieties, civic nationalism cannot come into conflict with cosmopolitan principles because it is constrained by them from the outset. It is not clear that Barry really has in mind a form of nationalism at all. It seems more like liberal patriotism: a shared allegiance to a particular society—but not necessarily a national society—based on a principled approval of the society's basic political values and an appreciation of the distinctive features of its social life that constitute its identity. Whatever we call it, this form of group loyalty is plainly important for the success of liberal polities; equally plainly, it is the only form that a cosmopolitan should accept. The arguments, both critical and constructive, are characteristically clear and sharp and exhibit great good sense.

Scheffler has a different interest. He notes that the conflict of global and sectional obligations often presents itself as a conflict between "general" responsibilities (those owed to everyone) and "special" responsibilities (those arising out of membership in various kinds of groups). When special responsibilities require us to subordinate general responsibilities, this does not seem like selfishness but, rather, a recognition of the importance of the special relationships that constitute the group. Against this, Scheffler considers an objection ("the distributive objection") that might be pressed by cosmopolitans. It holds that special responsibilities confer unwarranted advantages on those to whom they are owed. These persons have already benefited in some way from participation in the special relationship, and it is not right for them to benefit again, and at the expense of nonmembers who are needier, when others who are parties to the relationship honor their special responsibilities. To recognize special responsibilities, that is, is to acquiesce in a distinctive kind of unfairness.

Having framed the objection, Scheffler considers several rejoinders to it. He believes that these rejoinders are frequently overreaching, but he concludes that we cannot dismiss altogether the idea that there are such things as special responsibilities and that those may take priority over global or general ones. He argues that this possibility of conflict between the global and the sectional is inherent in the plurality of our ethical commitments. At the same time he believes, although strictly speaking he does not argue, that the sectional has too often been allowed to eclipse the global—that the tendency has been to honor special responsibilities at the expense of global ones, even when there is no credible defense for doing so.

It is not a criticism to observe that this analysis takes us only so far. As Scheffler points out, we need a better understanding of the constraints that special and general responsibilities can plausibly be allowed to impose on each other, but he does not propose such an understanding here. Accordingly, on the strength of this analysis, it is not possible to say with precision how much and in what ways the special responsibilities that we have reason to accept should constrain the global responsibilities that cosmopolitan consider-

ations require us to recognize. It remains as a challenge for the future to see how far this task can be carried out.

Katherine Fierlbeck states that her book is about "the consequences of the globalization of democratic norms" (p. 7). Each chapter addresses a different area of controversy in the recent literatures of democratic theory and comparative political development. These involve the meaning and justification of democracy, its relationship to liberal constitutionalism (on the one hand) and the aspirations of ethnic and cultural minorities (on the other), the relationship between democracy and the economy, and the significance of civil society for democratic stability. The reference to "globalization" in the title might therefore mislead. This is not a book about either globalization as a social process or the extension of democratic ideas to the global level; rather, it examines some normative and analytical issues that arise in the context of the spread of ostensibly democratic political forms beyond the Western industrial democracies.

With the exception of the chapter that criticizes the multiculturalists and the conclusion, the book is mainly composed of critical, synthetic reviews of the relevant literatures. As far as I can judge, these discussions are reasonably complete in their coverage. For the most part, Fierlbeck's own positions are plausible enough, particularly her criticism of the political temptation to stretch the definition of democracy beyond the point where it can serve any moral purpose. But the critical discussions are not very detailed—perhaps inevitably, as they range over large and diverse literatures—and readers who are strongly attracted to positions that the author rejects may not find their minds changed. Moreover, these discussions are not, except inferentially, elements in the progressive development of a single, unifying theory. This is too bad, because Fierlbeck's insistence that we should hold to a well-defined and ethically significant conception of democracy for purposes of foreign and international policy is timely and well founded. One wishes that the contours of such a conception had been more clearly etched and its normative foundations more straightforwardly defended.

**Lives of the Psychics: The Shared Worlds of Science and Mysticism.** By Fred M. Frohock. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 281p. \$27.50.

**Millennial Visions: Essays on Twentieth-Century Millenarianism.** Edited by Martha F. Lee. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. 214p. \$65.00.

Jodi Dean, *Hobart and William Smith Colleges*

Mainstream political science, particularly in its rationalist and pluralist modes, has relied on a narrative prominent in social thought at least since the work of Max Weber. This narrative reads modernity as a process of disenchantment. The process involves a division of the world into differing value spheres in the wake of the retreat of transcendental ideas as well as a demystification that sets out procedures and probabilities that determine both what is worth knowing and the conditions of certainty. One oddity of this narrative of disenchantment is its radical disconnection from the practices and beliefs that continue to enchant the world, a point Jane Bennett persuasively argues (*The Enchantments of Contemporary Life: Crossings, Energetics, and Ethics*, 2001). Not only do religious and magical worldviews continue to provide many people in ostensibly disenchanted societies with orientation and meaning, not only are there multiple knowledge communities, but also discourses that claim objective, scientific status themselves rely on magical, spectral, and incantatory supplements. *Lives of the Psychics and Millennial Visions*

bring to expression these supplements and are valuable contributions to the work of reorienting the study and practice of politics.

Both books are concerned with spiritual and supernatural answers to the question of what it means to be human. Although inquiries into the place of humans in what may be a multitude of universes as well as into the variety of experiences and realities in which we are situated have broad currency, those involved in the study of politics will be especially interested in these books because of their challenge to the suppositions of rationality that too often determine the boundaries of the political. That is to say, they remind us that today, in the highly integrated, mobile, and virtual societies of global capitalist technoculture, more pressing than the problem of competing conceptions of the good is the challenge of competing conceptions of the real.

Frohock presents his study as an ethnography of psychic and spiritual experiences. Relying primarily on interviews with “believers” and “skeptics,” he considers near-death and out-of-body experiences, experiments on extrasensory perception or *psi*, therapeutic touch, and mysticism. A benefit of this ethnographic mode is that it enables experiencers to speak for themselves. Frohock demonstrates thereby the value of testimonies to the supernatural, as they accommodate a richer, fuller range of the experience and meaning of being human. Indeed, one strength of the book stems from the ways he draws out the pleasures of accounts of mystical experiences for those who have and hear them, pleasures that exceed the rationalist or skeptical attempt to measure their specific factual content according to positivist standards.

This does not mean that Frohock abstains from evaluating the facticity of these testimonies. Rather, he introduces plausible criteria for assessing their claims to empirical truth. He uses the pleasing metaphor of half-way houses along the not-all-that-slippery slope from hard science to the fantastic. These half-way houses are “hybrid sciences,” “inquiries that examine a wide range of events and assertions with broader and less defined understandings of truth than found in experimental science” (pp. 106–7). They function according to four rules. First, lack of evidence is not enough to dismiss an experience. Second, the failure of a belief to pass the inference test of a particular human community is not sufficient for rejecting that belief. Third, less probable arguments do not refute more probable arguments. Fourth, mathematical laws are trumps: One should be skeptical of claims that violate basic mathematical principles. As Frohock explains, these rules are weak, designed primarily to avoid a too quick rejection of innovative or extraordinary beliefs.

Frohock’s rules, as well as his argument more broadly, stem from the basic premise of the limits of human knowledge. That is to say, Frohock moves from the indisputable claim that much of what we know is limited by our senses and intellect to the idea that one should be open to the factual truth of supernatural experiences. “If we accept a larger universe beyond our comprehension, then it must follow that we cannot know what our tenure here, in the space-time domain that we know as human experience, means in any sense of the larger scheme of things” (p. 228). Although this argument is not clearly wrong, it is unsatisfying insofar as it simply inverts the terms of rationalist approaches to truth. As Frohock himself nicely explains, contemporary approaches to knowledge, in particular those concerned with decisions made under conditions of risk and uncertainty, accept the limits of thought. They fully admit that human cognition is faulty and incomplete, that the world is complicated, and so on. They then respond to these limiting conditions with strict evidentiary criteria. They say that since human understanding

is limited, knowledge begins with what we can know. Frohock says that since human understanding is limited, knowledge begins with what we cannot know.

Perhaps the unsatisfying character of this sort of stand-off indicates the limits of certain kinds of rationalist thought, the way such thought is rent by antagonisms for which it cannot account under its own terms. If I am right, then more fruitful approaches to the multiplicity of human knowledges are those that consider the mechanisms and techniques for distinguishing truth from falsity, the disciplinary investments that accompany a will to truth, and the fantasies that infuse discourses of truth. Frohock suggests as much when he gestures toward the importance of narratives, allegories, and parables as “instruments calibrated to interpret, to decipher, to render the mysterious intelligible without reducing it to human proportions” (p. 227). But he too quickly moves away from an analysis of the discourses of the mysterious and paranormal to his argument for their possible plausibility and their challenge to reality.

The best contributions to Martha Lee’s *Millennial Visions* treat millenarianism as a discursive thematic that supplements larger regimes of power and knowledge. Rather than view millennial thinking as deviant or marginal to political institutions and practices, they analyze these institutions and practices for the ways that they manifest millennialist longing for and fears of the future. The first four of the eleven chapters were given as public lectures at the University of Windsor and provide general approaches to the millennium. Of these, the essay by Michael Barkun stands out for its analysis of the millennium as a concept open to interpretation and deployment. As he makes clear, this openness makes the millennium itself a field of struggle over meaning, particular by such dominant institutions as the church, state, and economy as they seek to thwart the more critical and potentially anarchic versions of millennial fervor. The contribution by Mark Kingwell similarly resists the urge to pathologize millennial emphases on transformation, but he goes farther than Barkun and acknowledges that the profound desires at the root of millennial expectation can fuel critical interrogation of the market, the state, the citizen, and the person.

The remaining seven chapters in Lee’s book focus on specific manifestations of millennialism in domains that range from racial hatred, to the writing of Betty Friedan, to UFOs, to Quebec nationalism. This latter contribution is particularly interesting: Susan J. Palmer reads the popularity of apocalyptic religious movements in the context of Quebec’s “separatist aspirations and deliberate insularity” (p. 175). As she makes clear, the problem of these groups’ relation to the Canadian government is primarily a problem of their relationship to nationalism and the Quebecois struggle over the proper meaning and practices of citizenship. Her analysis is particularly valuable because one of these groups, the Raelians, has received international attention for its efforts to clone a human being. In fact, as Palmer points out, the Raelians “have recently launched a company, CLONAIID, that offers future cloning services to its investors” (p. 185).

Admittedly, there is something odd in reading about the millennium today. Y2K seems such old news that it is hard to recall what the fuss was about. Nevertheless, the strongest chapters in Lee’s book remind us why we should care: Millennial thinking continues to orient political and social formations in ways that often conflict with equity and social justice. To this extent, these chapters cohere nicely with work by Lee Quinby (most recently in *Millennial Seduction: A Skeptic Confronts Apocalyptic Culture*, 1999). For example,

Frederick Wall's essay examines the ways that racial reductionism not only gives similar structure to the belief systems of black and white racials but also leads each group to anti-Semitism, as Jews are the enemy named for conspiring to weaken the pure race. Wall makes his argument through a close reading of the anti-Semitic tract *The Turner Diaries* (1980). He shows how its account of a struggle between whites and nonwhites has influenced some black rap music.

Not all the contributions in the Lee volume attend to the multiplicity of meanings of millennium or to the ways that sedimented apparatuses of power rely on millennialist supplements. To this extent, these chapters, it seems to me, remain in precisely that apocalyptic logic they seek to criticize, namely, a binary of insider and outsider, chosen and damned, knower and believer. In their very marginalization of millennial thinking, these essays reinforce it. Thus, Thomas Flanagan, in an essay that identifies millennial themes in political movements from the French Revolution, through Marxism, to eco-terrorism and radical feminism, attacks efforts to transform the human condition. His attack relies on an account of the natural family and the natural market. And it fails to acknowledge the already institutionalized practices of the production and transformation of human beings deeply embedded in sciences, states, and educational institutions. Similarly, Philip Lamy's discussion of UFO belief collapses into one group UFO religious cults, those who attempt to study UFOs in ways that they understand as scientific, and general belief in extraterrestrials. He then treats this group as marginal or subcultural, as if a majority of Americans did not believe in the reality of UFOs (which they do) and as if mainstream popular culture did not overflow with alien-related effluvia (which it does).

In conclusion, political scientists will disagree with numerous aspects of *Lives of the Psychics* and *Millennial Visions*. But the disagreements could well be productive, engaging fundamental questions of what it means to be human in a world that continues to enchant and confound us.

**Welfare in the Kantian State.** By Alexander Kaufman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 179p. \$45.00.

Elisabeth Ellis, *Texas A&M University*

Kant does make it hard for us. On the scope of legitimate state action, for example, he seems to make two contradictory claims: First, the state should care for society's disadvantaged members; second, the state may not engage in social welfare policies. In his most important political work, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant argues at one point that the state should be allowed to "impose taxes on the people for its own preservation, such as taxes to support organizations providing for the poor" (*Prussian Academy Edition*, VI: 326). A few pages earlier, however, Kant writes: "The well-being of a state must not be understood as the *welfare* of its citizens and their *happiness*" (*ibid.*, VI: 318, emphasis in original). Elsewhere, he argues forcefully that one cannot justify state paternalism in terms of the welfare and happiness of the people. He complains about the "common mistake, when the principle of right is under discussion, of substituting the principle of happiness for it" (*Theory and Practice*, *ibid.*, VIII: 301). In a note to *The Conflict of the Faculties*, Kant compares subjects who accept paternalistic welfare policies with "well-fed" and "docile" sheep (*ibid.*, VII: 87). It seems reasonable to conclude that, despite occasional support for state activism in the social welfare arena, Kant generally opposes such policies. According to this reading, citizens and their governments ought to preserve justice, not welfare, and individual

freedom of choice, rather than collective material happiness. Libertarian interpreters of Kant have drawn just this conclusion, defending a minimalist state with Kantian principles.

As Alexander Kaufman correctly demonstrates, Kant does not oppose the welfare state. His apparent remarks to the contrary notwithstanding, a comprehensive reading of his political theory reveals that Kant objected specifically to state paternalism rather than to redistributive policies as such. The libertarian interpreters (Kaufman cites Friedrich Hayek, among others) are right in their view that, for Kant, justice means preserving individual freedom of choice as far as possible in civil society. A principled judge of society must ask whether individual citizens are treated as ends in themselves, not whether their happiness is maximized. The familiar Kantian epistemological strategies apply here: Justice cannot be determined on a material basis, such as happiness, but must refer to formal principles independent of empirical circumstance. So far, so good for the minimalist reading.

Libertarian interpreters err, however, when they apply Kant's exclusion of material ends to the state's choice of means. True, oppressive systems of government may not be defended in material terms; one cannot argue, as the cameralists did before Kant, that the people's welfare justifies paternalistic despotism (pp. 50–61). Yet, the policies chosen by citizens in a "rightful civil condition" may themselves aim to improve collective welfare. In fact, they ought to do so. Public policies "must conform with the universal end of the public [happiness], and to be in accord with this . . . is the proper task of politics" (*Toward Perpetual Peace, Prussian Academy Edition*, VIII: 386). Moreover, in the name of securing substantive freedom for the people, the Kantian state may intervene to correct what Kaufman calls "inherently coercive conditions" (p. 148). In only 162 pages of text, Kaufman refutes the libertarian interpretation, defends a reading of Kant's political works in which justice demands equal "access to the opportunity to develop one's capacity for unconditioned purposiveness" (p. 153), and briefly illustrates some consequences for public policy.

Kaufman makes his case against the minimalist interpretation of the Kantian state so persuasively that the reader may wonder about the strength of the opposition. Kaufman cites Wilhelm von Humboldt and Friedrich A. Hayek as representatives of the libertarian interpretation, including a few more recent commentators, such as Bruce Aune. By the 1990s, however, this interpretation of Kant had already been fairly well refuted in the literature. First, anyone who argues that no Kantian system of justice could legitimate policies that benefit the disadvantaged would have to contend with the enormous challenge presented by John Rawls in *A Theory of Justice* (1971), whose theory (with its difference principle) is explicitly "Kantian constructivist."

Second, Allen D. Rosen (*Kant's Theory of Justice*, 1993, cited by Kaufman, pp. 27–8) covered much the same ground as Kaufman, with most of the same interlocutors and many similar conclusions. Rosen's arguments against the libertarian interpretation of Kant's opposition to paternalism are much easier to follow than Kaufman's, although Rosen does not convey the complex structure of Kant's actual system as well as Kaufman does. For example, Rosen (*Kant's Theory*, p. 206) defends Kantian welfare policies mainly on abstract principle: "No people could rationally agree to a constitution that failed to contain a provision guaranteeing [at least] the basic needs of all citizens. Constitutionally guaranteed rights to a minimal level of well-being are thus, on Kantian principles, part of the structure of any just and rational civil society." These principles are grounded by analogy to the moral duty of beneficence.