English, to track the remaking of Islamic law. She argues that a narrow understanding of the study of "law as rules and institutions" (p. 25) and of change in legislation alone provides an incomplete picture of legal reforms under colonial authorities: "This approach obscures the fact that the most significant changes that have occurred in Islamic law throughout the Muslim world are not to its substantive rules but to their application as part and parcel of the repertoire of the state" (p. 25).

In colonial Malaya the autonomy of local elites was limited to matters of religion and culture. This led to what Hussin terms the "paradox of Islamic law" (p. 236): the institutional marginalization of Islamic law at the hands of the colonial state was accompanied by its symbolic centralization as a source of authority and legitimacy for state elites. Religion and culture became contested spaces precisely because local elites' authority had been limited to them, so that an expansion of what can be classified as religion and culture meant expanding the authority of local elites. Tensions over what fell under the scope of religion and culture lead to unclear and contested jurisdiction, which also plays out in contemporary Muslim jurisdictions, as Hussin demonstrates with respect to the adjudication of apostasy cases in present-day Malaysia. Hussin makes a compelling case that we have to take history seriously if we want to understand law in the contemporary period. She emphasizes that calls for an imposition of Islamic law through codified state law are effectively calls for Islamic law as the construct that emerged during the colonial period.

The concluding chapter discusses Islamic law in contemporary Malaysia by drawing on two apostasy cases. In the case of Lina Joy, the High Court of Malaysia ruled in 2001 that a Malay citizen cannot renounce his or her religion. The post-independence constitution defines a Malay citizen as Muslim. Hussin shows how these identity conflicts can be traced back to the colonial period. The Pangkor Engagement of 1874 rendered possible the conflation of Muslim identity and Malay ethnicity by establishing the autonomy of Malay sultans over religion and culture. In the process, Islamic identity and Islamic law became sources of legitimacy for these elites (pp. 239–40).

Hussin focuses on how the system and organization of Islamic law changed, rather than on concrete changes in individual norms. For example, she states that the matriarchal laws of the Minangkabau of West Sumatra began to be replaced by more patriarchal adat temenggong, and the British interpretations of Islamic law from India came to be accepted legal practice for some areas of Malay religion and custom such as marriage and divorce (p. 86). But she does not say much about what these matriarchal laws were or how and why they changed. She appears to accept that, when the system of how Islamic law operates changed, by default the application of individual norms also changed. This position builds on Wael B. Hallaq's work (*An Introduction to Islamic Law*, 2009), which argues that the codification of Islamic law and the integration of Islamic law into state law led to a radical break in how the shariʿa operates. However, this assumption should be treated as an empirical question that requires further investigation when it comes to the concrete application of individual norms. In addition, changes might be greater in some areas of Islamic law than in others.

A comparison that moves beyond changes in the system of Islamic law and looks at how different provisions of Islamic law, especially in family law, were applied before and after the colonial period and in particular before and after codification, will complement Hussin's work. It will also help evaluate how great the break between the pre- and postcodification periods was and avoid the drawing of sharp distinctions between a liberal past and a patriarchal future or vice versa. Hussin's thoughtful analysis is thus a call for more comparative work in Islamic law.

Partisans, Antipartisans, and Nonpartisans: Voting Behavior in Brazil. By David J. Samuels and Cesar Zucco. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018. 196p. $99.99 cloth.
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Many analysts seem to agree that, since the election of Lula in 2002, Brazilian politics has been strongly shaped by the conflict between those who favor the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (PT)— in power from 2002 until 2016— known as *petistas*, and those who oppose the party, often referred to as *antipetistas*. Given that Brazil is a young and unequal democracy with a complex electoral environment, the fact that the country's political competition is structured around a party organization poses a challenge to existing comparative politics scholarship.

David J. Samuels and Cesar Zucco's book is an ambitious effort to answer the puzzle of partisanship in Brazil. Their approach has three main parts. They start by proposing a new classification of voters' orientations toward parties. The authors replace the conventional divide between partisans and nonpartisans with a classification that identifies hardcore partisans (those who like a party and dislike others), positive partisans (those who like a party without disliking others), antipartisans (those who dislike one or more parties without liking a party), and nonpartisans (those who are indifferent toward parties). Based on this conceptual scheme, they argue that the PT was able to gather unexpectedly large levels of mass support because, since its founding, it has used its organizational structure to engage individuals who were already mobilized in civil society. Moreover, once *petismo* became a widespread social identity in the country, *antipetismo* also developed as an out-group orientation

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among some voters. Therefore, *antipetismo* is not a new phenomenon, predating the PT's time in power, and is not directly related to the efforts of PT's political adversaries to build it.

To provide evidence for their argument, Samuels and Zucco proceed in a careful multistep examination of partisanship in Brazil that relies on surveys from 1989 to 2014, survey experiments, and municipal-level data, all of which are analyzed by sophisticated methods and techniques. They operationalize their classification of partisan attitudes and use surveys to show that, although partisans and antipartisans do not differ dramatically in their socioeconomic backgrounds, the latter tend to be less democratic and politically engaged than the former (chap. 2). They also use panel-survey data to show that partisan attitudes are relatively stable in Brazil and demonstrate with survey experiments how those attitudes shape voters' opinions on issues and policies (chap. 3).

Possibly the most interesting part of the book comes in their examination of the rise and fall of *petismo* (chap. 4). The authors combine survey data with municipal-level information on the party's organizational presence and civil society density. They show that the PT's effort to establish its organizational presence over time was rewarded with higher levels of partisanship mainly in municipalities with higher civil society engagement. This is a novel insight in understanding how parties can foster partisanship in democracies where those attitudes are less likely to develop. Once established, those partisan and antipartisan attitudes translated into consistent voting patterns that are different from those of nonpartisans (chap. 5). The book concludes by showing the extent of partisanship and antipartisanship cross-nationally, using comparative surveys to demonstrate that the patterns observed in Brazil are also present in other countries (chap. 6).

As with any rich scholarly enterprise, the book also opens points to be clarified and further examined. For instance, the authors claim that previous scholars "have underestimated the extent of partisanship in Brazil" (p. 160). On the one hand, like partisans, antipartisans do have parties as reference points in their voting behavior and opinions, as the book shows. On the other hand, antipartisans are not partisans in a crucial sense that matters for the previous scholarship. When studying the institutionalization of new party systems, the key component of partisanship is the positive support for parties and its subsequent translation into support for democratic institutions. As the authors show, antipartisans are more like nonpartisans than partisans in that respect, because they are less democratic and engaged (chap. 2). Because levels of partisanship, in its conventional conception, are low and decreasing in Brazil, there is support for the concerns of the previous scholarship that the authors criticize.

The evidence in the book also suggests that the numerator (partisans) may be even smaller compared to the denominator (electorate). Although the authors investigate the heterogeneity within nonpartisans (antipartisans and nonpartisans), they do not consider how the conceptual heterogeneity that they propose exists within partisans (hardcore and positive partisans) could blur some of the distinguishing behavioral features of partisans demonstrated elsewhere in the book. Samuels and Zucco acknowledge that the proportion of stable partisans is lower in Brazil than in other countries (chap. 3), but do not consider the possibility that heterogeneity in partisan stability could explain heterogeneity in partisan strength. Further evidence of this heterogeneity within partisans appears in the discussion about the decline of the PT. The authors propose that the number of *petismo* increased during Lula's two terms and decreased rapidly during Rousseff's first term because of negative perceptions of the party's performance in office. They explain that process by raising the possibility that some voters might have weaker and ambivalent partisan attitudes (p. 102), but the authors do not explore how the extent of those weaker attitudes further reduces the numerator that the book often celebrates.

Notably, the book thoroughly explores the analytical advantages of distinguishing antipartisans from nonpartisans in the study of public opinion and elections. Given that this is the main angle by which the book approaches the puzzle, some normative implications of the findings could be further explored. If one considers antipartisans as a separate category from partisans and nonpartisans, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that partisanship in Brazil is indeed lower and declining faster than elsewhere (chaps. 2 and 6). The opposite is true for antipartisanship, which is higher and increasing faster than in most other countries. Moreover, the growing number of antipartisans share the flaws of partisans (motivated reasoning, chap. 3) and of nonpartisans (being less democratic and engaged, chap. 2) while failing to display any of those groups' democratic virtues. As the book shows, antipartisans turn out to vote and display consistent voting patterns (chap. 5) when compared to nonpartisans, which suggests that they can turn their undemocratic and stubborn political dispositions into electoral results. This point reveals an accomplishment of the book, because it seems to foreshadow the victory of Jair Bolsonaro's antipartisan and authoritarian candidacy that came months after its publication.

After Samuels and Zucco's excellent contribution, there should be no doubt that antipartisanship is a phenomenon to be carefully examined in the study of comparative political behavior. By showing how the PT engaged and fostered mass partisanship in an environment where those attitudes are not likely to spread and develop, the book also provides a theoretical framework that challenges

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explanations for partisanship that are centered on personalist leadership, pork barreling, and clientelism. All in all, this is a mandatory book in the study of Brazilian politics and the subfield of comparative political behavior. Future scholarship must continue exploring the relevant implications of such an outstanding effort, with proper credit to Samuels and Zucco.

Democracy in Small States: Persisting Against All Odds. By Jack Corbett and Wouter Veenendaal. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 245p. $85.00 cloth.
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In the early 1970s Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte published an important book called *Size and Democracy* (1973), the purpose of which was to reflect on the question if and to what extent democracy was related to country size. What are, the authors asked, the comparative advantages and disadvantages enjoyed by political systems of different size, and how large should a political system be to facilitate rational control by its citizens? The outcome of the analysis was, however, somewhat cloudy and less than convincing, and in the epilogue of the book, the authors emphasized how illusory their initial hope had been to find a definition or determination of the optimal democratic unit. Indeed, they concluded, democratic goals conflict, and no single unit or kind of unit can best serve these disparate goals.

This view remained unchallenged for some time. About 20 years after the Dahl-Tufte investigation, in 1992, the Swedish political scientist Axel Hadenius, published a path-breaking study called *Democracy and Development*. Summarizing in this book what the empirical research on the relation between size and democracy had demonstrated, Hadenius came up with a disappointing answer: "Not much, actually" (p. 125). He did, however, on the basis of his own research contribute the highly interesting observation that whereas large states are less democratic, microstates with populations of less than 100,000 have surprisingly high values for democracy. This observation set the tone for a subsequent line of inquiry into a paradox, which has still not been well understood. On the one hand, comparative research has suggested that the quality of democracy has declined in several countries, and many studies have found that a shift to personalized, informal, and non-institutionalized forms of politics has been an important factor behind this decline. In other words, research has identified a cause, as well as an effect. On the other hand, however, the same factors are found to be present, even markedly so, in small-sized countries, but there the factors apparently do not contribute to a decline in democracy. On the contrary, small states perform exceptionally well in various democracy rankings and listings. Why, several studies have asked, is it so? Why are small states better equipped than larger states to moderate the impact of informality and personalization?

By means of a thorough mapping of how domestic politics actually works in small states, a recent book by Jack Corbett and Wouter Veenendaal with the apposite title *Democracy in Small States*: *Persisting against All Odds* advances in a long stride toward a fuller, if not full, understanding of this paradox. The focus is on 39 states with populations of less than one million: the standard cutoff point in studies that compare small and large political systems. The democratic performances of the small states and others are measured by the Freedom House freedom rankings, much used in comparative research (although the authors have neglected to tell their readers which year is used as a platform for deciding the country size and freedom rating). Points of departure and the bulk of the empirical analysis are found in consecutive chapters, each devoted to dealing with one group or family of factors, envisaged as independent variables: democratization and economic development, democratization and cultural diversity, democratization and geography, democratization and constitutional design, democratization and political parties, and democratization and small size.

In terms of method and execution, *Democracy in Small States* stands apart for both its novelty and pioneering effort. The literature on small states and island states has so far made only sparse use of data that are collected by means of interviews and other similar techniques like participant observation; Corbett and Veenendaal, in contrast, draw on more than 250 interviews in 28 small countries over the last seven years. The authors spoke to politicians, public servants, consultants, journalists, academics, and others. This impressive fieldwork took the authors to geographically diverse sites: Corbett conducted 95 interviews with political actors in 11 small countries during the years 2011–14, and Veenendaal conducted 22 interviews in Malta in 2017 and 21 similar interviews in Suriname in 2018. The authors also visited Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, and many other places. It is of course only natural that the authors take pride in their empirical effort and feel entitled to announce that the number of interviews and countries covered is one of the great strengths of the book. Are they right? Well, yes and no. Yes, insofar as the interview materials bring liveliness and richness to the analyses and contribute to formulating sets of hypotheses on the various mechanisms through which smallness molds political behavior and political style. No, insofar as the preoccupation of the authors with elaborating qualitatively tuned interview responses tends to become a hindrance to developing tables aimed at conveying and summarizing broad results in the form of quantitative observation.

Corbett and Veenendaal understand and recognize that very little is learned about small entities by studying

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