

# ‘Making the Difference’ in Warsop Vale: The Impact of Government Regeneration Policy and Community Development on a Nottinghamshire Ex-mining Community

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*This article reports the findings of a longitudinal study of the impact of government coalfield regeneration policy on the Nottinghamshire ex-mining community of Warsop Vale, whose colliery closed in 1989. Based on interviews with local residents, community development workers and representatives of regeneration agencies, the study highlights tangible improvements in community resources and the recent introduction of an innovative new housing scheme as evidence of a positive impact of government measures. Particular importance is attached to the key role of local government, the voluntary sector and regeneration agencies in carefully cultivating the local social capital and raising Warsop Vale’s political profile since 1989, enabling it to seize the opportunities inherent in New Labour’s coalfield policy.*

## Background

In June 1998, the government-commissioned Coalfields Task Force published its report, ‘Making the Difference: A New Start for England’s Coalfield Communities’, setting out proposals for remedying chronic social exclusion and deprivation in former mining areas. It established a framework for mining communities to ‘create their own new start, forging their own sustainable and prosperous future, and to engage the active support of all partners, particularly the government, in its delivery’ (Coalfields Task Force, 1998: 1).

Included in the report were two locality case studies by Sheffield Hallam University’s Centre for Regional, Economic and Social Research (CRESR, 1998). These examined the social and economic needs of two particular coalfield areas – the Barnsley Metropolitan District of South Yorkshire, and the Meden Valley portion of North Derbyshire and North Nottinghamshire – and explored the economic and practical feasibility of rejuvenating them. As part of this research, the author carried out a ‘social profile’ of the 650-strong Nottinghamshire ex-mining community of Warsop Vale, whose colliery had ceased operating in 1989. While few details of conditions in Warsop Vale were featured in CRESR’s final submission, the full village profile – since included in Waddington *et al.* (2001) – highlighted numerous chronic problems, including: high unemployment and long-term limiting illness; youth crime, drugs and educational underachievement; physical isolation and poor transport provision; political exclusion; environmental despoliation and, most strikingly of all, severely dilapidated and vandalised housing.

Most of the village’s tenanted properties – around 80 out of a total stock of 220 – were owned by a single absentee landlord. Barely habitable, most of these tenancies

were let to a growing concentration of poorer, often transient, welfare-dependent families with few options in the housing market. Properties left vacant were increasingly prone to vandalism or asset stripping and were reputedly rat-infested. Meanwhile, the dominant landlord was proving notoriously resistant to repair notices issued by Mansfield District Council.

The CRESR report outlined a possible housing improvement scheme for the village. Without focusing on Warsop Vale *per se*, the Task Force report proposed the establishment of a private/public sector 'Meden Valley housing regeneration trust' with the aim of improving housing across the Meden Valley. Village companies could be set up to manage the housing stock and work alongside other initiatives, such as a network of community resource centres, to promote employment and other aspects of community development (Coalfields Task Force, 1998: 68).

Responding to the Task Force report, the government unveiled a ten-year programme for arresting social deprivation in the coalfields (DETR, 1998). Preceding Conservative administrations had tried to ameliorate the socio-economic effects of the rash of pit closures since 1984 by: using British Coal Enterprise and the Training and Enterprise Councils to retrain former miners and support small business development, setting up Enterprise Zones to attract inward investment, and funding English Partnerships to reclaim and redevelop former colliery sites (cf. Waddington *et al.*, 2001: 165–176). Such measures exemplified what New Labour has since derided as the 'failed' post-war strategies of injecting urgent relief into areas of high unemployment, or using grants and tax incentives to attract inward investment (Working Party on Regional Economic Policy, 2001).

By contrast, the Blair government's 'new regional policy' advocated a 'bottom-up' approach to regional renewal, involving consultation and partnership between business, local authorities, the voluntary sector, community groups and other interested parties (*ibid.*). Accordingly, New Labour's coalfield policy constituted a determined attempt to improve on the largely 'piecemeal and uncoordinated', top-down approach of its predecessors (Waddington *et al.*, 2001: 182) by promoting a greater degree of community involvement in, and ownership of, regeneration activities, albeit under regional supervision.

The £354 million package of measures included a £70 million coalfield allocation from Round 5 of the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB5) and a £45 million investment over three years in a new Coalfields Regeneration Trust (CRT) to support community initiatives, such as one-stop shops. Elsewhere, the government committed itself to reviewing existing legislation on Compulsory Purchase Orders with a view to streamlining and speeding up existing procedures for appropriating rundown and neglected former Coal Board housing stock. It would also seek to improve the poor take-up of lottery funding in coalfields, bringing it up to the national average. The responsibility for developing and co-ordinating coalfield regeneration (including the allocation of SRB funding) would now rest with eight Regional Development Agencies, each charged with enhancing and supporting national policies, tailored to regional needs.

Some scepticism about such proposals was justified. Research by Bennett *et al.* (2000) on community regeneration in former mining areas in South Wales and North Nottinghamshire observed how the views and preferences of community representatives tended to be marginalised within local regeneration partnerships. In any case, regeneration funding and developmental activity had been too finite and short-lived to have had any sustainable impact. These and other authors (cf. Coalfield Communities Campaign

[CCC], 1999, 2000, 2002) have also questioned whether the new, 'business-oriented' RDAs possess the requisite political sympathy, or strategic and financial independence from central government, to promote the flexibility, patience and innovation required to achieve sustainable development in hard-hit mining areas.

These themes resonate within the wider literature on estate and area regeneration, which underlines that the success of local initiatives is contingent on such factors as: the amount of energy and resources devoted, both past and present, to developing local social capital (including external networks, or 'bridging capital') (Mayo and Taylor, 2001; Taylor, 1999, 2000); the commitment of relevant agencies to consulting the local community – without suppressing conflict and dissent (Balloch and Taylor, 2001; North and Bruegel, 2001); and the preparedness of such agencies to develop novel structures and styles of working which facilitate 'joined up' policy, confer greater autonomy on community representatives, and encourage flexibility, openness and trust (Forest and Kearns, 1999; Laverack, 2001).

### Focus

The importance of these contingencies will now be highlighted by considering recent progress made in Warsop Vale where, as we shall see, the government's coalfield measures are belatedly producing irrefutable evidence of community empowerment and rejuvenation. The following case study deliberately prioritises the experience and standpoints of village members, relevant professionals and politicians in order to provide a unique, *bottom-up* perspective on the impact of New Labour's coalfield policy. The study is based on 92 semi-structured interviews (undertaken in February/March 1998, July/August 2001 and August/September 2002) with local residents, village activists, community development workers and representatives of numerous regeneration agencies. (1) By adopting this longitudinal approach, it will be possible to show that, while such progress is undoubtedly a consequence of the government's ameliorative measures, it also owes much to painstaking and often enlightened processes of community development and political activism first rooted in the late 1980s.

To justify this claim, it is first necessary to review the nature of developmental activity in Warsop Vale in the period from pit closure in 1989 to the unveiling of the government's regeneration programme in 1998. Such an overview is presented in the following section. A subsequent section then focuses on processes of social regeneration and community empowerment occurring since October 1998. The study concludes by acknowledging the impact of the government's coalfield strategy and by reiterating the critical role of the sustained community development which enabled Warsop Vale to take significant advantage of the opportunities afforded by New Labour.

### Community development in Warsop Vale: 1989–1998

Three years after the closure of Warsop Main, representatives of Mansfield District Council, Nottinghamshire County Council and the Rural Development Commission asked the Civic Trust Regeneration Unit to prepare a strategy for the regeneration of Warsop Vale and a cluster of neighbouring communities. Its resulting report (CTRU, 1992) identified the sale of National Coal Board properties in 1984 as one of the main sources of the village's current problems. Although approximately half of the housing stock was bought

up by existing tenants, the remainder was sold off to private landlords, some of whom had neglected to maintain their properties. Adding to this problem was the poor physical condition of the unadopted local roads and pavements. Moreover, with the demise of Warsop Main, there was no longer a pit generator to power local streetlights.

With the transfer of housing stock into the private sector, a generation of new families had entered Warsop Vale who 'had no links with the colliery or mining' and who showed themselves 'reluctant to become involved in community activities' (ibid.: 85). Thus the community was losing its traditional cohesion. More optimistically, the study commented on the existence of a core of long-term residents, exemplified by members of the Community Association, who still harboured a strong attachment to the village and a commitment to its future. Nevertheless, there was widespread scepticism about the readiness of the local authorities to do anything constructive on behalf of the community. Such feelings had recently been aggravated by an acrimonious dispute concerning a county council proposal to upgrade the village streets but have local residents foot the bill.

The CTRU proposed plans for a housing and environmental renewal scheme. They further recommended that the council should consider meeting the cost of the road resurfacing and perhaps install a community development worker capable of 'working closely with the community to heal the rifts, restore a sense of pride in the area, and create a sense of shared purpose through the development of a community plan for Warsop Vale' (ibid.: 98). Fortunately, such a person had recently become active within the village.

Born and raised in nearby mining village of Shirebrook, Michael Stephenson (2) was a graduate community development worker who first became professionally involved in Warsop Vale in 1988 when he co-hosted a series of surgeries with Shelter on behalf of local residents experiencing problems relating to repairs and insecurity of tenure. During this initial intervention, Stephenson had persuaded the district council to carry out a survey of repairs and serve notices on errant landlords. A handful of these were successful, though the larger problem persisted.

With the publication of the CTRU report and its recognition of the need for community development, Stephenson assumed a larger role in village affairs – initially by helping other council officers to prepare a successful bid to the European Regional Development Fund for the surfacing of local roads and the introduction of streetlighting to the area. Then, with the state of the housing worsening, in 1994 Stephenson helped to instigate the Warsop Vale Residents' Action Group, which became the mainspring of subsequent local activism. With Stephenson's encouragement and inspiration, the Action Group started lobbying for a central play area for local children. At the hub of this campaign was a young single woman, Rhona Ashton, who had settled in the village in 1990.

Acting on Stephenson's recommendation, Ashton liaised with another sympathetic local professional, Peta Shaw, to submit a second successful bid, this time for £15,000, to the Rural Development Commission's small grants scheme. The onus for flattening and clearing the area was devolved to local residents, eight of whom (all women) worked round the clock, with the help of machinery and personnel borrowed from Welbeck Colliery. Interviewees acknowledge that this was a crucially formative and encouraging experience.

Other initiatives followed. During 1995 and 1996, with the help of Residents' Action Group and other village members, Stephenson and a handful of County Council colleagues carried out a community safety survey which highlighted a growing fear of

crime. Faced with this evidence, the County Council installed 75 burglar alarms and 35 dummy alarms for local people. Of arguably greater significance was a housing survey of the village, jointly funded by the County Council and the Rural Development Commission. This 'Stopping the Rot' report (Nottinghamshire County Council Health and Housing Group, 1996) revealed that, due to serious dampness, condensation, poor safety, inadequate facilities or general disrepair, 36 out of 39 tenancies internally inspected were unfit for human habitation. Of equal significance to the actual findings was the way that they were publicised.

Shortly before the publication of this report, a Nottinghamshire parish councillor and Labour Party activist, Kathleen Taylor, had recently joined the Nottinghamshire Rural Community Council as its rural housing enabler. It was Taylor's job to identify problems and gaps in housing service provision in former mining areas and formulate ways and means of solving them by bringing relevant people and agencies together. Taylor immediately saw in Warsop Vale a worst case scenario of what could easily happen to mining communities as the result of neglect; and, hopefully, a potential model of what could also be done to resuscitate them. Thus, with the co-operation of the authors, she helped organise a national publicity launch of the report:

The villagers had got all this anger and all this energy but it wasn't being directed in the right way. So we called in the press and television. But we *planned* it. With a meeting like this, you don't just send the invites out and expect it all to just happen. You plan your meeting: what do you want out of it? What questions are you going to ask? Then have some questions handy. And when people say they are prepared to help, have a record of the meeting! Well, they went one better than that: one of them videotaped it all!

The meeting yielded two important outcomes. First, a series of commitments were given by district and county council officers to assist Warsop Vale in various ways, e.g. by funding a pair of youth workers and enforcing repair orders against private landlords. The videotaping of the event was designed to ensure that such commitments were 'morally binding'. Secondly, in the wake of the national publicity, an officers' support group was instigated, comprising representatives of the Mansfield District Council housing department, the County Council community development services, the Regional Development Commission, the Rural Community Council, Groundwork Trust and local housing associations. Thus, in addition to being extensively networked across local political and municipal institutions, Warsop Vale could now boast an impressive array of champions to collectively fight its corner.

Later that year, a major setback occurred regarding the crucial issue of local housing. Prior to Stopping the Rot, Mansfield District Council had been deterred from serving repair notices because of a mandatory obligation to pay a partial cost of any repairs. Once the Housing Act 1996 made this contribution discretionary, the council began to serve more notices. However, the dominant landlord responded by seeking a judicial review of the council's actions, arguing that it was unreasonable to expect him to renovate unoccupied houses when the village no longer constituted a 'viable economic unit'. The issue remained deadlocked until the summer of 2001.

Nevertheless, other forms of progress were soon underway. In October 1997, Stephenson collaborated with members of the Residents' Action Group in submitting an application for £198,000 of lottery money to transform two vacant former shop premises

into a one-stop Community Resource Centre. One month later, a slightly less ambitious bid for £99,000 was submitted to the ERDF for a development worker to staff the existing, though somewhat cramped, community centre, with the intention of providing various forms of training and advice in conjunction with statutory and voluntary services. At around the same time, Stephenson personally entered a bid for SRB4 funding with the aim of setting up a homework club for older schoolchildren within the village.

In the meantime, Warsop Vale was also the focus of some astute political manoeuvring. Once the composition of the Coalfield Task Force had been announced, Kathleen Taylor vigorously lobbied two of its representatives, the National Director of the CCC and the Director of Development Services for Mansfield District Council, to ensure that, when they did their tour of the coalfield areas, Warsop Vale would be a key stop-off point.

These political allies were true to their word. As the Mansfield Director later confided in interview, those members of the Task Force none-too-familiar with coalfield areas were 'somewhat stunned' by conditions in Warsop Vale. Subsequently, the same officer used inside influence to ensure that the practical recommendations for the rehabilitation of Warsop Vale were included in CRESR's report.

Despite all the social problems alluded to in the introduction, the sustained application of community development initiatives, allied to the timely politicking of key actors, was undoubtedly having the effect of empowering local residents and raising social capital. It now remained to be seen how far such progress might be further stimulated by the government's coalfields policy.

### **Community development since 1998**

In order to understand the local impact of government measures on Warsop Vale between 1998 and 2002, it is first necessary to consider the nature of the regeneration structures and activities emerging in the Meden Valley within the period in question.

#### *Regeneration in the Meden Valley*

Following the publication of the government's response, challenge funding started to reach the Meden Valley in greater abundance, thanks in no small measure to what is perceived as the uniquely supportive attitude of the RDA, the East Midlands Development Agency (EMDA):

EMDA have been unique, I think, in national terms in being so supportive of coalfield issues. I remember taking [EMDA's chief executive] round in his car to a lot of these settlements and he said that he, personally, had seen some distressing sights in Leicestershire but that here was something much worse than he could ever have imagined. And at that point he pledged to do something about it and, true to his word, he has. They've allocated in Rounds 5 and 6 of SRB funding a substantial proportion of the total regional allocation. (Coalfields Task Force representative/Director of development services, Mansfield District Council)

Also, EMDA played a key part in forging regeneration structures and influencing relevant policy. A total of £24 million of SRB 5 funding was channelled into its coalfield areas by the newly formed 'North Derbyshire and North Nottinghamshire Coalfield Alliance', a

formal coalition of seven local authorities comprising a single representative voice and policy-making body for the previously disparate coalfield areas.

The primary responsibility for managing and delivering the Alliance's sub-regional economic strategy across the districts of Mansfield and Bolsover rested with a local regeneration agency, the Meden Valley Partnership (MVP). Among the MVP's flagship projects were a town and village centre renewal programme; a 'Get connected' initiative for improving formal and informal travel arrangements between towns and villages; and a community chest to finance small-scale community projects.

Of EMDA's SRB6 funding allocation, the Alliance received £15.2 million over six years. £5.6 million of this sum was ringfenced for a specific housing improvement initiative spanning the Meden Valley. The fact that government ministers had not yet succeeded as promised in changing the CPO legislation had required a change in strategic thinking. Consequently, EMDA was issuing a challenge to the MVP to work alongside the Mansfield and Bolsover district councils to devise such a scheme or entirely forfeit this funding component. In the late summer of 2000, the MVP responded by publicly unveiling its 'Special Purpose Vehicle' ('SPV'), an innovative subregional housing initiative, based on Task Force recommendations, which aimed to pull together private and public sector funding and expertise to tackle the area's chronic housing problems, starting with those in Warsop Vale.

#### *Regeneration in Warsop Vale*

At this particular juncture, the continuing dilapidation of Warsop Vale's housing stock was detracting from progress being achieved along other axes of community life. Most indicative of this progress was the Michael Stephenson Resource Centre, which opened on 31 March 2000. Named in tribute to the community development worker whose efforts had been so inspirational to local residents, but who had unfortunately died a year earlier, the centre had become the hub of a host of social and regenerative activities as well as a symbol of community empowerment. Fittingly, such activities were now organised by Rhona Ashton, who had assumed the role of local community development worker.

The opening of the centre reflected the success of the funding applications still pending at the time of CRESR's initial visit. These included a lottery grant of £198,000, to develop the Stephenson Centre, and SRB4 funding of £24,000 over two years to start up a homework club. Though the original bid for £99,000 of ERDF Objective 2 funding was initially rejected, a revamped application for a slightly smaller amount of £94,000, to purchase equipment and service staff salaries in the community centre, was subsequently successful.

These successes stimulated further applications for funding out of New Labour's coalfield measures. Prominent amongst these was a further development grant for the Stephenson Centre. The lottery bid had been predicated on estimated refurbishment costs of £60,000. However, when the actual costs of refurbishment reached £144,000, the Residents' Action Group approached EMDA early in 1999 and received funding to cover the shortfall. In the 18 months following its opening, 'the Stephenson Centre' received two small SRB5 grants for redecorating the outside of the building and creating a special play surface, and just over £11,000 from the National Lottery's 'New Opportunities' scheme to create 24 places on an out-of-school-care programme during school holidays. A new

£20,000 village minibus had been acquired, drawing on part-funding from the MVP's 'Get Connected' scheme. SRB money also entered the village indirectly, in the form of training provision offered by successful bidders, such as the Workers' Educational Association.

With ever-growing confidence and assertiveness, in the spring of 2002, the Warsop Vale Village Association received further funding worth £346,000 (£173,000 from the National Lottery's Community Fund, £104,000 from the CRT, and £69,000 from the Rural Development Partnerships), partly to secure the future of the Stephenson Centre for three more years, but also to promote greater collaboration with other community groups throughout the wider parish. The success of the application was a testament both to the boldness and flexibility of the funding agencies and the known quality of the applicants:

Once in a while you meet somebody – recently they've been labelled with the appalling title of 'social entrepreneurs'. What you see is somebody with some spark, some *vision* . . . and Rhona is one of those people. I don't know whether I quite go talent spotting for these people but I recognise them when I see them and these are the people I want to throw money at. (Regional Officer, CRT)

Such developments were crucial to Warsop Vale's future economic viability, especially as access to jobs and transport remained problematic. Drug use had now declined and greater harmony was being achieved between all sections of the community. However, in spite of such initiatives as the homework club, educational underachievement remained a pressing concern. The neglect of the dominant private landlord also remained unchecked. In spite of a court ruling in mid-2001 finally rejecting the judicial review, the landlord was now religiously invoking appeal procedures as a way of undermining repair notices. Despite local planning consultations with residents, the SPV was not creating any visible signs of progress. Indeed, troubling revelations that Treasury officials were rescrutinising its financial structuring suggested that its very future was in jeopardy.

In reality, such delay reflected the apprehensiveness of personnel within two of the main funding agencies, English Partnerships and the Treasury, about the viability of such a novel undertaking. Following tireless mediation by EMDA, resulting in a bold commitment by English Partnerships to diverting some of its funds away from its conventional preoccupation with pit-site reclamation to a novel concern with estate improvement, the SPV received full Treasury approval on 4 July 2002. Villagers were informed of the development at a specially convened meeting on 9 September, by which time 'delicate negotiations' were already underway with the dominant private landlord. However, with this process still deadlocked, by mid-2003, Mansfield District Council began contemplating the alternative strategy of compulsory purchase orders. Still frustrated by New Labour's failure to deliver its post-Task Force undertaking to legislate a 'fast-track' mechanism for processing CPOs, council officers were resigned to the possibility of a lengthy legal wrangle. Nevertheless, with a multi-million pound plan now in place, and the moral pressure of the Treasury, EMDA and English Partnerships behind them, housing officials considered it merely a matter of time before the SPV commenced its transformation of Warsop Vale.

## Conclusion

In mid-2002, Warsop Vale was the beneficiary of a housing regeneration initiative that virtually secured its long-term future. Even accepting the possibility of a long delay due



to the recalcitrance of an absentee landlord, a Special Purpose Vehicle is now set to ameliorate the village's perennial housing problem, making it infinitely more attractive to affluent new blood and economic investors. Local criticism has understandably focused on the government's failure to introduce the type of quicker, streamlined CPO procedure capable of eradicating such a delay. Against this, district council housing officers gratefully acknowledge New Labour's indirect contribution to the design and financing of a housing initiative which was initially conceived of by its own Coalfields Task Force.

Aside from the SPV, government coalfields measures have yielded other tangible benefits, notably in the form of additional community resources and improved local optimism and social cohesion. Since 1998, Warsop Vale has received close on £500,000 worth of funding from such agencies as EMDA, the National Lottery, and the CRT. This money has realised fresh benefits in terms of training, child care, local transport and, most recently, a broader *raison d'être* for Warsop Vale to link in with and help to develop a cluster of neighbouring communities. In all such crucial respects, government regeneration policy has undoubtedly 'made a difference'.

Key structural changes emanating from the government's decision to devolve the management of coalfield regeneration to the Regional Development Agencies have also been pivotal to the continued progress of Warsop Vale. Confounding those sceptics who doubted the RDAs' willingness or ability to deliver effective policy, the East Midlands Development Agency has fostered regional and subregional structures capable of planning and implementing a joined-up regeneration strategy. In terms of its generous allocation of SRB funding to coalfield communities, and its readiness to innovate on their behalf, EMDA has been highly supportive of places like Warsop Vale. Such benevolence was apparent, both in EMDA's seminal commitment to the pioneering Special Purpose Vehicle, and in their determination to help conquer the reticence of accountants within the Treasury and English Partnerships.

Other institutions within New Labour's regeneration framework have exhibited a refreshing penchant for flexibility, risk and innovation. This was undoubtedly true of the decision by the National Lottery and Coalfield Regeneration Trust to jointly fund the ambitious community development project, now enabling Warsop Vale and surrounding communities to link up their facilities and expertise; and to the willingness of English Partnerships to divert vital funds and expertise to the SPV initiative.

In common with the wider literatures on area and/or housing renewal, the present study highlights the importance to effective community development of joined-up regeneration structures staffed by actors with the requisite political will and ambition to explore difficult but sustainable solutions. However, the study further emphasises that, in order for communities to effectively compete for scarce resources and convert them into genuine signs of progress, they must have a requisite foundation of local social capital. Were it not for its solid bedrock of confidence and expertise, a widely spread network of support and influence and high political profile – assiduously cultivated for well over a decade by sympathetic professionals and community activists – it is unlikely that Warsop Vale could ever have acquired and made such telling use of the resources made available by New Labour. Indeed, the entire Meden Valley area has reason to feel grateful for the campaigning efforts of the people of Warsop Vale and its professional and political supporters.

The ongoing revitalisation of Warsop Vale vindicates the standpoint that instant palliatives are no substitute for community-oriented policies which involve, encourage

and empower. The government's own Task Force advised that 'Time and money must be devoted to community capacity building, which can take up to two years, so that local people can identify their own aspirations and priorities' (1998: 34). It may well take more patience and funding than was first imagined. 'Sometimes', as Kathleen Taylor acknowledges, 'the bulldozers will have to come in. But they should be learning from here and not sending them in straight away'. Warsop Vale could now serve as a beacon for social regeneration in other mining areas: 'This community, with its workers, has shown what can be done with sufficient will. And hopefully, soon, when the housing's been done up, we can say, "This is what we've done in Warsop Vale; now go do it in *your own* little communities"'.

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### Notes

1 This included a total of 48 face-to-face interviews with residents of Warsop Vale, and a further 44 with representatives of the following: Bolsover District Council, Coalfields Task Force, Coalfields Regeneration Trust, East Midlands Development Agency, Leicester Housing Association, Mansfield District Council, Meden School, Meden Valley Partnership, North Notts/North Derbys Coalfield Alliance, Nottinghamshire County Council, Nottinghamshire Rural Community Council, Nottinghamshire Rural Area Partnership, Warsop Vale Residents' Action Group, and Warsop Vale Village Association.

2 The names of all actors have been changed in order to conceal their true identities.

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