

bacchanals), we may perhaps find that Austen's inversions of value take the sting out of the charge that Austen loved a lord too much.

The real test of Barchas's method comes from what she discovers, and here there is much to intrigue. For example, how it broadens our understanding of *Northanger Abbey* to learn that when John Thorpe, thinking Catherine Morland is the heir to Mr. Allen's (nonexistent) great fortune, is driving that young lady off in his carriage with a promise to visit a medieval castle, they pause to discuss Mr. Allen's wealth at the exact place in the road where before them (in Bath's real geography) lies the great estate of Ralph Allen, the magnate and philanthropist who earned the honorific "The Man of Bath," with a sham castle built by the historical Allen (called Sham Castle) immediately to view. Moreover, in the exact opposite direction, not more than seven miles away lies a real castle/abbey, Farleigh Hungerford Castle, with a Gothic past of incarcerating, poisoning, and murdering wives fully in accord with Catherine's later (and unfounded) fears about Mrs. Tilney's fate. Barchas's volume is dense with such information about the historical substrates of Austen's fictional names, and this review cannot begin to do her revelations justice. Of course, Barchas cannot fully explain the extent nor the reasons for Austen's clue setting (if the clues are indeed as dense and complex as she suggests, there are probably clues left to unravel), and it is difficult to account fully for Austen's purposes in her sophisticated name games, for her ironies are replete and complicated. What exactly, for instance, are we to make of the fact that the naval names of *Persuasion* (Croft and Wentworth) come from the wealthiest and noblest of English families while the titled figures (Dalrymple and Carteret) take their names from two of Admiral Nelson's famous captains? Barchas suggests that "[b]y focusing on names that have risen, through merit and controversy, to high positions in both the Baronetage and the Navy List, Austen may point out that both systems of rank allow for promotion and change. . . . Just as these lists are not mutually exclusive, so Austen's modernity is compatible with her respect for rank and tradition" (254). This reading seems reasonable enough, but often as we discover what Barchas has to tell us of the complex history of Austen's fictional namesakes we are left in sheer wonderment about Austen's purposes—the pattern is so dense that untangling the meaning of her allusions seems freighted with difficulty. Ultimately, this exceptionally interesting volume only begins what is sure to be an ongoing venture of detection for Austen scholars, both to find the full array of her allusive tricks with history and to discern what she meant by them.

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TOM BUCHANAN. *East Wind: China and the British Left, 1925–1976*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 304. \$125.00 (cloth).  
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It has sometimes been suggested that the British Left was insular and that it liked to pretend that the rest of the world did not exist. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, British socialists from the earliest days onward were profoundly concerned with events elsewhere in the world. H. M. Hyndman plagiarized Marx. Some years ago the late Duncan Tanner showed the extent to which Edwardian socialists were concerned with the detail of debates within continental European social democracy. The importance of the empire for the British Left continues to provide much material for debate. Labour was profoundly involved with plans for peacemaking after both world wars. Of course, British interest in events such as the Spanish Civil War has provided considerable room for discussion and controversy. But the relationship between Britain and China, although of obvious current topicality, has until recently received very little decent historical analysis. On broad issues, this has changed over

the last fifteen years or so, with the work of Robert Bickers and others. But until now there has been no serious, sustained analysis of the relationship between the British Left and China. This is in some ways all the more surprising given the seemingly endless stream of material that continues to come out about the British Left's relationship with another revolutionary exemplar, Russia.

Tom Buchanan, author of the superb *Britain and the Spanish Civil War* (Cambridge, 1997), seeks to rectify this with *East Wind*, which considers the period between the mid-1920s and the death of Mao with some valuable further comments on the years since then. Buchanan shows that there was a relationship and that it did matter. China was successively an exemplar of a revolutionary situation, of civil war, of antifascism, of resumed civil war, and finally of a Communist regime. He is quick to admit that the impact was not as great as that of Russia, but he is right to claim that the British Left—or at least elements of it—paid attention, and sometimes close attention, to what was happening in China.

The book is highly scholarly and always readable. The broadly chronological structure makes it easy to follow yet also allows themes to develop over time. The early identification of the communications problems between the two countries is important, as are the periodic references to the sheer lack of information about China (e.g., the fact that there was no Western journalist witnessing the Long March). This all gives a much stronger impression of some of the logistics than exists in any of the existing literature. Long-run questions about “otherness,” globalization, and so on, are treated deftly and in such a way as to really draw out the contemporary significance as well as the historical record. Buchanan shows great adeptness in resurrecting now-obscure figures like Lord Marley, Cecil Malone, and the like. He is very good indeed on key players like Bertrand Russell, Joseph Needham, and Alan Winnington. Buchanan uses a wide range of archival and other source materials to uncover a wide range of left-wing attitudes. He has three points of focus: the non-Labour Left, primarily the Communists; the Labour Left and the trade unions; and intellectuals spanning both Communist and non-Communist organizations. He shows how China impacted upon each in turn and how the nature of that impact changed over time. In particular, he offers a sensible and sensitive appraisal of attitudes within the Communist Party and some really insightful and detailed comment on the significance of Maoism in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s. One thing that comes out very positively is the basic goodwill of many on the Left—the willingness to go to extra effort to raise money in a good cause and to help the ordinary Chinese people who, usually through little or no fault of their own, were the real victims of the sequence of wars, revolutions, and misguided ideological initiatives that characterized Chinese history in the period. More depressing, though, is reading about the tendency of some people toward self-delusion: for example, the views of the perpetual apologist D. N. Pritt, whose comments about the Great Leap Forward of the late 1950s were as ill judged, ill formed, and potentially harmful as those he had made about Soviet prison camps and other matters a quarter of a century earlier.

This is, in short, an excellent book. It breaks new ground and should be read by all historians of the British Left, and it also has a lot to say to specialists in the history of modern China. It represents scholarship of the highest caliber. It also acts, perhaps, as a caution to those who today rush rather too readily toward a rather uncritical appraisal of the achievements of contemporary China.

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