

***Deutschland und die Verfolgung der Juden im rumänischen Machtbereich 1940–1944.*** By Hildrun Glass. Südosteuropäische Arbeiten 152. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2014. viii, 303 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Maps. \$63.00, hard bound.

There is no doubt that the evolution of the Jewish question during the Antonescu regime represented a much-frequented theme of interest to both Romanian and foreign historians. In communist Romania, the antisemitic policies promoted by the regime were ignored, and the quality of the relatively scarce contributions to the history published before 1989 was further diminished by an imposed double censorship—informational and ideological. In this way, with few exceptions, in the works published between 1948 and 1989 one can observe a double mystification: as the role of Ion Antonescu's regime was denied or silenced, the influence and involvement of National Socialist Germany in the amount and degree of antisemitic persecution committed in Romania were overestimated. Although the fall of the communist regime in December 1989 created the necessary conditions for scholarly investigation of the situation of Jews in Antonescu's Romania, the results were far from what was promised. Parallel to this was the publication of studies that, sadly, did nothing more than reiterate uncritically the tendentious opinions and clichés of the pre-1989 literature regarding Germany's role and responsibility. It is thus understandable why the most balanced works on this theme were published abroad. Historians like Martin Broszat, Andreas Hillgruber, Andrej Angrick, and Armin Heinen produced evidence for the relation of causality and dependence between the antisemitic policies of the Antonescu regime and the influence, if not hegemony, of National Socialist Germany. Hildrun Glass's book is set on the same coordinates: its main objective is to identify Nazi Germany's responsibility in the fate of the Jews in Romania between 1940 and 1944.

Based on documents in archives in Romania, Germany, and the United States, as well as a vast secondary literature, Glass has proposed to analyze the Third Reich's efforts to incorporate Romania's Jews in the Final Solution, the Antonescu regime's own intentions and plans regarding the Jewish minority, and the two powers' diverging positions in their antisemitic policies. The book is structured in six chapters, followed by maps, a bibliography, and indexes of names and places. In the introduction, the author reviews the historiography on the issue, the sources used, and the objectives pursued; in the second chapter, Glass summarizes the evolution of the Jewish question in Romania between 1937 and 1944, dedicating a relatively large amount of space to the diplomatic and military representatives of the Third Reich present in Romania at that time and to how they referred to the country's Jewish minority.

Chapters 3–5 represent the central part of the work, every chapter corresponding to a stage of the evolving Romanian and German projects regarding the Jewish question. Chapter 3 differentiates between the situations of Jews from the Romanian Old Kingdom (Vechiul Regat) versus from Bessarabia, northern Bukovina, and Transnistria, showing how the Antonescu regime was mainly dedicated to copying and applying the "German model" in 1941, based on proposals by the adviser on Jewish affairs in Romania, Gustav Richter. The next chapter focuses on the deportation plans elaborated by German and Romanian authorities, shedding light on how the two states' ideas about how to "solve" the Jewish question diverged through 1942. Even if Marshal Antonescu's government had initially agreed to apply the Final Solution for the Jews in Vechiul Regat by deporting them (beginning with those who lived in southern Transylvania and Banat region) to the death camps in Poland, the regime later renounced this intention. Glass shows the internal and external motivators that contributed to this decision to be the direct interventions of Wilhelm Filderman, the leading figures of the political opposition, and the royal family, as well as the Ger-

man defeat at Stalingrad and the Antonescu regime's efforts to make contact with the Allies to exit the war. The last chapter presents the Third Reich's efforts to relaunch the Final Solution in Romania and the Romanian authorities' refusal, as well as the regime's decision to permit Jews to immigrate to Palestine as its own answer to the Jewish question.

Though it does not make spectacular interpretive innovations that will revolutionize the research on this topic, Glass's work introduces unedited sources into the research and adds nuance to several existing interpretations, and the author has formulated well-balanced and well-supported opinions in general. Consequently, the present work is certainly successful in its investigation of a highly complex issue, the final result of which is an indispensable tool for all researchers interested in this subject.

OTTMAR TRĂȘCĂ

*Institutul de Istorie "George Barițiu" Cluj-Napoca*

***Prelude to Mass Murder: The Pogrom in Iași, Romania, June 29, 1941 and Thereafter.*** By Jean Ancel. Trans. Fern Seckbach. Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2013. 682 pp. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Illustrations. \$58.00, hard bound.

Published posthumously in English translation (the original having been published in Romanian in 2006), this volume illustrates why the late Jean Ancel is in many ways irreplaceable. Throughout his lifetime, Ancel saw it as his mission to collect documents on Romanian Jewry's Holocaust, many of which still await researchers' attention in his private archive. Some of them, however, were utilized in the historian's own published work, which, in turn, underwent change as previously unknown documents became available, mainly due to altered political circumstances. The present volume is a case in point. As the author writes, only in 1996, after the United States Holocaust Museum managed to convince the Romanian authorities to make available archived material that was previously carefully hidden or available only to "trusted" historians who toed the Communist Party line, did the personal involvement of Romania's wartime leader, Marshal Ion Antonescu, in the preparations and implementation of his orders for the Iași pogrom wholly emerge.

Ancel believed he discovered proof of that involvement in the order issued by telephone to the commander of the Iași garrison, Colonel Constantin Lupu, on June 27, 1941. The order was reiterated by Antonescu on the night of June 28–29, that is to say, on the same night that army, police, and gendarmerie units launched the pogrom, and Lupu was careful to write it down word by word. It included two main points: the first, already issued in the first instructions one day earlier, ordered him to evacuate all the town's forty-five thousand Jewish residents, "including women and children"; they were to be evacuated "batch by batch" (*pachete peste pachete*) and dispatched "first to [the Moldovan] town of Roman and later to [the southern town] of Târgu Jiu." Lupu was told to "arrange the matter with the Ministry of Interior and the county prefecture," making "suitable arrangements" for this purpose. The second point (in fact, the first noted down) instructed Lupu to issue an order that "if anyone opens fire from a building, the house is to be surrounded by soldiers and all its inhabitants arrested, with the exception of children." Furthermore, "following a brief interrogation, the guilty party are to be executed" and "a similar punishment is to be implemented against those who hide individuals who have committed the above offense" (26).

It was precisely the accusation of opening fire on Romanian and German soldiers that would be used by the authorities to justify butchering the Iași Jewish population,