perhaps over-sanguine *résumé* of the very voluminous literature of the subject.

(1) *Journ. of Ment. Sci.*, Oct., 1895, p. 639.—(2) *Edinb. Med. Journ.* (new series), vol. iii, p. 152.—(3) *Brit. Med. Journ.*, 1898, ii, p. 684.

Philosophy of Knowledge: an Inquiry into the Nature, Limits, and Validity of Human Cognitive Faculty. By GEORGE TRUMBULL LADD, Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. Longmans, Green, and Co., London. Price 18*s*.

At starting, the definition of a metaphysician as a blind man searching in a dark room for a black hat, the hat in question not being there, strikes us not inappropriately, for there are many searchings in this book for something which does not appear to be there.

Professor Ladd is a philosophical writer, well known on both sides of the Atlantic, and this last volume of his, over 600 pages, dedicated "to those who by serious and prolonged inquiry, however sceptical, aspire to approach the truth," ably sustains his prominent position. This book is an attempt to get at the origin of knowledge—knowledge being "itself the establishment of a relation between the revealer, the absolute self, and the self to whom the revelation comes," and although the author in the preface states that the position he is placed in by his own independent investigations is somewhat antagonistic to and critical of the position of the critique of pure reason, he yet supports the assertion that this question has in some sort been settled once for all by the critical work of Kant.

This research is based first and foremost upon psychology, which is looked upon as a propædeutic, and the inquirer who is defective or slovenly in his analysis of the human mind is warned of his failure to grasp the significance of the problem of knowledge; for it must be through the analysis of mental processes or the "content of consciousness" that the problem of knowledge can be properly pursued; in other words, through the science of psychology. But the work in its aim is metaphysical, and Professor Ladd is less in sympathy with the biological, anthropological, and psychological study of the growth of mind than he is with its philosophical aspect. Indeed, he makes less acknowledgement to the experimental psychologist than seems to be the tendency of the present day. The text exercises a solicitude as to the *truth* of man's being and the *validity* of his knowledge. Throughout, the phrase "stream of consciousness," as showing the continuity of mental processes, is used. It originated in America, and has become generally adopted by English psychologists. For our part we feel it is better to give an indication of what the book contains than definitely to review it. To prepare the way for the argument of the work the question is asked early, "Why from the biological standpoint is man—who, like the other higher animals is concerned with eudaimonistic good—not satisfied with the appearances of things? Why should he wish to probe deeper and

to search for truth or reality?" But from the anthropological view the evolution of the race fails to account for this need, which he describes as an instinctive metaphysical faith. It is when we consider the evolution of science as a "growth in actual cognition" that the epistemological problem is introduced, as opposed to a mere presentation of senses, trains of associated ideas and abstract concepts. Science is looked upon as a hypothetical syllogism—

If A is B, C is D.

Such a science is not concerned with the actual relation of cause and effect, and such a science is therefore not knowledge, much less truth. Ladd explains *truth* to be a universal assumption of a mental representation having its correlate in reality, *i. e.* in the actual being and matter-of-fact performance of things—the mind of man which is self, and the object of his knowledge which is thing; this objectivity is the implicate of every truly cognitive act; there is a subject and a *trans*-subject. The study of this problem is recognised as an influential factor in the development of the reflective thinking of man. The alternate psychic element is, "I know;" and "My cognition is a process in my consciousness" is a presuppositionless and absolutely undeniable psychological assumption. Ladd traces ideation and object to a common root of consciousness, and points out that they exist in the beginning of psychic life, forming the original unity of our perceptive life—the "unity of apperception." Epistemology (or noëtics of Sir Wm. Hamilton) differs from the metaphysics of ethics, the philosophy of art, of nature, and of religion, as well as of rights and of history, insomuch that the latter have a complicated network of presuppositions which is the very substance of what holds them within their proper bounds. The very aim of epistemology is to get behind and underneath all assumption, and to deal with the human cognitive faculty itself. It is the analysis, explanation, import, and proof of cognition, taking cognition to mean a modification of consciousness and an implication of an external thing.

Kant has asserted that "Human reason has this peculiar fate, that, with reference to one species of its cognition, it is always burdened with questions which it cannot cast aside; for they are given to it by the very nature of reason itself, but they cannot be answered because they transcend the powers of reason," and the problem of the book becomes the philosophy of knowledge, in so far as it deals with the concept of the true. It must commence upon a scientific psychology of the developed human consciousness—the consciousness of a being already apperceptive and self-conscious; but psychology is not enough; a critical inquiry is raised as to whether and how far the forms of cognition coincide with the forms of existence; in other words, the relations between certain states of consciousness and what we conceive of as "the really existent," and includes here metaphysics or the philosophy of being which deals with the concept of the real. It presupposes one general fact alone, and that is "I know," which is the one primary datum of knowledge. The philosophical problem of knowledge, when investigated with critical thoroughness, takes nothing for granted beyond this ultimate and indisputable datum of all science. This "I know" is the datum and fact of knowledge itself, which is

subjective and has a conscious process in time as well as a trans subjective or an objective cognition. In an inquiry into the nature extent, and validity of knowledge, the concepts of ethics and the philosophy of religion must of necessity be touched upon; for know ledge cannot be divorced from faith nor from the life of action as it bears upon conduct. But Prof. Ladd very rightly avoids contested problems in these departments, and, although we think he has an undue tendency to scoff at the experimental psychologists, he endeavours successfully to bring the unity of man's total life into one with the reality of the universe. His history of opinion upon this subject will well repay careful reading; for he commences with Socrates and Plato as the first to treat of the "pretensions of reason to transcendent insights." He points out the impossibility of giving a wholly empirical account of the origin of cognition; and the necessity of recognising elements that for their explanation demand an appeal to the reality and external existence of the ideal are shown to be tenets in the Platonic doctrine of knowledge. Throughout does Plato emphasise the dependence of knowledge on desire, aspiration, virtue, and character, whereas Aristotle, unlike Plato's ethical origin of knowledge, derived it from dialectical induction and logical demonstration that knowledge was an end in itself evolved from individual observation to perception, and from perception, by means of memory, to experience. The influence of Origen, Augustine, Abelard, Descartes, John Locke, and Leibnitz, ending with Fichte, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, are interesting to read, and the chapter upon the psychological basis of knowledge particularly so. Identity and difference in opposition to the old association theory of knowledge find a place, and the volume concludes with chapters on idealism and realism, dualism and monism, the real and the absolute. To the student of psychology, this, one of Prof. Ladd's last works, well repays earnest study and thought, and we have derived much real pleasure in its investigation.

Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics, being a translation, in two volumes, by Dr. D. F. C. COSTELLOE, M.A., and J. H. MUIRHEAD, M.A., from Zeller's *Philosophy of the Greeks*. Longmans, Green, and Co., London. Price 24*s*.

These volumes, each of over 500 pages, give a complete record of the Aristotelian philosophy, a system of speculation which took a strong hold, not only of the mind of Greece but also of Western Europe. Aristotle pursued a middle course between the idealism of Plato and the sensationalism of Epicurus. He was the scholar of Plato and the preceptor of Alexander the Great. Born at Stagyra, in Macedonia, four centuries before Christ, he studied medicine in his youth, but the influence of Plato probably caused him to investigate the origin of knowledge and his maxim, towards which our latter-day experimental psychologist has distinct leanings, that "there is nothing in the intelligence which was not first in sensation" held sway until the time of