

more flexible and ad hoc processes that have done much to prevent the most destructive weapons from spreading across the globe. As Knopf concludes in the final chapter, these processes have been difficult to assess because they are often cumulative and gradual in nature (p. 297).

Perhaps the most important aspect of *International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation*, however, is the methodological approach, which identifies the shift in the world of nonproliferation from agreements that often required coordination of states toward similar policy goals—say, the reduction in numbers of nuclear weapons—to a more collaborative approach between different actors (p. 10). Knopf's introductory chapter offers a comprehensive survey of the literature on international cooperation and identifies the distinctions along the cooperation/coordination continuum. This is a significant insight, as it moves debate away from the simplistic binary of cooperation versus noncooperation. Too often when nonproliferation efforts are examined, success or failure is judged using this binary, with the result that the more flexible and adaptive approaches are overlooked. Knopf outlines the key factors that can contribute to the success or failure of international cooperation, and each contributor offers a case study that examines which factors were present and how effective the actors involved were in achieving their aims.

The case studies illustrate the diverse range of nonproliferation initiatives outside the treaty framework. Chapters 2 to 9 offer an initial look at a spectrum of nonproliferation efforts. These global efforts experienced varying degrees of success, flourishing where there was substantive collaboration within informal networks, and often failing when key states, such as the Russia or the United States, resisted or failed to provide leadership. This particular problem is explored by Wyn Q. Bowen and Alan Heyes in their analysis of the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of WMD in Chapter 5 (pp. 97–115). The aim of the initiative was to secure and reduce the threat posed by vulnerable fissile, chemical, and biological materials. This desire became acute in the aftermath of September 11. Bowen and Heyes regard the program as largely successful, yet they identify several weaknesses inherent in an informal agreement. Over time, the costs associated with the program have become a burden to some states, perhaps exacerbated by the global financial crisis (p. 112). Russia played an important role in driving the program forward, yet the chapter highlights the extent to which the successful aspects of the program were also the ones that aligned with the Russian government's own interests. Conversely, the areas that were less successful were the ones that Russia resisted (pp. 112–13). The lesson here, and certainly one that is applicable to the other case studies, is the extent to which key states can act as blockers or drivers in ensuring that informal efforts succeed.

This lesson is repeated in Scott A. Jones's assessment of the development of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and other multilateral export-control regimes (pp. 23–45) and in Emma Belcher's chapter on the Proliferation Security Initiative (pp. 116–39). Both chapters reinforce that it was the nonbinding and informal nature of the agreement that was in many ways responsible for its success. Belcher argues that this allowed norms to develop in response to changing needs that would have been hampered by a rigid, legally binding structure (p. 134). Yet both authors emphasize the continued role of states' self-interest in determining the extent to which involvement in such efforts is pursued or not (p. 127).

The chapters focusing on regional case studies also highlighted the problematic role of self-interest, and indeed the role of coercion, in whether nonproliferation efforts work effectively. David Santoro's chapter on the Iranian nuclear program and the E3+3/P5+1 diplomatic negotiations offers an important examination of this very problem. While the chapter concludes in 2013 with the election of President Hassan Rouhani, he rightly concludes that the diplomatic efforts had already achieved a degree of success, in that they upheld a multilateral commitment to international norms and rules (p. 289). However, it is important not to overlook the degree to which the self-interest of the various actors, and the decidedly coercive nature of the process, have resulted in an agreement that is deeply precarious and vulnerable to disruption. It is currently in Iran's national self-interest to cooperate, but domestic and international factors may change that calculation at any time. This highlights perhaps the greatest weakness in all of the cooperative measures explored in the volume, namely, that context and conditions change, and thus cooperative nonproliferation agreements are far more fragile than formal, legally binding ones.

In an atmosphere of decided pessimism over the future strength of the NPT and the norms prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons, the volume draws attention to the many successes of the informal and ad hoc, regional, and global nonproliferation efforts that help raise awareness about what happens beyond the treaty system. As Knopf argues in the conclusion, the nexus between formal and informal nonproliferation agreements deserves much greater attention (p. 310), and moving the field beyond a simple binary of cooperative versus noncooperative perspectives goes a long way toward deepening our understanding.

Across the Lines of Conflict: Facilitating Cooperation to Build Peace. Edited by Michael Lund and Steve McDonald. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. 448p. \$60.00. doi:10.1017/S153759271600400X

— Richard Caplan, *Oxford University*

Howard Wolpe, to whom this book is dedicated, was an MIT-trained political scientist specializing in Ibo politics

in Nigeria who was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1979. He served as chair of the Africa Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee and subsequently as U.S. Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region of Africa. When the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, signed in August 2000, failed to bring an end to the hostilities there, Wolpe, who had helped to negotiate the accord, undertook to engage key political, military, and civil-society actors in Burundi in a series of workshops involving role playing, simulation, joint problem analysis, and other related exercises, with the aim of building trust and ultimately transforming relationships among the parties. These efforts are credited, in part, with having contributed to the establishment of the fragile peace in Burundi in 2005 that is holding (albeit only just) to this day.

This volume represents an attempt to articulate the kind of approach that Wolpe employed in his peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts and to assess systematically the effectiveness of this approach. Edited by Michael Lund, a leading scholar of conflict and conflict resolution, and Steve McDonald, a former director of the Africa Program at the Wilson Center who worked with Wolpe in Burundi, *Across the Lines of Conflict* provides a systematic analysis of this important but largely underexamined dimension of peacemaking and peacebuilding. It is exceptionally well edited and achieves a coherence that often eludes edited volumes, beginning with the exposition of the conceptual framework by Lund, followed by case studies by country specialists of trust-building initiatives in six conflict-affected countries, and concluding with a discussion by Lund of the findings and implications drawn from his analysis of the case studies.

The basic premise of the volume is that externally supported conflict-resolution efforts often do not succeed because they fail to foster ownership of the process among the key local parties. The tendency of external actors, Lund maintains, is to place the emphasis on achieving particular outcomes (e.g., power-sharing agreements, elections) without sufficient regard for cultivating genuine *interest* in these outcomes among the parties. A corollary of this lack of attention to local ownership is the lack of investment by third parties in strengthening the *capacity* of political leaders, in particular, to work together as required to achieve sustainable peace.

The method examined in this volume—known variously as interactive conflict resolution, track-two diplomacy, and conflict transformation, among other names—is underpinned by the claim that it facilitates collaboration among leaders in conflict-affected societies in seeking to achieve the peaceful resolution of their conflicts. As the scholarly and policy literature on this approach tends to be descriptive, Lund and McDonald have sought to assess its effectiveness in a more rigorous way. For that purpose, they chose six country cases where the approach has been

employed—Burundi, Cyprus, Estonia, Guyana, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan—and developed a common framework of analysis to examine each of the initiatives. Each case-study author was asked to describe the conflict situation, the main features of the initiative, the apparent effects of the initiative on the conflict environment, and the factors that explain why the initiative had the effects that it did.

The case studies are one of the many strengths of this work. They are detailed and informative, and the analysis is carefully honed with the specific purposes of the volume in mind. Indeed, to help ensure coherence and comparability, case-study authors were provided with leading questions to address, drawn up by the editors on the basis of the few existing analyses of this type of intervention, although the authors were also invited to consider any other factors that they believed may have been germane to their particular case.

It is, of course, inherently difficult to isolate or pinpoint the specific influence of particular factors in social phenomena as complex as processes of conflict resolution, and this is one nagging issue that hangs over the volume. With respect to the one case study that Lund provides, for example, the Social Cohesion Program (SCP) in Guyana from 2003 to 2006, how does one distinguish the contribution that this program may have made to reducing political and ethnic tensions as opposed to, say, the very significant socioeconomic progress that Guyana was experiencing at the same time? There is a related question concerning endogeneity, as even Lund acknowledges tacitly when he observes that “it remains unclear how much of this improved socioeconomic and political climate can be attributed to the SCP in particular, or whether it arose independently from smarter economic management, global factors, and broader changes in politics” (p. 117).

The other questions that this exercise raises are how generalizable the findings are and what lessons can be learned from them. In her chapter on Estonia, Susan Allen cites Western security support for Estonia in 1994, when NATO welcomed Estonia into the Partnership for Peace framework, as one of the contextual factors that contributed to the success of the dialogue between Estonians and ethnic Russians in Estonia at the time, because, as she observes, it helped to alleviate Estonian security concerns about Russian troops and interests in Estonia. Yet it is easy to imagine how such a move by NATO instead might have antagonized Russia and inflamed tensions, as would effectively occur in Ukraine 20 years later, and thus heighten Estonian security concerns. On the other hand, if the lesson here is that the regional or international environment needs to be a factor of appreciation in assessing the impact of conflict transformation efforts, then the finding is indeed generalizable, but rather less significant insofar as much has

already been written about the international dimensions of internal conflicts.

These difficulties are inherent in any enterprise of this kind, and they are not meant to detract from the immense value of this volume. In view of the high rates of conflict recidivism, it is important to gain insight into the dynamics of conflict transformation, which this volume helps to achieve. The efforts, moreover, to introduce greater rigor and precision into our analysis, whether it is in relation to the characteristics of and requirements for sustainable peace or in devising categories of impact to guide us in our assessments of conflict resolution efforts—to give but two examples—have value that extends well beyond the contours of this particular study.

Building Legislative Coalitions for Free Trade in Asia: Globalization as Legislation. By Megumi Naoi. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 230p. \$113.00. doi:10.1017/S1537592716004011

— Christina L. Davis, *Princeton University*

How have governments managed the political challenges of trade liberalization? In her book, Megumi Naoi offers a compelling answer based on party strategies to dole out pork-barrel payments and policy benefits in order to win over support for liberalization. This is not a simple solution—leaders must overcome collective-action challenges when losers from liberalization are diffuse, and they also must act within budget constraints. Hence, the centralization of the party structure plays a critical role in allowing politicians to target the optimal level of pork and policy across districts. Under these conditions of centralized party rule, leaders are able to allocate side payments to districts that experience economic losses when they are subjected to high levels of liberalization, while limiting the level of liberalization for critical swing districts that would otherwise defect from the support coalition for majority rule.

Building Legislative Coalitions for Free Trade in Asia develops a theory of globalization as legislation in which the majority requirement in a legislature dictates the buying off of opponents to liberalization. The key theoretical concepts turn on how the distribution of losers and centralization of party organization balance the use of pork, policy, or institutional reform as the tool for building a majority coalition. Privileging the legislature as the central actor behind liberalization goes against the conventional wisdom that legislatures are inherently protectionist due to their susceptibility to the influence of special interests opposed to liberalization. Whereas previous studies emphasize delegation away from the legislature to the executive as the necessary condition for achieving trade liberalization, Naoi contends that legislative support remains necessary. Global markets and

trading partners are opportunities to be utilized by the leader who is able to distribute income gains effectively according to a political logic for compensating losers.

Using her theory of domestic preferences grounded in both economic interests and political institutions, Naoi is able to explain how a diverse set of countries across the developing and developed nations have come to embrace globalization. Her main theoretical contribution is to demonstrate how leaders exercise agency to actively build support for liberalization. Politicians are not helpless in the face of global pressures; they possess tools to mitigate market forces and compensate for harm. Where other scholars place greater emphasis on global firms, electoral institutions, or ideology as a source of preferences, Naoi focuses on majoritarian politics. The book pushes forward the literature on comparative political economy with a nuanced theory of political leadership.

For the empirical testing of the theory, Naoi undertakes a comprehensive analysis of trade policy in Japan and Thailand. In each case, she marshals detailed information about the schedule of liberalization across products, with attention to the political competitiveness of electoral districts and economic conditions faced by producers. The evidence ranges from analysis of party organization and statements by politicians and interest groups in the legislature to statistical analysis of the patterns of liberalization. Over time, she traces shifts in use of pork and policy to transitions in her key variables for the centralization of party and diffusion of costs. For example, the move to establish policy tribes within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in the 1970s is credited with reducing the intraparty bargaining costs and facilitating a shift from pork to policy. Thailand was able to increase its welfare spending only after Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra achieved one-party dominance. Remarkably, in both countries the structure of party organization matters more than electoral reforms or economic crises for shaping the strategies used by politicians to manage globalization.

By distinguishing among pork, policy, and institutional reforms, Naoi presents useful categories for empirical research analyzing compensation to losers from globalization. Rather than focusing on a single budget measure or policy outcome, she digs deep into the political context to highlight how a ministerial post, industrial development-zone designation, or subsidy may all represent substitutable forms of side payments to help politicians who would otherwise oppose liberalization measures. But when losers are diffuse, social-spending programs or protection against imports represent broader policy responses. Most surprising is the insight into institutional reforms as a form of benefit: Changing the rules of the game in politics can help those legislators threatened by the discontents of liberalization from losing office. The empirical chapters of the book show how Japanese and Thai politicians chose to allocate benefits