

political-economic struggles based on irrational fault lines of ethnicity and national origins? Or, to reflect on another moment of this struggle, if nativists are so riled up by waning sovereignty, then why did a majority in the House and Senate, though not a super majority, vote to pass the Dream Act at the end of 2010?

Indeed, especially in light of Brown's recognition that political sovereignty always has been some sort of "fiction" (p. 69), why invoke a zero-sum relation between state sovereignty and neoliberalism, or nativism and neoliberalism, as opposed to seeing new technologies of nativism as part of a fundamentally persistent instantiation of inter-generational political communities invoking birth and sacred territory to negotiate mortality, not unlike the way ancient Athenians managed their resident aliens? Brown does suggest that her argument may be "counterintuitive" (p. 24) and acknowledges that the "new walls thus seem to stand as a certain kind of rebuke to every poststructuralist theorization of power as well as to every liberal hope for a global village" (p. 81), not to mention Brown's own insistence here and in her earlier work that neoliberalism has triumphed over liberalism and the nation-state.

So many questions arise because Brown is stingy with discussing empirical work at odds with her own assumptions. Brown relies for evidence of waning sovereignty on Saskia Sassen's *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, published in 1996, in other words before Sassen or anyone else could assess the impact of the 1996 Illegal Immigrant Reform Act or the wars and national security measures occasioned by the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

It would have been useful if Brown provided some criteria for evaluating when increasing nativism is evidence of the nation-state bulking up and when it indicates its waning. What about earlier rejections of cheap incoming labor? Was the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act also evidence of waning sovereignty? What about the massive deportations of US residents of Mexican ancestry in the 1920s and 1930s, a period of corruption by party bosses that also called the rule of law and other prerogatives of government sovereignty into question, making today's lobbying and campaign contributions seem relatively benign?

These two books raise excellent questions about deportation policies that are timely even if they may not be unique to the twenty-first century. Moreover, the paradoxes on which they invite us to reflect suggest that state power and markets are not inherently good or evil but terrains of struggle on which many conflicting values may thrive or perish. For instance, the Arizona state legislature passed legislation that would seriously encumber the lives of immigrants and anyone profiled as an immigrant, legal or otherwise, but then rescinded portions of it in response to a boycott of the state by professional associations that was hurting the convention industry. (Likewise, the American Political Science Association changed its annual meet-

ing venue in solidarity with San Francisco hotel unions, resulting in a labor deal the unions found attractive.) In these cases, the market is not a vehicle for flattening social relations into one-dimensional profit-maximizing encounters but a venue for expressing vital progressive political commitments and using economic power to back them up. Perhaps one might view legislators giving way to business interests as evidence that the nativists are right to suspect waning sovereignty, or perhaps the progressive organizing behind the boycotts means a triumph of abject, democratic, and even corporate or professional cosmopolitanism. State power and markets will be used to hurt those whose values or unmanaged existence threatens the inherently fraught and unstable institutions of the nation-state and capitalist democracy, but, as Abdullahi suggests, perhaps "not if you take them on."

Immigration and Citizenship in Japan. By Erin Aeran Chung. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 224p. \$67.82. doi:10.1017/S153759271100185X

— Randall Hansen, *University of Toronto*

Erin Aeran Chung's welcome contribution to migration studies examines immigration and citizenship in the important case of Japan. Japan is a country that, given its low birth rates and rapidly aging population, absolutely needs immigrants, is absolutely attractive to immigrants, and absolutely does not want immigrants. This is puzzling, and scientists instinctively gravitate toward puzzles. Chung touches on this issue, but her book really focuses on a related question: Why is Japan the only country with a *fourth*-generation immigration problem? The "problem" is Korean residents, who are in many ways indistinguishable from ethnic Japanese but who in most cases remain foreigners, although their parents, grandparents, and often great-grandparents were born in the country.

Chung's answer is partly predictable—a word I am not using pejoratively—and partly unpredictable. In the former sense, neither the Japanese government nor its citizens wanted Koreans to naturalize. That much we would have guessed. Most Koreans ended up in Japan as a product of imperialism and war. After 1945, the Japanese government, with the support of the occupying Americans, stripped Koreans of their imperial Japanese nationality and sought to encourage their return (pp. 74–77). When most opted to stay, they remained as Koreans residents in Japan.

The story in subsequent decades becomes more complex and less predictable. Koreans remained Korean not only because naturalization was difficult but also because peak ethnic associations—Kankoku representing South Koreans and Choryō'n representing North Koreans—actively opposed naturalization. They, and above all Choryō'n, opposed naturalization and integration as a betrayal of North Korean nationality and as unthinkable

in the light of Japanese treatment of Koreans during the war. What is more, Choryōn, although Chung studiously avoids this conclusion, comes across as essentially a den of traitors, from the Japanese perspective. Shortly after the war, it issued a joint declaration with the Japanese Communist Party urging the “overthrow of the Japanese government” and calling for clashes with the police (p. 79). As Choryōn commanded majority support among the Korean population in Japan (p. 78), this declaration was not a trivial matter. The government declared Choryōn a terrorist organization and banned it in 1949. Although other Korean organizations—Mindan and Chongryun—were not politically extremist, they remained opposed to political, and even some forms of economic, integration. This strategy reached its crescendo in the early 1970s, when both organizations initially opposed a landmark human rights case against Hitachi, which refused to hire a Korean because he was not Japanese (p. 97), on the grounds that a change in the law would encourage assimilation. What is more, these organizations pursue a strategy of political and at times economic segregation very much against the wishes of Koreans in Japan.

One of the many revealing findings of this book is that 80% of Koreans intermarry with Japanese citizens, itself a high measure of cultural integration. The picture that emerges—one that Chung might have painted in brighter colors—is of an unholy alliance between Japanese conservatives and Korean nationalists with the aim of preventing Korean integration. The extremes do meet in the center. She convincingly shows how a seemingly simple story of Japanese ethnic preference is, in fact, a much more complex one.

As an empirical study of Japan, this book is very impressive. At times, the conclusions seem to be drawn from a relatively small number of in-depth interviews, but this sort of ethnographic research is an established and respected method of social-scientific inquiry. Where *Immigration and Citizenship in Japan* is less convincing is in its use of theory. The broadest claim in the book is that Koreans have gained more by lobbying as foreigners than they would have as citizens (p. 174). This central contention remains unproven: To know this, we would need to compare a large group of Korean permanent residents with a large group of Korean citizens. Since we lack the latter, any speculation about how a politically integrated Korean community might behave remains exactly that.

Chung’s treatment of the comparative literature is at best cursory. A single-country case study does not need a comparative approach, but she aims at it, and that aim needs to be evaluated. Her discussion of Rogers Brubaker’s culturally determined model of citizenship does not note the extensive criticism to which that model has been subjected (see Dieter Gosewinkel, “Citizenship and Nationhood: The Historical Development of the German Case, in Ferran,” in Requejo Coll and Ulrich K.Preuss, eds.,

European Citizenship, 1998); it also does not note that Brubaker himself has adopted a more political understanding of citizenship in recent work (“Migration, Membership, and the Modern Nation-State: Internal and External Dimensions of the Politics of Belonging,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 41 [no. 1, 2010]: 61–78). The German case is invoked casually, and it seems chiefly with the elusive aim of finding a comparison that makes Japan’s approach to immigration and citizenship appear liberal. Her claim that Germany’s citizenship policy toward *Aussiedler* was a sort of *völkisch* clubbiness grossly oversimplifies the matter and is based on another book that examines Japan (p. 162; for the citation, see p. 186). The point (made again to relativize Japan’s restrictive approach) that all citizenship policies are made up of a mix of descent, birth, and residence is well taken, but it was made some years ago by Marc Howard (“Comparative Citizenship: An Agenda for Cross-National Research,” in *Perspectives on Politics* 4 [no. 3, 2006]: 443–55).

Finally, throughout the book, the author seems unclear as to how her own conclusions relate to postnationalism. She seems to think that her book provides partial confirmation of the theory. In fact, it is—were another needed—a searing indictment of it. Japanese and Korean hostility to political citizenship has left Koreans, rather unremarkably, politically excluded, and it has not (whatever one book cover endorsement suggests) undermined the dominant Japanese self-understanding as a homogeneous nation utterly opposed to immigration.

Whereas differences of interpretation between the author and this reader remain, there can be no question that this book is a significant achievement, one that deserves a spot in university libraries, on course syllabi, and in scholars’ private libraries.

Remaking Citizenship: Latina Immigrants and New American Politics. By Kathleen M. Coll. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010. 248p. \$65.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

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— Roberta Villalón, *St. John’s University*

What is citizenship? How have theorists understood citizenship so far? How have lay people made sense of their experiences as subjects/citizens? What can be learned from Latina immigrants in San Francisco as they struggled for recognition as being worthy of human dignity and citizenship entitlements since the 1990s? Kathleen Coll’s book tackles these long-standing questions about citizenship based on collaborative/participatory research from a cultural anthropological perspective. Ethnographically rich, *Remaking Citizenship* provides a counterargument to dominant liberal theories of citizenship by looking beyond the formalities of individualistic rights and duties and their enactment and enforcement by governmental authorities. By building on cultural and critical feminist studies of