Does Immigration Erode Social Capital? The Conditional Effects of Immigration-Generated Diversity on Trust, Membership, and Participation across 19 Countries, 1981–2000

CHRISTEL KESLER *University of Oxford*
IRENE BLOEMRAAD *University of California, Berkeley*

Given increasing immigration-driven diversity in most advanced democracies, social scientists and policy makers have posed questions about the possible negative effects of diversity on social policy and democratic participation. Scholars have examined the welfare state and redistribution (Gilens, 1999; Hero and Tolbert, 1996; Lieberman, 1998; Quadagno, 1994; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Alesina et al., 2001), but also, more recently, *collective-mindedness*, by which we mean phenomena such as social trust, civic engagement and political participation (Hooghe et al.,

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Christel Kesler, University of Oxford, christel.kesler@nuffield.ox.ac.uk. Nuffield College, New Road, Oxford, OX1 1NF United Kingdom.
Irene Bloemraad, University of California, Berkeley, bloemr@berkeley.edu. Department of Sociology, 410 Barrows Hall, MC #1980, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-1980, USA.

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2009; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 2000). In this article, we address the latter and ask whether diversity undermines the willingness of citizens to trust one another, to participate in collective endeavours and to be politically engaged.

Our analysis uses a cross-national, cross-sectional time-series dataset that combines individual-level and country-level information. We theorize and investigate variation in immigration's effects on collective-mindedness, and we propose explanations for cross-national differences, building on prior research on comparative civic engagement and social trust (Curtis et al., 2001; Curtis, Grabb, and Baer 1992; Delhey and Newton, 2005; Hooghe, et al., 2009; Paxton, 2002, 2007; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005; Ruiter and de Graaf, 2006; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). The over-time dimension of our analysis is innovative and offers a distinct advantage: we track changes *within* countries as well as across countries. Our findings show that there is nothing inevitable about declining collective-mindedness in the face of increasing diversity. Indeed, we find that countries with an institutional or policy context promoting economic equality and recognition and accommodation of immigrant minorities experience less dramatic or no declines in collective-mindedness.

Theoretical Background and Motivation

Recently, political scientists and economists have sounded the alarm about the negative repercussions of ethno-racial diversity for social capital and democratic vitality, suggesting that heterogeneity affects "public collective-mindedness"—attitudes about others in society or engagement in social and political actions in the name of a general collective good. Called "social capital" by some, public collective-mindedness has been linked not only to the welfare state and redistribution, but also to health, crime, economic productivity and children's educational success (Castiglione et al., 2008; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 2002).

Most prominently, Robert Putnam's recent work (2007) argues that diversity reduces social capital. Such declines are problematic, according to Putnam, because they undermine people's ability to solve collective problems. While Putnam (2000, 2007) defines social capital narrowly, as social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness, his empirical investigation is capacious, incorporating trust in others and various measures of civic and political engagement. Putnam reports that those living in diverse areas have less trust in neighbours and local leaders, lower political efficacy, lower levels of voter registration, lower expectations of others' co-operation on collective problems and less likelihood of working on community projects (2007: 149–51).

Abstract. This article is an attempt to qualify existing evidence that increasing diversity is detrimental to a vibrant civil society. We focus specifically on immigration-generated diversity, and argue that while it may have negative effects on some specific civic and political outcomes in some contexts, these effects vary widely across advanced democracies. Our argument rests on analysis of a cross-national, cross-sectional time-series dataset that brings together individual-level World Values Survey data with country-level variables. With these data, we track within-country changes over time in trust and engagement. We show that immigration can have a negative effect on social trust, organizational membership and political engagement, but that institutional arrangements shape this relationship in systematic ways. In more economically equal societies and in more multicultural countries (where cultural minorities are recognized and accommodated), the negative effects of immigration on trust and engagement are mitigated or even reversed. We conclude that there is no general link between immigration-generated diversity and collective-mindedness. Rather, the direction and strength of the relationship depend on institutional and policy contexts.

Résumé. Cet article vise à nuancer les preuves existantes que la diversité croissante porte préjudice à une société civile dynamique. Nous nous concentrons particulièrement sur la diversité produite par l'immigration. Nous soutenons que même si elle peut exercer une influence négative sur quelques indices dans certains contextes, ces effets varient considérablement selon le pays examiné parmi les démocraties avancées. Notre argument repose sur l'analyse d'un ensemble de données multinational, transversal et longitudinal qui rassemble des données au niveau individuel du *World Values Survey* avec des variables au niveau des pays. Au moyen de ces données, nous examinons les changements survenus à l'intérieur des pays, au fil du temps, sur le plan de la confiance et de l'engagement. Nous montrons que l'immigration peut avoir un effet négatif sur la confiance sociale, l'adhésion à des organisations et l'engagement politique, mais que les arrangements institutionnels influencent cette relation de manières systématiques. Dans les sociétés plus économiquement égales et dans les pays plus multiculturels (où les minorités culturelles sont reconnues et accommodées), les effets négatifs de l'immigration sur la confiance et l'engagement sont atténués, voire inversés. Nous concluons qu'il n'y a aucun lien général entre la diversité produite par l'immigration et l'esprit collectif. La direction et la force de la relation entre les deux dépendent plutôt des politiques et des contextes institutionnels.

Critically, contact with "out-group" members reduces trust in *both* out-group *and* in-group members. "Diversity seems to trigger *not* in-group/out-group division, but anomie or social isolation; ... people living in ethnically diverse settings appear to 'hunker down'" (Putnam 2007: 149). While there are several measures of engagement in Putnam's study that *increase* with diversity, the primary argument rests on indicators that decrease with diversity.

Earlier empirical work on the United States provides additional support for this argument. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find that individuals in communities with greater racial and income heterogeneity (but not ethnic fractionalization) report less trust in others. A parallel analysis (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000) of civic participation finds broadly similar results. Costa and Kahn (2003) report negative correlations between racial fractionalization or "birthplace" fractionalization and volunteering or membership, but no correlation between fractionalization

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and trust. In most cases, Costa and Kahn report that income inequality also has an independent negative effect.[1] These earlier studies support the contention that "In the short to medium run ... immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital" (Putnam 2007: 138).

Evidence beyond the United States is far more mixed. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000: 848) note that countries with high levels of trust, high associational activity and strong norms of civic co-operation are also economically equal and "ethnically homogeneous."[2] Studying Canada, Soroka and colleagues (2006) find that ethno-racial diversity somewhat lowers generalized trust in others (though not trust in government), but Kazemipur (2006) finds a positive association between municipal-level diversity and trust across Canadian cities. Costa and Kahn (2003:107) note that some countries seem to conform to the American pattern (Finland, Germany, and the United Kingdom), but that others do not, such as Sweden (relatively high heterogeneity, high membership) or Portugal (low heterogeneity, low membership). An analysis of European countries by Hooghe and colleagues (2009) finds that of 26 static and dynamic indicators of diversity, only one weakly correlates with lower levels of trust, a null finding echoed in Gesthuizen and colleagues' study (2009) that evaluated a range of collective-mindedness indicators. Conversely, in an analysis of 60 industrialized and less developed countries, Delhey and Newton (2005) find a consistent, negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity on generalized trust, even after taking out the homogeneous, and trusting, Nordic countries of Europe.[3] In sum, the comparative research provides no definitive response to the question of whether the diversity-and-social capital linkage is a generalized phenomenon or a case of American exceptionalism. Our research aims to elucidate the competing empirical evidence by theorizing *why* societies might differ in their reaction to immigration-related diversity and applying our analysis to multiple countries over time.

Mediating Institutions: Theorizing Cross-National Variation

While a universal, negative response to diversity is possible, we believe that national contexts mediate reactions to diversity.[4] We concur with Hooghe (2007: 712) that scholars must specify the contexts in which we find a relationship between heterogeneity and social capital, rather than lament the negative relation. Institutional arrangements matter. As Rothstein and Stolle (2008) theorize and Delhey and Newton demonstrate, "good government is an essential structural basis of trust" (2005: 323).[5] We know that immigrants' civic and political engagement depends on the policy environment and institutional context of the receiving society

(Bloemraad, 2006; Ireland, 1994; Koopmans et al., 2005). In a similar way, societies may filter how the majority understands and responds to immigration. We advance two types of country-level factors that could mediate the response to immigration: those that shape *economic* security and those that address potential conflicts related to *cultural* diversity. We expand on each in turn.

Economic security and inequality

Advanced democracies vary in the extent to which labour markets are regulated (for instance, through minimum wage laws and employment protection legislation) and the state cushions the fall in instances of labour market failure (through, for example, welfare state income transfers) (DiPrete, 2002). Liberal, market-oriented regimes such as the United States tend to have less regulation and less cushion than other advanced democracies, and both contribute to the comparatively high degree of income inequality in the United States (Luxembourg Income Study, 2007). A number of scholars contend that increasing economic insecurity and inequality account for the post-World War II decline in social trust in the United States (Arneil, 2006; Uslaner, 1999; Uslaner and Brown, 2005; Wuthnow, 2002). Such inequality could heighten any negative response to immigration.

Prior research suggests two mechanisms through which economic inequality might diminish social capital. One is social-psychological: greater inequality may undermine the sense of shared fate or solidarity needed for social trust and collective action (Delhey and Newton, 2005; Uslaner and Brown, 2005), and it could diminish optimism and a sense of control over one's life, which Uslaner (2002) maintains are foundation stones for generalized trust. A second mechanism is grounded in the politics of economic scarcity: people may perceive real stakes in ethnic group differences because of threat to group position or due to general economic conditions, regardless of individual self-interest (Citrin et al., 1997; Quillian, 1995). We hypothesize that in countries with less income inequality, the possible negative consequences of increasing immigration are attenuated.[6] This suggests that the United States (and other more market-oriented regimes) might display a more negative diversity effect than countries where residents enjoy greater economic security and equality.

Cultural threat and multiculturalism policies

In his analysis of US immigration policy, Zolberg (1999, 2006) argues that the politics of immigration breeds strange bedfellows: free-market proponents on the economic right join with socio-cultural progressives to support migration, while those on the economic left join with social

conservatives worried about immigration. Migration raises the specter of economic threat but also generates cultural fears of fragmentation (Huntington, 2004; Zolberg and Woon, 1999).

Scholars debate whether policies—particularly around "multiculturalism"—attenuate or exacerbate perceptions of cultural threat. Multicultural proponents contend that under democratic government by the majority, minorities face disadvantages of recognition and accommodation, requiring culturally specific minority group rights (Kymlicka, 1995, 2001; Taylor, 1994). The primary purpose of such accommodations is to prevent majority domination, but scholars hint that these policies may mute negative reactions to immigration-generated diversity, thereby facilitating generalized trust and inter-group engagement in civic and political life. Starting in the 1970s, "old" (Canada and Australia, for example) and "new" (Sweden and the Netherlands, for example) immigration countries began to embrace multiculturalism. These governments provided funds for ethnic and immigrant organizations and non-majority language learning, accommodations for religious and cultural minorities, and public recognition.

Since the late 1990s, however, commentators observe a "backlash" against multiculturalism (Brubaker, 2001; Entzinger, 2003; Joppke, 2001). Critics blame multicultural policies for exacerbating social divisions, fuelling divisiveness, retarding immigrants' integration and, in some cases, undermining a country's liberal democratic values (Barry, 2001; Gitlin, 1995; Hollinger, 2000; Huntington, 2004). From this viewpoint, multicultural policies exacerbate any negative relationship between diversity and trust, though increasing divisiveness could fuel rather than temper civic and political engagement.

Empirically, there is some evidence that multiculturalism promotes collective-mindedness among *immigrants* by providing them with instrumental support and symbolic legitimacy, which could increase overall "stocks" of social capital as immigrant populations grow (Bloemraad, 2006; Vermeulen and Berger, 2008). It is less clear how multiculturalism affects social trust for *majority* populations. Hooghe and colleagues (2007) find that multiculturalism policies have no direct effect, positive or negative, on cross-national differences in trust and ethnocentrism, but they do not test whether such policies mediate the diversity-trust link. We thus identify two competing hypotheses: one suggests that multiculturalism promotes trust and engagement in the context of diversity, while the other suggests that it ignites a backlash, lowering aggregate trust and possibly willingness to engage in collective endeavours. We also consider a third hypothesis: that the interaction between diversity and multiculturalism does not affect trust and engagement in the same way. Multiculturalism policies might increase general distrust by highlighting differences, but this might motivate people to join a group, rather than hunker down.

Conceptualizing social capital

The possibility of differential effects for trust, on the one hand, and collective engagement, on the other, raises an important issue about conceptualizations of social capital. As Castiglione notes (2008: 558), definitions of social capital range from "thin" structural accounts focused on networks (see Lin 2001) to morally "thick" notions of social trust and cohesion (see Uslaner 2002). Theorists thus debate the centrality of trust for social capital, and empirical studies differ on whether trust and engagement co-vary (for example, Putnam 2000) or whether trust and engagement are independent from each other (Uslaner, 2008; Uslaner and Brown, 2005). Our own view is that in some contexts *distrust* may be a rational, useful sentiment that fuels civic and political engagement, but for this analysis we purposely remain agnostic, running models on three possible indicators of social capital: generalized trust, civic engagement and non-electoral political participation.[7]

Data and Methods

To investigate how institutional contexts mediate the relationship between diversity and collective-mindedness, we conduct a cross-sectional time-series analysis of social trust, organizational memberships and political action. We pay particular attention to changes over time and how these changes vary across countries with different characteristics. Individual-level data come from the World Values Surveys (WVS) (European Values Study Foundation and World Values Survey Association, 2006), conducted in a range of countries since the early 1980s. There are up to four waves of data for each country, from the early 1980s, around 1990, the mid-1990s, and around 2000.[8] We limit our analysis to advanced democracies for which we have data for multiple waves, so our analyses include 17 to 19 countries, depending on the outcome. The countries include Anglo settler societies (Australia, Canada and the United States); pre-2004-expansion EU-15 countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom); two non-EU Western European countries (Norway and Switzerland); and Japan.[9] Because of item availability, in the analysis of political engagement we drop Switzerland and, in the analysis of organizational memberships, Australia and Switzerland. At the country-year level, the sample size ranges from 47 to 60, and at the individual level from 66,573 to 77,756, depending on the outcome. We merge individual-level WVS data with macro-level variables compiled from several sources, including the United Nations (2005), the World Bank (2007), the Luxembourg Income Study (2007) and secondary sources, as outlined below.

Data limitations require us to focus on nation–states as the unit of analysis. This contrasts with much work that focuses on smaller, sub-national units (regions, cities, neighbourhoods, and so forth). While not always articulated, the sub-national focus derives from a theoretical perspective centred on inter-personal interactions. We contend that collective-mindedness also stems from *national level* institutional arrangements and policies, making this a critical level of analysis.[10] Ideally, we would want cross-national data at a sub-national level to study local and national context effects, but we know of no available data source that includes the range of countries we do *and* that measures immigration (or any other form of ethno-racial diversity) at a sub-national level *over time*. It remains an empirical question whether people are responsive to changing immigrant presence in their neighbourhoods, in the country as a whole, or both, with such reactions plausibly dependent on institutional contexts. Our results are not strictly comparable to studies that focus on sub-national units or use other measures of diversity, but our study provides an important starting point for highlighting the ways in which national contexts can mediate social attitudes and actions.

Dependent variables

We selected dependent variables that tap the main components of collective-mindedness, are available over multiple waves of the WVS, and overlap with prior research on social capital. We use a standard measure of generalized trust, which asks, "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" While we recognize the shortcomings of this formulation (for example, that "most people" remains undifferentiated and that we might trust the same person differently in different contexts or for different tasks), our analytic strategy requires consistent measurement over two decades. This is the best available variable, and it is used in the majority of previous studies we have discussed. Every WVS wave includes the generalized trust question, resulting in 19 countries and 60 country-years. We code "most people can be trusted" as one and "you need to be very careful" as zero. The mean level of trust across all surveys is .403, ranging from .174 in Portugal to .639 in Norway. Table 1 shows the mean value of each dependent variable by country.

Organizational membership captures the concept of civic engagement and is one way to tap social networks. We use a series of items about membership in specific types of organizations. Unfortunately, these membership items are not available in the third wave of the WVS, so we have only 17 countries and 47 country-years available for this analysis.[11] We create a dichotomous variable indicating whether a respondent belongs to *any* of six types of organization (social welfare service organizations

TABLE 1
Levels of Social Trust, Organizational Membership, and Political Action, by Country

Country	Social Trust	Org. Membership	Political Action
Australia	0.431		0.768
Austria	0.327	0.351	0.541
Belgium	0.313	0.362	0.551
Canada	0.455	0.505	0.739
Denmark	0.588	0.325	0.569
Finland	0.553	0.554	0.492
France	0.228	0.194	0.618
Germany	0.341	0.306	0.619
Ireland	0.415	0.368	0.460
Italy	0.322	0.206	0.585
Japan	0.422	0.222	0.555
Netherlands	0.526	0.675	0.530
Norway	0.639	0.344	0.637
Portugal	0.174	0.169	0.354
Spain	0.344	0.185	0.339
Sweden	0.623	0.556	0.749
Switzerland	0.394		
UK	0.372	0.347	0.739
US	0.415	0.674	0.726
All countries	0.403	0.360	0.589

Source: World Values Survey, averages across multiple waves

for elderly, handicapped, or deprived people; religious or church organizations; education, arts, music, or cultural organizations; Third World development or human rights organizations; conservation, environment, or animal rights organizations; and youth work organizations). The mean membership level across all surveys is .360, ranging from .169 in Portugal to .675 in the Netherlands.

While political participation is not strictly social capital, many scholars use it in their analyses because it is seen as flowing from trust and civic engagement or because it taps trust or engagement in a political system. We include it in our analysis for these reasons, and because commentators have suggested that culturally distinct migrant groups (often Muslims in Europe, sometimes Mexicans in the United States) undermine democratic vitality (Bawer, 2006; Huntington, 2004). Our measure comes from a standard battery of items about specific non-electoral political actions: signing a petition, joining a boycott and attending a lawful demonstration.[12] The original questions have three response categories: "have done," "might do" and "would never do." We collapse "might do" and "would never do," and our summary variable indicates whether someone has *ever* done any of these actions. We exclude Switzerland because

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the item is available only for one wave, resulting in 18 countries and 58 country-years. The mean value for the political action measure, across all surveys, is .589, ranging from .339 in Spain to .768 in Australia.

We analyze each dependent variable separately because we do not think that they necessarily tap the same underlying phenomenon, nor do we believe that diversity necessarily affects each in the same way. Indeed, empirically, the three outcomes are only weakly correlated.[13] At the individual level, the bivariate correlations are .13, .15 and .18, for trust and political action, trust and organizational membership, and organizational membership and political action, respectively; at the country-year level, they are .02, .32 and .29. These figures, especially the weak relationship between social trust and political action, lend credence to our argument that high levels of participation do not require generalized trust in other people.

Explanatory variables

Our primary focus is macro-comparative, but our models include individual-level control variables for gender, marital status, age, education, income, employment status and religious affiliation. Gender and marital status are dichotomous variables indicating being female and currently married. Age is a simple continuous variable. The education variable measures the age at which an individual left full-time education, bottom-censored at 12 and top-censored at 21.[14] We include a rough control for a respondent's household income, corresponding approximately to country-specific income deciles. There are more missing responses for income (around 17 per cent) than for other variables, so we include a variable indicating missing income rather than dropping these cases; the income coefficient thus pertains only to those with non-missing income information. Employment status has three categories: employed, unemployed and out of the labour force. Employed is the reference category. Finally, the religion variable taps whether a respondent is religiously affiliated, and if so, with which broad religion. No religious affiliation is the reference, and other categories include Catholic, Protestant, and "other." Means of all explanatory variables, by country, are reported in an appendix.

Research on diversity and public collective-mindedness is broadly concerned with human diversity of race, ethnicity, culture, religion, language or national origin. Such diversity can be a longstanding feature of a particular country—Belgium's two language groups or the United States' African American population—or "new" diversity from contemporary immigration. Unfortunately, much previous research does not differentiate between longstanding diversity and immigration. We concentrate our analysis on immigrants since immigration policy is perceived, by scholars and policy makers, as one of the few levers available to control diver-

sity. Our key independent variable is the percentage of the population that is foreign born, specific to country and year. This information comes from the United Nations (2005), and is available for each country every five years. We interpolate values for years that lie within these five-year periods.[15] We use the foreign-born measure since it is the simplest measure of immigration, allowing for the most straightforward interpretation of results. Because immigration statistics were not standardized across countries until very recently, this is also the most reliable measure. We recognize, however, that the native-born population might not view all immigrants alike: a Swede in Norway, for example, is likely seen less as an outsider than a member of the country's significant Pakistani-origin population. For this reason, we conduct a sensitivity analysis using an alternative measure that excludes immigrants from wealthy, industrialized countries. The two measures of the immigrant population, though not identical in the cross section, track each other closely over time, such that the results are largely similar regardless of which measure we use.[16]

Table 2 reports the size of foreign-born populations from 1980 to 2000 by country. It reveals dramatic variation. For example, Japan starts

TABLE 2
Percent Foreign Born 1980–2000, by Country

			Change 1980–2000	
Country	1980	2000	Percentage points	Percentage
Australia	21.1	21.4	0.3	1%
Austria	3.7	11.4	7.7	208%
Belgium	8.8	8.5	−0.3	−3%
Canada	15.5	18.1	2.6	17%
Denmark	3.2	5.7	2.5	78%
Finland	0.8	2.6	1.8	225%
France	10.9	10.6	−0.3	−3%
Germany	7.5	11.9	4.4	59%
Ireland	6.6	10.1	3.5	53%
Italy	2.0	2.8	0.8	40%
Japan	0.6	1.3	0.7	117%
Netherlands	3.5	9.8	6.3	180%
Norway	3.1	6.6	3.5	113%
Portugal	2.7	6.2	3.5	130%
Spain	0.6	4.0	3.4	567%
Sweden	7.3	11.2	3.9	53%
Switzerland	16.9	21.8	4.9	29%
UK	6.3	8.1	1.8	29%
US	6.2	12.2	6.0	97%
All countries	6.7	9.7	3.0	45%

Source: United Nations (2005)

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and ends the period with the smallest foreign-born population (1.3 percent in 2000). In contrast, almost 22 percent of Switzerland's population was foreign born in 2000. Rates of change also vary widely, from a slight decrease in Belgium and France, to an increase of more than 5 percentage points in Austria, the Netherlands, and the United States.

Our other key independent variables derive from our hypotheses that economic inequality and multiculturalism mediate the relationship between immigration-driven diversity and collective-mindedness. We use two indicators of economic conditions, GDP per capita and a Gini coefficient. Figures for GDP per capita, expressed in purchasing power parities (in thousands of constant 2000 U.S. dollars), come from the World Bank (2007). The Gini figures come from the Luxembourg Income Study (2007).[17] Gini figures are not available for every calendar year, and we use available data from the early 1980s to the present to interpolate figures for other years. Gini coefficients measure inequality in income distribution, with values closer to zero representing greater equality and values closer to one greater inequality. Among these countries, the Gini coefficient in 2000 ranged from .225 (Denmark) to .385 (Portugal). We use Gini coefficients to capture a range of underlying dynamics, from redistribution policies to labour market regulations.[18]

To evaluate the cultural threat and multiculturalism hypothesis, we rely on a typology developed by Banting and colleagues (2006), which categorizes countries as strong, moderate or weak on multiculturalism policies. Banting and colleagues enumerate eight types of policy: formal affirmation of multiculturalism; multicultural school curricula; insertion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in public media or licensing; exemption codes for ethno-religious minorities (of dress, Sunday store closing, and so forth); dual citizenship; state funding for minority cultural activities; funding of bilingual or mother tongue language instruction; and affirmative action for disadvantaged groups. Canada and Australia rank as the only two "strong" multicultural states; the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom rank as "moderate"; and France, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland are "weak." We group together "strong" and "moderate" countries to indicate those which have taken some steps to accommodate and recognize minorities.[19] Table 3 presents the association between the two key macro-level variables.

Modelling strategy

We use multi-level logistic regression models, where individuals are nested within country-year-specific surveys.[20] The model takes the general form

TABLE 3
Associations between Macro-Level Independent Variables

	Multiculturalism		
	Low	High	Total
Gini mean	0.282	0.284	0.283
n (country-years)	37	23	60
n (countries)	12	7	19

Note: Gini means are calculated at the country-year level.

$$\ln[P_{ij}/(1-P_{ij})] = \beta_0 + \beta_1 d_i + \beta_2 X_{ij} + \beta_3 X_i + \beta_4 * \textit{foreign born}_i + \beta_5 X_i * \textit{foreign born}_i + \epsilon_{ij} + \zeta_i$$

where i and j index surveys and individuals, respectively and P is the probability of one of the collective-mindedness measures as a function of country dummy variables in d_i, individual- and macro-level variables in X_{ij} and X_i, the foreign-born variable, and interactions between other macro-level variables in X_i and the foreign born variable. The terms ϵ and ζ are the individual- and macro-level error terms, respectively.

We include country fixed effects because our primary interest is in explaining *within*-country variation over time in levels of trust, membership and engagement, and not in explaining *stable* differences between countries. Any unmeasured features of a country that are constant over time are absorbed into the country fixed effects. This means that the main effects of time-constant country-level variables cannot be estimated, although we can and do examine interactions of these variables with the foreign-born variable, since the latter does vary over time.

Results

We begin with a baseline model shown in Table 4. This model includes only individual-level controls and country fixed effects. Results are not particularly surprising and are consistent with previous studies of similar outcomes (Ruiter and de Graaf, 2006; Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001). Women and men are indistinguishable in terms of levels of social trust; women have somewhat higher levels of organizational membership than men, but men are more likely than women to engage in political actions. Aside from some statistically insignificant results, being married, older, more educated and in a higher income bracket make a person more trusting of others, more likely to belong to

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TABLE 4

Log Odds of Social Trust, Organizational Membership, and Political Action (Baseline Model)

	Social Trust		Org. Membership		Political Action	
	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se
Individual controls						
Female	0.023	0.016	0.195**	0.019	−0.054**	0.018
Male (reference)						
Married	0.039*	0.017	−0.028	0.020	0.169**	0.019
Not married (reference)						
Age	0.006**	0.001	0.012**	0.001	0.000	0.001
Years of education	0.114**	0.003	0.149**	0.004	0.142**	0.003
Income decile	0.060**	0.004	0.037**	0.004	0.052**	0.004
Missing income	−0.169**	0.022	−0.147**	0.026	−0.243**	0.024
Non-missing income (reference)						
Unemployed	−0.315**	0.037	−0.267**	0.044	−0.089*	0.038
Out of labour force	−0.164**	0.022	−0.059*	0.026	−0.378**	0.024
Employed (reference)						
Catholic	−0.019	0.024	0.561**	0.028	−0.373**	0.025
Protestant	0.122**	0.026	0.923**	0.032	−0.183**	0.029
Other religion	0.004	0.037	0.998**	0.047	−0.298**	0.043
No religious affiliation (reference)						
Country fixed effects						
Australia	0.373	0.195			0.406	0.325
Austria	−0.058	0.196	−1.115**	0.334	−0.487	0.324
Belgium	−0.235	0.173	−1.134**	0.299	−0.757**	0.286
Canada	0.292#	0.172	−0.710*	0.298	0.045	0.286
Denmark	0.815**	0.174	−1.678**	0.300	−0.737*	0.287
Finland	0.587**	0.175	−0.924**	0.336	−1.236**	0.288
France	−0.593**	0.175	−1.817**	0.300	−0.353	0.287
Germany	−0.109	0.159	−1.452**	0.298	−0.466#	0.264
Ireland	0.374*	0.174	−1.018**	0.300	−0.742**	0.287
Italy	−0.029	0.173	−1.772**	0.300	−0.268	0.286
Japan	0.168	0.161	−2.007**	0.337	−0.916**	0.266
Netherlands	0.604**	0.174	0.405	0.300	−0.880**	0.287
Norway	1.077**	0.174	−1.748**	0.335	−0.365	0.287
Portugal	−0.753**	0.202	−1.749**	0.338	−1.006**	0.326
Spain	0.176	0.152	−1.789**	0.280	−1.219**	0.252
Sweden	0.856**	0.161	−0.620*	0.300	0.029	0.267
Switzerland	−0.029	0.197				
United Kingdom	0.039	0.161	−1.249**	0.299	0.372	0.287
United States (reference)						
Constant	−0.546**	0.115	−0.033	0.213	1.176**	0.189
Level 2 variance	0.048**	0.010	0.130**	0.028	0.136**	0.026
Wald χ^2 (df)	2718.70 (29)		3276.90 (27)		4224.53 (28)	

Note: Continuous variables are centred at their means.
* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; # $p < .10$ (two-tailed test).

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an organization, and more likely to engage in political actions, whereas being unemployed or out of the labour force has a negative effect.[21] Religious affiliation has very different effects on the three outcomes. Consistent with prior research, religious affiliation boosts the probability of organizational membership, though this is more true for Protestant and "other" than for Catholic affiliation. The opposite is true for political action: the non-affiliated have the highest rates of participation, followed by Protestants, "others" and Catholics. Finally, Protestants have higher levels of trust than the other three groups, which are indistinguishable from one another.

The models in Table 5 begin to answer our key questions of interest: whether changes in a country's immigrant population size affect levels of trust and engagement, and whether this relationship varies across institutional contexts. Model 5.1 is identical to the baseline model but adds the immigration variable along with a control for GDP.[22] We see that the immigration variable has an insignificant effect on trust and political action, but a significant, *positive* effect on membership. So the initial cross-national evidence here suggests no reason to believe that immigration erodes social capital and, in fact, may actually boost some forms of participation. Note, however, that model 5.1 shows only average effects across all countries; the possibility remains that the immigration effect could vary systematically across different *kinds* of societies. That is, we might see a negative effect of immigration in one subset of countries, but a null or even positive effect elsewhere, which produce no net effect of immigration when we look at all countries together. We turn to this question of varying immigration effects for the remainder of our discussion. To answer it, we examine interactions between the foreign-born variable and institutional and policy context variables. We do this for income inequality and multiculturalism policies separately (models 5.2 and 5.3), and then we turn to more complex models with multiple macro-level interactions (model 5.4).

We hypothesize that in countries with greater economic insecurity, residents might feel more threatened by immigration, and therefore withdraw more from collective life. As the results of model 5.2 show, we find some support for this contention. This model includes main effects of GDP and percentage of foreign born, as before, and adds effects for Gini and an interaction between Gini and percentage of foreign born. Given the interaction, the main effects of Gini and percentage of foreign born pertain to a situation in which the other variable is set to its mean. For our purposes, the most interesting result here is the negative and significant interaction between Gini and percentage of foreign born across all three outcomes.[23] This means that the effect of immigration on trust and engagement is more negative (or at least less positive) in contexts of greater income inequality. For social trust, the foreign-born effect becomes

TABLE 5

Effects of Foreign Born Population Size on Log Odds of Social Trust, Organizational Membership, and Political Action

	Social Trust		Org. Membership		Political Action	
Model	coef	se	coef	se	coef	se
Model 5.1						
GDP ($000s)	−0.006	0.014	−0.004	0.023	0.104**	0.013
%Foreign born	0.004	0.036	0.125*	0.059	−0.054	0.035
Constant	−0.515**	0.129	−0.070	0.216	0.634**	0.124
Level 2 variance	0.048**	0.009	0.105**	0.023	0.043**	0.009
Wald χ^2 (df)	2720.60 (31)		3326.14 (29)		4533.37 (30)	
Model 5.2						
GDP ($000s)	0.010	0.012	−0.003	0.023	0.105**	0.013
%Foreign born (FB)	−0.003	0.030	0.106#	0.056	−0.068*	0.032
Gini	−6.414**	1.843	2.758	3.352	1.525	2.015
%FB * Gini	−1.266**	0.285	−1.312*	0.576	−0.934**	0.309
Constant	−0.118	0.140	−0.121	0.255	0.628**	0.154
Level 2 variance	0.031**	0.006	0.092**	0.020	0.035**	0.008
Wald χ^2 (df)	2875.81 (33)		3364.10 (31)		4618.28 (32)	
Model 5.3						
GDP ($000s)	−0.007	0.013	−0.001	0.021	0.105**	0.013
%Foreign born (FB)	0.043	0.042	0.024	0.065	−0.080#	0.041
%FB * Multiculturalism	−0.077#	0.045	0.189**	0.066	0.049	0.044
Constant	−0.480**	0.127	−0.126	0.201	0.611**	0.125
Level 2 variance	0.045**	0.009	0.089**	0.019	0.042**	0.009
Wald χ^2 (df)	2738.71 (32)		3371.96 (30)		4541.97 (31)	
Model 5.4						
GDP ($000s)	0.009	0.012	0.007	0.020	0.108**	0.012
Gini	−6.302**	1.882	0.638	2.967	0.779	1.978
%Foreign born (FB)	0.003	0.036	−0.025	0.059	−0.112**	0.038
%FB * Gini	−1.241**	0.298	−1.824**	0.519	−1.112**	0.311
%FB*Multiculturalism	−0.012	0.040	0.236**	0.061	0.084*	0.041
Constant	−0.120	0.140	−0.071	0.222	0.638**	0.149
Level 2 variance	0.031**	0.006	0.068**	0.015	0.033**	0.007
Wald χ^2 (df)	2876.85 (34)		3460.16 (32)		4656.02 (33)	

Notes: All models include individual controls and country fixed effects, not shown here. Omitted categories are male, unmarried, available income information, employed, no religious affiliation, USA, and low multiculturalism. Continuous variables are centred at their means.
* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; # $p < .10$ (two-tailed test).

negative when a country's Gini coefficient is just below the mean, at about .284. Since the United States has income inequality far above this figure, the negative correlation between diversity and social trust found in prior studies of the United States might stem in part from high inequality. For organizational memberships, the foreign-born effect becomes neg-

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ative when a country's Gini is about .081 above the mean, at about .367. This is higher than the actual Gini for all countries but Portugal, so here, higher inequality implies less positive rather than more negative effects of immigration. For political action, the foreign-born effect becomes negative when a country's Gini is .072 below the mean, or .214, so countries with the range of inequality we observe will almost always have a negative effect of immigration on political action, with the effect attenuated in more equal countries.

We also hypothesized that multiculturalism policies will mediate the cultural threat of immigration, but this could have different consequences for engagement versus trust. We find that, in fact, such policies do appear to have different effects on different outcomes. Model 5.3 shows that the foreign-born effect on trust is slightly exacerbated in more multicultural states, but these same more multicultural countries experience higher organizational membership with greater immigration. There is no significant effect of multiculturalism on the relationship between immigration and political engagement.[24] For organizational memberships, a resident of a country without multiculturalism policies will experience no effect of increasing immigration, whereas an otherwise similar person's probability of membership in a more multiculturalist country increases by .053 in response to a one percentage point increase in the size of the foreign-born population.[25] The different pattern of effects for trust and membership implies that multicultural policies might have participatory benefits but not necessarily generate a strong sense of social cohesion.

Model 5.4 includes both macro-level interactions, and our major conclusions remain the same. The main effect of the foreign-born variable here refers to a non-multiculturalist country with average income inequality. For such a country, as the percentage of foreign born increases, levels of trust, membership and participation do decrease, though not significantly so for trust. But the conclusion that immigration harms collective-mindedness must be qualified. For each outcome, institutional arrangements mediate the foreign-born effect. Any straightforward story about the effect of immigration is impossible.

For all three outcomes, the interaction between income inequality and percentage of foreign born is negative and significant, as we saw in the model with only this single interaction. This suggests that immigration has a more negative or less positive effect in contexts of high income inequality. Multiculturalism policies, on the other hand, have different mediating effects for different outcomes. In the social trust model, there is still a small but statistically insignificant negative interaction between multiculturalism policies and percentage of foreign born, but the effect of immigration on organizational and political participation is actually significantly less negative or more positive in multiculturalist countries. Thus, multiculturalism policies seem to *increase* civic and political

participation in the context of an expanding immigrant population, but have no significant effect on social cohesion (as measured by generalized social trust).

Figure 1 illustrates the magnitude of key effects in Table 5, using coefficients from model 5.4. The predicted probabilities in this figure refer to an individual with baseline characteristics (male, unmarried, employed, and not religiously affiliated, of average age, education and income) in a country with average GDP and with unmeasured characteristics like those of the United States.[26] For each outcome, we illustrate the effect of a one percentage point increase in the size of the immigrant population (from the mean of 7.8 per cent to 8.8 per cent) in each of four country types: those with and without multiculturalism policies and with "minimum" and "maximum" income inequality (within the range of Gini coefficients in the data, from .20 to .38). The first thing to note is that immigration has no negative effect on any of the outcomes in a hypothetical country with both low income inequality and multiculturalism policies. In fact, for all three outcomes, immigration's effect is positive, and this is particularly so for the probability of organizational membership. In contrast, states with high income inequality and weak multiculturalism policies experience a negative effect of immigration on all three outcomes. The other two country types are less easily summarized since the relative magnitude of the inequality and multiculturalism effects varies across outcomes, but the clear conclusion is that there is no universal effect of immigration on trust, membership and participation.

Overall, our analysis suggests that any relationship between immigration and collective-mindedness is mediated by institutional structures and state policies. If immigration is threatening—economically or culturally—it can lead to "hunkering down," as documented in the American case, but this is not universally so. Social arrangements fundamentally shape these tendencies.

Implications and Caveats: Is the United States Exceptional?

Our findings extend and qualify previous studies. Focusing specifically on immigration, our analysis supports the view that immigration decreases trust, civic engagement and political participation in *some* advanced democracies. However, our analysis also raises important qualifications. In societies of relative income equality, residents are far less likely to withdraw from collective life in the face of immigration. Multiculturalism policies might reduce general social trust in the face of immigration, but they also appear to increase engagement. In countries that have both low income inequality and relatively strong multiculturalism policies, all negative effects of immigration on collective-mindedness disappear; we actually see *higher* levels of organizational and political participation with

FIGURE 1
Mediating Effects of Income Inequality and Multiculturalism on the Relationship between Immigration and Collective-Mindedness



Notes: Coefficients are taken from Model 5.4. Predicted probabilities are for an individual with baseline characteristics in a country with average GDP and unmeasured characteristics like those of the United States.

immigration. While increases in participation do not necessarily mean that everyone is "getting along" —native-born residents might organize to oppose immigration—trust and engagement both *increase* with immigration in more economically equal societies.

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More generally, our findings speak to a central theoretical claim: the need to take institutions seriously. Positing a general, negative relationship between diversity and collective-mindedness requires a universalist account of human behaviours and attitudes. Such an account, predicated on innate psychological traits, differential interests or fear of social change must be tempered by sociologists' accumulated knowledge about how institutions and social context channel humans' beliefs and actions. The United States might not be unique in experiencing decreased collective-mindedness in the face of diversity, but the American pattern is not the only type of response.

Our research comes with a number of caveats, challenges which we hope will spur further thinking and research on the topic. First, we treat multiculturalism policies as time-invariant. The reality of current political debates suggests otherwise. Since the late 1990s, we have witnessed a backlash against multiculturalism in some countries. Future work can build on the index created by Banting and colleagues (2006) to track changes in policies over time. We could then use policy changes as "natural experiments" for further analysis.

A second concern is the unit of analysis. Diversity is not necessarily experienced at the level of the nation–state, and this is a problem for an analysis that is unable to focus on sub-national units. Country-level analyses such as ours will hopefully lay the groundwork for targeted, cross-national case studies of how these processes operate in local communities.

We focus on immigration, specifically, because we are skeptical of studies that conflate various kinds of diversity. Our primary analysis relies on an undifferentiated measure of the immigrant population, but immigrants who are more racially, linguistically or religiously different from the mainstream population may well contribute more to a feeling of "diversity." Sensitivity analysis suggests that our findings are robust to an alternative definition that excludes immigrants who might be considered most similar to mainstream populations. Of course, it is difficult with available data sources to make differentiated measures truly comparable, but we find it reassuring that our main conclusions appear to hold regardless of which of these two definitions of the migrant population we use.

Our data also do not permit us to identify individual immigrants. If higher aggregate levels of trust or engagement have positive consequences on a society regardless of who trusts or is engaged, this is not particularly problematic. But if institutions have different effects on *immigrant* engagement than *native-born* engagement, we would want to know who is driving the patterns. Unfortunately, current large-scale comparative datasets do not oversample the foreign-born population, and the WVS does not uniformly identify foreign-born individuals. Given the relatively large changes in trust, membership and engagement that we observe as the immigrant population grows, we do not think that the immigrant

population itself could be entirely responsible for the patterns we find. Changes in native-born attitudes and behaviour must be part of the story. Furthermore, if we take the perspective that "social capital" is a public good, our findings are important regardless of the precise mechanism.

In short, much work remains to be done, but the general framework we have developed, considering the ways in which institutional arrangements and policies shape diversity's effects, is one that can and should be incorporated into future research. We conclude by reiterating our main findings: we find no *universal* link between immigration-generated diversity and collective-mindedness. The direction and strength of the relationship depend on institutional arrangements and policies. This insight is critical if we wish to assess future prospects for social capital in advanced democracies, as these societies grow ever more diverse.

Notes

1 Using aggregated state-level data, Hero (2003) finds a negative association between a state's social capital score and racial diversity, though a later analysis by Alexander (2007) suggests that the most important determinants of social capital across US states are average level of education and the percentage of people engaged in farming; he finds no significant effects of racial composition or illegal immigration.

2 We question their characterization because one such country is Canada, not ethnically homogeneous by any standard.

3 See also Knack and Keefer (1997).

4 We might expect a universal correlation if all humans are psychologically hardwired to engage in social withdrawal under conditions of heterogeneity. Alternate general theories rest on models of differential interests, or Durkheimian anomie. We contend that national contexts—and likely other social arrangements—mediate such general tendencies, if they exist, in significant ways.

5 Delhey and Newton (2005) find that the negative effect of ethnic fractionalization diminishes substantially once models control for stable, democratic government. Their research, and other studies that compare highly developed Western nations with less-developed or post-Communist countries, suggest that rule of law, lack of corruption and stable democracy are important determinants of social capital (Gesthuizen et al., 2009; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005). Given our focus on highly developed Western nations—a focus supported by the fact that social capital may work quite differently in non-Western countries (Rossteutscher, 2008)—we do not include these factors in our analysis.

6 This theoretical argument builds on Swank and Betz's empirical finding (2003) that universal welfare states attenuate the positive correlation between the volume of asylum seekers and support for far-right parties in Europe, but see Anderson and Paskeviciute (2006) for an opposing view comparing established democracies and developing countries.

7 As Arneil points out (2006), the conceptual roots of social capital are fed by two different normative structures. A benign, functional approach undergirds the micro-level, rational actor theory of Coleman (1988; 1990), also adopted by Putnam, where relations between people create social networks, reciprocity of obligations and expectations, and group norms that serve as public goods. In contrast, Bourdieu (1986) views networks as the historical accumulation and institutionalization of other sorts

of capital, reflecting and possibly perpetuating relations of power. See also Warren (2008) on "bad" social capital.

8 Spain, uniquely, has data for five time points, two for wave 4 (1999 and 2000).

9 We have data on Greece, Israel, Luxembourg, and New Zealand for only a single point in time, precluding a focus on change.

10 Portes (1998; 2000) questions the appropriateness of studying social capital as anything but a resource of networked individuals. We concur with Paxton (2002) that social capital can be measured as an aggregate feature of nations and linked to national institutions. As Hooghe and colleagues note (2009: 217), in the case of immigration, media and political debates often occur at the national level.

11 Wave 3 does contain questions about memberships, but with incomparable wording. Without wave 3 information, only one country-year of data is available for Australia and Switzerland, precluding over-time analysis.

12 We exclude two items about occupying buildings and participating in unauthorized strikes since they skirt issues of legality. These actions occur so rarely that the exclusion is not consequential. We do not consider voting, given very different electoral systems and the confounding effect of mandatory voting in some countries.

13 Hall (1999) also notes a disjuncture between trust and participation in Britain, and Putnam finds that some important indicators of social capital *increase* with diversity: "organizational activity of various sorts ... is essentially uncorrelated with diversity ... and ... several measures of political engagement are positively correlated with diversity" (2007: 150).

14 A variable about education level completed is not consistently available in the WVS. For Switzerland and Germany in wave 2, it was necessary to impute age at which full-time education was completed, using information on the country-specific relationship between educational level and age at which full-time education was completed for other waves of data. Far less imputation was required than if we had imputed educational level data.

15 Prior to 1990, immigration figures for Germany come from *Demographic Statistics*, published by the Statistical Office of the European Community (various years).

16 Details on the construction of the alternative variable and the accompanying results are available upon request. Since Hooghe and colleagues (2009) found almost identical results for models using 26 static and dynamics measures of immigration, we have further confidence that our findings would hold under alternative measures.

17 Gini figures come from the World Bank (2007) for Japan and Portugal, for which there are no LIS data.

18 Alternatively, we could use actual welfare state expenditures or Esping-Andersen's three welfare regime types (liberal, social democratic and conservative). However, Esping-Andersen's typology is hard to apply to some countries and welfare state expenditure only captures one facet of economic insecurity and inequality. Consequently we opt to use Gini coefficients, in line with numerous prior studies.

19 The index created by Banting and colleagues (2006) is based on a cumulative assessment of the policy terrain from 1980 to 2000 and does not vary within this period. Most multiculturalist countries had policies in place before or early in the period we are studying.

20 We use the xtmelogit command in Stata to estimate these models. The results of standard logistic regression models with Huber-White standard errors to account for clustering of observations by country- and year-specific survey are substantially similar. We choose to present the multi-level models because we then have an estimate of variance across surveys and can observe how much of it is explained by the macro-level variables we introduce.

21 The effect of not reporting income is consistently negative, so those who do not report their income are similar to those with low household income.

22 Tables from this point on do not show individual-level effects. These are available upon request. We performed sensitivity analyses for all models with interaction effects in Tables 4 and 5 and found that the results we report as significant at the .05 level are not particularly sensitive to the exclusion of any single country, with one exception noted below, in which the effect loses statistical significance even at the .10 level (but does not change direction). These results are also available upon request.

23 This interaction effect on organizational membership loses statistical significance even at the .10 level with the exclusion of Japan, although the direction of the effect remains the same. The effects on trust and political action are robust to the exclusion of any single country.

24 We cannot estimate a direct effect of multiculturalism policy since it is time constant. Our models incorporate such constant differences across countries into the country fixed effects. Since the proportion of foreign born does change with time, we can estimate interaction effects with multiculturalism.

25 This is the difference between $1/(1 + \exp(-(-.126 + .024 * 0 + .189 * 0 * 1)))$ and $1/(1 + \exp(-(-.126 + .024 * 1 + .189 * 1 * 1)))$. Note that the model includes country fixed effects, and the excluded country is the United States, so the predicted probabilities here refer to a country with unmeasured characteristics like those of the United States.

26 The choice to use the fixed effect for the United States affects only the overall level of trust and membership, and not the direction of the mediating effects of inequality and multiculturalism that are the intended focus. The predicted probabilities in this figure are calculated as $1/(1 + \exp(-(\mathbf{bx})))$, where **b** is a vector of coefficients from model 5.4, and **x** is a vector of independent variable values as just described.

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Table A1
Descriptive Statistics, by Country

Variable	AUS	AUT	BEL	CAN	CHE	DEU	DNK	ESP	FIN	FRA
Individual-level independent variables										
Female	0.515	0.587	0.527	0.541	0.510	0.544	0.506	0.522	0.509	0.516
Married	0.626	0.665	0.649	0.650	0.666	0.624	0.627	0.620	0.659	0.635
Age	41.6	46.9	45.6	43.4	47.0	45.6	43.5	43.0	42.1	43.8
Education	6.30	5.54	6.66	7.34	7.76	6.21	6.94	5.20	7.81	6.15
Income decile	5.31	5.29	5.27	5.76	5.38	4.70	5.10	4.69	5.22	5.17
Missing income	0.180	0.117	0.267	0.137	0.197	0.114	0.110	0.198	0.067	0.191
Unemployed	0.031	0.023	0.074	0.072	0.014	0.058	0.060	0.074	0.091	0.053
Out of labour force	0.327	0.395	0.345	0.298	0.331	0.331	0.231	0.387	0.238	0.367
No religion	0.132	0.136	0.283	0.218	0.033	0.349	0.079	0.133	0.115	0.358
Catholic	0.257	0.777	0.65	0.422	0.513	0.279	0.009	0.849	0.014	0.601
Protestant	0.439	0.058	0.018	0.309	0.374	0.352	0.896	0.004	0.841	0.014
Other religion	0.173	0.03	0.049	0.052	0.079	0.02	0.016	0.014	0.03	0.027
Time-varying country variables										
%Foreign-born	22.16	8.61	8.84	16.53	20.52	9.51	4.34	2.14	2.09	10.63
GDP ($000s)	22.1	25.4	23.5	23.8	29.3	22.5	23.5	17.5	23.7	23.2
Gini	0.298	0.255	0.242	0.295	0.300	0.265	0.241	0.320	0.229	0.284
Time-constant country variables										
Multiculturalism	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
n (individual)	3056	2692	5138	4680	1893	7784	3010	9086	2419	3464
n (country-years)	2	2	3	3	2	4	3	5	3	3

Variable	GBR	IRL	ITA	JAP	NDL	NOR	PRT	SWE	USA	All
Individual-level independent variables										
Female	0.539	0.542	0.518	0.512	0.556	0.489	0.552	0.475	0.532	0.526
Married	0.619	0.576	0.592	0.735	0.631	0.726	0.612	0.686	0.608	0.638
Age	45.1	43.7	42.3	43.9	42.8	43.9	42.9	44.6	44.0	44.0
Education	5.45	5.48	5.43	7.25	6.81	5.97	3.93	7.39	7.65	6.34
Income decile	6.27	6.14	4.96	5.15	6.34	5.61	4.26	5.46	5.75	5.313
Missing income	0.265	0.286	0.248	0.114	0.177	0.097	0.178	0.043	0.066	0.162
Unemployed	0.058	0.062	0.048	0.020	0.023	0.022	0.043	0.052	0.060	0.054
Out of labour force	0.350	0.353	0.328	0.235	0.346	0.205	0.315	0.144	0.277	0.312
No religion	0.191	0.038	0.14	0.433	0.474	0.078	0.172	0.146	0.157	0.205
Catholic	0.085	0.925	0.848	0.006	0.277	0.007	0.808	0.011	0.269	0.423
Protestant	0.458	0.025	0.005	0.01	0.2	0.893	0.003	0.816	0.432	0.289
Other religion	0.266	0.012	0.007	0.551	0.048	0.022	0.017	0.026	0.142	0.084
Time-varying country variables										
%Foreign-born	7.06	7.44	2.44	0.91	7.12	4.49	5.14	9.57	9.04	7.80
GDP ($000s)	22.0	17.7	22.1	22.7	24.4	25.8	16.2	22.6	27.4	22.6
Gini	0.322	0.325	0.315	0.249	0.251	0.233	0.385	0.225	0.340	0.286
Time-constant country variables										
Multiculturalism	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0.386
n (individual)	4369	3069	5100	4150	2964	3139	1930	3541	6272	77756
n (country-years)	4	3	3	4	3	3	2	4	4	60

Notes: For descriptive statistics of dependent variables, see Table 1. Figures are averaged across all waves.