

The Allied punishment and attempted socialisation of the Bolsheviks (1917–1924): An English School approach

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Abstract. This article makes theoretical and empirical contributions to the recent literature on the socialisation and punishment of state and non-state actors. First, it argues that the English School can add significantly to our understanding of the socialisation and punishment processes because of the theory's emphasis on great powers as 'custodians' of the society of states. Second, it analyses the policies of the United Kingdom, France, and, to a lesser degree, a number of other powers toward the Bolsheviks and the Whites during the Civil War and beyond (1917–1924). The basic argument is that London, Paris, and other capitals acted like 'guardians' of the society of states in their attempt to punish and socialise the participants in the Civil War.

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Introduction

At times, non-state actors like *Al-Qaeda* or countries like Fascist Italy pose a threat to the sovereign state system. These challengers either offer alternative ways of ordering the world¹ or reject agreed-upon norms, like respect for internationally accepted borders.² In the process of documenting this phenomenon, International Relations (IR) scholars have recently begun to investigate the ways in which the state system responds to such challenges. Some have analysed the response of international organisations,³ while others have looked at how great powers manage non-state actors like terrorists.⁴

* A version of this article was presented at the 2009 International Studies Association annual convention. I would like to thank Brent Steele, Juliet Kaarbo, Baris Kesgin, Adam Brown, Laura Dean, Andrew Hom, Cornelia Navari, and the reviewers for their extremely helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank the Political Science Department at the University of Kansas for funding part of this project via a Thompson Fellowship.

¹ Such as class instead of nation, like the Bolsheviks proposed.

² Like Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935–1936. See Anthony F. Lang Jr., *Punishment, Justice, and International Relations: Ethics in the Post-Cold War System* (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 83–5.

³ Lang, *Punishment*.

⁴ Oded Lowenheim, *Predators and Parasites: Persistent Agents of Transnational Harm and Great Power Authority* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006).

The current article is part of this recent trend in the literature, to which it makes two theoretical contributions and adds an empirical case study. First, the article argues that the English School (ES) of International Relations is a fruitful framework for understanding how the international system, especially great powers in their role as ‘guardians’ or ‘custodians’ of the system,⁵ react to challengers. Second, the article refines the ES approach to IR by developing the notions of punishment and socialisation, which have received little attention in the literature.⁶ Finally, the article uses a detailed case study of French and British policy toward the Bolsheviks and the White armies during the Russian Civil War and beyond (1917–1924) to illustrate the theoretical utility of this ES approach. A cursory investigation of US, German, and Japanese policies toward the Bolsheviks will also be included to verify whether other powerful countries engaged in similar punishment and socialisation actions.

Until 1924, Western countries like the United Kingdom and France refused to recognise the Bolshevik Government that had swept into power in Russia in 1917. To add insult to injury, London and Paris provided covert and often overt support to anti-Bolshevik forces and governments that sprang up in various corners of Russia during the Civil War (1917–1922), and imposed an economic blockade until 1920. This article argues that France and the UK did so because they acted like guardians of the international society (IS) and engaged in two types of behaviour to defend it. First, they sought to punish the Bolsheviks⁷ for breaking the rules of international society. Punishment in this article is defined as ‘the infliction of harm in response to a violation of a norm or rule.’⁸ Second, the great powers tried to engage in a process of socialisation: they attempted to convince all of the regimes that held Russian territory at various times during the Civil War, including the Bolsheviks, to respect the rules of international society.⁹ The Allies did so by primarily withholding the benefits of international society – diplomatic recognition and the normalisation of trade in particular – as bargaining chips for socialisation. These two processes occurred during different periods of time. The Allies were primarily focused on punishing the Bolsheviks from the end of 1917, when Lenin took over power in Russia, until 1920, when it became increasingly clear that Communism could not be defeated by military means and after anti-Bolshevik forces were all but destroyed. In parallel, during this period, the Allies tried to socialise the White forces in various parts of Russia. Between 1921 and 1924, the

⁵ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1977).

⁶ For exceptions, see Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press/Oxford, 1984) and David Armstrong, *Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Others outside of the ES, like Lang (2008), have also written on the topic.

⁷ The Soviet Union was formed at the end of 1922 out of a series of independent Soviet countries, including Russia. This article will talk about Bolshevik Russia until 1922 and make reference to the Soviet Union after 1922.

⁸ Lang, *Punishment*, p. 495.

⁹ This definition of socialisation is compatible with Armstrong’s (1993) use, who speaks of it in the context of the English School. For a critique of the various definitions of ‘state socialization’ and the need for more conceptual clarity, see Kai Alderson, ‘Making Sense of State Socialization’, *Review of International Studies*, 27 (2001), pp. 415–33. For a more direct critique of Armstrong’s treatment of socialisation, see Fred Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999), pp. 297–8.

Allies switched to socialising the Bolsheviks, who had by that time become the only viable Government in Russia. In 1924, both London and France officially recognised the Soviet Union.¹⁰

An important caveat is necessary from the outset. The article does not investigate whether punishment or the attempts at socialisation were effective. That is, the concern is not with whether the Bolsheviks really internalised the rules of the society of states in 1924, when London and Paris granted diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union. Instead, it seeks to cast light on the behaviour of great powers in their quest to protect the society of states against rebel members. The goal of this article, albeit limited, is to show that punishment and attempts at socialisation are phenomena that have suffered from relative neglect in ES theory, and that the international society approach to the study of IR would provide a better understanding of global politics if it took these phenomena into consideration.

It is clear, however, that the goals of Allied punishment of the Bolsheviks – getting them to respect the rules of the society of states or generally removing them as a threat to the international system – were ultimately achieved. This article does not try to find the exact reason why that happened because it is simply difficult to tell: the Bolsheviks and the Allies reached a similar conclusion at about the same time – they were both going to be long-term members of the society of states and needed to find a form of co-existence. In this regard, the Bolsheviks were, indeed, socialised into the society of states.

This article proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the notion of punishment and socialisation in the English School. Second, it explains why the Bolsheviks were considered to be against the society of states when they took power. Third, it investigates the process of punishment in which France and the UK engaged and the consequences thereof. Fourth, it looks at how the guardians of the society of states tried to socialise both the Bolsheviks and the Whites. Fifth, it summarises the behaviour of the US, Japan, and Germany toward the Bolsheviks to verify whether other powerful countries in the international arena engaged in similar punishment and socialisation attempts. Finally, the article concludes with the beginning of diplomatic relations between the Allies and the Bolsheviks, and their ultimate joining, however tenuously and reluctantly, the society of states.

The English School on punishment and socialisation

The English School of International Relations is normally a reference to a group of scholars that met under the aegis of the British Committee of International Relations between the 1950s and the 1970s,¹¹ including leading figures like Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, and Hedley Bull. Although the identity of the ES as a separate approach to International Relations is contested,¹² there is some scholarly

¹⁰ Germany officially recognised the Bolsheviks in 1922, Japan in 1925, and the US in 1933.

¹¹ Jason G. Ralph, *Defending the Society of States: Why America Opposes the International Criminal Court and Its Vision of World Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

¹² Ian Hall, 'Still the English Patient? Closures and Inventions in the English School', *International Affairs*, 77 (2001), p. 941; and Roy E. Jones, 'The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure', *Review of International Studies*, 7 (1981), pp. 1–13.

consensus, both from within the ES¹³ and from without,¹⁴ that the English School can be distinguished from other theories by at least two contributions to the study of world politics. First, the world of International Relations is characterised by the co-existence of three elements or pillars: an international system, an international society, and a world society.¹⁵ Second, ES scholars have tended to direct their attention toward the notion of international society more than toward the international system and the world society,¹⁶ as a result of which ES has often been called the ‘international society’ approach to the study of IR.

At the global level, an international society exists, in which states tend to follow certain rules of co-existence.¹⁷ As a consequence, sovereign countries see themselves as part of a community with a shared conception of common interests, values, rules, and institutions.¹⁸ This international society establishes some degree of order in international affairs, which serves to sustain societal goals.¹⁹ Such goals include the preservation of the sovereign state system, especially in the face of threats that can come, for example, from states seeking to become empires.²⁰ Others involve the preservation of the sovereignty of individual states, peace, the limitation of violence, keeping promises, and the stabilisation of possession.²¹

Although Hedley Bull and other ES theorists do not propose a ranking of IS goals, the preservation of the society of sovereign states seems to take precedence over all others, sometimes to the detriment of the sovereignty of individual countries.²² For example, the sovereignty of some states is allowed to wither away for the sake of principles such as the ‘balance of power’ that are intended to maintain the strength of the society as a whole.²³ The primacy of this goal also illustrates the custodial role played by great powers in preserving the society of states intact. Due to the fact that the most powerful countries normally profit most from the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, they also have considerable self-interest in the preservation of international society and act as its guardians.

Socialisation

This article uses Armstrong’s definition of socialisation as the acceptance of principles and institutions of international society.²⁴ Despite the fact that preservation seems

¹³ Tim Dunne, *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School* (London: Macmillan, 1998).

¹⁴ Martha Finnemore, ‘Exporting the English School?’, *Review of International Studies*, 27 (2001), pp. 509–13.

¹⁵ Tim Dunne, ‘The English School’, in C. Reus-Smit and D. Snidal (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 267–85; Barry Buzan, ‘The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR’, *Review of International Studies*, 27 (2001), pp. 471–88; Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The English School’, in M. Griffiths (ed.), *International Relations Theory for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007), pp. 75–87.

¹⁶ Cornelia Navari (ed.), *Theorizing International Society: English School Methods* (London: Macmillan, 2009).

¹⁷ See Bull, *Anarchical*, pp. 39–40; and see Barak Mendelsohn, ‘Sovereignty Under Attack: The International Society Meets the Al Qaeda Network’, *Review of International Studies*, 31 (2005), p. 48.

¹⁸ Bull, *Anarchical*, p. 13.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

²² Mendelsohn, ‘Sovereignty’, p. 49.

²³ Bull, *Anarchical*, p. 17.

²⁴ Armstrong, *Revolution*, p. 7–8.

to be a primary goal of international society, ES scholars have paid surprisingly little attention to exploring how this process occurs and how members of the society react to threats to its existence.²⁵ More recently, some²⁶ have looked at the co-existence of international and world society, which often touches upon great power attempts to shape and reshape the international order.

The work that has been done on socialisation has a limited focus insofar as it usually looks at the global expansion of international society and the incorporation of non-Western states. Bull and Watson and Suzuki, for example, have explored the way in which the core European states socialised China, Japan, and other states into IS; this process, as will be seen later, has often been coercive and has involved the infliction of harm. Few have, however, looked at reactions to threats to international society, particularly from non-state actors like the Bolsheviks.

David Armstrong's volume²⁷ on the relationship between international society and revolutionary states is an exception to this gap in the literature.²⁸ His contention is that the society of states has historically had to face threats to its existence due to the occasional appearance of revolutionary movements that are able to secure control over a territory.

These revolutionary regimes then challenge the basis upon which IS is founded – sovereignty and non-intervention in particular – by attempting to spread their ideas through means such as propaganda and subversion, or by refusing to immediately share the consensus viewpoint on appropriate behaviour in the community of states.²⁹ As time goes by, however, most of the revolutionary states are more or less 'socialized' into the society of states. This process of socialisation is defined as a 'grudging acceptance' of principles and institutions of the international society (such as diplomacy), sometimes combined with the desire to reform them.³⁰

²⁵ Mendelsohn, 'Sovereignty', p. 49. But see Tim Dunne, 'Society and Hierarchy in International Relations', *International Relations*, 17 (2003), pp. 303–320; Galia Press-Barnathan, 'The War in Iraq and International Order – From Bull to Bush', *International Studies Review*, 6 (2004), pp. 195–212; and Barry Buzan, 'Will the "Global War on Terrorism" be the New Cold War?', *International Affairs*, 82 (2006), pp. 1101–18. Also, for other theoretical approaches to great power management of international society, see Brent J. Steele, 'Ontological Security and the Power of Self-Identity: British Neutrality and the American Civil War', *Review of International Studies*, 31 (2005), pp. 519–40; and Oded Lowenheim, "'Do Ourselves Credit and Render a Lasting Service to Mankind": British Moral Prestige, Humanitarian Intervention, and the Barbary Pirates', *International Studies Quarterly*, 47 (2003), pp. 23–48. In addition, Oded Lowenheim, *Predators and Parasites: Persistent Agents of Transnational Harm and Great Power Authority* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006) has a book-length treatment of how great powers manage 'agents of transnational harm' like pirates and terrorists. Lang (2008) talks at times about the roles great powers have had in imposing punitive measures on various states and individuals, as well.

²⁶ Ian Clark, *International Legitimacy and World Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

²⁷ Armstrong, *Revolution*.

²⁸ See Barak Mendelsohn, 'Sovereignty Under Attack: The International Society Meets the Al Qaeda Network', *Review of International Studies*, 31 (2005), pp. 45–68 for other examples.

²⁹ Armstrong, *Revolution*, p. 203.

³⁰ Armstrong, *Revolution*, pp. 7–8, 302. The notion of 'state socialization' is also used in other International Relations theories. For some earlier treatments of the subject, see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization*, 52 (1998), pp. 887–917 and G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', *International Organization*, 44 (1990), pp. 283–315. A more recent discussion and debate on 'state socialization' was hosted by the *Review of International Studies* between Alderson (2001) and Cameron G. Thies, 'Sense and Sensibility in the Study of State Socialization: A Reply to Kai Alderson', *Review of International Relations*, 29 (2003), pp. 543–50.

Revolutionary states usually become socialised because leaders realise the extent of their dependence on external factors as their sovereignty over the territory solidifies. A country – revolutionary or not – feels the need for trade with other countries, has a desire for greater security, and perhaps sees the potential for revolutionising the society of states from within.³¹ As a result, the revolutionary state may become less of a threat to international society with the passing of time, although Armstrong finds that the degree of socialisation varies on a case-by-case basis.³²

Armstrong mostly covers factors within the revolutionary movement, however, while generally overlooking the strategies employed by great powers for the purposes of socialisation. That is, we know how this process unfolds in the domestic arena of the ‘rogue’ state, but we are not very clear on what great powers do to speed up the process or to convince the revolutionaries that a challenge to the system is futile. To Armstrong’s coverage of the processes within the revolutionary regime that lead to socialisation, this article adds the strategies employed by the members of the society of states, great powers in particular.³³ Generally speaking, these have involved withholding the benefits of the society of states – diplomatic recognition and the normalisation of trade in particular – until the ‘rebel’ accepts the rules.

Punishment

The literature on punishment – defined here as the ‘infliction of harm in response to a violation of a norm or rule’³⁴ – is equally sparse in the English School literature.³⁵ There is, however, some work on how core Western countries inflicted harm on non-Western countries to convince them to join the society of states. Suzuki argues, for example, that IS expansion outside of the West was ‘supported by overwhelming military strength, [which is why] the Western powers were able to impose their codes of diplomatic conduct and standards of viable statehood on the non-Western states.’³⁶ The work on the so-called ‘standards of civilization’³⁷ is replete with examples of Western countries inflicting harm on countries and forcing them to join the society of states.

The ES has, therefore, identified the fact that countries inflict harm on countries that do not yet follow the rules of international society. This behaviour has,

³¹ Armstrong, *Revolution*, p. 303.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 302.

³³ Although not necessarily part of the English School research programme, Schimmelfennig (2000) talks about ‘socialization agencies’ in the West, which were used for the socialisation of Central and Eastern European states. See Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment’, *European Journal of International Relations*, 6 (2000), pp. 109–39. This article is similar in the sense that it pays attention to attempts and methods of socialisation.

³⁴ Lang, *Punishment*, p. 495.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 35–39 talks about Hugo Grotius’ conceptions a punishment in an international order, but this is a rare theoretical analysis.

³⁶ Shogo Suzuki, *Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society* (London: Routledge), p. 17.

³⁷ Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of ‘Civilization’ in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

however, been observed in the process of the expansion of international society. The present article argues that Western countries, especially great powers, also inflict harm as a *response* to the active and conscious violation of a norm by a 'rebel' member. Moreover, this article indicates that states also inflict harm on non-state actors, whereas the focus of the 'expansion of IS' literature is on states.³⁸

In order to illustrate this dimension of great power behaviour, this article uses some recent literature on punishment outside of the ES. ES scholars could benefit from this recent concern with the notion of punishment, perhaps best exemplified by Anthony Lang's volume.³⁹ The article incorporates Lang's treatment of punishment and describes three forms of harm infliction in which London, Paris, and other capitals engaged in order to get rid of the Bolsheviks.

France and Britain were chosen because they were at the time the greatest powers in Europe, and continued to be major global players after World War I. This was more so the case than the US, which after a short period of active involvement in the post-World War I world, rejected a proactive international role.⁴⁰ It is therefore much more likely that attempts at socialising the Bolsheviks will be more visible if one pays attention to the actions of the great powers, France and Great Britain in particular. The endpoint of 1924 was chosen because it marked the year when both countries granted official diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union, and thusly accepted it as a member of the society of states. For greater generalisability, however, and to verify whether any country beyond Paris and London engaged in punishment and socialisation, this article will also include a cursory look at the foreign policy of the US, Germany, and Japan toward the Bolsheviks and the Whites, who eventually recognised the Soviet Union in 1933, 1922, and 1925, respectively.

The Bolsheviks against the society of states

International society in 1917

To understand the significance of the challenge that the Bolsheviks posed to the international society when they took power in November 1917, it is important to describe the nature of the international society at the time. Since early in the 19th century, a group of 'great powers' gained dominance on the international stage, which included France, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. The presence of these countries and their self-conscious role as great powers introduced a principle of hierarchy in the society of states, which challenged the consistency of a principle of the sovereign equality of states.⁴¹ These core states expanded into large swaths of the Asian and the African continent, where they secured

³⁸ Although the Allies punished and socialised non-state actors like the Reds and the Whites, these groups still sought to assert sovereignty over a territory. In the case of non-state actors like terrorist organisations that do not seek territorial control, it is entirely possible that states may simply engage in punishment without attempting socialisation.

³⁹ Lang, *Punishment*.

⁴⁰ David Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004), p. 363.

⁴¹ Armstrong, *Revolution*, p. 113.

administrative control. The Ottoman Empire, China, and Japan became increasingly engaged with the West during this period and, at the Hague Conference in 1907, representatives from the US Mexico, China, Persia, Japan, Siam, the Ottoman Empire, and Latin America were present.⁴²

In addition, the aforementioned great powers decided to take a more proactive role in the management of the international society, having assigned to themselves the role of coordinators of the balance of power, diplomacy, and international law.⁴³ A stronger awareness of the existence of the society of states also became visible in declarations made by leaders of great powers, as well as in the inclusion of a standard of 'civilization' for a state's admission into the society.⁴⁴ This referred to a government's ability to perform governmental tasks such as protection of foreign nationals, entering into diplomatic relations, and meeting international law obligations.⁴⁵

Although World War I challenged the stability of international society, the Treaty of Paris sought to re-establish its strength by replacing a balance of power principle with collective security. The principle of national self-determination also became the legitimate source of claims on sovereignty. This latter change was especially important because of the increasing impact of nationalism on the formation of sovereign states, and a growing belief in the idea that the principle of international legitimacy could no longer be based on 18th century notions of the right of the ruler over his subjects. Instead, it would have to rely on the presence of national self-determination and the consent of the governed.⁴⁶ As will be seen later, this principle of legitimacy was to play a very important role in the process of socialisation in which France and Britain engaged, particularly in its relationship with the White governments in Russia.

The end of World War I and non-recognition

The March 1917 Provisional Government in Russia was recognised very quickly by the Allied⁴⁷ powers and welcomed as a democratic member of the society of states.⁴⁸ The Bolshevik Revolution, however, had been treated with much more caution and even outright hostility, especially after Lenin and his allies signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, which took Russia out of the Great War.

On 25 October 1917, the Provisional Government of Russia was rendered irrelevant as Kerensky, now the Supreme Commander of the Russian Army and still an ardent supporter of Russian participation in World War I despite its unpopularity among the Russian people, found out that the Bolsheviks had staged a coup. V. I. Lenin and Leon Trotsky, the new leaders of Russia, had promised 'peace and land' to the population, and began investigating ways of getting out of

⁴² Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, *Expansion*, p. 123.

⁴³ Armstrong, *Revolution*, p. 114.

⁴⁴ Gong, *Standard*.

⁴⁵ Armstrong, *Revolution*, p. 118.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁴⁷ This article will use the notion of 'Allied' to refer to countries like France and the United Kingdom, which fought against Germany and Austria-Hungary during World War I.

⁴⁸ N. D. Houghton, *Policy of the US and Other Nations With Respect to the Recognition of the Russian Soviet Government, 1917–1928* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1929).

the war as quickly as possible.⁴⁹ On 30 October 1917, anti-Bolshevik forces, today generally defined as the Whites,⁵⁰ were involved in the first skirmishes with Bolshevik Red Guards, which signalled the beginning of a very bloody civil war.⁵¹

Throughout the duration of the war, especially into the end of 1919, France and Britain had relatively little reliable information about the actual progress of the conflict, but relied on the assumption that White governments could defeat the Bolsheviks and thus needed to be supported.⁵² The very ebb and flow of the Civil War itself provided contradictory information about who was winning. White armies would occasionally close in on Moscow and Petrograd, but would be pushed back by the Red Guards. In the fall of 1919, for example, White General Denikin had control over about 40 million Russians on three quarters of a million square miles of territory. He was also within 200 miles of Moscow.⁵³ At the same time, General Yudenich was headed toward Petrograd from the North. Both armies, however, were beaten back by the Red Army, which eventually destroyed both Denikin and Yudenich.

Allied leaders rarely hesitated to criticise the Bolsheviks for not being part of the 'normal' society of states. In November 1918, the French Foreign Minister said that 'All our information [...] indicates that the Soviet government intends to impose its doctrines and its methods on other nations and to establish everywhere a regime of anarchy, murder, and pillage [...]'⁵⁴ and Georges Clemenceau would call the Bolsheviks a 'government of brigands'.⁵⁵

Generally speaking, the French and British governments pointed to three violations which served as a reason for rejecting the legitimacy of the Bolshevik regime. First, they condemned Lenin's refusal to keep the promises made in signing agreements with foreign countries, which Bull says is one of the goals of the society of states that is indispensable for the preservation of order.⁵⁶ This violation manifested itself in the first few months of the Bolshevik regime, when the Russian press began to publish the secret agreements the country had previously signed with its Western allies. This made a very negative impression on the West and spurred calls for non-recognition of the Bolshevik regime. In addition, France and Britain were angered by Lenin's refusal to remain in the war, as Russia had previously agreed, until a common armistice was signed.

⁴⁹ W. Bruce Lincoln, *Red Victory: A History of the Russian Civil War* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 44.

⁵⁰ It is unclear why most of the opponents to the Bolsheviks in the Civil War were called 'Whites'. Most anti-Bolshevik forces tended to be led by Tsarist military officials, and it is possible that the name originates from the predominantly white colour of Imperial Russian military garb. However, opposition to the Bolsheviks was very diverse, including leaders whose beliefs ranged from Socialist to reactionary. See Richard Lockett, *The White Generals* (New York: Routledge, 1987). This article will generally use 'White' and 'anti-Bolshevik' to talk about the opposition to Lenin's regime.

⁵¹ Lincoln, *Red*, p. 45.

⁵² Evan Mawdsley, *The Russian Civil War* (Edinburgh: Birlinn Limited, 2005), p. 129.

⁵³ Lincoln, *Red*, p. 225.

⁵⁴ Michael Jabara Carley, 'Episodes from the Early Cold War: Franco-Soviet Relations, 1917–1927', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 52 (2000), p. 1276.

⁵⁵ Suzanne Championships, 'The Baltic States as an Aspect of Franco-Soviet Relations 1919–1934. A Policy or Several Policies?', *Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis. Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia*, 8 (1991), p. 405. Mr. Clemenceau also described the Bolsheviks as 'a colony of lepers' – see F. S. Northedge and Audrey Wells, *Britain and Soviet Communism: The Impact of a Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 30.

⁵⁶ Bull, *Anarchical*, p. 18.

Second, upon seizing power, the Bolsheviks cancelled the debts that previous Russian regimes had accrued, and confiscated the property of French and British companies, among others.⁵⁷ This was in clear violation of another goal of the society of states – stability of possession – which implies that states have to recognise each other's property.⁵⁸ Many British and French private individuals had invested millions of dollars in Russia before the Bolsheviks came to power under the hope that they could ultimately profit from those investments.⁵⁹

Finally, the great powers were incensed at the direct challenge to their sovereignty that Bolshevik propaganda posed.⁶⁰ The Bolshevik government took for granted the fact that 'a socialist revolution was an international movement without national boundaries' that sought 'world social revolution'.⁶¹ As a result, Moscow was directly involved in promoting open rebellion among the workers of Britain and France through pamphlets and funding for revolutionaries. Lenin had also supported liberation movements in places such as India, which caused a stir in Britain.⁶² For example, the British Government would complain of the circulation in India of a 1,000-rouble note that said 'Workers of the World, Unite!' in nine languages.⁶³ The fears of a Bolshevik insurgency or at least Communist-caused instability in London, Paris, and other countries were relatively widespread, and Bolshevik propaganda was seen as an attempt to generate even more problems.

Allied fears about Bolshevik propaganda and irreverence, to say the least, toward the society of states, was confirmed when it became clear that the Bolsheviks, upon taking power, literally planned on removing themselves voluntarily from the society of states. For example, they refused to appoint 'foreign ministers', preferring to call them 'foreign commissars',⁶⁴ and replaced traditional diplomatic departments with a Press Bureau and a so-called Bureau of International Revolutionary Propaganda.⁶⁵

Especially after the end of World War I, the question of pre-Bolshevik debts toward the Allies and of propaganda became primary points of contention during Allied interactions with the Bolsheviks.⁶⁶ The United Kingdom and France would request that Moscow pledge to renounce the two violations in order to enjoy the

⁵⁷ Robert Service, *Comrades!: A History of World Communism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 70).

⁵⁸ Bull, *Anarchical*, p. 18.

⁵⁹ Andrew J. Williams, *Trading with the Bolsheviks: The Politics of East-West Trade* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992).

⁶⁰ Walt (1996) notes that the British and the French feared Bolshevik revolutions or at least the success of Communist subversion in their countries. See Stephen Walt, *Revolution and War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

⁶¹ Robert G. Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective* (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1969), pp. 29–30.

⁶² George S. Moyer, *Attitude of the US Towards the Recognition of Soviet Russia* (PhD. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1926). This article does not address the somewhat ironic emphasis of the guardians of the society of states on sovereignty and their colonial possessions simultaneously. That is admittedly another under-explored theoretical issue in English School – see Shogo Suzuki, 'Japan's Socialization into Janus-Faced European International Society', *European Journal of International Relations*, 11 (2005), pp. 137–64.

⁶³ Northedge and Wells, *Britain and Soviet Communism*, p. 34.

⁶⁴ Wesson, *Soviet*, p. 31.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin* (Boston, MA: Little Brown and Co., 1961).

benefits of international society (which would be forthcoming once *de jure* recognition was extended). These two issues were key criteria for socialisation and pointed to the success of this process once the Bolsheviks accepted their resolution. In addition, Lenin's renunciation of world revolution in the wake of defeat in Poland in 1920 also signalled socialisation in the society of states.

Paris and London also emphasised the need for self-determination and democratic reforms within White governments in Russia. This was much less of a concern in Allied-Bolshevik ties because the Allies realised it would be much more difficult to convince the Bolsheviks to give up the revolution than to accept to limit the revolution to their borders.⁶⁷ Moreover, the Bolsheviks had never been willing to negotiate the nature of their domestic regime, while the White Russians showed more openness to talk about the issue of national self-determination and democracy within the territory they controlled.⁶⁸

The question was, however, why Lenin cared. If the Bolsheviks were revolutionaries who sought the destruction of world capitalism and its replacement with the dictatorship of the proletariat, why should they care if France and the UK, along with other countries, constantly pestered them about Russia's pre-Bolshevik debts and propaganda?⁶⁹ After all, immediately after the Bolsheviks took power, they 'neither sought nor gave diplomatic recognition'.⁷⁰ In large part, the Bolsheviks cared because Allied punishment had real consequences for the regime's internal stability and future existence. Very soon after Lenin took over, the revolutionary stance of Bolshevik foreign policy ended up having deleterious consequences for the regime.⁷¹

Punishing the Bolsheviks, 1917–1920

This article draws heavily on Lang's recent conceptualisation of punishment in international society because it is the most well-developed and appropriate framework for the case study. Lang defines punishment as 'the infliction of harm

⁶⁷ Richard K. Debo, *Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918–1921* (Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992), pp. 36, 151.

⁶⁸ Granted, the Whites were more often than not former Tsarist generals who wanted the revival of pre-Bolshevik Greater Russia and refused to acknowledge the independence of the countries that formed after the Tsarist regime fell. At the same time, these anti-Bolshevik forces needed Allied assistance, and were more willing to negotiate with France and Britain. They also did not engage in propaganda activities and promised to pay back debts. See Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1973* (New York, NY: Praeger), p. 97.

⁶⁹ Thank you to Ross Carroll for pointing out this very important point at the ISA Conference in New York, 15–18 February 2009.

⁷⁰ They also flaunted diplomatic convention openly – during the Brest Litovsk negotiations with Germany over the country's withdrawal from World War I, the Bolsheviks were represented 'by Adolf Joffe, an ascetic revolutionary intellectual, seconded by a worker, a sailor, a woman who had earned fame as an assassin, and a peasant picked up off the street at the last minute when someone noted the lack of a representative of his class' (Wesson, *Soviet*, p. 33). Also see Wesson, *Soviet*, p. 31.

⁷¹ Once again, this does not contradict Armstrong's (1993) contention that the Bolsheviks may have realised that they could not successfully push for world revolution and grudgingly accepted to play by the rules. One of the reasons for this internal change, however, was the presence of Allied attempts at punishment and socialisation.

in response to a violation of a norm or rule'.⁷² In this particular case, London and Paris sought to inflict harm on the Bolsheviks for their violation of a number of norms in international society, as described above.

The purpose of punishment, according to Lang, is two-fold: 'return the community to the balance that existed prior to the violation of the norm, and prevent such violations in the future'. In this case, the Allies attempted to inflict harm on the Bolsheviks in order to return the society of states to a balance altered by the revolutionaries and to prevent violations like debt cancellations in the future. Between 1917 and 1920, the Allies essentially used punishment to try to defeat and eliminate the Bolshevik threat.

London and Paris engaged in three types of punitive practices, all of which involved the infliction of harm. First, they intervened on Russian territory, offering military and political assistance to the Whites, as well as fighting with Bolsheviks on occasion. Second, they refused to extend recognition to the Bolsheviks, thusly harming the revolutionary regime's desire to follow its own self-interest in the shaping of the world after the Great War. Finally, London and Paris refused to trade with the Bolsheviks, hurting Russia economically. The Soviets were well aware of these punishment practices and protested them.

Intervention

Various lists of Bolshevik documents between 1918 and 1920 are full with protests and inquiries about Allied involvement in Russia and support for the White armies. For example, on 29 June 1918, Bolshevik foreign policy chief Georgy Chicherin wrote a letter to the French Consul-General in Russia, asking him to tell the Allies to stop 'the armed insurrection against the Soviet Government'.⁷³ On 18 April 1919, Chicherin wrote a scathing letter to 'the workers of the Allied countries', accusing their governments of trying to get rid of the revolutionary regime in Moscow.

Allied support for the Whites often came in training and material help, like weapons and other war materiel.⁷⁴ In addition, the Allies had thousands of troops on Russian territory – in the north, the south, and in Siberia – which were involved in some skirmishes and territorial attacks against the Bolsheviks. In the context of general hostility toward the Bolsheviks in virtually every country bordering Russia at the time, Allied support for and training of various groups that tried to annihilate the Bolsheviks was a big disadvantage and a thorn in Lenin's side.

Lang defines punitive intervention as 'the use of force across state borders by a state or a group of states aimed at inflicting harm on one or more agents that are responsible for violating the rules of norms governing international society'.⁷⁵ The armed Allied intervention in Russia during the Russian Civil War fits this

⁷² Lang, *Punishment*, p. 495.

⁷³ Jane Degras (ed.), *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Volume I: 1917–1924* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press 1951), p. 82.

⁷⁴ By some accounts, the Allies 'gave substantial military supplies, mostly leftovers from the war just concluded, to the value of about a billion dollars' (Wesson, *Soviet*, p. 42).

⁷⁵ Lang, *Punishment*, p. 61.

definition very well. The Allies intervened to inflict harm on the Bolsheviks directly via military incursions and indirectly by providing military and logistical help to anti-Bolshevik forces.

The Allied intervention in Russia, which included troops from more than a dozen countries like the UK, Canada, and Romania, initially began during World War I in the wake of the Bolshevik withdrawal from the war in March 1918. Troops were sent into the north, the south, and into Siberia. Ostensibly, Allied officials argued that they were moving soldiers into Russia, especially in the areas closer to the Western front, to protect military stores from possible German or Bolshevik looters, to re-establish the Eastern front, and to provide support to any Russian troops who might have been fighting the Germans.⁷⁶

In addition, in March 1918, American, British, and Japanese troops flowed into Siberia to provide help to the Czechoslovak Legion, a group of Bohemian, Moravian, and Slovak former prisoners of war who were now headed to the Western front to help the Allies defeat the Central Powers.⁷⁷ It is also important to remember that Vladivostok, where the Czechoslovaks were headed to embark for France, and where most of the Allied troops would ultimately concentrate, held about 648,000 tons of war supplies and various types of munitions around December 1917, when a Bolshevik local Government took power.⁷⁸

According to a report provided by Sir Henry Wilson (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) to the Secretary of the War Cabinet in the UK, on 2 January 1919, 'General Maynard [the commander in Murmansk] had under his command 6,832 British, 731 French, 1,251 Italian, 1,220 Serbian, and 4,441 Russian troops; and [...] General Ironside [the commander in Archangel] had under his command 6,293 British, 1,686 French, 5,203 American, and 2,715 Russian troops.'⁷⁹

Although the interaction between Soviet officials in Moscow and the Allied interveners was relatively peaceful at the beginning, in part because the Bolsheviks were still unsure about their ability to sign a peace treaty with the Germans,⁸⁰ towards the end of the summer of 1918 ties grew tense as the Allies became more visibly anti-Bolshevik in their behaviour and as it became clear that the Bolsheviks would not return their country to war.

On 8 July 1918, Allied troops moved to occupy the town of Kem, disarmed the local population, and executed three members of the Kem Soviet.⁸¹ In August 1918, Allied troops occupied the city of Archangel and supported an anti-Bolshevik Government in the area, which replaced Soviet authorities.⁸²

Meanwhile, on 29 June 1918, a large number of British, Czechoslovak, Japanese, and Russian White soldiers took over Vladivostok and rid the town

⁷⁶ Benjamin Isitt, 'Mutiny From Victoria to Vladivostok, December 1918', *The Canadian Historical Review*, 87:2 (2006), pp. 223–64; George A. Brinkley, *The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia, 1917–1921: A Study in the Politics and Diplomacy of the Russian Civil War* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), p. 75.

⁷⁷ W. P. Coates and Z. K. Coates, *Armed Intervention in Russia, 1918–1922* (London: Gollancz, 1935), p. 98.

⁷⁸ Isitt, 'Mutiny', p. 234.

⁷⁹ Coates and Coates, *Armed*, p. 161.

⁸⁰ Yanni Kotsonis, 'Arkhangelsk, 1918: Regionalism and Populism in the Russian Civil War', *Russian Review*, 51:4 (1992), p. 533.

⁸¹ Coates and Coates, *Armed*, p. 86.

⁸² Leonid Strakhovsky, 'The Liquidation of the Murmansk Regional Soviet', *Slavonic and East European Review*, 2:2 (1943), p. 19.

of the Bolshevik leadership. The city did not fall without resistance – a Soviet standoff in the Red Staff building was ended with an incendiary bomb that killed a number of people.⁸³ Into the autumn of 1918, Allied troops were in control of the railway going from Vladivostok all the way to within 300 miles of Moscow.⁸⁴ Anti-Bolshevik Governments sprung up in these areas, and ultimately united into an Omsk All-Russian Government on 9 September 1918. Such a feat would not have been possible without the protection of Allied troops in the region.

In the middle of these takeovers and increasing Allied hostility with the Bolsheviks all across Russia, the Armistice ending World War I was proclaimed in November 1918. At around this time, the Omsk Government was taken over by Admiral Kolchak, who was proclaimed dictator and began an offensive against the Red Army.⁸⁵

Considering the end of the war, however, the major question the Allies had to deal with was the actual reason why their troops were still scattered in disparate places in Russia. Since the German threat was gone, the Bolsheviks now became the main target, more or less implicitly.⁸⁶ Although the Allies had a difficult time coming up with a coherent policy on the ground, especially when it came to coordinating actions as a group of countries, the general orientation of London, Paris, and other countries was anti-Bolshevik in nature. In November 1918, the British cabinet said it was seeking to ‘give General Denikin [who was one of the more visible anti-Bolshevik leaders at the time] at Novorossisk all possible help in the way of military material.’⁸⁷ In part, these policies were also seen as an obligation to the anti-Bolshevik forces which the Allies had propped up in Russia after Brest Litovsk.

From about February 1919 into the end of that same year, Britain had provided ‘over 500 cannons, 250,000 rifles, 30 tanks, a million and a half shells, and 160 million rounds of rifle ammunition, plus substantial and costly support in naval power and aerial reconnaissance.’⁸⁸ Supplies were also forthcoming from France, while the US provided considerable amounts of medical supplies.

In Siberia, the Allies decided to continue providing support to the White armies, offering supplies, training troops, and fighting off Bolshevik advances.⁸⁹ Admiral Kolchak’s spring 1919 offensive made considerable use of British ammunition and rifles. On 15 May 1919, the Omsk Government expressed its gratitude to British forces for assisting Russia ‘in her national efforts.’⁹⁰ Later, in the fall of 1919, the White armies began to retreat from the region, but the British transported about 100,000 tons of ‘arms, ammunition, equipment, and clothing’ to the anti-Bolshevik forces.⁹¹

A similar approach was visible in other parts of Russia. In the south and the west, where British, French, Greek, and Romanian troops were initially stationed,

⁸³ Isitt, ‘Mutiny’, p. 234.

⁸⁴ Coates and Coates, *Armed*, p. 111.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

⁸⁶ Brinkley, *Volunteer*, p. 74.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

⁸⁹ Isitt, ‘Mutiny’, p. 256.

⁹⁰ Coates and Coates, *Armed*, p. 210.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

among other reasons, to establish ties with the anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army,⁹² anti-Bolshevik forces received munitions, weaponry and aircraft.⁹³ In March 1919, during a statement in front of the House of Commons, a British official noted that although the 20,000 British troops stationed around the Caspian sea were not directly involved in fighting, 'they are a certain source of strength and support' to the anti-Bolsheviks.⁹⁴

French officials explained in Parliament toward the end of 1918 that although French soldiers were not going to take direct part in anti-Bolshevik hostilities, their goal was to keep the Bolsheviks at bay while 'healthy elements' in Russia managed to organise themselves better and, with material support from the Allies, defeat Lenin.⁹⁵ French representatives were admittedly mired in the confusing, even by Russian Civil War standards, situation in Ukraine and ultimately had to leave in April 1919 because of threats of mutinies among the troops and an advancing Red Army. While stationed there, however, they attempted to find a balance and create consensus between the numerous anti-Bolshevik groups claiming or seeking control over places like Odessa. Their intervention, then, was still a punitive measure intended to strengthen the Whites and others against the Red Army.

Finally, in Archangel and Murmansk, British Minister of War Winston Churchill argued that British troops could not leave in March 1919 because of conditions on the ground and argued that the Allies were under threat of Bolshevik attacks. Relief forces were sent to the area in May 1919 as a result. In the winter of 1918–1919, Allied troops fought a Red Army that attempted numerous incursions into the territory secured by them during World War I. The most considerable casualties were registered during battles around a village called Bolshie Ozerki, when Red Army troops lost a reported number of 2,000 soldiers in battles with the Allies, who lost fewer men.⁹⁶

Toward the end of 1919, however, as the Red Army began consolidating its control over Russian territory and as the Whites grew weak, the Allies stopped seeing the necessity of continuing to provide assistance to the anti-Bolsheviks and turned to developing trade ties with the Bolsheviks. In January 1920, Russian diplomat-in-exile Vasily Maklakov said in a letter that the Allies essentially concluded that any attempt to overthrow the Bolsheviks had failed.⁹⁷ Moreover, most Allied troops were out of Russia by 1920. The punitive Allied intervention had essentially come to a stop.

Non-recognition

The situation was similar with Russia's representation abroad. Implicitly, the Allied help for anti-Bolshevik forces both before and after the war meant that the

⁹² Brinkley, *Volunteer*, p. 78.

⁹³ John Ainsworth, 'The Blackwood Report on the Volunteer Army: A Missing Chapter in the Resumption of Anglo-White Relations in South Russia in November 1918', *The Slavonic and East European Review*, 69:4 (1991), p. 638.

⁹⁴ Coates and Coates, *Armed*, p. 251.

⁹⁵ Brinkley, *Volunteer*, p. 89.

⁹⁶ Allen F. Chew, *Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1981), p. 9.

⁹⁷ Brinkley, *Volunteer*, p. 222.

Bolsheviks were refused the right to ‘speak for the Russian people’ or the right to claim to be official governmental representatives. This had a visible impact on the Bolsheviks’ ability to communicate with countries diplomatically, and to express their viewpoint or to be taken into consideration during the various negotiations surrounding the future make-up of the world after the end of the Great War.⁹⁸

This allied policy proved bothersome to the Bolsheviks, who were conscious of the disadvantages of being ignored diplomatically. On 12 February 1920, Chicherin sent a letter to the Norwegian Foreign Minister, expressing dismay at not having been invited to a conference that discussed giving the Spitzbergen Islands to Norway.⁹⁹ A similar event occurred in 1923, when Britain, France, and Spain held a meeting to regulate the new status of Tangier and excluded an unrecognised Russia from the talks. The Bolsheviks then claimed that considering the fact that imperial Russia had signed a treaty related to the issue in 1906, it had the right to deny any of the decisions of the three countries without Moscow’s participation.¹⁰⁰ This Bolshevik claim to rights of representation under old Tsarist treaties had been claimed a few times, as a matter of fact, but had gone unrecognised considering Allied refusal to set up diplomatic ties with Moscow.

The Bolshevik takeover in Moscow also brought up the question of Russia’s diplomatic representation. Since the Allies were unwilling to extend recognition to the new revolutionary government in Moscow, pre-Bolshevik ambassadors, many of them members of liberal parties like the Kadets, managed to stay in their foreign locations, formed a Council of Ambassadors, and interacted often with Allied governments. Western ties with these diplomats – who essentially represented a country and a regime that no longer existed – stood in contrast with the often vitriolic communication between the Allies and the Bolsheviks.

On 30 November 1917, Commissar of Foreign Affairs Leon Trotsky sent a memo to all Russian Ambassadors. In it, he asked them to either become the representatives of the Soviet Government or resign.¹⁰¹ Vasily Maklakov, the pre-Bolshevik Russian Ambassador to France, initially ignored the note because he decided to consult with the French government about what actions needed to be taken with regards to this issue. French Foreign Minister Pichon agreed with Maklakov that the request had to be tabled until consultations with all of the allies had taken place, but the problem essentially disappeared from French attention and Maklakov continued to serve as acting Russian ambassador.

In addition, immediately after the Bolsheviks signed the Brest Litovsk treaty, the Council of Ambassadors declared that the Bolsheviks acted contrary to the interests of the Russian nation and betrayed their allies. French Foreign Minister Pichon expressed gratitude at the Council’s position and replied in a letter to Maklakov that his country would try to ‘restore to Russia a legitimate government that will, as in the past, adopt a policy in keeping with that of her allies.’¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Lang does not talk about this type of punitive practice in his 2008 book.

⁹⁹ Degras, *Soviet*, p. 181.

¹⁰⁰ Teddy J. Uldricks, *Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917–1930* (London: Sage 1979), p. 151.

¹⁰¹ Nadia Tongour, *Diplomats in Exile: Russian Emigres in Paris, 1918–1925* (PhD Dissertation, Stanford University, 1979), p. 39.

¹⁰² Tongour, *Diplomats*, p. 48.

During the Allied non-recognition of the Bolsheviks, the Council of Diplomats would engage in various propaganda activities and direct contacts with Western officials, trying to convince them of the wisdom of continuing the non-recognition policy. Importantly, many of the ambassadors also engaged in intense campaigns to convince the various White governments that looked sturdy enough to resist the Bolsheviks to accept the various Western demands on them,¹⁰³ most of which focused on their pledge to repay Russia's debts and to allow some form of democracy in the territory they controlled.¹⁰⁴

The care and attention which the Allies extended to both the pre-Bolshevik Russian diplomats abroad and the White governments inside the country would also become visible during the various talks about the future of the world in the wake of World War I. Talks about Russian representation at the Paris Peace Conference had come up immediately after the end of the war and had been a constant matter of concern for the Allies until the conference began in January 1919.¹⁰⁵

All of the anti-Bolshevik forces, aware of the fact that the Allies would not invite the Bolsheviks to join the conference, began scrambling to form a united all-Russian government that could receive an official invitation to participate. These attempts ultimately proved to be unsuccessful, in part because of the confused nature of the situation among the various anti-Bolshevik factions, which ranged from monarchist reactionaries to leftist Social Revolutionaries. These Russian groups were eventually allowed, however, to be present unofficially and informally during the conference.¹⁰⁶ In addition, Maklakov was allowed to speak as an official representative of the defunct Provisional Government during a meeting discussing the unification of Romania and the former Russian province of Bessarabia.¹⁰⁷

In January 1919, the Allies had initially decided, after numerous arguments, to extend an invitation to all parties fighting in the Russian Civil War at the time to a separate conference, to be held on the island of Prinkipo¹⁰⁸ in Turkey. This essentially put the Bolsheviks and the anti-Bolsheviks on an equal footing.¹⁰⁹ Many hardliners within the Allied camp, who sought either intervention in Russia to get rid of the Bolsheviks or their complete ignorance during the conference at the very least, saw the Prinkipo proposal as a concession to the Bolsheviks. But the proposal ultimately failed after White refusal to participate, much of it accountable to disagreements within the Allied camp about the wisdom of this approach.¹¹⁰

Even despite White dismay at the Prinkipo proposal and the internal Allied conflict over whether this policy was a good idea, there was no consideration of recognising Bolshevik sovereignty, at least over the territory it controlled, or its ability to speak for the Russian people. On the contrary, anti-Bolshevik

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁰⁴ Implicitly, of course, the Whites guaranteed that they would not engage in revolutionary propaganda activities, which would have eliminated yet another threat the Bolsheviks posed to the society of states. They merely said that they sought to rid Russia of the Bolsheviks.

¹⁰⁵ John M. Thompson, *Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 37.

¹⁰⁶ Thompson, *Russia*, p. 75.

¹⁰⁷ Tongour, *Diplomats*, p. 206.

¹⁰⁸ The Turks used this island as a refuge for lost dogs (Northedge and Wells, *Britain and Soviet Communism*, p. 30).

¹⁰⁹ Thompson, *Russia*, p. 109.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 122.

forces could speak on an equal footing with the Bolsheviks despite not controlling much territory within Russia. The failure of the Prinkipo proposal, however, was followed up, after months of talks and quarrels within the Allied group, with the partial recognition of the White Russian government headed by Admiral Kolchak.¹¹¹ This policy of recognition and support – often military – would remain in place until the end of 1919, when the White alternatives to the Bolsheviks began decreasing in number and power.

Trade

Aside from respect for sovereignty over a territory and for the right to represent the Russian people, one of the other major benefits of recognition is the ability to engage in trade. Commercial relations between the Allies and the Bolsheviks were virtually non-existent during this period, however. In fact, the Allies blockaded the only Bolshevik port – Petrograd – until 1920.¹¹² In the absence of any treaties, at least until 1921,¹¹³ the Bolsheviks could not use their vast raw natural resources to increase the availability of money for domestic development. In part, this was due to the fact that Western countries were reluctant to accept the Bolshevik policy of keeping a state monopoly on foreign trade instead of allowing private actors more leeway.¹¹⁴

Trade became a stringent necessity for the Bolsheviks as the ravages of World War I were swiftly followed up by the disastrous situation caused by the Civil War. Russia's Gross National Product fell significantly during the domestic conflict, and attempts to centralise distribution and financing had led to a 'dysfunctional' economy whose recovery was very difficult given the isolation of the country from international trade.¹¹⁵

The Bolsheviks had expressed their interest in establishing trade to the Allies earlier on, even in 1918, although such willingness to engage in commercial relations was followed up – often in the same letters – by mockery or accusations that the West was imperialistic. Such ties were, however, impossible considering the lack of diplomatic recognition.

Socialising the Whites, 1917–1920

As described above, between 1917 and 1920, the Allies engaged in punishment in order to destroy the Bolsheviks. In parallel, during this time, London and Paris engaged in the socialisation of the Whites. In the case of anti-Bolshevik forces, the Allies withheld recognition, military resources, and further economic assistance in exchange for pressures aimed at convincing the Whites to respect international society rules. It is true that the West provided considerable assistance to the Whites

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

¹¹² Wesson, *Soviet*, p. 43.

¹¹³ When the British and the Bolsheviks signed a trade treaty.

¹¹⁴ Wesson, *Soviet*, p. 31.

¹¹⁵ Mary Schaeffer Conroy, 'Health Care in Prisons, Labour, and Concentration Camps in Early Soviet Russia, 1918–1921', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 52 (2000), pp. 1257, 1265.

during this period, but the suggestion during talks between the two parties was always that if the anti-Bolsheviks abided by the rules of international society, more help would be forthcoming.

Until the end of the Russian Civil War, France and Britain were much friendlier to anti-Bolshevik White governments, which were very eager to say that they would abide by the requirements of the society of states in exchange for Allied support.

In September, 1918, in the wake of the support extended to the White government in Omsk, Maklakov and the Council of Ambassadors in general were encouraged by the French government to push for certain domestic reforms that would have accorded with the new democratic requirements of international society. In a letter to Vologosdsky, the military leader of the Omsk regime, he said that 'it is absolutely vital to shelve all negotiable issues and come to a fundamental agreement on such principles as national sovereignty, social policy, economic development, and civil rights'.¹¹⁶

Moreover, in a letter to Denikin, Maklakov summarised the importance of adhering to some of the international rules at the time so as to be able to gain a voice for the anti-Bolsheviks in the international arena. He argued that, because of the strength of the principle of national self-determination, many Western countries were willing to grant independence to the nations that had been part of Russia. The government had to unify and tone down some of its rhetoric against minority rights (since some Whites wanted to re-establish pre-Bolshevik Russia, where many minority groups like the Lithuanians, for example, would not be allowed to have their own country) because 'your official recognition as the all-Russian government [is] more problematical inasmuch as it clashes with the pretensions of the nationalities to autonomy'.¹¹⁷

The Western states confirmed this stance in May 1919, when they sent a list of conditions to the Kolchak regime, which was essentially an international society checklist for recognition: the organisation of free and fair democratic elections as soon as Kolchak arrived in Moscow, free elections in zones controlled by the White armies, rejection of special privileges to any class or group of people, recognition of the independence of Finland and Poland, mediation by either the Paris Peace Conference or the League of Nations of any territorial disputes, membership of Russia in the League of Nations, and acceptance of liability for the debt cancelled by the Bolsheviks.¹¹⁸

In parallel with these requests, the Council of Ambassadors (now subsumed under a new organisation called the Russian Political Council), began to put pressure on Kolchak to institute democratic reforms in his own government to appease the Western powers and thusly gain recognition. The Kolchak regime was very slow in heeding the advice of the Council, and Western accusations of reactionism abounded, making the task of recognition more difficult. However, Kolchak eventually responded to the conditions by expressing a willingness to implement some democratic reforms and discuss further matters with the Western governments. The Whites always stressed their 'democratic' struggle against the

¹¹⁶ Tongour, *Diplomats*, p. 78.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹¹⁸ Once, again, the implicit assumption was that revolutionary propaganda activities would cease, since the Whites never claimed to be a revolutionary regime and, in fact, stressed the degree to which they hoped to be a conventional member of the society of states. Also see Tongour, *Diplomats*, p. 167.

tyrannous Bolshevik regime¹¹⁹ and constantly promised to return Russia's debts to the Allies.¹²⁰ A lot of the Allied support was often conditional on such commitments, like the requests extended to Kolchak in exchange for support show.

These attempts at socialising the Whites by trying to convince them to follow certain IS rules in exchange for assistance, diplomatic recognition, and an encouragement of sovereignty over territory hit a major snag at the end of 1920. By that time, the last White army that had even a remote chance of beating the Bolsheviks was defeated, and the Bolsheviks were quickly consolidating their power domestically. In essence, the Allies had lost their primary socialisation target and had no one else to talk to but the Bolsheviks, who were, by now, more willing to accept certain rules of co-existence in the society of states.

It should be noted, however, that the Bolsheviks had always attempted to extend peace offers to the Allies and had constantly tried to attract France and Britain into negotiations. In many instances, Moscow noted that it would be willing to talk about returning the debts of pre-Bolshevik Russia to the Allies and to discuss the stopping of propaganda activities both in Allied countries and in other territories of British interest, like Afghanistan – it said so throughout 1918,¹²¹ 1919,¹²² and 1920.¹²³

These messages were ignored and mistrusted by the Allies for two main reasons. First, the White governments were a lot more open to Allied demands for respecting the rules of international society, and were easier to socialise because they needed basic material support to continue fighting against the Bolsheviks. During the uncertainty of the civil war, France and the UK probably took the easy way out, hoping to socialise the Whites for their eventual victory over the Bolsheviks. London and Paris were basically focused on punishing the Bolsheviks. Moreover, statements about world revolution were of significant concern domestically in France, the UK, and other countries, where fears of leftist-inspired unrest at home abounded. Needless to say, the ultimate decision of the USSR to renounce such calls had the effect of reducing fears of subversion.

Second, Moscow's ostensible willingness to negotiate with the Allies was more often than not accompanied by a more revolutionary foreign policy that sought a world proletarian revolution, criticised the capitalist states of imperialism, and engaged in rhetoric that, essentially, continued to challenge the legitimacy of the existing society of states.¹²⁴ Such statements – characterised by what E. H. Carr¹²⁵ called a 'dual policy' of pushing for proletarian revolution while seeking diplomatic ties with the West – made it very difficult for the Allies to forget that the Bolsheviks were, indeed, very reluctant to play by the rules.¹²⁶ This approach was even institutionalised with the founding of the Third Socialist International, which

¹¹⁹ Thompson, *Russia*, p. 125.

¹²⁰ Jon Smele, *Civil War in Siberia: The Anti-Bolshevik Government of Admiral Kolchak* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 109; Debo, 'Survival', p. 262.

¹²¹ Debo, *Survival*, p. 22.

¹²² Thompson, *Russia*, p. 169.

¹²³ Carley, 'Episodes', p. 1276.

¹²⁴ Kennan, *Russia and the West*, p. 184.

¹²⁵ E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (London: Macmillan, 1973).

¹²⁶ Wesson, *Soviet*, p. 7 describes this situation well: 'Soviet foreign policy has had from its beginnings a dual aspect: the overthrow of alien institutions and the establishment of normal relations, the drive to indirect or direct territorial expansion along with peaceful coexistence.' The Whites were less ambiguous in this regard.

essentially became a Bolshevik mouthpiece that promoted proletarian revolution.¹²⁷ This, in turn, allowed the Soviet state to be more moderate in its foreign policy statements, despite the fact that the Allies were very well aware of the fact that the Comintern was not fully independent of Moscow.

Socialising the Bolsheviks, 1921–1924

As the Bolshevik invasion of Poland failed in 1920, Moscow realised that its hope for international revolution would have to be put on hold and be replaced by the internal consolidation of socialist power. Lenin had for a long time thought that Russia risked to fall apart if the Bolsheviks continued to emphasise a revolutionary foreign policy focused on deposing the Western governments and staging a proletarian world revolution.¹²⁸ At around the same time, it had become clear that the Whites would no longer be able to defeat the Bolsheviks and that the revolutionary regime that the Allies had tried so hard to get rid of would survive for at least a few years. Lenin and his associates realised that, to survive, Russia needed to secure respect for its sovereignty, which would prevent Allied intervention or the risk of further conflict, and that trade was necessary for the country's survival.

These two nearly simultaneous historical evolutions led to the surfacing of some degree of rapprochement between the Allies and the Bolsheviks. Toward the end of 1919, British Prime Minister Lloyd George admitted that the Allied intervention in Russia had failed to be of any help to the White defeat of the Bolsheviks and announced that London's troops in the country would withdraw.¹²⁹ In short, the end of 1919 signalled the Allied decision to switch from punishing to socialising the Bolsheviks. The process essentially hinged on withholding the benefits of IS – especially diplomatic recognition and the normalisation of trade – to convince the Bolsheviks to play by the rules.

The British actually began negotiations with the Bolsheviks over a trade treaty during 1920, a move which was initially approved by the Allies as a whole. A rapprochement was also visible at about that time in the establishment of agreements between the Bolsheviks and Britain and other countries about exchanges of prisoners detained during the Civil War; that was when negotiations surrounding a trade treaty actually started.¹³⁰ When they extended the invitation to the Bolsheviks, the Allies noted that they still refused to recognise Moscow as a legitimate Government,¹³¹ which indicated the fact that Britain and France were still uncomfortable with the Bolshevik challenge to the international society.

Moreover, British Prime Minister Lloyd George stressed that trade would only be established with cooperatives in Russia, which were considered to be

¹²⁷ Ulam, *Expansion*, p. 115.

¹²⁸ Thompson, *Russia*.

¹²⁹ Gabriel Gorodetsky, *The Precarious Truce: Anglo-Soviet Relations 1924–1927* (London: Cambridge University Press), p. 2.

¹³⁰ Wesson, *Soviet*, p. 83; Timothy Edward O'Connor, *Diplomacy and Revolution: G.V. Chicherin and Soviet Foreign Affairs, 1918–1930* (Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1988), pp. 118–9.

¹³¹ M. V. Glenny, 'The Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement, March 1921', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 5 (1970), p. 63

independent of the Bolsheviks (which they were not).¹³² From the outset, the British were clear about their desire to establish some sort of ties with Russia, which was ravaged by the Civil War and in great need of money, in exchange for getting agreements from the country to respect IS rules. Foreign Secretary Curzon noted that ‘we can hardly contemplate coming to its [the Russian Government’s] rescue without exacting our price for it, and it seems to me that price can far better be paid in a cessation of Bolshevik hostility in parts of the world important to us [by this Curzon meant . . . India], than the ostensible exchange of commodities, the existence of which on any considerable scale in Russia there is grave reason to doubt’.¹³³

In particular, the emphasis was on the cessation of Soviet propaganda both inside the United Kingdom and in territories of interest to it (like India), as well as the repayment of Tsarist Russia’s debts to Britain.¹³⁴ For months on end, British and Bolshevik officials went back and forth negotiating these conditions until, in the second half of March 1921, the Anglo-Soviet trade treaty was signed. Among other provisions, it included an agreement for both governments to refrain from propaganda activities in each other’s countries. In addition, the question of Russia’s debts to the allies was shelved for further talks during an eventual peace conference.¹³⁵

The latter request for the repayment of debts was reinforced by Prime Minister Lloyd George on 3 April 1922, when he said that the Bolsheviks needed to recognise the debts Russia owed to other countries. Moscow, he noted, had to ‘recognize all the conditions imposed and accepted by civilized communities, as the test of fitness for entering into the comity of nations’.¹³⁶ Lloyd George added later, as negotiations for the recognition of debts continued, that the situation would improve in Russia when the Bolsheviks fell ‘in with the civilized world’.¹³⁷

Official diplomatic recognition followed after a couple of years of talks back-and-forth about the question of propaganda and debts. At a conference in Genoa (April–May 1922), the Soviets were invited as essentially a diplomatic equal despite the fact that *de jure* recognition had not yet been forthcoming.¹³⁸ In many ways, this meeting set the stage for the development of further ties between Moscow and the Western capitals.

For the Bolsheviks, this was important because, as leading Bolshevik Lev Kamenev said, ‘*de jure* recognition means for us, first of all, the legalization of our trade relations. *De jure* recognition is the recognition of our laws and of our legislature, which is obligatory for those who wish to maintain business and commercial and economic relations with us.’¹³⁹ In essence, recognition meant that the Bolsheviks would now get to enjoy the benefits of the society of states – territorial sovereignty, diplomatic representation, and trade – by agreeing, at least

¹³² Debo, *Survival*, p. 151.

¹³³ Glenny, ‘Anglo-Soviet’.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

¹³⁵ Williams, *Trading*, p. 61. See also Stephen White, *Britain and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Study in the Politics of Diplomacy, 1920–1924* (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1980).

¹³⁶ White, *Britain*, p. 66.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹³⁸ Thompson, *Russia*, p. 86.

¹³⁹ Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Harold Henry Fisher, *Soviet Russia and the West, 1920–1927: A Documentary Survey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 189.

on the surface, to play by the rules. Importantly, Moscow was aware of the fact that recognition would also probably mean that Allied military action against the Bolsheviks would become more unlikely¹⁴⁰ and would therefore allow the regime in Moscow to preserve the revolutionary gains it made as a result of the defeat of the White forces.

On 1 February 1924, Britain recognised Soviet Russia once it pledged to stop all propaganda, restore commercial ties, and continue talks to repay the debts of the previous governments.¹⁴¹ In turn, the British recognised Russia's sovereignty and declared it would not intervene in its internal politics. The same reasons were invoked by Italy, which recognised Soviet Russia in 1924, as well.

As Britain became more active in its ties with the Bolsheviks, which culminated in 1924, France was beginning to warm up to the notion of having some sort of trade or diplomatic contact with Lenin, as well. French leaders realised that they would need to negotiate a co-existence of sorts with Moscow, and, as London and the Kremlin went back and forth in talks about propaganda and debt, Paris began to show some degree of willingness to talk to the Bolsheviks.

In December 1922, a trade news-sheet was established to facilitate commercial ties between the two countries.¹⁴² Talks about economic relations continued into 1923, and they often included talks about Moscow's debt toward French businesspeople and toward the French state.¹⁴³ Franco-Soviet trade was beginning to grow toward the end of 1923.¹⁴⁴ Although no official trade treaty had been signed, talks surrounding Moscow's willingness to cease propaganda to pay debts to Paris echoed, in many ways, the Kremlin's relationship with London. France granted official recognition to the Bolsheviks in 1924, as well, announcing that it expected a resumption of commercial ties, the disappearance of Soviet-funded propaganda activities, and Bolshevik acceptance of 'the ordinary principles regulating the relations between nations'.¹⁴⁵ Things had come full-circle for the Bolsheviks. They had joined the society of states.

More guardians? Early US, German, and Japanese ties with the Bolsheviks

This article has thus far looked primarily at London and Paris because they were the more prominent great powers at the time. The question arises, however, whether other powers – not necessarily global, but at least regional ones – behaved in a similar manner. If they did, the argument made in this article about patterns of punishment and socialisation would be strengthened.

Of the countries that could be considered, Japan, Germany, and the US could fit the profile of significant powers on the global arena at the time. Although the

¹⁴⁰ O'Connor, *Diplomacy*, p. 115.

¹⁴¹ These discussions continued into the mid-1920s, and the exchange of the ambassadors was initially postponed pending London and Moscow agreeing on the question of debt (Wesson, *Soviet*, p. 90). The UK and the Soviet Union did not exchange ambassadors until 1929 (Northedge and Wells, *Britain and Soviet Communism*, p. 38). The treaty also included some promise of a British loan for the Bolsheviks in exchange for some recognition of debts (Williams, *Trading*, p. 77).

¹⁴² Williams, *Trading*, p. 112.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 114–5.

¹⁴⁵ Moyer, *Attitude*, p. 225; Carley, 'Episodes', p. 1286.

US went through an isolationist phase during the interbellum period, it was slowly emerging as a great power whose global presence culminated with victory in World War II. Germany had lost its great power status in the wake of the Versailles Treaty, but was attempting to reassert its positions right after the end of World War I. Finally, Japan was a significant power that struggled with Russia, China, and the US for political control around its region.

There is evidence that all three of these countries engaged in some degree of punitive action and socialisation, although their circumstances – especially when it came to Japan and Germany – were more unique and require more detailed explanations than this article can provide. In Tokyo's case, a period of rapprochement with Russia after the 1904–1905 war ended once the Bolsheviks took power.¹⁴⁶ Hoping that the chaos that ensued after the beginning of the Civil War would allow them to secure control over significant chunks of Russian land at the border, Japan sent in tens of thousands of troops into Russia in 1918, ostensibly to help the Allies in the region achieve their goals (prevent Germans and Bolshevik from taking over munitions, provide protection to the Czechoslovak Legion, etc.).

Their behaviour on the ground, however, suggested a desire to, at the very least, create a buffer zone between Bolshevik Russia and Japan¹⁴⁷ or to consolidate control over territory in the area. Japanese troops engaged in fighting with the Red Army and supported White and Cossack armies. Although their motives seem to have been more focused on securing long-term territorial control in Siberia (the Allies had never shown signs of this purpose), Japan contributed to Allied punitive intervention. In addition, Tokyo did not trade with the Bolsheviks and only recognised them in 1925. In terms of socialisation, Japanese and Bolshevik officials were engaged in on-and-off talks since 1921 until 1925. Tokyo insisted on receiving concessions in Northern Sakhalin, an apology over a Bolshevik massacre against Japanese officials in Nicolaevsk, respect for private property, Moscow's acceptance of paying Tsarist and Provisional Government debts, and a cessation of propaganda.

In exchange, Moscow asked for full recognition and a withdrawal of Japanese troops from Russian territory. In terms of the Japanese requests, an argument can be made that Tokyo withheld official diplomatic recognition, just like Paris and London did, in exchange for the Bolsheviks accepting the rules of international society. Ultimately, the Soviet Union accepted these conditions, and Moscow and Tokyo signed an official recognition treaty on 20 January 1925.

Like Japan, the US engaged in some punitive behaviours with regards to the Bolsheviks. American troops intervened on Russian territory, both in the north and in Vladivostok, where they provided help to anti-Bolshevik forces and supplied them with both military and medical goods.¹⁴⁸ The military intervention ended shortly after the Armistice was signed, but the US continued the economic blockade until 8 July 1920. Washington was officially against Allied attempts to continue the economic blockade on the Bolsheviks during the Civil War, but it unofficially followed most Allied policies because, as acting Secretary of State Frank Polk said, 'it is the declared purpose of the Bolsheviks in Russia to carry

¹⁴⁶ Joseph P. Ferguson, *Japanese-Russian Relations, 1907–2007* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008).

¹⁴⁷ George Alexander Lensen, *Japanese Recognition of the U.S.S.R.: Soviet-Japanese Relations, 1921–1930* (Tallahassee, FL: Diplomatic Press, 1970), p. 6.

¹⁴⁸ N. H. Gaworek, 'From Blockade to Trade: Allied Economic Warfare Against Soviet Russia, June 1919 to January 1920', *Jarbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas*, 23:1 (1975), pp. 36–69.

revolution throughout the world.¹⁴⁹ Upon lifting the blockade in July 1920, US officials stressed that they did not do so because they recognised the Bolsheviks and said that anyone engaging in trade with the Bolsheviks were doing so ‘at their own risk.’¹⁵⁰ The normalisation of trade relations would have to wait for another decade, however. With the exception of some degree of rapprochement during the provision of US assistance to the Bolsheviks for the famine of 1921–1922, the US remained reluctant with regards to developing ties with the Soviet Union.¹⁵¹ In short, the US engaged in the punishment of the Bolsheviks between 1917 and 1920, and waited for about a decade to even attempt socialisation.

In large part, during that decade, the US accused the Soviet Union of refusing to pay back loans offered by the Wilson administration to the Provisional Government,¹⁵² argued that the Bolsheviks engaged propaganda and subversion, and that they had no respect for property. It was not until F. D. Roosevelt’s administration that the US officially recognised the Soviet Union. The initial treaty included provisions on Moscow pledging to refrain from propaganda activities and to allow the freedom of worship for Americans living in the USSR. The issue of debts was the most controversial, and although a settlement was reached on a sum (much smaller than the 193 million US dollars Russia owed), wrangling continued over the question.¹⁵³ The move had been made, however, and the US had slowly headed into the normalisation of ties with the Soviet Union. As Moscow and Washington, DC united to fight Nazi Germany in World War II, questions of non-recognition receded into the past.

Ties between the Bolsheviks and the Germans – whom some have called ‘Europe’s two most important outcasts’ at the time¹⁵⁴ – were a lot more complicated. Until the end of World War I, Berlin was more concerned with the conflict than with the Bolsheviks.¹⁵⁵ After the Armistice, however, and especially after it became clear that the Allies would stick to the conditions of the Versailles Treaty, Germany saw the development of ties with Russia as an opportunity to assert independence in foreign policy and to regain at least some of its great power status.¹⁵⁶ In May 1921, Germany signed a trade treaty with Russia, recognising the Bolsheviks as the only Government in Russia.¹⁵⁷ Ties culminated with the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo on 16 April 1922, which included provisions on a resumption of diplomatic ties, a renunciation of reparation claims, and the initiation of trade between Moscow and Berlin.¹⁵⁸

¹⁴⁹ Gaworek, ‘From Blockade’, p. 55; D. W. McFadden, *Alternative Paths: Soviets and Americans, 1917–1920* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 327.

¹⁵⁰ McFadden, *Alternative*, p. 329.

¹⁵¹ Benjamin D. Rhodes, *US Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918–1941* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), p. 53.

¹⁵² Rhodes, *United*, p. 104.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ J. D. Cameron, ‘Carl Graap and the Formation of Weimar Foreign Policy Toward Soviet Russia from 1919 until Rapallo’, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 13:4 (2002), p. 75.

¹⁵⁵ Gerald Freund, *Unholy Alliance: Russian-German Relations From the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1957), p. 245.

¹⁵⁶ J. D. Cameron, ‘To Transform the Revolution into an Evolution: Underlying Assumptions of German Foreign Policy Toward Soviet Russia, 1919–1927’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 40:1 (2005), p. 7.

¹⁵⁷ Lionel Kochan, ‘The Russian Road to Rapallo’, *Soviet Studies*, 2:2 (1950), p. 118.

¹⁵⁸ William Maehl, ‘The German Socialists and the Foreign Policy of the Reich from the London Conference to Rapallo’, *The Journal of Modern History*, 19:1 (1947), p. 51.

Obviously, Germany did not take part in punishing the Bolsheviks in 1917–1920, and neither did it deem socialisation as important as other countries did. Instead, it saw ties with the Bolsheviks as a way to counter-balance against an intransigent West. Some recent historical scholarship does reveal some hopes within the country that economic and political ties with the Bolsheviks would moderate the revolutionary Government there and end with ‘de-Bolshevization’.¹⁵⁹ There were also fears and suspicions of Bolshevik propaganda activities within Germany, which was, at the time, struggling with considerable revolutionary activities.¹⁶⁰ As a result, Article 7 in the Rapallo Treaty mentioned that officials could not engage in propaganda activities in their respective countries.

In terms of the attempted socialisation of the Whites, there is less evidence of this behaviour in the case of the US, Japan, and Germany. The first two did communicate and interact with anti-Bolshevik forces, but they took a secondary role to London’s and Paris’s socialisation attempts.

Conclusion

In the last few years, scholars have begun to investigate how the society of states reacts to threats posed to it by non-state actors¹⁶¹ and countries.¹⁶² This article has argued that the English School approach to International Relations can make a significant contribution to this emerging literature, particularly by incorporating and developing the notion of great power strategies of punishment and socialisation.

France and the United Kingdom, as well as the US, Japan, and Germany, to some degree, punished the Bolsheviks with intervention, non-recognition, and economic sanctions. In the case of the Bolsheviks, until 1920, punishment had the goal of destruction. As long as the Whites were an even remotely viable alternative to the Reds, the Allies tried to socialise them during this period. Once Paris and London came to the realisation that destruction would not work, and as the Whites fell to the Red Army, they turned to socialising the Bolsheviks by promising to grant the benefits of the society of states (recognition and normalisation of trade) in exchange for respect for the rules.

In 1921, right as the last remnants of anti-Bolshevik armies were leaving Russian territory off the coast of the Crimean Peninsula, the Bolsheviks realised, fresh from the inability to invade Poland and from the numerous failures of socialist republics in Germany and Hungary,¹⁶³ that they needed to consolidate their power domestically and to learn how to co-exist with capitalist countries. As a result, an Anglo-Russian trade treaty followed in 1921, and, after constant negotiations, so did diplomatic representation in 1924.

Whether the Bolsheviks actually internalised the rules of the society of states is not of direct relevance to this article’s main point. The fact of the matter is that

¹⁵⁹ Cameron, ‘To Transform’, p. 17.

¹⁶⁰ Freund, *Unholy Alliance*, p. 85.

¹⁶¹ Lowenheim, *Predators*; Mendelsohn, ‘Sovereignty’.

¹⁶² Lang, *Punishment*.

¹⁶³ Service, *Comrades!*

Western countries tried punishment and then socialisation, and ultimately the Soviet Union yielded. The country had joined the society of states less than a decade after it announced that it sought to destroy capitalism and install world revolution.

Why would a case study of events that happened almost a century ago be relevant today? First, the confused nature of territorial control and fluid sovereign authority during the Russian Civil War mirrors, in many ways, the situation in many post-Cold War geographic locations. Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, to name a few countries, exist on the map and have a seat at the UN. Who controls the territory in these countries, especially during civil conflicts, is much more uncertain and dynamic, however.

Russia after 1917 and into the 1920s was a chaotic site pockmarked with tens of governments and roving groups of political guerillas or simple bandits. Many countries today are eerily similar. It is, therefore, necessary to understand the process by which these pockets of chaos in the world have been dealt with in the past, and, importantly, how they eventually joined, or re-joined,¹⁶⁴ the society of states.

Finally, Bolshevik Russia was, at its time, a 'rogue' state. The use of this term has witnessed somewhat of a revival in the wake of September 11,¹⁶⁵ and understanding how great powers reacted to a major 'rogue' state that openly threatened the society of states is important in a context in which some countries continue to challenge the rules of international society today.¹⁶⁶ Powerful members of the international society, like the US, try to punish and socialise these countries.¹⁶⁷

This article has one major flaw that warrants more detailed investigation. It overlooks the fact that Allied policy toward the Bolsheviks was often incoherent and inconsistent.¹⁶⁸ There were conflicts between countries, as between Britain and France,¹⁶⁹ and within countries, as between Winston Churchill and Lloyd George, regarding the best policy toward the Bolsheviks.¹⁷⁰ At the same time, despite all of

¹⁶⁴ Tsarist Russia, and especially the Provisional Government of March 1918, had already made a lot of strides in terms of being a conventional state accepted by the Western powers.

¹⁶⁵ Elizabeth N. Saunders, 'Setting Boundaries: Can International Society Exclude "Rogue States"?', *International Studies Review*, 8:1 (2006), pp. 23–54; Gerry J. Simpson, *Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

¹⁶⁶ Although not necessarily in the theoretical context of the English School, some authors have been concerned with how great powers handle threats to international society. Lowenheim (2003) has investigated the British humanitarian intervention to stop the Barbary pirates, for example. Steele (2005) has investigated Britain's neutrality during the US Civil War, in a context in which Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation reframed the slavery debate in London. The subject is, therefore, not completely ignored by International Relations scholars. While acknowledging this, the goal of this article is to try to make sense of punishment and attempted socialisation in the context of the English School.

¹⁶⁷ For example, see the example of sanctions imposed on Cuba, Burma, or North Korea.

¹⁶⁸ Thompson, *Russia*, p. 39.

¹⁶⁹ Lang (*Punishment*, p. 82) notes, for example, that 'the role of sanctions versus other forms of ensuring compliance with international law has not always been shared across the Great Powers or throughout the international system'.

¹⁷⁰ Although the article is not concerned with this particular topic, conflicts within the Soviet Union should also be investigated in greater depth. Moreover, recognition was forthcoming in 1924 as Joseph Stalin, the new Soviet leader, was becoming more powerful in Moscow. The significance of this switch deserves some attention in further work, as well. See Dale Terence Lahey, 'Soviet Ideological Development of Coexistence: 1917–1927', *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 6 (1964), p. 89 for a suggestion why.

the squabbles and the internal conflicts within the Allied camp, the lowest common denominator seems to have been, at least as long as there was even a roughly viable White alternative to the Bolsheviks, that revolutionary Russia was not part of the international society of states and that it needed to be withheld from its benefits if it refused to play by the rules. This article focused on this denominator, but a fuller understanding of London's and Paris's policy toward the Bolsheviks would be forthcoming only after the impact of domestic factors on that policy is investigated.

Broadly speaking, however, this article sought to shed light on an often overlooked aspect of the way in which the guardians of the society of states attempt to preserve IS and to contain rebels. Its argument is that the English School has a word to say in this regard.