

book. In making his critique, however, Loxton is pointing to a bigger question that we thought a lot about: How should we best measure the dependent variable and ensure that our findings do not depend on how we operationalize political participation?

In the end, the findings in the book are very robust to different specifications, but we faced some difficult trade-offs. For example, we initially created an index of political participation that included *eight* different modes of political participation asked in LAPOP surveys up until 2012. This index was more robust and less susceptible to bias from one kind of political act alone. It also produced a stronger negative relationship between wealth and political participation than the 4-point index we eventually used. One of the most difficult decisions we had to make was whether to include our full index of political participation valid only up until 2012 or to use the 4-point index that allowed us to bring the analysis closer to the present. Given that the core substantive results were essentially the same regardless of how we constructed the index, we opted for using the most up-to-date information available to us at the time.

Perhaps more importantly, readers should not worry that our results depend on how we constructed the Political Participation Index. As we describe at length in chapter 3, we sometimes use the additive index, but the bulk of the analysis is based on separate statistical models for voting, protesting, and contacting government officials. In this way readers can see for themselves how each political act contributes to or detracts from political equality.

We agree with a second point raised by Loxton: the book would have benefited from the inclusion of case studies to bring the numbers to life and help tease out causal mechanisms, exactly the kind of rich case-study material that makes Loxton's book so compelling. That said, we drew heavily from our extensive fieldwork experience in several countries and from excellent qualitative studies by other scholars that enriched our understanding of political participation, partisan mobilization, and community organizing. In the end, this book came together as a complex quantitative story, one that we believed was important to make available.

Conservative Party-Building in Latin America: Authoritarian Inheritance and Counterrevolutionary Struggle.

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Unstable party systems have been a defining feature of politics in Latin America since the 1980s, when most

countries in the region made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. During this time hundreds of new parties emerged, but according to Steven Levitsky, James Loxton, and Brandon Van Dyck (*Challenges of Party-Building in Latin America*, 2016), only 11 (less than 5%) managed to survive for more than a few electoral cycles. Conservative parties did not fare well: across the entire region since 1978 only four new conservative parties became electorally significant and enduring political actors. However, all four successful cases of conservative party-building were authoritarian successor parties; that is, political parties that emerged from and had close ties with the outgoing authoritarian regimes. Why would conservative parties with close ties to repressive military dictatorships thrive while center-right parties with more democratic origins failed to take root? *Conservative Party-Building in Latin America* is a fascinating book that provides an empirically rich and theoretically persuasive explanation of why the most successful new conservative parties had deep roots in dictatorships.

According to the party-building literature, new parties need strong party–voter linkages, a territorial organization, and a source of cohesion to succeed. Loxton's framework draws on this literature to argue that, rather than handicapping new conservative parties, authoritarian inheritance provided some conservative parties with precisely these ingredients of party-building that allowed them to compete and survive under democracy. Specifically, Loxton identifies two crucial factors: authoritarian inheritance and counterrevolutionary struggle. Authoritarian inheritance provides parties with party–voter linkages in the form of an identifiable (and credible) party brand, strong preexisting partisan identification, and even access to clientelistic networks. Authoritarian successor parties may also inherit a territorial organization that enhances their capacity to mobilize electoral support, allows them to draw on the enthusiasm of committed party activists on the ground, and may help them win subnational office, which allows them to build a track record of successful governance under democracy. Additionally, counterrevolutionary struggle experienced under authoritarianism provides new conservative parties with an important source of internal cohesion that can serve as a powerful “glue” to hold parties together through crises, electoral defeats, and the death or exit of the founding leaders. In other words, rather than damning authoritarian successor parties, their roots in prior authoritarian regimes provide valuable resources and political capital that allow them to gain a solid footing under democracy. In contrast, the task of building a new party from scratch proved too difficult for conservative parties with more democratic origins.

This explanation is outlined in chapter 2, and the bulk of the book is dedicated to four detailed case studies of conservative party-building efforts: the UDI (Unión

Demócrata Independiente) in Chile, UCEDE (Unión del Centro Democrático) in Argentina, ARENA (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista) in El Salvador, and the PAN (Partido de Avanzada Nacional) in Guatemala. UDI in Chile and ARENA in El Salvador are clear cases of parties that succeeded, whereas UCEDE in Argentina and PAN in Guatemala are failed parties. These four cases pair nicely into most-similar comparisons between Chile's UDI and Argentina's UCEDE, and between El Salvador's ARENA and Guatemala's PAN, whereas Chile and El Salvador are paired as "most-different" cases of success. Chapter 7 examines the value of authoritarian inheritance and counterrevolutionary struggle in other shadow cases from the region, namely *Fujimorismo* in Peru, the PFL/DEM in Brazil, RN in Chile, and the Partido de la U in Colombia. Chapter 8 concludes by reflecting on the larger phenomenon of authoritarian successor parties in other parts of the world and the role they might play in consolidating or undermining democratic politics.

Conservative Party-Building in Latin America is a valuable addition to the growing literature on party-building efforts in Latin America and offers an important new take on enduring institutional legacies that persist after democratic transitions. The strength of the book lies in its case studies that skillfully trace the causal processes linking authoritarian inheritance and counterrevolutionary struggles (or their absence) with party-building outcomes. The empirical chapters are full of rich historical detail based on extensive interviews, archival research, and fieldwork that will be of great interest to many readers, particularly those doing research on political parties in these countries. It is a great example of the enduring value of fieldwork and of qualitative and historical analysis for illuminating complex causal processes.

We find the book's argument convincing, although we wonder whether there are other important factors that the analysis downplays. The most-different systems comparison between Chile and El Salvador provides powerful evidence for the importance of both authoritarian inheritance and counterrevolutionary struggle, because there are few other factors that the two cases share. However, although Chile and Argentina, and El Salvador and Guatemala are as similar as any two paired countries in the region, they are not identical. So, what other differences besides authoritarian inheritance and counterrevolutionary struggle might account for the different outcomes? Argentina and Chile differ on a number of factors that the literature argues are important to party-building outcomes: differences in the severity of the economic crisis (more severe in Argentina than Chile); differences in the timing of the crisis relative to the transition to democracy (it coincided with the demise of authoritarianism in Argentina, whereas in Chile the authoritarian regime had several years to recover); the nature of partisan competition; the extent to which the outgoing authoritarian

regime was able to set the rules of the democratic game; and, perhaps most importantly, the rules and institutions that defined the electoral system.

Electoral rules and institutions seem particularly important in explaining the success of conservative party-building in Chile, given that the binomial electoral system produced outsized congressional representation for conservative parties. This feature of the electoral system had profound effects on the strategic context facing both party elites and voters. In a binomial system, relatively small conservative parties are assured congressional representation and opportunities to govern, and therefore access to government patronage, which increases intraparty cohesion. Thus, voters have incentives to continue voting for relatively small conservative parties, knowing that their votes will not be wasted. Although Loxton briefly addresses this issue, given the richness of the case studies the analysis could have done more to trace the impact of electoral rules on party-building outcomes, particularly in Chile and Argentina.

Another perplexing omission, particularly in a book with such rich contextual data, is attention to public opinion data and the dynamics of popular support for conservative parties. Perhaps public support for center-right parties and policies is higher in Chile and El Salvador than in Argentina and Guatemala independent of authoritarian inheritance, thus helping explain the divergent outcomes. Of course, support for center-right parties may also depend on the nature of authoritarian inheritance, but voter preferences receive little or no attention in the analysis.

The two cases of failed conservative party-building are also more general cases where party systems have been especially volatile and make for difficult ground for party-building of any kind. Guatemala has had the most volatile and fluid party system in Latin America, whereas El Salvador and Chile boast two of the most stable party systems in the region. Perhaps there is something about the political systems in Argentina and Guatemala that make them particularly unlikely places for any new parties, including conservative parties, to take root.

Though deeply steeped in Latin America, the book should be of interest to scholars of party-building efforts in young democracies elsewhere where the phenomenon of authoritarian successor parties is common. The book is also an important reminder that transitions to democracy were not blank slates but grew out of specific conditions of authoritarian breakdown. The conclusion also has an interesting take on the enduring legacies of authoritarianism in young democracies. Although authoritarian vestiges can be harmful to democracy, Loxton argues that authoritarian successor parties can help stabilize young democracies by creating incentives for undemocratic actors (e.g., upper-class elites and the military) to stay in the democratic game. Successful conservative party-building efforts

may also help stabilize otherwise fragile party systems and enhance democratic representation. Where conservative parties fail to take root, electoral volatility and party system instability may be more likely.

Loxton's analysis also helps us make sense of some perplexing findings in our own book. For example, we were surprised to find that political activism by poor citizens in Latin America is very high in contexts occasionally governed by center-right parties, as has been the case in Chile and El Salvador. We also found that linkages between center-right parties and poor voters are strong in countries with authoritarian successor parties like Brazil, Colombia, and El Salvador. Undoubtedly the resources, party brands, and clientelist networks that center-right parties inherited from authoritarian regimes help account for these counterintuitive findings.

Overall, this book is an important and well-researched book that makes a wonderful contribution to understanding the survival of conservative authoritarian successor parties in Latin America.

**Response to Carew Boulding and
Claudio A. Holzner's Review of *Conservative
Party-Building in Latin America: Authoritarian
Inheritance and Counterrevolutionary Struggle***

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— James Loxton 

Scholarship is a collective enterprise. This allows younger generations to push the envelope by standing on the proverbial shoulders of giants, and it means that there is room for scholars to make very different—but ultimately complementary—contributions. The decision to pair my book, *Conservative Party-Building in Latin America*, with Carew Boulding and Claudio A. Holzner's *Voice and Inequality* in this Critical Dialogue was an inspired one. The former focuses on the classic vehicle of democratic participation (political parties); the latter highlights the importance of a frequently overlooked one (contacting government officials). The former focuses on what is often thought of as the quintessential political instrument of the wealthy (conservative parties); the latter focuses on people at the opposite end of the income distribution (the poor). The former is a small-N, fieldwork-based study; the latter is a large-N, survey-based one.

I am very grateful to Boulding and Holzner for their generous and insightful review of my book. It was especially gratifying to note the points of contact between our very different books. One such point they

highlight is the tendency of many poor people in Latin America to vote for center-right parties. This has, in fact, been true wherever such parties have thrived. British workers in the late nineteenth century, for example, were famously likened by Conservative visionaries such as Benjamin Disraeli to “angels in marble”—a Tory electorate just waiting to be released. Whether we agree with them or not, the decision of some poor people to vote for conservative parties cannot be written off as the product of false consciousness. They have their reasons. In their book, Boulding and Holzner observe that clientelism, for example, is not always a bad deal for the clients. In my book, I highlight other reasons—including, as normatively discomfiting as I personally find it to be, retrospective voting based on the achievements of past authoritarian regimes.

Boulding and Holzner offer two main critiques of my book. The first is that the most-similar comparisons of Chile/Argentina and El Salvador/Guatemala are imperfect because these countries are not identical. This is a fair point. Although I strongly believe that structured comparisons should remain a core part of the comparative politics repertoire, the truth is that such comparisons never approach anything resembling laboratory-like conditions. In my book, I attempt to get around this problem by both zooming in and zooming out: each of my four cases is subjected to in-depth, within-case analysis, and chapter 7 is devoted to a range of shadow cases. This kind of triangulation makes it possible to cast doubt on potential alternative explanations, such as Chile's binomial electoral system. Because the binomial system was unique to Chile, it cannot explain broader variation in conservative party-building in Latin America. Even in Chile, its importance seems to have been overstated: when it was finally ended in 2015, this had no apparent effect on the country's two main conservative parties.

Their second critique concerns the use of public opinion data. Even though my book does make use of such data—in chapter 3, for example, I present survey data showing that UDI voters in Chile have long held far more positive views of the Pinochet dictatorship than the broader population—I agree with Boulding and Holzner that there is more work to be done here. This brings me back to my earlier point about the collective nature of scholarship. It is my sincere hope that my book will inspire other political scientists to launch their own cross-national studies of conservative parties, including through greater use of public opinion data. This is how knowledge advances.