and the preservation of their traditional values. Karpinovitsh was less interested in spatially embedded traditional ways, focusing on action rather than environment. His mobile and dynamic characters, ranging from political activists and teachers to thieves and prostitutes, seek to break rather than fortify the traditional spatial borders that had for centuries separated Jews from the rest of the city.

According to the book's thematic organization, Studer moves her focus from literary depictions of Jewish spaces as the loci of *Yiddishkeyt* (the traditional Jewish way of life) to representations of the traditional Jewish life cycle and then on to the sites of modernity, such as secular Yiddish schools, theater, and publications, as well as centers of political activity. In the last part, "Snapshots of Jewish Lifeworlds," she analyzes particular characteristic phenomena of Vilne, including its rich and vigorous underworld. As the discussion of literary texts progresses from static traditions toward dynamic modernity, Karpinovitsh eclipses Grade as the chronicler of interwar Vilne, and traditional religious Yiddishkeyt is slowly replaced by modern secular Yiddish culture.

As Studer's meticulous reading and insightful analysis demonstrate, Grade's and Karpinovitsh's complementary works present a multifaceted portrayal of the lifeworlds of diverse social and cultural groups in Vilnius's Jewish population, which had been wiped away by the Holocaust. What has remained beyond the scope of this impressive historical study, however, is the specific literary aspects of their prose. Their texts are taken apart in search of minute historical details but are never put back together so that they could be appreciated and analyzed as works of literature. In the end, the question of the "realism" of those literary representations of the Jewish past remains unresolved, despite Studer's claim in the conclusion that "the depictions of the milieus are realistic, and the depicted places are real" (366). But this discussion would require a different kind of methodology. Studer's book is an important and valuable contribution to the growing body of research on Jewish space, which up to now has been dominated by historians. It should encourage literary scholars to step in, and remind English-language scholars of the increasing amount of first-rate research publications in German in eastern European and Jewish studies.

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Ukraine Crisis: What It Means for the West. By Andrew Wilson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014. x, 236 pp. Notes. Index. Illustrations. Plates. Tables. Maps. $17.00, paper.

With this timely book, University College London professor Andrew Wilson adds yet another volume to his series of seminal studies on postcommunist east European politics. Over the last twenty years, Wilson has published a number of important investigations of, above all, contemporary Ukraine and Belarus that have shaped the western academic study and, to some degree, general perception of post-Soviet affairs. His latest paperback is perhaps best read as a follow-up to his equally important volumes *Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World* (2005) and *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (2005), also from Yale University Press. The central theme of these earlier studies was the post-Soviet dictators' use of novel means of manipulation ("political technology") rather than older forms of repression to secure their authoritarian regimes' sustainability. The post-Soviet autocrats have been dismantling democracy not by way of an overt destruction of pluralism but through a sophisticated faking of political contests and a creative shaping of public discourse via

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"active measures." In *Virtual Politics*, Wilson had, moreover, shown that these subversive post-Soviet techniques had had their origins in the KGB's and other late Soviet bloc secret service's methods of undermining the east European dissident movements of the 1970s–80s from within.

In *Ukraine Crisis*, Wilson outlines in detail how the Kremlin has been extending this approach to domestic affairs into the fields of foreign policy, diplomatic behavior, and European politics, if not into international relations in general. In spite of its title, this book is thus as much about Putin's Russia as it is about revolutionary and wartime Ukraine. It constitutes a remarkably informative exposition of, and well-illustrated warning about, the Kremlin's application of political technology to the realms of post-Soviet geopolitics, foreign intelligence operations, interstate affairs, and military expansion. Wilson shows, as much as was possible at the time of the manuscript's completion, Russia's deep involvement in Ukraine's recent regime change, loss of Crimea, and seeming "civil war" in the Donets Basin.

To be sure, Wilson wrote this book in summer 2014 and was aiming at a fast-moving, under-researched, and unpredictably evolving target. Moreover, he—as all of his colleagues, including myself—was (and is) both an analyst and victim of the "information war" and the intentional confusion generated by the Kremlin's sophisticated propaganda campaign. In addition, Wilson was not yet able to include crucial evidence, which appeared only in autumn–winter 2014 and later, that would have supported his argument. This includes, for instance, some revealing interviews by the so-called Donets'k People's Republic's first "minister of defense," Igor Girkin (alias "Strelkov"); the investigative reports on the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 crash and the use of artillery in the Donbass produced by the Bellingcat research group; and Vladimir Putin's March 2015 admission that Russia had initiated and organized Crimea's secession and annexation. While reading his book, one occasionally feels the time pressure and emotional stress under which Wilson apparently wrote it. Presumably, for most observers, the first half of 2014 was an exhilarating time, as the Ukrainian state became, on the one side, ever more "European" and less post-Soviet but also, on the other side, more unstable and feeble by the week.

Yet, in spite of these constraints, Wilson had by late summer 2014 produced a text that, especially at the time of its publication, served (and will fulfill) a number of functions not only for east European studies but also for the public debate about the nature of the "Ukraine Crisis." First, he early on produced the first larger "Russocentric" interpretation of the prehistory, origins, and unfolding of the confrontation inside Ukraine during the first half of 2014. While many others have also alleged from the start the Kremlin's critical involvement, Wilson's extensive investigation demonstrated and contextualized Russia's machinations far more revealingly than any other interpreter until early 2015. Second, although there was not yet a full, empirical picture of the Kremlin's critical role in the creation and escalation of the crisis, Wilson chose to emphasize Moscow's part more than what the confirmed data had by mid-2014 actually allowed. That was certainly a risk, setting him apart from other scholars who were instead focusing on the east Ukrainian upheaval's local roots, and it could be seen as a flaw in his narrative. Yet, with every passing month since the book's publication, more and more hitherto-hidden episodes from 2014 come to the surface. Most of this additional evidence supports Wilson's initial interpretation, which, while being substantiated only with certain gaps, is holding its ground. Third, and perhaps most important, Wilson sets the 2014 crisis within a larger context in both historical and comparative terms. He relates the Kremlin's fueling of the crisis to its domestic political-technological policies, its earlier forays into Ukrainian internal affairs, and especially to Moscow's similar machinations in the Baltics, Belarus, Moldova, and the southern Caucasus. This contextualization to some degree "de-Ukrainianizes"

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the "Ukraine Crisis" in that it shows where, why, and how Moscow has also been involved in the domestic affairs of countries less important to Russia than Ukraine.

Wilson is to be congratulated for having produced yet another groundbreaking study of post-Soviet affairs that will shape our understanding of eastern Europe for years to come. One hopes that it will not be the last.

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Erinnerungskultur—Kulturgeschichte—Geschichtsregion: Ostmitteleuropa in Europa. By Stefan Troebst. Forschungen zur Geschichte und Kultur des östlichen Mitteleuropa, no. 43. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2013. 440 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Illustrations. Plates. Photographs. €64.00, hard bound.

This volume combines twenty-six essays written between 2006 and 2012. They were originally published in a wide variety of volumes and journals. The research presented touches on four different yet related themes: studies about the various notions of a Slavic Europe and their changing meanings, essays on memory culture in eastern and southeastern Europe, short pieces about the cultural history of eastern Europe, and, finally, two studies on spatial aspects of the east. With the exception of two English-language pieces, all of the reprinted articles are in German.

While most of Stefan Troebst's essays may be read as contributions to academic debates in Germany and Europe, some are clearly interventions in the politics of history. These are arguably the most interesting and possibly also more controversial texts presented here. One subject discussed in great depth and from a wide range of perspectives is the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact between Nazi Germany and the USSR that sealed interwar Poland's fate. The author shows how this event is remembered in different parts of the continent. He discusses the prospects for and difficulties of establishing August 23 as a *lieu de mémoire* in a united Europe. While the pact remains a highly emotional topic in east-central Europe, it is largely forgotten or ignored in the west of the continent. Putin's Russia excludes the alliance with Adolf Hitler from the grand narrative of the Great Fatherland War (1941–45) and refuses to take responsibility for its consequences. In the west, some fear that establishing August 23 on the continent's mental map would diminish the weight of January 27, the date of the liberation of Auschwitz, when the Holocaust is remembered. Thus, historical memory in eastern Europe as well as in Europe as a whole can still be a divisive factor. The recent crisis between Russia and the west has proven Troebst—who has written about these problems for more than a decade—right. While history and memory are not at the heart of the conflict between Kyiv, Moscow, and Brussels, they do play a role. The Kremlin's history politics seek to undermine western scholarship at home and in the "near abroad." Conflicts about historical memory the author has analyzed—like those between Poland and Russia (over 1939 and Katyń)—have intensified. They have once again become part of national identities and international politics.

Using numerous examples, Troebst discusses the inherent tension in a European memorial culture. While historical memory is part and parcel of the European project, it has been hard to find a consensus about the catastrophes that ought to be publicly remembered: the Holocaust, the gulag, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and colonialism have had different impacts in different parts of the continent. They carry different meanings in different national and regional contexts. The memory of 1945 is another example used to illustrate different perspectives on history. While in western Europe as well as in Russia, the end of World War II is celebrated as the "liberation" from

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