Here lies their blunder, that they conceive the stupendous forces of nature, and along with them other human will and consciousness, to be all alike, directly, separately, and independently, given to them. They fancy themselves beings of a superior world, floating in the air, and looking down on man and the surrounding energies all objectively submitted to them, alike human desires and human will, along with the other activities of heaven and earth, for their inspection and comparison. But the truth is, that no force whatever is given to them, but as a function of their own will—a function so to speak of the form $w.f.(w.)$, where w is the acting will-force—a function vanishing with w; that is to say, that if they were deprived of all consciousness and memory of will, no conception whatever of verified force would remain in them. Nor can they eliminate this w from their expression of any force, or from their reasonings about it. They may talk of the lightning's speed, or of the distance from earth of the furthest nebula, or of the living force of planets or of suns; but all these fine words are intelligible only because they suggest multiples of their own remembered will-effort. Will is not a force given to them externally among a number of other more commanding forces equally observed by them; nor can it be found or described as a resultant or product of such forces. The truth is, that no force of the external world is ever properly and directly observed, but rather inferred by them from their consciousness of baffled will.

The substance of Mr. Kirkman's book, when not purely critical, is a professed demonstration of this theory.

Philosophy and its Foundations: with an Appeal to Spiritual Psychology. London: Simpkin, Marshall and Co. 1876.

When we read some of the high-reaching metaphysical speculations which are contained in this essay, for which the author modestly begs a fair and serious consideration, in the evident conviction that he has thrown a flood of light upon questions that have so long perplexed the minds of men; when we see English men and women stand for hours to wait for, or rush in eager crowds to cheer frantically, a passing carriage because it contains two persons who are privileged by the laws of the country to style themselves Royal Highnesses, or read of the frantic rush which these same people will make to get possession of the cherry stones which a Royal Highness has spat out after eating the cherries;—we are so little in accord with the thoughts and feelings which animate beings who so think, feel, and act, so utterly insensible to any common sympathies, that we sometimes feel a grave doubt whether we actually belong to the

https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.22.98.292 Published online by Cambridge University Press

same species, and, if so, whether it be not to a morbid variety of it. If such sympathies be physiological, it is plain that the want of sympathy must be pathological, that is, if we are of the same species. The question then is, whether all human beings in a civilized land are really of the same species, or whether those who are almost always finding themselves in a miserably small minority are not branching off into the development of a new species, of a morbid or other sort.

The author will perhaps not thank us for placing him, though it be only for purposes of illustration, in the same sentence with those who made so mad a rush upon the cherry-stones; nor do we mean thereby to do more than indicate how far removed his line of thought is from what we can sympathise with. But when he speaks of something, or rather somebody, who "sits the Absolute *all-conditioned* on the bosom of the absolute *unconditioned*," we ask ourselves in despair whether such words have definite meanings, or whether we are intellectually deficient.

> The unconditioned is neither subject nor object, but pure spirit as negation, manifesting nothing, and in itself capable of manifesting nothing; yet having the inherent attribute of potentiality or the capacity of manifesting the powers of positive condition when positive condition is introduced. The prime or primitive conditioned is both object and subject in one: the object being the foundation of the physical which is necessarily in him, and the subject being the cognition or mental counterpart thereof. We cannot separate the objective selfhood from the subjective selfhood, and yet we may well distinguish them. The cognition of all that is in self is the subjective appropriation of the objective. This, of course, constitutes absolute cognition; for if this objective selfhood constitutes primarily the absolute foundation of objective being in the universe, the cognition of this selfhood implies absolute knowledge. This selfhood is limited as to the essential form, but unlimited as to endless development of being from self:—the creation of objective worlds being but the phenomena of conditions combined and built together out of primordial and eternal personal subsistence; and the formation of minor subjective intellectualism being but the framework arising in immediate connexion with the objective economies with which they stand connected, and whose experience they possess.

This passage embodies the author's philosophy. To render it more intelligible to the reader, he goes over ground which has been often gone over, and gives a short account of the speculations which have been entertained on the same great subjects by some of the more prominent philosophers—

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Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Schelling.

His speculations are not all so high and abstruse as those we have quoted; and the reader, if he has the courage to go on, will find matters become more easy to understand. For the author is not a pure idealist, but will have his feet on some positive ground; he disavows the doctrine of pure innate ideas, and maintains "that all our ideas are directly or indirectly given us from the external world, or are grounded as intuitions formed by a combination of these ideas." The following passage will serve to show how firm a hold he keeps of fact even in his speculations:—

> Mr. Hume pronounces "the tie or connexion cause and effect to be arbitrary," but it is no more arbitrary than calling a spade a spade. We might call it a broad palm of iron attached to a handle of wood, for digging the ground; but this would only be an awkward attempt to point to the elements in combination for the serving of a purpose. In causality exists a *tie* of the elements, and in virtue of the tie we have the elements as factors, producing a result or a phenomenon as a totality. What the tie is in the conjunction, we can only explain by saying that, if the combination be a chemical one, *such is their affinity;* and if it be mechanical, *such is their fastening.* The inward idea is but an expression of the outward fact.

In the latter part of his essay he treats of mind and morals in their foundation, maintaining that the grand prerogative by which man is distinguished from the lower animals is the *intuition of relationships.* This power of vision in the lower animal is, as a rule, confined to *self;* in man, it is equally applicable to *not-self.*

The last chapter or section of the essay deals with Scriptural Psychology, and has far too many capital letters in its pages for our taste. It is all about *spirit, soul,* and *body,* showing what each of them is and how they are related to one another.

A Philosophical Treatise on the Nature and Constitution of Man. By George Harris, LL.D., F.S.A. London: Bell and Sons. 1876.

This treatise occupies two formidable volumes, one of which has 410, and the other 566 pages—altogether, therefore, nearly 1000 large and closely printed pages. Some notion of

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