

imperial Rome. Furthermore, those excluded from public school or university education found it easier to learn Italian than Latin, making the language of Renaissance art and history the more accessible. One no longer needed a classical education to appreciate the most highly valued visual art, to act and to be seen as a well-informed, authoritative, feeling connoisseur.

McCue deftly combines current criticism with primary sources. She roots her polemic in traditional literary criticism, in art history, and in print culture, and she takes a thoughtful historicist approach to romantic debates such as the possibility of progress in the fine arts and the best ways to nourish national schools of painting. As a result, she draws on a great variety of secondary sources, from John Barrell's *The Birth of Pandora and the Division of Knowledge* to Luisa Calè's *Fuseli's Milton Gallery*. McCue scrupulously positions her text with respect to other scholars' work, grouping herself with scholars like Sophie Thomas and Christopher Rovee in that her work is more concerned with romantic authors and art viewers than with collectors. She happily acknowledges scholars' great debt to Maria Schoina's *Romantic Anglo-Italians*, while extending Schoina's argument significantly into the visual arts.

Mary Shelley on Anglo-Italians, William Hazlitt's art criticism, Madame de Staël's *Corinne*, and Anna Jameson's *Diary of an Ennuyée* seem to weave their way through the text, always appearing as telling examples to buttress McCue's position. McCue also uses less familiar authors, such as William Roscoe, the Liverpool banker, abolitionist, art collector, and seminal Renaissance historian, and Charles Molloy Westmacott, "a journalist and a notorious blackmailer," to make powerful contributions to her arguments, alongside a plethora of authors of guidebooks. Their impact is magnified by McCue's sensitive attention to print culture and to the contributions that the nature of publication—whether appearing initially in periodical magazines or in a single, lavish volume—could make to the meaning of a text. McCue reads canonical texts, like Lord Byron's *Beppo: A Venetian Story* and Percy Shelley's *The Cenci*, through the language of romantic art criticism, generating striking new insights and opening these texts to fruitful new analyses. In her final chapter she dusts off Samuel Rogers's bestseller, *Italy*, to tell us new things about the romantic illustrated book and the medleys of genres that achieved great commercial success in the literary marketplace, and to illustrate the unmatched power of Renaissance Italy in the romantic imagination. By showing us how *Italy* influenced major Victorian authors such as John Ruskin, McCue shows how the romantic reshaping of Italy continues to resonate with us today.

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DAVID REYNOLDS. *The Long Shadow: The Legacies of the Great War in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Norton, 2014. Pp. xxix + 514. \$17.95 (paper).
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David Reynolds is a fine historian, with a host of prize-winning publications to his name, and *The Long Shadow* is a fine book. It is both a synthesis and a reinterpretation of his subject—the legacy of the First World War—in transnational context. But this book is primarily written for a British audience, a fact that fundamentally shapes Reynolds's argument and perspective. For as he readily concedes, despite its international and comparative cast, this book focuses disproportionately on the legacy of the war for Britain. It is the dominant, negative, and very narrow perception of the war among the British general public on the eve of the centenary commemorations of the war that is the main target of the book. (The BBC recently aired a documentary series under the same title with Reynolds elucidating his theses onscreen). Reynolds wants the British to understand that for Britain (as opposed to some of the other combatant nations) the

impact of the First World War, at least prior to the onset of the Second World War, was not altogether the tragic, futile catastrophe now commonly perceived and sacralized. For Reynolds, this bleak view was the product of the Second World War and the cultural politics of the Cold War that followed. With masterful dispassion, Reynolds first looks broadly at what the war created as well as destroyed up to the Second World War and then looks to the second half of the twentieth century to understand why in Britain, at least, a very narrow view of the war's significance and meaning has taken root.

Putting the British experience into the wider context of Europe and the United States is a welcome contribution, often called for but rarely provided in the recent literature on Britain and the Great War. In Reynolds's comparison, organized thematically in chapters titled "Nations," "Democracy," "Empire," "Capitalism," "Civilization," and "Peace," the postwar experience of continental Europe, especially east and southeast Europe, was far more wrenching than it was for Britain. Not only did the British suffer fewer war casualties, but they managed to escape the destruction of the old political order, the rise of extremist politics, and the subsequent violent ethnic nationalism that would devastate the continent and lead to the larger catastrophe of the Second World War. This section of the book is superbly presented and largely convincing, although one might quibble with Reynolds that Britain was not as exceptional to continental developments as he suggests. For instance, as Adrian Gregory's magnificent *The Last Great War* (2008) makes clear, a nascent "stab in the back" myth fueled by far-right-wing activists like Horatio Bottomley was developing in Britain in early 1918. Victory in the conflict forestalled any such development, and we will never know how serious the threat really was. Moreover, Reynolds admits that Ireland's experience after 1918 directly parallels the rise of ethnic nationalism and civil conflict experienced during the interwar period on the continent. But, somewhat oddly, this is painted as an exception that proves the exceptionalism of the British experience.

In the second half of the book Reynolds takes on the issue of why in Britain (and to a degree, in France), in contrast to much of the rest of Europe, the First World War became seen as futile tragedy after 1945 when it was not perceived as such in the two decades after 1918. Reynolds is surely right to suggest that the narrow range of meanings that the war now enjoys in Britain was not dominant in the interwar years, and he suggests that the current view evolved only over the second half of the twentieth century. But readers of this journal who have taken more than a passing interest in scholarship on the First World War over the last twenty-five years will recognize that Reynolds's position here is hardly novel. Ever since Jay Winter's *Sites of Memory: Sites of Mourning* was published in the early 1990s, there has been a steady stream of books and articles about Britain and the memory and legacy of the First World War, making exactly these points. Military historians such as Gary Sheffield and Brian Bond have long been trying to fundamentally revise perceptions about the significance of the war, its battles, and its leadership. Meanwhile, social, cultural, and gender historians like Susan Grayzel, Adrian Gregory, Nicoletta Gullace, and Janet Watson have fundamentally revised our understanding of the British home front, civilian attitudes, and the fundamental connections between those attitudes and the war and its legacy. Indeed, a number of historians, notably Dan Todman, have also traced the evolving representation of the war over the entirety of the twentieth century. Some of Reynolds's examples in the book are indebted to this body of work.

Put in the context of this now large literature on the changing representation, commemoration, and remembrance of the war, Reynolds's account of the evolving British representation of the war lacks some subtlety and nuance. There is no doubt, as Reynolds argues, that the Second World War had a powerful influence on reshaping how the first was understood (leading to its practical effacement in much of Eastern Europe). But British attitudes toward the war were never static and monolithic, even in the interwar years, and as Todman and others have shown, too much emphasis has been placed on the 1960s as the fulcrum of the swing toward the narrative of the war as futile tragedy. Reynolds is right, too, to question

both the fetishization of the trench-bound “Tommy” and of the bitterly ironic poetic canon that represented that experience. But while this critique might well be new to the British lay reader (although I suspect many in the target audience for Reynolds’s book will have come across such criticism already), it has been standard fare amongst historical scholarship on the war for more than twenty years.

In short, then, this is a readable and very judicious examination of the First World War’s impact and legacy for Britain, put into transnational context. As a synthesis it is powerful. But ultimately it offers little that is novel or surprising for anyone familiar with recent scholarship on the topic.

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ANDREW SARTORI. *Liberalism in Empire: An Alternative History*. Berkeley Series in British Studies. Oakland: University of California Press, 2014. Pp. 288. \$39.95 (paper).
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Andrew Sartori’s *Liberalism in Empire: An Alternative History* examines the seemingly counter-intuitive historical process by which property “became available” as a language for mounting specifically liberal, anticapitalist, and anticolonial critiques in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (3). He begins with a fine-grained reading of Locke on property that confounds both Marxist and sympathetic liberal analyses by exposing how the “anticapitalist trajectories” of Locke’s thoughts were bound to the very practices of capitalist society (15). But whereas most political theorists would have left that startling insight to stand on its own, Sartori pursues its expression into the “vernacular,” as articulated through the relationship between landowners and tenants portrayed in nineteenth-century Bengali legal and political discourse and, ultimately, the discourse of twentieth-century Muslim nationalism in India (7, 128). Crucially, for Sartori, examining the circulation and transformation of liberal norms in this imperial context enables new critical insight into the epistemological assumptions and political and ethical impulses braided into the history of liberalism more broadly.

This is an important, groundbreaking book. It upends both mainstream approaches to the history of European liberalism as well as most scholarly inquiries into liberalism’s historical entanglement with the material, social, and cultural politics of empire. For instance, Sartori’s methodology expands considerably upon Uday Mehta’s influential critique of the status of abstract individualism in liberal theory (*Liberalism and Empire*, 1999). For Mehta, a close reading of Locke and Mill reveals how these thinkers situated their ideas of universal personhood in complex cultural and social entailments that liberal theorists then endeavored to obscure, particularly in the context of empire. Sartori agrees with this conclusion but also insists that it does not go far enough toward explaining the “impulse to abstraction” in the first place or the political, cultural, and economic conditions that enabled it. (27). To do this, the book argues, we must burrow more deeply into the complex relationship between liberalism and political economy both in Britain and in India. Hence, the difference in titles between Mehta’s and Sartori’s books—*Liberalism and Empire*, *Liberalism in Empire*, respectively—perfectly captures the difference in their approaches. Not only does Sartori insist that the history of liberalism be read within the context of those political-economic relationships that developed between landowners and tenants on the ground in Bengal, but he also argues that this form of analysis disrupts the overly schematized relationship between abstraction and cultural/social object found in Mehta’s account. In other words, Sartori urges us to understand the relationship between European liberalism and empire in, as Edward Said might call it, “contrapuntal” terms (see Said’s