Haun never offers a clear explanation for why the United States repeatedly makes this mistake. He surveys the literature of rationalist and nonrational causes of war, but finds them all wanting in one way or another. He would do well to give greater attention to nonrational factors such as emotion, and rationalist factors such as imperfect information and domestic political constraints. Emotions can distort judgments, color interpretations of facts, and magnify perceptions of the stakes. Imperfect information—which is always a problem in international crises (call it the fog of diplomacy)—can easily lead to miscalculations. Finally, as Robert Putnam argues (1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42: 427–460), domestic political calculations are as important as international ones in foreign policy decision-making. Decision-makers play a "two-level game," looking for a solution set that satisfies both their international aims and their domestic constituents. Haun takes the domestic sphere into account when explaining a weak state's resolve to resist; it is equally important for understanding a strong state's choice of demands.

After laying out his theory of coercion in asymmetric relationships, Haun examines seven cases studies to demonstrate the theory's applicability: the Gulf War; the invasion of Iraq; the Bosnian civil war; the 1998 crisis in Kosovo; the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986 over its support for terrorism; the Libyan bombing of Pam Am flight 103; and Libya's agreement to end development of weapons of mass destruction. Strictly speaking, the bombing of flight 103 is not a case of coercion because the U.S. responded with economic sanctions rather than the threat of force, but Haun notes that it fits the theory nevertheless—which reinforces the suspicion that the distinction he draws between economic and military sanctions is an artificial one.

On the whole, Haun's theory fits his cases reasonably well, though some creative interpretation is required when the facts don't quite fall neatly into line—especially in the complex cases of Bosnia and Kosovo. In Kosovo, Haun acknowledges, Slobodan Milosevic gave up territory that he regarded as part of the Serbian homeland, which the theory predicts he should not have done short of all out war.

Using case studies to empirically test game theoretic models of international relations is tricky: One can observe what the actors do and how they respond to one another's moves. But knowing what they are thinking—whether they are making the sort of rational calculations the theory postulates—is quite a high hurdle to clear, especially since their deliberations are almost always secret. This dilemma creates a temptation to engage in some deductive mind-reading: If country A behaves the way the theory predicts, it must be because leader A made the rational calculations the theory requires.

Haun recognizes this danger and is explicit in admitting that we do not know what Muammar Qaddafi was thinking most of the time, so the analysis of the Libyan cases is based on "how Qaddafi likely perceived the fact presented to him" (p. 137). We have somewhat better documentation of how other leaders saw things, but the other cases do not entirely escape the temptation to read into the thinking of the decision-makers the rational calculations that fit the theory.

Nevertheless, Haun has given us a valuable contribution to understanding the dynamics of asymmetrical power relationships in the international system and why conflicts between strong and weak states sometimes teeter precariously at the threshold between coercion and war.

Greening the Globe: World Society and Environmental Change. By Ann Hironaka. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 216p. $110.00 cloth, $28.99 paper.

— Debra Javeline, *University of Notre Dame*

Scholars, practitioners, and citizens concerned about the fate of humanity and the planet face a barrage of bad news. It can be difficult to find small rays of hope amidst all the failed negotiations, agreements, policies, and outcomes. *Greening the Globe* gives us some optimism. It turns out that cultural trends toward environmental stewardship are right before our eyes. The world has changed for the better, even when policies fail.

Some of the central insights of the book are quite gratifying. Scholars engaged in quantitative work well understand the difficulty of accounting for the joint effects of several small variables in complex interaction. Ann Hironaka encourages us to think of each variable—in this case, each small effort to address environmental concerns—as a single and seemingly inconsequential bee sting, and all the variables/efforts cumulatively as the quite potent force of a bee swarm. Environmental efforts in joint, cumulative, and complex interaction have mattered. This work is provocative and enjoyable.

For the book also to be persuasive, the reader must buy into the underlying assumption that there has been much progress in addressing environmental concerns. Progress or success is what it purports to explain, but the progress and success is assumed rather than proved. Readers who do not share the assumption will be left confused about what exactly is being explained.

"Social change" is the purported dependent variable of the study, but "environmental change," or actual improvements in the health of the global environment, is the author's (and probably the readers') real cause for concern. At times, there is a clear sequence proposed, in that institutional processes supposedly "reconfigure the social world of individuals and organizations," and the reconfigured social world ultimately brings about environmental

change (p.16). At other times, however, evidence of social change is presented as evidence of "environmental change." This is the heart of the difficulty: In the book and in the real world, there is, unfortunately, little evidence of meaningful environmental outcomes, such as reduced emissions of greenhouse gases, reforestation, soil regeneration, or improved water quality and quantity. The globe is not green; the globe is in trouble. For example, boundaries in three planetary systems—biodiversity loss, climate change, and the nitrogen cycle—have already been exceeded (Johan Rockstrom et al, "A Safe Operating Space for Humanity," *Nature* 461 [September 24, 2009]: 472–75; Will Steffen et al, "Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a Changing Planet," *Science* 347 [February 13, 2015]: 736–45).

Hironaka focuses on social changes, such as pro-environmental attitudes, and at times seems to substitute "widespread change in pro-environmental attitudes and successful efforts at environmental change" (p. 13) for actual improvements in planetary health. However, even the optimism about attitudes and behavior may, unfortunately, not be merited. In terms of attitudes toward climate change, for example, many Americans are aware of the problem, but polls consistently show that few are worried about it or see it as a real risk or high priority (e.g., Matthew C. Nisbet, "Communicating Climate Change: Why Frames Matter for Public Engagement," *Environment Magazine* 51 [no. 2, 2009]: 12–23). Cross-national studies show similarly low public knowledge, emotional engagement, and priority ranking (e.g., Lorraine Whitmarsh, Gill Seyfang, and Saffron O'Neill, "Public Engagement With Carbon and Climate Change: To What Extent Is the Public 'Carbon Capable'?" *Global Environmental Change* 21 [2011]: 56–65).

At heart, the difficulty is that the book sets out to prove the value of the "world society perspective." Some readers may care about this. Many more readers, however, will care mainly or only about the central puzzle of solving environmental problems. These readers may find the framework and constant advocacy for world society theory to be a needless distraction. Worse, they may not be convinced.

For example, the world society perspective downplays the role of actors. Caricaturizing competing arguments, Hironaka complains about studies that emphasize a "heroic actor," "Herculean actor," or "Smoking gun model," in which a single individual or group swoops in and "causes" social change, while institutional structures are reified as "fixed, monolithic, and impervious to change" (p. 77). However, the literature is filled with sophisticated studies that acknowledge the malleability of institutions while also documenting the important actions of individuals, and so the ardent assertion of a dichotomy is a straw man. For example, Dale Jameison documents the critical roles of Al Gore, George W. Bush, and other actors in the creation and failure of the Kyoto Protocol (*Reason in a Dark Time: Why*

the *Struggle Against Climate Change Failed—and What It Means for Our Future*, 2014), and Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway document the critical roles of conservative scientists, foundations, Exxon Mobil, and other corporate actors in climate change denial (*Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming*, 2011).

Greening the Globe would have done well to engage the wider body of literature that provides evidence contrary to world society theory—to discuss globally important individuals and show that their contributions were insignificant or at least not as central as institutions. Instead, it is a book devoted to contemporary environmental issues that makes no mention of Gore, James Hansen, Bill McKibben, and the thousands of scientists who contribute to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The latter omission is especially notable, because the IPCC is an institution and thus should support the book's thesis, but IPCC findings were brought into the public arena by Nobel Prize–winning individuals. Perhaps these individuals did their pathbreaking work only because institutions enabled them, but such claims should be backed with systematic empirical evidence and thoughtful consideration of contrary empirical evidence.

Contrary empirical evidence is similarly omitted in *Greening the Globe*'s story of the 1972 Stockholm Conference and the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme. Hironaka claims that other nations had no environmental narrative prior to this institution-building, but authors such as Ramachandra Guha document that Gandhi was making linkages between environmental concerns and developmental concerns in 1928—well before Stockholm. Indira Gandhi is referenced (p. 39) for a much later statement, in which she pits the concerns of poverty and pollution against each other and thus supports the book's claim of a lack of pre-Stockholm narrative. The quote feels cherry-picked.

Hironaka's point that institutions matter stands on strong ground. The more extreme version of the theory—that institutions are primary in all cases and sometimes even deterministic—feels forced and based on selective reading of the evidence. The author is careful to affirm that multiple variables matter for any outcome, but the narrative and constant insistence on the primacy of world society theory suggests otherwise. More attention should be paid to struggles within institutions and the reasons that institutions sometimes have positive outcomes for the environment and sometimes do not. Importantly, a door should be left open for falsification. For example, the failure to address climate change, discussed on pages 126–36, should be presented as a challenge to world society theory, without the wishful, make-it-fit editorializing language of "it is a slow process with a great deal of momentum," "the jury is still out," and "promised improvements in the future."

This book's challenges do not detract from its important contribution as a reasonable source of optimism. It is helpful to be reminded that we have a global environmental agenda, work spaces, and persistent environmental institutional structures. Readers who teach or practice sustainability will be gratified to learn that they are bees who matter.

Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics. By Hyeran Jo. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 354p. $120.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592716000980

— Bridget L. Coggins, *University of California, Santa Barbara*

A substantial body of work examines the conditions under which states commit to and abide by human rights and the laws of war, but we know considerably less about civil conflicts than international ones and less about rebel groups' adherence than we do governments'. Professor Hyeran Jo's book, *Compliant Rebels,* seeks to fill this gap. It asks, "Why do rebels comply with international norms and laws during civil war?" The answer to this question (together with the answer to the same question for governments) has critically important implications. It may ultimately help minimize civilian suffering in civil wars, encourage practices that more closely conform to the ideals contained in international humanitarian law (IHL), and it could help humanitarian-minded organizations and governments to more effectively allocate their scarce resources to affect change.

So, among rebels, who complies? Jo argues that a certain category of rebel organization, the "legitimacy-seeking" type, is more likely to abide by IHL than the other "legitimacy indifferent" type. Legitimacy-seeking rebels have a domestic and international constituency that supports the norms enshrined in IHL and so, for principally strategic reasons, will more likely comply with its rules. Legitimacy-seeking rebels have three characteristics in common: 1) they have an active [legal] political wing, 2) they have secessionist ambitions, and 3) they have a "human rights-conscious" foreign government benefactor (pp. 94–100). Legitimacy indifferent rebels, in contrast, "have little to no motivation to appeal to domestic and international constituencies" (p. 52). After setting out this argument, the book quantitatively examines legitimacy-seeking rebels' propensity to comply with three humanitarian laws: against the purposeful killing of civilians, against the use of child soldiers, and in favor of access to prisoners of war by the Red Cross (ICRC). Case vignettes are included alongside each large-N analysis to illustrate the mechanism connecting legitimacy-seeking motives to those rebels' compliance. The book concludes with historical and contemporary cases of rebellion and then makes recommendations for policies following from its principal findings.

Insofar as causality is concerned, this is a thorny subject. Norm compliance, a classic non-event, has bedeviled scholars for decades. So the question motivating this book is a very good one. Unfortunately, this reader remains stubbornly unconvinced that rebels' drive for legitimacy is at the root of their lawful wartime behavior.

The book's primary limit is that it lacks a theory of civil war to support its hypotheses. Five guiding assumptions about rebels are provided, (e.g.: that they fight for political ends, that compliance is costly, etc.) but the book does not provide a compelling reason why it is usually in rebels' best interest to violate humanitarian laws. Humanitarian laws exist because state leaders agreed that the outlawed practices were generally not required or desirable in war. Why is it *ceteris paribus* militarily advantageous for rebels to engage in the one-sided killing of civilians? Ought rebels be regularly, purposely killing civilians if they hope to win? What level of killing should we expect? Additionally, some of the conflicts in the project data are killing tens of thousands (Russia—Chechnya) while others are just surpassing 25 annual battle related deaths (Britain—Real IRA). Civilian killing seems much more likely in the former. In the latter, would child soldiers be desirable? Would the rebels hold prisoners? Would the ICRC request visits if no prisoners are held? In short, the nature of the conflict and scale of its violence seem important, and yet they are overlooked.

Therefore, it is unclear that rebel compliance is really "a puzzle." To illustrate, take the assumption that compliance is costly for rebels. Pages 91–92 report that 51% of rebel groups did not engage in any one-sided killing of civilians (>25 purposive killings in one year) during their wars. Indeed, where temporal data on civilian killing is presented in Appendix 3, it appears that most rebels are complying with IHL most of the time. The book concludes that these "persistent compliers" weighed the costs of not killing against the benefits of legitimacy and legitimacy concerns won-out. But when a rule is internalized, compliance is not considered in terms of the 'logic of consequence,' but via the 'logic of appropriateness.' Therefore, it is just as reasonable to conclude that, for the majority of rebels, compliance is *costless* because they do not consider slaughtering civilians to begin with. The so-called "switchover" compliers (and switchover non-compliers) seem to hold the most important evidence of the book's argument, but are not tested quantitatively.

While the book marshals an impressive array of data to support its claims, some of the modeling choices also limit the book's findings. For example, legitimacy-seeker qualification number three (above) seems as likely to be a result of the character of the organization's wartime actions as a cause (and a similar problem may arise with qualification 1). Would be sponsors with a strong IHL commitment should be more likely to offer support to