Migrant Remittances and Violent Responses to Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean

Ana Isabel López García
Barry Maydom

ABSTRACT

High levels of crime are a key driver of emigration from Latin America and the Caribbean. But can emigration change public opinion about how best to respond to crime? Focusing on the political economy of remittances—the money migrants send to their families and communities—this study argues that emigration can increase support for violent responses to crime. Migrants' families often spend remittances on investment goods, which makes them more vulnerable to crime and more supportive of violence to protect themselves. An analysis of AmericasBarometer data finds that remittance recipients are more likely both to fear crime and to be victims of crime than nonrecipients. They are also more approving of vigilantism, more tolerant of police bending the law to apprehend criminals, and more supportive of deploying the military in crime fighting. These findings contribute to our knowledge of the consequences of international migration for political development in migrant-sending countries.

Keywords: international remittances, crime, militarization, police brutality, vigilantism, Latin America and the Caribbean

Migration scholars have recently posited a connection between crime and emigration (Hiskey et al. 2014; Ríos Contreras 2014) and have begun to explore how connections with migrants abroad influence how those left behind view and respond to rising fear and insecurity in Latin America and the Caribbean (Acevedo 2019; Doyle and López García 2019; Ley et al. 2019; López García 2020; López García and Maydom 2019; Pérez Armendáriz and Duquette-Rury 2019). In public opinion surveys, a growing number of citizens support the idea of crime being countered through violent means (Cohen et al. 2017). Civil and human rights are vio-

Ana Isabel López García is a postdoctoral researcher at the Chair of Conflict and Development in the Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany. ana.lopez-garcia@uni-konstanz.de. ORCID 0000-0002-8294-363X. Barry Maydom is a lecturer in politics in the Department of Politics, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK. b.maydom@bbk.ac.uk. ORCID 0000-0003-0821-2019. Conflict of interest: We confirm that we have no competing interests regarding publication of the manuscript.

 DOI 10.1017/lap.2021.4

lated when real or suspected criminal suspects are tortured on arrest, abused in detention, sentenced to death, killed by the military, or lynched by fellow citizens themselves. Are Latin American and Caribbean migrants contributing to a growing set of undemocratic and unconstitutional attitudes in their countries of origin?

This article examines how the receipt of financial remittances from abroad shapes individual support for the use of violence in crime-fighting activities in contexts of emigration. We define "violent responses to crime" as the use or threat of violence in response to a (potential) criminal act. These responses can be perpetrated by both state actors (when the police or the military use brutal or lethal force to apprehend or execute real or suspected criminals) and nonstate actors (when individuals engage in acts of self-defense, vigilantism, or lynching).

We propose that remittance recipients are more likely to support the use of violence in response to crime than are nonrecipients. We attribute this to remittance-receiving individuals' concentration in the middle class and, among their peers, to their greater propensity to make investments and purchase durable goods—goods that are vulnerable to crime and its externalities—its extended effects in society (Galiani et al. 2020). Remittance recipients are more likely to experience and to fear crime compared with nonrecipients, and as a result, they are more likely to approve of violent measures in response—especially in Latin America and the Caribbean, where crimes are very often accompanied by violence.

To test this argument, this study uses survey data from the 2010 to 2018–19 waves of the AmericasBarometer. In line with our theoretical expectations, the quantitative analysis shows that remittance recipients are more likely to report being victims of, and afraid of, crime than nonrecipients. Furthermore, such recipients are more likely to approve of citizens' taking justice into their own hands, to support the police bending the law to apprehend criminals, and to endorse the armed forces' involvement in crime fighting than nonrecipients are. These findings are robust to controlling for a range of variables and matching individuals on observable characteristics. The evidence confirms that receiving remittances can make individuals more supportive of violence as a response to crime. This finding has important implications for attitudes toward the rule of law, the expansion and consolidation of human rights, and democratic development in countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.

This article makes a series of contributions to the literature. It adds to the growing body of research on the consequences of international migration for political development in migrant-sending countries.[1] In particular, it contributes to the study of the relationship between migrant transnationalism and violent origin-country democracies (Pérez-Armendáriz 2019). The study also brings new perspectives and insights to current scholarly work on popular support for violent approaches to tackling crime in Latin America and the Caribbean (Bateson 2012; Buchanan et al. 2012; Malone 2012; Nivette 2016; Pion-Berlin and Carreras 2017; Singer et al. 2019; Visconti 2019; Zizumbo-Colunga 2017).

https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.4 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Existing Literature

Individuals' economic anxieties and exposure to crime have often been associated with greater support for using violence against alleged criminals (Bateson 2012; Costelloe et al. 2009; Hogan et al. 2005; Nivette 2016; Singer et al. 2019; Visconti 2019). The scholarship shows that the receipt of remittances lowers economic anxieties, specifically in the form of more positive evaluations of the household and national economy (Ahmed 2017; Germano 2018; Tertytchnaya et al. 2018). Since remittance income arrives from abroad, recipients are less vulnerable to fluctuations in the national economy—mainly because remittances tend to be stable and countercyclical. The extra income provided by remittances also allows recipients to buy public goods (such as security protection) on the private market, so they have less incentive to demand them from the state (Doyle and López García 2019). If remittance recipients hold positive perceptions of the household and the national economy and have greater resources to access crime prevention measures than nonrecipients do, then we might expect that the receipt of remittances would lower individual support for the use of violence in crime-fighting activities.

But while remittances can provide recipients with greater resources to ensure their own private security, investments therein can sometimes generate violence and run counter to the rule of law (Malone 2012). This is the case, for example, when citizens buy and carry a gun for self-defense or fund or organize themselves into peasant patrols, militias, self-defense forces, or vigilante movements. Recent work by Pérez-Armendáriz and Duquette-Rury (2019) shows that vigilante organizations are more likely to emerge in Mexican municipalities where migrants finance and implement public goods projects through (collective) remittances from the United States. Ley et al. (2019) report similar findings when analyzing the relationship between the share of households receiving remittances from abroad and the emergence of self-defense groups at the municipal level in Mexico.

Further accounts show that remittances do not make recipients immune or indifferent to the lack of public insecurity in the society in which they live. We have found elsewhere (López García and Maydom 2019) that even though remittances depress voter turnout, recipients are more likely to go to the polls in contexts of crime and violence in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America—behavior spurred by the desire to influence government policies on the provision of public security. Likewise, Acevedo (2019) explores survey data from Latin America and demonstrates that in hypothetical scenarios of rising corruption and rising criminality, remittance recipients would be more supportive of military coups than nonrecipients. From existing studies, therefore, it is unclear how the receipt of remittances from abroad influences individual support for the use of violence in crime fighting across Latin America and the Caribbean.

https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.4 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Theory

This study argues that remittance recipients are more likely to approve of the use of violence against crime than nonrecipients. International migration is a costly, risky, and selective process, and therefore most migrant and remittance-receiving households do not belong to the poorest of society (De Haas 2007; McKenzie and Rapoport 2010). This is important, since the relationship between income and crime victimization is not linear (Gaviria et al. 2010; Gaviria and Pagés 2002; Justus and Kassouf 2013; Di Tella et al. 2010). Wealthier individuals are the most attractive to criminals because of their capacity to make investments and purchase durable goods. At the same time, however, the affluent are more capable than lower-income groups of protecting themselves and their assets from criminality. They can insure their goods, pay premiums, and even afford replacements. With lower levels of security protection than the rich, but greater resources than their poorer peers regarding investments and durable goods, middle-income citizens are most likely to fall victim to crime. Members of remittance-receiving households are thus part of a crime-anxious middle class. Among peers, however, remittance recipients are more likely than nonrecipients to fall victim to and fear crime.

Various studies have shown that relative to other sources of income, remittances are more likely to be spent on investments and durable goods than to finance everyday consumption (Adams 1991; Adams and Cuecuecha 2010; Durand et al. 1996; Massey and Parrado 1998; Woodruff and Zenteno 2001; Yang 2008). Asset accumulation is more likely among migrant households, due to the temporary and uncertain nature of remittance income. This idea is consistent with the tenets of the "new economics of labor migration" theory (Stark 1991; Stark and Bloom 1985). According to this approach, families strategically send one or more members to live in a labor market abroad that is not correlated with the one at home. Through the financial remittances that migrant family members send home, households overcome restricted access to labor, insurance, or credit markets—thereby promoting investment in durable goods and in physical as well as financial assets (such as vehicles, farming equipment, housing, land, new businesses, or other capital goods).

Durable goods are more valuable than consumables because of their longer lifespan and the greater returns or services they yield. Recent work by Galiani et al. (2020) has posited a connection between the durability of a good and the likelihood that it will be subject to a crime. Because criminals can get more utility from them, and even resell them on secondary (illegal) markets, durable goods are more likely to be stolen than nondurable ones. If the receipt of remittances is linked to a greater individual propensity to make investments and purchase durable goods, it follows that the receipt of remittances increases the supply side of goods that can be stolen from a given person.

Let us now take two households that are similar in their income, rely on the same crime prevention measures, and are equal in all other relevant characteristics, but that vary in their receipt of remittances. A criminal (or group) prefers to steal durable goods and has two choices: stealing from the nonrecipient household or

https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.4 Published online by Cambridge University Press

stealing from the remittance-receiving one. At the same level of income, the nonreceiving household is more likely to purchase consumables (e.g., food, clothing, entertainment), whereas the remittance-receiving one is more likely to make investments and buy durable goods (e.g., a car to use as a taxi, a bicycle to get to work, or a new tractor or water pump for the family farm). In this scenario, the remittance-receiving household will be more attractive to the criminal (or group) than the nonreceiving one.

Besides being more likely to be targeted by criminals, investments and durable goods—and thereby remittance-receiving households—are more vulnerable to suffer from the externalities caused by crime (Galiani et al. 2020). Crime can endanger the value and returns of property and hinder business development and opportunities—sectors in which remittances are often invested (Jaitman 2017; Soares 2015). For instance, the returns of a small grocery store or market stall acquired through remittance income can be affected due to declining customer security; similarly, the value of a house bought with remittance income can plunge due to rising neighborhood insecurity.

If remittance recipients are more vulnerable to crime, they are also more likely than nonrecipients to fear its occurrence. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the most violent region on earth, crime often involves violence (Galiani et al. 2020; UNODC 2014). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014), six out of ten robberies in the region involve violence, and the share of homicide victims who are killed during a robbery, assault, or a theft is larger in Latin America and the Caribbean than in other parts of the world. The likelihood of being killed during a crime's occurrence can have important psychological consequences for (potential) victims. When facing a violent threat, potential victims are more likely to react with violence. In sum, although members of remittance-receiving households may have fewer economic grievances, they are more likely to suffer from the physical, psychological, and economic anxieties and dislocations produced by crime.

As noted, previous research shows that crime and fear are important factors driving individuals to support the use of violence against alleged criminals, including vigilantism, harsh policing, and the militarization of public security (Bateson 2012; Nivette 2016; Visconti 2019). In the specific context of Latin America and the Caribbean, where people are more likely to die during the course of a crime being committed, we therefore expect that the receipt of remittances is linked to greater support for the use of violence in response to crime at the individual level. We attribute this to the propensity of remittance-receiving households to invest and to purchase durable goods, and the sensitivity of these to crime and its externalities, all else being equal. We also argue that remittance recipients will be more tolerant of state authorities' using violence, such as police brutality and torture in the course of arrest and detention or the militarization of policing functions.

Remittances can provide recipients with extra resources to provide security for themselves. It is unlikely, however, that these flows of money allow recipients to take full ownership of their own security. Remittances cannot easily or effectively substitute private security for the full range of security issues potentially affecting recipi-

ents. Therefore, we posit that the receipt of remittances will also increase individual approval of giving extra power to state forces to counter crime. This idea is in line with the results of previous research showing that crime and violence scenarios increase the incentives of remittance recipients to participate in elections, as well as their tolerance for military coups in scenarios of rising criminality (Acevedo 2019; López García and Maydom 2019).

We see vigilantism, police brutality, and the militarization of public security as different expressions—or "repertoires"—of the same phenomenon; namely, support for the use of violence in reaction to "alleged" crime and insecurity. Instead of being fixed or mutually exclusive, these reactions to crime are fluid and overlap in a gray zone between the legal and the extralegal (Bateson 2020). Our claims are thereby consistent with qualitative accounts of Brazil and the Dominican Republic showing that those who support the use of vigilantism and other forms of citizen-administered justice are also more likely to endorse the implementation of so-called *mano dura* (iron fist) policies (Bobea 2011; Caldeira and Holston 1999; Hume 2007; Moser and Rodgers 2005). They are also in line with evidence on collaboration between citizen security groups and public security forces in cracking down on crime (Bargent 2015; Davis and Pereira 2003; Malone 2012) and on state authorities' enabling and fostering the use of citizen justice in the face of crime (Casado and Londoño 2020; Hockstader 1991; Moser and Rodgers 2005; Payán 2015). As Moncada (2017) notes, it is difficult to define and theorize vigilantism and other forms of citizen-provided justice in comparison with state forms—especially in Latin America and the Caribbean, where vigilantism has often been instrumental for, rather than opposed by, those responsible for upholding state authority.

In sum, we argue that in the specific context of Latin America and the Caribbean, where most crimes are accompanied by violence, the receipt of remittances is linked to greater support for the use of violence in response to crime by both citizens and state forces. This argument leads to the following hypotheses:

H1: Remittance recipients are more likely to experience crime than are nonrecipients.

H2: Remittance recipients are more likely to fear crime than are nonrecipients.

H3: Remittance recipients are more likely to approve of citizens' engaging in acts of citizen-administered justice than are nonrecipients.

H4: Remittance recipients are more likely to approve of the police bending the law to capture criminals than are nonrecipients.

H5: Remittance recipients are more likely to endorse military intervention in crime fighting than are nonrecipients.

Although support for violent approaches to countering crime represents a challenge to democracy in Latin America (and elsewhere), this argument is not inconsistent with recent studies that attribute the positive impact of remittances on democratization to recipients' demands for property rights, since such guarantees are essential for remittance investments to be protected and to thrive (Bastiaens and

https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.4 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Tirone 2019; Bearce and Park 2019). However, we suggest an alternative outcome in the context of democracies in Latin America. To protect themselves and the value and returns of their investments and durable goods against crime and its externalities, remittance recipients will support concrete and tougher mechanisms to counter crime, including the use of violence. This idea echoes theories about the growing use of violence (nonstate and state) and coercion to protect property rights against crime in contemporary Latin America (Foweraker and Kznaric 2002; Pearce 2010; Pereira and Davis 2000).

Data

We test the proposed hypotheses using survey data from Latin America and the Caribbean. Data were gathered from the 2010–2018/19 waves of the Americas-Barometer (LAPOP 2019). Since the key questions that we are interested in remained the same throughout the different waves, we pooled the data and included country and wave fixed effects to control for cross-national and -temporal variation.

The main independent variable in this study is individuals' status as remittance recipients. This is a binary variable, coded 1 if respondents answered affirmatively to the question, "Do you or any members of your household receive remittances from abroad?" and 0 otherwise. To capture respondents' exposure to crime, we use a dichotomous variable measuring whether they themselves or a member of their household had been the victim of a crime in the 12 months prior to the survey. To measure respondents' fear of crime, we use a variable measuring how unsafe the persons in question consider the neighborhood they live in. This is an ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 3, with higher levels indicating more acute perceptions of a lack of safety in the immediate neighborhood.

While perceptions of insecurity in the neighborhood indicate that respondents are aware of the security risks where they live, this variable does not necessarily capture their personal fear of crime. A better measure of how fearful people are of crime is modified behavior because of insecurity. In this regard, we employ an index variable constructed from a battery of questions asking whether, in response to fear of crime, respondents had restricted their movements to safe places or certain times of day, avoided activities such as walking at night or through dangerous areas, felt the need to move to a different neighborhood, changed jobs, or organized with neighbors. Our index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher levels indicating a greater propensity to take crime prevention measures, suggesting more acute fears of crime.

To measure citizen support for violent responses to crime, we use three dependent variables. The first is based on the question, "Of people's taking the law into their own hands when the government does not punish criminals, how much do you approve or disapprove?" This is an ordinal variable ranging from 0 (strongly disapprove) to 9 (strongly approve). The second measure is a dichotomous variable in response to the question, "In order to apprehend criminals, do you think that police authorities should always respect the law, or that occasionally they can operate on the margins of the law?" Those who selected "they can operate at the margins of the

https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.4 Published online by Cambridge University Press

law, occasionally" were coded 1, and all those who disagreed were coded 0. The third measure captures support for military involvement in crime-fighting activities and is based on the question, "To what extent do you support the involvement of the armed forces to combat crime and violence (in the country)?" This is an ordinal variable, ranging from 0 (strongly disapprove) to 6 (strongly approve). [2]

We also include in our models a range of control variables that could also be related to stronger preferences for the use of violence against crime. Besides respondents' preoccupation with crime as a national problem and experiences with and fear of it, our models account for levels of trust in neighbors and trust in law enforcement agencies (the police, the courts, and the military). Since support for violent approaches to tackling crime might be driven by economic insecurities (Costelloe et al. 2009; Hogan et al. 2005; Nivette 2016; Singer et al. 2019), models also include respondents' evaluations of their personal economic situation and of the national economy. To address the possibility of remittance recipients' being more likely to support violent responses to crime when they intend to stay in (i.e., not emigrate from) their country of origin, a variable measuring individuals' intentions to work or live abroad in the future is included as well.

Additionally, we control for other socioeconomic and demographic characteristics likely to affect individual support for the use of violence in crime fighting: gender, age, rural or urban residence, education (with the reference category being primary/no schooling) and employment status. All models control for a wealth index (constructed additively from responses to a series of questions about respondents' possession of various durable goods). Any correlations we identify between remittances and support for violence in the face of crime are therefore unlikely to be driven purely by a resource effect, wherein those with greater amounts of resources (including from remittances) are more likely to support tougher crime-fighting measures. Instead, as suggested, one of the reasons why remittance-receiving individuals are more likely to support these approaches is their greater propensity to make investments and purchase durable goods. A full description of all the variables used in the models is available in the online supplementary material.

In our sample, 15 percent of respondents in Latin America and the Caribbean reported receiving remittances from abroad—ranging from less than 5 percent in Brazil to over 45 percent in Haiti and Jamaica. The average proportion who approved of police operating outside the law to apprehend criminals was 36 percent, ranging from 25 percent in Jamaica to 47 percent in El Salvador. Meanwhile, the mean score of individual support for citizens' taking justice into their own hands (recoded to a scale of 0–1, with poles of strongly disagree and strongly agree) was 32 percent, ranging from 20 percent in Costa Rica and Brazil to 42 percent in El Salvador. The mean score of support for giving the military a role in providing domestic security (recoded to a scale of 0–1, with poles of strongly disagree and strongly agree) was 75 percent, ranging from 60 percent in Uruguay to 85 percent in El Salvador. How the proportions of remittance recipients and their levels of support for violent responses to crime vary across the different countries surveyed by LAPOP are displayed graphically in the online supplementary material.

https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.4 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Empirical Strategy

To test the hypothesis that the receipt of remittances leads individuals to be more supportive of the use of violence against crime, we estimated a series of regression models. We used linear and (ordered) logit estimators, depending on the dependent variable. Two of our dependent variables are skewed: support for the militarization of public security leans toward the higher end of the spectrum, whereas support for vigilantism leans toward the lower end. The supplementary material illustrates the distribution of these variables.

As a preliminary check, we ran a series of partial proportional odds models. Unlike ordered logit models that are based on the "parallel lines assumption"—that is, the coefficient of an explanatory variable is the same across the various cumulative logits that can be estimated—partial proportional odds models constrain only those variables that meet the parallel lines assumption but do not impose that constraint for those variables where it is violated. The results of these models are reported in the supplementary material. The models confirm that remittance receipt meets the parallel lines assumption when estimating support for vigilantism. However, they reveal that the receipt of remittances leads to higher probabilities of support for militarization only among those individuals situated in the highest categories of support for the military. That is, the receipt of remittances is effective in driving people from strong to very strong support for militarization, but ineffective in moving people from zero to very little support for it. Since the proportional odds assumption is not fulfilled in this case, we instead report a series of binary logistic regression models estimating support for militarization based on cumulative probabilities.

As noted, all our models include dummies for every country and every wave of the LAPOP survey to control for any unobserved or unmeasured differences across countries over time.[3] To avoid bias from dropping observations, regression models using only observations that have nonmissing values on the relevant variables are reported.

Addressing Threats to Causal Inference

As we have seen, members of remittance-receiving households are not a random demographic. To mitigate the problem of "selection of observables," we used matching so that treated and control groups had similar covariate distribution (Ho et al. 2007). We employed the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) method (Iacus et al. 2012). CEM is a nonparametric matching method that helps to reduce the imbalance between treated and untreated groups. In this study, the treatment group is made up of respondents who receive remittances. They were matched on the pretreatment variables of age, gender, size of place of residence, years of education, employment status, and wealth. By adjusting for the distribution of covariates between recipients and nonrecipients, matching can allow us to separate the effect of remittances from other factors shaping individuals' support for violent crime control measures—and thereby create comparisons that are more valid.

https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.4 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Table 1. Socioeconomic Characteristics of Crime Victims and Remittance Recipients

	Crime as a Problem (1)	Insecurity in Neighborhood (2)	Victim of Crime (3)	Fear of Crime (4)	Remittance Recipient (5)
Urban	–0.149***	–0.424***	–0.482***	–0.093***	–0.006
	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.003)	(0.026)
Female	0.175***	0.171***	–0.085***	0.025***	–0.071**
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.003)	(0.023)
Age	0.003	0.013***	–0.002	0.002***	–0.043***
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.004)
Age^2	0.000	–0.000***	–0.000	–0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Secondary	0.050	0.039	0.241***	0.021***	0.043
	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.004)	(0.036)
Postsecondary	–0.039	0.034	0.372***	0.026***	0.094**
	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.004)	(0.032)
Wealth	0.133***	0.068***	0.096***	0.018***	0.493***
	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.002)	(0.018)
$Wealth^2$	–0.007***	–0.008***	–0.003**	–0.001***	–0.031***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.002)
Employed	0.002	–0.003	0.086***	0.005	–0.251***
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.003)	(0.024)
N	81,215	81,215	81,215	81,215	81,215

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Notes: Models 1, 3, and 5 are binary logit models; model 2 is an ordinal logit model; and model 4 is a linear model. Year and country dummies are included, but omitted here for ease of presentation. Standard errors in parentheses.

One caveat is the loss of observations to obtain balance. After matching, our sample shrank from 81,215 to 58,971 observations. However, this ensures that self-selection is not the main driver of the results. The matching solution reduces the overall imbalance between treatment and control groups (measured by the L1 statistic) from 0.67 to 0.50. We adjusted for the remaining imbalance by including the pretreatment variables in our models. In our matched sample, 47,911 individuals were in the control group and 11,060 in the treatment group. To compensate for the different sizes of the two groups, we used weighted regressions.

https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.4 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Figure 1. Wealth and Fear of Crime, by Remittance Receipt



Results

As shown in table 1, wealth is nonlinearly related to views about crime as the main problem afflicting the country, perceptions of insecurity in the neighborhood, fear of crime, and experiences with it. There is also a quadratic relationship between the receipt of remittances and wealth. That is, the majority of remittance recipients are members of the middle class. These preliminary results thus lend support to our initial assumptions.

Figure 1 reveals that for all wealth levels, remittance recipients are more likely to act out of fear of crime than are nonrecipients. Even among remittance recipients, the middle class is most likely to act out of fear of crime. The next step is to explore whether the receipt of remittances has an effect on (fear of) victimization above and beyond being in the middle class.

We examine whether remittance recipients differ from nonrecipients in their experiences with and fear of crime and their support for the use of violence in response, conditional on wealth. The models presented in tables 2 and 3 show the coefficients obtained after matching. Results of the statistical models using unmatched data are reported in the online supplementary material.

https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.4 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Table 2. Remittance Receipt and Experiences with and Fear of Crime

	Crime as a Problem (1)	Insecurity in Neighborhood (2)	Act Out of Fear of Crime (3)	Victim of Crime (4)
Remittance receipt	0.003	0.033	0.023***	0.300***
	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.004)	(0.026)
Urban	–0.145***	–0.423***	–0.097***	–0.534***
	(0.024)	(0.018)	(0.004)	(0.024)
Female	0.183***	0.162***	0.023***	–0.089***
	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.003)	(0.020)
Age	–0.002	0.013***	0.002***	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Age^2	0.000	–0.000***	–0.000***	–0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Secondary	0.040	0.035	0.031***	0.257***
	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.005)	(0.034)
Postsecondary	–0.048	0.012	0.028***	0.395***
	(0.030)	(0.023)	(0.005)	(0.030)
Wealth	0.055***	–0.013***	0.003***	0.039***
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.005)
Employed	0.006	–0.025	0.004	0.109***
	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.003)	(0.022)
N	58,971	58,971	58,970	58,971

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Notes: Models 1, 2, and 4 are logit models; model 3 is a linear model. Matched sample. Year and country dummies are included, but omitted here for ease of presentation. Standard errors in parentheses.

As table 2 reports, remittance recipients do not differ from nonrecipients in their views about crime as the most important problem in their country. Perceptions of insecurity in one's own neighborhood do not vary between remittance recipients and nonrecipients, either. However, the regression analysis confirms that compared to nonrecipients, remittance recipients are more likely to act out of fear of crime. They are also more likely to experience it: the change from nonrecipient to remittance recipient increases the predicted probability by 22 percent. This provides evidence for the main hypothesis of this study. The online supplementary material reports additional models estimating, as outcome variables, experiences with different types of crime—robbery, burglary, theft and threats of theft, assault, and extortion. The results indicate that relative to nonrecipients, remittance recipients are more likely to experience all types of crime.[4]

https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.4 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Table 3. Remittances and Support for Violence Against Crime (Logit Models)

	Vigilantism				Repressive Policing				Militarization			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Remittance receipt	0.034*** (0.022)	0.031*** (0.022)	0.031*** (0.022)	0.025*** (0.022)	0.040** (0.040)	0.035** (0.040)	0.035** (0.040)	0.032* (0.040)	0.049*** (0.030)	0.045*** (0.030)	0.045*** (0.030)	0.040*** (0.031)
Urban	–0.025*** (0.018)	–0.012* (0.018)	–0.004 (0.018)	–0.003 (0.018)	–0.030** (0.030)	–0.010 (0.031)	–0.004 (0.031)	–0.004 (0.031)	0.014 (0.024)	0.026*** (0.025)	0.022** (0.025)	0.022** (0.025)
Female	–0.044*** (0.016)	–0.046*** (0.016)	–0.046*** (0.016)	–0.043*** (0.016)	–0.062*** (0.028)	–0.067*** (0.028)	–0.069*** (0.028)	–0.067*** (0.028)	–0.007 (0.022)	–0.009 (0.022)	–0.004 (0.022)	–0.000 (0.022)
Age	–0.006*** (0.003)	–0.007*** (0.003)	–0.007*** (0.003)	–0.007*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.003* (0.004)	0.003* (0.004)	0.003** (0.004)	0.004*** (0.004)
Age^2	0.000* (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	–0.000*** (0.000)	–0.000** (0.000)	–0.000** (0.000)	–0.000** (0.000)	–0.000 (0.000)	–0.000 (0.000)	–0.000* (0.000)	–0.000* (0.000)
Secondary	–0.006 (0.027)	–0.009 (0.027)	–0.011 (0.027)	–0.011 (0.027)	0.035* (0.045)	0.030* (0.045)	0.029 (0.046)	0.029 (0.046)	0.019 (0.035)	0.015 (0.035)	0.020 (0.036)	0.019 (0.036)
Postsecondary	–0.030*** (0.024)	–0.034*** (0.024)	–0.035*** (0.024)	–0.036*** (0.024)	0.016 (0.040)	0.008 (0.040)	0.008 (0.040)	0.007 (0.040)	–0.019 (0.031)	–0.023* (0.031)	–0.014 (0.031)	–0.015 (0.031)
Wealth	–0.009*** (0.004)	–0.009*** (0.004)	–0.009*** (0.004)	–0.009*** (0.004)	0.005* (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	–0.005** (0.005)	–0.006*** (0.005)	–0.005** (0.005)	–0.005*** (0.005)
Employed	0.001 (0.017)	0.000 (0.017)	0.000 (0.017)	0.002 (0.017)	–0.009 (0.029)	–0.012 (0.030)	–0.012 (0.030)	–0.012 (0.030)	0.018* (0.023)	0.018* (0.023)	0.017* (0.023)	0.015* (0.023)
Crime victim		0.042*** (0.018)	0.036*** (0.018)	0.034*** (0.018)		0.099*** (0.031)	0.095*** (0.031)	0.095*** (0.031)		0.048*** (0.025)	0.050*** (0.025)	0.049*** (0.026)
Fear of crime		0.042*** (0.022)	0.036*** (0.022)	0.034*** (0.022)		0.021 (0.049)	0.018 (0.049)	0.017 (0.049)		0.073*** (0.029)	0.075*** (0.030)	0.073*** (0.030)

	Vigilantism				Repressive Policing				Militarization			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Insecurity in neighborhood		0.026*** (0.009)	0.015*** (0.010)	0.014*** (0.010)		0.032*** (0.016)	0.022*** (0.017)	0.022*** (0.017)		–0.005 (0.012)	0.001 (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)
Crime as a problem		–0.020*** (0.018)	–0.018** (0.018)	–0.016** (0.018)		0.052*** (0.035)	0.051*** (0.035)	0.051*** (0.035)		0.031*** (0.025)	0.024** (0.025)	0.022** (0.025)
Interpersonal trust			0.024*** (0.009)	0.024*** (0.009)			0.029*** (0.016)	0.030*** (0.016)			0.002 (0.013)	0.002 (0.013)
Trust in the police			–0.019*** (0.005)	–0.018*** (0.005)			0.002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)			–0.008*** (0.007)	–0.009*** (0.007)
Trust in the judiciary			–0.004 (0.008)	–0.003 (0.008)			–0.020*** (0.014)	–0.020*** (0.014)			–0.005 (0.011)	–0.007 (0.011)
Trust in the military											0.058*** (0.007)	0.058*** (0.007)
Emigration intentions				0.047*** (0.019)				0.012 (0.035)				0.025** (0.027)
Worse personal economy				–0.019** (0.021)				0.012 (0.036)				0.029*** (0.028)
Worse national economy				–0.022** (0.023)				0.023 (0.039)				0.041*** (0.031)
N	56,267	56,267	56,267	56,267	25,427	25,427	25,427	25,427	40,941	40,941	40,941	40,941

***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Notes: Matched sample. Models in Panel 1 are ordinal logit models, and models in panels 2 and 3 are logit models. Country and year dummies are included but omitted from the table for ease of presentation. Y-standardized coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.

In a third step, we examined the relationship between the receipt of remittances and support for violent responses to crime. We estimated four models for each dependent variable. The first represents a baseline, including basic socioeconomic and demographic control variables; the second adds crime-related variables; the third adds measures of trust in citizens and state authorities; and the fourth model includes measures of emigration intentions and economic insecurity. Table 3 reports the results from these models. Since odds ratios are sensitive to the inclusion of additional variables, Y-standardized coefficients are displayed.

The coefficient of remittance receipt is positive and statistically significant across all models. These results suggest that a remittance recipient—as compared with a nonrecipient—is more likely to support citizens' taking criminal justice into their own hands, to approve of military intervention in policing tasks, and to tolerate police bending the law to capture criminals. Once we control for crime-related variables, the coefficient for remittance receipt remains positive and statistically significant but decreases across models. This is consistent with our hypothesis of remittances working through that channel. It is not, however, the full story. Our models suggest that migrant remittances influence individual support for violence against crime in other ways—consistent with our hypotheses. Regarding crime-related variables, our models corroborate the findings of recent studies showing that those individuals who have experienced and fear crime are more likely to support violent approaches being used as part of activities undertaken to combat it (Bateson 2012; Nivette 2016; Visconti 2019).[5]

The conditional correlation between remittance receipt and support for the use of violence to tackle crime is also robust to the inclusion of variables measuring respondents' levels of trust in law enforcement agencies and trust in neighbors. It even remains significant when respondents' pocketbook and sociotropic economic evaluations and emigration intentions are included in the models. These are interesting findings: as noted above, the receipt of remittances is usually linked to more positive economic views (Ahmed 2017; Doyle 2015; Germano 2018; Tertytchanaya et al. 2018), and economic insecurities are commonly related to increased support for iron fist crime reduction policies and vigilantism (Costelloe et al. 2009; Hogan et al. 2005; Nivette 2016; Singer et al. 2019).

Since favoring violent approaches to crime might also be driven by support for the national executive, the online supplementary material reports a series of additional models, including as control variables measures of trust in the executive, presidential approval, and evaluations of the government's job in providing security. The conditional correlation between remittance receipt and support for the use of violence to counter crime remains positive and meaningful above and beyond individuals' backing of the executive. Again, these findings are consistent with those of the baseline models.

Figure 2 displays the predicted probabilities across remittance recipients and nonrecipients based on the models in tables 2 and 3. In relative terms, the results tell us that for an otherwise average individual, the change from nonrecipient to recipient status leads to a 7 percent decline in the likelihood of strongly opposing vigilan-

https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.4 Published online by Cambridge University Press

Figure 2. Average Marginal Effects by Remittance Receipt with 95 Percent Confidence Intervals



tism, to an 8 percent increase in the probability of tolerating the police bending the law in the course of fighting crime, and to a 6 percent increase in the likelihood of strongly approving of the militarization of countermeasures to crime.

Additional Checks

Heterogeneity Analysis

The regression models described above assume that crime and fear and support for the use of violence in crime fighting and individual attributes are similarly associated across all countries. However, crime experiences and support for the use of violence against crime might be context-dependent. For instance, the militarization of public security might mean different things to respondents in different countries. Similarly, the violence with which crime is committed might differ across emigration settings.

To control simultaneously for the individual-level characteristics and country-level factors that may influence the probability of approving of violent responses to crime and therefore allow for more precise articulation, we estimated a series of mul-

https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.4 Published online by Cambridge University Press

tilevel models, with individual respondents nested in countries across which intercepts vary. The models include the following country-level predictors: remittance inflows as a percentage of gross domestic product from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (as a proxy for both country levels of economic development and dependence on remittances); and homicide rates from the Igarapé Institute (as a proxy for the incidence of crime). We use the latter as a measure of crime, given that data on other types (such as robbery, theft, assault, or burglary) may vary according to citizens' propensity to report or not to report crimes to state authorities. Differences also exist in the classification and collection of crime statistics by state agencies (Fearon 2011). The online supplementary material illustrates how remittance dependence and homicide rates vary across the different countries surveyed.[6]

Results from these mixed models are reported in the online supplementary material. The variance is statistically meaningful across models, indicating that there is a significant amount of between-country variability in the outcome. Yet the coefficient for the receipt of remittances is nonetheless positive and significant across models. This indicates that remittance recipients are more likely to support vigilantism, the militarization of public security, and police ability to bend the law, even after accounting for an economy's level of dependence on remittance inflows and the homicide rate in a given country.

To assess how variations in the propensity of remittance recipients to be victims of crime or to support the use of violence in tackling it relate to other (unobserved) contextual or country-specific factors, the online supplementary material reports the coefficients of the main variable of interest (receiving remittances) obtained when models are estimated for each of the countries under study. Although the statistical significance of the results does indeed differ across countries, there is a tendency for the receipt of remittances to be positively associated with both experiences of crime and support for the use of violence in crime fighting (vigilantism, police brutality, and militarization)—similar to our baseline specifications. For instance, remittances drive variations in support of the militarization of public security in countries with relatively low levels of violence, such as Suriname and Paraguay (at the 0.05 level) and Peru (at the 0.1 level), as well as in highly violent countries, such as Honduras and Guatemala (at the 0.05 level). Therefore, it is fair to say that our main results are not influenced just by particular countries.

Alternative Outcomes

So far, the evidence suggests that remittance recipients are (on average) more likely to support the use of violence in countering crime. However, one might also reasonably ask whether the receipt of remittances influences individual support for nonviolent responses to crime, such as penal welfarism or preventive social policy. Although support for these policies makes sense in the longer term, there is strong evidence linking individual experiences with and fear of crime (which recipients are more likely to have) with support for tougher short-term policing measures rather than long-term crime reduction strategies (Bateson 2012; Nivette 2016; Visconti 2019).

https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.4 Published online by Cambridge University Press

To verify this, we ran a series of logit models estimating the likelihood that individuals think the main cause of crime is poverty and the lack of youth and social programs, that homicides should be reduced through investment in jobs and education, and the likelihood that individuals think that crime should be countered through preventive measures.[7] The results of these models are reported in the online supplementary material. We find no evidence that the receipt of remittances increases support for social or preventive measures to reduce crime.

Additionally, we explore whether the receipt of remittances is associated with individual support for gun ownership out of fear of crime.[8] The results of these models are reported in the online supplementary material. We find that in countries where firearm ownership is allowed, remittance recipients are more likely than nonrecipients to carry a gun out of fear of crime and to live in households in which at least one member owns a gun. Even in countries where firearm ownership is banned, remittance recipients are more likely than nonrecipients to support the idea of owning a gun for self-protection—should they have this opportunity. While these findings do not tell us whether remittance recipients engage in violence themselves, they are, nevertheless, consistent with our argument.

In sum, the results of the statistical analysis are in line with our main hypotheses. Migrant remittances have a positive influence on individuals' fear and crime experiences and support for the use of violence to counter crime. This finding holds true after matching individuals on observable characteristics and using different dependent variables measuring support for violence in crime-fighting activities. It is also robust to the inclusion of a range of control variables. Results are valid after accounting for heterogeneous effects associated with different levels of (economic) development and violence. All in all, these findings are telling in regard to how the receipt of remittances influences individuals' tolerance of what Latin American and Caribbean governments and societies choose to do as part of tackling crime.

Conclusions

This article has examined how the receipt of remittances shapes individuals' support for the use of violence in crime fighting across Latin America and the Caribbean. Using survey data from the 2010–2018/2019 waves of the AmericasBarometer, a statistical analysis has revealed that the receipt of remittances is positively and significantly related to individual support for the use of violence in response to crime by both citizens and state actors. Specifically, we find that remittance recipients are (on average) more likely to approve of citizens' taking matters into their own hands, more likely to endorse military intervention in policing tasks, and more likely to tolerate the police bending the law to apprehend criminals than nonrecipients are. We attribute this to remittance recipients' greater propensity to make investments and purchase durable goods, coupled with the vulnerability of these kinds of goods to violent crime (Galiani et al. 2020). Remittance recipients are found to be more likely to fear crime and to have experienced it.

https://doi.org/10.1017/lap.2021.4 Published online by Cambridge University Press

What do the results of this study tell us about the contribution of migrant remittances to crime control and democratic development in Latin America and the Caribbean? If the proportion of remittance-receiving households continues to rise across the region, as it has done over the past few years (Orozco 2019), these findings suggest that popular support for violent responses to crime will only increase. Through their influence on citizens' support for the use of violence in crime fighting, remittances may contribute to civil rights violations that stem from the use of coercion and repression by state and nonstate actors alike (Cruz 2016; Flores-Macías and Zarkin 2019; Muggah 2019; Pérez 2015). The microlevel results also speak to recent work showing that respect for human rights is negatively related to remittance inflows in developing countries (Bang et al. 2019; Carneiro and Figueroa 2019).

The evidence and propositions advanced here can, therefore, help us to refine our understanding of the role that migrants and the remittances they send home play in the patterns of coercion and violence in contemporary democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean—where violence is constantly reproduced as an integral part of how rights are perceived, experienced, and defended (Cruz 2016; Pearce 2010; Pérez Armendáriz 2019; Santamaría and Carey 2017). By illustrating how remittances incentivize support for the use of violence to tackle crime, this study also contributes to the emerging literature on the individual determinants of preferences for punitive and violent measures toward crime in Latin America and beyond.

That said, this study has a number of limitations. The results presented here should be corroborated using alternative data, as well as alternative quantitative research designs. For instance, scholars could go deeper and investigate how the frequency and amount of remittances affect households' consumption and investment patterns, as well as preferences in crime-fighting approaches. Longitudinal survey data (with time-invariant respondent heterogeneity) could also be used to test how support for violent countermeasures to crime varies before and after the receipt of remittances or across time. Exploring this topic further is vital, since violent approaches to combating crime have proved ineffective in reducing fear and insecurity across the region.

Longitudinal survey data could additionally help to address endogeneity concerns. For example, individuals who receive remittances may be more supportive of the use of violence in addressing crime because their relatives abroad originally emigrated due to rising fears and violence—and thus they themselves developed such attitudes. Unfortunately, lack of data availability prevented us from addressing these key issues in this particular study. Another potential source of endogeneity is omitted variables affecting remittance receipt and support for violence. Further studies should deal with potential endogeneity and the causal effects of remittances on support for violent approaches against crime.

Another limitation of this study is that it focuses on only one region: Latin America and the Caribbean (where crimes are often accompanied by violence). As such, these results might be highly context-specific. Most Latin American and Caribbean migrants tend to concentrate in the United States, where vigilantism and gun ownership are well rooted and where the militarization and brutality of police

forces have intensified in recent years. Further research should explore how support for violence to counter crime relates to a transfer of norms across countries. This study has explored only how these attitudes are influenced through the income channel of migrant remittances. Relevant data from other world regions and countries of origin and destination are therefore needed to better understand how the receipt of remittances affects individual support for violent approaches to tackling crime.

In sum, analyzing the ways that transnational migrants—and the financial resources that they send back home—shape individual support for the use of violence in tackling crime can add nuance to an area of research that has hitherto mostly conceived of migrant-to-country-of-origin engagement as conducive to peace, democratization, and human rights (Escribà-Folch et al. 2015; Pérez Armendáriz 2014, 2019; Pérez Armendáriz and Crow 2010, 2018).

Notes

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers, Corinne Bara, Sarah Berens, Paul Dolfen, Sandra Ley, Katrina Maydom, Hilde van Meegdenburg, Enzo Nussio, James Powell, and Thomas Rixen for their excellent comments and suggestions on previous versions of this article. Preliminary versions of it were presented at the Peace and Security Section of the 2020 Annual Conference of the Swiss Political Science Association at the University of Lucerne, the IR Section of the 2020 German Political Science Association at the University of Freiburg, and the Politics of Crime Control and Social Protection Workshop at the University of Cologne (October 15–16, 2020). We acknowledge the use of data made publicly available by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). All errors remain our own.

1. For recent examples, see Acevedo 2020; Ahmed 2020; Careja and Emmenegger 2012; Córdova and Hiskey 2015, 2019; Doyle 2015; Duquette-Rury 2019; Escribà-Folch et al. 2015, 2018; Germano 2018; López García 2017, 2018; Maydom 2017; Pérez-Armendáriz 2014; Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010, 2018; Pfütze 2012, 2014; Tertytchnaya et al. 2018.

2. This question is available only starting in the 2012 wave. Excluded from this item are the cases of Costa Rica, Haiti, and Panama, since they lack traditional military institutions.

3. In our models, Mexico serves as the reference category.

4. Data for extortion victimization indicators are available only for Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and El Salvador for the LAPOP survey waves 2008, 2010, 2016–17, and 2018–19. Questions on experiences with robberies, burglary, theft, and assault were asked in the 2014 wave only in the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

5. Since, in various countries, heavy-handed approaches to crime have been implemented in response to gang crime and violence, the online supplementary material reports a series of additional models, including the presence of gangs in the respondent's neighborhood as a control variable. Results are still consistent with those reported above. For every measure of support for the use of violence to counter crime, the coefficient of remittance receipt remains positive and statistically significant.

6. Complete data for these country-level indicators were available for only 17 countries. In the models, continuous predictors at the country and individual levels center on the population average.

7. The question about the lack of youth and social programs was asked in the 2008 and 2012 waves of the LAPOP survey only in Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-

duras, Nicaragua, and Panama. The item about jobs and education was asked in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico in the 2016–17 and 2018–19 waves of the LAPOP survey. The question about preventive measures was asked in 22 countries in the 2012 and 2014 waves of the LAPOP survey. It was measured as an ordinal variable, coded 2 if respondents reported that preventive measures should be implemented to reduce crime, 1 if they reported that both preventive measures and higher penalties were needed to reduce crime, and 0 if they reported that increasing the punishment of criminals suffices to reduce crime.

8. To examine this, we used three variables. The first is a dichotomous variable based on the question, "Have you ever carried a gun out of fear of crime?" The second is a binary variable based on the question, "Does someone in your household own a gun?" These two items were surveyed in the Bahamas, Barbados, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago, where firearm ownership is allowed. The third variable is a dichotomous one based on the question, "If you could, would you have your own firearm for protection?" This question was posed in the remaining LAPOP countries, where there are bans on firearm ownership.

References

Acevedo, Jesse. 2019. Remittances and Support for Military Coups. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 4–7.

———. 2020. Migrant Remittances and Demand for Redistribution. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 55: 403–35.

Adams, Richard H., Jr. 1991. The Economic Uses and Impact of International Remittances in Rural Egypt. *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 39, 4: 695–722.

Adams, Richard H., Jr., and Alfredo Cuecuecha. 2010. Remittances, Household Expenditure and Investment in Guatemala. *World Development* 38, 11: 1626–41.

Ahmed, Faisal Z. 2017. Remittances and Incumbency: Theory and Evidence. *Economics and Politics* 29, 1: 22–47.

———. 2020. *The Perils of International Capital*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bang, James T., Arindam Mandal, and Aniruddha Mitra. 2019. Transnational Remittances and State Protection of Human Rights: A Case for Caution. *Economic Notes: Review of Banking, Finance and Monetary Economics* 48, 3: 1–15.

Bargent, James. 2015. Vigilante Justice Popular Across Latin America: Report. *Insight Crime*, March 30. www.insightcrime.org

Bastiaens, Ida, and Daniel C. Tirone. 2019) Remittances and Varieties of Democratization in Developing Countries. *Democratization* 26, 7: 1132–53.

Bateson, Regina. 2012. Crime Victimization and Political Participation. *American Political Science Review* 106, 3: 570–87.

———. 2020. The Politics of Vigilantism. *Comparative Political Studies*, online first. DOI https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020957692

Bearce, David H., and Seungbin Park. 2019. Why Remittances Are a Political Blessing and Not a Curse. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 54, 1: 164–84.

Bobea, Lilian. 2011. *Democratizing Violence: The Case of the Dominican Republic*. Washington, DC: Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center.

Buchanan, Cornelia, Liz DeAngelo, Ruidan Ma, and Chris Taylor. 2012. Mano Dura in the Americas: Who Supports Iron Fist Rule. *AmericasBarometer Insights* 80: 1–8.

Caldeira, Teresa P., and James Holston. 1999. Democracy and Violence in Brazil. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 41, 4: 691–729.

Careja, Romana, and Patrick Emmenegger. 2012. Making Democratic Citizens: The Effects of Migration Experience on Political Attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe. *Comparative Political Studies* 45, 7: 875–902.

Carneiro, Cristiane Lucena, and Ana Figueroa. 2019. Migrant Remittances and Rights to Physical Integrity: A Cross-section Study of Latin America, 1981–2014. *Brazilian Political Science Review* 13, 2: 19–31.

Casado, Leticia, and Ernesto Londoño. 2020. Gun Ownership Soars in Brazil Under Bolsonaro. *New York Times*, March 31.

Cohen, Mollie J., Noam Lupu, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, eds. 2017. The Political Culture of the Americas 2016/17: A Comparative Study of Democracy and Governance. Nashville: Vanderbilt University. https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2016/AB2016-17_Comparative_Report_English_V2_FINAL_090117_W.pdf

Córdova, Abby, and Jonathan Hiskey. 2015. Shaping Politics at Home: Cross-Border Social Ties and Local-Level Political Engagement. *Comparative Political Studies* 48, 11: 1454–87.

———. 2019. Development Context and the Political Behavior of Remittance Recipients in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Political Behavior,* online first. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-019-09574-5.

Costelloe, Michael T., Ted Chiricos, and Marc Gertz. 2009. Punitive Attitudes Toward Criminals: Exploring the Relevance of Crime Salience and Economic Insecurity. *Punishment & Society* 11, 1: 25–49.

Cruz, José Miguel. 2016. State and Criminal Violence in Latin America. *Crime, Law and Social Change* 66, 4: 375–96.

Davis, Diane E., and Anthony W. Pereira, eds. 2003. *Irregular Armed Forces and Their Role in Politics and State Formation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

De Haas, Hein. 2007. Turning the Tide? Why Development Will Not Stop Migration. *Development and Change* 38, 5: 819–41.

Di Tella, Rafael, Sebastian Galiani, and Ernesto Schargrodsky. 2010. Crime Distribution and Victim Behavior During a Crime Wave. In *The Economics of Crime: Lessons For and From Latin America*, ed. Di Tella, Galiani, and Schargrodsky. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 175–204.

Doyle, David. 2015. Remittances and Social Spending. *American Political Science Review* 109, 4: 785–802.

Doyle, David, and Ana Isabel López García. 2019. Crime, Remittances, and Presidential Approval in Mexico. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, online first. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1623325

Duquette-Rury, Lauren. 2019. *Exit and Voice: The Paradox of Cross-Border Politics in Mexico*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Durand, Jorge, William Kandel, Emilio A. Parrado, and Douglas S. Massey. 1996. International Migration and Development in Mexican Communities. *Demography* 33, 2: 249–64.

Escribà-Folch, Abel, Covadonga Meseguer, and Joseph Wright. 2015. Remittances and Democratization. *International Studies Quarterly* 59, 3: 571–86.

———. 2018. Remittances and Protest in Dictatorships. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62, 4: 889–904.

Fearon, James D. 2011. Homicide Data. Third revision. Background paper prepared for the World Development Report 2011 team. *World Development Report Background Papers*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Flores-Macías, Gustavo, and Jessica Zarkin. 2019. The Militarization of Law Enforcement: Evidence from Latin America. *Perspectives on Politics,* online first. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719003906

Foweraker, Joe, and Roman Krznaric. 2002. The Uneven Performance of Third Wave Democracies: Electoral Politics and the Imperfect Rule of Law in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society* 44, 3: 29–60.

Galiani, Sebastian, Laura Jaitman, and Federico Weinschelbaum. 2020. Crime and Durable Goods. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 173 (May): 146–63.

Gaviria, Alejandro, and Carmen Pagés. 2002. Patterns of Crime Victimization in Latin American Cities. *Journal of Development Economics* 67, 1: 181–203.

Gaviria, Alejandro, Carlos Medina, Leonardo Morales, and Jairo Núñez. 2010. Who Bears the Burden of Crime in Colombia? In *The Economics of Crime: Lessons For and From Latin America*, ed. Rafael di Tella, Sebastian Galiani, and Ernesto Schargrodsky. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 101–32.

Germano, Roy. 2018. *Outsourcing Welfare: How the Money Immigrants Send Home Contributes to Stability in Developing Countries*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hiskey, Jonathan, Jorge Daniel Montalvo, and Diana Orcés. 2014. Democracy, Governance, and Emigration Intentions in Latin America and the Caribbean. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 49, 1: 89–111.

Ho, Daniel E., Kosuke Imai, Gary King, and Elizabeth A. Stuart. 2007. Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference. *Political Analysis* 15, 3: 199–236.

Hockstader, Lee. 1991. President-Elect Condones Vigilantism in Haiti. *Washington Post*, January 10. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/01/10/president-elect-condones-vigilantism-in-haiti/ef4f72f5-1889-4963-970d-89fbe981e1c7

Hogan, Michael J., Ted Chiricos, and Marc Gertz. 2005. Economic Insecurity, Blame, and Punitive Attitudes. *Justice Quarterly* 22, 3: 392–412.

Hume, Mo. 2007. Mano Dura: El Salvador Responds to Gangs. *Development in Practice* 17, 6: 739–51.

Iacus, Stefano M., Gary King, and Giuseppe Porro. 2012. Causal Inference Without Balance Checking: Coarsened Exact Matching. *Political Analysis* 20, 1: 1–24.

Jaitman, Laura. 2017. *The Costs of Crime and Violence: New Evidence and Insights in Latin America and the Caribbean*. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0000615

Justus, Marcelo, and Ana Lúcia Kassouf. 2013. Evidence of the Effect of Wealth Observed by Criminals on the Risk of Becoming a Victim of Property Crimes. *Economía* 14, 2: 88–101.

Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). 2019. AmericasBarometer Surveys 2004–2017. Nashville: Vanderbilt University.

Ley, Sandra, José Eduardo Ibarra Olivo, and Covadonga Meseguer. 2019. Family Remittances and Vigilantism in Mexico. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* online first. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1623309

López García, Ana Isabel. 2017. Economic Remittances, Temporary Migration and Voter Turnout in Mexico. *Migration Studies* 6, 1: 20–52.

———. 2018. International Remittances, Cash Transfer Assistance and Voter Turnout in Mexico. *Comparative Migration Studies* 6, 1.

———. 2020. The 3×1 Programme and Criminal Violence in Mexico. *Global Networks* 20, 4: 625–55.

López García, Ana Isabel, and Barry Maydom. 2019. Criminal Violence, Remittances and Turnout. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, online first. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1623294

Malone, Mary Fran T. 2012. *The Rule of Law in Central America: Citizens' Reactions to Crime and Punishment.* London: Continuum.

Massey, Douglas S., and Emilia A. Parrado. 1998. International Migration and Business Formation in Mexico. *Social Science Quarterly* 79, 1: 1–20.

Maydom, Barry. 2017. Migrant Remittances and Democracy. Ph.D. diss., University of Oxford.

McKenzie, David, and Hillel Rapoport. 2010. Self-Selection Patterns in Mexico-US Migration: The Role of Migration Networks. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 92, 4: 811–21.

Moncada, Eduardo. 2017. Varieties of Vigilantism: Conceptual Discord, Meaning and Strategies. *Global Crime* 18, 4: 403–23.

Moser, Caroline O., and Dennis Rodgers. 2005. Change, Violence and Insecurity in Non-Conflict Situations. Working paper 245. London: Overseas Development Institute. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/1824.pdf

Muggah, Robert. 2019. Reviewing the Costs and Benefits of Mano Dura Versus Crime Prevention in the Americas. In *The Palgrave Handbook of Contemporary International Political Economy*, ed. T. M. Shaw, L. C. Mahrenbach, R. Modi, and X. Yi-Chong. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 465–83.

Nivette, Amy. 2016. Institutional Ineffectiveness, Illegitimacy and Public Support for Vigilantism in Latin America. *Criminology* 54, 1: 142–75.

Orozco, Manuel. 2019. Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean in 2018. Washington, DC: Inter-American Dialogue. https://www.thedialogue.org

Payán, Tony. 2015. The Coproduction of Public Safety and Organized Crime in Mexico. Working Paper. James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University.

Pearce, Jenny. 2010. Perverse State Formation and Securitized Democracy in Latin America. *Democratization* 17, 2: 286–306.

Pereira, Anthony W., and Diane E. Davis. 2000. Introduction: New Patterns of Militarized Violence and Coercion in the Americas. *Latin American Perspectives* 27, 2: 3–17.

Pérez, Oscar J. 2015. *Civil-Military Relations in Post-Conflict Societies: Transforming the Role of the Military in Central America*. New York: Routledge.

Pérez-Armendáriz, Clarisa. 2014. Cross-Border Discussions and Political Behavior in Migrant-Sending Countries. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 49, 1: 67–88.

———. 2019. Introduction: Migrant Transnationalism in Violent Democracies. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, online first. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1623275

Pérez-Armendáriz, Clarisa, and David Crow. 2010. Do Migrants Remit Democracy? International Migration, Political Beliefs, and Behaviour in Mexico. *Comparative Political Studies* 43: 119–48.

———. 2018. Talk Without Borders: Why Political Discussion Makes Latin Americans with Relatives Abroad More Critical of Their Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies* 51, 2: 238–76.

Pérez-Arméndariz, Clarisa, and Lauren Duquette-Rury. 2019. The 3x1 Program for Migrants and Vigilante Groups in Contemporary Mexico. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,* online first. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2019.1623345

Pfütze, Tobias. 2012. Does Migration Promote Democratization? Evidence from the Mexican Transition. *Journal of Comparative Economics* 40, 2: 159–75.

———. 2014. Clientelism Versus Social Learning: The Electoral Effects of International Migration. *International Studies Quarterly* 58, 2: 295–307.

Pion-Berlin, David, and Manuel Carreras. 2017. Armed Forces, Police and Crime-Fighting in Latin America. *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 9, 3: 3–26.

Ríos Contreras, Viridiana. 2014. The Role of Drug-related Violence and Extortion in Promoting Mexican Migration: Unexpected Consequences of a Drug War. *Latin American Research Review* 49, 3: 199–217.

Santamaría, Gema, and David Carey, Jr., eds. 2017. *Violence and Crime in Latin America: Representations and Politics*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 3–18.

Singer, Alexa J., Cecilia Chouhy, Peter S. Lehmann, Jessica N. Stevens, and Marc Gertz. 2019. Economic Anxieties, Fear of Crime, and Punitive Attitudes in Latin America. *Punishment & Society* 22, 2: 181–206.

Soares, Ricardo R. 2015. Welfare Costs of Crime and Common Violence. *Journal of Economic Studies* 42, 1: 117–37.

Stark, Oded. 1991. *The Migration of Labor*. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Stark, Oded, and David Bloom. 1985. The New Economics of Labor Migration. *American Economic Review* 75, 2: 173–78.

Tertytchnaya, Katerina, Catherine E. De Vries, Hector Solaz, and David Doyle. 2018. When the Money Stops: Fluctuations in Financial Remittances and Incumbent Approval in Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. *American Political Science Review* 112, 4: 758–74.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2014. *Global Study on Homicide 2013: Trends, Contexts, Data*. Vienna: UNODC. https://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf

Visconti, Giancarlo. 2019. Policy Preferences After Crime Victimization: Panel and Survey Evidence from Latin America. *British Journal of Political Science* 50, 4: 1–15. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123418000297

Woodruff, Christopher M., and René Zenteno. 2001. Remittances and Microenterprises in Mexico. Working Paper. Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of Caifornia, San Diego.

Yang, Dean. 2008. International Migration, Remittances and Household Investment: Evidence from Philippine Migrants' Exchange Rate Shocks. *Economic Journal* 118, 528: 591–630.

Zechmeister, Elizabeth. 2016. *The Political Culture of the Americas—LAPOP*. Nashville: Vanderbilt University.

Zizumbo-Colunga, Daniel. 2017) Community, Authorities, and Support for Vigilantism: Experimental Evidence. *Political Behavior* 39, 4: 989–1015.

Supporting Information

Additional supporting materials may be found with the online version of this article at the publisher's website: Supplementary Material.