political solidarity. Scholz defines solidarity at the most general level as 1) a form of unity that 2) mediates between the individual and community and 3) entails moral obligations. She then identifies three types of solidarity at the second level of her system: social, civic, and political solidarities. Attachments like sympathy and camaraderie comprise the third level in her system. She classifies these bonds as "parasitical solidarity" since they do not entail moral obligations and, thus, are not really forms of solidarity.

Scholz's project of conceptual clarification is primarily aimed at the second level, distinguishing what she calls the "three basic forms" from one another (p. 17). *Social* solidarity has to do with group cohesiveness, whether that group is a family, passengers on a bus, a club, a racial or ethnic group, or spectators at a sporting event. Each of these is marked by a degree of interdependence based on shared interests, experiences, or consciousness, which then translate into varying degrees of moral obligations to other members of the group. *Civic* solidarity has to do with the unity and moral obligations among citizens of a political state—obligations, Scholz claims, that are generally fulfilled through the state itself. Here, she comes the closest to equating solidarity with justice, noting that while justice focuses on "the individual's claim against the community," civic solidarity inverts this and focuses on the communal obligation to the individual (p. 29). Though she notes that social solidarity might be a basis for civic solidarity, she also claims that civic solidarity does not necessarily require social solidarity.

The third basic form, *political* solidarity, arises out of a conscious commitment on the part of individuals to challenge a perceived injustice. This is the unity found in social movements, and the bulk of the book is aimed at theorizing this bond by describing the types of obligations it entails, the forms it takes, and some of problems that it raises. Scholz acknowledges that this unity is context dependent, manifesting itself differently according to the injustice targeted, the structures at issue, the extent of an individual's commitment, and other factors. Yet she contends that a common form of unity marks these struggles, connecting participants to one another and setting them off from those opposed or indifferent to the movement. The conscious commitment to fight injustice is fundamental to her conception, for this commitment not only distinguishes political solidarity from the other types but also gives rise to the moral obligations that mark it as a true solidarity, rather than mere parasitic solidarity.

Political scientists and theorists will benefit from Scholz's careful conceptual distinctions and her clear definitions. Although the "levels" framework seems unnecessary, especially since the third level turns out not to be solidarity proper, clarifying the differences among social, civic, and political solidarities is an especially useful contribution. Scholz demonstrates this in her discussion of the relationship between the oppressed group and those who are not oppressed but who fight alongside them against injustice. She argues that accounts of this relationship tend to conflate social and political solidarity and are, thus, unable to offer a proper analysis of the role of those who are not themselves victims. Distinguishing different forms of unity addresses this failing by identifying a ground for collective action—political solidarity's commitment to fight a particular injustice—one that is not necessarily rooted in shared experience or identity. It is not always clear in this analysis whether Scholz is making an argument about the conceptual tools for analyzing movements or offering advice to movements themselves. In arguing against identity as the basis for movement membership, for example, she claims that an identity approach "limits the membership of the social movement" and also "risks contradicting solidarity" since individual freedom is lost (p. 130). She later adds that such identities are often the product of oppression, which may itself "make solidarity an impossibility" (p. 132). This is certainly true, and it is good advice for movement leaders, though it is not clear that either of these is a problem for conceptualizing solidarity per se.

Nonetheless, Scholz's conceptual categories could inform current debates about recognition and redistribution. Bringing her categories and this literature together would open up further inquiry into the relationships among social, civic, and political solidarity, even if they can be distinguished conceptually. For example, a claim for recognition could fruitfully be framed as a movement of political solidarity based on an unjust denial of social solidarity—that is, as a demand to be included as part of a collective "we," rather than remain a marginalized other. Or, a demand for redistribution could be framed as a movement of political solidarity pressing a claim for civic solidarity—that is, for the state to make good on its obligation to a particular group. A theoretical engagement like this would also press the question of why a conscious commitment must be the ground for the obligations of political solidarity, as Scholz claims. There is "no inherent duty to join in political solidarity itself," she argues, but once one has made a conscious commitment against a particular injustice, obligations follow (p. 254). In this way, she largely refrains from addressing the question of justice posed earlier, even though the answer to this question may already lie within her own framework: Perhaps social and civic solidarity themselves demand that we make a conscious commitment to join in political solidarity with others.

Silence and Democracy: Athenian Politics in Thucydides' History. By John G. Zumbrunnen. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008. 208p. $45.00.
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— Jeanne Morefield, *Whitman College*

This book makes the wonderfully suggestive attempt to interpret the ringing "silence" of the Athenian demos in

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Thucydides's *History of the Peloponnesian War* in a manner that renders it more than the quietude of an only nominally democratic mass. John Zumbrunnen asks readers of the *History* to reject interpretations of Thucydides as resoundingly anti-democratic and instead to read his famously self-identified "factual" account of the Peloponnesian War in terms of what it can teach us about mass democracy and the relationship of the "silent" demos to the ongoing construction of group identity and the actions of the polis in war. Zumbrunnen does this by examining Thucydides's different understandings of democratic silence in the Mitylene debate, Pericles's speeches, the Melian dialogues, and the case of the Athenian allies in Plataea. He identifies two kinds of silence in these cases. At times, according to Zumbrunnen, as in the case of the Mitylene debates, the silence of the democratic demos in Athens destabilized elite control of the city. More frequently, however, Thucydides presents Athenian action absent any kind of deliberation as a silent ceding of "all attempts to control meaning" or establish identity to elites (p. 190). In this second instance, Zumbrunnen suggests that Thucydides's account be read as a warning about the "tendency of democracy to become merely nominal" (p. 2).

In either case, Zumbrunnen's most original contributions to both Thucydidean scholarship and democratic theory more generally are his observations on the opacity of silence in the context of democracy. Contra the tendency among many scholars of the *History* to read the speeches of elites as representative of a collective Athenian "character" (*tropos*), Zumbrunnen's account seeks to situate discussions of who *hoi Athenaioi* are within the largely unknown (and unknowable) dynamics of their democratic politics. This approach works better in instances when he challenges the textual and historical readings of the character-driven analysis. For instance, in response to scholars who have read the Melian dialogues in terms of a decline in Athenian character since the Mitylene debates, Zumbrunnen points out the numerous textual uncertainties regarding the "representativeness" of the envoys sent to Melos. Such uncertainties call into question the collective nature of the silent demos whose politics they are meant to represent, thus rendering the "character" of the Athenians unstable and opaque. At other moments, Zumbrunnen's analysis is less convincing. His attempt to cast the Funeral Oration as a moment of "deliberative and democratic" politics feels particularly strained. Zumbrunnen's point that that the oration should be read as Pericles's attempt to define the identity of the Athenians rather than as "as simple expression of that identity" is well taken and puts Pericles into his rightful place as rhetorician rather than a speaker of truth (p. 91). But the unreadable nature of Thucydides's presentation of the demos's silent response to this speech remains simply that: unreadable. Coding this silence as "deliberative" in any form seems an odd contortion, one that ultimately finds "deliberative and democratic" practices in precisely the kinds of "nominal" politics that Zumbrunnen dislikes. In this reading, it is unclear how Thucydides's account of the demos in Athens is any different from the patently undemocratic narrative of the silent, but always slightly ominous and powerful, presence of "the people" in medieval "Mirror of Princes" texts.

What, then, is Thucydides's contribution to democratic theory and, particularly, to theories that wrestle with the nagging tension between the plurality of democracy and the unity of the polity during wartime? Zumbrunnen rightly asks us to consider this question from within a context that challenges the "inside/outside" debate in political theory and international relations scholarship. Realists, he argues, have long viewed Thucydides as a theorist solely concerned with the city as a "unit of action" where the internal dynamics of democratic practices aimed at self-identification remain inconsequential to the actions of a polity at war. Rather, Zumbrunnen argues that we need to read the silence of the Athenian demos through a "constructivist" lens that views the "unit of action" as a diverse package of norms, history, and identity debates (p. 17). But Zumbrunnen's analysis ignores precisely the richest and most revealing insight to be gained from such a dual focus. Thus, he argues, the Athenians demos in the *History* (through their differently textured silences regarding the city's action) can be understood as always engaged in a process of defining their collective character. Zumbrunnen then turns to Aristotle and Hannah Arendt to help think through the process of conceptualizing character through action. He notes the "awkwardness" of applying such notions developed for individuals "to a city" (p. 78), but then does it anyway, concluding that Athenian silence and political speech incorporate both the "revelatory" and "instrumental" aspects he finds in Aristotle and Arendt (p. 85).

What we lose in this strangely reductive reading of the Athenian polis as an individual is any understanding of how the forging of collective identity *in the context of* the city's actions as a unit of action reflects back on and conditions the forging of that identity itself. In other words, we lose the sense of a complicated dialectical relationship between internal debates (or silences) about identity and externally focused debates (or silences) about action that Zumbrunnen's very analysis invites us to explore. Thus, despite Pericles's entreaties to forget the past and to forge Athenian actions based on the realities of the present, the silent Athenian demos would absolutely have been aware of themselves as an *imperial* power and not merely another city caught up in the push and pulls of "Greek intercity relations" (p. 147). If Zumbrunnen truly wants Thucydides to speak to contemporary democratic theorists concerned with the "activation of the demos" in a way that challenges the standard "character" debates that emerge in times of war (p. 187), then

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exploring the relationship between democracy, collective identity, and the polis as an *imperial* "unity of action" would seem essential. Indeed, such a reading might go far toward countering apologist readings of the *History* as a guidebook for negotiating the tension between democracy and empire that have infected Thucydidean scholarship since the creation of "international relations" as a discipline.

AMERICAN POLITICS

The Private Abuse of the Public Interest: Market Myths and Policy Muddles. By Lawrence D. Brown and Lawrence R. Jacobs. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. 168p. $40.00 cloth, $15.00 paper.

The Politics of Bad Ideas: The Great Tax Delusion and the Decline of Good Government in America. By Bryan D. Jones and Walter Williams. New York: Pearson Longman, 2008. 384p. $16.95.
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— Eric M. Patashnik, *University of Virginia*

It is way too soon to know whether President Barack Obama will deliver on his promise of transformational change. The future trajectory of politics and policy in the United States is anything but settled, and powerful coalitions and vested interests will seek to preserve the status quo. But it is already clear that the long era of conservative dominance over American economic policy has passed. After the election of Ronald Reagan, conservatives supplied the ideological energy in economic policy debates. To be sure, conservatives failed to achieve many of their specific objectives, including Social Security privatization, a flat tax, and a permanent reduction in the level of domestic spending. But, conservatives largely dictated the terms of the economic policy debate in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Liberals found themselves on the defensive, unable to advance their reform projects and forced to defend past victories from reversal. The era of Big Government may not have been permanently over, as President Bill Clinton famously declared in 1996, but a vast expansion of the American state was plainly not on offer during his eight years in the White House.

The election of Barack Obama, in the context of the most serious crisis of capitalism since the 1930s, has opened the door to the largest expansion of government since Lyndon Johnson's Great Society. In his initial budget proposal to Congress, President Obama signaled that he intends to undo key elements of the Reagan Revolution. Breathtaking in its scope and ambition, Obama's budget attempts to reduce greenhouse gases and address climate change, and it proposes tax hikes on the wealthy to help pay for a universal health-care system. Conservatives denounced the budget as an invitation to class warfare. Whatever the outcome of this initial budget battle, it seems likely that the next four years will witness a fundamental debate about government's economic role in the twenty-first century.

How did we arrive at a moment when the relationship between politics and markets in the United States is up for renegotiation? What economic policies worked and did not work over the past quarter century, and what are the prospects for more effective governance in the future? The two excellent books reviewed here offer fresh insights into these important questions. Taken together, they provide timely reminders that markets are shaped by politics, that economic ideas must be judged by their consequences, and that ideology is no substitute for hard evidence and rigorous analysis. Roughly speaking, Bryan D. Jones and Walter Williams, in *The Politics of Bad Ideas,* analyze the conservative effort to shrink the size of government through deep tax cuts, while Lawrence D. Brown and Lawrence R. Jacobs, in *The Private Abuse of the Public Interest,* examine conservatives' moves to expand markets and roll back state power in important domestic arenas. Although thoughtful and reasonable in tone, neither book is likely to persuade conservatives about the best way to repair the economy or improve governance. Each of these stimulating, myth-piercing books, however, deserves a wide audience among scholars, policymakers, and concerned citizens.

Jones and Williams investigate the causes and consequences of U.S. fiscal policy since World War II. Their central focus is on the economic theories that modern conservatives have used to justify tax cuts, even when the ensuing results have been (in the authors' evaluation) disastrous for the nation. Back in the Eisenhower era, many Republicans believed in balanced budgets and more or less had come to terms with programs like Social Security. Tax cuts were a nice thing, if the government could afford them, but they had to be evaluated in the context of competing budgetary priorities. By the early 1980s, however, tax cutting became an essential part of conservative Republican ideology. Jones and Williams argue that conservatives have embraced two "bad" (by which they mean empirically dubious) economic ideas that have been used to rationalize a radical tax-cutting agenda. The first is supply-side economics, which argues (in its "miracle" version, as opposed to its more sophisticated, academic version) that tax cuts on the rich will stimulate enough capital investment to greatly increase the level of economic growth and wipe out budget deficits. The second bad economic idea is the "starve the beast" theory, which claims that the short-term budget deficits caused by tax cuts will generate a public outcry that forces

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