

and from 9/11, through the Obama years, to the election of Trump (chapter 9). In eminently readable prose, Corder and Wolbrecht catalog how politicians and news outlets described women as political actors in each of these periods, consider the claims that scholars have made about women's political behavior, and assess what we actually can know given the period-specific data that are available to us. Each chapter then analyzes patterns of turnout and partisan preferences along the dimensions of race, age, educational levels, household composition (including marital status, parenthood, and employment), and geographic region.

Corder and Wolbrecht show that an initially large gender turnout gap but a relatively small preference gap (with white women leaning slightly more Republican) that characterized the earliest elections with women voters began to dissipate by the 1936 presidential election. After that point, within demographic groups, men and women tended to vote at similar rates and for similar parties for 30 more years. In the 1970s, the parties began to divide on key feminist issues like abortion, and the Democrats made relative strides toward integrating women into the party: whereas in 1968 only 13% of the party's convention delegates were women, the proportion rose to 40% in 1972 (p. 129). A shift of white men away from the Democrats and toward the Republicans, and the increasing allegiance of African Americans of both genders toward the Democrats, catalyzed the coalition that is still in force today.

In recounting this tale—of initially large gender differences in turnout and small differences in preferences, which transformed into small differences in turnout and larger differences in preferences—the book compellingly argues against a single notion of “the women's vote” that traverses time, space, and demography. It deals in a sensitive manner with some of the thorny racial tensions that have plagued women's movements in the United States, and takes care to document race-based behavioral patterns in each of the periods it studies. It also takes seriously regional differences across the states. For example, by showing that Southern women, initially among the least likely Americans to vote, have now surpassed Southern men in participation rates, the book suggests that falling levels of education have had demobilizing effects on men in the South.

The attention to group-based differences and regional patterns of participation is a hallmark of Wolbrecht and Corder's long-term collaboration, but the description of larger demographic changes for US women is new. Their accounting of average differences across groups is exemplary, but at times I wish they had pushed the demographic analyses further by telling us more about how demographic changes made the abstention or participation of specific groups more politically salient. For example, they tell us that in the early 1960s unmarried

women with and without children were the most Republican. Because women were less likely to work outside the home, and women who did not work were the most Republican of any group, there was a gender preference gap in favor of the Republican party. Providing this type of insight in a more systematic way would help clarify the political meaning of demographic changes by providing a better picture of how women's power has changed as a result of their changing lives.

Wolbrecht and Corder's sweeping tour of gender and political behavior over the last century, which deftly presents and at times defies old ideas with new data, was hard to put down. The book's contribution rests not only in the analysis of women voters, but also in its recounting of how our knowledge of elections more generally has evolved over the past century, and how our understanding of women in politics has grown with the increasing integration of women into the political science profession. It is a welcome text not only for scholars interested in gender and politics but also for those interested in the development of behavioral research on American politics more generally. It could be assigned in any graduate course on American elections or in any course on gender and politics, and it is approachable for entry-level undergraduate courses. As we gear up for future elections, this is the book to read and to recommend to your siblings, your parents, your friends, and your Twitter followers.

Irony and Outrage: The Polarized Landscape of Rage, Fear, and Laughter in the United States. By Dannagal

Goldthwaite Young. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.

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Irony and Outrage provides a thoughtful and well-researched explanation for the psychological tendencies of liberals to prefer satirical media content and for conservatives' psychological tendencies to prefer outrage-based media content. It is engaging, funny, and particularly informative about the differences between liberals' and conservatives' political media consumption and its potential effects.

In this book, Dr. Dannagal Goldthwaite Young contends that the psychological profiles of conservatives and liberals, including their levels of need for cognition, tolerance for ambiguity, need for closure, and sense of humor, offer explanations for their selections of media content and also the success of particular kinds of media content. Conservatives tend to have lower levels of need for cognition, tolerance for ambiguity, and sense of humor along with higher levels of need for closure, which Young argues makes outrage programming appealing for them. Meanwhile, liberals tend to be higher in need for cognition,

more tolerant of ambiguity, have a greater sense of humor, and express a lesser need for closure, which makes them a more receptive audience to political humor and satire. Liberals tend not to be successful in harnessing the power of outrage, and conservatives tend to fail at the effective use of satire, at least in part due to their audiences' predispositions and media creators' lack of understanding of those predispositions. She finishes the book by contextualizing these arguments within the Trump presidency, where conservatives found a companion in their outrage and liberals found difficulty in locating the humor in Trump's policies.

After providing an abbreviated history of both comedy and talk radio, Young argues that in some ways the history and driving forces behind the consumption of satire and outrage programming are similar: they have "parallel histories, encouraged by the same technological and political transformations, and serve similar political functions for their audiences" (p. 207). They both appeal to the particular psychological tendencies of their audiences, perhaps at two extremes of the same ideological scale. This results in conservatives consuming outrage programming (e.g., Sean Hannity and Rush Limbaugh) and liberals consuming satirical programming (e.g., Jon Stewart and Stephen Colbert). Young points out that neither of these types of content, or the psychological profiles that drive them, is necessarily better than the other. Conservatives' penchant for order may help facilitate the play spaces needed for liberals. However, the outrage genre is much more easily used to exploit its audience. Whereas outrage can be used by conservative elites to influence audiences (she calls it a "well-trained attack dog"), satire is a tool best used by satirists alone (she calls it a "wild racoon," p. 214). The juxtaposition between outrage and satire in the current American political landscape has done much to position conservatives and liberals as being at odds with each other, rather than as necessary entities within a functioning democracy.

The book ends with a discussion of how the use of these two forms of media—outrage and satire—and the psychological profiles of their audiences should not be at odds. Young concludes with a call to action: "It is time to recognize these ideologies as overlapping and necessary systems that both contribute to everyone's cultural and societal well-being" (p. 214). Although satire may appeal to liberals and outrage to conservatives, it is OK for liberals to be outraged from time to time and for conservatives to laugh at politics every once in a while.

Interesting extensions of this work include conservatives' and liberals' responses to COVID-19, as well as the Black Lives Matter protests in 2020. First, as Young has addressed on her Twitter feed (which I recommend following!), conservatives, given their psychological tendencies, should have had a strong response to the threat of a global pandemic, resulting in their vigilance and carefulness in dealing with the virus. Instead, conservatives

responded more strongly to the Republican Party source cues, including outrage media, that discounted the threat of the virus. This resulted in conservatives' reluctance to wear masks and engage in social distancing (more so than liberals). In this case, the outrage was directed at Democrats' supposed overreaction to COVID-19, rather than the fact that the virus was killing people in large numbers worldwide. What would it take to get outrage media to acknowledge the importance of scientists' recommendations, and how and when might conservative audience members respond? Second, the Black Lives Matter protests across the world brought increased attention to the issue of police violence, particularly as it disproportionately affects Black Americans. Many liberals responded to these protests by either joining them or contributing resources to them. Can something so important ever be satirized and considered funny, even among those with the greatest levels of tolerance for ambiguity? In her book, Young addresses where comedy and satire fit within more serious political issues. Satirists tend not to make light of very serious issues (e.g., September 11 attacks, separating migrant children and parents). The book does mention a few comedians beginning to joke about some of Trump's more prejudicial policies, but I wonder how far the use of satire can extend into a controversial (to put it lightly) presidency.

As I reflected on Young's arguments, I realized how much I appreciated her conversational and, even at times, personal style of writing. She condenses a great deal of academic research into a readable narrative that should be approachable for many audiences. By discussing the ability of the current fragmented media landscape and political polarization in the United States to drive a wedge between conservatives and liberals, she considers that her audience may include both ends of the political spectrum. This approach allows for audiences not only to understand the psychological predispositions that may drive them toward particular media content but also to consider how that content may try to take advantage of them. In this way, *Irony and Outrage* offers a potential toolkit for each reader to recognize their own political media content selections and how these selections may color their understanding of the world and their ability to connect with other, diverse individuals.

Mobilized by Injustice: Criminal Justice Contact, Political Participation, and Race. By Hannah L. Walker. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. 216p. \$99.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592720002844

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Those familiar with social science research on criminal justice contact and political participation could easily feel pessimistic about the potential for reform in the United