

gender ideologies of the nineteenth century. Although residents of Sitka, including Lutheran pastor Uno Cygnaeus, who comes to life on these pages as a dyspeptic, foiled seducer of young women, complained that Etholén was cold and overly concerned with morality, we can see in her diaries that her active public life, such as running a school for girls, masked an anguished private obsession. Her young son had died, and she was unable to deal with this event with the kind of gender-specific religious stoicism that prescriptive literature called for. Instead, she raged against God and then felt guilty for doing so. Her unhappiness made social life in Sitka awkward. Later on in her life, Etholén regained her equilibrium and became a beloved figure, but her time in Sitka was a painful one for her.

The final governor's life, Anna Furuhjelm, was indeed a naïve young woman, as Rabow-Edling notes. She was madly in love with her new husband, Governor Hampus Furuhjelm, but she did not know Russian, which made any public role in Sitka difficult. Instead, she focused on creating a warm home life for her husband, who was the center of her world. She was less interested in the public life of the colonies. Anna was horrified by what she saw as immorality and retreated almost entirely to her home.

This is an important addition to our understanding of the social life of Sitka during this time. Using archives in Finland, Estonia, and America enriches our understanding of Sitka during a time when it was seen as the most civilized town north of San Francisco. The writings of Wrangell and Etholén particularly add to our understanding of the complex social life of the town, in which Creoles were full participants in balls and other gatherings, leading Governor Wrangell to call them "near-equals to the Russians" (89). Cygnaeus was far more critical of the Creoles, however, while Russian observers tended to be more positive.

If there is any critique I would make of the book, it is to wonder if Baltic Germans and Finns had the same idea of the civilizing role of empire as did Russians. It is possible that there were different attitudes toward race and civilization within the Russian Empire. Similarly, the Scots had more relaxed ideas about racial mixing than did the English, according to the work of Sylvia van Kirk. Overall, this work is an important addition to our understanding of Russian America and the role of gender in the Russian Empire.

SUSAN SMITH-PETER

College of Staten Island / City University of New York

Imperial Russia's Muslims: Islam, Empire, and European Modernity, 1788–1914.

By Mustafa Tuna. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. vii, 288 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Photographs. \$99.99, hard bound.

Mustafa Tuna's book aims to present a "holistic picture of the experiences of imperial Russia's Muslims" (3, 14). The text focuses on transformations in the lives of the Volga-Ural Muslims from 1788 to 1914. Although it remains an open question whether the Volga-Ural Muslims could represent the experiences of imperial Muslim communities in Central Asia, Caucasus, and Crimea, Tuna's choice of the case study makes sense within his conceptual framework. First, the Volga-Ural Muslims had been the oldest Muslim subjects of the Russian tsars. Second, they had a mobile diaspora and participated in cultural exchange with Muslims in other regions of the Russian empire and beyond (4). These exchange relations are central to Tuna's analysis. He develops the idea of imperial exchange by introducing the concept of "domain" to describe Muslims' experiences and to capture the complexities of imperial situations. By

“domains,” Tuna understands “metaphorical” (not physical) common spaces” which offer a “comfort zone” to its participants and are defined by the “patterns of exchange” (10–11). He identifies four domains: the transregional Muslim domain, the Volga-Ural Muslim domain, the Russian imperial domain, and the pan-European domain (13).

First, Tuna demonstrates how through educational travel, kingship ties, correspondence, and Sufi associations, Islamic scholars who played the central role in shaping ordinary Muslims’ norms and imaginaries, created a transregional “Muslim domain,” a space where Muslims “felt familiar and comfortable” (35). Next, he turns attention to the state strategies of integration. While Catherine the Great’s confessional policy relied on Islamic scholars as intermediaries and helped accommodate the Volga-Ural Muslims in the empire, russification through schooling in the 1870s aimed to include Muslims into the imperial domain on the basis of unmediated governance (15, 81). Tuna suggests that Muslim peasants’ responses to state schooling policies varied, but their primary concern was the “preservation of the Volga-Ural Muslim domain’s mediated distance” (89). The expansion of a pan-European domain, mainly global changes in transportation and integration into the world market “did not easily diminish the Volga-Ural Muslims’ long-maintained distance from the state and from things non-Muslim,” but drew them into the exchange of goods and services (116). Tuna argues that “most Muslims rarely engaged the world beyond the confines of the regional and transregional Muslim domains” (232), but there were two exceptions: wealthy Muslim merchants and progressive Muslim intellectuals. The progressive Muslim intellectuals’ agenda for national awakening, however, found support neither from the Muslim bourgeoisie nor resonated with the broader Muslim population (143, 173, 193). Moreover, during the last decades of tsarism, the relations between the state and Muslims deteriorated. Tuna supports the point that Russian imperial discourse was Orientalist: Muslims were viewed as a scorned other and these views informed policy (215). Yet, Tuna concludes that on the eve of the First World War there existed some “opportunities for cooperation, but not necessarily for integration” (218).

The issue of Muslims’ integration into the Russian imperial state and society is an underlying question of the book. Tuna covers familiar ground in some respects while also adding a new dimension. For example, his attention to merchants and railroads is a welcome contribution. The discussion of the expanding consumer market is especially fresh and interesting. I wonder if future studies of personal relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, the imperial army, and cities as sites of interaction might bring a corrective to Tuna’s view of Russian Muslims as an “insulated community.” The period before the middle of the 19th century still remains relatively understudied. Tuna succeeds in highlighting multiple sources of influence and exposing the complexity of the Volga-Ural Muslims’ experience, which involved both accommodation and tension. Unfortunately, he does not see the complexity in Russian views and policies toward Islam. The analysis of “exchange relations” and conceptualization of “domains” raises several questions. In Tuna’s account, Muslims emerge as reacting to outside influences rather than as active participants of cross-cultural exchange. What were the impacts of the Volga-Ural Muslims on other Muslims, on Russians, and on other non-Muslim subjects of the tsar? To agree with Tuna’s interpretation of domains as “zones of comfort,” one needs to see more attention given to the subjective dimension. Maps and a discussion of geography would have helped better understand trans-regional vectors of exchange and networks. Should state schooling policies be interpreted as a part of a broader pan-European trend? How did the expanding empire alter the patterns and routes of exchange within the Muslim domain? Did Muslim scholars’ and merchants’ networks intersect?

Tuna’s book is a thought-provoking work and a valuable contribution to a vibrant

field of studies of Russian Muslim societies, as well as a part of a growing appreciation for cross-regional phenomena in the study of empire.

ELENA I. CAMPBELL
University of Washington

Turks Across Empires: Marketing Muslim Identity in the Russian-Ottoman Borderlands, 1856–1914. By James H. Meyer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. xii, 211 pp. Bibliography. Index. Figures. Map. \$99.00, hard bound.

In *Turks Across Empires*, as he did in his dissertation, James Meyer pursues an imaginative approach to the final decades of the Russian and Ottoman Empires by focusing on the biographies of three activists—a Crimean Tatar, an Azerbaijani, and a Volga Tatar—who, while born in Russia, were men with substantial interest and experience traveling to and living in the empire’s southern neighbor. Biography becomes, thus, the *modus operandi* for unraveling the roles of these and similar men—“trans-imperial people,” as Meyer calls them—in propagating pan-Turkism and suggesting it as a new identity for Turks, who were also overwhelmingly Muslim, everywhere.

The book comprises an introduction followed by six chapters, an epilogue, and a conclusion, with the fifth—“The Politics of Naming”—arguably being the key chapter. I point to this chapter because it captures what I see as the book’s core argument: that one of the salient features of the period from the 1850s to 1914 was the emergence of highly politicized forms of identity competing for mass allegiance. Pan-Turkism was among the choices, contends Meyer. By virtue of his devoting his entire text, in principle and spirit, to that ideology, he suggests it was one of the most significant and attractive.

However valuable this book may be, in many ways it is a disappointment. Beginning with a title that stresses two terms—“borderlands” and “Muslim”—it inevitably conjures mistaken or misleading images. Of the three “borderlands” that Meyer pinpoints, only the Crimea justifies the appellation. By 1900, Azerbaijan no longer bordered the Ottoman Empire and the Volga region never did. Moreover, while Islam had governed the lives of most Turks for centuries, it was not the identity that the book’s protagonists—Yusuf Akçura, Ahmed Ağaoğlu, and Ismail Bey Gasprinskii—were pedaling. On the contrary, as modernists, they were secularists personally and disapproved of Islamist teachings in the public arena.

This ambiguity-fostered confusion is merely the first sign of deeper problems. The pervasive theme of pan-Turkism remains largely an abstraction barely subjected to definition, and Meyer provides little from their own ample writings as to what the three heroes actually thought and wrote about Turkic unity. In his conclusion, he unintentionally justifies my point: “While their [the pan-Turkist] specific agendas changed with the times, they were deeply a part of important developments taking place during the late imperial era, . . . [and they] invoked *Muslim* [?] religious and national identity. . . . Their manner of marketing *Muslim* [?] identity was particularly overt. . . . [They] invoked *Muslim* [?] identity in a multitude of ways, and in most cases managed to find buyers for their wares” (179; my emphases). We must ask: how were the pan-Turkists marketers of Islam, why would they be so, and more importantly, what did Islam mean to Akçura, Ağaoğlu, and Gasprinskii that could make Meyer’s claims apposite?

Stranger still is when Meyer writes of the pan-Turkist scene in Istanbul as “a hub of activity . . . more than anything else, the scene was about pursuing connections and