

design could reasonably be interrogated. It is true that Russia was more developed than Indonesia at the time of transition, and it is true that both are resource-rich countries. And it is true that both had a long autocratic past. What is more questionable is Lussier's assertion that these were both mobilizing regimes cut from largely the same cloth (pp. 80–81). My sense is that it would be more feasible to observe that the Soviet Union, with Russia at its core, was the most socially intrusive and coercively mobilizing regime of the twentieth century. Indonesia in the New Order era was simply never anywhere near this invasive and put much more of a premium on acquiescence between elections than active pro-regime mobilization. Hence, the “floating mass” principle driving New Order politics under which citizens were expected simply not to participate. As a result, as multiple authors have noted (e.g., Michael Bernhard and Ekrem Karakoc, “Civil Society and the Legacies of Dictatorship,” *World Politics*, 59(4), 2007; Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua Tucker, *Communism's Shadow: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Political Attitudes*, 2017), citizens of the former Soviet Union are substantially less likely to belong to civic associations and to trust political institutions. In short, one could argue that divergent levels of participation are learned from the long-term macropolitical setting, and are endogenous to regime attributes rather than productive of them. Lussier herself hints at this being an important difference later in the book (p. 174), and it is a potentially central alternative argument.

Another important factor missing from the Indonesia analysis is the fundamental economic transformation of the 1980s and 1990s. The collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s was followed by a surprisingly quick and successful shift to light-manufacturing export-oriented economics, and this almost certainly had a real impact on the economic autonomy of ordinary citizens from the state (and its many inefficient state-owned enterprises). No such shift had ever taken place in the Soviet era, leaving post-Soviet Russians in the early 1990s with nothing of the newfound economic independence that many of their Indonesian counterparts would have eight years later. One might ask, too, about the crushing economic meltdowns that both countries suffered in the 1990s. These were both Depression-level crises. There was one key difference. In Russia, democratic leaders presided over the crisis, arguably delegitimizing Boris Yeltsin and democratic governance more broadly. In Indonesia, it was autocratic rulers who had to confront the one thing that could threaten their legitimacy: failure to provide the development on which they had built their reason for existence.

Insufficient attention is given here, too, to the legacy of both official opposition parties and nonparty Islamic organizations in the New Order era. The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI and its later offshoot PDI-P or

the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) and the United Development Party (PPP), while they never posed a national-level threat to Suharto's ruling GOLKAR party apparatus, regularly performed well at the provincial level in different parts of the country, and activists took their presence seriously enough to keep the parties viable straight into the post-transition years. So, too, did the two major Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, remain active and important parts of the political landscape before democratization. These latter two bodies, in particular, were effective in part because they eschewed direct electoral roles, focusing instead on public goods provision and education. The result was that by 1999, Indonesian democracy could inherit a set of robust organizations to be complemented, rather than having to build a civil society *and* party apparatus entirely from scratch. Moreover, these organizations had not been tainted by direct association with autocratic rule (although even GOLKAR has fared well under democracy). The important point, again, is not that Lussier's rich analysis of divergent attitudinal and participatory rates is incorrect, simply that it misses some important parts of a feasible alternative causal account linking prior conditions to regime outcomes through behavior.

A final point to consider is whether elites might not be a more central part of the story in both cases. One could quite reasonably argue that had not the leaderships of both Suharto's ruling party and his armed forces withdrawn their support at a crucial moment in May 1998, his regime might well have survived despite the massive anti-regime protests going on. No such set of elites could pose a threat like this to Vladimir Putin. As a result, it is worth asking again how the analysis might differ with a closer look at elite dynamics.

Despite the questions raised by employing these more traditional lenses in the study of regimes and regime change, *Constraining Elites in Russia and Indonesia* is an important addition to the study of political behavior in new democracies. Lussier's welcome and skillful effort to tease out the role of individuals in holding elites to account and pushing democracy forward at the ground level should be followed by more of this kind of work, especially that which ties attitudes and behavior directly to their macro contexts.

Reshaping the Political Arena in Latin America: From Resisting Neoliberalism to the Second Incorporation.

Edited by Eduardo Silva and Federico M. Rossi. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2018. 360p. \$32.95 paper.
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— Samuel Handlin, *Swarthmore College*

The last two decades saw a new wave of popular-sector (poor and working-class) organization, mobilization, and claim making in Latin America. Occurring after the

region's embrace of market reforms and concurrently with its turn to the left, this surge in popular mobilization has attracted great attention from scholars seeking to theorize an emerging "postneoliberal" interest politics in the region. Editors Eduardo Silva and Federico M. Rossi's *Reshaping the Political Arena in Latin America* represents a landmark addition to this burgeoning line of research, standing out for its analytic rigor, careful attention to concepts, and impressive empirical contributions.

Silva and Rossi's approach to new trends in popular-sector interest politics explicitly builds upon Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier's (1991) analysis of the politics of labor incorporation in twentieth-century Latin America, in *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America*. Collier and Collier's study of the "first incorporation" (as termed by Silva and Rossi) examined the recognition, formal legalization, and political integration of the labor movement and how variation in labor incorporation drove subsequent patterns of party-system competition and, ultimately, the dynamics of political regimes. Silva and Rossi propose that a "second incorporation" has occurred in the last two decades (a notion also advanced by Rossi in previous work), which has also been highly consequential for regional politics.

In their introduction, the editors advance a carefully crafted conceptual and theoretical framework for analyzing the second incorporation. Latin America's age of market liberalism was a period of popular "disincorporation," as it greatly undermined the unions and labor-based parties that emerged during the first incorporation and became core institutions of popular-sector representation. The subsequent era was marked by "partial reincorporation." Political rights like voting and the right to organize were already in place. Therefore, reincorporation was partial and mainly involved the expansion of "substantive" rights like the recognition of popular-sector claims for representation and, in some cases, the formal integration of popular-sector collective actors into policymaking processes. The new leading players in these processes have been "territorially based" social movements representing constituencies that were previously largely excluded from the arena of interest politics (such as the indigenous, unemployed, landless peasants, and shantytown denizens). But labor unions have remained important to the infrastructure of popular representation, and political parties have also played vital roles, responding to popular-sector mobilization and actively shaping the ways in which popular-sector collective actors have been formally and informally integrated into politics.

The volume is divided into three sections that, respectively, examine the three actors just mentioned: social movements, labor unions, and left-wing political parties. Each begins with a short thematic introduction and contains three empirical chapters that analyze the same

five cases following the same pattern (a Bolivia–Ecuador comparison, a chapter on Venezuela, and an Argentina–Brazil comparison). By employing this structure and by enforcing discipline in the use of concepts, the editors have managed to bring a remarkable level of coherence and organization to an edited volume.

The first section focuses on the territorially based social movements that are the new protagonists of the second incorporation. A section introduction by Rossi frames the study of these movements as collective actors struggling for reincorporation in a postneoliberal era. Silva's chapter offers a novel and compelling argument for differences in movement-based incorporation in Ecuador and Bolivia, focusing on the strength of movements, their relationship to left parties, and the ideological frames of political leaders. María Pilar García-Guadilla analyzes how the highly exclusionary model of interest politics of Punto Fijo–era Venezuela gave way to a series of Chavista initiatives to spur popular-sector mobilization that were highly exclusionary in their own right. Rossi offers an insightful and detailed analysis of movement reincorporation in Argentina and Brazil.

The next section turns to labor unions. Ruth Berins Collier's section introduction offers a sweeping overview of patterns of change across the five countries. The following chapters explore and reveal cross-national variation. Jorge León Trujillo and Susan Spronk suggest that labor politics in Bolivia and Ecuador have been marked by different forms of "contestatory interest intermediation." Steve Ellner's chapter on Venezuela complicates the simplistic notion that interest politics have been exclusively "top-down," showing that the Bolivarian labor movement engaged in substantial grassroots mobilization and achieved significant organizational power, albeit while toeing the party line. Julián Gindin and Adalberto Cardoso analyze how union fortunes were partially revived in Brazil and Argentina when labor-based parties came to power.

The final section analyzes the politics of the second incorporation from the perspective of the major left-wing political parties in each country. Ken Roberts's section introduction outlines how the neoliberal era and its aftermath shaped patterns of party politics in the region. Catherine Conaghan's insightful comparison of Ecuador and Bolivia analyzes how new-left movements remade party systems and achieved hegemony. Daniel Hellinger's close analysis of the Venezuelan case looks granularly at the staged evolution of the Venezuelan party system from the Punto Fijo era to the Nicolás Maduro presidency. Pierre Ostiguy and Aaron Schneider examine the twin cases of Brazil and Argentina, where party systems displayed much greater continuity than in the other three countries.

While the volume provides an invaluable framework for exploring the second incorporation, it is on shakier ground when discussing broader implications. The

second incorporation has entailed important changes in popular-sector interest representation, with real consequences that should not be dismissed lightly. But there is little evidence—at least when viewed from today’s perspective, with only limited temporal distance—that alternative modes of incorporation have driven patterns of party competition or the dynamics of political regimes, as was true of the first incorporation. As such, can we really say that the second incorporation has been responsible for “reshaping the political arena,” as the volume’s provocative title claims? Silva’s thoughtful conclusion offers some insightful reflections, as well as an interesting analysis of cross-case differences seen through the lens of “segmented interest intermediation regimes.” But the volume never fully grapples with the possibility that the second incorporation, and variation in modes of incorporation, might have had negligible impact on patterns of party contestation and political conflict in contemporary Latin America. This may be an essential characteristic of the second incorporation that distinguishes it from the first.

Another question regards whether the concept of a second incorporation accurately captures the new landscape of popular-sector interest politics across Latin America. The project focuses on five “paradigmatic cases” in which new social movements were particularly impactful and left parties and governments actively forged relationships with collective actors. This approach offers real advantages, allowing the volume to plumb important cases in depth. Yet in many other Latin American countries, new forms of popular mobilization have been less politically salient and have triggered little response from partisan and state actors. Does the notion of a second incorporation really capture the dynamics of contemporary popular-sector interest politics in those cases? This seems like another potential contrast with the first incorporation, during which some degree of state initiative to regulate the labor movement was nearly universal, even in highly agrarian societies where labor was relatively weak.

Ultimately, these are questions for further investigation, and scholars may reasonably arrive at different conclusions. *Reshaping the Political Arena in Latin America* has provided an invaluable set of conceptual tools, theoretical propositions, and empirical insights to guide this research agenda, and will be an enduring contribution for these reasons.

Ideologues, Partisans, and Loyalists: Ministers and Policymaking in Parliamentary Cabinets. By Despina Alexiadou. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 328p. \$90.00 cloth. doi:10.1017/S1537592718003626

— Conor Little, *University of Limerick*

What difference do ministers make? This question has remained unresolved despite the voluminous literature on the political determinants of policy—most pertinently the

role of parties—and the development in recent years of a significant body of work on ministers and their careers. Despina Alexiadou’s book, then, is situated at research frontiers in the study of government ministers and the political determinants of public policy in parliamentary democracies.

The central contribution of *Ideologues, Partisans, and Loyalists* is to address systematically the question of ministerial influence. Alexiadou argues that certain ministers matter for policy, while others do not. In making this case, she contributes to debates on ministerial government and party government, showing that ministers’ attributes contribute to an explanation of policy outputs, often to a greater extent than partisanship. The book also makes valuable contributions to the study of social welfare reform and the relationship between social democracy and employment policies.

The study proceeds in several steps: Chapter 2 sets out Alexiadou’s “theory of ministerial types” with the aid of a formal model; Chapter 3 describes the attributes of the ministers in 18 countries since the 1940s about whom she has collected data; Chapter 4 establishes that the selection of ministerial types is not simply driven by the preferences of party leaders, but is also a function of the constraints under which those leaders operate. The main analyses are presented in Chapter 5 on social welfare policy, in Chapter 6 on employment policies, and in Chapters 7, 8, and 9 on case studies drawn from Ireland, the Netherlands, and Greece.

Being expensive and politicized, social welfare and employment policies are, Alexiadou argues, a hard test of ministerial influence. Drawing on existing data sets, she measures social welfare policy outputs in terms of change in social welfare generosity from the 1970s on. The analyses of employment policy focuses on two areas: employment protection and spending on several types of active labor market policies (ALMPs): training, employment assistance, and direct job creation.

The “theory of ministerial types” posits three types of ministers, distinguishable by their preferences and capacities: ideologues, partisans, and loyalists. So-called *ideologues* prioritize policy seeking, whether or not they are senior party figures. The strong policy preferences that distinguish them from other ministers are identified operationally through their professional background: Ideologues in left-of-center parties are ministers with a professional background in trade unions. Left ideologues have more intense left-of-center preferences concerning social welfare. In employment policy, they are expected to protect labor market insiders, and they should also prefer ALMPs favored by unions, such as training, whereas nonideologues should support cheaper and more flexible job-creation measures. Ideologues from conservative and liberal parties are those with professional backgrounds in economics, banking, finance, or business; this is treated as