

Exits, Voices and Social Investment: Citizens' Reaction to Public Services. By Keith Dowding and Peter John. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 208p. \$103.00.
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Is exit beneficial to democracy? To be more specific, does giving citizens the opportunity to leave a political group, public good, or the state itself strengthen the ideals, practices, or bureaucratic efficiency of democracy? Some democratic theorist, such as Mark E. Warren (“Voting With Your Feet: Exit-Based Empowerment in Democratic Theory,” *American Political Science Review* 105, [November 2011]: 683–701) and Chandran Kukathas (“Exit, Freedom and Gender,” in Dagmar Borchers and Annamari Vitikainen, eds., *On Exit: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on the Right of Exit in Liberal Multicultural Societies*, 2012), tend to answer in the affirmative, emphasizing that exit options underscore the values of empowerment, freedom of association, individual autonomy, and political accountability. Others, such as Sigal Ben-Porath (“Exit Rights and Entrance Paths: Accommodating Cultural Diversity in a Liberal Democracy,” *Perspectives on Politics* 8 [November 2010]: 1021–33) and Anne Phillips (*Multiculturalism Without Culture*, 2007), are more critical, pointing out that exit is not a viable option for those with a strong normative attachment to the political group and that the most vulnerable in democracies often need entrance paths as well as exits.

Exits, Voices and Social Investment is a terrific addition to this debate because it brings in much needed data. The book’s authors, Keith Dowding and Peter John, conclude in a very qualified way that exit can make democracies more efficient in their delivery of social services to their citizenry. Dowding and John reach this conclusion through an economic approach to exit that focuses on the costs and benefits of using exit or voice as a response to a deterioration of the quality of a product or service. Thus, their book brings attention to the ways in which exit and voice function in the day-to-day economic decision making of citizens who are weighing the costs and benefits of their options concerning doctors, schools, trash collection, public transportation, and so on.

Dowding and John have two goals. First, they aim to modify the theoretical model supplied by Albert O. Hirschman’s (1970) *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* by illuminating additional modes of exit and voice. Thus, their use of plurals in the book’s title is deliberate. In the first three chapters, they argue that voice has two basic forms: individual voice (IV) and collective voice (CV). The latter category can be further divided into collective voice vote (CVV) and collective voice participation (CVP). The authors also separate exit into three categories: geographical exit (or Tiebout exit); private exit, which

denotes moving from public sector services to the private sector; and internal exit, which entails exiting from one public provider to another. Not to neglect Hirschman’s third term, “loyalty,” Dowding and John argue that loyalty is properly understood as “a form of social investment in a community or a way of life” and should be associated with standard measures of social capital (p. 133). With this new definition, they are able to quantify loyalty and, as important, propose a connection between the social capital literature and the exit literature. While it is too soon to tell if this connection will be fruitful to both literatures, it is provocative and worthy of further exploration.

Second, Dowding and John test their modified model with survey data on public services in the United Kingdom from 2005 to 2009. The discussion of this material occurs in the final two chapters of the book and the conclusion. In an appendix, the authors provide the survey instrument, which is focused on health, education, and local government. Some of their conclusions will sound familiar: Exit and voice are not always rivals (p. 134), the use of voice is connected to satisfaction (p. 135), and those who have used voice and are satisfied are less likely to exit in the future (p. 135). Others are new and informative: 27% of respondents were “locked in” to health and education services, meaning that they were unable to exit because of the expense of exit. Respondents who feel locked in have a greater propensity to use voice than those who do not. “This is strong evidence,” they conclude, “that increasing exit options will reduce voice” (p. 141).

So what does this all mean on the question of whether exit is beneficial for democracy? Dowding and John conclude that while exit does contribute to the bureaucratic efficiency of local government, it carries a toll as well. They point out that the expansion of choice may exclude citizens, some of whom might be “the most valued” (p. 138). Choice “can be stressful” and “it does not come free” (pp. 138, 139). And, thinking of the 27% who lack exit, the authors state that “all forms of exit are less costly for the better off and the better off also [use] voice more. To increase exit will be at the expense of voice, and that will be at the expense of the poorest and most vulnerable people in society” (p. 141).

One question worth further discussion is how much an economic approach to the workaday world of local bureaucratic decision making reveals about exit and voice generally. Dowding and John argue that their theoretical conclusions are generalizable to state policy, party politics, protest, and migration (p. 130). Here the book appears to overreach. Dissidents who have emigrated from China to the West, for instance, have argued that their voice has increased with exit, particularly in the age of social media. Freed of censorship and fear, Chinese dissidents like Chen Guangcheng and Wang Dan now speak openly to tens of thousands of followers via the Internet. The same might be said of Edward Snowden, whose exit from the United

States increased his political voice, not lessened it. It is not clear, moreover, what Dowding and John's terms IV, CV, CVV, and CVP mean in nondemocratic contexts. Still other examples seem to defy a cost–benefit approach altogether. There are spectacularly inefficient exits, like, for instance, those individuals who attempt to opt out of local social services altogether by “living off the grid” or establishing eco-topias. Outside of the world British bureaucracy, a number of empirical cases raise intriguing questions for Dowding and John. One hopes that they will take these on in future work on exit.

Haiti: Trapped in the Outer Periphery. By Robert Fatton, Jr. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2013. 230p. \$55.00. doi:10.1017/S1537592714002552

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Following Haiti's devastating earthquake of January 12, 2010, people around the world watched in disbelief at the scale of destruction—and, even harder to fathom, the apparent inability of the Haitian government to help its own citizens. Neighboring countries sent doctors and emergency supplies, concerned onlookers sent donations (nearly half of U.S. households contributed), and the United Nations sent a special envoy to coordinate the relief and reconstruction process. Yet this massive outpouring of energy and resources seemed to produce few positive results. As the five-year anniversary of the earthquake approaches, a number of recent books attempt to shed light on this vexing case. What can explain the dire political and economic conditions that have caused so much suffering in Haiti? Why is the Haitian state so weak and its democracy so tenuous? How did the stated goal of the international community to “build back better” meet such utter defeat? Several recent works offer partial answers, highlighting the country's long history of political violence and economic mismanagement, its flawed constitutional order, or the vagaries of an ineffective and unaccountable international aid system. However, few studies capture the complex array of forces underpinning Haiti's political development as completely or as lucidly as Robert Fatton's most recent monograph, *Haiti: Trapped in the Outer Periphery*.

At its core, Fatton's argument is an extension of the world-systems analysis of Immanuel Wallerstein. The central conceit of the book is that Haiti, along with a handful of the world's most impoverished and politically unstable countries, occupies an unenviable new position at the outer limits of the international system—aptly named the outer periphery. According to Fatton, the outer periphery constitutes “a new zone of catastrophe . . . integrated into the margins of the margin of the global economy” (p. 14). Economically, states in the outer periphery have been pushed to the very bottom of

the global production process, where workers are paid ultra-cheap wages and the majority live in abject poverty. Politically, states in the outer periphery may feign electoral democracy, but their governments enjoy extremely limited sovereignty. In reality, according to the author, they are ruled as “virtual trusteeships of the international community . . . under the surveillance of foreign peacekeepers and under the control of international financial institutions and nongovernmental organizations” (p. 14).

According to this logic, the central actor in Fatton's analysis is the “self-appointed international community” (p. 1), which has foisted self-serving and destructive neoliberal policies on the states of the outer periphery for the last three decades. Under the guise of aid, the international community has used international lending practices, humanitarian assistance, and multilateral peacekeeping forces to infiltrate markets and dismantle governmental institutions in states like Haiti. Thus, the roots of extreme poverty and state weakness can be traced back to policies imposed by external actors. As he puts it, “the emasculation of the state is not an accident” (p. 100).

Fatton does not place all of the blame on international actors, however. Building on his previous work on the politics of Haiti (which he notably dubbed a “predatory republic”), the author clearly acknowledges the culpability of domestic elites. With remarkable nuance and clarity, he explores how the politics of race and class have combined with material scarcity and an adversarial constitutional system to produce a political elite focused on personal privilege and wealth extraction, rather than the common good of the Haitian people. Harkening back to a previous era of formal colonial rule, Fatton describes contemporary Haitian elites as “collaborators” (p. 26) who subjugate the local population on behalf of the imperial core in pursuit of personal gain. Thus, his analysis ultimately rests at the intersection of international and domestic politics: “It is the interaction between imperial actors and indigenous collaborators resulting in an opportunistic convergence of interests that explains the outer periphery's obvious dependence on the core” (p. 26).

While the author's tone may strike some readers as provocative or inflammatory, this is a skillfully crafted book whose arguments merit serious consideration. It is not only an incisive rejoinder to the dominant intellectual discourse about international aid and state failure; it also offers a thought-provoking challenge to policymakers (both Haitian and international) engaged in the reconstruction of Haiti. Indeed, Fatton's analysis is many things at once—an astute political history of the world's first black republic, a penetrating indictment of failed international intervention, and a policy manifesto that implores political leaders to radically rethink the neoliberal agenda that continues to dominate Haitian politics. And it is precisely in its ambitious scope and broad reach that the book's