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Galician Catholics into Soviet Orthodox: religion and postwar Ukraine[†]

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While important work has been done on what it meant to become newly "Soviet" after 1917, or during the era of "High Stalinism," it is less clear what it meant to become Soviet for the first time after World War II. For the residents of the new Soviet Baltics, each prewar state received its own republic. In the case of the existing Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic, territories that had not experienced Soviet power or the war on the same timeline were put into existing republics and thus existing Soviet structures. How did this process work? For Western Ukraine, one event in this process was the formation of the 1946 Initiative Committee, a joint project of the Central Committee and the newly formed Plenipotentiary for the Matters of the Russian Orthodox Church that presided over a forced conversion of Uniates to the Russian Orthodox Church. This paper examines how the mass religious conversion of Uniates was part of the process of making Galicians into Soviet Ukrainians, a postwar renewal of Soviet nationalities policy. Yet this decision, much like 1917 or 1939, was imagined as only the beginning. Turning "disloyal" Galicians into Soviet Ukrainians was a project of both re-writing the separate histories of Galicia and Soviet Ukrainians to emphasize their unity and teaching Galicians to imagine themselves as Ukrainian in the Soviet sense. In contrast to a new Soviet order with an emphasis on the secular, Western Ukraine's Sovietization was brought about through religious terms and an emphasis on Russian Orthodoxy.

Keywords: Soviet Union; Ukraine; Uniate Church; Russian Orthodox Church; World War II; religion; nationalism; Galicia; Western Ukraine

Introduction

> Mighty … Moscow, the capital and symbol of our great … motherland … is standing watchful guard over the freedom and independence of Ukraine.

These words conclude an essay on Ukrainian history by Yaroslav Halan titled, "We must not forget." Writing in 1947 as the eastern half of the former Austro-Hungarian province of Galicia became part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Halan was one of many officials charged with teaching Galicians how to be Soviet Ukrainians as Soviet borders expanded after World War II. While important work has been done on what it meant to become newly "Soviet" after 1917, 1922, or during the era of "High Stalinism," and on

[†]This article is a result of dissertation research conducted in the early stages of my PhD program at New York University's Department of History. Some of these arguments were presented in a conference paper at the North East Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (NESEEES) held at NYU in April 2016.
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the transformation of Soviet society after the war, it is less clear what it meant to become Soviet for the first time after World War II.

For the residents of the new Soviet Baltics, each prewar state received its own republic. In the case of the existing Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic, territories that had not experienced Soviet power or the war on the same timeline were placed into existing republics and thus existing Soviet structures. How did this process work?

For Western Ukraine, one event in this process was the formation of the 1946 Initiative Committee, a joint project of the Central Committee and the newly formed Plenipotentiary for the Matters of the Russian Orthodox Church that presided over a forced conversion[1] of Uniates[2] to the Russian Orthodox Church. To my knowledge, this is the only mass religious conversion presided over by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, enforced by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). This forced religious submission took place in Lviv, the seat of the Uniate Metropolitan, and reassigned all the Uniate parishes that had been brought into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic during World War II to the Russian Orthodox Church (Bociurkiw 1996).[3]

In this paper, I will examine how the mass religious conversion of Uniates can be seen as an important aspect of the process of making Galicians into Soviet Ukrainians. Yet this decision, much like 1917 or 1939, was imagined as only the beginning. Turning "disloyal" Galicians into Soviet Ukrainians was a project of both rewriting the separate histories of Galicia and Soviet Ukrainians to emphasize their unity and teaching Galicians to imagine themselves as Ukrainian in the Soviet sense. The emphasis on this history and Galicians themselves as "Ukrainian" is also significant, especially for former Uniates, who were imagined by the Soviets to be Ukrainians even though some Uniates identified as Poles or were simply nationally indifferent.

While some have seen this conversion as Russification, I view it through the framework of Sovietization, tailored to the specific, local conditions of Western Ukraine and the former Galicia, as defined by Tarik Amar in *The Paradox of Ukrainian Lviv* (2015).[4] In this paper, I will examine the ways in which the Uniate Church's 1946 "reunion" with Orthodoxy was part of a project of creating a new, Soviet Ukrainian history. Creating this history meant declaring some historical institutions, especially the Uniate Church, illegitimate while legitimating others, including the Russian Orthodox Church, in new Soviet histories. In contrast to a new Soviet order with an emphasis on the secular, West Ukraine's Sovietization was brought about through religious terms and an emphasis on Russian Orthodoxy.

My paper will focus on the historical tracts about Ukraine commissioned by Soviet authorities to be written during and immediately after the meeting of the initiative committee, by Soviet writer Yaroslav Halan. The historical narrative Halan presents for postwar Soviet Ukraine emphasizes the illegitimacy of the Uniate Church and the importance of Russia in Ukraine's national liberation. Halan does not deny Ukraine a history; instead he presents a national historical narrative unique to Ukrainians, with Russia as its guardian. Halan's writings, though presented as general history, focus on the Uniate Church as the source of many of the perceived anti-Soviet and anti-Orthodox aspects of Galicia, as well as "bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism" ([1947] 1975). For the vision Halan and his Soviet sponsors had for Ukraine, a new history had to be accompanied by a new church. Thus, in this article I examine the Initiative Committee in tandem with Halan's historical essays. Both represented Soviet efforts to create a new Ukrainian national mythology, and both church regulation and historical revision were necessary to enact this vision.

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The Uniate Church: Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian history

The Uniate Church was formed as a compromise in 1596 as way to bring Orthodox believers under the authority of the pope in the newly formed Poland–Lithuania. Because of its hybrid nature, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century church often served as a battleground for Catholicism and Orthodoxy, as well as Polish, Russian, and Ruthenian/Ukrainian nationalisms (Wolff 2002). Yet as Larry Wolff (2002) and John-Paul Himka (1998) point out in their work on the Uniate Church, those categories and what they meant to different actors were in constant flux during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries.

However, as Himka, Wolff, and others writing against a purely nationalist historiography are careful to argue, the church did not simply become an institutionalized form of Ukrainian nationalism. Instead, the newly educated clergy became part of two other important national movements: Polish-Catholic nationalism and Ruthenian Russophilism. The fact that one church could produce these competing nationalisms is a testament to the uniqueness of the Galician context, as well as to the contingencies of creating a nation. More importantly this created an ideal context for the Soviets, who could draw upon these competing legacies of the church as a way of portraying it as an incoherent and opportunist institution (Halan 1962, [1947] 1975).

The Ukrainian nation in the Soviet Union

By 1946, the Soviet state had experimented with various nationality policies toward the Ukrainian people. While in the 1920s, a robust Ukrainian nationality policy was developed as part of *korenizatsiia* that sought to create an urban-Ukrainian proletariat, by the 1930s Ukrainian nationalism began to be perceived as too dangerous to the Soviet order. A purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia followed by a state-sponsored famine signaled a violent switch from promotion of a Soviet vision of Ukrainian nationalism to suppression of it. The category of the nation and Ukraine as a Soviet socialist republic persisted, yet the ways one could be nationally Ukrainian without being anti-Soviet became extremely limited (Boryz 1960; Martin 2001; Hirsch 2005).

After World War II, I would argue that the questions raised by Ukrainian nationalism (and then suppressed) in the 1930s appeared again with the addition of new territories to Ukraine. Previously, Ukrainian nationality policy did not attempt to transform Galician Ukrainians, who were both imagined as separate from new Soviet Ukrainians and physically lived outside Ukraine. To be sure, the architects of Ukrainian nationality policy and Ukrainians themselves engaged with the cultural legacy of Galicia, as well as with historical relationships between Ukrainians of Galicia and subjects of the Russian Empire, but the specific national narrative crafted for Soviet Ukrainians was based on a history of living within imperial Russia and did not account for the context of Galicia. Before the Soviet Union, Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia and Ukrainian nationalists in imperial Russia saw themselves as all Ukrainian in certain (but not all) nationalist circles, yet operated mostly in separate networks with separate cultural, political, and religious roots. This was not simply a regional distinction or even a native vs. diaspora division, but separate contexts that often led to deep ideological splits. By rewriting the history of Galician "Ukrainians" and labeling them Russian Orthodox, the Soviets were attempting to break down a division in order to make new, Soviet Ukrainians who were on the same path toward progress.[5]

The vast majority of those eventually designated by the Soviet as "Ukrainians" in the 1920s before the incorporation of Galicia may not have considered themselves Ukrainian

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in the national sense or seen any kinship with the Ukrainians of Galicia. The ideological differences between Galician Ukrainians and the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire were hashed out in exclusive, intellectual circles that most of the illiterate population (in both Russia and Galicia) was unaware of. However, what most at the time were aware of was their church – Orthodox or Catholic. Many Orthodox believers in Ukraine were deeply suspicious of Catholicism, which they (along with imperial Russian authorities) eventually associated with Polish nationalism (Dolbilov and Miller 2006). For those who supported a church "reunion," making Ukrainians Orthodox was a way to separate Ukrainians from their Polish neighbors to the west and connect them to their Ukrainian and Russian neighbors to the east. Under the Russian Orthodox Church, the people in Galicia on their way to becoming Soviet at the time could now be placed in the same category as the rest of the Ukrainians in the Soviet Union.

Even before the incorporation of Galicia, Soviet ethnographers and planners struggled to understand the history and national belongings of the western edges of pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine. As Kate Brown describes in her study of this region, *A Biography of No Place*, Soviet policy-makers first designated the western territories that bordered Galicia as historically Polish (2005). After concerns arose over threats of Polish nationalism in the 1930s, this territory was then determined to be a new Ukrainian heartland. Those designated as Poles were deported to Central Asia as the Soviets sought to make this region "Ukrainian." In the case of Galicia, much of the work of the ethnic homogenization had been done during the war, especially during Nazi occupation. During Nazi rule in Western Ukraine, Galicia's Jews were mostly killed. Poles were targets of various ethnic cleansing campaigns. Yet in the postwar period the Soviets continued the process of engineering Galicia as ethnically homogenous. After the war, the Soviets exchanged populations of people they deemed "Poles" with people they deemed "Ukrainian" across the new Polish border. Thus, via the Initiative Committee of 1946, the Soviets developed their policies for Galicia as a Ukrainian national territory. The challenge for the Soviets, then, was to make Galician Ukrainians legible through existing Soviet categories for a Ukrainian nation. But because debates on these Ukrainian categories had been shut down in the 1930s, a new, transformed postwar Soviet Union had to take on this question.

The Initiative and Committee: 1946

The religious redefinition of the Uniates raises two important questions: Why this tactic and where did this strategy come from? The first mass transfers of the Uniates to Orthodox churches took place in Enlightenment-era imperial Russia, under Catherine the Great after the partitions of Poland. The meeting of the 1946 Initiative Group that converted the clergy and faithful of the Uniate Church to Orthodoxy was in fact the third instance of a supposed "decision" to accept Orthodoxy and declare the Uniate theologically illegitimate (Bociurkiw 1996; Werth 2014).[6] In 1794 and again in 1839 Catherine the Great and Nicholas I, respectively, organized mass conversions in the name of a "return" of Uniates to their original faith (Werth 2014, 78). Working with the Orthodox clergy, secular officials used the emerging ideology of "reunion" with the Orthodox world to convince Uniate worshippers to join "again" with Orthodoxy, often backed by the deployment of military force. This first reunion resulted in the conversion to Orthodoxy of 1.6 million people – half the Uniate members acquired after the first partition of Poland. The second reunion, concluded in 1839, converted the remaining 1.5 million. Thus by 1840, the Russian Empire no longer recognized any Uniate churches on its territory – all had been "reunited" with Orthodoxy (Werth 2014, 78–79).

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The reason for these "reunions" vary, but as Paul Werth argues, each state-sponsored policy of mass conversion came from nineteenth century changes in how Russia and other empires viewed religion (2014).[7] The Russian Empire's policies as a multiconfessional state were threatened, its leaders thought, by "foreign" religions forcing foreign loyalties onto individuals. Werth argues that starting in the nineteenth century:

> Increasingly state officials regarded the activities and outlooks of non-Orthodox clergies as disturbing "political" manifestations that challenged the autocratic order or the integrity of the empire. Still committed to promoting religiosity for all of the empire's subjects, the autocracy now became more inclined to perceive "politics" rather than spirituality in some expressions of non-Orthodox piety. (2014, 5)

In the case of the Uniate Church, the Russian Empire associated it with pro-Polish sympathies.[8] Soviet activity in response to the church began only when part of Galicia was incorporated into the Soviet Union as part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1939. Before then, the Bolsheviks seemed to accept the Tsarist precedent of hostility towards the Uniate Church.[9]

In 1946, the Council for the Affairs for the Russian Orthodox Church (CAROC) petitioned the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to gather a group of Uniate and Orthodox clergy into the Initiative Group for the Reunion of the Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox Church. This committee decided to liquidate the Uniate and convert all of its clergy and believers to Russian Orthodoxy, based on a declaration of the 1596 Union of Brest as illegitimate (Bociurkiw 1996, 173).[10] The use of the term "reunion" here shows the CAROC and other Soviet authorities actively drawing on a strategy of rule from the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Russian Empire.

Although those who protested this third "reunion" were sent to Siberian labor camps and in some cases executed (Bociurkiw 1996, 113–117, 199–204), the church at first attempted to avoid it. Ever since the Red Army marched into Galicia in 1939, high-level clergy in the Uniate Church (most notably Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky) attempted to negotiate for recognition under Soviet control. Church officials wrote letters "speaking in Bolshevik" that proclaimed their desire to be a recognized church after they were "liberated" by the Red Army. In November 1945, then-Uniate metropolitan Iosyf Slipyi issued a statement declaring the church's loyalty to the new Soviet government. Ostensibly a pastoral (or public sermon) to clergy and faithful, the intended audience was clearly the new Soviet authorities:

> After the liberation of Western Ukraine and its reunion with Soviet Ukraine thanks to the efforts of the heroic, invincible Red Army, the late metropolitan Sheptytsky expressed our joy and gratitude on his and the clergy's behalf, undersigning thereby hope for the possibility of church work in the Soviet Union. Our Greek Catholic Church does not interfere in political affairs, and in accord with Christ's will instructs the faithful to carry out state laws that agree with divine laws. (Bociurkiw 1996)[11]

Their petitions were not accepted and in 1946, the Initiative Group's "theological determination" that the Union of Brest was illegitimate and that conversion to Orthodoxy would reverse it, became encoded into Soviet policy (Bociurkiw 1996, 164–179). Slypij was sent to jail, only to be freed as part of Cold War negotiations.[12]

Remaking Galician Ukrainians through history

As the Initiative Committee began to form, Halan was selected to write political essays criticizing the church as part of the broader political education of Galicia (Bociurkiw 1996, 107–113; Amar 2015, 225–229). As Tarik Amar points out, the first battleground of the

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political education of Lviv was history. Or as he puts it, "The first great postwar campaign in 1946 targeted the present through the past" (Amar 2015, 224).

To be sure, it was not just in the realm of historical writing that the Soviets marked Lviv and other parts of Galicia as part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Beginning during the war, as Jan Gross argues, the Red Army along with Soviet party officials began fierce political education campaigns, held elections, took inventory of the population, and began widespread surveillance operations (Gross 1988). Once the Red Army drove the Nazis from the former Galicia for the last time in July 1944, these programs began again in earnest.

Yet, this context alone does not explain the decision to assign Uniates to Orthodox churches (or in the jargon of the day "reunify" them). During the Red Army's first occupation, many who were viewed as anti-Soviet had been arrested or murdered. In addition, population exchanges agreed on between Poland and Soviet Ukraine added to chaos in the region. The sheer amount of violence experienced there, committed by Nazis, the Red Army, and some local collaborators, meant that a violent campaign against the Uniate Church was not out of the question for the new authorities. Other religious sects were violently suppressed in the region, including Evangelical Christians, Polish Roman Catholics, and the members of Lviv's last synagogue.[13]

The "reunion" of 1946 was not strictly peaceful. A vast number of clergy and church activists were killed or arrested – but an even greater number were given the opportunity to work with the new Soviet regime and agree to this church "reunion." This option makes sense only in the context of creating a new history of Ukraine, devoid not of religion but of certain churches.

The project of writing histories of the church was part of a new postwar push to create a history of Ukraine. In fact, it was only *after* it was determined that the Uniate Church needed to be excised from a Ukrainian national history that Soviet intellectual authorities realized there was no proper *Soviet* Ukrainian national history. While there existed a historical narrative about Ukraine embedded in Soviet nationality policy, an official history book had yet to be written by the Soviets spelling it out. What Soviet historians and policy-makers did have, however, was a model of the kind of history they wanted to write against: Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine*. Specifically, they wanted to refute Hrushevsky's history that contested Russian claims to Kievan Rus and instead argued that Kievan Rus was the beginning of a Ukrainian nation. In addition, he presented Galicia as "a crucial link in the Ukrainian historical continuum from Kievan Rus' to the present" (Amar 2015, 225). Most upsetting to thinkers like Halan was Hrushevsky's assertion that Ukraine was more influenced by Western European culture than Russian culture (Amar 2015). This Soviet history of Ukraine was eventually written and its goal was to stress links between Ukrainians and Russians, praising figures like Bohdan Khmelnytsky, portrayed as a man who fought Catholics to bring Orthodox Cossacks under the wing of the Russian Empire. The Uniate Church had no place in that story, but the Orthodox Church as the historical link between Kievan Rus and Russians and Ukrainians did.[14] Thus, for this new history of Ukraine to work, the Uniate Church had to be de-legitimized.

Conversion as Soviet redemption: Soviet history of Uniates and Ukrainians

In his 1947 essay "We Must Not Forget," Halan begins his historical essays on Ukraine with a polemic against Hrushevsky's version of history: "Grushevsky's [*sic*] purpose was simplicity itself: tear away the Ukraine [*sic*] from Moscow and annex her to

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Berlin, both figuratively speaking and, if circumstances required, in the direct sense of the term" (12).

Halan's first characterizing of Hrushevsky is not incorrect. One of Hrushevsky's goals in writing his history was to write a history of the Ukrainian people that emphasized their claims to Kievan Rus and a national narrative separate from Russia's own national history (Plokhy 2005). However, Halan puts a fundamentally contemporary spin on that argument. Even though Hrushevsky had completed his history and died well before World War II, for Halan, emphasizing Ukraine as separate from Russia meant allying with Nazis, and other forces bent on destroying the Soviet Union. Halan even mentions that Hrushevsky left imperial Russian Kyiv to write his history of Ukraine so that he could be in Habsburg Lemberg "a hundred paces from the office of the vice-regent" (12). Halan's aside implies that Hrushevsky was simply an instrument of Russia's Habsburg enemies, instead of noting that he did not have the intellectual freedom to write his texts in imperial Russian Kyiv.

Halan frames his own historical essays as point-by-point attacks on Hrushevsky's view of history, arguing that Hrushevsky's analysis of Khmelnytsky joining with Russia as a last resort was incorrect and that Khmelnytsky wholeheartedly viewed his fate as tied up with the Russian people (13). Ultimately, Halan concludes, it is the Ukrainian people whom Hrushevsky mischaracterizes. Halan argues that Ukrainians "saw the Russians as their brothers, not demons of the flesh" (13). Halan concludes with what eventually becomes the Soviet narrative of Ukrainian history after the war:

> The last thirty years of history have taught us the simple lesson that love of Moscow is love of the Ukraine, that hatred of Moscow is the same as hatred of the Ukraine. Admittedly, it is a long step from Grushevsky to Bandera's bandits but, for all that, they are birds of a feather. (21)

In an earlier essay, he argues that the church has served to inculcate the same hatred for Russia that men like Hrushevsky did. As both an institution and an instrument of "bourgeois Ukrainian nationalism," the church embodied the kind of "anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalism" that Halan found abhorrent in Hrushevsky's writings. In his essay "By Cross or By Knife," Halan analyzes the writings of Uniate Church Metropolitan Sheptytsky and other members of the Uniate-Ukrainian intelligentsia. Typically, political writings by Uniate clergy have been seen as the beginnings of Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia. As John-Paul Himka argues, the church was the only institution providing a context for the emergence of a Ukrainian-speaking intelligentsia. The vast majority of Ukrainian-speaking Ruthenians were peasants, who had a rich folk culture but did not undergo what Himka calls "a centralized modernizing educational process" that was essential to the development of nationalism. The clergy, under Habsburg religious reforms, however, did undergo this process (Himka 1998, 9). Thus, the first political organizations with an overt Ukrainian nationalist bent in Galicia were made up entirely of Uniate clergy (10). Reflecting on this nineteenth-century Ukrainian print culture, Halan says:

> Predictably, all this printed matter was saturated with hatred for the Orthodox "heretics" and for Russia, the bastion of Orthodoxy. This crude propaganda for the people … was primarily designed to estrange the Galician Ukrainians from their brothers on the Dnieper and insulate them, cost what it may, from the contagion of revolutionary ideas that were agitating the hearts and minds of many in Eastern Ukraine and resulting in armed uprisings of workers and peasants. (1962, 91, [1947] 1975)

Here, Halan establishes a framework that future Soviet histories of the church will expand upon – the Ukrainian nationalism of the church was a "bourgeois" nationalism that was as much about separating Galician Ukrainians from the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire as it was about promoting hatred for Russia and Orthodoxy. This also implies that the two are

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inherently intertwined – any force that seeks to separate Ukrainian history from Russian history also separates Galician Ukrainians from the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire.

What Halan and none of the other Soviet histories of the church mention is that the Uniate clergy of the nineteenth century also grappled with these issues, leading to ideological struggles within the church and within the newly formed Ukrainian intelligentsia.

The Soviet narrative that Halan is forming for the Ukrainian nationality greatly resembles nineteenth-century "Russophilism" or "Little Russian Nationalism." Halan's appeal to unity and friendship were terms that some Ruthenian national movements, including those associated with the Uniate Church, were using at the time. As both John-Paul Himka and Faith Hillis argue, within the groups of educated elites that embraced nationalism in right-bank Ukraine, Russophilism existed alongside Ukrainophilism. What Hillis refers to, as "Little Russian nationalism" was a political agenda that insisted that Ukrainians and Russians were in some ways distinct but that the Ukrainians were the "younger brothers" of the Russians (Himka 1998; Hillis 2013).

In this ideology, Galician Ruthenians and Russians were part of the same political and cultural nation and Ruthenians needed the Russian Empire for support against the forces of Polonization. This belief did not contend that Ruthenians were in fact *Russian* or that they were not related to the "Little Russians" of the Russian Empire. Instead, this "all-Russian national orientation" as Himka calls it "rejected the notion that the Ruthenian or Little Russian peculiarities had or should have political or high cultural significance" (1998, 10–11). It was not the Uniate Church that undermined this friendship, but the dominance of Roman Catholic Poles in the church and a relationship with the Vatican that oppressed Ruthenians by driving them away from Russians, in this political interpretation. The idea of "all-Russian nationalism" or "Little Russian nationalism" is the only political orientation in which the ideas presented by the Halan article make sense.[15]

Conclusions

Brigid O'Keeffe's work on Soviet gypsies offers a helpful framework for understanding how the Soviet nationalities policy worked: nationality as a diagnosis for everyone, with a varied prognosis for each group. Every single individual in the Soviet Union was assigned a nationality as a diagnosis, as "an obstacle to overcome" (O'Keeffe 2013, 12). However, the *prognosis* for each nationality was different. Some nationalities, such as the gypsies O'Keefe focuses on, were deemed "backward" and "pathology and danger writ large," but collective farming and Soviet education "served as a prognosis for [a] promisingly brilliant future as literate, cultured, clean, and socially useful citizens fully integrated into Soviet life" (O'Keeffe 2013, 12). Francine Hirsch (2005) calls this ideology "state-sponsored evolutionism."

However, most stories of Soviet nationalities policy, including the defining work by Yuri Slezkine, shows the field of experimentation in this "evolutionism" or "prognosis" nearly disappearing by World War II (Slezkine 1994; Martin 2001; Weiner 2001; Hirsch 2005; O'Keeffe 2013). To be sure, nationality was still important to how the Soviet Union saw its citizens and how these citizens saw themselves but resources for transforming these nationalities were no longer prioritized in state allocation.[16]

Yet the expansion of the Soviet Union after World War II, as well as the experience of the war itself presented a challenge for a less dynamic nationality policy. As Amir Weiner argues, this meant that some nationalities were excised from the Soviet narrative (2001). In the case of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and its titular nationality, it meant creating a new history that privileged the history of left-bank Ukraine over the history of right-

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bank Ukraine but still was meant to *integrate* right-bank Ukrainians. For right-bank Ukrainians to become Soviet, their history outside the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union was declared illegitimate. While it would make sense for Soviet history to argue that those who had not experienced the revolution in 1917 had missed their destiny, the fact that this destiny stretches all the way back to the reign of the Orthodox Church and imperial Russia is less expected.

The meeting of the Initiative Committee in 1946 to convert and "reunify" the Uniate Church with the Orthodox Church was the first step in recasting the history of Galician Ukrainians and creating a new Ukrainian history for the Soviet conception of the Ukrainian nationality.[17] Once the church was declared illegitimate and now part of the Orthodox Church, the same could be done for aspects of Galician Ukrainians' history that separated Ukrainians from Russian influence at key junctures.

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Notes

1. After helpful suggestions from the anonymous reviewers, I understand the need to use "conversion" with caution in describing this process. In many cases, "conversion" has an implication that a religious rite has been performed and theological beliefs changed. In this case, however, "conversions" were done in secular spaces using Soviet secular practices, such as denunciations, signed testimonials, and property registration. The major theological change asked of priests and congregants was the disavowal of the pope, since Orthodox and Uniate theology are essentially similar except on that point. However, mass religious transfers throughout history have often taken place using secular practices and through state institutions, with little concern for theology. Therefore, when I use "conversion" I mean in the state-sponsored sense, as opposed to a personal decision that must be ratified through religious rites.
2. The Uniate Church can also be referred to as the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, the Greek Catholic Church, Eastern Rite Catholicism, and other names. I use Uniate in this paper because that was the name of the church most used in Soviet Ukraine at the time.
3. The most comprehensive account of the Initiative Committee is Bohdan Bociurkiw's *The Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State 1939–1950* (1996). I rely a great deal on his pioneering work and richly documented history. However, Bociurkiw presents the Initiative Committee in the context of church history, while I believe the committee should be seen as part of a broader, postwar context of the USSR. Bociurkiw's work argues that the Initiative Committee was an example of Russification against Ukrainian nationalism and Ukrainian institutions in Ukraine, as well as another chapter in a history of a church with a rich history of martyrdom. Here I try to integrate policies toward the church *within* ideas of Ukrainian nationalism, even if it is a Ukrainian nationalism defined by Soviet authorities.
4. In his book *The Paradox of Ukrainian Lviv* (2015), Tarik Amar argues that a concern for "the local" is an important concept to understanding the program central Soviet authorities had for the new regions of Ukraine. Amar also argues convincingly that Sovietization in Western Ukraine still sought to create a homogenous Ukrainian nation-state, albeit on terms that denied Ukraine a separate history from Russia. This framework is critical for understanding Soviet policies toward the Uniates.

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5. As Tarik Amar points out, before World War II, "nationalists from western Ukraine had sought to carry eastward their version of Ukraine … [however] eastern Ukrainians in postwar Lviv helped impose a version of Ukraine that was Stalinist and subordinate to a Russian 'elder brother.'"
6. Bociurkiw (1996) describes these previous "reunions" but argues that they should be seen as "elminat[ing] the barrier to the integration of Ukrainians and Belarusians with the Russians (5)." In contrast, Werth (2014), in describing these historical reunions, uses an approach that rejects national identification of the church and its congregants and instead focuses on associations with foreign enemy governments and monarchs, instead of nations.
7. In some cases, it was a result of rebellions in the Polish lands, in other cases it was the result of theological changes that were perceived to move the church more toward "Latin" orientations (Werth 2014, 77–79).
8. This was in fact often quite the opposite. As historians of Galicia have pointed out, "Uniates" were just as concerned about Polish Catholic religious and political hegemony in the nineteenth-century Habsburg Empire as they were about their Orthodox neighbors. Relations between Polish Roman Catholics and Ukrainian Greek Catholics were contentious in the nineteenth century and became violent in the twentieth century. Here, it is important to emphasize "pro-Polish" had more to do with alliances within the Polish nobility than ideas about nationalism (Wolff 2002).
9. Greek Catholics and their parishes were also split among territories in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Poland after the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
10. The text of the "reunion" during the Lviv Sobor of 1946 summarizes the proceedings as "The sobor of the Greek Catholic clergy … decided to liquidate the Brest Union of 1596, to break away from Rome, and to reunite with one Orthodox Church of our fathers."
11. "Dukhovenstvu i virnym, myr u Hospodi i blahoslovennia" Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine, L'viv fond 408, opys 1, sprava 50, fols. 19–20 Translated into English and quoted in Bociurkiw (1996, 87–88).
12. From the presentation of Iosyf Slypij's memoirs http://ucu.edu.ua/eng/news/3680/.
13. See Amar (2015, 271–274) for the fate of Lviv's synagogue.
14. See Amar (2015, 230–232) on Krypiakevych and his history.
15. In "Far Eastern Europe," Szporluk does not acknowledge this movement when he states "The West Ukrainians … did not have the historic feeling of inferiority versus Russia that their Eastern co-nationalists had had … Russia did not impress them as a higher civilization … " (476).
16. For discussions of the periodization of Soviet policies on nationalities, see O'Keeffe (2013), Hirsch (2005), and Martin (2001).
17. It was also the first "reunion" of many. Similar "reunions," were undertaken in other areas of Ukraine and places deemed to have Ukrainian regions, including Sub-Carpathian Rus, Czechoslovakia, and Romania in the late 1940s and into the early 1950s. These reunions and how they resemble and differ from the original Galician project will be the subject of my continuing research.

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