

As the Romans left the security of the Italian peninsula during the Punic Wars, so the authors leave the land of *communis opinio* on the subject on intelligence activities. They follow the interpretation of the Italian scholar, Giovanni Brizzi, who argued that Roman leaders were loyal to the idea of *fides* and averse to any use of underhanded methods in warfare. This supposed attitude remained an obstacle to victory against Hannibal until consciously discarded by Scipio. The authors seem blithely unaware of how often this interpretation has been dismantled (for example, J. Briscoe, *JRS* 73 (1983), A. Lintott, *Gnomon* 56, 6 (1984), Sheldon, *Guerra Segreta nell'antica Roma* (2008), and several works by E. L. Wheeler). They are on firmer ground in ch. 4 when they turn back to internal Roman affairs. They give a detailed discussion of the power struggle between Marius and Sulla, the proscriptions, the Catilinarian conspiracy and the rise in the use of informers and political assassination.

Chs 5 through 7 discuss the legal definitions, structure and function of the diverse groups which made up Rome's intelligence gathering capacity in the Empire: the *speculatores*, the *exploratores*, the *frumentarii*, and the *agentes in rebus*. Once again, they follow an Italian scholar, this time Purpura, while ignoring the English and German scholarship on the subject. They are certainly entitled to disagree with what has come before, but in a work of this size it is inexplicable that the authors should choose to completely ignore a body of scholarship on the very subject of their book. Totally absent is the work of Wilhelm Blum on the *curiosi* and *regendarii*, of Manfred Clauss on the *frumentarii*, *speculatores* and *magister officiorum*, of Davies on policing, Kneppel on internal security, Pekary on sedition, etc. The list is a long one and since all of these works were gathered in *Espionage in the Ancient World: An Annotated Bibliography* (2003), even identifying them does not take much work. At least a mention in the footnotes and the authors' basis for disagreement would have been helpful.

The disagreements between scholars exist, not because previous authors have failed to look at the same evidence (of which there is precious little anyway), but because there is a philosophical difference between those who see the work of Rome's security services as sinister and their collective activities as oppressive and corrupt (e.g. Sinnigen, Frank, Sheldon, Blum) and those who see these men as simply Roman bureaucrats upon whom a modern interpretation has been intruded (e.g. A. H. M. Jones, Liebschutz *JRS* 60 (1970) reviewing Blum). The latter group believes the former has been led astray by making analogy to modern secret police organizations, and there is no doubt that a scholar's view can be coloured by their own personal or national experience with the subject of secret police. There will always, however, be a divide between those who believe spying has always been the world's 'second oldest profession', with far fewer morals than the first, and those who do not want to acknowledge such behaviour in their beloved Romans.

Despite its flaws, this is a beautifully produced book, lavishly illustrated and filled with thoughtful discussions on Roman legal and epigraphical sources. The authors make many useful insights and discuss topics in greater detail than previous works. The 140 Euro price tag, however, will limit its distribution to libraries with a large budget willing to stock Italian titles. This will deprive it of the wider readership it deserves.

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doi:10.1017/S0075435812000536

M.-W. SCHULZ, *CAESAR ZU PFERDE. ROSS UND REITER IN CAESARS KOMMENTARIEN UND IN DER GERMANIA DES TACITUS* (Spudasmata 123). Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2009. Pp. x + 322, illus. ISBN 9783437139296. €49.80.

As the title suggests, the focus of this book is on the works of Caesar, though some thirty pages are devoted to Tacitus' *Germania*. According to Schulz, Caesar in Gaul initially tried to reform his four thousand-strong Gallic cavalry by integrating Roman officers down to quite a junior level (this rests largely on the *decurio*, L. Aemilius, mentioned at *B Gall* 1.23). Nonetheless, they remained unreliable, and after the disasters and vexations of his fifth and sixth years in command Caesar realized — rather late in the day for a 'great' general — that the war was not winnable without cavalry superiority. Hence he started to use German cavalry, or rather *Doppelkämpfer*, since a foot warrior ran and fought alongside each horseman. S. successfully shows that from the seventh campaign onwards they were present as a decisive shock force on numerous occasions. One of the book's most interesting ideas is that Caesar, who claimed for years to be defending Gaul (and

Rome) from the German menace, eventually used Germans to conquer Gaul. In the Civil War, the cavalry were decisive in the almost bloodless victory over Afranius in Spain, and so highly did Caesar think of the *Doppelkämpfertaktik* that before Pharsalus he trained a new force — the Germans having been mostly left behind in Italy — to fight in this way. The African campaign of 49 B.C. is dealt with more from a literary point of view; the comparison drawn between Caesar's depiction of Sabinus' downfall (*B Gall* 5) and that of Curio (*B Civ* 2) is detailed and very interesting, though I should hardly have expected to find it under the title *Caesar zu Pferde*.

This raises a perplexing question: what is the unifying theme or subject matter of this book? It is hard to understand, as far as the historical questions are concerned, why the evidence of the pseudo-Caesarian corpus is so little exploited, especially when the *Spanish War* is preoccupied with cavalry matters; similarly, for what reason is Hirtius' *Gallia* 8 considered, but the *Alexandrian War* (possibly also written by Hirtius) overlooked?

Some obvious evidence is missed. For example, S. catalogues the thousands of kilometres Caesar journeyed to and fro as governor of Gaul, something which 'only an excellent rider with great endurance' could manage (19); yet Suet., *Iul.* 57, which indeed describes him as a skilful horseman, also tells us he 'travelled very great distances with incredible speed in a carriage'. Other evidence is over-interpreted. For example, *B Gall* 5.35 does not mention cavalry (185); similarly, the mixed force of Numidian infantry and cavalry (*B Civ* 2.25) are taken to be *Doppelkämpfer* (172 n. 173), whereas the source does not say this, and indeed the number of horse and foot does not match.

Still, there is much of value here. A self-contained 'equestrian precis' (262–302), dealing with ancient horsemanship and the most relevant aspects of equine natural history, is appended. One useful insight amongst many is that a relatively high level of remounts (i.e. extra horses beyond the number of troopers) was required in antiquity, because of the lack of iron horseshoes. This factor is often overlooked in the examination of the logistical requirements of ancient armies. Also of great interest are the author's successful experiments, illustrated by photographs, with the mounted use of the spear, which help elucidate certain aspects of the *Germania*, and the *Doppelkämpfertaktik* (with S. being pulled along by a galloping horse).

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doi:10.1017/S0075435812000548

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S. KOON, *INFANTRY COMBAT IN LIVY'S BATTLE NARRATIVES* (BAR International Series 2071). Oxford: Archaeopress, 2010. Pp. ii + 149. ISBN 9781407306322. £34.00.

The rehabilitation of Livy as a historian has rested primarily on his substantial literary talent. A new line of enquiry is now beginning to emerge, initiated boldly by Miriam R. Pelikan Pettinger's recent volume on triumphs in Livy (2008), whereby scholars sift the *Ab Urbe Condita* for insights which the text may provide on Roman history. In this book Sam Koon explores Livy's representation of infantry battle. K. suggests that Livy had some military experience (23). K.'s Livy may not be an expert military historian, but he merits acknowledgement as an 'intelligent amateur' (26). This is an important assertion which challenges the assumption that Livy had little knowledge of the practical matters about which he wrote in his history.

Ch. 1 serves as a brief introduction. Ch. 2 constitutes the traditional literature survey in the form of Roman infantry battle as K. delineates theoretical issues and surveys the vast literature on Roman warfare. Ch. 3 provides context through general analysis of Livy as military historian with an overview of his representation of battles. Chs 4–6 provide the bulk of the analysis through close scrutiny of Livy's use of combat vocabulary: *currere* (or rather its compounds), *impetus*, and *inferre*, respectively. In these chapters K. methodically catalogues (twelve appendices may be found in this book) and explicates the very large number of instances of these terms, noting the historian's multi-faceted usage of each. The thoroughness of these chapters and the accompanying appendices is to be commended, since they will prove a valuable resource for further study of the representation of infantry battle in Latin historical narrative.

Two other historians who feature prominently in this study are Polybius and Caesar, the subjects of comparative analyses with Livy in chs 7 and 8, respectively; these chapters expand nicely upon analysis provided in ch. 3. In these chapters K. demonstrates that Livy effectively synthesizes the Greek and Roman literary traditions of narrating battle. Ch. 9 constitutes the conclusion of the