

The Effect of Religiosity on Political Attitudes in Israel

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Abstract: This article studies the influence of religion on political attitudes in Israel by testing two propositions: “religion-friendly” democratization and “greedy” socialization. The former implies that accommodation of religious demands stimulates democratization, the latter argues that domineering religious socialization does not motivate democratic attitudes. Analysis of data from representative surveys conducted in 2006–2013, supports “greedy” socialization over the “religion friendly” hypothesis. I show that in most instances, socialization in religion-friendly environments does not moderate the political attitudes of religiously conservative groups. The results suggest that unbounded accommodation of religious needs in non-religious institutions may strengthen undemocratic political attitudes.

INTRODUCTION

What happens to the political attitudes of religious conservatives when democratic society attempts to integrate them via non-religious socialization?

In the past, Orthodox parents rightly feared for their sons and daughters who joined the military or attended university. Communities often severed ties with these soldiers and graduates, because military and academic experiences had a well-deserved reputation for eroding religious commitment (Petrovsky-Stern 2009). But, times have changed, at least in multi-cultural democracies that strive to accommodate religious, ethnic, and

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racial diversity without harming it. Democracies celebrate respect for *the other*, and consider toleration of anti-liberal groups an indication of their strength and “health” (Ekeli 2012). This said, policy-makers continue to debate the maximum thresholds of accommodation. Should secular instructors in public universities dress according to the custom of their religious students? Conversely, may a professional wear a burqa (hijab, kippah, shtreimel, etc.) at work? What about banning women from singing during public events or from teaching religious males in public universities or the military? Is it appropriate that courses of study be calculated to avoid challenging the Orthodox worldview and attitudes? These are only a handful of the questions raised as societies try to feel their way toward a public space where custom and democracy can coexist without becoming detrimental to each other (Ben Yehuda 2010). The evidence we have from cross-cultural research on Muslim and Christian societies poses that “religion friendly” integration into society increases support for democratic practices among conservative religious actors (Driessen 2014). Literature that develops a “greedy” socialization argument maintains, in contrast, that intense religious education will block any changes to political attitudes among the religiously conservative. It further suggests that religious institutions will seek to neutralize influences which potentially challenge the religious society’s authority and values. To evaluate these opposing propositions and understand the influence of non-religious socialization on religious conservatives, I analyze the political attitudes of this group, specifically, support for democracy, propensity to resolve inter-ethnic conflicts, and tolerance of the *other*. These political attitudes underlie the ability of states to survive and function as democracies (Arian 1993; Peffley, Hutchison and Shamir 2015; Yaniv 1993).

For data, I turn to Israel, because few democracies¹ go as far as the Israeli state to accommodate religious fundamentalism in the public domain. This formal democracy, with relatively well-developed democratic institutions, acts based on a mix of republican and liberal democratic principles. In contrast to other developed democracies, spiritual and institutionalized religiosities in Israel are both on the rise. About 80% of Jewish Israelis believe in God, about 60% practices at least some religious rituals and pray. Slightly less than 30% adhere to strict Orthodox norms (ESS 2008; IDI 2012). The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics forecasts that in three decades, the non-religious population will have dropped below 25%, leaving Orthodox Jews and Muslim Arabs to form the majority. Responding to these trends, the state has started to integrate Arabs² through non-governmental sector initiatives, while integration of

ultra-Orthodox Jews is performed mainly via the military and academia (Zehavi 2012). Recently, all major public universities and some colleges have introduced gender-segregated classes, where female instructors do not teach male students (Chabin 2013). In the military, the integration process was begun in the late 1960s, when the army launched special programs managed by rabbinic authorities (Levy 2012). These programs allow religious men and women to serve and study religion in a “kosher” environment.

The ultimate purpose of programs for the religiously conservative is to ensure these publics are integrated into the economy. Perhaps for this reason, other by-products of integration, and specifically the potential impact of non-religious learning experiences on political attitudes, has never been a focus of either academic or policy research.

This text fills the gap by zooming in on the political attitudes of religious conservatives. To this end, I first explore how religiosity in Israel influences support for democracy, forbearance toward *the other*, and propensity to resolve conflicts. I then compare the effect of religiosity on political attitudes with the influence exerted by other dominant socialization frameworks. Relying on this background, I analyze two competing propositions that differently predict the effect of non-religious socialization on political attitudes amongst the ultra-Orthodox.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Religion and Political Attitudes

The association between religion and political attitudes has garnered much attention in academic and public circles. It has been studied to the n^{th} degree in cross-national studies, using individual, institutional and country levels of analysis (Gibson and Hare 2012; Fox 2011; 2012). Nonetheless, this wealth of existing empirical accounts engenders conflicting conclusions, implying that religion — measured as belief, behavior or belonging — may have unsystematic effects on political attitudes.

Evidences that religion decreases democratic commitment emerges from cross-cultural research that measures religion as a set of beliefs; so construed, religion associates with intolerance, militarism and lack of support for democracy (Barker, Hurwitz, and Nelson 2008; De Kadt 2013; Mueller 2013; Hofman and Shahin 1989; Shelef 2010). Factors underlying the negative influence of religion on democratic attitudes include

personal fundamentalism, growing inequalities, and policies of “de-secularization from above” (Canetti-Nisim 2004; Karakoç and Başkan 2012; Karpov, Lysovskaya, and Barry 2012).

Evidence of a diminishing link between religion and political attitudes comes from democracies where religion withdraws from the political and public domain. Putnam and Campbell (2010) disentangle the workings of this process in the United States. In their view, the development of parallel but opposing tendencies is responsible for the change: they point to growing interfaith tolerance and spirituality, religious polarization, and increasing numbers of the religiously unaffiliated as factors underlying the weakening of religion’s contribution to politics. Free market forces, technological advancements, and existential security, which have been on the rise in areas of the world where religion has relinquished its role in the public domain, also appear to attenuate the association between religion and politics (Barber 2013; Ben Porat 2013; Norris and Inglehart 2011).

Lastly, evidence that religion increases tolerance and democratic behavior comes from scholarship focusing on religious behavior and group-belonging. Hoffman and Jamal (2014) report that Quran readings during the Arab spring motivated Arab Muslim youths to develop independent civic positions and join protests. Relatedly, a growing body of literature theorizes “religion friendly” integration of conservatives as having positive effects on support for democracy (Driessen 2014; Fox 2012; Kopelowitz and Diamond 1998). This research suggests that incorporating religious demands in the public sphere can encourage religious actors to participate in a democratic process, and to adopt a more democratic political outlook. United States-based studies developing this approach indicate that religious actors reinforce democratic attitudes via informal interactions (Burge and Djupe 2014; Djupe and Calfano 2012; Djupe and Gilbert 2009). This latter literature echoes the argument of Drissen (2014), describing practices by which religious actors may enhance tolerance and overall social cohesiveness within their congregations.

Overall, the conflicting evidence concerning associations between religion and political attitudes implies a contextual rather than systematic impact of religion (Gu and Bomhoff 2012; Nicolet and Tresch 2009; Tessler 2010). Comparative studies vividly highlight this importance of context. For example, Gu and Bomhoff (2012) found that in countries with Muslim and Catholic majorities, religiosity related unsystematically to tolerance and support for democracy. In Muslim majority states, the pious are more intolerant, yet more supportive of democracy compared to the less religious. In Catholic majority countries, stronger religiosity

decreases both support for democracy and related political attitudes. These results are consistent with earlier studies in Muslim and Christian societies, where relations between individual religiosity and political attitudes varied (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Djupe and Gilbert 2006; Nicolet and Tresch 2009; Tessler 2002; 2010; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1998; Wald and Wilcox 2006).

The literature on Jews and Israelis is as mixed as it is elsewhere. Overall, though, it seems to be the Israeli context, rather than Judaism *per se* that causes democratic attitudes to decline. Specifically, there is compelling evidence that support for democracy, tolerance, and predisposition to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict decrease as religiosity increases (Arian 1995; Attar-Schwartz and Ben-Arieh 2012; Ben Rafael 2008; Seligson and Caspi 1983; Smootha 2005). And, on the flip side, religiosity relates to more intensive political involvement, strength of political opinion (dogmatism), and the feeling of national pride (Ben Rafael 2008; Ichilov 2005; Sorek and Ceobanu 2009).

Comparative research also exposes that the effect of religion is more pronounced in Israel than among the Jews of the diaspora. In other words, the Israeli context amplifies the influence of religion on attitudes. Thus, Wald and Martinez (2001, 387) found that religiosity increased intolerance (toward Palestinians) and eroded desire to resolve the conflict among both American and Israeli Jews. Israelis' experience, however, intensified the impact of religiosity on these attitudes. Indeed, Liebman and Cohen (1990) exposed political and social attitudes among American and Israeli Jews that were so drastically different they had to propose "two worlds of Judaism" as an explanation.

Summing up, the impact of Judaism on political attitudes seems to be context specific, at least in part. It is, therefore, important to juxtapose religion with other factors that forge the context and, in doing so, shape political attitudes. The literature indicates that the country's relatively short history was marked by struggle with ideological, ethnic and class cleavages that shaped the political context alongside religious schism (Smootha 2002). These cleavages, rather than religiosity, have oriented political discourse, determining both attitudes and electoral choices (Arian 1995; Arian and Shamir 1999; Ben-Rafael 1986; Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir 2015; Peled 2013; Shafir and Peled 2002; Smootha 2002; Shamir and Shamir 1995; Yaniv 1993). Thus, before examining either proposition regarding socialization, I ask the question: has the religious-secular divide relegated other cleavages to a secondary role in shaping political attitudes?

Red Stars or Stars of David: The Schisms That Define Political Attitudes

Asher Arian's (1995) seminal *Security Threatened* is a rare work that compares ethnic, religious, class, and ideological divides to conclude that religiosity has a stable influence on a range of political attitudes, electoral, and policy choices. Other studies that view ideological differences as the core determinants of political attitudes propose ideology, rather than religion, as the most important political rift. This body of research assumes that ideological cleavage in Israel reflects the liberal-conservative values divide, which holds sway over political preferences in the United States and elsewhere (King and Smith 2014; Lijphart 1979; Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir 2015; Shafer and Spady 2014; Karpov, Lysovskaya, and Barry 2012; Layman 2001).

An ethnic divide between Jews of Oriental³ and Western backgrounds distantly echoes the politically acute racial divides in the South Africa and the United States (Gibson 2006). Some studies, even today, view ethnic cleavage as continuing to subtend political attitudes (Smooha 1993; 2002; 2005; Peled 1998). The influence of the ethnic divide on political attitudes originates in the traumatic absorption of North African and Middle Eastern Jews in the 1940s and 1950s. "Western" elites — an embodiment of the socialist left — failed to effectively integrate arriving Oriental Jews. As a result, the lingering memory of painful integration triggered ethnic vote during the 1970s–1990s (Arian 1995). The ethnic model, however, does not hold when competing cleavages are taken into account. In comparative studies, ethnicity loses much of its influence on political attitudes (Arian 1995, 145; Ben Meir and Bagno-Moldavski 2011; Weakliem 1997). It is therefore, reasonable to assume that in Israel, as elsewhere, the impact of ethnic rift on political attitudes is declining (Lockerbie 2013).

Finally, class-consciousness has been particularly weak in Israel, which explains the trivial association between class and political attitudes (Arian 1995; Ayalon, Ben-Rafael, and Sharot 1987; Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir 2015; Smooha 1993). Nonetheless, class is often interpreted as part of the other cleavages. For example, class is preserved through religiosity in studies that envisage a possible secularization of the political landscape under the pressure of free market forces (Ben Porat 2013). According to this view, the combined effects of secularization and growing polarization between classes are what will shape political attitudes in the future. Similarly, Peled (2013) cites growing inequalities as

the destabilizing factor responsible for eroding ethnic democracy. Here too, class schism is viewed as an accompanying factor that shapes political attitudes in the shadow of a major ethnic divide.

A brief overview of extant empirical works shows that the evidence is equivocal about the role of schisms in shaping political attitudes (Arian 1995; Peled 2013; Shelef 2010; Smootha 2002; 2005). On the one hand, research linking religion to political attitudes is burgeoning (Blackstone, Matsubayashi, and Oldmixon 2014; Federer-Shtayer and Meffert 2014; Fox 2011; 2012; Stadler, Lomsky-Feder, and Ben-Ari 2008; Wald and Martinez 2001). On the other hand, the impact of religiosity on attitudes can potentially be overshadowed by ideological or ethnic rifts (Ben Porat 2013; Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir 2015; Peled 2013). Given that studies of political behavior fail to provide a clear expectation as to the power of religious divides, I turn to the literature on socialization. Research in this area focuses on how different learning experiences take effect and the impact they have on individuals' attitudes, situating Judaism as one amongst several competing socialization frameworks.

Socialization Frameworks

The idea of competing socialization experiences sets up a rivalry between religious institutions in Israel and ideological, class and ethnic frameworks of socialization. This begs the question: do these institutions actually possess mechanisms for outperforming the other frameworks? To answer this query, I turn to the theory of greedy institutions, which suggests that certain institutions stand out in politics because they elicit near-blind commitment from members in the face of competing loci of attention. But, which institutions qualify? In *Greedy Institutions* (1974), Coser suggested that religious and non-religious socialization frameworks can generate equally domineering practices. The archetypal greedy institutions he studied were the Jesuits, a religious order, and the anti-clerical authoritarian Bolshevik Party. Both the aggressively secular and the religious frameworks: “encompassed within their circle the whole personality” of their members (Coser 1974, 4).⁴ Coser's method is well-adapted to measure the level of “greediness” exhibited by Israeli socialization frameworks. And, to this end, I describe the practices generated within ethnic, ideological and religious institutions, and their ability to defend these practices in non-religious settings.

Class socialization has never been particularly strong in Israel, except for a brief period at the beginning of the “Yeshuv” era, when the teachings of intellectuals like A.D. Gordon were implemented in settlements established by their followers. Ideological socialization, which permeated the political landscape during the 1940s–1960s, has been on the ebb ever since (Ben Yehuda 1995). Ethnic socialization belonged mainly to the family domain until the 1970s. In the 1980s, a political movement of Oriental Jews (Sha“s) did secure funding for ethnic educational and community projects, but these were supplementary rather than alternative socialization frameworks. Moreover, the movement targeted Oriental Jews via religious programs, which further weakened the ethnic appeal of this socialization. Summing up, the three socialization frameworks — ideological, class, and ethnic — cannot be qualified as greedy, in contrast to socialization developed by Orthodox religious communities.”

A religious person can be born, educated, married, employed, integrated politically, and eventually buried, all within a network of institutions controlled by the Orthodox religious community. Levels of commitment toward the in-group and rabbinical authorities are high, and come close to blind obedience, especially among the ultra-Orthodox (Ben Yehuda 2010; Freedman 1991; Stadler et al. 2008). At the same time, outside pressures on the fast-growing Orthodox sector have made it impossible to preserve this social vacuum. Therefore, encounters with non-religious socialization frameworks are becoming inevitable.

As with any re-socialization, such encounters may change the political attitudes of religious conservatives, whose own socialization is known to breed radical political attitudes (Don-Yehiya 1998; Ichilov 2005). But how will they change? The “religion-friendly” hypothesis predicts that accommodating religious demands ought to prompt religious conservatives to appreciate democracy and moderate their views. The “greedy” socialization hypothesis predicts no moderation. On the contrary, “greedy” frameworks may reinforce their control over the attitudes of members to counter the impact of non-religious experiences. Turning to Israel and its growing religious sector, I ask how the two hypotheses of “greedy” socialization and “religion friendly” democratization predict changes in political attitudes.

Socialization in the Military and in Academia versus Religious Socialization

Religion shapes political attitudes in specific contexts: shifting circumstances may diminish its role, or even change the valence of its influence

(Brathwaite and Bramsen 2011; Burge and Djupe 2014; Djupe and Gilbert 2009; Driessen 2014; Fox 2012; Kopelowitz and Diamond 1998; Norris and Inglehart 2004). In Israel, service in the army and study in academia are the only two venues for non-religious socialization available for religious conservatives, while being known to influence political attitudes.

Military experience stimulates civilian actions such as volunteering, voting, and non-electoral political participation (Nesbit and Reingold 2011; Teigen 2006). In Israel, all these behaviors can also be performed within the conservative religious sector. However, military service is also known to increase racial tolerance and political knowledge, instilling veterans with the confidence to formulate a stance on foreign policy issues (Jennings and Marcus 1977). Moreover, veterans of combat units, according to some accounts, are more lenient toward the enemy, compared to soldiers in support units (Shalit 1988; Horowitz 1982).

The officer corps in Israel may represent an additional moderating factor in socialization. By virtue of their authority, commanders wield immense influence over the educational curriculum (Libel 2014). It is also known that top officers soften their political attitudes coming up through the ranks (Barak and Tsur 2012; Peri 2006). This situation, where moderates are in charge of the curriculum, may help explain shifts in the political attitudes of soldiers. Added up, the literature suggests that a tendency to moderate political attitudes may follow from service in the military.

On the other hand, recent evidence has weakened the Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) reputation as the ultimate agent of socialization, exposing its role in the reproduction of existing ethno-social divides (Cohen 2008; Levy 2007). Nevertheless, failure to increase cohesiveness among veterans is seen as deleterious to the IDF experience, except for accommodating the religious needs of the Orthodox (Levy 2007; 2012), which is considered a special case. Here, the army and rabbinic authorities design programs dedicated to maintaining an environment that preserves the unique value system of the religious (Levy 2012). Through its military and education budgets the government helped to set up over 150 military-educational institutions (*yeshivot hesder*, *mehinot*, and *midrashoth*) for religious men and women (men since 1965, women since 1995) that accommodate the modern Orthodox lifestyle. These programs have allowed conscripts to combine religious studies with military service in separate units supervised by religious authorities. In the 1960s, before such arrangements were introduced, religious men served in integrated units, and women opted out of the draft. Recent attempts to mobilize ultra-Orthodox publics have stimulated further demands for both,

complete gender segregation even in shared military facilities, and a strengthening of ultra-Orthodox authorities' role in decision-making processes. According to the “*friendly democratization*” hypothesis, military socialization designed to address the full spectrum of Orthodox needs will soften attitudes among those who experience it. In contrast, the “greedy” socialization hypothesis predicts that a “religion friendly” military experience will not prompt moderation of political attitudes. On the contrary, interaction between religious socialization and military experience may strengthen veterans' conservative political attitudes (Federer-Shtayer and Meffert 2014).

Universities represent the other venue of socialization available for religious conservatives. There, unlike the military context, special programs for the ultra-Orthodox are new, and their influence cannot be reflected in our results (Chabin 2013). University education implicates two processes potentially in competition with religious socialization. First, students open up their social networks to peers and faculty who may have very different ethnic, religious or ideological backgrounds. This network heterogeneity moderates political attitudes among individuals with certain (open) personality types, regardless of their religiosity (Ben Nun Bloom and Bagno-Moldavsky 2014). Relatedly, there is compelling evidence from Israel and elsewhere that university education directly increases support for democracy and moderates political attitudes (Almond and Verba 1963; Arian 1995; Campbell et al. 1960; Inglehart 1990; Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir 2015; Seligson and Caspi 1983). Thus, religious conservatives experiencing academic learning may soften their political outlook.⁵ Such an outcome would indicate that reality corresponds to neither hypothesis. To be in line with a “religion-friendly” democratization argument, the political attitudes of religious conservatives should not respond to experiences gained in university framework, which only recently adopted distinct “religion-friendly” practices. And for the “greedy” institutions' hypothesis to be supported, conservative graduates should strengthen their nondemocratic political attitudes.

HYPOTHESES

Based on the foregoing discussion, there is every reason to expect that religiosity will reduce support for democracy, forbearance toward *the other* and propensity to resolve conflict.

This expectation aligns with an abundance of theory and research linking religiosity to an erosion of democratic attitudes in Israel:

H1-direction: Religiosity will decrease support for democracy, toleration of Israeli Arabs, and inclination to resolve conflict.

The religious sector in Israel is burgeoning politically, demographically, and institutionally. As a result of its pervading institutional power, political preferences are increasingly structured along religious lines (Shelef 2010). In contrast to the religious divide, ethnic, ideological, and class socialization frameworks are not supported by “greedy” institutional practices. It is therefore reasonable to expect the influence of religion on political attitudes to overshadow the influence of other factors that underlie social divides.

H2-cleavage: Religiosity is a stronger predictor of the political attitudes than ethnicity, ideology or class.

But, how appropriate it is to expect religion-friendly socialization to moderate or radicalize political attitudes will depend on the results from two pairs of competing propositions.

H3_a: Military socialization will increase support for democracy, toleration of Israeli Arabs and inclination to resolve conflict.

H3_b: Military socialization will decrease support for democracy, toleration of Israeli Arabs and inclination to resolve conflict.

H4_a: University socialization will increase support for democracy, toleration of Israeli Arabs and inclination to resolve conflict.

H4_b: University socialization will decrease support for democracy, toleration of Israeli Arabs and inclination to resolve conflict.

If the Orthodox moderate their attitudes after religion-friendly military socialization (H3_a), while Orthodox college graduates do not demonstrate moderation (H4_b), then the argument supporting a “religion-friendly” socialization that promotes democratization is confirmed, and the “greedy socialization” argument is refuted (H3_a and H4_b). This conclusion also holds if the religiously conservative moderate their attitudes after *both* friendly and neutral socialization (H3_a and H4_a). However, the first

combination (H3_a and H4_b) draws stronger support for the “religion-friendly” socialization argument. From the second combination (H3_a and H4_a) we cannot argue a causal relationship, specifically that “religion-friendly” socialization *induces* moderation of attitudes while university socialization does not. Rather, the second combination refutes the “greedy” socialization hypothesis and *retains* the “religion-friendly” hypothesis. In the third combination, the religiously conservative radicalize their attitudes following “friendly socialization,” but moderate them in the wake of neutral socialization experiences (H3_b and H3_a). In this case, neither the “religion-friendly” nor “greedy” socialization argument holds. This result would mean that extensive accommodation of religious conservatives associates with the radicalization of political attitudes, while, at the same time, re-socialization in a neutral non-religious framework (university) encourages moderation of conservative attitudes. Finally, the “greedy socialization” argument is confirmed when religiously conservative publics radicalize their political attitudes following both “religion-friendly” and university socialization experiences (H3_b&H4_b).

DATA AND MEASURES

To test these hypotheses and address the magnitude of religiosity’s effect on support for democracy and political attitudes toward the conflict and Israeli Arabs, I use pooled data from four nationwide representative surveys of the adult Jewish Israeli population, conducted in 2006, 2007, 2009, and 2012 ($N=2681$). In each survey, a probability sample of Israeli Jews was surveyed in face-to-face interviews; ultra-Orthodox households were approached by ultra-Orthodox interviewers (men and women), making this data the most comprehensive source of information on the political preferences of religiously conservative publics. Online Appendix A has details on survey methodology.

Measures

All variables except for age were coded to vary between 0 and 1.⁶

Outcome Variables

Attitude toward Palestinian-Israeli conflict: To measure predisposition to resolve conflict, I use the scale introduced by Arian (1995, 114) with

amendments reflecting the development of discourse around the issue of territories for peace (Ben Meir and Bagno-Moldavsky 2013). Eleven items that survey attitudes toward the conflict are normalized, recorded as 0–1, and added-up, on a scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.80, CFA with one factor solution, 40% of variance explained) where “1” reflects support for political resolution vs. “0” — support for military resolution.

Forbearance toward Israeli Arabs is surveyed with an item: “Do you agree or disagree that the government should encourage voluntary Arab emigration from Israel.” Recent literature on Arab minority’s changing status in Israel (Jamal 2011; Rekhess 2014) suggests that both conceptually and empirically,⁷ the item is an independent analytical concept that signifies “reconstruction” (Rekhess 2014, 188) also called *Israelization* (Amara and Schnell 2004) of Arabs as an Israeli distinct minority population rather than a hostile enemy out-group (Arian 1995, 108–109; Rekhess 2014).

Support for democracy: This scale measures support for democracy relative to three competing value-alternatives — peace, the Jewish majority, and the greater Israel. These are core political values equally cherished by Jewish Israelis if trade-offs are not required (Arian 1995; Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983; Shamir and Shamir 1995). Respondents ranked four competing values in descending order of importance. On the resulting 24-point scale,⁸ the *ethno-nationalist* pole “0” represents the preferences of respondents who selected the greater Israel first, followed by the Jewish majority, peace, and democracy in that order. The opposite *democracy* pole, at “1,” represents inverse value preferences, where democracy is followed by peace, the Jewish majority and, lastly, the greater Israel. The 22 categories in between capture the decreasing importance of democracy as a value.

Controls

Religiosity was measured using the item: “Would you describe yourself as Haredi (ultra-Orthodox), religious (modern Orthodox), traditional religious, traditional non-religious or non-religious?” (five-point scale). This measure of religiosity is more appropriate in the Israeli (Jewish) context compared to questions measuring levels of observance such as “do you observe all tradition,” or “do you believe in God.” I use a question that differentiates between the modern Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox — publics that both indicate “full observance” of rituals and unequivocal

belief but differ in their rates of enrolment in the IDF and higher education (Cohen 1999; Wald and Martinez 2001).

Ideology: a seven-point scale of political preferences based on self-reported voting in the last elections; Ethnic origin: (four-point scale) “Asian-African origin,” “Eastern European origin,” “Western origin,” “Israeli born”; Age: continuous 18–94; male/female: 1-male; Education: 1-academic degree; Army service: 1-veteran; Expenses: five-point scale of average family household expenses. Class: three-point scale constructed from data on average family household expenses. All measures except for age are normalized as 0–1.

RESULTS

Political Attitudes in Israel

The three attitudes — support for democracy, forbearance toward Arabs, and predisposition to conflict resolution — have somewhat declined compared to their 1989–1993 levels (Arian 1995). The secular public remains inclined to conflict resolution more than any other group of Israeli Jews (Table 1). Religious differences aside, about 21% of the sample score in the lowest quadrant of the scale (no concessions and negative attitude toward the Palestinians and their state); a further 87% of the sample score under 0.75, and 13% are situated in the upper quadrant (0.75–1, support for political resolution and concessions), yielding a sample mean of 0.45.

The Jewish public is intolerant toward Israeli Arabs. It believes that the government should induce voluntary emigration of Arabs from Israel, with only 12% of the public strongly opposing this idea (vs. 32% who strongly support it). Relatedly, democracy is the most important value for 14% of the sample (the upper quadrant 0.75–1), while 9% cherish the value of greater Israel — “*Erez Yisrael ha shlema*” (the lower quadrant 0–0.25). Roughly 23% of Israelis privilege ethno-nationalist values in either combination of Jewish majority and greater Israel (vs. 21% who prefer a combination of peace and democracy).

Religiosity vs. Ideology Ethnicity and Class

Religiosity decreases predisposition to political resolution of the conflict. The ultra — Orthodox are the least predisposed to political

Table 1. A comparison of attitudes toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Israeli Arabs and support for democracy by religiosity, ethnic origin, class and ideology (pooled sample)

	Support for resolution of the Conflict				Opposition to state induced emigration of Arabs from Israel				Support for Democracy			
	Mean	SD	N	Diff.#	Mean	SD	N	Diff.#	Mean	SD	N	Diff.#
Ideology												
Left	0.49	0.26	102	n.s.	0.38	0.32	98	n.s.	0.61	0.32	100	n.s.
Center	0.50	0.23	660	n.s.	0.38	0.33	648	n.s.	0.59	0.31	657	n.s.
Right	0.44	0.23	1229	**	0.36	0.30	1209	n.s.	0.52	0.32	1212	**
Class[†]												
Poor	0.41	0.24	702	n.s.	0.38	0.33	687	n.s.	0.52	0.32	685	n.s.
Middle	0.48	0.23	1593	n.s.	0.38	0.34	1568	n.s.	0.57	0.32	1583	n.s.
Upper	0.53	0.24	222	**	0.40	0.34	218	n.s.	0.60	0.31	222	**
Origin												
Eastern Europe	0.45	0.20	433	n.s.	0.35	0.33	424	n.s.	0.53	0.30	427	n.s.
West	0.46	0.21	431	n.s.	0.39	0.32	422	n.s.	0.58	0.31	426	n.s.
Asia-Africa	0.46	0.21	238	n.s.	0.36	0.29	233	n.s.	0.58	0.31	236	n.s.
Born in Israel	0.46	0.25	1575	n.s.	0.39	0.36	1550	n.s.	0.56	0.32	1558	n.s.
Religiosity												
Ultra-Orthodox	(1) 0.25	0.19	251	***	0.28	0.36	248	n.s. ⁽²⁾ *** ^(3,4,5)	0.33	0.28	243	***
Modern-Orthodox	(2) 0.32	0.20	332	***	0.30	0.33	326	n.s. ⁽¹⁾ *** ^(3,4,5)	0.37	0.31	329	***
Traditional Religious	(3) 0.43	0.19	333	***	0.38	0.34	328	n.s. ^(4,5) *** ^(1,2)	0.48	0.31	330	***
Traditional Nonreligious	(4) 0.47	0.21	583	***	0.38	0.34	568	n.s. ^(3,5) *** ^(1,2)	0.55	0.29	581	***
Secular	(5) 0.55	0.22	1161	***	0.42	0.32	1142	n.s. ^(3,4) *** ^(1,2)	0.68	0.28	1148	***

One-way ANOVA test for the group means (harmonious means). Means are significantly different across the groups at ** $p < 0.001$ and *** $p < 0.0001$, two tailed. If insignificant the group means is indicated as n.s. [†]Class and Ideology variables are recoded to have three categories each for descriptive presentation in table 1, in multivariate analysis continuous scales are used. Relative group sizes reflect the demographic composition of the Israeli society in terms of ethnic origin, income and religious sectors among the Jews, see Central Bureau of Statistics Source: http://www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnaton/shnatone_new.htm?CYear=2010&Vol=61&CSubject=0.2

resolution ($\bar{x} = 0.25$ $sd = 0.19$ vs. $\bar{x} = 0.55$ $sd = 0.22$ among non-religious). The same is true of support for democracy, ultra- and modern Orthodox are the least inclined to value democracy over ethno-nationalist values ($\bar{x}_{\text{ultra-Orthodox}} = 0.33$ $sd = 0.28$; $\bar{x}_{\text{modern Orthodox}} = 0.37$ $sd = 0.31$ vs $\bar{x}_{\text{non-Religious}} = 0.68$ $sd = 0.28$). The difference of means is significant across all groups at the $p < 0.000$ level.

Regarding the idea of state-induced emigration of Israeli Arabs, roughly one third of the sample in the 2000s opposes this policy. This is 9% points less than the 41% reported by Arian in 1993 (1995, 109, 277). Here as well, the two Orthodox groups appear to be significantly less tolerant than the rest of the citizenry ($\bar{x}_{\text{ultra-Orthodox}} = 0.28$ $sd = 0.36$; $\bar{x}_{\text{Modern Orthodox}} = 0.30$ $sd = 0.33$ vs. $\bar{x}_{\text{Traditional religious \& traditional nonreligious}} = 0.38$ $sd = 0.34$; $\bar{x}_{\text{non-Religious}} = 0.42$ $sd = 0.32$).

Level of forbearance toward Israeli Arabs does not differ statistically across classes, ideological camps or ethnic backgrounds. These latter also do not influence attitudes toward democracy, or the conflict. This departs from findings reported by Arian in *Security Threatened*. Two decades ago, attitudes toward the conflict and democracy varied significantly among European, Israeli and Asian-born Jews (Arian 1993, 119). Present results also indicate that affluence matters for democracy and propensity to resolve conflict, specifically, the upper class supports democracy ($\bar{x} = 0.60$ $sd = 0.31$) and conflict resolution ($\bar{x} = 0.53$ $sd = 0.24$, $p < 0.001$) more, as compared to the poor and middle classes.

The Relative Effect of Religiosity vs. Class, Ideology and Ethnicity on Political Attitudes

Model I exposes the direction of influence and relative power of four cleavages over political attitudes (H_1 and H_2). The three dependents are regressed on religiosity, ethnicity, ideology and class variables, and on a set of controls. To model the “religion-friendly socialization” hypothesis and the “greedy” socialization hypothesis, first, Model II tests the interaction between religiosity (groups) and service in the IDF. To complete the investigation, Model IV estimates the interaction of academic education (university degree) with religiosity. Since only men are encouraged to serve among the ultra-Orthodox, while religious women choose “national service” that does not necessarily includes socialization in the military, Model III measures the interactive effect of religion and service for men. Results for the twelve models (three

measures of political attitudes X four models for each) are presented in Table 2.

First, Model I shows that religiosity significantly reduces support for democracy, forbearance toward Arabs and predisposition to conflict resolution, confirming H_1 . *Ceteris paribus*, moving from secularism to ultra-Orthodoxy decreases support for democracy by about a tenth of its range (11%). The other two attitudes are decreased by about one-twelfth and one-twentieth of their range (8% — predisposition to resolve the conflict and 5% — forbearance toward Arabs). For the two Orthodox groups, the impact of religiosity is very powerful. It decreases support for democracy by about half of the range among the ultra-Orthodox (45%) and about a third of the range (35%) for modern-Orthodox. This reinforces hypotheses about the “greedy” nature of religious socialization.

Relatedly, the power of religiosity (H_2) to shape attitudes is measured using a comparison of standardized beta coefficients, and via a series of step-wise regressions⁹ (Online Appendix C). Based on Model I, religion had the highest standardized beta coefficient across the three dependent variables ($\beta_{\text{conflict}} = -0.433$; $\beta_{\text{Arabs_emigration}} = -0.196$; $\beta_{\text{support_for_democracy}} = -0.413$) when compared to economic class ($\beta_{\text{conflict}} = 0.364$; $\beta_{\text{Arabs_emigration}} = \text{n.s.}$; $\beta_{\text{support_for_democracy}} = \text{n.s.}$), ethnic origin ($\beta_{\text{conflict East-European}} = -0.208$; $\beta_{\text{Arabs_emigration}} = \text{n.s.}$; $\beta_{\text{support_for_democracy East-European}} = -0.162$.) and ideology ($\beta_{\text{conflict}} = \text{n.s.}$; $\beta_{\text{Arabs_emigration}} = \text{n.s.}$; $\beta_{\text{support_for_democracy}} = \text{n.s.}$). Overall, these results are consistent with prior research in the West and Middle East that points to the situational nature of political attitudes and relates them to the most salient rift in a society (Ciftci 2013; Federer-Shtayer and Meffert 2014; Martin 1978). As mentioned earlier, studies on political attitudes in Israel acknowledge the role of religion in politics, but emphasize the effects of ethnic origin and ideology (Arian 1995; Peffley, Hutchison, and Shamir 2015; Smootha 1993). The results presented here indicate that in the 2000s, political attitudes were less sensitive to ethnic, ideological, and class differences than to variation across religious groups.

Moving to the examination of the two alternative propositions of “religion-friendly” socialization and “greedy” socialization ($H_{3\text{a-b}}$ - $H_{4\text{a-b}}$), I analyze Models II, III, and IV. First, the interaction terms reveal a significant interaction between the most religious group (ultra-Orthodox) and service in the army, for the three political attitudes (Figure 1 plots the marginal effect of army service (graphs a, b, c) and university education (graphs d, e, f) on religiosity for all three dependent variables).¹⁰ Results plotted on Figures 1a and 1b support the “greedy” socialization

Table 2. Attitudes toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Israeli Arabs and support for democracy

	Support for resolution of the Conflict				Opposition to state induced emigration of Arabs from Israel				Support for Democracy			
	I _a	II _a	III _a	IV _a	I _b	II _b	III _b	IV _b	I _c	II _c	III _c	IV _c
Level of Religiosity	-0.075*** (0.004)	-	-	-	-0.049*** (0.006)	-	-	-	-0.109*** (0.004)	-	-	-
Ideology	-0.044 (0.029)	-0.053 (0.038)	-0.102* (0.040)	-0.058* (0.028)	-0.040 (0.048)	-0.042 (0.048)	-0.082 (0.065)	-0.042 (0.046)	-0.057 (0.041)	-0.054 (0.042)	-0.058 (0.054)	-0.051 (0.040)
Origin												
Eastern Europe	-0.042* (0.018)	-0.033* (0.017)	-0.037 (0.026)	-0.036 (0.017)	-0.012 (0.030)	-0.003 (0.031)	-0.008 (0.042)	-0.002 (0.029)	-0.046 (0.026)	-0.046 (0.026)	-0.116** (0.035)	-0.048* (0.025)
West	-0.019 (0.022)	-0.019 (0.020)	-0.053 (0.038)	-0.018 (0.020)	-0.037 (0.036)	-0.032 (0.036)	-0.014 (0.050)	-0.027 (0.034)	-0.032 (0.031)	-0.032 (0.031)	-0.031 (0.042)	0.019 (0.030)
Born in Israel	-0.051 (0.036)	-0.043 (0.034)	-0.061 (0.053)	-0.051 (0.034)	-0.009 (0.059)	-0.006 (0.059)	-0.120 (0.085)	-0.002 (0.056)	-0.019 (0.051)	-0.023 (0.051)	-0.028 (0.071)	0.036 (0.049)
<i>Asia-Africa (ref)</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Army	0.018 (0.012)	0.073*** (0.018)	0.061* (0.034)	0.019 (0.012)	-0.025 (0.021)	-0.034 (0.032)	-0.080 (0.055)	-0.027 (0.020)	0.012 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.018)	0.053 (0.047)	-0.003 (0.017)
Religiosity												
Ultra-Orthodox	-	-0.215*** (0.026)	-0.178*** (0.047)	-0.241*** (0.022)	-	-0.271*** (0.044)	-0.269*** (0.076)	-0.206*** (0.037)	-	-0.345*** (0.039)	-0.226*** (0.065)	-0.338*** (0.033)
Modern-Orthodox	-	-0.194*** (0.028)	-0.215** (0.066)	-0.207*** (0.021)	-	-0.164*** (0.049)	-0.231** (0.106)	-0.141*** (0.034)	-	-0.300*** (0.043)	-0.242** (0.090)	-0.330*** (0.030)
Traditional Religious	-	-0.043 (0.028)	-0.143* (0.081)	-0.107*** (0.018)	-	-0.031 (0.048)	-0.058 (0.130)	-0.001 (0.030)	-	-0.146** (0.042)	-0.315** (0.110)	-0.175*** (0.026)
Traditional Nonreligious	-	-0.017 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.058)	-0.065*** (0.015)	-	-0.010 (0.043)	-0.007 (0.093)	-0.036 (0.025)	-	-0.074 (0.037)	-0.028 (0.078)	-0.118*** (0.022)
<i>Secular (ref)</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Religiosity*Army:												
Ultra-Orthodox*Army	-	-0.096* (0.040)	-0.135* (0.062)	-	-	0.167* (0.068)	0.201* (0.099)	-	-	-0.122* (0.060)	-0.241** (0.084)	-
Modern-Orthodox*Army	-	-0.060* (0.034)	-0.011 (0.071)	-	-	0.025 (0.060)	0.150 (0.113)	-	-	-0.071 (0.052)	-0.062 (0.095)	-
Traditional-Rel0.*Army	-	-0.124*** (0.033)	-0.024 (0.085)	-	-	-0.019 (0.058)	-0.039 (0.136)	-	-	-0.099* (0.048)	-0.078 (0.115)	-
Traditional Nonreligious* Army	-	-0.079** (0.029)	-0.083 (0.061)	-	-	-0.062 (0.050)	-0.033 (0.098)	-	-	-0.096* (0.041)	-0.169* (0.083)	-

Continued

Table 2. Continued

	Support for resolution of the Conflict				Opposition to state induced emigration of Arabs from Israel				Support for Democracy			
	I _a	II _a	III _a	IV _a	I _b	II _b	III _b	IV _b	I _c	II _c	III _c	IV _c
<i>Secular*Army (ref)</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Education (University)	0.051*** (0.011)	0.051*** (0.010)	0.051** (0.016)	0.083*** (0.015)	0.016 (0.019)	0.016 (0.019)	0.041 (0.026)	0.032 (0.025)	0.053** (0.016)	0.049** (0.016)	0.069** (0.022)	0.081*** (0.021)
Religiosity*University:												
Ultra-Orthodox*University	-	-	-	-0.092* (0.039)	-	-	-	-0.064 (0.064)	-	-	-	-0.104* (0.056)
Modern-Orthodox*University	-	-	-	-0.081* (0.033)	-	-	-	0.005 (0.054)	-	-	-	0.015 (0.047)
Traditional Religious*University	-	-	-	-0.082* (0.037)	-	-	-	-0.149* (0.060)	-	-	-	-0.086 (0.053)
Traditional Nonreligious*University	-	-	-	-0.025 (0.028)	-	-	-	-0.037 (0.046)	-	-	-	-0.064 (0.041)
<i>Secular*University(ref)</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Household Expenses	0.075*** (0.016)	0.071*** (0.016)	0.097*** (0.025)	0.069*** (0.016)	-0.018 (0.028)	-0.019 (0.028)	-0.040 (0.048)	-0.018 (0.026)	0.035 (0.024)	0.041 (0.024)	0.023 (0.033)	0.033 (0.023)
Age	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001*** (0.000)	-0.002*** (0.000)	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.001* (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.001 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)
Male	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.011)	-	-0.002 (0.010)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.018)	-	-0.015 (0.017)	0.011 (0.016)	0.011 (0.016)	-	0.011 (0.015)
Immigrant	-0.064* (0.021)	-0.053 (0.033)	-0.051 (0.050)	-0.064* (0.033)	-0.014 (0.057)	-0.020 (0.058)	0.113 (0.080)	-0.007 (0.055)	-0.002 (0.050)	-0.009 (0.050)	0.022 (0.068)	0.018 (0.048)
Year												
2007	-0.058*** (0.013)	-0.055*** (0.013)	-0.042* (0.019)	-0.059*** (0.013)	-0.054* (0.022)	-0.050* (0.021)	-0.065* (0.030)	-0.053* (0.021)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.024 (0.026)	-0.014 (0.019)
2009	-0.058*** (0.015)	-0.059*** (0.014)	0.055** (0.021)	-0.059*** (0.014)	-0.092*** (0.023)	-0.087*** (0.023)	-0.075* (0.034)	-0.049* (0.023)	-0.049* (0.021)	-0.053* (0.021)	-0.050 (0.028)	-0.047* (0.020)
2012	-0.037** (0.014)	-0.037** (0.014)	-0.023 (0.020)	-0.039** (0.013)	-0.069** (0.023)	-0.057* (0.022)	-0.063* (0.033)	-0.059** (0.023)	-0.011 (0.020)	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.040 (0.027)	-0.002 (0.019)
2006 (ref)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Constant	0.561*** (0.047)	0.517*** (0.046)	0.576*** (0.075)	0.560*** (0.045)	0.634*** (0.077)	0.632*** (0.076)	0.531*** (0.120)	0.611*** (0.073)	0.690*** (0.066)	0.631*** (0.069)	0.671*** (0.101)	0.625*** (0.064)
N	1691	1684	827	1684	1656	1652	813	1652	1674	1667	819	1667
R ²	24.35	20.29	25.28	26.01	5.38	5.68	5.44	5.61	18.94	19.42	20.36	19.33

Table entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients, robust standard errors in brackets. ***two-tail 99.5% confidence level, **two-tail 99%, *two-tail 95%.

argument. Thus, army service decreases support for democracy among the modern and ultra-Orthodox (Figure 1a; note that military service associates with stronger support for democracy among the non-religious ($\beta = 0.138$, $p = 0.003$)). The same pattern of relationships is recorded for attitudes toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Figure 1b). Here again, the most religious veterans are not inclined to support political resolution (for the ultra-Orthodox, the interaction is significant and negative $\beta = -0.135$, $p = 0.029$), while the opposite is true for the non-religious ($\beta = 0.035$, $p = 0.005$). Moreover, the effect is stronger for ultra-Orthodox men than for the general ultra-Orthodox population (the coefficient for the ultra-Orthodox is higher in Model III compared to Model II).

The “greedy” socialization argument does not hold, however, when it comes to opposition vis-à-vis state-induced Arab emigration. Among ultra-Orthodox veterans, about 26% oppose the idea (vs. about 18% of ultra-Orthodox who did not serve in the Army) — this finding contradicts the “greedy” socialization hypothesis, and supports the “religion-friendly” argument.

To further test the competing “greedy” and “religion friendly” propositions, I turn to Figure 1 (graphs c, d, e), which depicts the interactive effects of academic education and religiosity on the three attitudes for different levels of religiosity. In line with the general theory, education has a positive and significant impact on attitude toward the conflict and support for democracy among non-religious publics. Among the most religiously conservative (ultra-Orthodox), however, the effects of academic education are reversed, both for attitude toward the conflict (Figure 1e) and support for democracy (Figure 1d). The effect is also negative when it comes to forbearance toward Israeli Arabs, although it is statistically insignificant (Figure 1f). Overall, the results are more consistent with predictions made on the basis of the “greedy” socialization theory, rather than the argument of “religion-friendly” democratization.

The models also included several control variables, whose results reveal the stable impact of some indicators, and the contextual nature of others. Support for democracy and political conflict resolution, as well as forbearance toward Arabs declined over the 2006–2012 period. Being an immigrant reduces support for political resolution of the conflict, but does not affect the other two political attitudes. Age has a significant, but inconsistent, effect on both propensity to resolve the conflict and support for democracy, however, its effect on forbearance toward Israeli Arabs, is significant and negative (younger respondents are more hawkish). Other demographic controls have overall insignificant or sporadic effects on political attitudes.




FIGURE 1. (Color online) Interactive effects of army serve (a, b, c) and university education (d, e, f) with religious groups (0-non-religious, 1-nonreligious traditional, 2-traditional religious, 3-modern Orthodox, 4-ultra-Orthodox) on three political attitudes (democracy, conflict, forbearance of Israeli Arabs).

Results obtained for hypotheses H₁-H₄ are in line with the findings of previous cross-national studies in the Middle East (Ciftci 2013; Lee 2010) that record an increasing impact of religion and religion-induced values on political attitudes. At the same time, the results do not consistently support the argument that accommodation of demands by religious conservatives in non-religious institutions increases their appreciation for democracy and democratic attitudes.

DISCUSSION

The role of religion in Israeli politics may have been uncertain 50 years ago, but recent evidence, including this analysis, leads us to envisage the 21st century in Israel as “a century of religion” (Huntington 2004; Parsons 1975; Shils 1956). This study examines how religion affects political attitudes among the most religiously conservative publics when they experience non-religious socialization. It estimates the impact of religious socialization relative to that of ethnicity, ideology and class, while taking into account “religion-friendly” and “greedy” modes of integration. These two propositions predict that political attitudes will change in opposite directions following the “religion friendly” integration of religious conservatives in non-religious institutions. Studying the effect of individual and institutional contexts on political attitudes offers a broader perspective on the role of religion in politics.

The findings echo previous research characterizing religion as a factor that depreciates democratic norms (Ben Rafael and Sharot 1991; Wald and Shye 1994; 1995). They also strengthen arguments that affirm the contextual nature of religion’s impact on political attitudes (McAdams and Lance 2013; Wald and Martinez 2001). Complementing such investigations, the present work demonstrates that, in an Israeli context, the influence of religiosity overrides the effects of class, ethnic, and ideological divides. The analysis speaks to the robustness of religiosity’s effect and its overall resilience in the face of competing socialization.

This study furthermore demonstrates that religious conservatives strengthen their non-democratic attitudes when alternative socialization is supplied by institutions willing to accommodate demands from religious groups (Cohen and Susser 2014). This conclusion contradicts the “religion friendly” argument that accommodation of religious demands encourages conservatives to adopt democratic attitudes, such as the inclination to resolve conflict or support for democracy.

However, the “greedy” argument needs further clarification with regard to forbearance toward Israeli Arabs. First, the ultra-Orthodox, who start with very low levels of forbearance toward Israeli Arabs, moderate their position after military service. In contrast, the non-religious are more intolerant after serving in the IDF. Two lines of research have been explored that provide context and suggest an explanation. Levy (2007; 2012) reports that the ideological messages the IDF offers all its conscripts are increasingly ethno-nationalist. This may explain the tendency among non-religious veterans to level off their attitudes. At the same time, qualitative research by Stadler et al. (2008) on ultra-Orthodox veterans showed that the IDF experience strengthens ethno-nationalist values among this very conservative, but initially ideologically “non-integrated” public. The radically simplified interpretation of the ethno-nationalist stance on Israeli Arabs suggests that the extended Jewish state can accommodate a subordinate Arab minority. This might explain why Orthodox veterans become less supportive of the idea of state-induced Arab emigration from Israel, while turning increasingly hostile to the idea of conflict resolution or equal rights (democracy).

Overall, previous research established a link between context and how religion influences political attitudes (Djupe and Gilbert 2009; Lee 2010); this study has taken such scholarship one step further, suggesting how the effect of religiosity withstands rival influences and strengthens its position when religious demands prevail over weaker competing institutions. The irony of this greedy mechanism is that the individuals who least value democracy appear to become even less supportive after exposure to university and military experiences designed to facilitate their “integration”.

Recent public opinion polls suggest that, in 2001, about 60% of Israelis preferred democracy over a Halakhic (i.e., rule by religious law) state (Israel National Elections Study Survey 2001); in 2009, slightly over 48% preferred democracy (Israel National Elections Study Survey 2009), while in 2013 this number dropped to 43% (The Israel Democracy Institute 2013). Does this trend mean that Israel is becoming a theocratic democracy, described by Ben Yehuda (2010, 171) as: “wonderfully complex, innovative, and interesting”? Interesting as it may be, this article suggests that religiosity, when institutionally reinforced, is a powerful shaper of political views that may shrink democratic commitment.

What do the findings say about the value of religiosity for predicting political attitudes? Religiosity *per se*, measured as behavior or belief, may remain a next-in-line predictor of political attitudes, as in the

studies examining the resurrection of the Christian Right in the United States, or the Islamic values-debate in the Arab Middle East. However, unequal competition between “friendly” non-religious and “greedy” religious frameworks means that religion’s impact on political attitudes might well become unparalleled in democracies that accept religion’s domineering role in competing institutional socialization processes.

In Israeli settings, the “greedy” socialization argument accounts for the strengthening of conservative views amongst the Orthodox, but it requires further empirical refinement. First, evidence from recent studies is conflicting, in part, because religiosity is often measured interchangeably as belief, behavior or belonging. In the future, all three modes of religiosity should be incorporated in the “greedy” argument and compared, because they have distinct political expressions. Second, future comparative work must focus on countries that represent alternatives of scale and scope to Israel and its Orthodox Judaism. The analysis of alternatives can serve to disprove a potential interfering influence of the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict, and the special place that Judaism occupies in Israel, a country established in the shadow of human tragedy and a near extinction of the ultra-Orthodox population in Europe during WWII. The most obvious future avenue for research to explore will be the effects of institutionalized religiosity on political attitudes in democracies built around Islam – another growing and loosely structured religion.

Supplementary materials and methods

To view supplementary material for this article, please visit <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755048315000516>.

NOTES

1. For example, Japan, Northern Ireland, Italy and Spain are traditional cultures that are similar to Israel in terms of strength of democratic institutions and practices. But religiosity and religious orthodoxy in these countries is in decline. In democracies where religiosity is on the rise (e.g., Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan) democratic institutions are less developed. Therefore, Israel is uniquely positioned to observe what effects friendly non-religious socialization may have on the political views of religious fundamentalists.

2. The paper focuses on Jews because Arabs integrate the regular frameworks in universities. Arabs, Druze and Bedouins who serve in the military, unlike Orthodox Jews, do not have special programs that combine religious studies with service.

3. Jews whose ancestors originate from the Middle East and Africa are often called Mizrahi and, more rarely Sephardic Jews. The latter refers to differences in liturgical texts that exist between Sephardic and Ashkenazi communities, whereas the former designates geographic origin.

4. The greedy institution concept has already been applied to research on the IDF (Cohen 1999), gender expectations (Currie, Harris, and Thiele 2000; Gerstel and Gallagher 2001) marriage and the

family (Gerstel and Sarkisian 2006); work and occupations (Brayfield 1995; Ezzy 2001); immigrant groups (Kivisto 1984); sectarian movements (Rochford 1995; Shaffir and Rockaway 1987); as well as hobbies and sports (Adler and Adler 1988; Puddephatt 2008).

5. Recent sparse qualitative evidence on ultra-Orthodox college graduates in Israel casts doubts in the ability of higher education to moderate their political views. Specifically, this literature reports that the ultra-Orthodox college graduates show no evidence of attitude change (Geiger and Alt 2014).

6. Rescaling variables to vary 0–1 is a standardization technique that allows a comparison in the effect size of independent variables of different units. It is computed using the formula new value = (value - min)/(max - min), which allows variables to have differing means and standard deviations but equal ranges. Online Appendix B has details on measures and descriptive statistics.

7. Construct validity tests for discriminant and convergence validity with security policy scale (Arian 1995) and political tolerance toward least-liked groups and abstract political tolerance scales suggest that the item weakly relates to the security policy scale ($r = 0.19$, $p = 0.000$), and possesses stronger relationship with an abstract tolerance scale $r = 0.29$, $p = 0.000$ and with the scale of political tolerance toward a pre-defined least liked group (Arabs) $r = 0.45$, $p = 0.000$. For a detailed description of the validity measures, see Online Appendix B.

8. The 12-point scale based on a combination of the first two value preferences was introduced by Asher Arian (1995, 219). I computed a 24-point scale with permutations ($n!/((n-r)!)^r$) that involved all four rank-ordered value preferences ($4! = 24$ combinations of values). The 24-point scale based on four value preferences related to the 12-point scale based on Arian (1995), the correlation between the scales $r = 0.86$ ($p = 0.000$).

9. The lowest contribution of religiosity is in the area of 3% of the attitude toward Arab emigration variance, the highest contribution is 20% of variance, in the attitude toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The numbers for the support for democracy are quite similar (contribution in the area of 18% of variance in the dependent). When religiosity comes after all the other variables, it adds from 3 to 16% to the “explanation” of dependent variables (see Appendix D for details of the stepwise procedure).

10. Online Appendix D Graphs 1–6 present these interaction plots for each group with 99% confidence intervals.

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