

Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings

Wendy Pearlman

In any political setting, a few people will defy political authority. The main challenge for theories of rebellion is to explain when and why others join en masse. Scholarship on social movements typically develops answers to this puzzle on the basis of either of two microfoundations. Explanations that conceptualize individuals as utility-maximizers contend that they protest as a means to other ends. Explanations that see individuals as driven by values and beliefs suggest that people protest for the inherent benefit of voicing dissent. Both perspectives generate compelling explanations. Yet how do purposeful individuals act when utilitarian calculations and cherished values recommend contrary courses of action? Why might an actor prioritize one or the other at different points in time? Taking on these questions, I argue for an approach to microfoundations that focuses on emotions. Emotions such as fear, sadness, and shame promote pessimistic assessments, risk aversion, and a low sense of control. Such dispiriting emotions encourage individuals to prioritize security and resign to political circumstances, even when they contradict values of dignity. By contrast, anger, joy, and pride promote optimistic assessments, risk acceptance, and feelings of personal efficacy. Such emboldening emotions encourage prioritization of dignity and increase willingness to engage in resistance, even when it jeopardizes security. When instrumentality and values offer different answers to the question of whether to resign or rebel, therefore, emotions can shift individuals toward one or the other. I ground this argument in findings from the neurosciences and illustrate it with evidence from the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt and the absence of an uprising in Algeria.

All books about all revolutions begin with a chapter that describes the decay of tottering authority or the misery and sufferings of the people. They should begin with a psychological chapter, one that shows how a harassed, terrified man suddenly breaks his terror, stops being afraid. This unusual process, sometimes accomplished in an instant like a shock or a lustration, demands illuminating. Man gets rid of fear and feels free. Without that there would be no revolution.

—Ryszard Kapuściński, *Shah of Shahs*, 1985

What explains the sudden wave of popular protest that swept across the Middle East and North Africa in 2011? Much attention in recent scholarship on social movements has focused on the microfoundations of resistance, usually following one of two approaches. Explanations that conceptualize individuals as utility-maximizers contend that people protest as an

instrumental means to other ends. They elaborate the structural and strategic conditions under which people participate because they expect it to yield a favorable ratio of costs to benefits. Alternatively, explanations that see individuals as driven by values suggest that people protest in the name of deeply held beliefs, if not the inherent benefit of voicing dissent. They trace the social processes that elevate such values, often regardless of protest's prospects for success.

Both strategic thinking and value commitments play powerful roles in the politics of social change. Yet it is unclear how individuals deliberate between the two when each recommends a competing course of action. This question comes to the fore in the recent Arab uprisings. For

Wendy Pearlman is Assistant Professor of Political Science and the Crown Junior Chair in Middle East Studies at Northwestern University (pearlman@northwestern.edu). She is the author of two books, *Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement* (Cambridge University Press, 2011) and *Occupied Voices: Stories of Everyday Life from the Second Intifada* (Nation Books, 2003). She is grateful for helpful suggestions and feedback from Salma al-Shami, Mert Arslanalp, Nathan Brown, Rami Gabriel, Jordan Gans-Morse, Jeff Goodwin, Raja Halwani, Amaney Jamal, Yanna Krupnikov, Ellen Lust, Marc Lynch, Quinn Mecham, Lexi Neame, Stephen Nelson, Jason Seawright, Jillian Schwedler, Mark Tessler,

Scott Wiener, Jessica Winegar, Yael Zeira, participants in the Northeast Middle East Politics Workshop, and the IMES Ph.D. Student Roundtable at George Washington University. She also thanks Jeffrey Isaac and the anonymous reviewers from *Perspectives on Politics* for valuable comments. All errors are her own.

doi:10.1017/S1537592713001072

© American Political Science Association 2013

June 2013 | Vol. 11/No. 2 387

decades under authoritarian regimes, many citizens in the Arab world did not engage in public dissent for fear of danger and doubt about its ability to produce change. In 2011, however, many defied that very calculus. Large numbers protested even as autocrats' grip remained formidable, repression menacing, and the outcomes of conflict highly uncertain. Their participation was not due to a profound shift in values. Most had long experienced unaccountable rule as an affront to basic dignity. When they demonstrated, it was in the name of principles that they long cherished.

If not new values or low costs, what pushed many people from relative resignation to resistance? A striking number of Arab citizens explain this puzzle with the expression *inkasar hajez al-khawf*—"The barrier of fear has broken." Their self-understandings call for an approach to microfoundations that, distinct from utility maximization or values, focuses on emotions. Emotions are noninstrumental, subjective, evaluative experiences that are evoked by external or mental events and carry both physiological changes and action tendencies.¹ Emotions of fear, sadness, and shame encourage individuals to avoid risk, prioritize security, and pessimistically submit to circumstances that they find threatening. Emotions of anger, joy, and pride increase risk acceptance, prioritization of dignity, and an optimistic readiness to engage in resistance. Attention to the effect of such emotions on appraisal and behavior supports a larger argument: dispiriting emotions render rebellion improbable, even at the cost of accepting indignities. Emboldening emotions, by contrast, can drive defiance even when strategic or structural variables cast doubt on the utility of resistance.

In what follows I explore these dynamics in the Arab uprisings. Other analyses of these events have focused on such factors as contagion, socio-economic trends, regime institutions, and communication technologies. My purpose is not to question the importance of these factors. Like Ashutosh Varshney writing in this journal ten years ago, my goal is to help pluralize understandings of the microfoundations of contentious politics.² Varshney identified instrumental and value rationality as alternative microfoundations. Highlighting a dimension that has received insufficient attention, I posit emotions-infused decision-making as a third. Other approaches explain much of political action, however they discount the importance of affective influences, and especially the roles of fear in generating quiescence and indignation in generating rebellion.

A microfoundations approach to explaining macropolitical events like rebellion is valuable because, as Daniel Little argues, "the mechanisms through which social causation is mediated turn on the structured circumstances of choice of intentional agents and nothing else."³ Following Little, I evaluate microfoundations by examining the "local circumstances" that structured individual choices in the Arab uprisings, as well as the aggregative processes

generating mass rebellion. I seek this data in hundreds of narrative accounts in Arabic, English, and French, including press reports, personal testimonials, photographs, videos, and audio recordings. Narratives are an appropriate source because they showcase agency and the temporal relations between events.⁴ I treat each piece of narrative data as a causal-process observation: a piece of data that provides insight into context or mechanisms and is particularly useful for uncovering critical turning points or moments of decision-making.⁵ Employed with careful tracing of processes over time⁶ and "thick," detailed knowledge of cases,⁷ this kind of analysis offers inferential leverage distinct from quantitative analysis of data sets.⁸ I analyze narrative data with an ethnographic sensibility, in the sense of seeking to glean the meaning of behavior to the actors involved.⁹ This approach is pertinent for the study of contentious politics because there is often a disconnect between how members and close observers of social movements explain their participation and the models that social science puts forth. I seek to uncover the understandings that develop when we close that gap.

I begin by reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches. I then present my alternative focus on emotions, drawing upon different subfields in political science as well as research in neuropsychology. Turning to the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, I examine the dispiriting emotions that cemented authoritarian regimes and the emboldening emotions that helped mobilize revolt in 2010–2011. I further demonstrate the power of emboldening emotions by evaluating their absence in Algeria. In the conclusion, I argue that greater attention to emotions can help illuminate the underpinnings of both authoritarianism and rebellion, and more broadly contribute to a dialogue in political science about the microfoundations of political action.

Competing Microfoundations

A microfoundational approach to social explanation builds from an explicit stipulation of how individuals behave. Two distinct approaches to microfoundations dominate contemporary social movement theory. The first treats individuals as self-interested agents who optimize their allocation of resources by obtaining information, forming beliefs on that basis, and then choosing the most beneficial course of action.¹⁰ Individuals protest as a means to other ends, and are unlikely to participate if costs remain high. On these grounds, theorists track the factors that should generate protest by decreasing its costs and increasing its expected ability to bring about change. They give particular attention to factors such as leaders' strategic solutions to collective action problems, the development of dissident organizations and social networks, and shifts in the structure of political opportunities that indicate the increasing vulnerability of the status quo to protest.

Many of these factors were notably minimal in the Arab uprisings. Pre-existing organizations and leaders appeared to have played a role secondary to that of spontaneous grassroots mobilization. Regime institutions and incumbent strategies kept political opportunities closed; autocrats were not only adroit at curtailing opposition, but also poised to facilitate hereditary succession in presidential and monarchical systems alike.¹¹ Most fundamentally, strong coercive apparatuses warned that the costs of protest remained high.¹² Those who joined demonstrations in 2011 had every reason to expect violent repression. Yet they assumed those risks—many of them unlike ever before. Their participation highlights a paradox: popular rebellion, rather than resulting from a decline in the costs of dissent, can be the context in which individuals accept costs that they previously had not accepted.

Other arguments building on the microfoundations of instrumental rationality emphasizes the availability of information. Technological innovations such as the Internet and mobile phones altered the cost/benefit ratio of protest by reducing the time and resources needed to communicate updates and rally large numbers to participate.¹³ In addition, rational actors become increasingly likely to participate as they adapt to fresh information about the extent or success of protest. In this context, news of the shocking resignation of Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali caused people throughout the region to update their calculations about the probability that popular protest could overthrow a head of state. Kurt Weyland develops a microfoundational account of this dynamic, arguing that updating in this case was widespread, but ultimately ill founded.¹⁴ He assumes that individuals are rational, but that rationality is bounded by imperfect information and inherent deficiencies in individuals' ability to process it. They thus rely on cognitive shortcuts, particularly in the absence of strong organizations and leadership. Acting on the heuristics of availability and representativeness, citizens in other Arab countries overestimated their countries' prospects for replicating Tunisia's success. They thus rushed to emulate revolution without seriously evaluating opportunities and risks.

Weyland's argument sheds light on rapid the diffusion of rebellion across countries. Yet it leaves several questions unanswered. It does not explain why some countries in the region were not swept by the revolutionary wave, despite similar political grievances and presumably the same cognitive psychology. Neither does it address the many participants who explicitly recognized the differences among Arab countries. On the question of "whether Syria would follow in the footsteps" of its Arab neighbors, a Syria-based scholar found her interviewees to be acutely aware of the "structural differences between Syria, Tunisia, and Egypt." They consistently mentioned uniquely Syrian experiences with sectarianism and regime violence as the "important variables" governing prospects for contentious action in their country.¹⁵

When protestors did take to the streets, it was without illusions about the enormous obstacles that they faced. According to a Syrian commentator, Syrians "know the road ahead is still full of sorrow and ambushes, and the price for their freedom and dignity will be high."¹⁶ A Libyan rebel recalled the onset of protest in similarly sanguine terms. "We did not know how far we could go or if changes were going to be possible in Libya," he explained. "All we knew that our attempts to try would be hard and bloody." He noted that, whereas Qaddafi "had faith he would win this war," rebels were pushed primarily by the sense that "despite a lack of weapons . . . we had to do something."¹⁷ These and many other protestors were not "rash" and "unthinking" about either easy victories or their governments' readiness to use force. They advocated revolution not out of erroneous forecasting, but out of hope. Richard Lazarus defines hope as "fearing the worst but yearning for better."¹⁸ It is not a cognitive crutch, but an emotion.

Some of the anomalies unexplained by instrumental understandings of microfoundations find explanation in an alternative approach emphasizing noninstrumental values. According to this view, individuals defy authority due to the inherent benefit of actualizing their convictions or sense of self, sometimes regardless of the ability of protest to effect change. This is what Vaclav Havel refers to as "living in truth,"¹⁹ Timur Kuran calls "expressive utility,"²⁰ and Rachel Einwohner understands as a "sense of honor."²¹ An emphasis on the noninstrumental rewards of protest underlies theories of social movements that often emphasize culture, identity, new forms of consciousness, or meaningful social relationships.

Varshney crafts an explicit appeal for such an approach in what he, invoking Max Weber, terms "value rationality."²² Varshney argues that exercising voice fulfills human needs for recognition, integrity, and self-respect. This understanding of microfoundations helps account for high-risk protest in the Arab revolts. However, if the need for dignity explains political resistance, what explains resignation to indignities? The latter was a part of Arab politics for decades. In Rashid Khalidi's words, "incessant infringements by these authoritarian states on the dignity of nearly every Arab citizen, and their rulers' constant affirmations of their worthlessness, were eventually internalized and produced a pervasive self-loathing and an ulcerous social malaise."²³ Identification of the importance of autonomy and self-worth alone does not help us predict under what occasions rational people will or will not undertake risks on that basis.

We are left in a bind. Why do people defer to a cost-benefit calculation that discourages protest at some times, and protest despite high costs and uncertain benefits at other times? Why do people rebel in order to actualize dignity or alternatively bow before degrading abuses of power? In a third approach to these questions, Kuran combines instrumental and value rationalities into a synthesis

model.²⁴ Like others,²⁵ he conceptualizes mass mobilization as a cascade that swells when a few “early movers” act and others adapt to new cues. He argues that individuals have private preferences regarding political outcomes. The public preference that they choose to convey to others, however, is a product of three factors: the intrinsic, substantive utility of the desired outcome; the reputational utility of revealing preferences for one’s social status; and the expressive utility of being true to oneself, and thus the personal harm incurred by preference falsification. Given these three utilities, all individuals have a threshold at which they will reveal their true opposition, which depends on the number of others who are already doing so. A contingent event that prompts even a few to protest can trigger people with successively higher thresholds to join. This encourages others to do likewise until a full revolution is underway.

Kuran’s model captures the surprising and sudden momentum of the Middle East uprisings.²⁶ His concept of preference falsification also offers a useful lens for understanding the role of social media, insofar as these media generated relatively safe ways for people to reveal their views and gauge how many others shared them. Nonetheless, Kuran’s schema has important limits. Preference falsification was not ubiquitous in semi-authoritarian countries such as Egypt, where citizens aired political criticism in speech and print for years.²⁷ Indicators of discontent were pervasive, yet the revolution still took nearly everyone by surprise. More fundamentally, Kuran’s focus on the interdependent dynamics of decision-making brackets its subjective dimensions.²⁸ He treats individuals’ substantive, reputational, and expressive utilities as additive for the sake of “simplicity,”²⁹ not because this is consistent with knowledge about the human mind. We are left to wonder how his framework might benefit if complimented by direct exploration of the internal processes by which people adjudicate between competing imperatives.

This comes to the fore in the question of revolutionary thresholds. The notion that people have fixed points at which they join protest misconstrues the contingency of decision-making.³⁰ Alternatively, the idea that a shift in private opinion precedes the choice to participate misses the personally transformative experience of revolution. Kuran proposes that a minority in any population are activists who protest for its own sake.³¹ By contrast, the nonactivist majority has weak expressive needs,³² and only engages in dissent on the basis of expected rewards and punishments.³³ While elegant, this schema does not consider how people’s expressive needs may change as they actually feel what it is to express themselves. One Syrian oppositionist described demonstrations as a nearly transcendent event in which “you visualize all the walls of fear and the markers of humiliation falling,” and find a will to “continu[e] your hysterical chanting, because for the first time you can hear your voice.”³⁴ Another added, “Noth-

ing will bring back those who have . . . experienced the ecstasy of rebelling.”³⁵ In the course of a popular uprising, nonactivists, who once scarcely imagined criticizing the regime, can become activists willing to die for a cause. As these participants’ words relay, this is a journey paved by an overcoming of fear and shame and a discovery of joy and pride. In other words, it is infused with emotions.

Kuran scarcely mentions emotions. Weyland and Varshney explicitly reject emotions as an explanatory factor, and equate them with irrationality.³⁶ If there is an implied role for emotions in their theories, it is only in the “consequentialist” sense that rational people might factor future emotional benefits into their utility functions. They do not consider the impact of “immediate emotions” experienced at the moment of decision-making.³⁷ That oversight contradicts decades of research in psychology and neuroscience that demonstrates that emotions are inextricably intertwined with thinking and action.³⁸ It also ignores experiences that are clearly felt and articulated by participants and close observers of social movements, such as the Arab uprisings.³⁹

Against those who bracket emotions, I posit an approach to microfoundations that puts them at the forefront. My aim is to employ what science has learned about emotions, as well as what the self-understandings of actors can teach us, in order to produce a richer and more psychologically nuanced understanding of politics. My approach finds support in the various subfields of political science.⁴⁰ A body of research in American politics examines how emotions influence voting⁴¹ responses to framing,⁴² and the effects of campaign advertising,⁴³ among other topics.⁴⁴ Some writings in international relations consider emotions in interstate conflict and cooperation.⁴⁵ Political philosophy from antiquity until the present has grappled with the relationship between passions and reason.⁴⁶ Contemporary political theory has foregrounded themes of recognition, courage, and dignity, giving attention to their affective dimensions.

Closest to my own project, different waves of scholarship on social movements have addressed the role of emotions. Classical theories of collective behavior looked distrustfully upon the passions whipped up by crowd dynamics.⁴⁷ Shedding such negative connotations, works in the 1970s argued that indignation was a psychologically and socially grounded response to perceived injustice, and hence a powerful motivator of rebellion.⁴⁸ Since the 1990s, a new trend has explored the role of emotions in mobilization theoretically and empirically.⁴⁹ Roger Petersen argues that emotions are resources that entrepreneurs strategically manipulated to mobilize ethnic violence in the Balkans. Elisabeth Wood attributes support for insurgency in El Salvador to moral commitments with affective meanings, such as the pleasure and pride found in participation, defiance, and agency.⁵⁰ Deborah Gould’s case study of the direct-action AIDS movement posits

Figure 1
Four emotional experiences distinguished

		Level of analysis	
		Individual	Collective
Time	Transient	Reflex emotions	Crowd feelings
	Enduring	Affective orientations	Emotional climates

that visceral feelings influence political action or inaction by shaping people's sense of what is politically possible.⁵¹ These and other studies support an argument that cuts to the foundations of political science: actors' articulations of fear, outrage, courage, and joy deserve to be taken seriously in their own terms. Moreover, doing so suggests a conception of individual behavior different than those which typically dominate the discipline.


Analyzing Emotions

Defining emotional terms is famously difficult. For my purposes here, I recognize that emotional experiences operate at the levels of individuals or groups, and can be short or long lasting. Adapting existing definitions, Figure 1 identifies four kinds of emotional experiences.

Reflex emotions arise suddenly in encounter with the environment, but then subside and do not necessarily motivate future action.⁵² When an emotion continues to influence a person's social interactions after it is experienced, it can be called an affective orientation. These individual experiences shape and are shaped by emotions experienced collectively. Crowd feelings emerge in interaction with a group and dissipate after that group has dispersed. Emotional climates are more amorphous moods that endure within a collective over time.⁵³ The instability of transient emotions makes them subject to swift and powerful fluctuations. This changeability is an avenue through which contingent events can gain sudden causal impact. Idiosyncratic incidents are less likely to effect surprising changes in other variables pertinent for politics that evolve gradually, such as ideas or institutions. By contrast, enduring emotions change slowly and their influence carries over from one situation to another.⁵⁴

External impetuses influence individuals' behavior by shaping their cognition and emotions. Emotions in turn influence both cognition and action in ways that are not reducible to external factors.⁵⁵ Building on Petersen and others, I posit a causal chain that begins with a stimulus of some sort of new event or information. This causes people both to feel certain emotions and to prioritize particular values.⁵⁶ I concentrate on two values: security, which is the most basic material interest, and dignity, a primary nonmaterial need. The triggered emotion and value priority re-enforce each other, and both encourage particular action tendencies (refer to Figure 2).

Figure 2
Causal process underlying emotional microfoundations



Four categories of neuroscientific findings elaborate the mechanisms connecting the components of this causal process. First, emotions infuse how people define interests. As Petersen explains, individuals have many desires and their ranking of these desires is not fixed. Rather, emotions affect that which is most salient at any juncture.⁵⁷ In Ronald de Sousa's words, emotions are not reducible to beliefs or desires, but instead "set the agenda" for both. They "tip the balance between conflicting motivational structures, but they do so neither in a merely mechanical way nor merely by adding more reasons."⁵⁸

Second, emotions influence how people assess information. Emotions activate relatively automatic appraisal tendencies. These in turn lead individuals to focus on information relevant for or congruent with that appraisal and discount other information.⁵⁹ Emotions therefore affect how people perceive new events and forecast the future.⁶⁰ In shaping judgment, emotions appear to overpower nonemotive considerations more than vice versa. Joseph LeDoux explains that "emotions easily bump mundane facts out of awareness, but nonemotional events (like thoughts) do not so easily displace emotions from the mental spotlight."⁶¹ The implications resonate with Weyland's argument that eventful times can encourage erroneous inferences. However, this effect is due not only to the reliance of cognition on shortcuts, but also on the ways that cognition is influenced by emotions.

Third, once activated, emotions are powerful motivators of action.⁶² For Lazarus, linkage to an action tendency, readiness, or impulse is what distinguishes an emotion from a nonemotion.⁶³ Considerable, though not uncontroversial, evidence suggests that automatic emotional judgments are a primary engine of human behavior while slow, conscious calculations play a secondary role.⁶⁴ The more intense the emotions, the more likely they are to supersede deliberative decision-making and exert a direct impact on behavior.⁶⁵

Specific emotions influence motivation, appraisal, and action in systematic ways. In Table 1, the unshaded rows reference findings most relevant for the question of

Table 1
Emotions encouraging political resignation or resistance

Value priority	Dispiriting Emotions			Emboldening Emotions		
	Security		Shame	Dignity		Pride
Emotions triggered	Fear	Sadness	Shame	Anger	Joy	Pride
Relational theme & action tendency ⁶⁶	Avoid or escape from threat	Inaction; hopelessness about irrevocable loss	Hide personal failure	Attack agent committing demeaning offense	Pleasure with progress toward goal	Enhancing of self-worth and identity
Sense of certainty & control ⁶⁷	Low	Low		High		Medium
Blame attribution ⁶⁸		Tendency to blame situations		Tendency to blame people		
Assessment ⁶⁹	Pessimistic	Pessimistic		Optimistic	Optimistic	
Risk ⁷⁰	Perceived high; increased aversion			Perceived low; increased acceptance		
PROTEST OUTCOME	RESIGNATION			RESISTANCE		

protest. I distinguish between two clusters of emotions, which I label dispiriting or emboldening. I propose that each is connected to a different value priority, identified in the top row. I also posit that each carries a different implication for the likelihood of participating in political resignation or resistance, as indicated in the final row.

Stimuli that emphasize the high value of security and that trigger emotions such as fear, sadness, and shame give rise to dispiriting effects. They increase individuals' tendencies to make pessimistic assessments, discount prospects of change, privilege information about danger, have a low sense of control, and avert risk. In consequence, these emotions encourage people to resign to political circumstances, even at the cost of accepting indignities. By contrast, stimuli that emphasize the value of dignity and that trigger emotions such as anger, joy, pride, and shame have emboldening effects. They expand one's sense of identity, and heighten attention to slights to that identity. They also promote optimistic assessments, a sense of personal efficacy, and risk acceptance. Such emotions increase an individual's likelihood of political resistance, even if it jeopardizes security.

These emotional microfoundations support a macro-political argument: mass rebellion is improbable to the degree that dispiriting emotions prevail among a population, and emboldening emotions can drive defiance despite strategic disincentives. Relevant here is the relative intensity of dispiriting or emboldening emotions; one need not exist to the complete exclusion of the other. In fact, anger and fear are contrary, yet often oscillating adaptations to threat.⁷¹ The question is thus not the conditions under which fear disappears, but under which people press on despite fear. As Bahraini activist Maryam Al-Khawaja said of the uprising in her country, "Everyone is afraid. What we need is not the absence of fear, the fear will always be there because we know what the regime is able to do. We try to overcome the fear. We want to fight despite our fear."⁷² The ability to overcome fear, Richard Avramenko argues, cannot be explained in terms of rational choice. "One does not *choose* to act courageously in a given situation. Instead one *musters* courage," he writes. "Courageous actions emerge from beneath the liminality of reason."⁷³

What enables people to overcome fear? As Corey Robin argues, fear among the less powerful of the more powerful is endemic to society's various vertical cleavages. It is created or used by leaders to ensure that some groups submit to hierarchies while others benefit at their expense.⁷⁴ Episodes of contention disrupt this pervasive, structural form of fear, yet can elicit other forms. Government repression sometimes frightens people and sometimes incites defiance, a variability contributing to what is dubbed the coercion-protest paradox. Analysis of emotions alone does not resolve this puzzle. However, it highlights an issue to which analysts should be attentive: the intertwining of

fear and anger with a subjective sense of efficacy. In Nico Frijda's words, fear is the emotion of "uncertainty and lack of control" that renders it "of no use to stick your head out in efforts at control."⁷⁵ By contrast, anger is both an urge to fight and the sense that "fighting is meaningful."⁷⁶ For this reason, "anger implies hope."⁷⁷ Theodore Kemper similarly conceptualizes fear as the emotion produced by a "structural condition of insufficient power."⁷⁸ It is a "personal thwarting" that results in subjugation when no alternatives to subjugation are available.⁷⁹ In contrast, anger stems from "hunger for . . . status and benefits denied" by another agent. Animosity is released when one feels worthy but does not receive due recognition or respect. When anger is not expressed, however, people suffer both the original injury and the additional "loss of self-esteem by virtue of cowardice in taking the injury lying down."⁸⁰

If felt efficacy is a fulcrum distinguishing fear from anger, then dispiriting emotions dominate where people are unable to mobilize the hope to do other than submit to a threat. This may be the case where past experiences leave people fatigued and saddened. Alternatively, when people marshal the emotional resources to overcome fear, the initial trigger may lay in a "moral shock," a deeply felt stimulus that sparks visceral reactions against a reprehensible reality.⁸¹ Moral offenses have mobilizing power because indignation puts "fire in the belly and iron in the soul."⁸² Employing empirical findings from behavioral economics, Edna Ullmann-Margalit and Cass Sunstein argue that indignation can "lead the disadvantaged to disrupt an otherwise stable situation" of inequality or perceived injustice because they come to feel that they have "nothing to lose but their chains." Objectively, "they do have something else to lose—the material payoff of the status quo—but . . . that material payoff . . . is worth less to them than the cost of remaining in a situation of perceived injustice."⁸³ Indignation can be analyzed from a rationalist perspective insofar as it entails a set of judgments about unacceptable actions. Yet it is also, irreducibly, an emotion.⁸⁴ Though indignation does not burn indefinitely, it activates immediate appraisal and action tendencies that embolden behavior. It can therefore bring people to act in ways that neither conventional social science nor they themselves might have predicted.

The Authoritarian Context

In the Middle East, authoritarian regimes both produced and were reproduced at the macro-level in part by the dispiriting emotions that they generated in citizens at the micro-level. Under dictators such as Saddam Hussein, state violence generated mortal dread. "Terror struck deeper into the population," Kanan Makiya wrote about his native Iraq, "withdrawal, cynicism, suspicion, and eventually pervasive fear replaced participation as the predominant psychological profile."⁸⁵ In hybrid autocracies such as Egypt,

regimes subdued their populations through a combination of co-optation, monitoring, and physical coercion, while allowing controlled pluralism and limited freedom of expression. Those who gained privileges from the system feared losing those privileges. Those who did not were aware that, to find a job, resolve administrative matters, or just meet basic needs, they were best defer to power. Powerholders wielded fear as a tool for survival, enforcing it with security apparatuses and state discourses that warned that the alternative to the regime was chaos or Islamic radicalism. No less, fear was often self-enforced by people's dispirited sense that the status quo was unchangeable, and societally enforced by norms regarding those who fought it as foolish, if not reckless. In Nathan Brown's assessment, the prevailing sentiment in the Arab world was futility. For most people, "working for change was like fighting gravity . . . and so few tried."⁸⁶

The sense that politics was inevitably corrupt and corrupting imbued society with cynicism. John Waterbury's description of Morocco in the early 1970s offered a telling portrait of the region for decades thereafter:

There is a general level of cynicism running throughout—the cynicism of the non-participant masses who fall back on the traditional reflex, "government has ever been thus"; the cynicism of the participants who partake of the system individually while refusing any responsibility for it; and the cynicism of the King who plays on the weakness and greed of his subjects.⁸⁷

In several countries, small forms of defiance contributed to emboldening emotions over time. Demonstrations on permissible foreign policy issues hinted at domestic discontent and showed a capacity for street politics. Satellite television, the Internet, and civil society activism expanded means for voicing criticism, as did episodic protests and strikes. These developments varied across the region and nowhere significantly undermined regime strength in terms of institutions, elite loyalty, and material resources. Nonetheless, precursor protests helped unmoor the dispiriting effects that cemented authoritarianism. In the words of one columnist, they prepared people for rebellion "at the level of their minds, hearts, mentalities, and political awareness, consciously or unconsciously."⁸⁸

Indignities accumulated, especially in those "republics" that once claimed a revolutionary, redistributive legitimacy, but by the twenty-first century offered citizens little more than "presidents-for-life."⁸⁹ Arab citizens often invoked the exasperated term "*zahqna*"—meaning that they were fed up and could not bear the status quo any longer.⁹⁰ Yet most did bear it. In the 1970s, Waterbury observed that Moroccan "society appears to be ever on the verge of an explosion that never occurs."⁹¹ Forty years later, the same could arguably still be said about the region as a whole. Nonetheless, the "personal thwarting" that Kemper identified as anger without outlet remained the "volte-face potential" in everyday life under authoritarian

rule.⁹² Small shows of defiance tapped into that emotive power. If it could be harnessed en masse, a dispiriting emotional climate might be transformed into an emboldening one, and the social power unleashed would be tremendous.

Revolt in Tunisia

In December 2010, President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali's 23-year rule appeared secure. In the book *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb*, published that year, Christopher Alexander noted that "one is struck primarily by how little the substance of Tunisian politics has changed [over the past five decades]."⁹³ Scholars attributed durable authoritarianism to a strong coercive apparatus, the loyalty of business elites, severe restrictions on free speech, and containment of opposition.⁹⁴ No less important were affective orientations of fear and futility across society. One Tunisian explained that his compatriots opted for the safe path of "seeing nothing, hearing nothing, and saying nothing."⁹⁵ In a country where informants were everywhere and "even walls had ears," citizens "used to look right and left before talking, even in private."⁹⁶ The urban middle classes typically "kept their heads down" and "checked out of politics."⁹⁷ Alexander wrote that, seeing no viable alternative to the status quo, "many Tunisians have simply given up on politics."⁹⁸

It was rational to resign to the status quo. However, doing so injected life with a pained sense of indignity. To live in Ben Ali's Tunisia was to deny the core values that Varshney predicts should motivate resistance. Sadri Khiari explains: "Each Tunisian was forced to be complicit with corruption to a certain degree. This phenomenon led to a form of collective and individual self-degradation . . . Multiple compromises, different ways of paying allegiance to power, even active participation in its networks . . . produced frustrations, humiliations, and feelings of disrespect for oneself and others."⁹⁹

In Kemper's terms, feelings of self-worth denied were a sign of introjected anger. Ordinary Tunisians were repulsed by the mafia-like immorality of the president, his wife, and their relatives, who treated the country as private property and its people "like serfs."¹⁰⁰ A 2008 United States Embassy cable observed that "although petty corruption rankles, it is the excesses of President Ben Ali's family that inspire outrage among Tunisians." The abuses of the president's wife and her family provoked "the greatest ire," and conspicuous displays of wealth "added fuel to the fire."¹⁰¹ Protests by students and the unemployed in the early 2000s vented such indignation, as did the 2008 and 2010 demonstrations that engulfed the impoverished Gafsa region.¹⁰² Nonetheless, police crushed them before the explosive power of cumulative frustrations could spread and transform the resigned emotional climate dominating the country at large.

In December 2010, protests again erupted in the southern periphery. The spark was a self-immolation by street

vendor Mohammed Bouazizi, after reportedly being insulted by a policewoman and failing to retrieve his confiscated wares. Bouazizi's sister described his death as a "rebellion against insult" pushed by "oppression, injustice, and despotism."¹⁰³ Though the act dramatized the particularly intense despair of unemployed youth, Tunisians from all walks of life empathized with the feelings of shame and frustration that animated it. "[Bouazizi] killed himself because he was humiliated," an activist explained. "All the classes felt humiliation."¹⁰⁴ For Mohammed Bamyeh, Bouazizi's "protest-suicide" allegorized the "extreme desperation and exasperation" of life without hope.¹⁰⁵ As a stimulus for others, it both intensified prioritization of the value of dignity and triggered righteous anger. The immolation embodied the essence of indignation, which some define as the feeling provoked "by an agent who, intentionally and without provocation or adequate reason, causes a victim to suffer harm."¹⁰⁶ If there were ever such wanton and pitiless harm, it would seem to be authorities' denial of this man's "last meager resource . . . for leading a decent life."¹⁰⁷

Bouazizi's family and others marched in outrage that day. Police responded with beatings and tear gas, which provoked further indignation.¹⁰⁸ As riots spread to nearby towns, several others also publicly took their lives. One shouted "No to misery!" before electrocuting himself.¹⁰⁹ It is difficult to explain this protest as utility maximization. Rather, echoing Ullman-Margalit and Sunstein's words, it was a "desperate rebellion . . . driven by indignation, not by a belief that it will have strategic advantages."¹¹⁰ Given a choice between facing "Ben Ali's heavy hand" and accepting "an oppressive and impoverishing status quo," these citizens were pushed toward the latter.¹¹¹ No identifiable opening in the structure of opportunities propelled that choice. On the contrary, protest was "a response to a sense of closed possibilities," if not "the absence of any opportunities whatsoever."¹¹²

Activists intervened to spread and sustain protest. Though political parties remained uninvolved, local members of unions and professional syndicates organized continued demonstrations and articulated increasingly political demands.¹¹³ For decades, the regime had generally managed civil society organizations.¹¹⁴ It was only in an emboldened emotional climate that they fulfilled their oppositional potential. Activists made a major contribution to the revolutionary cascade. However, this did not primarily lay, as Kuran argues, in exposing regime vulnerability, convincing people of the system's wrongs, or generating select incentives for participation.¹¹⁵ Rather, one of their major roles was to urge nonactivists to find the courage to voice dissent. They did so in part by modeling that courage themselves. A sign at a lawyers' syndicate protest declared "After today, no more fear."¹¹⁶ The message was both plea and observation. For a Tunisian blogger, it "perfectly summed up" popular sentiment. He wrote that

“Tunisians, who have been accustomed to being silent, afraid and obedient for decades, are finally taking their destiny in their own hand.”¹¹⁷

Technology also played a role in these events. Citizens circumvented a government media blackout by filming protests with cellphones, posting videos online, and following updates on satellite television.¹¹⁸ Yet means of communication were only as powerful as the emotional impact of that which they communicated. News and images were meaningful because they reenacted moral offenses and lay bare protestors’ passions. Social media also helped larger circles of Tunisians muster courage. “Facebook allowed us to overcome our fear of the regime,” an activist remarked. “We felt like we belonged to a group which, even though it was virtual, would protect us.”¹¹⁹ The safety offered by online networks *was* virtual, but its emboldening impact was real. In helping people to surmount fear, it encouraged optimistic judgments about the future and willingness to embrace risk.

After ten days, Ben Ali delivered a television address in which he dismissed protestors as extremists and mercenaries, and promised severe punishment. By then, police had killed two people and injured dozens. Repression, one protestor commented, was both “terrifying” and “provocative.”¹²⁰ It tipped further in the direction of incendiary when regime forces killed 21 unarmed civilians in the western towns of Tala and Kasserine—including one seven month-old baby.¹²¹ From January 8–12, snipers on rooftops fired on a funeral procession and riot police shot citizens at close range, some in the back of the head. Security forces stormed a women’s bathhouse with tear gas and blocked its exits. Semi-clothed women and choking children barely managed to escape.¹²² At a time when calm had largely returned to the south, this bloodletting reignited outrage and rebellion at large. An Arabic daily later reflected that

anger is the primary producer of the power that every oppressed person lacks. Anger brings the oppressed together to discover that they are capable of repudiating injustice. The problem with collective anger, however, is that it requires continued provocation. That is usually provided by the stupidity of oppressors, as they intensify abuse and cruelty, and overindulge in modes of repression.¹²³

The massacres were a turning point. As an activist noted, Ben Ali’s “fundamental mistake was thinking killing people would make others afraid.”¹²⁴ Instead, the killings roused the indignation of the theretofore silent majority in the capital. A reporter noted that it “transformed what had been a regional uprising into a genuinely nationwide movement” and “pushed the middle classes of Tunis into the streets.”¹²⁵

The growing emotional climate was one of righteous anger beyond fear. Desperate to turn the tide, the president again appeared on television and promised reform. “Ben Ali ruled by fear, and when he thus implied that his

government would respond to the Tunisian street, he was no longer Ben Ali,” Eric Goldstein wrote.¹²⁶ The dictator to be dreaded thus became a man to be defied. The transformation occurring at the grassroots forced change in key institutions. The leadership of the national trade union, the UGTT, had remained loyal to the president. Under pressure from local branches, however, it called for a general strike.¹²⁷ Meanwhile, military leaders had decided not to fire at demonstrators, in part out of concern that soldiers might refuse orders.¹²⁸ Beyond this, many shared civilians’ resentment of the regime. Ben Ali showered his Presidential Guard with privileges, while leaving the regular army with poor pay, minimal benefits, and a dearth of equipment. In the words of one officer, “We were driven into beggarmdom by the Ben Ali regime.”¹²⁹ According to the International Crisis Group, the army regarded the president’s contempt as “a source of humiliation.”¹³⁰

On January 12, protests reached the suburbs of Tunis. Youths threw stones at the police, while chanting, “We are not afraid, we are not afraid.”¹³¹ The following day, hundreds “gleefully” ransacked the mansion of a presidential relative while police fled the scene. “Now, we can say we what we want,” one protestor described his emboldenment. “It has started to change.”¹³² In the capital, meanwhile, union activist Wical Jaidi would recall being “terrified.”¹³³ She was beaten by police at a demonstration but returned to protest everyday, nonetheless. In Kuran’s terms, this self-identified “militante” had “fixed public preferences more or less consistent with private preferences.”¹³⁴ Kuran might say that she fit his definition of activists as those who are “inclined to speak their minds even at the risk of severe punishment.”¹³⁵

That would be accurate. However, Kuran’s treatment of such risk acceptance as a straightforward cause of activism misses its significance as the *outcome* of emotional processes. Activism in oppressive circumstances is not an automatic extension of ideological commitment. It is a continued struggle to prevent fear from becoming a barrier to action. Kuran’s description of activists as those who “obtain unusually high satisfaction from truthful self-expression”¹³⁶ is thus very far from Jaidi’s self-description of being “scared shitless.” On the eve of the revolt’s end, she and a colleague were apprehended and brought to the dreaded Ministry of Interior. “It was such a fear that it has never really left me,” she recalled. “If we entered that door, we knew we would be raped and killed, and no one would ever hear what happened to us.”¹³⁷

For these and other Tunisians, protest meant putting their lives on the line for the fight for dignity. Kuran and others recognize that risk acceptance varies across individuals.¹³⁸ Yet they offer fewer clues about why a single individual manifests different willingness at different times, or why people might surprise themselves with their own daring. Nor do they elucidate how devoted revolutionaries come to marshal, in Avramenko’s words, the courage to

risk life and limb for something they care about fundamentally.¹³⁹ If we do not devote analytical attention to such emotional struggles, we miss processes without which high-risk protest might never occur.

On January 14, the UGTT held its strike and some 10,000 Tunisians flooded the streets of the capital. Anger and pride were evident in defiant signs such as “Game Over” and “Liar, you have not have stopped the fire.”¹⁴⁰ It was further dramatized by those who climbed the walls of the Interior Ministry. That exuberant crowd feelings galvanized once unimaginable boldness suggests a “power in numbers” that went beyond the size of the crowd. Not mere arithmetic, the joy of acting in concert gave the assembly a force greater than the sum of its parts. Many of these citizens had previously been demobilized by feelings of helplessness before an amorphous and unfixable system. Emboldened, they targeted their grievances directly at its figurehead. Their doing so demonstrated an appraisal tendency associated with anger rather than sadness. It also illustrated findings that the more specifically people pinpoint blame for injustice, the greater their inclination to protest.¹⁴¹ Blame could not have been more narrowly attributed for the thousands of Tunisians who defaced the president’s picture and chanted, “*Ben Ali dégage!*”—Ben Ali, get lost.

Mass mobilization created new pressures upon the army, which intervened against Ben Ali. He fled that night. The weeks that followed were enveloped in uncertainty as governments fell and all aspects of politics came under debate. Yet one thing was not in flux: the shift in the emotional climate of politics. A Tunisian diplomat was overwhelmed by the transformation in his homeland. Once omnipresent, the sense of “oppressive fear . . . was palpably absent.”¹⁴² On the first anniversary of Ben Ali’s departure, a correspondent noted that “many Tunisians feel that their liberation from fear is the most important achievement of this revolution.”¹⁴³ When a Tunisian director produced the first major documentary about the uprising, he gave it a simple title that encapsulated both its defining trait and its hope for the future: “No More Fear.”¹⁴⁴

Revolt in Egypt

By 2011, Egypt was characterized by pervasive discontent due to unemployment, corruption, inequality, police brutality, rigged elections, crumbling infrastructure, and the specter of an octogenarian president’s succession by his son.¹⁴⁵ Nonetheless, Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year reign appeared immune. Scholars attributed its durability to a strong coercive apparatus,¹⁴⁶ cohesive ruling party,¹⁴⁷ and institutionalized clientelism.¹⁴⁸ These elements generally curtailed opposition and forestalled elite splits. “Mubarak’s structures of dominion were thought to be fool-proof,” Mona El-Ghobashy summarized. “And for 30 years they were.”¹⁴⁹

Yet regime stability was not attributable to institutional mechanisms alone. In the words of one analyst, Mubarak was “basically ruling via apathy.”¹⁵⁰ Ashraf Khalil explains that Mubarak so disrespected Egyptians that they lost respect for themselves, and with it any sense of being able to make change:

[Mubarak] took a proud and ancient civilization and presided over the virtual collapse of its citizens’ sense of public empowerment and political engagement. He taught them how to feel helpless, then made them forget they had ever felt any other way. His reign spread cynicism, apathy, and, eventually, self-loathing. Several successive generations were instilled with the belief that the system was rotten to the core, and that there was nothing anyone could do about it. Anyone who tried to change that dynamic was a noble fool.¹⁵¹

Affronts to basic values did not inspire collective action, as Varshney would predict, as much as a pervasive sense of futility. This was articulated in popular expressions such as “walk next to the wall,” which cautioned people to avoid politics and focus on feeding their families,¹⁵² and “buy back your brain,” which warned that only dupes dreamt of something better.¹⁵³ Political activity seemed “useless.”¹⁵⁴ Fouad Adjami lamented “the lapse of the country’s best into apathy and despair.”¹⁵⁵

Dispirited emotions became a pillar of durable autocracy. Still, a daring to speak out developed from the bottom up. Increasingly after 2000, unions, non-governmental organizations, youth movements, and opposition parties mounted protests.¹⁵⁶ The reformist Kefaya (Enough) party broke taboos by confronting power-holders directly. Activists used the Internet to voice dissent and cultivate domestic and international networks.¹⁵⁷ Exposure of police brutality and other abuses, such as the 2010 torture and killing of Khalid Said, reached large audiences. Nonetheless, a strong civil society met its match in a strong regime.¹⁵⁸ Though grassroots efforts chipped away at feelings of fear and futility, Egyptians continued to joke that the only place where they could open their mouths was at the dentist’s.¹⁵⁹ Even activists admitted hopelessness. “I used to believe . . . that revolution is the answer,” an oppositionist said in 2005. “But our people are not cut out for revolution.”¹⁶⁰

In this context, the impact of Ben Ali’s resignation was profound. Weyland argues that the stunning events in Tunisia made Egyptians abandon “prudence and caution” and “[jump] to the conclusion that they could repeat a similar feat in their own country.”¹⁶¹ In contrast, I propose that Tunisia’s primary effect upon Egypt, as upon the rest of the Arab world, was an emotional jolt. It was a stimulus that intensified the value of dignity and triggered emboldening affects. Many Egyptians felt a mixture of pride and joy in what Tunisians had accomplished, and embarrassment and envy that Egyptians—who prided themselves in being leaders of the Arab world—had not done so first. “Machismo played a big part,” an Egyptian

blogger admitted. “Egyptians looked at Tunisia and said, ‘Wait that’s possible? And you’re just . . . Tunisia! We’re Egypt!’”¹⁶² Activist Asmaa Mahfouz directly harnessed such emotions of pride and shame in a viral YouTube video in which she challenged her compatriots: “If you have honor and dignity as a man, then come out [to protest].”¹⁶³

As importantly, Tunisia gave Egyptians hope. In demonstrating the once “unthinkable” truth that mass protest could force a dictator to resign, it “unblocked something in [their] psyches.”¹⁶⁴ As discussed earlier, Lazarus defines hope as an emotion that means “wishing . . . for the realization of a positive outcome when the odds do no greatly favor it.”¹⁶⁵ That Egyptians were aware of sobering odds was manifest in the expression that many repeated at the time, “Egypt is not Tunisia.”¹⁶⁶ At the same time, Tunisia offered a lesson that even veteran Egyptian statesman Amr Moussa dubbed “obvious.” It made clear, he said, that “people will no longer accept to be marginalized and pressurized like this.”¹⁶⁷

Egyptian activists sought to rally feelings of hope as they urged people to participate in the annual demonstration called for Police Day, January 25, 2011. Whereas Weyland depicts Egyptians as driven by a sense of certainty that they would succeed, closer examination reveals what Lazarus identifies as hope’s defining components: uncertainty and yearning.¹⁶⁸ Though some 80,000 people pledged on Facebook that they would attend, the history of prior protests suggested that most would not turn up.¹⁶⁹ A prominent blogger-activist later conceded that “I have to admit, a few days earlier I wasn’t taking it seriously.”¹⁷⁰ An organizer recalled, “We went out to protest that day and expected to be arrested in the first ten minutes, just like usual.”¹⁷¹ A young Egyptian described the uncertain days prior to January 25 as ones in which “everyone was contemplating whether to go or not and asking each other whether they were going.”¹⁷² Tweets in the wee hours of the night revealed nervous anticipation. “Scared, excited and hopeful,” an activist tweeted just before midnight. “Yes, I’m worried about tomorrow. Which is exactly why I am going,” another replied.¹⁷³ These testimonies question the usefulness of Kuran’s argument that, given private preferences, people’s revelation of dissent depends on the expected level of public opposition. In the Egyptian case, as Charles Kurzman said of the Iranian Revolution, people struggled to predict turnout, but found it exceedingly difficult to gauge.¹⁷⁴

Hence, as in other countries, Egypt’s “Day of Revolt” did not begin with explosive anger as much as trepidation.¹⁷⁵ By day’s end, some 20,000 people stunned the police by converging on Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo. The record-breaking turnout cannot be attributed to organizational structures and social networks, as many demonstrators lacked prior contact to dissident movements. “There may be a core of activists who have been preparing for this day,” Issander El-Amrani noted. “But they are

outnumbered by people who are there just because they have had enough.”¹⁷⁶ Hani Shukrallah added, “The revolution, virtually in the blink of an eye, went far beyond the scope and political and organizational capacities of both the young people who triggered it and the old people who lead the various opposition political parties.”¹⁷⁷

The day was a turning point. “Egyptians were liberated from addiction to fear,” an Egyptian filmmaker reflected. “That is the difference between pre- and post-January 25, 2011.”¹⁷⁸ Video footage showed demonstrators daring to shout at police, strangers chanting in unison, and a buoyant woman calling that day the happiest of her life.¹⁷⁹ Echoing findings that emotional gratification is stronger when it comes as a surprise,¹⁸⁰ protestors’ pride and joy were intensified by the fact that the large attendance was unexpected. “I was shocked. Everyone was,” an activist recalled. “I had an ear-to-ear smile on the whole day.”¹⁸¹ Even the Interior Minister later testified to being “astonished” by a “situation . . . beyond imagination”: the sight of such “angry people and indescribable hatred of the government.”¹⁸² A lieutenant colonel was flabbergasted. “A young man standing in front of an armored vehicle, jumping on it to strike it, falling off and then doing it again?” he exclaimed. “Honestly, there was no fear.”¹⁸³

Building on this emotional surge, organizers called for another demonstration on January 28. Targeting still other emboldening emotions, they dubbed it “Day of Rage.” Demonstrations again began throughout city and marched toward Tahrir. A massive security deployment fired tear gas and water canons, but “enraged” crowds pushed forward and pounded them with rocks. One participant described the power of their indignation saying, “Some people were ready to eat [security cadres] alive.”¹⁸⁴ Eventually, some troops abandoned their vehicles and fled. Khalil identified this as the “exact turning point” that fear collapsed. Protestors outnumbered police, who realized that they no longer deterred dissent. The change in the balance of forces was not the result of a slow shift in political structures.¹⁸⁵ “In an instant,” Khalil wrote, “the fearsome and hated bullies of the Interior Ministry had become pathetic and irrelevant.”¹⁸⁶ The emotions inspired by that second mass protest were captured in a video from a solidarity demonstration in London the next day. Weeping in joy, an expatriate thanked the heroes of his homeland for doing what he never imagined possible in his lifetime.¹⁸⁷

The military’s decision not to turn guns against the people undoubtedly lowered the costs of protest from what they otherwise might have been. Yet other security forces, as well as paid thugs, did not shy from physical force. By revolt’s end, more than 800 would be killed, 6,000 injured, and 12,000 arrested. In unleashing violence, the regime attempted to rekindle dispiriting emotions. The rebellion, in turn, extracted pride from death by honoring the courage of martyrs and singing songs

such as “Cursed be fear, oh God.”¹⁸⁸ The regime tried to generate chaos by setting prisoners free and withdrawing police from the streets. In a new spirit of community, citizens formed watch groups to protect their neighborhoods. Mubarak appealed to empathy by citing his history of service and offering concessions. Protestors received these words as insults. In this way, much of the action-reaction dynamic of the regime and its challengers was emotional in content. Even Mubarak’s severing of communications technology on the uprising’s fourth day affected emotions as much as logistics. “When I woke up . . . and there was no net or mobile phone coverage, that’s when I got really mad,” one Cairo resident explained.¹⁸⁹

Protestors occupied Tahrir and resolved to stay until the president resigned. Signs quickly filled the square with messages that, ranging from witty to indignant, expressed and embodied the shift from a dispirited to an emboldened emotional climate. Some conveyed remorse for the prior decades of submission, pleading, “Forgive me Lord, I was afraid and silent” or “My country, I’m sorry it took me so long.”¹⁹⁰ Others testified to the sense of participation as a kind of rebirth. A mock identity card read, “Name: Citizen; Place of birth: Tahrir Square; Date of birth: 25 January 2011.”¹⁹¹ These messages were consistent with the shift from preference falsification to voice that Kuran theorizes, but go beyond in communicating the emotions that render it not simply a choice, but rather a process of personal transformation. Transformation, unlike choice, carried a sense of refusing to go back to the way things had once been. A poster announced, “I would rather die in Tahrir Square than have you govern me and live in humiliation.”¹⁹²

As in Tunisia, chants directed toward the president the contempt that people felt he long showed them. The flip-side of animosity for Mubarak were citizens’ new feelings of solidarity toward each other. Egyptians donated blood, medicine, food, and other materials to sustain the uprising. These acts, as well as the energy produced by demonstrating together, generated an emotional climate that was the antithesis of the cloud previously cast. Many in the square were “shocked” to realize both the extent of their alienation from their compatriots and the gratification that they found in joining with diverse sectors of society. “I had been asking myself, where are the Egyptians? I came here and I found them,” a protestor said of Tahrir.¹⁹³ Another agreed. “My relationship to the country has transformed . . . People never used to talk to one another. This has been broken.”¹⁹⁴ Such feelings recruited and sustained participation, despite risks and weak pre-existing personal ties.

Many who participated did so not only to challenge the regime, but also to rebuild society on better values. In rallying with others, some felt exhilaration that they were already doing so, from the ground up. In Ahdaf Soueif’s words, the revolution “brought out the best in us and

showed us not just what we could do but how we could be.”¹⁹⁵ The sense of unfolding change was experienced individually as well as socially. “Protestors not only transformed [Tahrir],” Khalil posited. “They were themselves transformed by their presence in it.”¹⁹⁶ “I learned to say no, I am not a coward anymore,” explained a 40-year-old who camped in Tahrir. “I am Egyptian again, not marginalized, not without value or dignity.”¹⁹⁷ Kuran would describe these individuals as revealing preferences to the public; they described themselves as discovering determination that they did not know resided within them.

The uprising lost momentum as a standoff disappointed hopes for swift victory. February 8 brought another emotional turning point. Millions of Egyptians viewed a televised interview with Wael Ghonim, the creator of the “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook page, just hours after his release from detention. Shown photographs of protestors killed, Ghonim burst into tears and walked off the set. His breakdown inspired tremendous sympathy, especially among those middle class Egyptians who identified with Ghonim yet had not joined the uprising. The interview, Mona Eltahawy tweeted, gave the revolution “a shot of adrenaline in the heart.”¹⁹⁸ Though the effect on protest numbers eludes precise measurement, many in Tahrir the next day said that the interview had moved them to participate,¹⁹⁹ some for the first time.²⁰⁰ One newcomer remarked:

When I saw Wael Ghonim [on television], I really got affected by his words and understood that a lot of people suffered in this revolution. I really wanted to be part of it and support it. I wanted to join for Egypt, because I didn’t want the people who had died, and the ones who had protested every day, to pay the price alone for what all Egyptians would benefit from.²⁰¹

This 16-year-old demonstrated an awareness of the free-rider problem: some were bearing the burden for public goods that all would enjoy. She knew what a narrow sense of self-interest deemed rational, yet purposefully rejected that choice. A 22-year-old echoed her sentiments. “Someone had to stand up and say ‘enough is enough’—and that is why I decided to take part in the revolution,” he explained. “At first I was afraid to take part. But, as I realised the demands of the revolution were my own demands, I was willing to pay whatever price.”²⁰² These protestors made no reference to reputational concerns, as Kuran posits, or belief in near victory, as Weyland suggests. They recognized that participation carried significant risks and uncertain benefits, but pledged to face them, regardless.

Protest continued, as did international pressure and the army’s assessment that Mubarak had become a liability. On February 10, news circulated that Mubarak was to announce his resignation. A celebratory mood took shape as hundreds of thousands gathered in Tahrir for the televised address. Yet when Mubarak finally appeared, he

refused to step down. Some Egyptians were moved by his emotional appeals to patriotism and loyalty. In Tahrir, however, the crash of palpable optimism into rage warned of pending escalation.²⁰³

Military leaders realized that intervention was in order. The next day Mubarak's resignation was announced. The response across the country was euphoric. Egyptians took to the streets and exchanged congratulations with an expression that confirmed a revolution in emotions had accompanied Mubarak's fall. Whereas people once advised bowing their heads shamefully, they now exclaimed, "Lift your head, you are Egyptian."

This analysis of the emotional dimensions of the Egyptian uprising complements, rather than discounts, appreciation of its rational and organizational components. That Egyptian protestors were feeling subjects does not deny that they were also strategically adroit, particularly in avoiding violence and divisive ideological issues.²⁰⁴ Emotions affected protestors' appraisals of changing circumstances and willingness to assume risk. They embodied the uprising insofar as they deprived the authoritarian system of the sentiments that underpinned it. "Reservoirs of confidence, creativity and empowerment emerged which some feared had been lost forever," Khalil wrote.²⁰⁵ Adjami penned a similar observation. His 1995 essay had been titled "The Sorrows of Egypt." A commentary after the revolt came under the headline, "How the Arabs Turned Shame Into Liberty."²⁰⁶

Non-Revolt in Algeria

Algeria shared with Egypt and Tunisia not only collective identity and geographic proximity, but also many of the problems that drove rebellion. Its citizens suffered poor living standards, socio-economic inequality, domination by a single ruling party, and widespread corruption.²⁰⁷ Some 70 percent of the population was under the age of 30, and unofficial estimates put unemployment above 30 percent.²⁰⁸ Algerians were so familiar with the indignities of unaccountable and abusive government that they coined their own term, *hogra*, to express rulers' contempt for the ruled.

These grievances were the backdrop to some 11,500 riots and demonstrations in 2010 alone.²⁰⁹ In early 2011, when Tunisian protests were in their second week, the Algerian government enacted a price increase that sparked days of rioting. Indeed, a comparison of Algeria and Tunisia during the first week of January arguably showed the former to be more poised for nationwide revolt than the latter.²¹⁰ Demonstrations and strikes continued throughout the year, with more than 100 Algerians setting themselves on fire.²¹¹ Nonetheless, protest never went beyond localized or sporadic and expressions of discontent. Despite efforts by an opposition coalition, they did not mobilize mass participation or seriously threaten ruling authorities.²¹²

Scholars offer various explanations for the absence of an "Algerian spring." Some cite the opaque and oligarchic

nature of regime leadership, dubbed *le pouvoir* (the power).²¹³ Whereas centralization of authority in the authoritarian president gave rebellion a unifying target in Tunisia or Egypt, Algerians' were demobilized by a murky ruling structure. This logic arguably also applies in Syria. There masses rebelled even though regime power was invested in a network of elites and institutions as much as a single individual. Others contend that the Algerian regime dampened discontent by using oil and gas rents to subsidize public services, staple goods, and loans.²¹⁴ The government increased social spending when protests began in 2011. It also rescinded the unpopular price hikes, ended the 19-year state of emergency, authorized new political parties, and announced parliamentary elections.²¹⁵ Conciliatory measures certainly played a role in curbing revolutionary momentum. Yet we are left to wonder why concessions failed to mollify protestors in other autocracies, or why rentier politics did not prevent uprisings in Libya or Bahrain.

A third argument credits large deployments of well-trained police for containing demonstrations with minimal bloodshed.²¹⁶ However, the fact that police sometimes outnumbered protestors raises the question of why sweeping participation did not instead overwhelm deployments, as happened in Egypt and Tunisia. Finally, some claim that fractures in civil society compounded a lack of unity and organization in the national opposition.²¹⁷ That Berber uprisings in 1980 and 2001 centered on cultural and linguistic rights forecasted the difficulty of rallying all Algerians under a single banner. Yet social fragmentation did not prevent national revolts elsewhere, as seen in Yemen and Libya despite tribal divisions, or in Syria despite sectarian cleavages.

Tellingly, the authors of these competing explanations, like those of dozens of other academic or journalistic analysis, uniformly mention another reason why mass protest did not gather momentum: fear.²¹⁸ In 1988, tens of thousands of Algerians participated in cost-of-living riots. The government responded with shocking repression, after which it granted extensive new civil liberties and multi-party elections. An outpouring of optimism and energy accompanied what appeared to be the Arab world's first democratic transition. The opposition Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) triumphed in the first round of elections in 1991. It was likewise assured to win the second round when the military seized power, canceled elections, and declared a state of emergency. A brutal civil war ensued between the government and various Islamist rebel groups. Some 100,000 Algerians were killed and 7,000 disappeared before conflict waned by 2002.

Today, in Fareed Frahi's words, "memories of blood are still fresh in Algerians' minds."²¹⁹ The war is a "ghost" that haunts the population and leaves it with no "appetite" for radical change.²²⁰ "To put it simply," an Al-Jazeera investigation summarized, "people are scared."²²¹ Such an

affective orientation is particularly prominent among young people. The generation that led defiance in neighboring states is, in Algeria, scarred by childhoods of witnessing bloodshed. A 23-year old explains:

[The headmistress of my elementary school] was kidnapped outside her home, taken to a secret location, tortured, and executed. At the same time, our school suffered a terrorist attack that left ten of my classmates dead and many more injured . . . That was ten years ago. Yet the images of other children's bodies drenched in blood still haunt me. As does the memory of my headmistress, who endured torture I simply cannot bring myself to describe.²²²

Fear, both as an individual orientation and an emotional climate, dampened the will to rebel by leading Algerians to prioritize security above other values. "Even if we would like to fight against corruption, for justice, freedom and democracy, Algerians are still traumatized," psychology professor Cherifa Salhi explained. "We need more time to overcome the effect of ten years of violence."²²³ In the words of another Algerian, "the people who died have died . . . and the ones that are left behind just want to live in peace."²²⁴

Dispiriting emotions were both cause and effect of people's appraisals of information. Many Algerians felt that they already had their Arab spring and concluded that a seeming blossoming of democratic possibility can carry seeds of disaster.²²⁵ Looking around them at other rebellions in 2011, they were more likely to derive lessons congruent with that pre-existing fear. This was distinct from Egyptians, who gained emboldening inspiration from events in Tunisia, and Yemenis, Bahrainis, Libyans, and Syrians, who gained inspiration from Egypt. By contrast, many Algerians focused less on triumphant people's power than the resultant "messy transitions." Events in the region thus only "strengthened" their own trepidation.²²⁶ A columnist in an Algerian daily noted that his compatriots "feared the repetition of a tragic experience, some of the facets of which are now being seen in certain Arab countries."²²⁷ The violent Libyan experience was particularly foreboding. "We dislike what happened in Libya," an Algerian citizen explained. "We cannot again go through this kind of problem."²²⁸ Foreign intervention in Libya also rekindled emotional memories of Algerians' own colonial experience. "We don't need to go down the route of the Libyan disaster," an Algerian expatriate paraphrased the sentiments of his family back home. "We don't want the France we expelled in 1962 to come back to our country."²²⁹

The Algerian government took advantage of and worked to reinforce these popular fears.²³⁰ Hence, against Weyland's argument, revolution in one country did not trigger overly optimistic inferences everywhere in the region. Weyland argues that cognitive heuristics made people throughout the Arab world "willing to throw caution to the wind."²³¹ Algerians, however, may have clung to caution to an undue degree. Their words suggest what Weyland

does not consider: that interpretations of information are colored by both cognition and emotion, and thus may vary in accord with the emotional climates dominant at any time and place.

The emotional climate in Algeria increased aversion to risk, and hence a tendency toward resignation rather than resistance. In May 2012, parliamentary elections unfolded without event even though, in the words of one Algerian, they were but "a theatrical production prepared by innovators in the art of corruption."²³² Algerians suffered an "atmosphere of political suffocation"²³³ no less than their brethren in countries that launched uprisings. Yet most preferred the known problems of the status quo to the terrifying uncertainty of renewed instability.

The Case for Emotional Microfoundations

Charles Kurzman asks, "What would happen if we not only recognize meaning-making as an important facet of social movement mobilizations, but privilege it as the central feature of such phenomena?"²³⁴ In taking up this question in the case of the Arab uprisings, I aim to use these historic events as an opportunity to intervene in disciplinary conversations about the microfoundations that underpin contentious politics. Two dominant approaches respectively envision people as utility-optimizers or self-actualizers. Elaborated formulations of each, such as bounded rationality and value rationality, offer nuance. I argue for an even more psychologically inflected conceptualization of individuals as guided by both cognitive appraisals of information and emotional experiences. I take my lead from testimonials from the Middle East and North Africa. Citizens under authoritarian regimes were rational either to submit to authoritarianism or to rebel against it, so rationality alone cannot fully explain their behavior. Emotions also played a role, which was neither reducible to values nor epiphenomenal to information. Different emotions shaped people's sense of what mattered most, as well as how they made sense of external cues, judged the future, and approached risk.

Under some circumstances, an approach to microfoundations that accentuates emotions generates predictions distinct from those that emphasize instrumental or value rationality. Under others, it produces similar predictions, but attributes them to causal mechanisms that are potentially more consistent with psychology research and actors' self-understandings. In either case, it can help explain anomalies left unexplained by theories that build on other microfoundations. The cultural value of dignity was similar across countries that did or did not revolt, while the prospective costs and benefits of protest varied considerably among those that did. In some countries, such as Egypt, criticism and protest emboldened society in small ways prior to 2011. Yet in others, such as Syria, silence reigned. In some countries, such as Tunisia, armies' refusal to shoot

demonstrators widened the space for defiance. Yet in others, such as Bahrain, military forces led brutal crackdowns. In some cases, such as unions in Tunisia, formal opposition groups were important in aiding protest. Yet in Yemen, they joined only after revolt was underway, and in Libya, scarcely existed. From online communities to extended families, social networks helped recruit protesters across the region. Yet these informal ties existed before 2010 and appeared compatible with general resignation to authoritarianism . . . until they were not.

What uprisings across the Arab world held in common, and what distinguished them from the past, was the dramatic transformation from dispiriting to emboldening emotions evidenced by large portions of the population—especially those who had never before participated in public resistance. Repression generated an indignation that gave energy and courage to resisters. Emboldened by uniting with others and hopeful about the potential for change, people intensified their demands to the once unimaginable overthrow of the regime. These emotive experiences were not simply calculated or organized. Nor were they a mere byproduct of structural or strategic conditions. Rather, they helped change those conditions by propelling people into the streets and thereby altering—suddenly and shockingly—the balance of power between regime and opposition.

Future research can develop these themes by examining the role of emotions as causes, effects, or mechanisms linking contentious processes. It can explore different forms of evidence of emotions and study how emotions interact with other factors of causal import. New investigations can also advance knowledge about current developments in the Middle East by exploring a larger range of emotions. My interest in the initial shift from resignation to resistance leads to a focus on emboldenment. Others can follow the lead of Petersen and others, and probe darker emotions such as hatred, resentment, and desire for revenge. Research can also follow what happens when the provocative effects of moral shocks fade or ephemeral exhilaration evolves into disillusionment. The Egyptian filmmaker who described his compatriots as addicted to fear proposed that, 16 months after the revolution, they had become addicted to anxiety.²³⁵ At its two-year anniversary, feelings of dashed hopes rendered the dominant mood one of *ihbat*, or being weighted down by frustration.²³⁶ In Tunisia, meanwhile, a renewal of old affects motivated recurrent protest in the impoverished south. “There is a feeling that we are just not paid attention to, that no-one cares about our problems here, that no-one really respects us,” one demonstrator said in late 2010.²³⁷ These analyses remind us that ever evolving events shape emotions, and vice versa. Investigation of the two in tandem can yield new understandings of politics.

The outcomes of the Arab uprisings remain uncertain. As of this writing, elements of old regimes retain power in

many countries and civil violence rages in others. The euphoria of revolutionary victory is an increasingly distant memory. Still, something fundamental has changed in the politics of the Middle East and North Africa. In the old order, elites took societal acquiescence for granted and citizens regarded mass protest as unimaginable. The emotions that cemented those assumptions, and likewise the rules of the political game constructed upon them, have dissipated—at least for now. Even if new rules prove no less friendly to democracy, the emotions that they generate are unlikely to be an exact replica of the past. This may be the most profound legacy of the Arab revolts.

Notes

- 1 Frijda 1986, 4.
- 2 Varshney 2003, 95.
- 3 Little 1998, 203.
- 4 Patterson and Monroe 1998; also see Polletta 1998.
- 5 Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004, 252, 264.
- 6 George and Bennett 2005, ch. 10.
- 7 Ragin 1987.
- 8 Collier, Brady, and Seawright 2004, 265; Goertz and Mahoney 2011, 88–90.
- 9 Schatz 2009, 5. While this article does not directly cite my own ethnographic work, it pulls upon years of field research or study in Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories, as well as a 2012 trip interviewing Syrian refugees in Jordan about the Syrian uprising.
- 10 Elster 1999, 285.
- 11 Owen 2012.
- 12 Bellin 2004.
- 13 See Lynch 2011b.
- 14 Weyland 2012.
- 15 Ismail 2011, 540.
- 16 Aita 2011.
- 17 D. Shah 2011.
- 18 Lazarus 2001, 282.
- 19 Havel 1985, 40.
- 20 Kuran 1995, 30.
- 21 Einwohner 2003.
- 22 Varshney 2003.
- 23 Khalidi 2011; also see Wedeen 1999; Goldstein 2012; Weddady and Ahmari 2012.
- 24 Kuran 1995.
- 25 Ullmann-Margalit and Sunstein 2001.
- 26 See Kuran 2011.
- 27 Brown, forthcoming.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 44.
- 29 Kuran 1995, 35.
- 30 Kurzman 2004; Goodwin 2011.
- 31 Kuran 1995, 50–51.
- 32 *Ibid.*, 56
- 33 *Ibid.*, 5, 37, 54

- 34 Zeitouneh 2011.
 35 Saleh 2011.
 36 Weyland 2012, 921; Varshney 2003, 87.
 37 Loewenstein and Lerner 2003, 626; McDermott 2004.
 38 Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1996; Elster 1999; Lazarus 1991; Nussbaum 2003.
 39 Polletta 1998.
 40 See Marcus 2000; McDermott 2004.
 41 Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000.
 42 Druckman and McDermott 2008.
 43 Brader 2006.
 44 See Neuman et al. 2007.
 45 See Crawford 2000.
 46 See Nussbaum 2003.
 47 Le Bon 1903.
 48 Lupsha 1971; Scott 1976; Moore 1978; Sunstein and Ullmann-Margalit 2001; Kahneman and Sunstein 2005.
 49 Klandermans 1997; Jasper 1997; Aminzade and McAdam 2001; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 2001; Flam and King 2005.
 50 Wood 2003, 231–237.
 51 Gould 2009, 41.
 52 Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 2001, 416; Robinson, Smith-Lovin, and Wisecup 2006, 183.
 53 Frijda 1986, 59; McDermott 2004, 692.
 54 Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 2001, 421.
 55 Petersen 2002, 23; 2011, 25–29; also see Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1996; Elster 1999; Lazarus 1991; Nussbaum 2003; McDermott 2004.
 56 See Brader 2005; Petersen 2011.
 57 See Frijda 1986; Helm 1994; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Petersen 2002, 2011.
 58 de Sousa 1987, 196, 172.
 59 Lerner and Keltner 2000, 473, 489.
 60 de Sousa 1987; Damasio 1994; Lazarus 1991, 168; Petersen 2011.
 61 LeDoux 1996, 19.
 62 Frijda 1986, 71; LeDoux 1996, 19.
 63 Lazarus 2001, 59.
 64 See Bargh, 1984; Zajonc 1984; LeDoux 1996; Loewenstein et al. 2001; Slovic et al. 2002.
 65 Loewenstein and Lerner 2003.
 66 Lazarus 1991, ch. 6–7.
 67 Frijda 1986, 72, 199–200; also see Lerner and Keltner 2000, 479.
 68 Keltner, Ellsworth, and Edwards 1993.
 69 Mano 1994; Elster 1999, 298–300; Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001.
 70 Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Mano 1994.
 71 Lazarus 1991, 223.
 72 Meringolo 2012.
 73 Avramenko 2011, 15.
 74 Robin 2004, 18–20.
 75 Frijda 1986, 429.
 76 Ibid.
 77 Ibid.
 78 Kemper 1978, 55; also Barbalet 1998, 157.
 79 Kemper 1978, 58.
 80 Ibid., 65.
 81 Jasper 1997, 106.
 82 Gamson 1992, 32.
 83 Sunstein and Ullmann-Margalit 2001, 339, 344.
 84 Kahneman and Sunstein 2005, 91.
 85 Makiya 1998, 58.
 86 Brown, n.d.
 87 Waterbury 1973, 555.
 88 Diab 2011; also see Goldstein 2012, Khiari 2011.
 89 Owen 2012.
 90 Winegar 2013.
 91 Waterbury 1970, 61.
 92 Flam 1990, 43.
 93 Alexander 2010, 36.
 94 Ibid.; Bellin 2002; Perkins 2004.
 95 Mahmoud 2011.
 96 Tlili 2012.
 97 Goldstein 2011; also see Anis 2012.
 98 Alexander 2010, 67; also Perkins 2004, 211.
 99 Khiari 2011.
 100 Daragahi 2011.
 101 United States Embassy Tunis 2008.
 102 Alexander 2011; Goldstein 2012.
 103 Al-Souaf 2011.
 104 Daragahi 2011.
 105 Bamyeh 2012, 54.
 106 Kahneman and Sunstein 2005, 96.
 107 Bamyeh 2011, 54.
 108 Schneider 2011.
 109 Moumneh 2011.
 110 Sunstein and Ullmann-Margalit 2001, 344.
 111 Moumneh 2011.
 112 Bamyeh 2011, 54.
 113 Ryan 2011a.
 114 Bellin 1995.
 115 Kuran 1995, 285–86.
 116 Anis 2012.
 117 Ibid.
 118 Ryan 2011a.
 119 International Crisis Group 2011b, 8.
 120 BBC Worldwide Monitoring 2010.
 121 Human Rights Watch 2011.
 122 Ryan 2011b.
 123 Safdee 2012.
 124 Daragahi 2011.
 125 Ryan 2011b.
 126 Goldstein 2011.
 127 International Crisis Group 2011b, 11.
 128 Daragahi 2011; Schneider 2011.

- 129 Lutterbeck 2012, 7.
 130 International Crisis Group 2011b, 11.
 131 BBC 2011a.
 132 Kirkpatrick 2011a.
 133 Sebystyen 2011a.
 134 Kuran 1995, 54.
 135 *Ibid.*, 50.
 136 *Ibid.*, 50.
 137 Sebystyen 2011.
 138 Kuran 1995, 50–51; Tilly 1978, 88.
 139 Avramenko 2011, 7.
 140 *Financial Times* 2011.
 141 Javeline 2003.
 142 Mahmoud 2011.
 143 Tlili 2012.
 144 Nizgharat 2011.
 145 Bradley 2009; Osman 2010.
 146 Bellin 2004.
 147 Brownlee 2007a.
 148 Blaydes 2011.
 149 El-Ghobashy 2011.
 150 A. Khalil 2011, 31.
 151 *Ibid.*, 22.
 152 *Ibid.*, 22.
 153 Middle East Report 2011.
 154 El-Naggar 2011.
 155 Adjami 2011b, 21.
 156 Beinin 2005, 2011; El-Ghobashy 2011.
 157 Lynch 2011.
 158 El-Ghobashy 2011.
 159 Lévy 2011.
 160 Sharp 2005.
 161 Weyland 2012, 927, 923.
 162 A. Khalil 2011, 145.
 163 “Asmaa Mahfouz” 2011.
 164 A. Khalil 2011, 145.
 165 Lazarus 2001, 283.
 166 El-Shobaki 2011.
 167 *Ibid.*, 126.
 168 Lazarus 2001, 283.
 169 A. Khalil 2011, 129.
 170 *Ibid.*, 130.
 171 El-Ghobasy 2011.
 172 A. Khalil 2011, 130.
 173 Idle and Nunns, 2011, 29.
 174 Kurzman 2004.
 175 See Flam 2004.
 176 El-Amrani 2011.
 177 Shukrallah 2011, 312.
 178 Diab 2012.
 179 Frontline 2011.
 180 Elster 1999, 54.
 181 A. Khalil 2011, 121.
 182 El-Ghobasy 2011.
 183 *Ibid.*
 184 A. Khalil 2011, 2.
 185 El-Ghobasy 2011.
 186 A. Khalil 2011, 177.
 187 “Waseem Wagdi” 2011.
 188 “Songs of the Egyptian Revolution” 2011.
 189 International Crisis Group 2011a, 4; also see Goldstein 2012, 24.
 190 K. Khalil 2011, 71, 127.
 191 *Ibid.*, 72.
 192 *Ibid.*, 1.
 193 El-Naggar 2011.
 194 *Ibid.*
 195 Soueif 2012, xiv.
 196 A. Khalil 2011, 5.
 197 El-Naggar 2011.
 198 Malas 2011.
 199 Mackey 2011; Kirkpatrick 2011b; NPR 2012; Weaver 2011.
 200 BBC 2011b; A. Shah 2011.
 201 A. Shah 2011.
 202 D. Shah 2011.
 203 Drogin 2011.
 204 Sallam, Stacher, and Toensing 2011.
 205 A. Khalil 2011, 245.
 206 Adjami 2011a.
 207 Entelis 2011; Brynen et al. 2012, 32–33.
 208 Entelis 2011, 663.
 209 Hamouchene 2012.
 210 Séréni 2012.
 211 Khadraoui 2012.
 212 Le Monde 2012; Noe and Raad 2012.
 213 Hamouchene 2012; Brynen et al. 2012, 31.
 214 Achy 2012; Brynen et al. 2012, 32; Watanabe 2012, 3.
 215 Willis 2012, 259; Entelis 2011, 675.
 216 Hamouchene 2012; Séréni 2012.
 217 Watanabe 2012.
 218 See Entelis 2011; Joffe 2012; Willis 2012; BBC. Al Jazeera 2012a, 2012b, 2012c; Benakcha 2012; Le Monde 2012; Lowe 2012; Reuters Arabic 2012; Sgrena 2012.
 219 Reuters Arabic 2012.
 220 BBC 2011c; Achy 2012; Chikhi and Lowe 2012; Entelis 2011, 675.
 221 Al-Jazeera 2012c.
 222 Weddady and Ahmari 2012, 41.
 223 Sgrena 2012.
 224 Lowe 2012.
 225 Khadraoui 2012.
 226 Achy 2012; also Entelis 2011, 675.
 227 Bouzid 2012.
 228 Al Jazeera 2012b.
 229 Hamouchene 2012.
 230 Barkaoui 2012.
 231 Weyland 2012, 927.

232 Al-Jazeera 2012a.
 233 Entelis 2011, 673.
 234 Kurzman 2008, 5.
 235 Diab 2012.
 236 Winegar 2013.
 237 BBC 2012.

References

- Achy, Lachen. 2012. "Will Algeria Sidestep the Arab Spring?" *Carnegie Endowment*. May 31 (Arabic), <http://arabic.carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=48293>
- Adjami, Fouad. 2011a. "How the Arabs Turned Shame into Liberty." *New York Times*, February 26, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/opinion/27ajami.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>
- . 2011b. "The Sorrows of Egypt." In *The New Arab Revolt*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
- Aita, Samir. 2011. "Syrians Want Freedom and Signity." *Le Monde Diplomatique English*, July 5, <http://mondediplo.com/blogs/syrians-want-freedom-and-dignity>
- Alexander, Christopher. 2010. *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb*. London: Routledge.
- . 2011. "Tunisia's Protest Wave and What It Means for Ben Ali." *Foreign Policy online*, January 3, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/02/tunisia_s_protest_wave_where_it_comes_from_and_what_it_means_for_ben_ali
- Al-Jazeera. 2012a. "Algerian Elections . . . Fear and the Desire for Change." May 8 (Arabic), <http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/6c34bce9-abde-4116-bece-e6fe74245122>
- . 2012b. "Is Algeria Immune to the 'Arab Spring'?" May 14, <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/05/201251465357500445.html>
- . 2012c. "Algeria: The Revolution That Never Was." May 17, <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/peopleandpower/2012/05/2012516145457232336.html>
- Al-Souaf, Mohammed Hamid. 2011. "Death by Fire: An Expression of Civil Disobedience by the Arab People." *Annabaa Online*, January 22 (Arabic), <http://www.annabaa.org/nbanews/2011/01/239.htm>
- Aminzade, Ronald R., and Doug McAdam. 2001. "Emotions and Contentious Politics." In *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*, ed. Ronald R. Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone, Doug McAdam, Elizabeth J. Perry, William H. Sewell Jr., Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Anis. 2012. "Dorénavant, on n'a plus peur." *Anis Ibn Baddouda around the world*. December 31, <http://anisb.wordpress.com/2010/12/30/dorenavant-on-na-plus-peur-asmaa-mahfouz>
- "Asmaa Mahfouz." 2011. *YouTube*, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgjIgmDsEuk>
- Avramenko, Richard. 2011. *Courage: The Politics of Life and Limb*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- BBC. 2011a. "Tunisia Protests: Fresh Clashes in Tunis." January 12, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12168175>
- . 2011b. "Profile: Egypt's Wael Ghonim." February 8, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12400529>
- . 2011c. "Algeria: A Hunger for Stability?" June 2, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13616049>
- . 2012. "Three Faces of the New Tunisia." December 17, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20755296>
- BBC Worldwide Monitoring 2010. "More Riots Reported in Tunisia as Islamist Leader Calls on Youth to 'Soldier On.'" December 28.
- Bamyeh, Mohammed. 2012. "The Tunisian Revolution: Initial Reflections." In *The Dawn of the Arab Uprisings*, ed. Bassam Haddad, Rosie Bsbeer, and Ziad Abu-Rish. New York: Pluto.
- Barbalet, Jack. 1998. *Emotions, Social Theory, and Social Structure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bargh, J. A. 1984. "Automatic and Conscious Processing of Social Information." In *Handbook of Social Cognition*, vol. 3, ed. R. S. Wyer and T. K. Srull. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Barkaoui, Miloud. 2012. "Winds of Change: The Arab Spring and the 'Algerian Exception.'" In *Algeria and the Arab Spring: A Roundtable*. Conference at the University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom, March 16, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/miloud-barkaoui-jean-pierre-s%C3%A9r%C3%A9ni-hamza-hamouchene-sami-bensassi/algeria-and-arab-spring-roundtable>
- Beinin, Joel. 2005. "Popular Social Movements and the Future of Egyptian Politics." *Middle East Report Online*, March 10, <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero031005>
- Bellin, Eva. 1995. "Civil Society in Formation: Tunisia." In *Civil Society in the Middle East*, ed. Augustus Richard Norton. vol. 1. Leiden: EJ Brill.
- . 2002. *Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor, and the Paradox of State-Sponsored Development*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- . 2004. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Politics* 36(2): 139–57.
- Benakcha, Narrimane. 2012. "The Algerian Barrier: An Arab Spring Survivor." *Columbia Journal of*

- International Affairs*, March 7, <http://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/algerian-regime-arab-spring-survivor>
- Biedermann, Ferry. 2011. "No Arab Spring for Algeria, Only Scars of the Past." *The National*, May 12, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/africa/no-arab-spring-for-algeria-only-scars-of-the-past#full>
- Blaydes, Lisa. 2011. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bouزيد, Boumedién. 2012. "Change and the Barrier of 'Shared Fear.'" *Al-Khabr*. May 4 (Arabic), <http://www.elkhabar.com/ar/autres/makal/288518.html>
- Brader, Ted. 2005. "Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2): 388–405.
- . 2006. *Campaigning for Hearts and Minds*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bradley, John R. 2009. *Inside Egypt: The Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink of a Revolution*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Brown, Nathan J. [forthcoming]. "Abbe Sieyes, Guttenberg, and Habermas: Constitutional Revolutions in Egypt and the Arab World." In *On the Brink: The Arab Uprisings*, ed. Marc Lynch and Lisa Anderson. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Brownlee, Jason. 2007a. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2007b. "Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies." *World Politics* 59: 595–628.
- Brynen, Rex, Pete W. Moore, Bassel F. Salloukh, and Marie-Joëlle Zahar. 2012. *Beyond the Arab Spring: Authoritarianism & Democratization in the Arab World*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Chikhi, Lamine, and Christian Lowe. 2012. "Is an Arab Spring in the Air for Algeria?" *Reuters*, February 15, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/15/us-algeria-vote-idUSTRE81E15420120215>
- Collier, David, Henry E. Brady, and Jason Seawright. 2004. "Sources of Leverage in Causal Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology." In *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*, ed. Henry Brady and David Collier. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Crawford, Neta C. 2000. "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotions and Emotional Relationships." *International Security* 24(4): 116–36.
- Damasio, Antonio R. 1994. *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.
- Daragahi, Borzou. 2011. "Tunisia's Uprising Was Three Years in the Making." *Los Angeles Times*, January 27, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/27/world/la-fg-tunisia-uprising-20110127>
- DeNardo, James. 1985. *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- de Sousa, Ronald. 1987. *The Rationality of Emotion*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Diab, Mohammaed Abdel Hakim. 2012. "Egypt: The Revolution That Liberated the Citizens from Fear Is Threatened by Anxiety." *Al Quds*, June 29 (Arabic), <http://alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=today\29qpt699.htm&arc=data\2012\06\06-29\29qpt699.htm>
- Diab, Shabib. 2011. "Arab Popular Movements: A Phenomenon in the Process of Transformation." *Al-Akhbar*, March 31 (Arabic), <http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/7964>
- Diani, Mario, and Doug McAdam, eds. 2003. *Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Drogin, Bob. 2011. "Mubarak Speech Turns Elation in Tahrir Square to Anger." *Los Angeles Times*, February 10, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/10/world/la-fg-egypt-square-scene-20110211>
- Druckman, James, and Rose McDermott. 2008. "Emotion and the Framing of Risky Choice." *Political Behavior* 30: 297–321.
- Einwohner, Rachel L. 2003. "Opportunity, Honor, and Action in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943." *American Journal of Sociology* 109(3): 650–75.
- El-Amrani, Issander. 2011. "Why Tunis, Why Cairo?" *London Review of Books* 33(4): 3–6.
- El-Ghobashy, Mona. 2011. "The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution." *Middle East Report* 258/41(1): 2–13.
- El-Naggar, Mona. 2011. "The Legacy of 18 Days in Tahrir Square." *New York Times*, February 19, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/20/weekinreview/20tahrir.html?pagewanted=all>.
- El-Shobaki, Amr. 2011. "Egypt Is Not Tunisia." *Egypt Independent*, January 17, <http://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/egypt-not-tunisia>
- Elster, Jon. 1999. *Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Entelis, John P. 2011. "Algeria: Democracy Denied, and revived?" *Journal of North African Studies* 16(4): 653–78.
- Financial Times. 2011. "In pictures: Protests in Tunisia." January 14, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ce79ea78-1fee-11e0-b458-00144feab49a.html#slide0>
- Flam, Helena. 1990. "Emotional 'Man': 1. The Emotional 'Man' and the Problem of Collective Action." *International Sociology* 5(1): 39–56.
- . 2004. "Anger in Repressive Regimes: A Footnote to *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* by James Scott." *European Journal of Social Theory* 7(2): 171–88.

- . 2005. “Emotions’ Map: A Research Agenda.” In *Emotions and Social Movements*, ed. Helena Flam and Debra King. London: Routledge.
- Flam, Helena, and Debra King, eds. 2005. *Emotions and Social Movements*. London: Routledge.
- Frank, Robert H. 1988. *Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Frijda, Nico H. 1986. *The Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Frontline. 2011. “Revolution in Cairo.” *PBS*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/revolution-in-cairo/>
- Gamson, William A. 1975. *Strategy of Social Protest*. Homewood, IL: Dorsey.
- . 1992. *Talking Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Goertz, Garry, and James Mahoney. 2011. *A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Qualitative and Quantitative Paradigms*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Goldstein, Eric. 2011. “A Middle-Class Revolution.” *Foreign Policy online*. January 18, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/18/a_middle_class_revolution
- . 2012. “Before the Arab Spring, the Unseen Thaw.” In *World Report 2012*. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Goodwin, Jeff. 2011. “Why We Were Surprised (Again) by the Arab Spring.” *Swiss Political Science Review* 17(4): 452–56.
- Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, eds. 2001. *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 2004. “The Emotional Dimensions of Social Movements.” In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, ed. David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers.
- Gould, Deborah B. 2009. *Moving Politics: Emotion and ActUp’s Fight against AIDS*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hamouchene, Hamza. 2012. “Algeria and the Arab Spring.” In *Algeria and the Arab Spring: A Roundtable*. Conference at the University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom, March 16, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/miloud-barkaoui-jean-pierre-s%C3%A9r%C3%A9ni-hamza-hamouchene-sami-bensassi/algeria-and-arab-spring-roundtable>
- Havel, Vaclav. 1985. “The Power of the Powerless.” In *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central Eastern Europe*, ed. Vaclav Havel et al. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Helm, Bennett W. 1994. “The Significance of Emotions.” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 31(4): 319–31.
- Human Rights Watch. 2011. “Tunisia: Hold Police Accountable for Shootings.” January 29, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/01/29/tunisia-hold-police-accountable-shootings>
- Husayb, Khayr ad-Deen. 2012. “The Arab Spring: Analytical Tools for the Causes of Success and Failure.” *Al-Quds*, March 23 (Arabic), <http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=data\2012\03\03-23\23qpt480.htm>
- Idle, Nadia, and Alex Nunns, eds. 2011. *Tweets from Tahrir*. New York: OR Books.
- International Crisis Group. 2011a. “Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East I: Egypt Victorious?” *Middle East/North Africa Report* 101.
- . 2011b. “Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East IV: Tunisia’s Way.” *Middle East/North Africa Report* 106.
- Ismail, Salwa. 2011. “The Syrian Uprising: Imagining and Performing the Nation.” *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 11(3): 538–49.
- Jasper, James M. 1997. *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography and Creativity in Social Movements*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Javeline, Debra. 2003. “The Role of Blame in Collective Action: Evidence from Russia.” *American Political Science Review* 97(1): 107–21.
- Joffe, George. 2012. “The Arab Spring in North Africa: Origins and Prospects.” *Journal of North African Studies* 16(4): 507–32.
- Kahneman, Daniel, and Cass R. Sunstein. 2005. “Cognitive Psychology of Moral Intuitions.” In *Neurobiology of Human Values*, ed. Jean-Pierre P. Changeux et al. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
- Keltner, Dacher, Phoebe Ellsworth, and Kari Edwards. 1993. “Beyond Simple Pessimism: Effects of Sadness and Anger on Social Perception.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 64(5): 740–52.
- Kemper, Theodore D. 1978. *A Social Interactional Theory of Emotions*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Khadraoui, Wided. 2012. “Elections and Instability in Algeria.” *Foreign Policy in Focus Online*, May 11, http://www.fpiif.org/articles/elections_and_instability_in_algeria
- Khalidi, Rashid. 2011. “Reflections on the Revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt.” *Foreign Policy Online*, February 24, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/24/reflections_on_the_revolutions_in_tunisia_and_egypt
- Khalil, Ashraf. 2011. *Liberation Square: Inside the Egyptian Revolution and the Rebirth of a Nation*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

- Khalil, Karima. 2011. *Messages from Tahrir: Signs from Egypt's Revolution*. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press.
- Khiari, Sadri. 2011. "The Tunisian Revolution Did Not Come Out of Nowhere: Sadri Khairi Speaks to Béatrice Hibou." In *African Awakening: The Emerging Revolution*, ed. Sokari Ekine and Firoze Manji. Oxford: Pambazuka Press.
- Kirkpatrick, David. D. 2011a. "Behind Tunisia Unrest, Rage Over Wealth of Ruling Family." *New York Times*, January 13, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/world/africa/14tunisia.html?pagewanted=all>
- . 2011b. "As Egypt Protest Swells, U.S. Sends Specific Demands." *New York Times*, February 8, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/world/africa/14tunisia.html?pagewanted=all>
- Klandermans, Bert. 1997. *The Social Psychology of Protest*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Kuran, Timur. 1995. *Private Truths, Public Lives: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 2011. "The Politics of Revolutionary Surprise." *Daily News Egypt*, February 9, <http://dailynewsegypt.com/2011/02/09/the-politics-of-revolutionary-surprise/>
- Kurzman, Charles. 2004. *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 2008. "Meaning-Making in Social Movements." *Anthropological Quarterly* 81(1): 5–15.
- Lazarus, Richard S. 1991. *Emotion and Adaptation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Le Bon, Gustave. 1903. *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*. London: Fisher Unwin, Fourth Ed.
- LeDoux, Joseph E. 1996. *The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Le Monde. 2012. "L'Algérie à contre-courant du printemps arabe." May 12, http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2012/05/12/l-algerie-a-contre-courant-du-printempsarabe_1700317_3212.html
- Lerner, Jennifer S., and Dacher Keltner. 2000. "Beyond Valence: Toward a Model of Emotion-Specific Influences on Judgment and Choice." *Cognition and Emotion* 14(4): 473–93.
- . 2001. "Fear, Anger, and Risk." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 81(1): 146–59.
- Lévy, Bernard-Henri. 2011. "Why Egypt May Not Be Tunisia" *Huffington Post*, February 1, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bernardhenrilevy/post_1598_b_816912.html
- Little, Daniel. 1998. *Microfoundations, Method, and Causation*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Loewenstein, George, Christopher Hsee, Elke Weber, and Ned Welch. 2001. "Risk as Feelings." *Psychological Bulletin* 127(2): 267–86.
- Loewenstein, George, and Jennifer S. Lerner. 2003. "The Role of Affect in Decision Making." In *Handbook of Affective Science*, ed. Richard J Davidson, Klaus R. Sherer, and H. Hill Goldsmith. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Lowe, Christian. 2012. "Algeria Offers Own Brand of 'Arab Spring' for Vote." *Reuters*, April 15, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/15/us-algeria-vote-idUSBRE83E0JH20120415>
- Lupsha, Peter. 1971. "Explanation of Political Violence: Some Psychological Theories Versus Indignation." *Politics & Society* 2(1): 89–104.
- Lutterbeck, Derek. 2012. "After the Fall: Security Sector Reform in Post-Ben Ali Tunisia." *Arab Reform Initiative*, September, <http://www.arab-reform.net/after-fall-security-sector-reform-post-ben-ali-tunisia>
- Lynch, Marc. 2011. "After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab State." *Perspectives on Politics* 9(2): 301–10.
- Mackey, Robert. 2011. "Subtitled Video of Wael Ghonim's Emotional TV Interview." *New York Times*, February 8, <http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/08/subtitled-video-of-wael-ghonims-emotional-tv-interview/>
- Mahmoud, Youssef. 2011. "Tunisia after the Uprising: Conversations and Observations." *International Peace Institute Comment & Analysis*, September 16, <http://www.ipinst.org/news/comment-a-analysis/260-tunisia-after-the-uprising-conversations-and-observations-.html>
- Makiya, Kanan. 1998. *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Malas, Nour. 2011. "The Interview with Wael Ghonim That Galvanized Protesters." *Wall Street Journal Blogs*, February 8, <http://blogs.wsj.com/dispatch/2011/02/08/the-interview-with-wael-ghonim-that-galvanized-protesters/>
- Mano, Haim. 1994. "Risk-taking, Framing Effects, and Affect." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 57(1): 38–58.
- Marcus, George E. 2000. "Emotions and Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3: 221–50.
- Marcus, George E., W. Russell Neuman, and Michael MacKuen. 2000. *Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Margalit, Edna and Cass R. Sunstein. 2001. "Inequality and Indignation." *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 30(4): 337–62.
- Masoud, Tarek. 2011. "The Road to (and from) Liberation Square." *Journal of Democracy* 22(3): 20–34.
- McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds. 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- McDermott, Rose. 2004. "The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science." *Perspectives on Politics* 2(4): 691–706.
- Meringolo, Azzurra. 2012. "The Inconvenient Revolution." *Foreign Policy Online*, November 7, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/07/the_inconvenient_revolution
- Middle East Report. 2011. "Red-White-and-Black Valentine.", February 14, <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero021411>
- Moore, Barrington Jr. 1978. *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
- Moumneh, Rasha. 2011. "A Young Man's Desperation Challenges Tunisia's Repression." *Foreign Policy Online*, January 3, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/03/a_young_man_s_desperation_challenges_tunisia_s_repression
- NPR. 2012. "Wael Ghonim: Creating a Revolution 2.0 in Egypt." February 9, <http://www.npr.org/2012/02/09/146636605/wael-ghonim-creating-a-revolution-2-0-in-egypt>
- Neuman, W. Russell, George Marcus, Ann Crigler, and Michael MacKuen, eds. 2007. *The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Nizgharat, Othman. 2011. "The Arab Revolution begins on the Croisette." *Al-Akhbar*, May 17 (Arabic), <http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/12260?page=1>
- Noe, Nicholas, and Walid Raad. 2012. "No Arab Spring Please, We're Algerian." *Bloomberg*, May 7 <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-07/no-arab-spring-please-we-re-algerian.html>
- Nussbaum, Martha C. 2003. *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Oberschal, Anthony. 1973. *Social Conflict and Social Movements*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Osman, Tarek. 2010. *Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Owen, Roger. 2012. *The Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Patterson, Molly, and Kristen Renwick Monroe. 1998. "Narrative in Political Science." *Annual Review of Political Science* 1: 315–31.
- Perkins, Kenneth. 2004. *A History of Modern Tunisia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Petersen, Roger D. 2002. *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2011. *Western Intervention in the Balkans: The Strategic Use of Emotion in Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Polletta, Francesca. 1998. "'It Was like a Fever . . .': Narrative and Identity in Social Protest." *Social Problems* 45(2): 137–59.
- Ragin, Charles. 1987. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Redlawsk, David, ed. 2006. *Feeling Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Reuters Arabic. 2012. "Algeria Goes after Street Vendors following Declining Fear of Unrest." October 12 (Arabic) <http://ara.reuters.com/article/topNews/idARACAE89B06P20121012?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0>
- Robin, Corey. 2004. *Fear: The History of a Political Idea*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Robinson, Dawn T., Lynn Smith-Lovin, and Allison K. Wisecup. 2006. "Affect Control Theory." In *Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions*, ed. Jan E. Stets and Jonathan H. Turner. New York: Springer.
- Ryan, Yasmine. 2011a. "How Tunisia's Revolution Began." *Al-Jazeera*, January 26, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/2011126121815985483.html>
- . 2011b. "The Massacre behind the Revolution." *Al-Jazeera*, February 16, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/02/2011215123229922898.html>
- Safdee, Mataa. 2012. "The New Arab Left: Remnants of the Old Regime or New Vanguard?" *Al-Quds*, April 4 (Arabic), <http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=today\29qpt699.htm&arc=data\2012\04\04-29\29qpt699.htm>
- Saleh, Yassin al-Haj. 2011. "The Syrian 'Common': The Uprising of the Working Society." *Jadaliyya*, August 14, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2377/the-syrian-common_the-uprising-of-the-working-soci
- Sallam, Hesham, Joshua Stacher, and Chris Toensing. 2011. "Into Egypt's Uncharted Territory." *Middle East Report Online*. February 1, <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero020111>.
- Schatz, Edward. 2009. "Introduction: Ethnographic Immersion and the Study of Politics." In *Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power*, ed. Edward Schatz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schneider, Cathy Lisa. 2011. "Debate: Violence and State Repression." *Swiss Political Science Review* 17(4): 480–84.
- Scott, James. 1976. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

- Sebystyen, Amanda. 2011. "Voices From the Tunisian Revolution," *Red Pepper Online*, May, <http://www.redpepper.org.uk/voices-from-the-tunisian-revolution/>.
- . 2012. "Voices from the Tunisian Revolution." *Red Pepper Online*, May, <http://www.redpepper.org.uk/voices-from-the-tunisian-revolution/>
- Séréni, Jean-Pierre. 2012. "Contrasted Overtures to the Arab Spring in Algeria and Tunisia." In *Algeria and the Arab Spring: A Roundtable*. Conference at the University of Portsmouth, United Kingdom, March 16, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/miloud-barkaoui-jean-pierre-s%C3%A9r%C3%A9ni-hamza-hamouchene-sami-bensassi/algeria-and-arab-spring-roundtable>
- Sgrena, Giuliana. 2012. "Algeria Skips the Revolutionary Spring." *IPS News*, October 31, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/10/algeria-skips-the-spring-of-discontent/>
- Shah, Angela. 2011. "Egypt's New Hero: Can Geek-Activist Wael Ghonim Overthrow Mubarak?" *Time*, February 8, <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2047006,00.html>
- Shah, Dhruvi. 2011. "The Big Stories Affecting You in 2011." *BBC News*. December 26, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16275176>
- Sharp, Heather. 2005. "Egypt's Young Call for Change." *BBC News*, August 3, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4709011.stm
- Shukrallah, Hani. 2011. *Egypt, the Arabs, and the World: Reflections at the Turn of the Twenty-first Century*. Cairo: American University of Cairo Press.
- Slovic, Paul, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, and Donald MacGregor. 2002. "The Affect Heuristic." In *Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment*, ed. Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- "Songs of the Egyptian Revolution: Cursed Be Fear." 2011. *YouTube*. Uploaded on February 16 (Arabic), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uzz_Zi7hfT4
- Soueif, Ahdaf. 2012. *Cairo: My City, Our Revolution*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Sunstein, C. R. and E. Ullmann-Margalit. 2001. "Solidarity Goods." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 9: 129–149.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Tlili, Hassan. 2012. "The Demise of Fear and the Freedom to Talk Are Among the Most Important Achievements of the Jasmine Revolution." *AFP*, January 14 (Arabic), <http://www.france24.com/ar/20120114-tunisia-commemorating-one-year-anniversary-fall-benali-no-fear-free-expression>
- United States Embassy Tunis. 2008. "Corruption in Tunisia: What's Yours Is Mine." *Wikileaks*, Cable 08TUNIS679, created June 23, 2008, released August 30, 2011. <http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/06/08TUNIS679.html#>
- Varshney, Ashutosh. 2003. "Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality." *Perspectives on Politics* 1(1): 85–99.
- "Waseem Wagdi, Egyptian protester. Egyptian Embassy, London." 2011. *YouTube*, Uploaded January 29, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7hBV0ApIh_4
- Watanabe, Lisa. 2012. "A 'Spring for Algeria'? The Prospects for Managed Transition." *GCSP Policy Paper 2012/6*.
- Waterbury, John. 1970. *Commander of the Faithful: The Moroccan Political Elite—A Study in Segmented Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . 1973. "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime." *World Politics* 25(4): 553–54.
- Weaver, Matthew. 2011. "Egypt protests." *Guardian Blog*. February 8, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2011/feb/08/egypt-protests-live-updates>
- Weddady, Nasser, and Sohrab Ahmari. 2012. *Arab Spring Dreams*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Wedeen, Lisa. 1999. *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Weyland, Kurt. 2012. "The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848?" *Perspectives on Politics* 10(4): 917–34.
- Willis, Michael J. 2012. *Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Winegar, Jessica. 2013. "Weighed Down: The Politics of Frustration in Egypt." *Middle East Report Online*, January 11, <http://www.merip.org/weighed-down-politics-frustration-egypt>.
- Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2003. *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Zajonc, Robert B. 1984. "On the Primacy of Affect." *American Psychologist* 39: 117–23.
- Zeitouneh, Razan. 2011. "The Makers of the Revolution." Trans. Hani Sayed. *Jadaliyya*, August 18, <http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/2417/the-makers-of-the-revolution>