Citizen-teachers play a crucial role in such education. According to Esquith, citizen-teachers are intellectuals, such as academics, writers, and artists, who help a larger audience understand the meaning behind critical reenactments. Through their interpretation of critical reenactments, citizen-teachers cultivate empathy, an ability to "understand severe violence . . . without becoming either self-absorbed in their own moral status or oblivious to the differences that remain between themselves as bystanders and those who suffer most from severe violence" (p. 84). Citizen-teachers educate bystanders critically (helping both themselves and bystanders appreciate their own complicity in violence), responsibly (drawing attention to the responsibilities we share with other members of the groups of which we are a part), and democratically (stimulating discussion of what the political responsibilities of everyday bystanders are, rather than dictating how political responsibilities should be understood).

In my critical commentary, I want to draw attention to three issues that Esquith does not address but which impact the force of his argument. First, he is very explicit that his purpose is not to provide an account of what the political responsibilities of everyday bystanders are. He does not answer such questions as "Once everyday bystanders recognize their complicity in severe violence, what are they supposed to do? . . . Should everyday bystanders support reparations, reform immigration laws, or increase foreign aid and charitable giving?" (p. 210). The failure to address this question, in my view, diminishes his overall argument because it leaves unclear just how urgent it is to motivate bystanders to fulfill their responsibilities. If the moral demands on bystanders are quite robust, then this strengthens the imperative of countering the widespread denial of their existence. However, if what morality demands is relatively minor, then the urgency of recognizing our bystander status becomes more questionable.

Second, Esquith is, in my view, overly optimistic about the positive impact that democratic education, and citizen-teachers in particular, can have on everyday bystanders. Such optimism seems questionable if we situate the role of the citizen-teacher and political education within a broader social context. Structural or institutional factors may prevent the citizen-teacher's voice from being heard or message taken seriously, as may the desire of those who benefit from severe violence to avoid confronting their complicity. The author does not consider these issues and how, relatedly, such factors may be mitigated.

Finally, Esquith does not clarify the relationship between political education and other kinds of political processes that may inform the way that individuals think about, and the degree to which they take seriously, their political responsibilities. Such a discussion is important both for formulating realistic expectations about the extent and kind of contribution that democratic education can make and for appreciating the other actions that must be taken if everyday bystanders are to acknowledge and take political responsibility for severe violence.

At the same time, this is an important book because it takes seriously a seldom discussed, but critically important, question: How can we encourage bystanders to violence to recognize and take seriously their political responsibilities? Esquith draws on a wide range of sources, including personal stories, movies, poetry, novels, and plays. He provides a compelling diagnosis of some of the obstacles to recognition of political responsibility by bystanders and makes a persuasive case for the importance of citizen-teachers and critical reenactments in cultivating empathy and critical reflection.

John Dewey and the Habits of Ethical Life: The Aesthetics of Political Organizing in a Liquid World.
By Jason Kosnoski. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010. 272p. $75.00.
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— R. W. Hildreth, *Southern Illinois University-Carbondale*

According to Jason Kosnoski, modern social life is profoundly disorienting. We are unable to "locate ourselves" in the midst of increasing fragmentation, social acceleration, complexity, and interdependence. The temporal and spatial qualities of modernity are, in Zygmunt Bauman's term, "liquid." This liquidity undermines our ability to make moral and intellectual connections between our lived experiences and the social forces that structure our larger environments. How should we confront this challenge? Kosnoski develops an answer in his ambitious book *John Dewey and the Habits of Ethical Life: The Aesthetics of Political Organizing in a Liquid World.* By placing John Dewey's aesthetic thought into conversation with neo-Habermasian political theory, Kosnoski's goal is to theorize the discursive practices and strategies that can "constitute a concrete ethical life" (postconventional *Sittlichkeit*). Expanding these practices will help individuals "sustain a flexible, expansive, and democratic understanding of justice that could inspire a truly active, global public sphere" (p. 5). While the book has great promise, it is less successful in articulating political strategies to counteract the social liquidity that Kosnoski finds so troubling. The book is worth reading, however, both for its unique interpretation of Dewey's social philosophy and its important contributions to deliberative theory.

The book begins with a diagnosis of our current predicament. The first chapter draws primarily on Jürgen Habermas and Zygmunt Bauman to document increasing social fragmentation and "social liquidity." Kosnoski claims that such conditions have created a "crisis in *Sittlichkeit.*" Because we cannot form "trustworthy cognitive maps" that connect our lived experiences with larger environments, we cannot discern the "immediate ethical import of events"

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(p. 27). So how do we address questions of global democratic justice in the context of radical disorientation? In chapter 2, Kosnoski turns to the work of neo-Habermasians such as Seyla Benhabib, Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato, and Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson. Kosnoski reads this group of theorists as making progressive corrections to Habermas's theory of discourse ethics. Kosnoski argues that while neo-Habermasians provide a fuller and more realistic account of the content and process of democratic deliberation, they fail to explore the actual lived experiences of such discussions. For Kosnoski, Dewey's aesthetic theory best addresses this omission.

In chapter 3, Kosnoski presents a Deweyan account of the lived experiences of communication, emphasizing its noncognitive, aesthetic, and mediatory dimensions. He argues that through reconstructive communication, groups can develop new cognitive maps of and new relationships with their larger environment" (p. 111). In chapter 4, reconstructive communication is formalized via Dewey's concept of thinking. For Kosnoski, the habits of curiosity, deep suggestion, and judgment represent normative guides to discursive practice. Chapter 5 considers Dewey's understanding of associational life as a communicative space that simultaneously protects us from and enables us to engage our liquid social environment. Because Dewey does not theorize the internal structure of associational life, in chapter 6, Kosnoski presents the "teacher/organizer" as a guiding figure for communication.

John Dewey and the Habits of Ethical Life presents a vital contribution to Dewey studies. Kosnoski offers an important alternative to participatory readings of Dewey's political thought (e.g., those of Robert Westbrook, William Caspary, and Judith Green). Instead, he focuses on the aesthetic dimensions of communication. This displaces the instrumentalism of problem solving with cooperative meaning making. Kosnoski does an excellent job tracing this process: Starting with pre-cognitive experiences of felt difficulties, individuals do not know the nature of their problematic situations. This confusion and ambiguity propels individuals to communicate with others. Dewey's aesthetic theory highlights the temporal, spatial, somatic, and emotional dimensions of communication. Through a progressive and reiterative process of expressing meanings, listening to others, and reconfiguring perceptions, groups are able to reformulate problematic situations, understand larger social dynamics, and form cognitive maps of their social worlds.

Kosnoski argues that this attentiveness to the lived experiences of communication makes two important additions to neo-Habermasian political thought. First, he carefully describes how feelings of vagueness represent an alternative pathway to discourse. Rather than entering deliberation on the basis of interests or clear problems, we may also enter into deliberation because we don't know what to do. Second, Dewey presents a thicker account of the actual conversational practices that produce an "enlarged mentality." Specifically, "habits of thinking" highlight the competencies that both motivate individuals and help them learn through communication. Kosnoski argues that norms of autonomy, reciprocity, and solidarity are not located in abstract procedures but in "habits that underlie a particular moral conception cognizant with democratic justice" (p. 124). Thus, this book shows how Dewey can be put into productive conversation with contemporary deliberative theory. Instead of standing as a precursor, Dewey, as Kosnoski effectively shows, can be a vital participant in current debates.

This book advances the ambitious aim of constructing a concrete ethical life of democratic justice in the face of social liquidity. Such ambition raises the stakes. In my view, Kosnoski falls short on two counts. First, I was not convinced that social liquidity represents a crisis in ethical life. While the pace, scale and scope of change are unsettling, it is unclear if these developments "inhibit individuals from forming 'cognitive maps' they might use to negotiate their fragmented, constantly shifting public environment" (p. 10). Moreover, Kosnoski's claim that Dewey's social analysis of social dislocation and acceleration bears "a striking resemblance to Bauman's descriptions" (p. 167) begs the question: How has social liquidity changed between the time of Dewey and today? Indeed, we might see the ways in which our cognitive maps are always partial. We draw on ethical values precisely because of incomplete information. So rather than a crisis, our partial maps might be a constitutive feature of ethical life.

Second, while the emphasis on aesthetic dimensions represents an important corrective to participatory readings of Dewey, Kosnoski's expansive concept of aesthetics does not seem to have the political or critical traction to counteract social liquidity. For Kosnoski, the end of reconstructive communication is "mutual understanding concerning meanings within situation" (p. 110). While mutual understanding may help us develop better cognitive maps, I was not convinced that this, in turn, will "lead to more active citizenry . . . that demands a large sphere of democratic control encompassing areas of economy and society" (p. 243).

Kosnoski points to associational life as the location for this transformation from cognitive maps to democratic control. He looks to Dewey's educational writings to flesh out how such a process occurs. In the penultimate chapter, Kosnoski offers a convincing account of schooling as "aesthetic geography." He looks to Dewey's original design of the Laboratory School as a way to walk us through the aesthetic, geographic, and collective experience of reconstructive communication. This process requires the assistance of a teacher to guide these experiences. Kosnoski then argues that we can translate the model of a teacher/classroom into an organizer/community association. This

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translation needs to be articulated more fully. Schools and community organizations are qualitatively different institutions. It is also difficult to see a proliferation of organizers across associational life.

There are several important shortcomings in this book. They do not, however, take away from its central insights. Kosnoski's innovative reading of Dewey and analysis of the lived experience of communication are highly valuable for anyone interested in democratic theory.

A General Theory of Domination and Justice. By Frank Lovett. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 288p. $85.00.
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— Casiano Hacker-Cordón, *Trinity College*

The concept of domination plays a central role both in the relatively new wave of civic republican theorizing, headed by Philip Pettit, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli, and in the works of theorists of justice and democracy, such as Iris Marion Young, Ian Shapiro, and James Bohman. Yet, upon close inspection of such work, one will be disappointed to find that while the term is used in various rhetorically decisive junctures, domination is never defined in a cogent manner. Hence, the normative correctness or incorrectness of the various political arguments made by appeal to nondomination is bound to remain vague. So claims Frank Lovett, and his book aims to rectify this situation by developing a theory of domination that defines the term in a cogent manner and explains the normative appeal of nondomination in the context of a theory of social justice, correspondingly dubbed "justice as minimizing domination," or JMD. As Lovett states, "(JMD) Societies are just to the extent that their basic structure is organized so as to minimize the expected sum total domination experienced by their members, counting the domination of each member equally" (p. 159).

Taking a clue from legal positivist analytical jurisprudence, Lovett divides the book into a "descriptive" part and a "normative" part. The definition of domination adequate for a useful theory, Lovett argues, should be "strictly descriptive," such that when it's applied, it is capable of identifying real-world instances of domination without reference to the normative features of those instances (p. 19). Lovett points out that the statement "Wilderness areas ought to be preserved for reasons x, y, and z" (p. 18) does not give reasons for action or inaction unless we have a conceptual definition of wilderness that specifies salient, strictly descriptive features of wilderness such that, with those features in mind, we can identify particular tracts of land as instances of wilderness. Yet unlike wilderness, domination is not a natural phenomenon but a social one, and as such, it may very well have features that are simultaneously descriptive and normative. I agree that a cogent definition of domination should specify characteristics; I disagree that *all* these characteristics have to be thoroughly nonnormative or strictly descriptive in order for the definition to play a practically informative role in a useful theory.

Part 1 of Lovett's book develops his "strictly descriptive" conception of domination, and the normative analysis in Part 2 puts the conception in the context of a theory of justice. Assuming for the sake of argument that his method of separating descriptive analysis and normative analysis is sound, the normative analysis could not really get going in a worthwhile direction if the descriptive analysis is faulty. That alone motivates me to concentrate the rest of my discussion on Part 1. But there are other reasons to concentrate our attention on this part, since one of Lovett's most important contributions is that he delineates a typology of conceptions of domination, which is in itself very useful for understanding, classifying, and arguing through the variety of views about domination that can be gleaned from the plentiful literatures germane to the concept. In chapter 4, Lovett succinctly addresses and draws from vast families of discussions, including arguments derived from Antonio Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, and Michel Foucault, as well as arguments closer to Lovett's own, such as Steven Lukes's interventions on power. The typology he develops enables him to both build on some prior contributions to the enterprise of defining domination and to clearly distinguish his position from those that can be found in or constructed from the extant germane literatures.

So what is Lovett's definition of domination? Put in his own words, "persons or groups are subject to domination to the extent that they are dependent on a social relationship in which some other person wields arbitrary power over them" (p. 119). As he points out (p. 120), this definition excludes the notion that social systems can themselves be considered domination on account of their modus operandi: domination directly involves the intentional behavior of specifiable agents, dominators and dominatees. The dominators and the dominatees must be in a social relationship with each other, the dominators must have more power than the dominatees, and—crucially, to distinguish Lovett's view from prior accounts that focus on differentials in power within social relationships—their social relationship must be such that the more powerful wield "arbitrary" power over the less powerful. People familiar with Philip Pettit's argument regarding freedom as nondomination will at this point probably think there is thus nothing new in Lovett's book, since Pettit also makes a big deal about how domination should be defined in terms of a sort of arbitrariness. But Lovett's account of arbitrariness is markedly different from Pettit's, and he clearly distinguishes this difference (pp. 115–16). While for Pettit, the nonarbitrariness of the power dynamics operative in a social relationship is a function of whether the relationship is somehow made to track or responsively reflect the affected persons' beliefs about their interests as

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