

however, attempting to answer them, or to assess Franklin's answers to them. For instance, where Franklin notes that the American Indians seemed reluctant to give up their lives of ease and freedom to adopt European lifestyles, and even that many European settlers who were taken captive by the Indians were loath to return to "civilization," Houston simply remarks that although Franklin was "keenly aware of the complex, contingent, and sometimes ironic character of improvement," he never "doubted the virtues of civilization" (pp. 126–28). Even if readers looking for a comprehensive, critical exposition of Franklin's political thought may come away somewhat disappointed, however, all readers will thank Houston for helping to deepen and expand our understanding of this complex, and often underappreciated, political thinker.

**Hobbes, Bramhall and the Politics of Liberty and Necessity: A Quarrel of the Civil Wars and Interregnum.**

By Nicholas D. Jackson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 360p. \$104.00.  
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Thomas Hobbes is widely regarded as one of modern political thought's foundational thinkers. In his book, Nicholas D. Jackson considers Hobbes against the backdrop of the philosophical and political controversies of his day and, in particular, in terms of his arguments with John Bramhall, bishop of Derry and later Armagh.

The contents of the book can be divided into two parts: uninterpreted facts regarding what Bramhall said and did on various occasions, and judgments about the significance of these facts. Jackson's book may be commended for the first. The bishop comes off as "a shrewd surveyor and assessor of property and profitability" in the author's words (p. 34), a politically engaged royalist and theological controversialist steeped in scholasticism. Beyond that, Jackson tells the familiar story about how in 1645 the then-Earl of Newcastle asked his fellow exiles, Bramhall and Hobbes, to discuss the issue of free will. Bramhall, the Arminian, was for it, Hobbes, the Calvinist, against it. After the debate, Bramhall wrote up his views for Newcastle, who then asked Hobbes for his reply. Neither man was to publish his thoughts at that time, in part because the topic was inflammatory. However, Hobbes's contribution, *Of Liberty and Necessity*, was eventually published in 1654 without, he claimed, his knowledge. Offended, Bramhall replied. More offended, Hobbes replied in *Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance*. Offended to the highest degree, Bramhall replied in *Castigations of Mr Hobbes his last Animadversions in the Case concerning Liberty, and Universal Necessity*.

Rather than directly proving that free will exists, Bramhall argues that it is presupposed in the Bible and is a necessary condition for morality. Hobbes argues that the

Bible does not presuppose the theory of free will and morality does not require it. To sin is to break a law of God, and that neither says nor entails anything about free will. Hobbes is a "soft" determinist because he thinks that words such as "free" and "voluntary" can be given a straightforward sense and can be correctly attributed to human beings or their actions. Jackson reports many of the beliefs held by each man but does little to analyze their arguments, much less to evaluate them. This brings us to the kind of judgments and interpretations he does offer.

The author's general thesis is that the significance of the debate between Bramhall and Hobbes is that "the whole quarrel" between them was "a by-product or collateral intellectual skirmish of those rebellions and wars in the British Isles" (p. 1). Adherence to free will went with royalism, and adherence to predestination went with the parliamentarians. If Jackson's general thesis were right, then the free will debate would be a philosophical tail wagging a political dog. Further, describing the political activities of Bramhall—and, in Hobbes's case, the relative lack of political activities—does not prove that the debate over free will was a by-product of the British civil wars. The debate is perennial. It goes back to the church fathers, was a central issue during the Reformation, and was a principal point of contention in England between Calvinists and non-Calvinists throughout the seventeenth century. Jackson is not helped by the fact that views about free will and politics are logically independent of each other. Some parliamentarians believed in free will and some royalists did not. If there is a causal relation between free will and one's politics, the direction could go either way.

Jackson is amazed that Hobbes's works in political philosophy are not replete with partisan arguments for or against Charles I and Charles II, or for or against the rebels and the Commonwealth. While his amazement may be due to the fashion of treating Hobbes's works of political philosophy as political actions, Jackson might have considered that they are works of philosophy, not political tracts (cf. p. 273). Hobbes preferred monarchies and moderate episcopal churches, subject to monarchs; but he professed the legitimacy of other forms of government and hated any religious theory that he thought would subvert government, in particular, presbyterianism and episcopacy *jure divino*.

Jackson exaggerates the consequences of actions. He thinks that since Hobbes disagreed with Bramhall, who held the same view as the king, Hobbes was indirectly insulting the king; and that since he, while in exile, received money from the Cavendishes, he could be considered "the spokesman of the Cavendishes"; conversely, any criticism of Hobbes could be criticism of the Cavendishes. If Hobbes was "a pollutant," then the Cavendishes were "the chemists of such pollution" (pp. 270–71, Jackson's emphasis).

The author's prose is overheated. He says that Hobbes is "arrogating" something on several occasions when

Hobbes is merely presenting his views (e.g., pp. 121 and 229). So sensitive is Jackson to Hobbes's arrogance that he sees "a striking resemblance between the faces of the Leviathan figure and Hobbes" (p. 249). Hobbes's doctrines are subversive, and his "fangs" are dripping with sarcasm on one occasion and bared on another; and he lies "through his teeth" (pp. 204, 217, 226). He is a "chameleon" (pp. 179 and 268; cf. p. 272).

Jackson is verbose. Every abstract, possible interpretation of Hobbes's behavior is mentioned, even though not all the evidence for the plausible ones is given. So it is not enough for Jackson that Hobbes declared that he had nothing to do with the publication of *Of Liberty and Necessity* and that there is no evidence that he did, and it takes the author four pages to conclude that Hobbes probably did not, but maybe he did (p. 194). This conclusion also illustrates another problem with the book. It is too equivocal. After insisting on the incompatibility of Bramhall's royalism and Hobbes's nonroyalism, near the end Jackson says that Hobbes was "in all likelihood more royalist than not" (p. 273). He also concedes that the "quarrel over the issue of free will" is separable from "the unique political and personal contexts" and part of the "two forces within a broad 'anglicanism,'" and that Hobbes was right to frame the debate as "an arminian-calvinist one" (pp. 276–77). In short, Jackson seems to retract in the Conclusion what he propounded earlier in the book. As a result, *Hobbes, Bramhall and the Politics of Liberty and Necessity* offers some useful commentary and contains much of historical interest, yet it comes up very short as an analysis of Hobbes's philosophy, his politics, or the intellectual history of his time.

**Reimagining Politics After the Terror: The Republican Origins of French Liberalism.** By Andrew Jainchill. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008. 336p. \$45.00.

**Liberal Values: Benjamin Constant and the Politics of Religion.** By Helena Rosenblatt. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 296p. \$99.00.  
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The two books under review address a moment in the development of French political thought that has come in for intense scrutiny in recent years. In the wake of the French Revolution, a diverse array of political thinkers pondered such themes as the restoration of order, the legitimation of political authority, the proper limits of such authority, and the creation of institutions through which sovereignty—whether of the people or the monarch—might be restrained as well as exercised. It is common to classify these thinkers as "liberals," although it is one of Andrew Jainchill's central themes that the term itself may be an obstacle to a clear understanding of their ideas.

This terminological problem arises out of a long-running historical debate launched by John Pocock's *Machiavellian Moment* (1975) and Bernard Bailyn's work on the origins of the American Revolution. It became commonplace for a time to oppose the "republican" thinkers and pamphleteers who were the focus of Pocock's and Bailyn's work to a distinct tradition of "liberal" thought, descended from John Locke. As the debate wore on, some scholars concluded that perhaps distinctions introduced originally for analytic clarity had led to a heightening of the contrast between the two schools, whose actual manifestations had been less sharply delineated in reality than in the pages of scholarly monographs. Liberals and republicans did not form hostile camps. Although their emphases were different, many of their more fundamental concerns about the nature of the state and the relation of polity to society were shared.

In France, a similar debate grew out of the revolutionary historiography of the French Revolution, associated most notably with the late François Furet. Furet placed the liberal-republican dichotomy at the heart of the revolution itself and conceptualized the subsequent century's history as a series of efforts to tame disruptive republicanism and bring the revolution home to "safe harbor." Jainchill persuasively links the "explosion in interest" in this theme of taming revolutionary passions to "a very specific historical context, the French 'antitotalitarian' moment of the 1970s and 1980s, which has decisively shaped the scholarship on French liberalism" (p. 15). In short, Furet and his followers were reacting against the idea that the French Revolution, by establishing popular sovereignty, had simultaneously established liberty. Following Tocqueville, Furet instead saw the substitution of one type of power for another. On this view, French liberalism exhibited a congenital "distrust of popular democracy" (p. 17).

Against this Furetian revisionism, Jainchill argues that French liberalism was in fact a hybrid of liberalism with republicanism. It was elaborated, moreover, "in revulsion [not] to Jacobinism" but "more to the experience with Bonaparte's authoritarianism" (p. 17). Jainchill thus defends a view of French liberalism as more a product of the revolution than a reaction against it, the work of men steeped in republican ideas and ideals but educated by experience with revolutionary government to seek "a stable, constitutional republic" (p. 17).

There is a certain fluctuation in Jainchill's various characterizations of the group of thinkers on whom he focuses. At times, he calls them "centrist republicans" (p. 17). Elsewhere drawing on the work of James Livesey, he insists on a distinction between "classical" and "modern" republicanism, only to dissolve it quickly in "classical-republican concerns stemming from post-Terror political culture and . . . best described as 'liberal republicanism'" (p. 11). There is a somewhat artificial feel to the kaleidoscope of fine distinctions drawn throughout the Introduction, where