

In legislative institutions where partisanship is the dominant mechanism guiding behavior, the creation of bipartisan caucuses attempts to disrupt deeply held norms and loyalties. But as Mahoney astutely explains: “Organizing legislatures around partisan identities poses inherent contradictions for legislators who hold multiple politically salient identities” (p. 26). Women’s caucuses can create sites for organizing among women that are alternative to their party caucuses, thus addressing their shared experiences and marginalization, but they may also pose risks and challenges to women members. These risks and challenges are documented in interviews and case studies throughout the book, suggesting that partisanship is the most significant hurdle—and one that only seems to be growing taller—to women’s collective organizing within today’s state legislative chambers.

“Savvy entrepreneurs,” as the author calls them, are necessary to effectively evaluate and navigate the partisan and gendered terrain of state legislatures if attempts to create women’s caucuses are to be successful. These critical actors must be willing to take on the risk of organizing along gender lines, and must be savvy enough to understand and identify windows of opportunity and marshal the resources to take advantage of them. They must also develop effective frames by which to recruit caucus supporters and members, recognizing where partisan constraints require the creation of less policy-focused organizations and tapping into the type of gender consciousness identified by Mahoney as at least helpful for uniting women legislators.

While the bulk of the text focuses on the creation of women’s caucuses, it also makes a strong case for why women’s collective organizing in state legislatures matters. Mahoney argues that women’s caucuses can provide emotional support for women in male-dominated—and too often hostile—environments; facilitate information sharing and relationship development; help women to develop skills and expertise for legislative success; and offer outward-facing results, such as support for women’s leadership development and candidacy.

More directly drawing from feminist institutionalism literature, Mahoney describes the interventions of women’s caucuses into legislative institutions that go beyond, though can also include, the adoption of women-friendly policy. She notes that women’s caucuses challenge the false idea of gender neutrality in these institutions, simultaneously making visible and pushing back against male dominance. When she describes women’s caucuses as “visible gendered practice,” she clearly captures why studying them is so important and revealing. Beyond telling compelling stories about the success or failure of specific caucuses, *Women Take Their Place in State Legislatures* successfully tells a much larger—and even more broadly applicable—story about the ways in which

gender and partisanship significantly shape the patterns, distribution, and exercise of power within our legislative institutions.

**The Unsolid South: Mass Politics and National Representation in a One-Party Enclave.** By Devin Caughey. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018. 240p. \$99.00 cloth, \$35.00 paper.

doi:10.1017/S1537592719000331

— Charles S. Bullock, III, *University of Georgia*

Here is a spoiler alert. If you have read the late Barbara Sinclair’s *Congressional Realignment, 1925–1978* (1982), then you know how southern Democrats’ roll-call voting changed from being more liberal than that of many northern Democrats to frequently aligning with Republicans. Early in the New Deal, southern Democrats were among the most liberal members of the House except when it came to Civil Rights. Over time, growing numbers of Southerners shifted rightward. *The Unsolid South* covers some of the same ground as Sinclair’s book but is limited to economic policy, which Devin Caughey defines as two of the five policy areas she examines: government management and social welfare.

While the two works reach the same conclusion, Caughey provides richer detail than Sinclair when documenting the dramatic shift in southern Democrats’ policy preferences. Caughey parallels Sinclair at points, but goes beyond her work in several ways. He analyzes both chambers of Congress whereas Sinclair focused exclusively on the House. A more significant difference, however, is that Caughey links the changing roll-call behavior of southern members of Congress to shifts in the policy preferences of their constituents. By examining the linkage between the public and its representatives, he ventures deeply into unexplored territory guided by a heretofore unexploited resource: extensive polling data.

In the course of explaining the bases for shifting legislator preferences, Caughey weighs in on the debate over the identity of those to whom southern members of Congress were responsive. He meticulously documents that southern legislators were not pawns of the elite but instead faithfully represented the changing preferences of their voters, that is, the white electorate that the author dubs the “selectorate.” Contrary to what some have assumed, the South’s one-party politics experienced a level of responsiveness among members of Congress comparable to that in the two-party North. The often dismissed Democratic primary system promoted southern legislator responsiveness by pitting supporters against opponents of progressive policies, thereby creating choices similar to those offered by partisan competition elsewhere in the country.

In the early days of the New Deal, southern Democrats, in part motivated by their region’s desperate

economic conditions and in part displaying partisan loyalty encouraged by the first taste of unified Democratic government in more than a decade, compiled some of the most liberal voting records in Congress. But as northern urban and pro-labor legislators challenged the dominance that rural Southerners had enjoyed, legislators from the South swerved rightward on economic policy. Challenges to the region's segregationist practices mounted by the Congress of Industrial Organizations provided an accelerant to existing southern anti-union bias. As perceived threats to segregation came to outweigh economic benefits, increasing numbers of Southerners voted more conservatively.

In the North, changes in the policy preferences Caughey studies resulted from partisan replacement. In the South, where Republicans had made no gains during the 1930s and 1940s, the change in median legislator position resulted more often from the adoption by sitting legislators of more conservative stands than due to member replacement. There were, however, multiple instances that Caughey documents where Southerners, like Rep. Maury Maverick (D-TX), ignored the growing conservatism in their primary constituency and paid the price at the ballot box. Early in the New Deal, Southerners who were more conservative than their constituents fell to candidates who embraced Franklin D. Roosevelt with the same ardor as today's Republicans pledge fealty to Donald Trump.

Although his primary interest is economic policy, Caughey frequently notes that Southerners' growing conservatism did not extend to all policies, and that provides the basis for the book's title. However, Sinclair documented in greater detail than Caughey the areas in which Southerners' liberal leanings persisted longer. Using the policy classification scheme from Aage Clausen's *How Congressmen Decide* (1973), Sinclair showed that southern Democrats continued to be generally liberal on two of five policy dimensions throughout the 1950s.

It may surprise readers that despite the lack of partisan competition, southern members of Congress represented their electors as faithfully as did their northern colleagues. After first doing a cross-sectional analysis, Caughey examines linkages over time to show that Southerners in Congress were held in check and guided by those who voted in the Democratic primary. He then concludes "that *dynamic* responsiveness was, if anything more robust among House and Senate delegations in the South than in the non-South. . . . Thus, overall, these analyses support the hypothesis that in the case of congressional politics, lack of partisan competition did not inhibit Southern MCs' representation of the white selectorate" (p. 160; emphasis in the original). In denying that partisan competition is a prerequisite for responsiveness, the author challenges the gospel of V. O. Key (*Southern Politics*, 1949), which contended

that partisan competition was a prerequisite for democracy. However, in the recently published *Why Parties Matter* (2018), party specialist John Aldrich and coauthor John Griffin challenge Caughey's reliance on factions as adequate for democracy. Among the problems they note are that factions, unlike parties, lack continuity, and the absence of continuity means that while a legislator may be held responsible, that is not the same as holding a party responsible; it is the latter that shapes an agenda.

Much of the previous research on Southerners' roll-call voting has used Conservative Coalition support scores. Caughey criticizes this measure, which focuses on the group rather than on individuals. In place of the Conservative Coalition support scores that *Congressional Quarterly* calculated for decades, Caughey determines pivot points and examines the distribution of legislators around them. As New Deal fervor flagged, first on labor bills and then on economic programs more broadly, Southerners often occupied the middle ground. Even as they became more conservative as a group, a minority of Southerners would at times join their northern fellow partisans to forestall Republicans' more extreme alternatives. Whether Southerners provided the margin for a liberal or conservative outcome, beginning in the late 1930s the path to making economic policy ran through Dixie.

During my tenure as a Congressional Fellow for the American Political Science Association roughly a generation after the end point of Caughey's research, I witnessed the tension he describes between constituent pressures and a partisan magnetism that pulled southern Democrats leftward even as their constituents drifted farther to the right. Members of the Georgia delegation frequently voted against their party, but on issues being whipped, partisan apostasy triggered soul searching and fretting about the inability to be loyal to their party and win reelection. Defecting, while not uncommon, was not taken lightly. To the extent that they felt they could, Georgia Democrats voted with the party, thereby increasing their scores on measures of liberalism more than if they had responded exclusively to constituent preferences, much in keeping with Caughey's analysis.

*The Unsolid South* makes multiple contributions. First, it demonstrates a linkage between white public opinion and southern Democrats' roll-call voting during the heyday of one-party politics, thus challenging the notion that these members of Congress responded just to wealthy plantation owners. Second, Democratic primaries offered voters choices, at least on the dominant economic issues, and the actuality of defeat was sufficient to encourage responsiveness. Third, southern Democrats tended to be more liberal than Northerners with similar constituencies. This book will be prized by those who study

congressional politics, southern politics, and American political development.

**The Cash Ceiling: Why Only the Rich Run for Office—and What We Can Do about It.** By Nicholas Carnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018. 344p. \$29.95 cloth. doi:10.1017/S1537592719000112

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Nicholas Carnes's research has given new life to the study of class in American politics. His earlier work delved into how the dearth of working-class legislators matters for policy outcomes and the quality of political representation. His most recent book, *The Cash Ceiling*, builds on this agenda and asks why there is such a shortage of working-class Americans in elected office. The figures are indeed dismal: Individuals with working-class backgrounds make up around half of the population but a mere 2% of Congress and, at the high end, 10% of city councilors. Carnes provides the first empirical examination of the reasons for this disparity and, in doing so, gives class a rightful place in studies of candidate emergence.

It is rare for scholars to have such an open empirical terrain. While a variety of reasons come to mind as to why workers are underrepresented in politics, the book marshals an impressive array of data to actually put them to the test. The chapters tackle several possible explanations, including the notions that working-class individuals are unfit to govern or that voters would not support working-class candidates. The evidence instead points to a much different conclusion. The central argument of the book is that workers are less likely to hold office because they are less likely to run in the first place, not because they are unqualified or because voters prefer more affluent candidates.

Carnes develops a Qualified-Run-Succeed (QRS) Model for thinking about why social groups are underrepresented in office. The basic idea is that there are many stages in which individuals are screened out of the candidate emergence process. Some individuals do not have the necessary skills and qualifications to hold office; most who are qualified still do not run; and many who run do not win. The group will be underrepresented relative to its numbers in the population if they are disproportionately screened out at any stage.

The empirical analyses draw on a mountain of data and a variety of methods to identify the stage at which workers are screened out. The results from several original surveys of political candidates, party leaders, and voters suggest that for workers, the Qualified and Succeed stages are unlikely to be the problem. Workers are just as likely to have the qualifications that both party leaders and voters deem important, and workers are just as likely to think they are qualified to run. Results from actual elections and survey experiments further demonstrate

that voters are just as willing to support working-class candidates.

Rather, the scale tilts toward the Run stage. The main barrier keeping workers out is the “cash ceiling”—the many burdens associated with office seeking and the extensive resources that campaigning requires. In addition, workers are less likely to be recruited and encouraged to run by political elites, party leaders, and interest groups. To further delve into these mechanisms, Carnes leverages observational data to show that workers hold fewer offices in states with more burdensome elections and run less often in places where elections are more expensive. Workers also hold more seats and run more often in states where unions are stronger, perhaps because workers are more plugged into the networks of political leaders.

After uncovering the hurdles that working-class individuals face, the book then considers a crucial next question: What can be done? Most of the commonly cited solutions hold little promise because they do not address the underlying reasons why workers do not run. Higher salaries for legislators do not alleviate the burden of unpaid campaigning, and there is little evidence that the public financing of elections has much of an impact on the number of workers who run or win. Instead, interventions that are targeted and tailored to the specific needs of working-class Americans are more likely to be successful, such as candidate recruitment efforts, training programs, seed money, and political scholarships.

The scope of the book is beyond impressive. It provides the first analysis of the reasons that working-class Americans are underrepresented in office, but it is much more than a first cut. Examining any one of the stages in the Qualified-Run-Succeed Model of candidate emergence is difficult, but Carnes seamlessly weaves through all three. The theoretical and empirical contributions will spark new discussions and debates across subfields in American politics, yet many of the central insights have the clearest and most direct implications for the study of group underrepresentation and the study of candidate emergence more generally.

First, the findings raise new questions about how the QRS Model varies across groups. For example, since the early 2000s, gender and politics scholars have focused largely on the Run stage to understand women's underrepresentation. One of the leading explanations for why women are less likely to run than men is that women are less likely to think they are qualified. In other words, the Qualified and Run stages are tied together for women but not for workers. From a gender and politics angle, the finding that workers do perceive themselves to be just as qualified to run for office is fairly surprising. The white-collar ethos of government and the dearth of “worker role models” in office, particularly high-level offices, do not seem to dampen political ambition among workers. Uncovering this kind of variation will inspire further