

Reviews

Economics and Development by BARBARA INGHAM

London, McGraw-Hill International, 1995. Pp. xi + 412. £21.99 paperback.

This interdisciplinary compendium is an introduction to development economics that avoids the unhelpful dichotomies of developed/developing, rich/poor, and centre/periphery by seeking to provide, as explained by Barbara Ingham, ‘a more unified approach anchored in the global economy of the past and the present day’ (p. xi). Amongst the many merits of this textbook are the sections that recall and reassess the significance of the works of the influential economists who pioneered the study of ‘development’. These include Arthur Lewis, whose most celebrated article, ‘Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour’, appeared in 1954, and Peter T. Bauer, whose more specialised *West African Trade* (Cambridge, 1954) criticised state-run marketing boards.

Economics and Development is a four-part volume that starts with an introductory overview. The emphasis here is on the peculiarities of the economies of developing countries – the majority of them in Africa – and the meaning of ‘development’. Then, in the context of the so-called ‘pattern approach’ promoted by I. Adelman and C. T. Morris, *Society, Politics and Economic Development* (Baltimore, 1967), an historical distinction is drawn between economic growth and economic development, with special emphasis on the critical rôle of human resources in the creation of relevant institutions that can profoundly influence both growth and development.

In Part II, ‘Development Theory’, the insights of the classical economists, notably Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, and Adam Smith, have been brought to bear on those long-run issues which still confront economies in transition. In addition, Ingham has reviewed some of the ways in which such orthodox neo-classical writers as Bauer, Lewis, and Walter Rostow have applied the principles of ‘the market’ to developing countries. Many central ideas have emerged from this scenario, amongst which two deserve special mention. The first concerns the tacit justification for the well-known ‘labour-surplus model’ enunciated by Lewis in 1954, in which ‘Development is defined...as the process by which the “modern” sector expands as the “traditional” sector contracts’ (p. 109). The second relates to perhaps one of the most controversial demographic issues of our time; namely, the phenomenon of the ‘Malthusian population trap’, under which, due to poverty, ‘People are “consuming their capital”, perhaps eating the seed-corn, in order to maintain subsistence income’ (p. 124). Ingham plausibly – albeit rather unconvincingly – advances the above metaphor as the theoretical underpinning of the so-called ‘vicious circle’ of poverty in the developing countries.

In Part III, ‘Policy Issues’ are examined with special reference to (i) the political context; (ii) poverty, inequality, and the distribution of income; (iii) population, migration, and employment; (iv) the rôle of agriculture, and (v) the mobilisation of domestic resources in the developing countries. Of

particular significance are the author's forthright assertions that 'Mostly, authoritarian regimes have failed economically' (p. 203), and that 'democratic advance in Africa to date has achieved very little' (p. 204). Furthermore, with the advent of development economics in the 1950s, as typified by the influential works of Lewis and his contemporaries, the underlying philosophy in Europe was that 'development' was the prime responsibility of the government. However, with the slow march towards democracy in Africa, 'it is not surprising that community organizations, which cut across arguments for "the state" versus "the market", receive increasing attention as development alternatives' (p. 210).

Finally, in Part IV, 'The International Environment', we are given an authoritative appraisal of the possibility that trade can serve as a veritable 'engine of growth' for all developing countries to boost their own version of the so-called 'East Asian miracle'. Indeed, there is some evidence that such progress has been taking place in Latin America, with Argentina leading the way in commendable efforts to fend off the ugly spectre of stifling debt burden. The author also discusses foreign economic assistance, and outlines an international agenda for development while assessing recent initiatives by the United Nations regarding a number of vital policy issues, such as controlling pollution, investing in health, human security, children, and what is nowadays called 'beyond aid'.

Not surprisingly, some of the paradigms of development in the book can be criticised. Certainly, 'adjustment with a human face' must include measures that both recognise and protect 'vulnerable groups' such as women and children in developing countries. However, certain euphemisms merely re-echo the socio-economic views already expressed by UNICEF, the World Bank, and the IMF to the effect that health, education, and nutrition should not be compromised under structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). It needs to be emphasised that these have socio-demographic implications, not least since stringent 'austerity measures' adopted under the prototype versions of SAPs were recklessly executed by predominantly authoritarian régimes during the 'debt decade' of the 1980s. Such actions impoverished millions of ordinary Africans, resulting *inter alia* in significant demographic consequences, including delayed marriages, increasing divorce rates, and declining fertility. Paradoxically, however, they have been regarded by some as 'blessings in disguise' for those third-world countries where such measures are helping to stem the nascent threat of a population explosion. This, incidentally, has been the case in Nigeria, where there already exists an interesting plethora of literature on the 'Contraceptive called SAP'.

Ingham identifies two main causes of the alleged 'vicious circle' of poverty. First of all, as regards the Malthusian population trap, she ingeniously establishes a 'low-level equilibrium' profile for the developing countries below which 'any increase in total income is more than matched by an increase in population... pushing per capita income down to subsistence level' (p. 124). Here, however, there are some inherent demographic inconsistencies. For instance, while it is true that contemporary economic conditions are far from satisfactory – especially in countries suffering from triple-digit hyperinflation – it is perhaps premature to ascribe the resultant pauperism, willy-nilly, to over-population. Indeed, in tropical Africa, it is perhaps only in Nigeria, with

over 110 million inhabitants, where poverty can be marginally linked with a huge population base.

Secondly, as regards the failure of trade to act as the 'engine of growth', many will find the 'beneficial effects' of the export-led growth advocated by Ingham very palatable; namely, that trade widens the extent of the market, promotes international competition, increases real income through high levels of savings and investment, and has 'an important educative effect' (p. 335). Unfortunately, the reverse is the case as regards the reasons adduced for the 'failure' of the growth hypothesis:

The commodity terms of trade for primary products have deteriorated over a long period, relative to manufactured goods. This is because of the lower income elasticity of demand for primary products as compared with manufactured goods *plus* the monopoly bargaining power of producers in rich countries, which has kept the prices of manufactures artificially high (p. 336).

While it would be wrong to dismiss this statement outright as a neo-colonial apologue, the fact of the matter is that primary producers continue to be 'price-takers' not only for their exports of raw materials but also for their imports of finished products. Even with the best of intentions, such a lopsided arrangement is, in the final analysis, capable of turning the terms of trade perpetually against the primary-producing countries, increasing their debt burden, and compromising their social, economic, and technological progress, and hence their transition to sustained growth.

Meanwhile, opposition mounts world-wide against trading arrangements which fail to recognise the fundamental importance of primary producers, at least on the *quid pro quo* basis of equity. Many critics still refer approvingly to *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (London, 1972) by Walter Rodney, who claimed that a vicious circle of poverty had been perpetrated by the 'skewed' trading relationships between developed and developing countries. As stated more subtly in *Economics for a Developing World: an introduction to principles, problems and policies for development* (London, 1977), by Michael Todaro, 'the world countries have in the past benefited disproportionately less from their economic dealings with developed nations and in the long run some may have even suffered absolutely from this association'. Some analysts have suggested that the trade impasse can be mutually resolved by revisiting the UN-sponsored 'New International Economic Order' of 1974 – a package which, among other things, sought 'to eliminate the widening gap between developing and developed countries of the world'. Perhaps the long-stalled North-South Dialogue should be reconvened.

Economics and Development could not have been published at a more auspicious time. This remarkable volume is surely essential reading for all who need a clear and comprehensive introduction to development economics, especially degree-level students in Africa, as well as those elsewhere who wish to understand what is happening in countries that are termed 'developing'. Apart from referring so skilfully to the achievements of a number of outstanding scholars to whom we remain indebted, and updating their analyses, Barbara Ingham is surely poised to blaze a spectacular intellectual trail into the new millennium in development economics.

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Democracy and Development in Africa by CLAUDE AKE
Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1996. Pp. x+173. \$38.95.

Authors usually try to bring order into otherwise disparate, even incoherent, sets of occurrences, and a recent work by a passionate and long-time observer of change in modern Africa has organised the problems experienced since independence around a new thematic narrative. Surely, three decades of political instability, economic crisis, and human suffering in the 50 states that are normally listed as being sub-Saharan would test the craft of even the best storyteller. By reversing the tired old cliché about 'failed' development in the continent, however, the late Claude Ake confronts his readers with perhaps his most incisive, and regrettably, last set of arguments 'that the problem in Africa is not so much that development failed as that it never really began' (p. 42).

Democracy and Development in Africa accords only a few final pages to the kind of feasible democracy that is required, because explanations of the battles over the meaning and implementation of development, as well as its use by exogenous forces, comprise the bulk of this slim volume. This provides Ake with grounds for claiming that the impediments to a more prosperous and democratic Africa are primarily political and must be removed before positive changes can occur.

Ch. 1, 'The Development Paradigm and Its Politics', the author's opening account of the measures for growth that were discussed and adopted by states in the throes of decolonisation, provides a clear and accessible path through the complexities of modernisation and dependency perspectives. In itself, this primer on the initial 'development project' as understood and applied in Africa is instructive, but unremarkable. Ch. 2, however, entitled 'A Confusion of Agendas', offers a lucid analysis that readers will be hard pressed to find elsewhere. Ake untangles the various strands of the struggle for economic policy in Africa which ensued when Western-influenced strategies, adopted by a first generation of post-colonial leaders looking to safeguard their political survival, produced disastrous consequences starting in the mid-1970s.

Specifically, Ake situates the adoption of the *Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980–2000* by the Organisation of African Unity in 1982 within the political context of the ongoing crisis, and then carefully dissects its provisions so as to reveal how it differed from *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: an agenda for action*, the report prepared by the World Bank in 1981. The side by side comparison of the provisions of these documents allows readers better to understand why the former ascribed economic failure to forces outside of Africa, and why the latter listed domestic policy mistakes as its retort. Ake's discussion thereby establishes the context for the flood of reports that followed in the 1980s as economic conditions in the majority of states in the region worsened.

Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery, 1986–90 (APPER), adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the OAU in 1985, accepted the critical assumptions and strategies of *Accelerated Development* while discarding those of the *Lagos Plan*. African leaders acknowledged the domestic causes of underdevelopment, and embraced policies and management styles

that encourage the free play of market forces. For Ake, the acceptance of APPER and the burden of responsibility it placed upon Africa for economic failures reveals less about actual causes than about the degree to which the battle for development policy had been fought and won by the Washington-based international financial institutions. 'In this context, development becomes alienating on all sides':

The outsiders that fashion the agenda are alienated from it the very moment it is created, because it is for others. Although it may be desirable for them to make the agenda stick as a manifestation of their values or power, they need not take serious interest in it, especially if such commitment entails significant costs...

For the African leaders the alienation is more ominous. They are saddled with a strategy that hardly any of them believe in and that most of them condemn... Lacking faith in what they are doing and caught between their own interests, the demands of their external patrons, and their constituents, African leaders tend to be ambivalent, confused, and prone to marginalize development and even their role in its pursuit. The development of Africa will not start in earnest until the struggle over development agendas is determined (p. 41).

Ake examines in ch. 3, 'Improbable Strategies', the development policies adopted in a number of states to demonstrate their inadequacies, notably their lack of adaptation to local conditions and inability to counter the political practices by which those in power could extract monetary gains. For instance, the penchant for large infrastructural projects in the Nigerian agricultural sector relegated improvement of production itself to the level of a residual concern. Likewise, the strategy of industrialisation served the accumulation needs of local élites as well as the profit margins of multinational corporations. Such 'development' helped to improve the lot of a privileged few while doing little to increase output.

In the wake of the decline of modernisation and dependency perspectives, and in the absence of successful models of endogenous development, Ake argues in ch. 4, 'Blocked Options', that Africa has been left to accept the new international economic orthodoxy – structural adjustment schemes and policy reforms aimed at the creation and expansion of exports – despite the fact that few African economies are in a position to gain advantages in the global markets in which they must now compete. Most leaders continue 'to assume that development is essentially a matter of making adjustments in the vertical relations between Africa and the wealthy nations of the North'. But:

The debt problem is not an aberration. It is inherent in the development strategies that Africa has been pursuing, in the location of Africa in the world economy, and in the prevailing international division of labor; its persistence and magnitude underline the limitations of present development strategies and the difficulties of overcoming them (p. 103).

Ake goes on to emphasise that the marginalisation of the continent simply underscores 'the necessity and desirability of smallholder agriculture', which means that Africans must adopt forms of development that take 'people as they are and not as they ought to be' (p. 152).

It is according to this logic that the final chapter addresses democracy as 'The Residual Option', as part of a participatory approach to agricultural development. Only an inclusive democracy that prizes collective as much as individual rights, that thrives on the 'energy of ordinary people' (p. 124), and

that is committed to the view that they are ‘the agents of development’ and not just its end (p. 126), can prevail over the current strivings of political élites. ‘Even at its best, liberal democracy is inimical to the idea of the people having effective decisionmaking power’ (p. 130). For Ake’s Africa of smallholder farmers, the democratic future of the continent is not yet won, but the contours of its authenticity have been drawn.

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The Anthropology of Anger: civil society and democracy in Africa by
CÉLESTIN MONGA

Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner, 1996. Pp. xi + 219. \$45.00.

With the dramatic transitions that have been occurring in Africa over the past several years, considerable attention has been paid not only to political institutions, but also to the rôle that civil society can play in counterbalancing or complementing the state. Much of the democratisation debate has focused on the applicability of Western models and concepts for the analysis of African socio-political events. Often absent from academic debates has been the poignant expression of political actors themselves. This void only began to be filled by the publication of *Anthropologie de la colère* (Paris, L’Harmattan, 1994), by Célestin Monga, a World Bank consultant, former university professor of economics, and Cameroonian political activist, who had been harrassed and arrested for speaking out against the régime headed by Paul Biya.

The Anthropology of Anger: civil society and democracy in Africa, translated by Linda L. Fleck and Monga from the earlier French version, suggests alternative ways of viewing socio-political change, and offers ideas for adjusting existing theory to fit the African context. Drawing on his breadth of experience, the author advises paying less attention to the tools of classical social science in order to provide the grassroots perspective that is conspicuously absent from the literature. Frustrated by reductionist studies on determinants of democratisation and the political behaviour of Africans, Monga seeks to describe and analyse the collective anger of marginalised peoples, and finds that ‘far from rejecting [economic and political] development, Africa is forging new trails toward the affirmation of its dignity’ (p. 11).

The theoretical frameworks that have been used for examining political change in sub-Saharan Africa are evaluated in ch. 2, ‘How Africa Fits into Democratic Theory’, in order to show the shortcomings and contradictions of each. Though Western political scientists have looked at the continent from a variety of perspectives, the one thing they seem to agree upon is the backwardness of Africa. Monga wields his mordant pen with zeal, sparing almost none of the major theories related to democratisation or African political development:

In recent years the continent has become the El Dorado of wild thought, the best place for daring intellectual safaris, the unregulated space in which to engage in theoretical incest, to violate the fundaments of logic, to transgress disciplinary prohibitions; in short, to give oneself over to all forms of intellectual debauchery – with impunity and in good conscience (pp. 39–40).

He takes a similarly harsh tack in addressing the contemptuous attitudes of African heads of state as they seek to rationalise their exclusion of political opponents from the areas of debate, and to justify their aversion to electorally-determined changes in leadership. Democratisation in Africa is different from elsewhere, Monga asserts, largely because of the unequal array of political forces and consequent power advantages that are exploited by entrenched autocrats. Because of oppression and the consequent wariness of régime opponents, the important rôle of civil society in the current transitions, as well as the rationality of activists at the grassroots, must be inferred rather than observed directly.

Although Monga offers many creative insights on factors affecting political processes in Africa, his book reads more like a collection of related essays than as a coherent whole. In chs. 3 and 5, he presents evaluations of the rôle of popular culture and religion, respectively, and illuminates the cultural foundations of social change, and how the politics of the sacred relate to current realities. While these are interesting topics, it is the subject matter in the other chapters that most fluidly follows from the book's title.

Ch. 4 makes concrete Monga's assertions of democratic patterns behind everyday behaviour. Alongside the failures of post-independence Africa and the autocratic excesses of many régimes, 'new ways of structuring and negotiating reality have emerged' (p. 109), including numerous forms of subtle insubordination and non-compliance with the powers that be. African peoples undertake informal strategies of resistance in order to struggle against injustice without suffering its full wrath: 'Anarchy is a sort of asymptote that they approach but never reach. Africans are well aware of the consequences of crossing the line: The resulting disorder sanctions a brutal swing of the pendulum' (p. 116). Monga argues that such actions as shirking, petty theft, tax resistance, sabotage, slander, and desertion, among others, constitute explicitly political behaviour, 'a state of mind that refuses to be duped by the authorities' (p. 119). Such mistrust for state officials has important implications for the implementation of policies.

Monga owes a substantial debt to James C. Scott's work, notably *Weapons of the Weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance* (New Haven, 1985), and acknowledges his support for the premise that oppressed groups often rebel in ostensibly banal ways that would not be immediately recognised as subversive, while disagreeing about the broader political implications of everyday forms of resistance. While Scott believes that subtle quotidian forms of subversion have greater political import than as mere self-help or coping mechanisms, he argues that they may not explicitly intend to change the structure of the state or its legal system. In contrast, Monga contends that 'people living in rural areas [in Africa] had no such limited views on the significance of their citizenship during the first phase of the democratic liberalization that occurred between 1989 and 1993' (p. 7). Though the author's faith in, and respect for, the political awareness of ordinary Africans is laudable, he never systematically offers support for this bold assertion.

In ch. 6, Monga presents arguments on the potential of civil society in the quest for democracy. In defining civil society, he acknowledges the difficulty of comparing autonomous organisations with their European counterparts,

given the necessary secrecy and lack of formality which often characterise African groups. He employs a very broad definition which includes religious and civic groups, professional organisations and, ultimately, all those ‘who are able to manage and steer communal anger’ (p. 149). He makes policy recommendations aimed at using such social groupings as conduits through which members and leaders learn the importance of inter-group solidarity, as well as the virtues of democratic accountability and negotiation. Monga also suggests building horizontal links among groups and vertical links to represent civil society in legislative bodies. Ultimately state and society must realise their interdependence and constructively channel societal anger into meaningful participation. While these proposals certainly ring true, they sound little different from the counsel given by other proponents of civil society in both academic and policy circles.

Finally, ch. 7 proposes theoretical frameworks for an understanding of ‘the pervasiveness of disenchantment and the tendency to resort to violence’ (p. 164). Monga uses an innovative, rudimentary game theoretic model to show that the lack of open protest is a rational product of the array of costs and benefits, and not of apathy – democracy is a ‘public good’ subject to the familiar ‘free rider’ problem faced by consumers of all public goods. A formal explanation of why disempowered Africans do not often engage in overt political protest is tied back into his earlier ‘weapons of the weak’ argument, and shows that a lack of successful political rallies does not mean that people are apathetic. After his presentation of conceptual issues, Monga makes a series of recommendations about both short- and long-term strategies for the prevention of conflict in Africa. He gives a laundry list of appealing proposals but no concrete direction on how to implement them.

The author’s principal strengths are breathtaking erudition and eclecticism, as demonstrated by a wide range of references to African, European, and American social science theory and popular culture. The most glaring weakness is the careless way in which much of this is cobbled together. In explaining his lack of systematic methodology, Monga acknowledges the complexity of African social systems, and says that the only honest solution is to ‘limit my propensity to generalize about Africa’ (p. 10). In fact, however, he makes many unsupported claims about African political behaviour that he hopes can contribute to ‘an ambitious, universal theory of sociopolitical change’ (p. x), and often engages in astonishing degrees of hyperbole to make his points. For example:

In an Africa where cable stations like CNN are watched in every home, where Michael Jackson and Michael Jordan are as popular in the country as they are in big cities, it is archaic to believe that those who live in rural areas are sociologically different from city dwellers (p. 28).

While his point about the declining importance of the urban-rural dichotomy in most of the continent is valid, much of the West Africa that he purports to describe is still characterised by dramatic urban-rural differences in access to technology and popular culture. Similar overstatements and factual errors occasionally weaken otherwise insightful arguments.

The Anthropology of Anger is an important book, and one can only laud Monga’s personal courage and active involvement in the issues he describes.

This renaissance intellectual and activist has interesting ideas that he cares deeply about and expresses well. His articulation of a modified ‘weapons of the weak’ argument for the African context constitutes a major contribution. We now need more systematic empirical research to test his compelling hypothesis on the conscious political nature of everyday forms of resistance.

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Africa’s Management in the 1990s and Beyond: reconciling indigenous and transplanted institutions by MAMADOU DIA

Washington, DC, The World Bank, 1996. Pp. xii+293. \$21.95 paperback.

The book is about the best that can happen to the continent while donors are winding down their assistance. Mamadou Dia presents the findings of the World Bank’s Africa’s Management in the 1990s research programme commissioned in 1992, and shows that contrary to stereotyped beliefs that nothing good can come out of Africa, its management problems are mainly a result of failure to make use of untapped talents and initiatives. Hence the following central themes: (i) that the ‘much-lamented crisis of capacity building in Africa is not so much a crisis of technical capacity (a lack of skills, methods, systems, and technology) as... of institutional capacity’, (ii) that this crisis ‘is essentially due to a structural and functional disconnect between informal, indigenous institutions rooted in the region’s history and culture and formal institutions mostly transplanted from outside’, and (iii) that ‘institutional reconciliation is the key to resolving the crisis’ (p. 25).

Africa’s Management in the 1990s and Beyond: reconciling indigenous and transplanted institutions begins with a helpful and comprehensive ‘Executive Summary’ of the scope and focus of the book. After an introductory analysis of the importance of ‘capacity building’ to economic management and performance, Dia goes on to explain the ‘structural disconnect’ between indigenous and modern practices and institutions that has ‘created a crisis of legitimacy and accountability that affects governance and the performance of public administration, as well as the development of an indigenous private sector and African entrepreneurship’ (p. 36). Thereafter, ch. 1 focuses on the origins, nature, and extent of three levels of ‘institutional disconnect’: between central government and civil society, between the formal and the informal private sectors, and between corporate and societal cultures.

Part II, ‘Reconciling the State and Civil Society’, devotes considerable attention to a variety of ‘best practices’ that have improved performance and increased capacity-building through the involvement of the private sector in the provision of public services. Illustrations are provided from a cross-section of African states – now listed alphabetically and not according to the importance of their innovations – Botswana, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, South Africa, Togo, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, as well as East Asia. The major conclusion to be drawn from their various experiences is the importance of institutional reconciliation as regards the enhancement of macro-economic management, with more emphasis being placed on com-

munity/grassroots participation in decision-making and implementation, in order to strengthen ethics, transparency, and accountability. In addition, references are made to certain indigenous practices in Africa which might be introduced to formal institutions to serve as incentives and sanctions that would further boost their effectiveness.

Part III, 'Reconciling the Formal and Informal Private Sectors', examines the problems that have been hindering the growth of most small- to medium-scale enterprises (SMEs), and how best certain constraints can be overcome. As a start, Dia presents a sample of seven indigenous enterprises that have successfully graduated into large enterprises, despite a management culture rooted in Western and indigenous practices. The importance and rôle of intra-lineage transfers is emphasised, since these have major significance in many African socio-economic systems, and appear 'to have considerable staying power'. According to the author, here is 'an interconnected network of income equalization, risk, and benefit sharing, and upward-mobility generation' (p. 178), which serves as a form of social insurance whereby either cash and/or kind are channelled through family members, specific individuals, or special organisations.

The findings of a comparative study of formal and informal finance in Mali are presented in ch. 7, 'Developing the Indigenous Private Sector: filling the financial missing middle'. The results of this survey enable Dia to argue that the capacity of indigenous enterprises can be increased: 'new institutional mechanisms, or *structures de relais*, must be developed to do what the banks cannot – that is, absorb the additional risk in smaller-scale lending on a sustainable basis' (p. 195).

Part IV, 'Conclusions: Process and Institutional Requirements and Operational Implications for Reconciliation', includes proposals for three-tier action that can bring about an effective 'reconciliation paradigm'. What is needed is a truly participatory approach that will empower clients and beneficiaries, and put local communities first, as in South Africa. It is claimed that this will provide a system of communications that is well adapted to local conditions, as well as guaranteeing access and voice to stakeholders, and a stable institutional and political environment.

The value of this book lies in the systematic efforts that have been made, especially by means of the case-studies, to show that the African crisis of management requires different solutions from those previously advocated. Dia demonstrates as a result of various sharply-focused research projects that some African civil services and private enterprises have awoken to the challenge of fashioning new techniques out of Western and indigenous practices that have been able to attenuate their management problems. Here are rays of hope that should encourage all who are trying to improve performance in the public, parastatal, and private sectors. The author goes one step further by objectively highlighting the shortcomings of some of these innovations, and by suggesting the necessary amendments that could be introduced to make them more efficient.

The simplicity of language in which the findings are presented and summarised means that *Africa's Management in the 1990s and Beyond* will be of great interest to all those studying public and business administration, as well

as of considerable value to practitioners in all sectors. Donors will no doubt also discover useful guidelines for the design and implementation of future assisted projects in the continent.

I have a major reservation, however, about Dia's position on 'the culture- and religion-sanctioned institution of transfers', despite the statement that this 'provides a potent social glue that binds together economically differentiated members of the family and lineage, urban and rural segments of society, and the government and private sector'. His ensuing claim, that 'Interference with this institution is thus likely to be socially and politically divisive' (p. 193), needs to be treated very cautiously because transfers can deal a big blow to accountability and political stability. They are one of the major reasons why corruption is endemic, and also help to explain the creation of 'bureaucratic kinship' in Africa. Too many who are unable to fulfil their expected kinship obligations, mainly because of low income, seek extra-legal means of making money through fraudulent practices in order to redeem their social status. In addition, those who seek/make transfers often try to reduce the number of 'beneficiaries' on their payrolls by using their social connections to get them regular paid jobs in the private and public sectors, albeit with little or no regard for merit, experience, or professional qualifications. The 'institution of transfer', in my view, should as far as possible be discouraged.

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In Pursuit of Science and Technology in Sub-Saharan Africa: the impact of structural adjustment programmes by JOHN L. ENOS

London and New York, Routledge, 1995, in association with the United Nations University Press. Pp. xvi + 286. £45.00.

Two important limitations have characterised much of the scholarly debate about structural adjustment and the decline of the economies of sub-Saharan Africa. The first has been the single-minded attention given to improving capital flows and the efficiency of markets, as justified by the neo-classical school using unrealistic assumptions about the ensuing promotion of knowledge and technology. The fundamental rôle of technical change and the institutions that foster this is a much neglected aspect of the continent's economic recovery, or lack thereof. The second has been the tendency to focus on Africa's historical political economy as a primary reason for its problems, although exercises in introspection are valuable only if used to suggest new and/or alternative courses of action. I was therefore delighted to be asked to review a book which seems to address unhesitatingly (and simultaneously) these issues, especially since the title suggests a pragmatic focus on an analysis of the facts, and the resultant policy options available to governments.

In Pursuit of Science and Technology in Sub-Saharan Africa: the impact of structural adjustment programmes is a timely publication given that several countries have undergone a decade of structural adjustment – long enough for the efficacy of these programmes to be assessed. Bearing in mind that their enunciated objective 'is to help make the recipients more productive', John L. Enos asks,

‘do Structural Adjustment Programmes [SAPs] help to make a few of the institutions of the recipients more productive?’ (p. 4), and then sets out to examine those which attempt to advance science and technology in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. What he does well is to evaluate, in a succinct fashion, the rôle of public institutions in promoting progress in these all-important fields, and how this has changed with SAPs. The statistics that have been compiled on all relevant budgets and expenditures, as well as key features of each economy, enable us to understand the difficult environment within which progress is being made in science and technology. He has separated, for instance, the work undertaken by research and development (R & D) institutions from that of universities, broken down expenses and sources of funds, and looked at conflicts between the objectives of governments and foreign donors.

Regrettably, however, this study suffers from several limitations, not least the traditional view of technology as a good, and the unstated assumption that innovations or useful findings generated by public institutions are easily disseminated. Very little is said about what mechanisms will ensure that this happens, although their importance is acknowledged. To what extent is the research output of the public sector aimed at the creation of appropriate technologies? They need to be utilised widely and efficiently if structural adjustment is to work. Furthermore, even though state-funded R & D programmes may be a crucial component of science and technology development, the innovatory activities of the private sector are also of great significance, even if a variety of firms undertake only limited modifications to imported technologies.

Foreign investors constitute an important sub-group within the economies studied – by 1993 their stock held as proxy for the sales of multinational enterprises (MNEs) accounted for 6.5, 6, 2, and 1 per cent of gross domestic product in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda respectively. If we were to focus on only manufacturing (using Nigeria as a guide), well over 50 per cent of that sector in these four countries is probably controlled or owned by foreign firms. As such, MNEs are a great economic force in their own right. Given their access to foreign technologies, skilled manpower, and capital, and their ability to transfer such assets across borders almost effortlessly, they are also a real source of technology and knowledge.

Considerable research has been conducted on these issues in Latin America and Asia. Indeed, it is acknowledged that the economic success of a number of countries in those continents has as much to do with the ability of structural adjustments to improve the efficiency of markets, as with developing domestic skills and firms through the activities of MNEs – see, for instance, Sanjaya Lall, *Building Industrial Competitiveness in Developing Countries* (Paris, OECD, 1990), Robert Wade, *Governing the Market: economic theory and the role of government in East Asian industrialization* (Princeton, NJ, 1990), and John Dunning and Rajneesh Narula (eds.), *Foreign Direct Investment and Governments: catalysts for economic restructuring* (London, 1996).

The author declines to challenge several assumptions of the World Bank about SAPs while admitting that at least some are unrealistic – for example, that workers are perfectly mobile between sectors. And although ch. 2 reviews

theories of structural adjustment, all of which are neo-classical in nature, these are not tested or utilised except in a limited way, and add nothing to the overall discussion or thesis of the book. Indeed, some of the analyses and policy recommendations are disappointing. How, for instance, do the four selected countries compare with, say, Thailand, Indonesia, or Korea? Benchmarks are needed if performance in Africa is to be usefully evaluated. This is certainly possible with most Asian economies, as comparable data for a relatively long period is readily available.

In Pursuit of Science and Technology in Sub-Saharan Africa is an interesting and promising contribution to the literature despite these reservations, mainly because of the rich and detailed data that have been presented in as many as 96 tables for Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. Anyone wishing to understand the plight of science and technology in Africa will do well to consult this informative book.

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The Economics of Agricultural Technology in Semiarid Sub-Saharan Africa by JOHN H. SANDERS, BARRY I. SHAPIRO, and SUNDER RAMASWAMY

Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Pp. xxiii + 303. £45.50.

In his controversial article, 'The Coming Anarchy', in *The Atlantic* (London), February 1994, pp. 44–65, Robert Kaplan predicted the outbreak of a Hobbesian state of war throughout the African continent. This bleak, Malthusian view of the region and its prospects epitomises popular perceptions on the eve of the twenty-first century. While many observers remain as pessimistic as Kaplan over the future of Africa, there is room for cautious optimism. For example, recent years have seen the arrival and spread of the 'third wave' of democratisation, as well as improved food security and beneficial agricultural changes.

The Economics of Agricultural Technology in Semiarid Sub-Saharan Africa draws upon these advances and views current attempts at rural development as promising. The study first presents an overview of both successes and failures in the implementation of the 'green revolution' technology during the past two decades. While sub-Saharan Africa has suffered declines in food output per capita since the 1970s, and many authors have bemoaned the woeful state of Africulture, John Sanders, Barry Shapiro, and Sunder Ramaswamy offer a sanguine assessment of future prospects for agricultural development in the region. Using fieldwork and modelling from the major ecological zones of crop production, the authors analyse the strengths and weaknesses of various yield-oriented strategies by evaluating them on three grounds: their ability to hedge against risk, their level of sustainability, and their impact on women. Ultimately, Sanders et al. advocate a development strategy that focuses on water availability, soil fertility, and new cultivars, and although this requires high levels of government support, the authors maintain that the benefits of

the scheme outweigh the costs. In particular, they draw on empirical evidence from several successful projects to demonstrate how the nations of semi-arid sub-Saharan Africa can implement technological change in the rural sector.

Section 2, which focuses on the introduction of agricultural technology to a variety of ecological zones, contains perhaps the book's most compelling chapters. In the past, there have been a number of well-documented technological failures in sub-Saharan Africa, such as the attempted transfer of hybrid sorghum varieties from India to Upper Volta, Niger, and Mali in the 1970s which flopped due to disease, variability in rainfall, and inadequate soil fertility. Yet Sanders et al. argue that technological change can be accomplished successfully in a variety of climates, despite ecological differences, and show that both Burkina Faso and Mali have reaped great rewards from the introduction of cotton and maize hybrids to their Sudan-Guinean zone. Using an impressive set of data, they contend that the Sudanian region of Burkina Faso and the Sahelo-Sudanian region of Niger, as well as the mechanised rain-fed zone and the Gezira of the Sudan, can enjoy continuing success in their rural transformations. Through their analysis of available evidence, the three authors do a fine job in refuting the gloomy public view of the state of African agriculture.

Sanders, Shapiro, and Ramaswamy should also be commended for their focus on gender as a key development issue. Since women play a vital rôle in the rural economy, a proper understanding of the impact that technological change has on them is a necessary precondition for meaningful reform of African agriculture. As a group, women have traditionally been ignored in economic literature, and their inclusion in a study of this importance is a welcome sign.

In the course of their work, however, the authors run into several problems. Their rejection of the link between risk aversion and delayed introduction of intensive agricultural technology is surprising in face of so much evidence to the contrary since the 1970s – see, for example, James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven, 1975), and James A. Roumasset, *Rice and Risk: decision making among low-income farmers* (Amsterdam, 1976). Yet to support their position, Sanders et al. only draw upon data from small-scale farmers in two regions of Niger and large-scale farmers in two regions of the Sudan. Additionally, the haphazard and cursory citation of supportive findings from Portugal and Honduras is problematic. The authors could have just as easily cited Scott's study of central Luzon in the Philippines which maintains that peasants, using a safety-first rationale, will often prefer traditional agricultural methods to new technology.

Sanders et al. also undermine their own argument when they admit that risk aversion had a 'modest' to 'moderate' impact on the introduction of technology in three of the four cases studied. They might have presented a more balanced view of the issue by examining the impact of risk on farming decisions over time, thereby separating short- versus long-run effects. Additionally, they could have assessed the impact of risk aversion on distinct groups of peasants, since those who live at the margins of subsistence undoubtedly make different economic assessments of technological change than better-off, landowning peasants. In parts of semi-arid Africa, many peasants

hover so dangerously close to the subsistence level that they cannot risk falling below this line with the adoption of new technology.

Separately, Sanders et al. advance a development strategy that would require significant government support for agricultural research, more purchases of inputs by farmers, and increased foreign-exchange expenditures. However, given that high levels of state interference, including the unsuccessful manipulation of prices and exchange rates, have left Africa in its current crisis, decision-makers must carefully consider if additional government entanglement is really the answer to the continent's agricultural problems.

Throughout their study the authors argue that the development of intensive agricultural technology is quite simple, and that many climatic constraints to progress in semi-arid regions can be easily overcome. Why then has change been so slow in sub-Saharan Africa? Sanders et al. respond to this critical question, albeit only briefly in their conclusion. Although their study is meant to focus on economic issues, policy prescriptions for change must address a wide range of concerns, including the structural and political impediments that are preventing the diffusion of agricultural technology throughout the countryside. Urban bias, for example, has produced a series of African development policies that violate the market logic of neo-classical economic theory but represent a rational response to the political exigencies facing leaders in the region – see, for example, Robert H. Bates, *Markets and States in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley, 1981). With the superior mobilisation, organisation, and visibility of the urban sector, governments have responded to industrial demands for both low food prices and surplus extraction from the rural areas by creating state-sanctioned agricultural monopsonies, and by implementing a series of policies that have had a detrimental impact on crop production and investment in agricultural technology. So long as these impediments to progress remain, the promise of economic growth and technological change in the rural sector will remain unfulfilled.

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African Industry in Decline: the case of textiles in Tanzania in the 1980s by PETER DE VALK

Basingstoke and London, Macmillan; New York, St. Martin's Press; 1996, in association with the Institute of Social Studies, The Hague. Pp. xii + 370. £45.00.

Jua Kali Kenya: change and development in an informal economy, 1970–95 by KENNETH KING

Oxford, James Currey; Nairobi, East African Educational Publishers; Athens, Ohio University Press; 1996. Pp. xx + 236. £14.95 paperback.

As explained by Peter de Valk, his study has been 'motivated by the desire to understand the reasons for the slow and difficult process of industrial development in most of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s' (p. 1). It is argued that the performance of a manufacturing firm has to be understood 'as the

outcome of an interplay of factors at four distinct levels' (p. 6): *international* – developments in technology and trade, external institutions, policies of other countries; *macro* – the government's own macro-economic strategy, and the rôle of the state; *sectoral* – structure of ownership, marketing arrangements, and regional production and demand; and *micro* – structural and behavioural characteristics of individual firms, including technological and management capabilities, as well as locational factors affecting supplies and demand.

African Industry in Decline: the case of textiles in Tanzania in the 1980s effectively divides into three parts: the first considers micro- and macro-economic theory in relation to the measurement of industrial performance; the second reviews the world's textile industry, together with policies which have been pursued in a number of selected Asian and African countries; and the third concentrates in some detail on the performance of the sector in Tanzania. Following the Arusha Declaration of 1967, in which it was announced that the 'commanding heights' of the Tanzanian economy should be under state control, strong emphasis was given to the expansion of manufacturing on the basis of standard (for the time) policies of import-substitution under protection. Production in the textile industry increased up to about 1980–1 but, following liberalisation, fell drastically by 43 per cent to 1989. Indeed, by that date the output of enterprises in the public sector had dropped by as much as 60 per cent compared with 1979–81, albeit partially offset by a 64 per cent increase (but from a small base) in the private sector. The problem, not fully acknowledged by de Valk, would thus appear to have been particularly in the public sector.

The analysis of economic and technical efficiency, which forms the core of de Valk's book, involves using various measures of a firm's performance, and combining these eventually into efficiency indexes for each enterprise in both the public and private sectors. This enables allowances to be made for different factors affecting output, such as failures in power or water supply by public utilities. All firms have been seriously handicapped at various times by disruptive and mistaken governmental decisions, and/or by limited access to foreign exchange or financial capital, and it is clear that a sound macro-economic and general policy framework of operation is essential for effective industrial growth.

Data are presented for individual firms and for the two categories, public and private. However, the author appears reluctant to identify public ownership as a prime cause of poor performance, pointing to the fact that one major and one less important such enterprise functioned well according to the various criteria. In fact, taking his total performance index, for instance, only 25 per cent (two out of eight) of the firms in the private sector scored below 50 per cent, compared with 78 per cent (seven out of nine) that were publicly owned. Measures of profitability – seriously negative in most public sector cases – also showed a wide divergence.

One deficiency in the overall presentation, in the course of the technical calculations, is the limited description of the firms themselves: we are not told when they were established, who are their owners (only towards the end do we learn that some are Asians), what are their sizes in terms of numbers employed, and what type of textiles each produces, for which market(s). While, therefore, the analysis sets out to capture the effects of different kinds

of factors on performance, it is likely that even more than those considered by de Valk are involved.

Nevertheless, *African Industry in Decline* represents a useful study which not only advances the application of methodology in the analysis of efficiency of firms in developing countries, but also brings out many of the reasons why African industrial performance has been so weak.

Jua Kali Kenya: change and development in an informal economy, 1970–95 can be considered a sequel to Kenneth King, *The African Artisan: education and the informal sector in Kenya* (London and New York, 1977), based on research carried out in 1972. Over 20 years later, King was able to re-interview most of the original operators in metalwork and candlemaking, together with new informants engaged in carpentry and tailoring in Nairobi, and in the previous village site to the north. His social anthropological approach is based on a limited number of in-depth interviews that were selected to exemplify and demonstrate the content of economic activities – what he calls “‘peopling’” the analysis of the informal sector with individuals’ (p. 3).

This kind of research certainly provides genuine insights into the industrial lives of those considered (as examples of a broad category of cases), including their progress in acquiring technical skills and in developing their range of products, as well as the obstacles periodically faced. On the other hand, a more systematic quantitative approach would have provided a statistical basis to better substantiate what are a number of major assertions made in different chapters regarding progress in Kenya’s informal sector. In addition, King would have had less difficulty in drawing the sort of overall conclusions which social scientists would be looking for 25 years after the ILO’s *Employment, Incomes and Equality in Kenya* (Geneva, 1972).

One might question, for instance, the implied initial assertion in ch. 2, that there has been a ‘*jua kali*-fication’ of Nairobi – ‘*jua kali*’ being the more recently adopted local term for the informal sector. With continued secular rural-urban migration into the city, the share of the formal sector, as well as its non-African components, will inevitably have declined as a proportion of the total. But the fundamental character of Nairobi would not appear to have changed with Africanisation, and it has not become merely a collection of ‘*Gikombas*’, the name of the specific workshop area that the author has re-studied, which is not particularly large.

King refers also to the ‘*jua kali*-fication’ of products from the officially designated industrial areas as part of the ‘second stage’ of import substitution, referring here to the output in the informal sector of capital goods, machines of different kinds, previously imported or produced by larger firms, generally at lower cost. This clearly is a phenomenon which calls for fuller and more quantitative investigation in order to assess the extent of its importance for the potential development, if any, of the sector.

The re-interviews conducted with eight of the original *jua kali* operators are once again interesting, but show mixed rather than conclusive results, with some metalwork businesses having made promising advances and others showing no substantial progress over the period. They are perhaps more revealing as examples of small-scale entrepreneurship than being capable of generating any broad conclusions regarding the informal sector itself. No

information is provided, unfortunately, on the growth of enterprises as measured either by the numbers employed or the value of capital assets. One significant element which is brought out in several of King's case-studies is the value of the skills and experiences earlier acquired as paid workers in larger enterprises, and thus more generally the advantages of interaction between those formal and informal sectors. Hence the implication that the creation of *jua kali* activities might be much more difficult in other countries – in neighbouring Uganda, for example – that do not have Kenya's substantial formal-sector manufacturing enterprises.

Methodological problems reappear in ch. 4 on the rural informal sector, which has received very little attention in the literature, since most surveys have focused on urban areas. There is, in fact, a large question mark regarding the extent to which manufacturing and processing, as opposed to trade and services, can be expected to make real progress outside the towns and cities in Africa. The chapter is, however, based on evidence from Githiga, a village some 40 kilometres from Nairobi, and based on a comparison of two small sets of data, collected in 1990 and 1992. King concludes that there has occurred 'a very substantial amount of new activity in a very short time', with 'a great diversity' among new businesses (p. 141). But this might be explained simply by the wider range of activities covered in the second sample, particularly the trade and services omitted in the first. While the high proportion of new starts during the most recent period is given as one indicator of expansion in the sector, the actual percentage in the first sample in the equivalent period (not calculated) turns out to be the same, in both cases probably representing no more than the well-known high turnover of new, micro-sized enterprises in the informal sector.

To the extent that there *has* been an expansion in the number and importance of businesses in Githiga, as there may well have been, it would have been important to know whether this was associated with any increase in the population of the village (its size over the period is not indicated), and/or if the proliferation in activities that occurred here is representative of villages of a certain size within Kenya's rural areas. On a further statistical note, the level of net earnings – one of the most obvious indicators of an effective operation – is given for a few enterprises, thereby indicating the possibilities, but not the overall spread of incomes secured, and these in K.Shs. (likely to rapidly lose meaning with inflation) rather than in US dollars or some other international currency.

One final observation: whether we call it the informal sector or *jua kali*, the activities embraced include trade and services of all kinds, with manufacturing just one component and not the largest. King is concerned almost entirely with small-scale enterprises by artisans and related technology and technical training, and it is here, despite the caveats made above, that he offers a number of insights which certainly call for more systematic investigation. Both *Jua Kali Kenya* and *Textiles in Tanzania* could profitably be read by those concerned with the current problems of African industry, and the development of appropriate policies in the small or larger-scale sectors.

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Liberalised Development in Tanzania: studies on accumulation processes and local institutions edited by PETER GIBBON
Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1995. Pp. 176. SEK140.00/£14.95 paperback.

This work is the outcome of a programme of research initiated by the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies on the political and social context of structural adjustment in sub-Saharan Africa. Tanzania was one of three countries covered in detail, and the three authors present accounts of what has happened following the Government's decision to change the nature of its economy and political system after Julius Nyerere stepped down as President in 1985.

Liberalised Development in Tanzania: studies on accumulation processes and local institutions commences with a study by the editor entitled 'Merchantisation of Production and Privatisation of Development in Post-Ujamaa Tanzania: an introduction'. Peter Gibbon reviews the Nyerere administration's promotion of African socialism under the guise of *ujamaa* and villagisation policies, and subsequent moves towards structural adjustment. Two neo-liberal discourses are outlined that address 'the implications of an "unfettered" informal sector on the one hand, and the outcome for popular accountability and "civil society" of the rise of NGOs [non-governmental organisations] and associated voluntary initiatives on the other' (p. 17). The open competitive markets that still characterise the informal sector in Africa have undoubtedly been useful for promoting economic liberalisation, and the rise of intermediary NGOs continue to provide a framework for community development activities (CDAs).

From the early 1980s a number of social scientists began to attach greater importance to the rôle of certain 'indigenous' forms of development that existed in most African societies. Later, in a preparatory report for the World Bank that was to pave the way for *Sub-Saharan Africa: from crisis to sustainable growth* (Washington, DC, 1989), Goran Hyden called on African states 'to once and for all abandon attempts to transform society on the basis of public sector institutions', and for their governments and donors 'to instead promote an "enabling environment" for "indigenous" economic and socio-political forms' (p. 18).

According to Gibbon, the ultimately more decisive neo-liberal discourse was provided by the World Bank's influential 1989 report, with government policies being blamed for the absence of market-oriented economies. As a solution:

the key economic aspect of the 'enabling environment' which should be put in place was improved scope for private formal sector ventures, partly through improvements to infrastructure and the banking sector, but mainly through state withdrawal from involvement in production and most services, deregulation of the conditions under which the private sector operated, and improved incentives for investment (p. 19).

However, although plausible arguments for increased informal-sector activities and NGO participation in promoting economic development continue to be presented, many academic commentators are today challenging 'the idealising

aspects of some of the neo-liberal formulations and the resulting fudging of issues of differentiation, discontinuity and conflict' (p. 23). So Gibbon asks how the real economic and socio-political changes underway should be understood, and claims that the ensuing two studies illustrate the 'merchandisation of production' and the 'privatisation of development'.

In ch. 2, 'The Meek Shall Inherit the Earth but Not the Mining Rights', Chachage Seithy L. Chachage discusses the correlation between the economic crisis of the late 1970s and the extent to which the mining sector became increasingly 'informal' and not documented in the mid-1980s. By the end of that decade the state was encouraging the liberalisation of the industry, and previously unrecorded activities were being regarded as part of the 'second economy', so that by 1994 one could speak of an expanding mining sector that enjoyed both local and foreign financial support and participation.

After a historical overview of both mining in Tanzania and the associated legal and institutional issues, Chachage gives profiles of the study areas: Mererani, where tanzanite, the country's most famous gem is mined; Mahenge/Ulangu, where the red corundum gemstone known as ruby is to be found; and Geita, one of the districts that have been most heavily invaded by small-scale miners of gold. His examination of the occupational and social groupings among miners includes interesting information about claim-holders after independence, the pit-owners, and the mineworkers, as well as the dealers and brokers, 'the ones who gain most from the mining industry' (p. 81). As regards the politics of accumulation in these areas and associated implications:

Essentially, the socio-political organisation of mining sites, villages and settlements in the areas studied was dominated by the mining associations, village government, CCM [the ruling party], the police and the *sungusungu* vigilantes. Like the mining sites, these are overwhelmingly dominated by men and their numbers of women members are extremely limited (p. 96).

Chachage claims that although the potential for mineral development 'is indeed vast' in Tanzania, 'World Bank policies and those of liberalisation generally confuse support for mining with the selling off of mineral rights and the facilitation of illegal dealing' (p. 104).

Ch. 3, 'When the State Withdraws: local development, politics and liberalisation in Tanzania' by Andrew S. Z. Kiondi, presents the findings of research in nine districts that reflect the country's main geographical and economic variations: Ilala, Hai, Pemba South, Tanga, Songea, Same, Newala, Kondoa, and Bukoba Rural. He explains the 'local development space' in each as regards the provision of services, notably education and health, that were previously largely monopolised by the state, and then describes the levels and nature of external donor, NGO, and community development activities. The conclusion is not surprisingly reached that 'There are a series of different patronage and sub-patronage relations embedded in the new local development space in Tanzania' (p. 165), not least because of the increasing rôle played by 'outsiders' in the promotion of social development.

As far as propositions about the political rôle of 'civil society' are concerned, this study appears to have discovered little evidence that the growth of non-governmental organisations and voluntary development activities contribute to increased democratisation, as much recent literature continues to suggest.

Kiondi found that ‘In reality the NGO/CDA group phenomena has no single or unambiguous meaning’, and that ‘The issue of who is empowered and how by the developments described is a complex one’ (p. 171), as is ‘the extent and ways to which state power is “balanced” by the great increase in private sector, NGO and CDA group presence’ (p. 173).

Kiondi identifies *inter alia* what might be called the ‘donorisation’ of local government functions, as well as grassroots developments that are business operations depending on donor support, and patrons who use their relationships with clients in order to advance their own interests. Although some advocates of economic liberalisation point to the positive impact of programmes that generate local income and facilities that would otherwise be absent, there are those who emphasise the negative consequences of the continued decline in state-supported social provisions, while at the same time central governments officially sanction donor-driven activities and the diversion of scarce financial resources to non-state actors/organisations. Other issues to be addressed include the support of the state for the power of local élites, and the movement by some neglected groups to create their own developmental opportunities. This last tendency alone can lead to exclusionary tactics that promote ethnic tensions which adversely affect moves towards a more democratic society.

The informal sector has always been a ‘haven’ where the un/under-employed have been able to retreat in the absence of paid work elsewhere. Likewise Africa has for far too long been suffering from ‘imported’ strategies that ignore local institution-building, ethnic differences, political corruption, and a deteriorating natural environment. So there is no doubt that governments need to promote strategies and institutions that can foster local participation and support ‘people centric’ and gender-conscious forms of development. But these should entail co-operation between countries and donor agencies, rather than impose general initiatives that ignore the significance of local areas. Only then it is likely that environmentally and economically sound programmes will empower the weak and marginalised.

While *Liberalised Development in Tanzania* does not offer an agenda for internal reforms and external assistance, it clearly reveals the type of research that needs to be encouraged and more widely undertaken in other countries. It should certainly be of considerable interest not only to students who want to know more about Tanzania, but also all those broadly concerned with the political economy of sub-Saharan African states, as well as their local and national politics.

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Kampala Women Getting By: wellbeing in the time of AIDS by SANDRA WALLMAN

London, James Currey; Kampala, Fountain Publishers; Athens, Ohio University Press; 1996. Pp. x + 246. £35.00. £14.95 paperback.

The spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa continues to be of great concern in the late 1990s, with the World Health Organisation estimating that

some 24 million in the continent will be infected by the year 2000. Although statistics for Uganda suggest that from 10 to 12 per cent of the population are HIV positive, or already suffering from AIDS, this is one of the pioneering African countries in acknowledging the epidemic and proactively attempting to mitigate the spread of AIDS. Hence the importance of a most timely book by Sandra Wallman, in association with Grace Bantebya-Kyomuhendo, Valdo Pons, Jessica Jitta, Frank Kaharuza, Jessica Ogden, and Solveig Freudenthal.

Kampala Women Getting By: wellbeing in the time of AIDS is the outcome, as explained in the introduction, of a two-year multi-disciplinary study of 'the factors affecting the response of "ordinary" urban women to their own symptoms of sexually transmitted diseases (STD) and to acute symptoms of illness in their children under the age of five' (p. 2). The ensuing ten chapters provide a illuminating account of the difficulties of 'getting by' in one of the capital's small and densely populated but largely unplanned suburbs. They include a great deal of information about the physical setting and urban system, the people and their community life, the well-being of their households, treatment options, children's illnesses, the perception and management of STDs, and individual accounts of several women. In addition, a number of maps and coloured photographs, as well as helpful diagrams and tables of statistics, provide a clear demographic picture of life in Kamwokya.

The authors have attempted to contribute to the control of AIDS, as claimed in their summary and conclusions, 'by specifying the factors preventing early and effective treatment of STD among "ordinary" women in low-income urban Africa' (p. 226). In other words, they have sought to uncover why so few use government hospitals or clinics for the treatment of STDs, and hence have looked to the 'social context'. Their approach has been 'holistic', with a methodology that is familiar to all social anthropologists who have undertaken research by means of surveys, interviews, group discussions, and case/situation analyses.

This book is excellent if you want to get a 'feel' for life in Kamwokya, although the strength of its rich and vivid descriptions are also weaknesses in so far as some readers may be overwhelmed with details that do not always lead to clear conclusions. Needless-to-say, the multi-authored chapters vary in quality, and do not always show the relationship between what is being described and the central focus of the study. One chapter that stands out as stellar, by Jessica Ogden and Grace Bantebya-Kyomuhendo, discusses the significance of the household as the locus of health, the nature of the home treatment process, including the importance of clinic dispensaries and pharmacies, and the links between traditional, informal, and formal forums for health care.

Several important conclusions arise from *Kampala Women Getting By*, notably the need to recognise the key rôle played by women in health care. It is also clear that in order to understand why health decisions are made that may seem irresponsible to 'us', we have to look at the social, economic, and political contexts. Unless we have a cultural understanding of perceptions of 'wellbeing' and how to treat illness, Western-directed AIDS policy and assistance will be ineffective in combating the epidemic. What is certain is that

the meticulous and enlightening portrayal of daily life in an urban neighbourhood in Africa will give all readers a clearer understanding as to what is really happening and why.

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Africa in the New International Order: rethinking state sovereignty and regional security edited by EDMOND J. KELLER and DONALD ROTHSCHILD

Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner, 1996. Pp. x+253. \$49.95. \$19.95 paperback.

This book is the outcome of an international conference, 'The End of the Cold War and the New African Political Order', held in 1994 at the University of California, under the auspices of the James S. Coleman African Studies Centre. Generous grants enabled participants to be invited from all over the world who realised that ethnic and religious conflicts had become rife since the end of superpower competition for clients in Africa, especially among the 'soft' states that were weak and ineffectively governed. In Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, and Zaïre, for example, the sense of a common destiny and overriding societal concerns had collapsed, resulting in violent encounters between state and insurgent armies, as well as widespread brutality and violence among the militia. In the midst of these problems, Western countries and Russia were disengaging from the continent, leaving African states and peoples to their own devices. The main objective of the 1994 conference was to engage scholars in a dialogue to assess the implications of these changes, the responses of African states and leaders, and possible alternative strategies.

Africa in the New International Order: rethinking state sovereignty and regional security, after a helpful explanatory introduction by Edmond J. Keller, starts with 'a balance sheet' of the region and the cold war by General Olusegun Obasanjo, the former Nigerian Head of State, who refers to the unease being felt about attempts 'to impose Western democratic models lock, stock, and barrel on African countries as a condition for economic assistance' (p. 19). Thereafter, in Part 1, 'Perspectives on Regional and Global Issues', Ibrahim A. Gambari confirms that African governments are not going to find it easy to secure the external aid needed to help them tackle their huge tasks of reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation, not least because of the increased competition for development assistance from former members of the Eastern bloc.

But as Solomon Gomes also points out, the end of the cold war provided the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) with the opportunity to assess the issue of security in its wider dimensions. Indeed, as the 1991 Kampala conference on security, stability, development, and co-operation in Africa had claimed: 'Security must be transcendental of orthodox definition and perception of security in military terms... must be all-embracing and all-encompassing and ramifying... must include personal security, food security, economic security and social security' (p. 44).

It seems clear that the conflict between topography and demography in the definition of security has to be resolved, so that the concept can be broadly located within a larger framework of socio-economic and geopolitical development, and not necessarily in militarism and internal security mechanisms. A degree of consensus has emerged that the United Nations should be entrusted with the tasks of establishing and managing a reliable system of collective and universal security, in which continental and sub-regional institutions have a rôle to play. In his analysis of changing patterns of relations, I. William Zartman identifies 'four underlying sources of conflicts: internal consolidations, internal collapse, territorial uncertainties, and structural rivalries' (p. 53). He notes that conflicts in Africa since the end of the cold war have taken the form of attempted secessions from weak and oppressive régimes, while some have been the outcome of pressures to democratise that have caused both authoritarian movements and democratic parties to find support in neighbouring countries.

In Part 2, 'Regional Security and the End of the Cold War', the contributors offer a series of case-studies. Anna Simons shows that conflicts between states in the Horn of Africa had become internationalised because their geo-strategic location had enabled them to flirt with the superpowers. However, since then the civil war in Somalia had been largely triggered by contradictions in family-clanship structures which were exploited by various warlords. Terrence Lyons argues that armed conflicts in Ethiopia and Eritrea had roots in the contentious process of state and nation building, the complex search for justice and equity, the challenges of identity and governance, and the competition for scarce resources and sustainable development.

According to Francis M. Deng and Khalid M. Medani, the 'civil war that has raged intermittently for nearly four decades' in the Sudan is ironically 'the result of the country's greatest promise as a microcosm of Africa and a bridge or cross-roads between the continent and the Middle East' (p. 100). They remind us that

the northern Sudanese see themselves as Arabs and deny the strongly African element in their skin color, physical features and cultural elements, even in the practice of Islam ... While ... the south, where the African identity has predominated, remained isolated, protected by natural barriers and the resistance of the Nilotic warrior tribes, primarily Dinka, Nuer, and Silluk (p. 101).

This ethnic-religious dichotomy has been reinforced by Sudanese leadership through the post-independence era, and has influenced its foreign policies and its allies in the international arena.

Turning to another region, Marina Ottawa emphasises that ethnic realities in South Africa were exacerbated by *apartheid*, and that 'ethnic nationalism was an ideology upheld by whites long before it became an issue among blacks' (p. 121). However, by the early 1990s it had become 'part of the struggle for power among competing movements and leaders trying to stake out a position in the new system' (p. 122). As she points out, this has implications that go beyond the borders of South Africa, because 'a democratic government sensitive to ethnic demands and willing to negotiate ways to accommodate them' would set an encouraging example for the rest of the continent (p. 131). Thereafter, Denis Venter examines sources of insecurity in

Southern Africa, 'arguably the only part of the African continent that can look forward to a truly regional dynamic', but only 'if there is genuine and constructive cooperation among the countries of the region' (p. 145).

Margaret Aderinsola Vogt and Robert A. Mortimer deal respectively with the involvement of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) in Liberia, and the rôle of the Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (Ecomog). Evidence is presented that this multinational interventionary force was not always perceived to observe the principles of impartiality and neutrality, in particular because it was mainly controlled by Nigeria, regarded in the sub-region, especially by francophone states, as a hegemon. On the rationality and legality of the actions taken by Ecowas, it seems obvious that effective strategies of economic integration cannot be pursued in the absence of law and order: there must be security of life and property, as well as freedom of movement of peoples. The 1981 Ecowas protocol on defence provided the legal basis for Ecomog, and Vogt argues that the absence of two main structures – the Defence Council and the Defence Commission – was responsible for Nigeria's domination of the leadership and policy direction.

In Part 3, 'Extracontinental Actors and Regional Security', Peter J. Schraeder shows that the foreign policy of the United States during the cold war was interventionist and based on anti-communism and containment, being driven by events as opposed to events being shaped by policy, and mainly determined in relation to Africa's significance as regards the struggle between East and West. But since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, according to the author, American foreign policy has exhibited eight trends: (i) the willingness to go on treating Africa as a 'back-burner issue'; (ii) the search for budgetary cutbacks in staff and aid for Africa; (iii) the increased importance of national security bureaucracies; (iv) the continuing concern about threats poised by low-intensity conflicts and 'radical' African leaders; (v) the growing perception that Islamic fundamentalism is a threat to US interests on the continent; (vi) more diplomatic involvement in the resolutions of regional conflicts in Africa; (vii) the promotion of multi-party democracy as a precondition for improved economic and political relations with Washington; and (viii) the gradual abandonment of ideologically based policies in favour of the pursuit of economic self-interest.

On Moscow's cold and post-cold war policies, Jeffrey A. Lefebvre notes that although Africa was considered for a long time to be of marginal importance, 'the Soviet Union maintained an interest in the region if only because it was one of the weak links in the world capitalist system'. Military and economic assistance was guided by pragmatic realism and ideological dogmatism, but different tendencies prevailed from the days of Lenin onwards:

The right-wing approach favored support for sympathetic noncommunist movements or governments and strengthening ties with geopolitically important developing countries, even if capitalist in orientation. Conversely, the left-wing approach emphasized ideology as a litmus test, whereby support was given primarily to Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties or movements (p. 206).

Moscow's policy towards Africa changed following the death of Leonid Brezhnev in 1982 and the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev. Expensive

support for armed liberation movements was abandoned with the introduction of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, and it was not long before some 50,000 Cuban troops that the Soviet Union had sponsored were withdrawn from Angola. Henceforth strategic and geopolitical factors took a back seat, with policies towards the continent being characterised by 'constructive participation'. Moscow helped Lisbon and Washington to broker peace in Angola, supported UN involvement in Somalia, and restored diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1992.

Africa in the New International Order lacks a theoretical framework, but offers valuable insights into, and analyses of, the continent's security problems in the light of continuing global challenges. These can only be faced successfully by African states if they redefine and empower existing regional and sub-regional institutions. As regards the needed processes of economic, political, and social engineering, Donald Rothchild claims in his conclusion that 'Proportionality, inclusiveness, and decentralization... are guidelines intended to foster interest group accommodation and moderate behavior' (p. 236), and supports the earlier arguments presented by Obasanjo that for democracy to endure, it must be 'home-induced, home-grown, and home-sustained' (p. 19).

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Japan and Africa: big business and diplomacy by JUN MORIKAWA
London, Hurst, 1997. Pp. xii + 298. £35.00.

An open-minded approach and thorough knowledge of subject matter has enabled Jun Morikawa to make a penetrating analysis of Japan and Africa that is, in fact, pro-African without being anti-Japanese. Rich with details, albeit without being verbose, some chapters perhaps unavoidably overlap in their coverage of the interactions between different segments of Japanese government and organised business in the construction of the country's African diplomacy. As the book relies, for the most part, on materials written in the Japanese language, with generous quotations from original sources, it is a welcome and refreshing addition to the literature, and as such should serve as an invaluable source of both information and reference.

Japan and Africa: big business and diplomacy aims to offer an analytical framework that 'may help to explain why Japan has acted (or failed to act) as it has in Africa, and to reveal the perceptions of Africa that have guided the behaviour of Japanese policy-makers', in 'the hope of making a small contribution to the eventual realisation of more democratic control over Japan's African diplomacy' (p. 4). In ch. 2, Morikawa presents 'the basic framework' that enables the guiding principles and policy objectives of Japan's relations with Africa to be understood, before coming to the view that the outcome 'has not been as non-political and as "clean" as has sometimes been suggested' (p. 50). He substantiates his conclusion by referring to Japan's relations with South Africa, South-West Africa, and Ethiopia before World War II. The mixing of 'theory' and 'history' tends to reduce the smooth flow of Morikawa's otherwise well-integrated arguments, and this minor limitation might have been avoided had he devoted a chapter for each theme.

A concise overview of the evolution and post-war development of Japan's 'white' and 'black' Africa policies is presented in ch. 3, in which Morikawa brilliantly examines how Japan tried to reconcile its pro-Pretoria policy and the corresponding pressures from black Africa through 'dual diplomacy'. He also shows how Japan tried to cope with the dictates of its economic interests in 'white Africa' and its diplomatic concerns in 'black Africa', and provides an impressive collection of historical statistics on the economic interactions of Japan and the continent. Thereafter, ch. 4, 'Actors in the External Decision-making Structure', analyses 'the degree and the extent of the participation of [the] three major actors in the construction of Japan's African diplomacy' (p. 92) – the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the bureaucracy, and the *zaikai* or organised business – with details of their origin and relevant structural attributes. For most researchers who are not Japanese, such information is either inaccessible or simply incomprehensible, but Morikawa's intimate knowledge of the nation's language and culture has enabled him to make excellent use of the available data and literature.

Several cases are examined in ch. 5 which reveal the full breadth of the co-operation and participation that exists between government and big business as regards aid, personal exchange activities, and public relations, while ch. 6 focuses on the most sensitive aspect of Japan's African diplomacy: racism. Morikawa relates the history of anti-*apartheid* movements in Japan, and briefly but candidly discusses the origin and nature of Japanese attitudes towards black people in general, and Africans in particular, before stressing in ch. 7 that lack of adequate philosophy and credibility have characterised the country's African diplomacy. After assessing recent trends, Morikawa concludes that 'the possibility that the Japanese government will introduce democratic notions as the guiding principles of its African diplomacy is remote, since the government has yet to show any sign of wishing to reassess its past policies of dual diplomacy or *kanzai ittaishugi*' (p. 232). The ensuing 40 pages of appendices include a list of Japanese companies with offices in South Africa, and the number established elsewhere in Africa, as well as the 1993 Tokyo Declaration on African Development 'Towards the 21st Century'.

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Il Negus. Vita e morte dell'ultimo re dei re by ANGELO DEL BOCA
Bari, Laterza, 1995. Pp. viii + 394. L35,000.

Angelo Del Boca is committed to the history of Italy's colonial record and later involvement in the Horn of Africa and Libya. He is, in fact, one of the most prolific writers in this field, and has the advantage of being able to draw on a considerable range of knowledge acquired both as an academic and a journalist. The impetus for his biography of the last Ethiopian Emperor stemmed from a number of meetings with Haile Selassie. As a correspondent for several newspapers towards the end of the 1960s, the author was mainly based in Somalia and Ethiopia, and combines scientific research with

valuable first-hand experience, which is of great help in giving readers the deserved impression that he knows what he is writing about.

Il Negus. Vita e morte dell'ultimo re dei re commences with an introduction entitled 'Morte per Assassinio', in which we learn about the final months of Haile Selassie's life after he had been overthrown as Emperor by a military *coup d'état* in September 1974. During his incarceration, which lasted nearly one year, he was understandably tormented at the reduction of his status to that of a virtual onlooker, forced to observe the collapse of his monarchy. Most of his family were also jailed in the Akaki prison, and in November 1974 several of his most loyal and trusted subjects were executed there, including two former Prime Ministers, Aklilu Hapte Wold and Makonnen Endelkachew. Haile Selassie was 83 when the *Derg* authorised him to be killed on 26 August 1975 because, despite his age, he was still strong and authoritative enough to pose a threat to the military rulers.

We are told that Tafari Makonnen had a 'real veneration' for his father (p. 22), who had become famous for the momentous military success against the Italian army at Adwa in 1896, and who died in 1906. Del Boca documents the obstacles that Tafari faced before becoming *Negus* in September 1928, from the fight against his cousin Lij Yasu to the continuing disagreements with Menelik's daughter Zauditu, who had been crowned Empress in 1917. Indeed, it was only after her death in April 1930 that he gave himself the name of Haile Selassie. The author explains the opposition that he met while trying to introduce a limited programme of reform that was 'destined to be criticised both by conservatives and progressives'. The new Emperor 'was not a reformer as Kemal Ataturk, who imposed respect for the new legislation with the stick' (p. 57), and did not break completely with the past, preferring instead to choose for the future only what he thought was necessary to preserve the status quo. Moreover, to make matters more difficult from the second half of the 1920s onwards, Haile Selassie had unresolved differences with Benito Mussolini that eventually led to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935–6.

The penultimate section of the book, 'Solo contro il fascismo', includes details of the fierce resistance against the fascist invaders mounted by the Emperor until he decided to attack, heroically but unsuccessfully, the positions that they held at Maichew. The epic battle that took place there on 31 March 1936 was the last before the Italians entered Addis Ababa, forcing Haile Selassie to go into exile in England. This was one of the saddest periods of his life, despite increased support from the British Government once Italy entered World War II on the side of Germany in 1940.

After the euphoria following Haile Selassie's triumphant return to Addis Ababa at the end of 1941, it was not long before the stability of his imperial régime was shaken by several conspiracies and armed uprisings. The Emperor was aware that Ethiopia needed important reforms, and his commitment to modernising the army before and after the war with Italy, as well as to improving the education system, offered evidence of important progressive attitudes. However, when the new constitution was introduced in 1955, Haile Selassie still retained the powers of an absolutist monarch. In 1960, he was nearly removed by the Governor of Jijiga, Girmame Neway, supported by General Mengistu Neway, chief of the Imperial Guard, and by Lieutenant-

Colonel Workneh Gebeyehu, in charge of the Security Department. Their insurrection was repressed in bloodshed, but the seeds of discontent remained and go a long way to explain the success of the coup that ended the monarchy in 1974.

The Emperor wanted to nurture his public image as a progressive leader with an international standing, and in 1963 successfully promoted the creation of the Organisation of African Unity in Addis Ababa, which became the seat of the OAU itself. While Haile Selassie's commitments on the international scene were being extended and becoming more widely known – see his address to the summit conference of Heads of State published in this *Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1963, pp. 281–91, under the title 'Towards African Unity' – student-based opposition to the monarchy was openly growing. The president of the Ethiopian Student Movement, Telahun Gizaw, was killed in 1969, and Addis Ababa University was closed after a number of riots had led to several students being arrested. Needless-to-say, 'Haile Selassie was aware that it was increasingly difficult to bridge the gap between him and the young intellectuals' (p. 296). Del Boca concludes by highlighting the Emperor's contradictions, and claims that one of the main mistakes he made was to be caught between progressive and conservative forces, never taking a final decision one direction or the other. None the less, the 1974 revolution 'caused Ethiopia irreparable damage, pushing the country towards the civil war that Haile Selassie always tried to avoid' (p. 336).

Il Negus makes good use of what has been written about Haile Selassie by, *inter alia*, Edward Ullendorff, Christopher Clapham, Leonard Mosley, John Markakis, and Harold Marcus, but relies especially on the Italian diplomatic documents to be found in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Historical Archives and the State Central Archives. The author's analysis of the Emperor's opposition to fascism, and his positive attitude towards the Italian community in Ethiopia after liberation, are likely to be of special interest for many readers, but we also learn about his efforts to re-establish diplomatic ties with Rome, as well as his visit to the Italian capital in 1970. Indeed, Del Boca's most significant achievement is almost certainly the detailed picture he gives us of Haile Selassie's relationship with Italy. As intended, his book will definitely make a 'contribution to a better knowledge' of an important African leader who deserves to be more widely understood, although it is probably an unnecessary exaggeration to claim that he was 'a monarch that for half a century dominated the African scene' (p. 336).

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African Popular Theatre from Pre-Colonial Times to the Present Day by DAVID KERR

London, James Currey; Portsmouth, NH, Heinemann; Nairobi, EAEP; Cape Town, David Philip; and Harare, Baobab; 1995. Pp. x + 278. £35.00. £11.95 paperback.

Let us hope that many will have their attention arrested by a well-illustrated publication's striking cover, with its title, author's name, and an ecstatically

joyful scene from *Woza Albert!* all starkly presented in white on black, framed by a thin rectangle in orange. This book certainly deserves to be read because intriguing snippets of popular theatrical forms and practices from all over sub-Saharan Africa have been assembled into a coherent collage that stretches from pre-colonial to present times. As explained in his preface, David Kerr has attempted 'to give a roughly chronological account of the development of African popular theatre along with an examination of its economic, social and political background, linked to the conditions of production' (p. x).

African Popular Theatre has been written by a scholar who has worked within and outside Universities in Botswana, Malawi, and Zambia, three of the countries that have been in the forefront of 'the travelling theatre movement' and 'theatre for development', as vividly covered in chs. 7–8. All the other headings also speak for themselves: 1, 'pre-colonial African popular theatre', 2, 'colonialism and theatre', 3, 'the reaction of indigenous African theatre to colonialism', 4, 'syncretic popular theatre: militaristic mime', 5, 'syncretic popular theatre: concert party and Yoruba opera', 6, 'literary drama and popular theatre', 9, 'popular theatre and macro-media', 10, 'populist theatre and national ideology in modern Africa', 11, 'popular theatre and the struggle for liberation in Southern Africa', and 12, 'towards a theatre of popular struggle'.

Any comprehensive work with the title 'African' is bound to face an uphill task, not least because of the heterogeneous nature of the continent, and the fact that each sub-region, not to mention each country, has its own history and culture that continue to shape its theatre. So it is very hard, if not virtually impossible, to make an integrated study of the emerging manifestations of the African theatre in the twentieth century, or even since independence, in a continent that is anything but homogeneous. For example, the masked performances described in ch. 1 from West Africa only constitute a small part of the total picture of what was taking place elsewhere in pre-colonial Africa. At any rate, the rites of passage cited there, as well as the associated ceremonies of initiation found in other parts of the book, are all classified as forms of 'African theatre'. But such a definition is rather controversial, because some ritual 'performances' have specific social, religious, and economic functions within traditional African societies. Ancestral masquerades may, for instance, involve spiritual possession exercised within lineage-based cults for purposes of ancestral worship, and may include sacred non-public rituals, or even communicating with entities of the 'alternate reality'.

Colonialism and neo-colonialism are appropriately used as backdrops against which popular forms of theatre are discussed, and Kerr sheds light on some that draw on the African cultural matrix for their enrichment. In effect, he shows the dualities of indigenous performing aesthetics and colonial influences as being integrated into works of art that can be described as genuinely African in content and features. For example, ch. 5 focuses on the tradition of the 'concert party', and accurately traces its history from Bob Johnson, the original Ghanaian exponent, to its influence on the Yoruba opera popularised by Hubert Ogunde in Nigeria.

The contributions of several national theatres and universities to the development of 'literary drama' and other popular forms are highlighted.

Mention is made of the work of James Gibbs, two of whose earliest productions in Malawi at the beginning of the 1970s were former 'hits' from the short-lived Legon Road Theatre in Ghana:

The University of Malawi Travelling Theatre illustrates very well the way shifting personnel in African universities have contributed to the dispersal of popular theatre techniques. Apart from the inputs provided by Gibbs, other contributions have been made by Mupa Shumba and the author, who had experience of the Makerere Free Travelling Theatre and the University of Zambia's Chikwakwa Theatre respectively (p. 139).

The 'theatre for development' is defined as being for community 'conscientisation' or 'renewal', and is traced from its early beginnings in the mid-1970s in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, and thereafter to other parts of Africa. As Kerr points out, its limitations 'did not go unnoticed by drama practitioners':

The good communications between popular theatre workers in different parts of Africa meant that experiences were shared and a critical attitude developed, which helped the amateurs create improved Theatre for Development practices. One group which undertook a sustained critical reappraisal...was the ABU Collective at the University of Ahmadu Bello in Zaria, Northern Nigeria...

The Collective was heavily influenced by the concept of... 'theatre as discourse', where, instead of a polished performance presented to popular audiences by an elite cadre of artists, the theatre team actually collaborated with the audiences in the creation of drama' (p. 161).

In the next edition, the author may wish to include information about 'theatre for development' in other parts of Africa where it has gained substantial ground. Such work started at the University of Ghana under Sandy Arkhurst has made great strides since its inception in the late 1980s.

Selected materials on popular theatre in a number of French-speaking countries are also presented by Kerr, as well as an account of the rôle of the electronic media (radio, television, and films) in disseminating information on popular theatre. Chs. 10–11 might have been amalgamated, with sub-headings introduced to identify variations in their common theme. Of particular interest is the detailed elucidation of the extent to which agit-pros aided the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. This is carefully set against some attempts to promote the popularity of community-based theatre in Kenya by Ngugi wa Thiong'o and others, which were crushed with hostility, resulting in imprisonment and exile.

Almost inevitably in a work of this magnitude, some readers and reviewers will be able to find a few slips and errors in various chapters, especially where references are being made to their own countries. For example, the experimental open-air playhouse in the capital of Ghana was situated near the Ambassador Hotel, and not 'next to a lorry park in an unfashionable area of downtown Accra' (p. 118), and is now located at Legon as part of the facilities of the School of Performing Arts at the University of Ghana. However, as Kerr acknowledges, he had to rely heavily on secondary sources, and expects that future corrections 'will come from scholars noting the discrepancies between the theories here and the facts revealed by further primary research' (p. ix).

Perhaps the main strength of *African Popular Theatre* stems from its extensive documentation. The texts of notable plays have been summarised, some enhanced by rare production notes and the actual experiences of companies,

including accounts of close brushes with local authorities in their respective countries. Here is a valuable history of the popular theatre of Africans and, to some extent, a study of their literature. Place your orders now!

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Steve Biko – I Write What I Like: a selection of his writings edited with a personal memoir by AELRED STUBBS
London, Bowerdean Publishing, 1996 edn. Pp. xxiv + 216. £9.99/\$14.95 paperback.

When the South African Students Organisation (SASO) was officially inaugurated at the University of the North, Turfloop, in July 1969, Steve Biko was elected President. The following year, after being succeeded by Barney Pitso, he became chairman of SASO Publications, and thereafter the monthly *SASO Newsletter* began to carry articles by Biko called ‘I Write What I Like’ but signed Frank Talk. Seven years later the man who had become the leader of the Black Consciousness movement was arrested at a check point by South African security police, who later tortured and watched him die from the head injuries they had inflicted. Given that Biko’s death in 1977 continues to be condemned as an outrage by so many South Africans and by the international community, why is his name rarely included today among the pantheon of anti-*apartheid* leaders? Although killed before his charismatic qualities had turned him into a phenomenon akin to Nelson Mandela – or such leaders as Albert Luthuli and Robert Sobukwe – Biko undoubtedly helped to reinvigorate what was at the time a moribund popular struggle.

Steve Biko – I Write What I Like is a new edition of his writings and utterances that celebrates what would have been his 50th birthday in December 1996. Indeed, 1997 sees the 20th anniversary of the death of the man who appealed to blacks to stridently reject South African liberalism and gradualism, to embrace an African-centred history and culture, to construct a ‘black’ opposition comprised of Indians, Coloureds, and Africans, and to support a comprehensive restructuring of all aspects of South African society so that *apartheid* could be abolished.

Black Consciousness played an influential rôle in breaking the close association between white liberals and prominent black resistance leaders in South Africa. Biko’s first article in the *SASO Newsletter*, August 1970, headed ‘Black Souls in White Skins’, gives a good indication of his fiery prose:

There is nothing the matter with blacks. The problem is WHITE RACISM and it rests squarely on the laps of the white society... White liberals must leave blacks to take care of their own business while they concern themselves with the real evil in our society – white racism (p. 23).

And in his next article, ‘We Blacks’, published the following month, Biko explained ‘the urgent need for an understanding of what is involved in the new approach – “black consciousness”’ (p. 27).

His movement fundamentally reordered the objectives of the populist struggles against white oppression in South Africa, which during the 1950s and early 1960s had been largely limited to the formal political realm. Biko

asserted that resistance to *apartheid* required that economic relations, art, churches, schools – all had to change. According to ‘White Racism and Black Consciousness’, the paper that he delivered at a conference sponsored by the Abe Bailey Institute for Inter-Racial Studies to bring the leaders of all the main national student organisations together in January 1971, ‘One has to overhaul the whole system in South Africa before hoping to get black and white walking hand in hand to oppose a *common enemy*’ (p. 64).

In Biko’s view, the country’s Indian, Coloured, and African populations shared a history of resistance to white oppression that had to be unified, and thus their squabbling had to be quelled. As explained to a SASO leadership training course, probably in December 1971, in a paper entitled ‘The Definition of Black Consciousness’:

1. Being black is not a matter of pigmentation – being black is a reflection of mental attitude.
2. Merely by describing yourself as black you have started on a road towards emancipation, you have committed yourself to fight against all forces that seek to use your blackness as a stamp that marks you out as a subservient being (p. 48).

By the early 1980s the politically involved members of ‘non-white’ groups had coalesced, and although co-operation at the popular level was far less forthcoming and quite transitory when it did surface, the unity principle of Black Consciousness that Biko had promoted contributed to the success of the United Democratic Front later in that decade. In fact, his influence on this shift in resistance politics can hardly be overstated.

Indeed, Biko undoubtedly helped the reassertion of black cultural and social pride that continued well into the 1980s by his repeated reasoning that white racism in South Africa had obliterated and replaced black history with a litany of conquest, submission, and subjugation, and that there was a vital need to celebrate black culture and to emphasise black resistance to white oppression:

We have to rewrite our history and describe in it the heroes that formed the core of resistance to the white invaders. More has to be revealed and stress has to be laid on the successful nation-building attempts by people like Shaka, Moshoeshe and Hintsu... It is through the evolution of our genuine culture that our identity can be fully rediscovered (p. 70).

Biko sometimes romanticised and over-generalised aspects of South Africa’s diverse ethnic groups, as in ‘Some African Cultural Concepts’, originally presented as a paper at a conference held at the Ecumenical Lay Training Centre, Edendale, Natal, in 1971. But despite tendencies towards simplification and idealisation, Biko’s African-focused history, particularly ‘from below’, became the norm in the mid-1970s and 1980s among South African scholars. It would be a stretch to credit Biko for this shift in historiography, but he articulated his position long before this perspective was in vogue.

I Write What I Like is still relevant because it confronts a central paradox facing contemporary South African society: that of endorsing cultural differences while embracing a cohesive national culture. In an address to black students in December 1969 entitled ‘SASO – Its Role, Its Significance and Its Future’, Biko claimed that the paradox could only be solved if national bodies were unitary, not divided by race, and he went on to support the

legitimate existence of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS):

SASO accepts the principle that in any one country at any time a national union must be open to all students... and in our country NUSAS is the national union and SASO accepts her fully as such and offers no competition in that direction (p. 5).

In his February 1970 'Letter to SRC [Students Representative Council] Presidents', Biko enunciated that his unitary ideal was not simply a self-serving appeal on behalf of the black community. Indeed, even conservative groups such as the *Afrikanse Studentebond* had a fundamental right to exist, regardless of how deplorable their organisational premise might be to South African blacks.

Biko's insistence that blacks should be united at the national level, while non-racial political formations could allow room for even culturally and racially exclusive movements, might easily be imagined to be the politically murky position embraced by today's African National Congress (ANC) Government. But that is the importance of Biko's legacy. He was able to see the complexities and searing paradoxes confronting South Africa, and he had the fortitude and intellect to construct a formidable response.

The introductory statements accompanying each of Biko's contributions have not been updated by his friend and editor, Father Aelred Stubbs, to reflect recent political changes in South Africa, but are still essential for understanding the context of each. Of particular interest is 'Martyr of Hope: a personal memoir' by Stubbs, who had first met the Biko family in 1963. But special mention must also be made of the writings headed 'What is Black Consciousness?' and 'The Righteousness of Our Strength', because they are extracts from Biko's evidence in the SASO/BPC trial during 1975-6, which ended with all nine accused being found guilty of one or more charges under the Terrorism Act.

Although only specialists may want to read all the details of the shifts and turns in student politics and tactics during the early 1970s, at a deeper level, *I Write What I Like* stands as a prescient discussion of the dilemmas caused by racial and class exploitation. So it is likely to remain as one of the most important collections of political essays in the history of South Africa, if not the continent. Along with Franz Fanon, *Les Damnés de la terre* (Paris, 1961), later published as *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York 1968, and Harmondsworth, 1969), Biko's writings are an essential source for understanding white domination and African resistance.

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