

The Development of Dual Loyalties: Immigrants' Integration to Canadian Regional Dynamics

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Introduction

Regionalism, the presence of systematic variations in regional political cultures and the existence of regional cleavages, is a central feature of Canadian politics. At the heart of regionalism lie tensions between popular loyalties to federal and provincial governments. As Clarke and colleagues explain (1980: 35), loyalty to the regions and not to the country as a whole was a basic reason why the Fathers of Canada crafted a confederation. Since then, Canadians exhibit a “will to live together” and a “will to live apart” (LaSelva, 1996) and consistently balance those distinct and potentially conflicting loyalties to their province and to the country. This is a fundamental part of the basic dynamics of Canadian regionalism and hence of Canadian politics.

Whether regional political cultures and cleavages between dual loyalties are attributable to different settlement patterns (Elkins and Simeon, 1980; Schwartz, 1974; Wiseman, 1996), fundamental regional economic differences (Brodie, 1990; Brym, 1986; Wilson, 1974) or Canada's federal political institutions (Simeon and Elkins, 1974) remains a focus

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of vigorous debate.¹ That said, most acknowledge that variations in the origins, timing and settlement patterns of large flows of immigrants to Canada have had a marked impact on the development of Canadian political culture and, more specifically, regional subcultures (Blake, 1972; Simeon and Elkins, 1974: 433; Elkins and Simeon, 1980; Lipset, 1990; Wiseman, 1996, 2007). Such immigrant waves as the early settlement of New France, the migration of loyalists from the American colonies to Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia in the 1780s, and the movement of Americans and Central and Eastern Europeans to Ontario and Western Canada in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century are all thought to have a profound impact on the dominant political outlooks of these regions.

Substantial attention has been paid to understanding the origins of cleavages between these dual loyalties, but relatively few efforts have been directed at exploring the contemporary dynamics of regionalism in Canada. This analysis directly explores the interplay between these two central features of Canada's political dynamics, namely regionalism and immigration. More specifically, the focus is on how contemporary immigrants navigate the dynamics of orientations towards the federal and provincial governments. Previous research examining whether dual loyalties induce identity conflict found that Canadians accommodate these dual loyalties reasonably well (Clarke et al., 1980: 68). But does the same hold for new Canadians? Do immigrants develop political loyalties that are centripetal or centrifugal? Are these newcomers more federally or provincially oriented than their native-born counterparts living in the same province? And what impact do these new Canadians have on regional dynamics of political loyalties?

There are good reasons to suppose that contemporary immigration patterns have the potential to significantly transform these regional dynamics. Both the magnitude of immigration flows and the settlement patterns of new immigrants have changed considerably in recent decades. First, immigrants made up some 19.8 per cent of the Canadian population in 2006, and as the data in Figure 1 indicate, immigration has contributed to more than half of Canada's population growth since the 1960s. The proportion of population growth due to immigration peaked at just over 85 per cent between 1996 and 2001, a level not seen since immigration waves in the early part of the twentieth century with the settlement of the Western provinces. Second, the settlement patterns of immigrants to Canada have shifted significantly in recent years. The longstanding pattern was that Ontario has been the overwhelming destination of choice for the majority of immigrants. Ontario remains the province of choice for most immigrants, but Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta have experienced recent rapid growth in their foreign-born populations. Third, these shifts have also been accompanied by significant changes in the

Abstract. The transformations in recent patterns of immigration have the potential to reshape the trajectory of Canada's regional political dynamics. Drawing on data from the 1993–2006 *Canadian Election Studies*, this analysis explores how immigrants adjust to the prevailing regional political norms in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia. Do newcomers adopt the political orientations (feelings towards Canada and their province, confidence in provincial and federal governments, perceptions about how the province is treated by the federal government and support for the Liberal party) that resemble those of their native-born provincial counterparts? The results suggest that immigrants, especially newer waves from non-traditional source countries, tend to develop orientations that are more federally oriented than the local populations in their province. This tendency is most pronounced in Quebec where both groups of immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries internalize political grievances and norms less efficiently than their counterparts in other provinces.

Résumé. Les transformations récentes des tendances migratoires pourraient avoir un impact sur l'évolution des dynamiques politiques régionales au Canada. Cette enquête s'appuie sur les données de sondage de l'*Étude électorale canadienne* de 1993 à 2006 et vise à déterminer si les immigrants adoptent les attitudes et les comportements politiques dominants de leur province de résidence (Québec, Ontario, Alberta et Colombie-Britannique). Les immigrants adoptent-ils des attitudes et des comportements politiques (attachement au Canada et à la province de résidence, confiance envers les gouvernements fédéral et provincial, perception du traitement réservé par le gouvernement fédéral à la province de résidence et appui au Parti libéral du Canada) qui ressemblent à ceux des populations locales de leur province? Les résultats de l'enquête suggèrent que les immigrants, surtout ceux d'origines dites non traditionnelles, ont tendance à développer des comportements et des attitudes politiques plus orientés vers le gouvernement fédéral que ceux affichés dans leur province. Cette tendance est particulièrement marquée au Québec où les immigrants, tant d'origines traditionnelles que non traditionnelles, semblent assimiler moins efficacement que les immigrants des autres provinces les griefs et les normes politiques de la population provinciale.

composition of Canada's immigrant population over the last 40 years. The founding waves of immigrants came from traditional source countries, Europe and the United States. The contemporary record is different. The vast majority of new immigrants now come from non-traditional source countries in Asia, the Middle East and Africa (Chui et al., 2007). Given the volume, the sharp shift in country of origin and the significant changes in settlement patterns, it is reasonable to suppose that these new waves of immigrants have the potential to reshape regional political dynamics. As with previous waves of immigration, the inflow of new Canadians potentially brings an influx of distinct values and ways of relating to political institutions. The values of today's immigrants are likely to become an important part of Canada's future political culture. What impact, then, do these new patterns of immigration have on Canadian political culture and more specifically on regional dynamics in the country?

Regionalism and immigration are two central features of Canada's political system, but systematic empirical explorations of the relationship between the two remain relatively rare. One exception is Elkins' pioneering investigation (1980) into whether immigrants develop atti-

FIGURE 1
Population Growth Due to Immigration (% Change from Previous Census)



Sources: Statistics Canada 2009; Chui et al. 2007

Note: Data from 1901 to 1951 are in 10-year increments; Data after 1951 are in 5-year increments

tudes similar to those of the people already living in the host province. Elkins' central finding was that immigrants generally did adjust to provincial political norms, but his data also showed that provincial patterns were less pronounced among immigrants. According to Elkins, "regional and provincial variations have, if anything, been muted by the vast numbers of immigrants to Canada" (122). Elkins' insights focused on such core aspects of political culture as political efficacy and trust, and they relied entirely on data collected in the 1960s and 1970s and thus on immigrants who settled in Canada during the 1940s and 1950s. Given the recent transformations in immigration patterns it is not at all clear that these original findings provide a firm foundation for generalizing about more contemporary dynamics. The present analysis revisits the question and explores immigrants' federal and provincial loyalties from two vantage points. The first focuses on immigrants from traditional source countries, the group that most closely approximates the subjects of Elkins' study. The second focus is on immigrants from non-traditional source countries. Not only is this group increasingly prominent in contemporary Canadian immigration, it is also more culturally distinct from the country's native-born population.

Immigrants' Political Integration: Provincial versus Federal Poles of Loyalties

The process of immigrants' political integration is complex and it involves many factors that may or may not entail *acculturation* (Berry, 2001). Through acculturation immigrants undergo both "culture shedding" and "culture learning" (Berry, 1997); immigrants "unlearn" some orientations acquired in their previous cultural context, while "learning" and adopting the new attitudes and orientations that reflect their new cultural context. Empirical evidence from Canada (Black, 1987; Black et al., 1987; White et al., 2008) and elsewhere (Finifter and Finifter, 1989; McAllister and Makkai, 1991, 1992; Bilodeau, 2008) supports this perspective. On balance, the data indicate that although immigrants' pre-migration backgrounds tend to influence their political outlooks in the new host country, immigrants are nonetheless adept at political learning in the host society. Thus, the acquisition of political loyalties should be part of the achievable culture learning menu available to immigrants in the new host society. But which political loyalties are absorbed and which ones are not?

One possibility is that immigrants' cultural learning in the Canadian setting entails internalizing provincial-level political norms and values. A large body of empirical research demonstrates that local interpersonal communication networks are vital to the formation of political attitudes and behaviours. People tend to develop political attitudes that are consistent with the local majority opinion that surrounds them daily (Huckfeldt et al., 1998); and people still favour interpersonal communication over other means of acquiring political information (Beck et al., 2002; McClung, 2003). Evidence from internal migrants in the United States, for example, indicates that, when it comes to racial attitudes and partisanship, people who move to new environments (states or neighbourhoods) tend to adopt attitudes that resemble those of the local surrounding population (Glaser and Gilens, 1997; McBurnett, 1991; MacKuen and Brown, 1987; Brown, 1981; Markus, 1979). The precise dynamics of this acculturation process remain somewhat unclear, but one possibility is that immigrants take on the norms and attitudes of their new local environments to lower the costs of "fitting in" to their new contexts (MacKuen and Brown, 1987; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; Huckfeldt et al., 1995). Applied to the Canadian case, this line of reasoning implies that immigrants will adopt provincial and federal loyalties that mirror those of the local population within their respective provinces and that interprovincial differences in political loyalties among Canadian-born citizens are consequently reproduced among immigrants.

The dynamics of immigrants' acculturation, however, are quite different from those of political socialization among non-immigrant Cana-

dians, and this encourages the expectation that immigrants might hold political views that are distinct from those of the local population within their respective provinces.

The inculcation of core political norms and values through such socialization agents as schools and the family typically occurs during childhood and adolescence, the early stages of the life cycle (Greenstein, 1965; Hess and Torney, 1967; Easton and Dennis, 1969). But immigrants typically arrive during later stages in the life cycle. Thus immigrants have not necessarily been inculcated with the same core values and norms as those found within the local populations of their new host settings. Indeed, when it comes to new immigrants who originate from non-traditional source countries, it is more likely that the discrepancies between the value sets of immigrants and native-born Canadians will be greater than the differences between immigrants from traditional source countries and native-born Canadians.

Furthermore, immigrants often have different preoccupations than the local population both upon arrival (for example, employment and housing) and subsequently when faced with the challenges of adapting to the new host society (such as discrimination and marginalization). It is these distinct sets of concerns that frequently encourage immigrants to join local networks and associations for mutual support. Thus, studies of immigrants' integration show that ethnic networks and associations play a powerful role for newcomers (Fennema and Tillie, 1999).

Given these different points of reference and distinct settlement challenges, immigrants face choices during the course of adapting to new political settings. The evidence seems to be that immigrants select adaptive strategies that strike a balance between the desire to fit into the new host society and ensure a successful settlement and the desire to retain their own distinctive norms and values (Berry et al., 1987; Berry, 1997). As Berry explains:

In all plural societies, cultural groups and their individual members, in both the dominant and non-dominant situations, must deal with the issue of *how* to acculturate. Strategies with respect to two major issues are usually worked out by groups and individuals in their daily encounters with each other. These issues are *cultural maintenance* (to what extent are cultural identity and characteristics considered to be important, and their maintenance strived for); and *contact and participation* (to what extent should they become involved in other cultural groups, or remain primarily among themselves). (1997: 9)

The development of political loyalties among immigrants is thus likely to be influenced by adaptation strategies and social network dynamics. These strategies and dynamics, we suggest, increase the chances that new immigrants might acquire distinctive federal-provincial outlooks. One possibility is that immigrants might be inclined to internalize political

outlooks that favour the federal pole. The Canadian federal government's multiculturalism policy offers immigrants an alternative pathway to social and political integration by legitimizing the retention of aspects of immigrants' pre-migration identity (Kymlicka, 1995, 1998). The symbolic value of this policy of multiculturalism, which acknowledges and accepts a multiplicity of cultural models, thus presents attractive re-socialization alternatives to newcomers in Canada. The multiculturalism policy, in effect, not only validates immigrants' pre-migration cultural identity and characteristics, but in doing so also lowers the cost of fitting in socially, economically and culturally.

The implication of this alternative line of speculation is that, irrespective of their province of residence, immigrants may be more inclined to develop federal loyalties rather than provincial ones. Furthermore, given the shorter period of residence and the greater cultural and ethnic differences with the Canadian-born population, the multicultural model might be even more attractive to immigrants from non-traditional source countries than their counterparts from traditional source countries. If that were the case then these immigrants might be more likely than others to develop stronger federal loyalties, thus attenuating interprovincial differences in political loyalties.

Research Design and Data

The analysis proceeds in two stages. The first stage focuses on the question of whether immigrants in each province are systematically more likely than their Canadian-born co-residents to gravitate towards the federal pole. More specifically, it examines whether immigrants in each province adopt political loyalties that are more provincially or federally oriented than the local population in the province where they reside. The second stage of the analysis assesses whether provincial cleavages in political loyalties—systematic interprovincial differences in federal–provincial orientations—are more or less similar among Canadian-born citizens and immigrant Canadians. In this instance, the focus is on whether immigrants reproduce, or alter, regional cleavages in Canada. If the cleavages observed among immigrants across all four provinces are similar to those observed among the Canadian-born population, then the conclusion would be that immigrants simply reproduce existing regional cleavages. However, if the cleavages observed among immigrants across all four provinces vary substantially from those observed among the Canadian-born population, then the implication is that contemporary immigration patterns do have the potential to alter regional cleavages.

The analysis focuses on four dimensions of political loyalties. Following Clarke and colleagues (1980) the first three dimensions directly

concern respondents' relationship to Canada, the federal government and the provincial governments. Western Canadian citizens' alienation from Canada's centre and Quebec citizens' alienation from the federal government are well documented (Clarke et al., 1980; Gibbins, 1982; Henry, 2002). There has been longstanding debate about the integration and powers of some regions or provinces within the federation as well as about the real or perceived unequal treatment that provinces received historically from the federal government. Do immigrants in each province reflect the same kinds of "alienation" from the federal government, and possibly weaker attachment to Canada, than their respective Canadian-born provincial counterparts?²

The first indicator measures an affective dimension of political loyalties. Following Clarke and colleagues (1980) we examine respondents' feelings toward Canada and their province of residence. Here, the focus is on the differences in immigrants' feelings toward Canada and the respondents' province. The first dependent variable is thus captured by a scale (ranging from -1 to $+1$) indicating whether respondents express a more positive feeling toward Canada than toward their province (>0), a more positive feeling toward their province than toward Canada (<0), or equal feelings toward Canada and their province ($=0$). The next two indicators measure evaluative dimensions of political loyalties. The second indicator captures the gap in respondents' levels of political confidence between the federal and provincial governments. This scale (ranging from -1 to $+1$) indicates whether respondents express more confidence in the federal government than in the provincial government (>0), more confidence in the provincial government than in the federal government (<0), or equal confidence in the federal and provincial governments ($=0$). The third indicator measures respondents' perceptions of whether their province is treated better ($+1$), worse (-1) or about the same (0) as other provinces by the federal government.

Following conventional practice (Clarke et al., 1980), we also include a behavioural dimension of political loyalties and examine which party immigrants tend to support. The conventional wisdom is that immigrants typically support the Liberal party of Canada (Blais, 2005; Bilodeau and Kanji, 2010), but what is far less clear is whether that support is uniformly distributed or varies substantially across provinces. Given that recent elections have produced major regional variations in partisan preferences (Gidengil et al., 1999; Blais et al., 2002; Nevitte et al., 2000) the relevant question to ask is whether partisan support among immigrants follows those regional lines or whether immigrants are more likely to vote Liberal regardless of region of residence. Precisely why immigrants have tended in the past to rally behind the Liberal party is not entirely clear but some scholars speculate that the Liberal party might attract immigrant voters because it is perceived as the party most committed to pro-

moting the multiculturalism agenda in Canada, an issue potentially important to immigrants when making their vote choice (Bilodeau and Kanji, 2010).³ Consequently, our focus is specifically on provincial variation in immigrants' voting for the Liberal party of Canada.⁴

These questions are empirically explored with pooled data from the 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 *Canadian Election Studies (CES)*.⁵ For reasons of sample size and population distribution, the analyses are limited to the immigrant-rich provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia. Table 1 presents the sample composition for each group of respondents for each of the four provinces. The analyses control for such socio-demographic variables as sex, age, education, income and employment to take into account the possibility that potential differences between immigrants and Canadian-born respondents might be attributable to socio-structural variation between these subpopulations. Furthermore, because it is possible that feelings toward Canada and the provinces, levels of confidence in provincial and federal governments, perception of the province treatment by the federal government and the propensity of voting for the Liberal party of Canada varied across elections between 1993 and 2006, the analyses also control for the election year in which respondents were interviewed. (For detailed information about variable construction, see appendix A.)

Immigrants' Federal and Provincial Loyalties

The first step entails determining whether immigrants in each of the four provinces exhibit political loyalties that are more provincially or federally oriented than the Canadian-born population in the province where they reside. The descriptive findings are presented in Table 2 and the summary results from the multivariate analyses, which compare for each province the political loyalties of immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries with those of Canadian-born citizens, are presented in Table 3. The full multivariate results are reported in appendix B.

TABLE 1
Sample Distribution and Size by Province

	Quebec	Ontario	Alberta	British Columbia
Canadian-Born Population	4403	4004	1731	1850
Traditional Immigrants	161	468	127	290
Non-Traditional Immigrants	242	580	104	219

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Studies

TABLE 2
Outlooks of Immigrants and the Canadian-born Respondents

	Quebec	Ontario	Alberta	British Columbia
Feelings about Canada - Province (1997 & 2000 CES)				
(% of people with stronger feelings for Canada than for their province)				
Canadian-born population	23	37	30	24
Immigrants				
Traditional sources	43	29	31	29
Non-traditional sources	39	32	39	27
	(1699)	(1491)	(1188)	(659)
Confidence in Federal-Provincial Governments (1993–2004 CES)¹				
(% with greater confidence in federal than provincial government)				
Canadian-born population	12	20	11	26
Immigrants				
Traditional sources	16	28	8	26
Non-traditional sources	20	24	9.3	24
	(1474)	(1698)	(1376)	(793)
Perceptions of Treatment of Province by the Federal Government (1993–2006 CES)				
% who believe their province is treated better than other provinces				
Canadian-born population	10	29	5	4
Immigrants				
Traditional sources	24	24	6	4
Non-traditional sources	22	24	9	11
	(4434)	(4555)	(3396)	(2158)
% who believe their province is treated worse than other provinces				
Canadian-born population	33	19	48	58
Immigrants				
Traditional sources	20	26	51	60
Non-traditional sources	25	16	31	47
	(4434)	(4555)	(3396)	(2158)
Proportion of Liberal Voting (%) (1993–2006 CES)				
Canadian-born population	29	45	24	27
Immigrants				
Traditional sources	53	46	16	24
Non-traditional sources	66	61	33	45
n	(2719)	(3140)	(2313)	(1496)

¹Mail-back component of the Canadian Election Studies.

Data reported in Table 2 indicate that there are significant differences in respondents' feelings towards Canada and their province between the immigrant and Canadian-born population in Quebec. About 23 per cent of the Canadian-born population in Quebec express more positive feelings toward Canada than Quebec, but those proportions climb to 43 per cent and 39 per cent among immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries respectively in that province. The multivariate analysis reported in Table 3 support these descriptive results. Everything else being equal, immigrants from traditional source countries score, on average, more than .10 point higher than Canadian-born residents of Quebec on the -1 to 1 scale. And immigrants from non-

TABLE 3
Differences between Immigrants and Canadian-born Respondents by Province

		Quebec	Ontario	Alberta	British Columbia
Gap in Canada and Province Feelings (-1 to 1)					
Immigrants	Traditional sources	.10**	-.02	.01	.03
	Non-traditional sources	.08***	-.03**	.00	-.03
Gap in Confidence between Federal and Provincial Governments (-1 to +1)					
Immigrants	Traditional sources	.04	.02	-.06*	.02
	Non-traditional sources	.03	.01	.01	-.05
Perception of Province Treatment by the Federal Government (-1 to +1)					
Immigrants	Traditional sources	.24***	-.03	-.03	.02
	Non-traditional sources	.23***	-.03	.23***	.18***
Proportion of Liberal Voting					
Immigrants	Traditional sources	1.01***	.04	-.65**	-.07
	Non-traditional sources	1.44***	.77***	.60**	.68***

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Studies

Entries report unstandardized B coefficients based on OLS regressions for Canada and province feeling, gap in confidence between federal and provincial governments and province treatment received by federal government and B coefficient based on logistic regression for Liberal voting. Analyses control for age, sex, education, income, employment status and year of interview. See appendix B for full tables.

***: B significant at $p < .01$; **: B significant at $p < .05$; *: B significant at $p < .10$.

traditional source countries score about .08 point higher on average than the Canadian-born Quebec population.

That pattern, however, is not replicated in the other provinces under consideration. For example, there is no discernable difference between immigrants from traditional source countries and the Canadian-born populations in Ontario, Alberta or British Columbia, or between immigrants from non-traditional source countries and the Canadian-born population in British Columbia. The only other significant difference to emerge is in Ontario, where according to the multivariate analysis, immigrants from non-traditional source countries express less positive feelings for Canada than for their province in comparison to the local population (.03 point lower than their Canadian-born provincial counterpart). In Alberta, immigrants from non-traditional source countries also appear more likely to express positive feeling toward Canada than the local Albertan population (see Table 2) but this finding is not replicated in the multivariate analysis (see Table 3).

Thus, the Quebec results diverge significantly from others when it comes to the affective loyalty of immigrants. Immigrants from both tra-

ditional and non-traditional source countries, express more federally oriented loyalties than the Canadian-born population of their respective province. This result may not be so surprising given that it is in Quebec, according to the descriptive results, that we find the largest proportion of the Canadian-born population expressing more positive feelings for their province than for Canada: 42 per cent of Canadian born Quebecers view their province more positively than Canada, compared to 21 per cent of Canadian-born Albertans or British Columbians and 9 per cent of Ontarians.⁶ It is nevertheless striking to see that this more positive feeling toward Quebec than Canada is not transferred very efficiently to immigrants; only 16 per cent of immigrants from traditional and 24 per cent from non-traditional source countries respectively express a more positive feeling for Quebec than for Canada.⁷

When it comes to expressions of confidence in governments, there are no discernable differences between immigrants and local populations in each of the four provinces. Immigrants in Quebec and Ontario are somewhat more likely to express greater confidence in the federal than in their provincial government. But as the multivariate results reported in Table 3 indicate, these differences are not statistically significant. The only statistically significant difference observed in Table 3 concerns immigrants from traditional sources countries in Alberta; this group seems less federally oriented than the local population. When it comes to confidence in these institutions, immigrants are not, on balance, more federally oriented than their respective Canadian-born counterparts, even in Quebec.⁸

The differences between immigrant and Canadian-born populations, however, are larger and more numerous when it comes to evaluations of how the federal government treats provinces. Immigrants from non-traditional source countries in Alberta and British Columbia supply significantly more favourable evaluations of the role played by the federal government than do Canadian-born respondents. Some 48 per cent of native-born Alberta residents and 51 per cent of immigrants from traditional source countries believe that Alberta receives worse treatment than other provinces from the federal government. That proportion drops to just 31 per cent among immigrants from non-traditional source countries. The distribution of responses in British Columbia, 58 per cent, 60 per cent and 47 per cent, respectively, replicate the same pattern and these findings are supported by the multivariate analyses in Table 3. Immigrants from traditional source countries in Alberta and British Columbia express similar evaluations to those of the local populations of the treatment received by their respective province from the federal government. Immigrants from non-traditional source countries in these two provinces, however, are significantly more inclined to express more positive evaluations than the local populations.

Once again, it is the Quebec findings that turn out to be most striking. In that province, immigrants from both traditional and non-traditional source countries are more likely than their Canadian-born co-residents to think that Quebec receives fair treatment from the federal government. Thirty-three per cent of non-immigrant Quebecers think that their province receives worse treatment from the federal government than other provinces, while 20 per cent of immigrants from traditional and 25 per cent of those from non-traditional source countries share that view. Only 10 per cent of non-immigrant Quebecers believe that their province receives better treatment from the federal government than other provinces while more than twice as many immigrants from traditional (22 per cent) and non-traditional (24 per cent) source countries hold that view.

Given the previous findings it comes as no surprise to discover that it is Ontarians who express the most positive evaluations of how the federal government treats their province. In that setting, 29 per cent of non-immigrant respondents think that the federal government treats their province better than other provinces. That finding contrasts sharply with the views held by comparable groups in Quebec (10 per cent), Alberta (5 per cent), and British Columbia (4 per cent). And it is only in Ontario that both groups of immigrants and the Canadian-born population share the same evaluations.⁹

A similar pattern of differences between the immigrant and Canadian-born populations in each of the provinces emerges with respect to partisan support. Blais (2005) and Bilodeau and Kanji (2010) demonstrate that Canadians of non-European origins are more likely than other Canadians to support the Liberal party of Canada. Our analyses indicate that this holds for the most part in the four provinces examined. Descriptive data reported in Table 2 indicate that the propensity to vote Liberal among immigrants from non-traditional source countries is 37 points higher than among the local population in Quebec, 18 points higher in British Columbia, 16 points higher in Ontario and 9 points higher in Alberta. Quebec emerges yet again as an outlier. Furthermore, Quebec also distinguishes itself from other provinces when it comes to the case of immigrants from traditional source countries. Immigrants from traditional source countries are almost as likely as Canadian-born respondents to express support for the Liberal party in British Columbia and Ontario and they are even less likely to do so in Alberta. Immigrants from traditional source countries in Quebec, however, are significantly more likely than the local Quebec population to support the Liberal party (by 24 percentage points). All of these findings are confirmed by the multivariate analyses.

These initial findings indicate that new Canadians, and more particularly newer waves of immigrants from countries with social and political systems that are vastly different from Canada's, tend to exhibit political loyalties that are more federally oriented than those of Canadian-born

populations. They evaluate more positively the federal governments' treatment of their province and they are also more likely to support the Liberal party of Canada. The discrepancies between immigrant and Canadian-born populations are most pronounced in Quebec and generally least pronounced in Ontario than elsewhere. The most striking finding, perhaps, concerns the extent to which both groups of immigrants in Quebec differ from their Canadian-born counterparts in that province. Elsewhere, it is mostly only immigrants from non-traditional source countries that differ from the Canadian-born population. These initial results suggest that immigrant populations do have the potential to alter regional cleavages in loyalties to the federal and provincial governments.

Do Immigrants Reproduce Regional Cleavages in Political Loyalties?

The preceding analysis sheds some light on the question of immigrants' integration in regional dynamics but it provides only a partial view of how newcomers shape the dynamics of regionalism. Do immigrants reproduce regional cleavages in political loyalties? That question is explored by analyzing the data from each of our three subgroups of citizens (Canadian-born, immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries) in a multivariate setup. At issue is the direction and size of the differences in political loyalties between Canadian-born residents in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia and the question of whether these differences are replicated when immigrants of all four provinces are compared. For instance, if non-immigrant Albertans evaluate their provincial government more positively than their counterparts in Ontario, then the expectation is that immigrants in Alberta would also evaluate their provincial government more positively than their counterparts in Ontario. As before, these comparisons are undertaken for both groups of immigrants separately. The core findings are summarized in Table 4. The full specification is presented in appendix B. In these tables and analyses, respondents from Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia are each compared to those from Ontario.

For the most part regional outlooks are reproduced among immigrants, notwithstanding the differences between immigrant and Canadian-born populations within provinces observed in the previous section of the analyses. Consider first the data concerning interprovincial differences in confidence in federal and provincial governments. The differences observed between non-immigrant Quebecers, Albertans and British Columbians with Ontarians are almost exactly replicated among both groups of immigrants. For instance, the gap between non-immigrant respondents of Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia with Ontario are

TABLE 4
Differences between Provinces (by subgroup)

	Quebec	Alberta	British Columbia
(in comparison to Ontario)			
Canada—Province Feelings (−1 to 1)			
Canadian-born population	−.12***	−.03***	−.03**
Immigrants from traditional source countries	.02	−.02	.02
Immigrants from non-traditional source countries	−.01	−.00	−.03
Gap in Confidence between Federal and Provincial Governments (−1 to +1)			
Canadian-born population	−.09***	−.13***	.03**
Immigrants from traditional source countries	−.08*	−.21***	.01
Immigrants from non-traditional source countries	−.05	−.14***	.00
Perception of Province Treatment by the Federal Government (−1 to +1)			
Canadian-born population	−.35***	−.54***	−.63***
Immigrants from traditional source countries	.02	−.47***	−.55***
Immigrants from non-traditional source countries	−.14**	−.30***	−.42***
Proportion of Liberal Voting			
Canadian-born population	−.70***	−.98***	−.77***
Immigrants from traditional source countries	.27	−1.71***	−.97***
Immigrants from non-traditional source countries	−.07	−1.21***	−.76***

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Studies

Entries report unstandardized B coefficients based on OLS regressions (and logit regression in the case of Liberal Voting) controlling for age, sex, education, income, employment status and year of interview. See appendix B for full tables. Coefficients correspond to predicted differences between each group of respondents (Canadian-born respondents, immigrants from traditional source countries, and immigrants from non-traditional source countries) with its counterpart in Ontario.

***: B significant at $p < .01$; **: B significant at $p < .05$; *: B significant at $p < .10$.

respectively −.09, −.13 and .03 and those observed among immigrants from non-traditional source countries are respectively −.05, −.14 and .00. The structure of regional cleavages, then, appears to be replicated among newcomers.¹⁰

The same broad findings emerge from the analysis of the three other indicators for Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia. First, there are only small differences in feelings toward Canada and the provinces among the non-immigrant populations and a similar pattern is observed among immigrants. Second, native-born Albertans and British Columbians tend to evaluate more negatively than local Ontarians the treatment their province receives from the federal government. The same holds among both types of immigrants in these respective provinces. And third, non-immigrant Albertans and British Columbians are less likely to vote for the Liberal party than their counterparts in Ontario. That same pattern is

also reflected among immigrants of these respective provinces. The regional cleavages observed among immigrants in Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia on these three dimensions, however, do not precisely correspond to those of their native-born counterparts. Rather, the regional cleavages observed among immigrants tend to be more moderate than among the local populations when it comes to feelings toward Canada and the province, and when it comes to the perceptions of how the province is treated by the federal government. Moreover, the regional differences tend to be even less pronounced among immigrants from non-traditional source countries particularly when it comes to evaluations of province treatment by the federal government. Thus, for instance, while the predicted differences between local Albertans and Ontarians in perception of the treatment received by the province from the federal government is $-.54$, the predicted difference is $-.47$ for immigrants from traditional source countries and $-.30$ for immigrants from non-traditional source countries.

The final core finding that emerges from the data presented in Table 4 concerns Quebec. As with the initial findings, it appears that provincial loyalties are least efficiently transmitted from the Canadian-born population to both traditional and non-traditional immigrants in Quebec. Canadian-born Quebecers score approximately .12 point lower than their Ontario counterparts on the Canada/province thermometer. The corresponding gaps for immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries, however, are just .02 and $-.01$ points respectively, and they are not statistically significant. Similarly, Canadian-born Quebecers are significantly less likely than their Ontario counterparts to view the federal government's treatment of their province favourably ($-.35$). But there is no corresponding chasm between immigrants from traditional (.02) and non-traditional source countries ($-.14$). Finally, neither group of immigrants replicate the regional cleavages observed between local Quebecers and Ontarians when it comes to the matter of support for the Liberal party. Certainly, local Quebecers are significantly less likely to vote for the Liberal party than their Ontario counterparts ($-.70$) but the same cannot be said for immigrants from traditional (.27) and non-traditional source countries ($-.07$).

Explaining the Case of Quebec: Language Matters

Immigrants in Quebec, evidently, hold patterns of outlooks that are strikingly different from those of their counterparts in Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia. That finding requires closer scrutiny. And one candidate explanation for these variations might concern the role of language. To explore that possibility we compare 1) the political loyalties of immi-

grants who speak French at home to those of the native-born population in Quebec and 2) the political loyalties of immigrants who speak either English or another language (other than French) at home to the native-born population in Quebec.¹¹ In both comparisons we continue to distinguish between immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries. Table 5 reports the results of these multivariate analyses. These findings should be interpreted cautiously, given the modest samples of immigrants available for the analyses (N=186 and 214, respectively, for immigrants who speak French and English or another language).

The analyses suggest distinct patterns of political integration, depending on which language immigrants speak at home. For three of the four types of orientations examined immigrants who speak English or another language at home exhibit political loyalties significantly different from those of the native-born population in Quebec. That pattern holds for both immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries. By contrast, immigrants who speak French at home exhibit political loyalties similar to those of the local population. There are no discernable differences in the orientations of French-speaking immigrants from traditional source countries and the native-born population in Quebec. And although French-speaking immigrants from non-traditional source countries are more likely than the native-born population of Quebec to support the Liberal party, the difference in party support is quite modest when compared to their counterparts who speak English or another language.

These tentative findings suggest that the dynamics of immigrants' integration in Quebec are different from those of immigrants in other provinces and that integration in Quebec appears to follow lines of linguistic integration. Immigrants who speak French at home tend to develop political loyalties that are similar to those of the local population. By contrast, those who speak English or another language at home tend to exhibit orientations that are more federal than those of the local population.¹² These findings are consistent with other research showing that, when it comes to support for the Parti Québécois or support for Quebec sovereignty, the patterns of support within French-speaking ethnic communities are more similar to those of the native-born Quebec population than those from other ethnic communities who do not speak French (Lavoie and Serré, 2002).

Concluding Discussion

Citizen outlooks towards their federal and provincial governments are a primary prism for understanding the dynamics of regionalism in Canada. Most Canadians are socialized to these dualities, but what about new Canadians? The significant changes in the scale, distribution and com-

TABLE 5
Difference between Immigrants and Canadian-born Population in Quebec

	Gap in Canada and Province Feelings (-1 to 1)		Gap in Confidence between Federal and Prov. Govts. (-1 to +1)		Province Treatment by Federal Government (-1 to +1)		Liberal Vote (0-1)	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
French-Speaking Immigrants								
Traditional Immigrants	.03	.06	.02	.05	.12	.08	-.06	.37
Non-Traditional Immigrants	.00	.04	-.01	.05	.03	.06	.91	.29 ^a
English and Other Language Speaking Immigrants								
Traditional Immigrants	.19	.06 ^a	.06	.06	.33	.07 ^a	1.83	.31 ^a
Non-Traditional Immigrants	.23	.05 ^a	.08	.06	.41	.07 ^a	2.11	.35 ^a
Female	.01	.01	.02	.02	-.02	.02	.18	.09 ^c
Education	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.02	-.04	.08
Income	.00	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	-.04	.04
Age	.00	.00 ^a	.00	.00 ^a	.00	.00	.02	.00 ^a
Employed	-.02	.02	-.01	.02	.01	.03	.00	.13
Election 1993	n.a.		.01	.02	.33	.04 ^a	1.04	.18 ^a
Election 1997	n.a.		.00	.02	.07	.03 ^b	1.04	.15 ^a
Election 2000	.05	.01 ^a	n.a.		-.03	.03	1.04	.15 ^a
Election 2004	n.a.		-.06	.02 ^a	.02	.03	.76	.16 ^a
Constant	-.20	.05 ^a	-.17	.05 ^a	-.36	.07 ^a	-2.58	.36 ^a
Adjusted R-square/Cox and Snell	5.0		1.2		4.0		8.6	
N	1540		1363		3895		2433	

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Studies.

Entries report unstandardized B coefficients based on OLS regressions for Canada and province feeling, gap in confidence between federal and provincial governments and province treatment received by federal government and B coefficient based on logistic regression for Liberal voting.

a: B significant at p<.01; b: B significant at p<.05; c: B significant at p<.10.

position of Canada's immigrant population raise the question of how these changes contribute to the dynamics of regionalism in the country. The analysis began by investigating whether immigrants adopt political outlooks that are more federally or provincially oriented than the Canadian-born population. It then turned to evaluate whether new immigration dynamics have the potential to transform the structure of cleavages in federal–provincial orientations between Canada's provinces. Almost 30 years ago, Elkins reported that immigrants who arrived in Canada in the 1940s and 1950s exhibited relatively weak regional differences in such core orientations as political efficacy and trust. Canadian immigration patterns have changed quite substantially since then. Even so, the conclusions emerging from this analysis corroborate Elkins' findings with respect to other core features of political culture. For the most part, immigrants do reproduce the structure of interprovincial cleavages. But a significant caveat is in order: the cleavages observed among immigrants, especially those among immigrants from non-traditional source countries, are weaker than those found among the Canadian-born population. Contemporary immigration thus appears to have the potential to continue to slowly erode regional cleavages.

We presented at the outset two competing sets of expectations about immigrants' acquisition of federal–provincial orientations. The first possibility explored was that immigrants' federal–provincial loyalties essentially reflect those of their new provincial context. The alternative possibility was that immigrants acquire loyalties that are more federally oriented than those of the local population, regardless of province of residence. On balance, the data support the latter interpretation: immigrants tend to exhibit political loyalties that are somewhat more federally oriented than those of the Canadian-born population. And these federally oriented outlooks are particularly striking among a growing segment of the immigrant population, namely, those coming from non-traditional source countries. However, the fact that immigrants develop somewhat stronger federal loyalties than the Canadian-born population in their respective provinces does not imply that they are completely impervious to local dynamics. The analyses indicate that in spite of the difference between immigrants and their corresponding Canadian-born provincial population, there is clear evidence of a strong reproduction of regional cleavages.

The expectation that immigrants might be inclined to evaluate the federal pole more positively was informed by the special features of immigrant adaptation. If immigrants choose strategies for adjusting to new environments that lower the costs of adaptation, (see Berry et al., 1987; Berry, 1997), then the federal governments' multiculturalism policy might offer them a promising pole of identification. Immigrants, especially those from non-traditional source countries, plausibly might identify with the policy of multiculturalism of the federal government, a policy that explic-

itly recognizes cultural specificity and encourages the retention of cultural difference. This attraction would then lead to greater attachment to the federal pole of loyalty. The data, however, do not allow us to pinpoint the specific reasons for why newcomers develop stronger loyalties to the federal government and so the precise origins of this stronger attachment remain open for debate and for future research.

The Quebec case suggests, clearly, that regardless of the salience of the multiculturalism policy explanation, other factors are at play in immigrants' integration dynamics. Of the four provinces examined, Quebec turns out to exhibit exceptional patterns. As in other provinces, Quebec immigrants from non-traditional source countries exhibit political loyalties more federally oriented than those of the local population. And uniquely, immigrants from traditional source countries in Quebec also exhibit more federally oriented loyalties.

The Quebec case seems to present counterintuitive findings. Of all Canadian provinces it is Quebec that most actively promotes policies to ensure immigrants' integration. Bill 101 requires French education. Quebec was also the first province to sign an agreement in 1991 with the federal government giving the province a greater role in the selection of their immigrants. And through this agreement Quebec has the opportunity to favour francophone immigrants. Most significantly, perhaps, Quebec has a policy of *interculturalisme* to address its cultural and ethnic diversity, one that is substantively similar to the federal government's multiculturalism policy (Kymlicka, 1998: 67–68; Gagnon and Iacovino, 2004). The collective impact of these policies might facilitate more efficient integration to Quebec society. Yet it is in Quebec that the immigrant population carries political outlooks that are most at odds with those of the native-born provincial population, and in that sense it is in Quebec that immigration has the greatest potential to attenuate Canadian regional cleavages.

Our analyses of the role of language suggest that the absorption of federal–provincial loyalties in Quebec is consistent with patterns of linguistic integration. Immigrants who speak French at home develop political loyalties that are almost indistinguishable from those of the local population while those of immigrants who speak English at home or another language are significantly more federally oriented. A determining factor in Quebec, then, appears to be immigrants' choice of which linguistic community they join.

One question raised by these findings concerns the matter of whether the impact of immigration on regional dynamics is short-lived or long-term. To answer this question definitively required a detailed investigation of whether immigrants' political loyalties evolve or remain more federally oriented the longer they reside in Canada. To this point, the limits of the data make it difficult to address that question directly or in detail.¹³

Canadian political culture has been substantially shaped by the series of immigration waves that settled in the country in the last centuries. Whether they came from France, the British colonies, Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, immigrants have made a significant contribution to determining how Canadians relate to politics and their political institutions. This paper presents evidence suggesting that today's immigrants, like their predecessors, are indeed forging contemporary regional dynamics in Canada. Immigrants, especially newer waves from non-traditional source countries, seem to develop somewhat stronger federal political loyalties, even if they also absorb regional political norms to a significant degree. The specific reasons why this is so and whether these differences are sustained or diminish with time, remain to be demonstrated, but in the meantime it appears that immigration to Canadian provinces has some potential to dilute regional cleavages in federal–provincial political orientations as Elkins (1980) had shown close to three decades ago. It strengthens what LaSelva (1996) characterized as the “will to live together” within the Canadian confederation.

Notes

- 1 A related area of contention is boundaries of regions. For some, provinces are useful boundaries because they are “analytically distinct political systems” (Simeon and Elkins, 1974: 400; see also Schwartz, 1974; Wilson, 1974), while for others (MacDermid, 1990; Henderson, 2004) socio-demographic boundaries are more appropriate because they are the “constituent units of culture” (Henderson, 2004: 602).
- 2 Clarke and colleagues examine affective, cognitive, evaluative and behavioural expressions of political loyalties among the Canadian-born population. It is not possible in this paper to examine in a reliable fashion the cognitive (knowledge-based) expression of political loyalty. There are simply too few items in the Canadian Election Studies that allow us to reliably measure knowledge of provincial politics and hence to compare immigrants' knowledge of federal and provincial politics.
- 3 There are other potential explanations to account for immigrants' support for the Liberal party; Blais (2005), however, casts significant doubt on explanations emphasizing differences in socio-economic status and in a number of specific policy preferences. Blais finds no discernable differences in opinion between immigrants and Canadian-born citizens when it comes to multiculturalism policy but he does not examine how salient that issue is in shaping party support among immigrants.
- 4 Because the Bloc Québécois is found only in Québec and because the Reform Party was replaced subsequently by the Canadian Alliance and the Conservative Party of Canada, it is difficult to also examine support for these parties.
- 5 Note that the indicators for feelings toward Canada and the respondents' province are available only for the 1997 and 2000 *Canadian Election Studies*. Moreover, the indicators for confidence in federal and provincial governments are not available for the 2006 *Canadian Election Study* and, when available, these question items have been asked in the mail-back components of the survey. Consequently, the sample sizes for these confidence items are smaller. For more information on the *Canadian Election Studies*, visit: <http://ces-eec.org/pagesE/home.html>
- 6 These descriptive data are not presented in Table 2.

- 7 These descriptive data are not presented in Table 2.
- 8 The descriptive findings for the proportions of respondents who report greater confidence in the provincial than federal governments do not reveal more significant patterns.
- 9 In three provinces, it also appears that immigrants from non-traditional source countries are more likely than either traditional source immigrants or Canadian-born citizens to say that the federal government gives a similar treatment to all provinces: Ontario (60 versus 50 and 52 per cent, respectively) in Alberta (60 versus 43 and 47 per cent, respectively) and in British Columbia (42 versus 36 and 38 per cent, respectively). The only exception in this regard is Quebec (53 versus 56 and 57 per cent, respectively). We reproduced the analyses presented in Table 3 using an alternate specification of the “province treatment” variable that contrasts respondents who believe their province receives a “lesser” treatment (0) to those who believe their province receive a “better” or “equal” treatment (1). The results of this alternate specification replicate those presented in Table 3.
- 10 The coefficients among immigrants are not always statistically significant; this is probably because of the small sample sizes for the immigrant analyses.
- 11 Note that in 2004 and 2006 we rely on the first language learned and still understood by immigrants. The 2004 and 2006 CES did not ask respondents for the language they speak at home.
- 12 This interpretation is supported by further analyses revealing no differences between the political loyalties of immigrants who speak English or another language and native-born residents of Quebec who speak English or another language (results not presented).
- 13 Even with pooled CES data, the resulting samples of immigrants are too small to conduct reliable multivariate analyses. Exploratory investigations were conducted by dividing immigrants from non-traditional source countries into three groups (who have lived in Canada for 10 years or less, who have lived in Canada for 11 to 20 years, and who have lived in Canada for more than 20 years), and then comparing the political loyalties of these groups to those of the Canadian-born population in their respective provinces (No analyses were performed for immigrants from traditional source countries). Only a small proportion of immigrants in the CES sample have lived in Canada for less than 10 years. The tentative conclusion suggested by these data is that the impact of contemporary immigration on regional cleavages in political outlooks seems short-lived. The differences in federal–provincial orientations between immigrants from non-traditional source countries and the Canadian-born population within each province appear to diminish the longer immigrants have lived in Canada. This finding is consistent with those of other studies demonstrating significant changes in immigrants’ political orientations with the passage of time (White et al., 2008).

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Appendix A: Construction of Variables

1993–2006 Canadian Election Studies

Gap in Canada and Province Feelings	-1 to 1 scale: 1 = respondents feel strongly more positive toward Canada than their province; -1 = respondents feel strongly more positive about their province than about Canada.
Gap in confidence between federal and provincial Governments	-1 to +1 scale: >0 = respondents express more confidence in the federal government than in the provincial one; 0 = equal confidence in both federal and provincial governments; <0 = respondents express more confidence in the provincial government than in the federal one.
Perception of province treatment by the federal government	Three-category variable: 1 = respondents believe that their province is treated better than other provinces by the federal government; 0 = province is treated the same as other provinces, and -1 = province is treated worse than other provinces by the federal government.
Liberal Vote	Dichotomous variable: 1 = voted Liberal; 0 = voted for another party
Education	1: at best finished primary school; 2: at best finished high school; 3: at least some post-secondary education
Age	Age in years.
Female	1 = female, 0 = male.
Income	Household income in quintiles 5 = highest; 1 = lowest
Employed	1 = full time or part time employed, 0 = all others.
Immigrants from traditional source countries	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA, Ukraine,
Immigrants from non-traditional source countries	Albania, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bosnia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Central/South America, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, CroatiaCzech, Dominica, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St-kits/Nevits, St-Vincent de Grenadine, Taiwan, Trinidad, Turkey, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe, Other African Country, Other Asian Country, Other European country, Other Middle Eastern Country, and Other South American Country.

Appendix B

TABLE B1

Difference between Immigrants and Canadian-born Populations in Gap in Canada and Province Feelings

	Gap in Canada and Province Feelings (-1 to 1)							
	Quebec		Ontario		Alberta		British Columbia	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Traditional Immigrants	.10	.04 ^b	-.02	.02	.01	.02	.03	.02
Non-Traditional Immigrants	.08	.03 ^b	-.03	.01 ^b	.00	.02	-.03	.02
Female	.01	.01	.00	.01	.02	.01	-.01	.01
Education	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.00	.01
Income	-.00	.01	-.01	.00 ^c	-.00	.00	.00	.00
Age	.01	.00 ^a	.00	.00	-.00	.00 ^c	.01	.00 ^b
Employed	-.02	.02	.01	.01	-.01	.01	.03	.02 ^b
Election 2000	.05	.01 ^a	.02	.01 ^b	.02	.01 ^c	.06	.01 ^a
Constant	-.20	.05 ^a	.02	.03	.04	.03	-.08	.04 ^c
Adjusted R-square	4.1		0.6		0.5		4.8	
N	1540		1308		1041		575	

Source: 1997 and 2000 Canadian Election Studies. a: P<0.01; b: P<0.05; c: P<0.10. Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients.

TABLE B2

Difference between Immigrants and Canadian-born Population in Gap in Confidence between Federal and Provincial Governments

	Gap in Confidence Between Federal and Provincial Governments (-1 to +1)							
	Quebec		Ontario		Alberta		British Columbia	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Traditional Immigrants	.04	.04	.02	.02	-.06	.03 ^c	.02	.03
Non-Traditional Immigrants	.03	.04	.01	.02	.01	.04	-.05	.03
Female	.02	.02	.03	.01 ^b	.05	.02 ^a	.02	.02
Education	.01	.01	.02	.02	-.01	.02	.02	.02
Income	.01	.01	.01	.01	-.00	.01	.00	.00
Age	.01	.00 ^a	.01	.00 ^b	.00	.00	.01	.00 ^c
Employed	-.01	.02	-.01	.02	.00	.02	.02	.02
Election 1993	-.00	.02	.08	.02 ^b	.08	.02 ^a	.01	.03
Election 1997	.00	.02	.02	.02	-.03	.02	.01	.02
Election 2004	-.06	.02 ^a	-.01	.02	-.01	.02	.11	.03 ^a
Constant	-.17	.05 ^a	-.09	.05 ^b	-.12	.06 ^a	-.12	.07 ^c
Adjusted R-square	1.2		1.7		2.6		2.8	
N	1363		1544		1251		728	

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000 and 2004 Canadian Election Studies. a: P<0.01; b: P<0.05; c: P<0.10. Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients.

TABLE B3

Difference between Immigrants and Canadian-born Population in Evaluations of province Treatment by the Federal Government

	Province Treatment by Federal Government (-1 to +1)							
	Quebec		Ontario		Alberta		British Columbia	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Traditional Immigrants	.24	.06 ^a	-.03	.04	-.03	.05	.02	.04
Non-Traditional Immigrants	.23	.05 ^a	-.03	.03	.23	.05 ^a	.18	.05 ^a
Female	-.02	.02	.13	.02 ^a	.01	.02	.03	.03
Education	.01	.02	.06	.02 ^a	-.06	.02 ^a	-.01	.03
Income	.01	.01	-.02	.01 ^c	-.03	.01 ^a	-.04	.01 ^a
Age	.00	.01	-.01	.00 ^a	-.01	.00 ^a	-.01	.00 ^a
Employed	.01	.03	.01	.03	-.01	.03	-.06	.04
Election 1993	.33	.04 ^a	-.28	.04 ^a	-.03	.04	-.12	.05 ^b
Election 1997	.07	.03 ^b	-.07	.03 ^b	.16	.03 ^a	.06	.04
Election 2000	-.05	.03	.11	.03 ^a	.04	.04	-.10	.04 ^b
Election 2004	.02	.03	.08	.03 ^a	-.03	.03	-.19	.04 ^a
Constant	-.35	.07 ^a	.23	.08 ^a	-.08	.08	.08	.10
Adjusted R-square	3.6		6.4		3.4		6.6	
N	3895		3905		2944		1838	

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Studies.

a: P<0.01; b: P<0.05; c: P<0.10 Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients.

TABLE B4

Difference between Immigrants and the Canadian-born Population in Liberal Voting

	Liberal Vote (0–1)							
	Quebec		Ontario		Alberta		British Columbia	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Traditional Immigrants	1.01	.22 ^a	.04	.13	-.65	.26 ^b	-.07	.20
Non-Traditional Immigrants	1.44	.22 ^a	.77	.14 ^a	.60	.24 ^b	.68	.21 ^a
Female	.18	.09 ^c	.14	.08 ^c	.02	.11	.20	.13
Education	-.04	.08	-.15	.08 ^b	.14	.10	.13	.13
Income	-.05	.04	.04	.03	.01	.04	.03	.05
Age	.02	.01 ^a	.01	.00 ^c	.01	.01	.00	.01
Employed	-.01	.13	.17	.11	-.04	.15	.27	.17
Election 1993	1.00	.17 ^a	.91	.13 ^a	1.03	.17 ^a	.32	.21
Election 1997	1.00	.15 ^a	.63	.12 ^a	.57	.17 ^a	.18	.19
Election 2000	.99	.14 ^a	.57	.12 ^a	.48	.19 ^a	.40	.20 ^b
Election 2004	.76	.15 ^a	.32	.11 ^a	.43	.17 ^b	.02	.18
Constant	-2.55	.36 ^a	-.86	.32 ^a	-2.26	.44 ^a	-1.80	.50 ^a
Pseudo R-square	7.7		3.5		2.6		2.4	
N	2433		2779		2075		1306	

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Studies. a: $P < 0.01$; b: $P < 0.05$; c: $P < 0.10$

Entries report logit estimates.

TABLE B4.1
 Reproduction of Regional Cleavages among Immigrants in Canada (Part 1)

	Gap in Canada and Province Feelings (-1 to 1)						Gap in Confidence between Federal and Prov. Govts. (-1 to +1)											
	Native			Non-Trad.			Native			Trad.			Non-Trad.					
	B	SE		B	SE		B	SE		B	SE		B	SE				
Quebec (vs. Ontario)	-.12	.01 ^a	.02	.03	.02	.03	-.01	.02	.03	.02	.03	-.09	.01 ^a	.05 ^c	-.08	.05 ^c	-.05	.05
BC (vs. Ontario)	-.03	.01 ^b	.02	.03	.03	.03	-.03	.03	.03	.03	.03	.03	.01 ^b	.04	.01	.04	.00	.05
ALB (vs. Ontario)	-.03	.01 ^a	-.01	.03	.03	.03	-.00	.03	.03	.03	.03	-.13	.01 ^a	.04 ^a	-.21	.04 ^a	-.14	.05 ^a
Female	.01	.01 ^b	-.04	.02 ^c	.02 ^c	.02 ^c	-.04	.02 ^c	.02 ^c	.02 ^c	.02 ^c	.03	.01 ^a	.03	.02	.03	-.00	.03
Education	.00	.01	.00	.02	.02	.02	.03	.02	.02	.02	.02	.01	.01	.03	.00	.03	-.01	.04
Income	-.00	.00	-.01	.01	.01	.01	-.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.00	.00	.01	-.01	.01	.01	.01
Age	.00	.00	.01	.00 ^c	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00 ^a	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00 ^b
Employed	-.01	.01	.03	.03	.03	.03	.01	.03	.03	.03	.03	.01	.00	.04	-.03	.04	-.05	.04
Election 1993																		
Election 1997																		
Election 2000	.04	.01 ^a	.01	.02	.02	.02	-.05	.02 ^b	.02 ^b	.02 ^b	.02 ^b	.02	.01 ^b	.04	-.03	.04	.05	.05
Constant	.01	.02	-.02	.08	.07	.07	-.05	.07	.07	.07	.07	-.09	.03 ^a	.13	.06	.13	-.02	.05
Adjusted/PseudoR ²	7.1		0.0				2.4					6.7			8.2		3.5	
N	3860		292				313					4236			367		284	

Source: 1997 and 2000 Canadian Election Studies for the “Gap in Canada Province Feelings” and the 1993, 1997, 2000 and 2004 Canadian Election Studies for the “Gap in Confidence between Federal and Provincial Governments”.

^aP<0.01; ^bP<0.05; ^cP<0.10 Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients.

TABLE B4.2
 Reproduction of Regional Cleavages among Immigrants in Canada (Part 2)

	Province Treatment by Federal Government (-1 to +1)						Liberal Vote (0-1)					
	Native		Trad.		Non-Trad.		Native		Trad.		Non-Trad.	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Quebec (vs. Ontario)	-.35	.02 ^a	.02	.07	-.14	.06 ^b	-.70	.07 ^a	.27	.24	-.07	.26
BC (vs. Ontario)	-.63	.02 ^a	-.55	.06 ^a	-.43	.06 ^a	-.77	.08 ^a	-.97	.23 ^a	-.76	.24 ^a
ALB (vs. Ontario)	-.54	.02 ^a	-.47	.06 ^a	-.30	.06 ^a	-.98	.07 ^a	-1.71	.29 ^a	-1.21	.27 ^a
Female	.04	.01 ^a	-.01	.05	.01	.04	.18	.05 ^a	-.06	.18	.05	.19
Education	.02	.01	-.08	.04 ^c	.00	.04	-.02	.05	-.23	.16	-.30	.20
Income	-.01	.01 ^a	-.02	.02	-.04	.02 ^b	.03	.02	-.06	.07	-.09	.07
Age	-.01	.00 ^a	-.01	.01 ^b	-.01	.00 ^a	.01	.00 ^a	.01	.01	.02	.01 ^b
Employed	-.01	.02	.04	.06	.03	.06	.02	.07	.21	.23	.55	.25 ^b
Election 1993	-.02	.02	-.15	.08 ^b	-.13	.08 ^c	.94	.09 ^a	.62	.28 ^b	.40	.30
Election 1997	.04	.02 ^b	.04	.07	.08	.07	.64	.08 ^a	.67	.26 ^b	.63	.32 ^b
Election 2000	-.01	.02	.04	.07	.02	.06	.68	.08 ^a	.80	.29 ^a	.14	.26
Election 2004	.01	.02	-.09	.06	-.00	.06	.45	.08	.26	.25	-.05	.28
Constant	.24	.05 ^a	.51	.19 ^a	.44	.17 ^a	-1.27	.21 ^a	-.13	.79	.35	.78
Adjusted/PseudoR ²	13.0		15.4		8.2		5.2		11.2		7.1	
N	10800		859		924		7385		664		544	

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Studies. a: P<0.01; b: P<0.05; c: P<0.10
 Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients for "Province Treatment" and Logit estimates for Liberal Voting.