

more comfortably situated might still feel able to dismiss as hackwork was, in large measure, how Marx made his living and supported his family, and there is no reason to suppose, *prima facie*, that in so doing he relaxed the high standards to which he adhered in his more academic (read “Western”) writings.

We need to take into account the fact that in writing for the *Tribune* (and for other, similarly oriented organs elsewhere), Marx was reaching the audience of workers—a large number of workers—with whom he most wanted to touch base. E. J. Hobsbawm has made the rather misleading point that of Marx’s various writings, what was available and in print even during the later stages of Marx’s career as a revolutionist was “exiguous”; I countered in “Critical Reception: Marx Then and Now,” in the *Cambridge Companion to Marx* (Terrell Carver, ed, 1991) with the observation, to which I still cleave, that we have no way of knowing what the effect on readers was even of major works that are now considered canonical but had fallen out of print in the course of Marx’s lifetime. (This, in turn, is to say nothing of works like *The German Ideology* that never found a publisher, or works like *The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* or the *Grundrisse* that Marx never wished to publish in the first place.) Anderson, for his part, thinks it is time for us to stand back and take our bearings, and I agree with him on this. The evidence is not all in, and pretty severe questions remain about what is to count as (only recently published) evidence anyway. But Marx’s journalism, which was published and which circulated widely, must unquestionably count in the tally.

Consider, to begin with, a question that is not often raised in the scholarship about Marx: how important the *New York Daily Tribune* was in the history of nineteenth-century journalism. “With a circulation of two hundred thousand, the *Tribune* was unquestionably the most important US newspaper during the nineteenth century,” a paper “for which Marx served as . . . chief European correspondent for over a decade, from 1851–1862, the longest and most remunerative employment of his life” (p. 11)—a sobering reminder of how close to the edge Marx and his family lived before Engels was able to subsidize them from Manchester. It is indeed ridiculous, as Anderson does not flinch from pointing out, that to date “there has been no comprehensive analysis of Marx’s *Tribune* writings” (p. 12).

The question that Anderson’s fine book leaves us with may admit of no formulaic answer. It may be framed in the following way: *The German Ideology* lists three kinds of class societies based on three successive forms of private property, and restricted to a (broadly defined) Western Europe: ancient society, based on slavery; feudal society, based on serfdom; and capitalist society, based on formally free wage labor. Marx’s *Grundrisse* of 1858 features not the inclusion within but the *addition* to this sequence

of a fourth type of society, the “Asiatic” mode of production, and the 1859 *Preface* (to the *Critique of Political Economy*) follows suit, listing “the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the bourgeois methods of production as so many epochs in the progress of the economic formation of society.” The Asiatic mode of production has a peculiar relation to the other three stages. It stands apart from them. Feudalism grows out of ancient society, capitalism grows out of feudal society, and communism will grow out of capitalist society (or its forcible overthrow). The Asiatic mode of production by contrast appears to have had no internal dynamic at all. It continuously rectifies its own *status quo ante* instead of generating any significant internal change. Any modification of the Asiatic mode, which is not a stage but a condition, must by extension be introduced from without, which has been held to explain (without justifying) Marx’s (limited but notorious) defense of British colonialism in India. However, the notion of a (singular) Asiatic mode of production remains an indefensible one, an embarrassment to all too many modern readers.

The acid question about *Marx at the Margins* then becomes whether or not this same commonly expressed generalization about Marx (to which I gave voice in *Political Thinkers*, ed. David Boucher and Paul Kelly, 2003) should now be jettisoned in the wake of Anderson’s arguments. Not all of it. Any talk of *the* (singular) Asiatic mode of production is and remains suspect and dated. But Anderson has persuaded me, hands down, that in view of Marx’s more nuanced understandings of non-Western societies, as indicated by his various forays into journalism, the rather formulaic picture based on (and restricted to) the 1859 preface and the *Grundrisse* does not tell the whole story and needs to be modified along the lines Anderson suggests and convincingly proffers. In this respect, *Marx at the Margins* has done us all an enormous service and should serve to regroup (or at the very least shift or change) discussions about the character of Marx’s status not just as a theorist or theoretician, but also as an observer of what was going on around him as the nineteenth century ran its course, an observer who kept his eyes open.

Chimeras, Hybrids and Interspecies Research: Politics and Policymaking. By Andrea L. Bonnicksen.

Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009. 192p. \$26.95.
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— Steve Fuller, *University of Warwick*

This book provides a sober and systematic treatment of the philosophical and political issues surrounding so-called interspecies research, or ISR, which ranges from, say, the implantation of human stem cells in a mouse embryo to the transplantation of organs from a genetically modified pig into a human body. In the former case, the mouse is

used as a breeding ground for human organs; in the latter, the pig is actually bred to provide those organs. Andrea L. Bonnicksen observes at the outset that the former—so-called early ISR—appears to raise more ethical worries than the latter because it involves converting the mouse into a “chimera,” that is, a creature bearing the cells of two species. In any case, ISR poses a variety of problems because of its straightforwardly instrumental treatment of living matter, all of which is cultivated to promote human welfare. The “means” produced in service of this end, sometimes intentionally but often as by-products, are the chimeras and hybrids of the book’s title. (Unlike chimeras, “hybrids” literally constitute “interspecies,” as produced by the successful joining of egg and sperm from different species.)

Once we treat these transgenic entities as ends in their own right—and not mere means—the troubles begin. Moreover, these troubles are difficult to resolve because chimeras and hybrids are unstable both conceptually and materially: Their identities not only violate conventional species boundaries; even granting a liberal sense of species identity, these creatures are unlikely ever to become self-sustaining organisms. In short, ISR forces us to countenance the deliberate production of living matter stripped of what the molecular biologist Jacques Monod called “teleonomy,” the capacity for purposefulness. Here, the Italian postmodern theorist Giorgio Agamben makes a relevant distinction between *bios* and *zoe*—the organism as, so to speak, subject and as subjected; in specifically human terms, “People” as a self-conscious political unit and “people” as a miscellany of individuals studied by population geneticists. For Agamben, the fundamental problem of politics is how to enforce the distinction, with the meaning of human dignity hanging in the balance. However, he understands the problem in classical terms as concerned with how otherwise normal people pass from the status of *bios* to *zoe* in extreme political situations, ranging from slavery to ethnic cleansing. He overlooks the prospect presented by ISR—namely, that life forms might be bred so as *never* to be capable of enjoying the status of *bios*.

In this respect, ISR belongs in the center of political deliberation, though for now it remains a relatively understudied, and certainly undertheorized, area of policymaking. Bonnicksen’s book should substantially alter this impression—but more by its careful analysis of the entanglement of extant ISR in more mainstream policy concerns than by its case for the profundity of the normative issues that ISR raises. Bonnicksen, while knowledgeable of philosophy, discusses it only on a need-to-know basis vis-à-vis specific policy matters, which are drawn mainly from the United States and the United Kingdom, with occasional glances at the rest of the European Union, Canada, and Australia. Nevertheless, her philosophical instincts are quite sharp, as she presumes that all is not

right in anti-ISR arguments that appeal to “human dignity” in the context of complaining that human cells implanted in another organism would be unable to develop fully their human capacities. Given our general inability to distinguish species on strictly genetic terms, such an objection seems a bit presumptuous. Moreover, taken too literally, the objection would cast doubt on the probability of cell and organ transplants between humans, which arguably enhances one individual’s dignity at the expense of another’s.

The main lesson that Bonnicksen seems to draw from a literature that still largely consists of preemptive moral censure of prospective forms of ISR is that ethics needs more instruction from science than vice versa. She never puts the point quite so boldly, but she repeatedly highlights the relatively primitive, if not outright prejudicial, bases offered for halting ISR. A reliable source of examples here is George W. Bush’s bioethics tsar, Leon Kass, a physician by trade but a natural law theorist in the Aristotelian mould by vocation. He has consistently opposed ISR on the grounds of the “deep wisdom” reflected in our instinctive repugnance of chimeras and hybrids—what is often called the “yuck factor.” In response, Bonnicksen sides with transhumanist ethicists, such as Oxford’s Julian Savulescu, who cast suspicion on the very *instinctiveness* of our repugnance, as that suggests a response harking back to an earlier evolutionary era—and hence in need of being unlearned. Even seemingly more sophisticated moral critiques of ISR, which accept its possible health benefits but reject an open-ended exploratory approach to transgenic organisms, increasingly need to contend with the movement toward “systems” or “living” architecture, in which organisms are embedded—and in some cases engineered—to complement the life cycle of ordinary construction materials, so as to provide for more ecologically integrated buildings capable of literally repairing themselves with minimal human intervention.

To put the arguments concerning ISR in broader perspective, it is worth recalling that animals (and plants) have always been used for experimental purposes in science, typically in ways that require a radical transformation of their default state of being. However, as the philosopher of science Rom Harré has recently stressed (in *Pavlov’s Dogs and Schrödinger’s Cat*, 2009), such transformation may occur in one of two spirits: The animals may be treated either as *instruments*, in which case their bodies are simply means to detect, measure, or produce something else, or as *models*, in which case their bodies are studied in abstract conditions that enable the isolation of their own natural-occurring but normally hidden processes. The difference is epistemologically substantial. For example, much of Charles Darwin’s empirical basis for evolution came in a shift of perspective on, say, pigeon breeding from an instrument used for specific purposes to a model of the more general process of natural selection.

Harré interestingly opines that the history of science has been marked by so much apparent mistreatment of animals because, until quite recently, it was acceptable (though not unanimously approved) for scientists to regard animals as little more than sentient machines for human use and study. This was a theological legacy of the scientific revolution, which, by tending toward a literal understanding of our having been created “in the image and likeness of God,” effectively licensed the appropriation of nature as a laboratory for humans to acquire a better understanding of God’s plan. ISR may be seen as Darwin’s revenge on this entire line of thought, as we now come to treat our own bodies as the scientific revolution taught us to treat those of animals. To be sure, from ancient times, there have been thinkers who defended the integrity of animal bodies against human wants and needs. But once Darwin’s fully naturalized conception of species removed the ontological divide between humans and other animals, the human body—especially in its embryonic and antenatal stages (Bonnicksen’s “early ISR”)—became the main battleground.

Thus, in their defense of human dignity, the so-called pro-life lobby led by Leon Kass nowadays adopts arguments used by animal lovers in the past, just as scientists have come to treat human embryos and fetuses as factories, the other recognizable way of treating animals in the past. In the end, our “humanity” may simply not lie in the possession of a determinate physical form or genetic makeup, in the improvement of the godlike capacity to manufacture life itself, the Pandora’s box that ISR is slowly but steadily opening.

If this book fails to have the popular and even academic impact that it deserves, it will be due to its mechanical chapter structure and boring style. However, these features are reminiscent of the manner in which policy white papers are written, and so—no doubt helped by the location of the publisher—the message is likely to be heard in Washington as a calm voice amid the hyperbole surrounding interspecies research.

Family, Law, and Community: Supporting the Covenant. By Margaret F. Brinig. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010. 288p. \$49.00.
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— Mary Lyndon Shanley, *Vassar College*

Margaret F. Brinig’s latest book will interest all those who study public policy and law dealing with families in the United States. Brinig is a prominent scholar in the field of law and economics at Notre Dame Law School; *Family, Law, and Community* builds on Brinig’s earlier book, *From Contract to Covenant: Beyond the Law and Economics of the Family* (2000). There, she argued that while many of the activities of family life can be usefully analyzed as market activity, others are better understood as

covenant relationships (in which obligation endures even if one side violates an agreement). In *Family, Law, and Community*, Brinig seeks to identify those factors that produce permanence, unconditional love, and the mutual involvement of the family in the community and of the community in the family. Although I share Brinig’s aspirations for stability, responsibility, and vibrant voluntary communities, I find her argument that these will best be achieved by “maintain[ing] the status quo” (p. 201) unpersuasive. The status quo is at odds with Brinig’s declared commitment to equality regardless of race, sexual orientation, and gender, and it slights measures that seem to me crucial to enable people to form and fulfill the responsibilities of family relationships. I hope this review of Brinig’s provocative work will draw others into a conversation about how to achieve a world more hospitable to families.

Let me add a note about that conversation. *Family, Law, and Community* reveals a lack of direct engagement between law and economics scholars and feminist theorists even when discussing the same issues respecting families. Brinig cites few feminist scholars, while I (a feminist political theorist) am unfamiliar with many of her sources (a lacuna I intend to remedy). The sensation of academicians talking past one another is discouraging. I regret my inability to engage details of Brinig’s empirical studies. At the same time, I regret Brinig’s failure to engage or discuss the most significant opposing positions on such issues as same-sex marriage and gender equality. This limits the vibrancy of her argument and the persuasiveness of her policy proposals. Let me try to illuminate the “big issues” this important book raises.

Brinig’s discussions of cohabitation, divorce, same-sex marriage, and gender equality illuminate the contours of her argument and reveal the tensions that threaten its coherence.

Cohabitation, in Brinig’s eyes, is a poor substitute for marriage because it does not bring stability to family relationships. Cohabiting couples stay together for a shorter period than married couples, even when they have children. Domestic violence is more frequent in cohabiting than marital relationships (pp. 15–17). Brinig fails to establish, however, that these correlations are causally related. Brinig also insists that whether a couple stays together is influenced by the recognition and respect that society and the communities to which they belong extend to their relationship. While “marriage now serves as an important signal that a person is committed,” cohabitation sends a “fuzzy” signal (p. 12); cohabitation deprives the couple of the social recognition that helps the couple weather hard times, work things out, and stick together. Brinig does not suggest anything as drastic as laws against fornication or cohabitation, but argues that public policy should not extend benefits given to married couples to cohabiting couples, and should