

Robustness and modular structure in networks

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Abstract

Complex networks have recently attracted much interest due to their prevalence in nature and our daily lives (Vespignani, 2009; Newman, 2010). A critical property of a network is its resilience to random breakdown and failure (Albert et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2000; Callaway et al., 2000; Cohen et al., 2001), typically studied as a percolation problem (Stauffer & Aharony, 1994; Achlioptas et al., 2009; Chen & D'Souza, 2011) or by modeling cascading failures (Motter, 2004; Buldyrev et al., 2010; Brummitt, et al. 2012). Many complex systems, from power grids and the Internet to the brain and society (Colizza et al., 2007; Vespignani, 2011; Balcan & Vespignani, 2011), can be modeled using modular networks comprised of small, densely connected groups of nodes (Girvan & Newman, 2002). These modules often overlap, with network elements belonging to multiple modules (Palla et al. 2005; Ahn et al. 2010). Yet existing work on robustness has not considered the role of overlapping, modular structure. Here we study the robustness of these systems to the failure of elements. We show analytically and empirically that it is possible for the modules themselves to become uncoupled or non-overlapping well before the network disintegrates. If overlapping modular organization plays a role in overall functionality, networks may be far more vulnerable than predicted by conventional percolation theory.

Keywords: *modular networks, percolation, network resilience, community structure, overlapping communities*

1 Introduction

Consider a system of interacting *elements* representing computers, power generators, neurons, office workers, etc. Typically these elements fulfill individual roles in the network such as regulating power or propagating neuronal signals. Yet in many systems, global functionality may require elements to also perform collective tasks

of sufficient complexity that they cannot be completed by single elements. The elements must instead work closely in teams, forming densely interconnected *modules*. These tasks may be parallelized computations, protein biosynthesis, or higher-order neurological functions such as visual processing or speech production.

Among various ways that modules can communicate or jointly function with each other, a prominent one is sharing common elements across modules. Such overlapping elements may result from, e.g. pleiotropy in the genome (Stearns, 2010) or “structural folds” in social systems (Vedres & Stark, 2010). In biological networks, functional modules often coordinate by sharing common elements. For instance, the recent yeast protein complex catalogue, with high-quality hand-curated protein complex data, showed that a significant fraction of proteins belong to multiple protein complexes (Pu et al., 2009). In functional brain networks, overlap may indicate regions that integrate, e.g., visual and auditory sensory cues (Kaiser, 2011), while in structural brain networks it was shown that “confluence zones” that integrate information from other regions tend to participate in multiple modules (de Reus et al., 2014). In large human organizations, liaison jobs—where workers coordinate cross-team activities by spending significant time in multiple teams—are common (Galbraith, 1974). For instance, many companies implement hierarchical management systems, where a manager oversees several teams. In such cases, coordination between the teams are arranged mainly by the manager who works with all the teams, playing the role of the overlapping element. Moreover, collaboration and management across multiple locations frequently takes the form of swapping or dispatching personnel across places. Another example is the systems analyst (Kaiser & King, 1982). Systems analysts help organizations to improve their information technology offerings by liaising between end users or external vendors outside the organization and the programming teams of the organization itself. Similarly, the militaries of many nations have command structures dedicated to liaising between different military branches during joint operations, including with the militaries of other countries (Vego, 2009).

Inspired by these examples, we ask how these networks respond when a random fraction of elements fail: can the modules become uncoupled (i.e. non-overlapping) before the network loses global connectivity? Random failures provide a general model of, e.g. a traumatic brain injury or degenerative disease. If enough elements fail, overlap may be lost and some or all modules may no longer be able to complete their tasks (higher brain functions are lost) even though the network may remain connected (simpler autonomic responses persist). Likewise, an individual module may fail if too many of its member elements cease to function. These effects in combination may lead to a loss of modular overlap in the system, which by our simplified assumptions causes impairment to the entire system. See Figure 1 for an example illustrating how the loss of a random element may cause a module to fail.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we study the robustness of an analytically tractable model of modular networks (Sections 2.1 and 2.2), as well as additional models of modules (Section 2.3) and models of how those modules may respond to random failures and targeted attacks (Section 2.4). Section 3 supports these results with studies of four empirical network datasets covering very different research domains. Finally, in Section 4, we discuss the context of this work and




Fig. 1. Modeling failures in modular networks. We analyze two networks, one representing the linkages between network elements (a) and a second detailing the overlapping connectivity between the modules themselves (b). In this example, the failure of element 3 leads to the loss of module B, since B no longer has sufficient members to complete its collective task. This causes the module network to become disconnected (bottom) even though the element network remains connected. (color online)

how it may apply to the practical issue of missing data during the detection of overlapping and non-overlapping communities in real-world network datasets.

2 Modeling modular networks

Networks with overlapping modular structure can be well modeled with a bipartite graph, also known as an affiliation network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). This network consists of two types of nodes representing the elements and the modules and undirected links representing which elements belong to which modules. Links in the bipartite graph only connect element nodes to module nodes. The network is characterized by two degree distributions, r_m and s_n , governing the fraction of elements that belong to m modules and the fraction of modules that contain n elements, respectively (Newman et al., 2002; Newman et al., 2001; Newman, 2003; Newman & Park, 2003). Links are placed randomly between element and module nodes respecting these degree distributions (Newman & Park, 2003). The average number of modules per element is $\sum_m m r_m \equiv \mu$ and the average number of elements per module is $\sum_n n s_n \equiv v$. Using this as a starting point for our model, we derive two networks from the bipartite graph by projecting onto either the elements or the modules: One is the network between elements, studied by Newman (2003) and Newman & Park (2003), while the other is a network where each node represents a module and two modules are linked if they share at least one element. The Largest Connected Component (LCC) (also known as the giant component (Stauffer & Aharony, 1994)) in the element network disappears when, due to missing elements, the network loses global connectivity; in the module network it vanishes if the modules become uncoupled (non-overlapping). Before projection elements fail independently with probability $1-p$ and are removed from the network. Meanwhile, a module is unable to complete its collective task if fewer than a critical fraction f_c of its original elements remain. These failed modules are removed from the module network but any surviving member elements are not removed from the

element network (Figure 1). This model of element and module failure serves as our starting point, but we will also explore additional models.

Before we analyze this model, it is important to note that it makes two assumptions about the modular nature of the system: that all interactions within each module exist and are equal, and that there are no differences between individual elements that share a module—i.e. there are no “captains” or “team leaders”. One may expect that these homogeneous (or “mean-field”) assumptions may limit the applicability of results derived from this model. However, we argue that, when large numbers of modules are involved, such microscopic, per-module details are less important to the macroscopic robustness of the large-scale system than the overall organization of the network’s modules. That is, an averaged or mean-field model for module failure captures the most essential elements of many systems’ robustness. Furthermore, we will present a number of findings that relax these mean-field ingredients.

We wish to determine $S(p)$, the fraction of remaining nodes within the LCC as a function of p , for both the element and module networks. We use four generating functions (Newman, 2003; Newman & Park, 2003):

$$\begin{aligned}
 f_0(z) &= \sum_{m=0}^{\infty} r_m z^m & f_1(z) &= \frac{1}{\mu} \sum_{m=0}^{\infty} m r_m z^{m-1} \\
 g_0(z) &= \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} s_n z^n & g_1(z) &= \frac{1}{\nu} \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} n s_n z^{n-1}.
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{1}$$

These functions generate the probabilities for (f_0) a randomly chosen element to belong to m modules, (f_1) a random element within a randomly chosen module to belong to m other modules, (g_0) a random module to contain n elements, and (g_1) a random module of a randomly chosen element to contain n other elements.

To analyze this model we now separately study the two projections (the element and module networks) of the original bipartite graph.

2.1 Element network¹

Consider a randomly chosen element A that belongs to a group of size n . Let $P(k|n)$ be the probability that A still belongs to a connected cluster of k nodes (including itself) in this group after failures occur:

$$P(k|n) = \binom{n-1}{k-1} p^{k-1} (1-p)^{n-k}.
 \tag{2}$$

The generating function for the number of other elements connected to A within this group is

$$h_n(z) = \sum_{k=1}^n P(k|n) z^{k-1} = (zp + 1 - p)^{n-1}.
 \tag{3}$$

Averaging over module size:

$$h(z) = \frac{1}{\nu} \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} n s_n h_n(z) = g_1(zp + 1 - p).
 \tag{4}$$

¹ This short calculation was presented in Newman (2003) and Newman & Park (2003). We repeat it here for completeness and to introduce notation used for subsequent calculations.

The total number of elements that A is connected to, from all modules it belongs to, is then generated by

$$G_0(z) = f_0(h(z)). \tag{5}$$

Likewise, the total number of elements that a randomly chosen neighbor of A is connected to is generated by

$$G_1(z) = f_1(h(z)). \tag{6}$$

Before determining S , we first identify the critical point p_c where the giant component emerges. This happens when the expected number of elements two steps away from a random element exceeds the number one step away, or

$$\partial_z G_0(G_1(z))|_{z=1} - \partial_z G_0(z)|_{z=1} > 0. \tag{7}$$

Substituting Equations (5) and (6) gives $f'_0(1)h'(1)[f'_1(1)h'(1) - 1] > 0$ or $f'_1(1)h'(1) > 1$. Finally, the condition for a giant component to exist, since $h'(1) = pg'_1(1)$, is

$$pf'_1(1)g'_1(1) > 1. \tag{8}$$

For the uniform case, $r_m = \delta(m, \mu)$ and $s_n = \delta(n, \nu)$, this gives $p(\mu - 1)(\nu - 1) > 1$. If $\mu = 3$ and $\nu = 3$, then the transition occurs at $p_c = 1/4$.

To find S , consider the probability u for element A not to belong to the giant component. A is not a member of the giant component only if all of A's neighbors are also not members, so u satisfies the self-consistency condition $u = G_1(u)$. The size of the giant component is then $S = 1 - G_0(u)$.

2.2 Module network

Consider a random module C and then a random member element A. Let $Q(\ell|m)$ be the probability that C is connected to ℓ modules, including itself, through element A, who was originally connected to m modules including C:

$$Q(\ell|m) = \binom{m-1}{\ell-1} q_1^{\ell-1} (1 - q_1)^{m-\ell} \tag{9}$$

where

$$q_1 = \frac{1}{\nu} \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} ns_n \sum_{i=x}^n \binom{n-1}{i-1} p^{i-1} (1 - p)^{n-i}. \tag{10}$$

(Notice that $q_1 = 1$ when $x(n) \equiv \lceil nf_c \rceil = 1$ for all n .) The generating function j_m for the number of modules that C is connected to, including itself, through A is

$$j_m(z) = \sum_{\ell=1}^m Q(\ell|m) z^{\ell-1} = (zq_1 + 1 - q_1)^{m-1}. \tag{11}$$

Once again, averaging j_m over memberships gives

$$j(z) = \frac{1}{\mu} \sum_{m=0}^{\infty} mr_m j_m(z) = f_1(zq_1 + 1 - q_1). \tag{12}$$




Fig. 2. The size of the Largest Connected Component S for the element and module networks. Theory and simulations confirm that the network undergoes a transition from coupled to non-overlapping modules well before it loses global connectivity. Symbols represent element (\odot) and module (\square) networks. Here we used $r_m = \delta(m, \mu)$, $s_n = \delta(n, \nu)$, with $\mu = 3$ and $\nu = 6$. Simulations used 10^6 elements. (color online)

The total number of modules that C is connected to is *not* generated by $g_0(j(z))$ but by $\tilde{g}_0(j(z))$, where the \tilde{g}_i are the generating functions for module size after elements fail:

$$\tilde{g}_0(z) = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \tilde{s}_n z^n \qquad \tilde{g}_1(z) = \frac{\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} n \tilde{s}_n z^{n-1}}{\sum_{n=0}^{\infty} n \tilde{s}_n}. \tag{13}$$

The probability \tilde{s}_k to have k member elements remaining in a module after percolation is given by

$$\tilde{s}_k = \frac{\sum_n \binom{n}{k} p^k (1-p)^{n-k} s_n}{\sum_n \sum_{k'=x}^n \binom{n}{k'} p^{k'} (1-p)^{n-k'} s_n}. \tag{14}$$

The denominator is necessary for normalization since we cannot observe modules with fewer than $\lceil nf_c \rceil$ members. Notice that $\tilde{s}_n = s_n$ when $s_n = \delta(n, \nu)$ and $\lceil nf_c \rceil = n = \nu$.

Finally, the total number of modules connected to C through any member elements is generated by $F_0(z) = \tilde{g}_0(j(z))$ and the total number of modules connected to a random neighbor of C is generated by $F_1(z) = \tilde{g}_1(j(z))$. As before, the module network has a giant component when $\partial_z F_0(F_1(z))|_{z=1} - \partial_z F_0(z)|_{z=1} > 0$ and $S = 1 - F_0(u) = 1 - \tilde{g}_0(j(u))$, where u satisfies $u = F_1(u) = \tilde{g}_1(j(u))$.

For the uniform case with $\mu = 3$, $\nu = 3$, and $f_c > 2/3$, the critical point for the module network is $p_c = 1/2$, a considerably higher threshold than for the element network ($p_c = 1/4$). In Figure 2, we show S for $\mu = 3$ and $\nu = 6$. The *robustness gap*, the difference between the critical points for the element and module networks, grows as the module failure cutoff increases, covering a significant range of p for the larger values of f_c .

Of particular interest are scale-free networks (Barabási & Albert, 1999; Newman, 2010). Here we take $r_m = \delta(m, \mu)$ as before, but now $s_n \sim n^{-\lambda}$, with $\lambda \geq 2$. (The degree distribution after projection remains scale-free, with the same exponent, although the maximum degree may increase.) It is known that scale-free networks




Fig. 3. Robustness of scale-free modular networks. Here $r_m = \delta(m, 3)$, $s_n \sim n^{-\lambda}$, $f_c = 1/2$, and $N \equiv \max\{n \mid s_n > 0\}$. Increasing N and decreasing λ , measures known to improve the robustness of scale-free networks (Cohen et al., 2000), actually magnifies the difference between the critical points. Surprisingly, this also increases the fragility of the module network, indicating that optimizing against structural failure may worsen the network's functional resilience. Simulations used 10^5 elements. (color online)

are robust to random failures when $2 < \lambda < 3$ (meaning that $p_c \rightarrow 0$). However, this result also requires that the maximum value K of the degree distribution be large ($K \gg 1$) (Cohen et al., 2000). Indeed, as we lower λ , we discover that, while we increase the robustness of the elements, we actually *decrease* the robustness of the modules (Figure 3). Interestingly, increasing the maximum module size cutoff $N = \max\{n \mid s_n > 0\}$ improves element robustness, but not overall functional resilience.

2.3 Additional models of modules

Our analytic calculation (Sections 2.1 and 2.2) uses a basic, mean-field model of modular structure. Specifically, we follow Newman and Park (2003) and represent the element-element network as the *projection* of a bipartite graph between elements and modules. This assumes that each module is fully dense, i.e. that all interactions within the module are present and of equal strength (hence the mean-field nature). Due to these assumptions, this network model is tractable, a great strength. Yet while we expect modules to be unusually dense, it is unlikely that they will universally be *completely* dense. However, when considering expected behavior over many modules, which is the primary factor of the model's global network robustness, we argue that such higher-order effects and potential microscopic details are subordinate to gross modular features when studying global network connectivity.




Fig. 4. Modules do not need to be completely dense. Here we study the scale-free modular networks of Figure 3. However, before element failures occur we first delete links inside modules such that the final density of each module is approximately $1 - \rho$. When $\rho = 0$ we recover the results of Figure 3. We consider two values of f_c (top and bottom) and two scale-free exponents λ (left and right). Closed symbols correspond to element networks, open symbols to module networks. We see that in most cases the decreased density of modules has little effect. Only for the more extreme values of ρ do we see a change, which is reasonable because high values of ρ effectively destroy the modular nature of the network. (color online)

Despite this, understanding how more detailed modular representations affect network robustness is important. As a first step we relax our assumption of mean-field intra-modular coupling. Before elements fail (site percolation) we delete each link in the projected element-element network with a probability ρ (bond percolation). When $\rho = 0$ we recover the original mean-field model where every module is completely dense. For large values of ρ , such as $\rho > 0.8$ or 0.9 , the modules possess no intrinsic density above that of the overall density, and we recover a non-modular random graph. What this means is that we now model modules with approximately Erdős–Rényi graphs. In this pre-percolation phase, an element fails if it loses all its neighbors. Such elements are removed from the element-element network and they are counted as element failures towards the modules.

We study the robustness of these networks in Figure 4. We observe that ρ has little if any influence on the relative robustnesses of the two networks, over a range of parameters. This provides further evidence that our results do not pathologically depend on the mean-field nature (all-to-all coupling) of the underlying model. We return to the importance of module density when we discuss our empirical results in Section 3.

2.4 Additional models of module failures

We proposed a basic, mean-field model for how modules can fail. Instead of considering the microscopic details of each module, we assumed that a module requires a critical fraction f_c of its original member elements to remain, regardless of which particular elements actually remain. This was done for the sake of analytic tractability, yet there are numerous other models one can study, typically of greater complexity. For example, certain modules may possess distinct critical structure in such a way that the module may continue to function so long as one key element remains, regardless of how many other elements have failed. But failure of that one element will invariably cause the module to fail.

As a first step towards exploring such alternative models of module robustness, consider the following. Instead of requiring a critical fraction f_c of elements for a module to function, we now consider a module to remain if it has at least $x > 0$ elements remaining. This absolute number is now independent of the original size of the module. We can study this analytically using nearly the same calculation presented in Section 2.2; we need only replace $x(n) = \lceil nf_c \rceil$ with $x = \text{const}$. In Figure 5, we study the robustness of the scale-free modular networks considered in Figure 3 under this new failure criterion. We see that, while the critical point of the module-module network does vary, it remains different from the critical point of the corresponding element-element network for the most parameter values. The primary change being that increasing the maximum module size does improve the robustness of the module network, when the scale-free exponent $\lambda < 3$.

In addition to random failure, seminal network studies also considered *attacks* where certain nodes—the high-degree hubs—are more likely to fail. We again study the robustness of the scale-free network systems in Figure 3 but now elements fail with probability proportional to their degree in the element-element network. We see in Figure 6 that these attacks do shift the locations of both networks' percolation critical points, as expected. Yet, the module-module network remains less robust to attacks than the element-element network. Thus our qualitative results remain for multiple failure methods, including targeted attacks.

3 Empirical results

We study failures in the following four biological and technological real-world datasets: A metabolic network, a protein-protein interaction network, a network of web pages captured by a web crawler, and a brain network captured from fMRI data. The Metabolic and Protein-Protein Interaction (all) networks were previously used in Ahn et al. (2010); details are available there. The World Wide Web network is constructed from a web crawl made available by Google². Finally, the Brain network was derived using normal subject fMRI data where each node is a “voxel” dividing the brain spatially and links exist between voxels with correlated time series. Full technical details can be found in Mørup et al. (2010). (We preprocessed the fMRI network to remove spurious connections; see Appendix A for full details.)

² Google no longer hosts these data, but it remains available at <http://snap.stanford.edu/data/web-Google.html>.




Fig. 5. An alternative failure mode for modular networks. Here modules fail when they have fewer than $x = 4$ original member elements remaining. This absolute cutoff size differs from the relative cutoff model where a fraction f_c of the original member elements needed to remain for the module to remain functional. We see that, despite this very different mechanism for module failure, the difference in critical points between the two networks remains, supporting the generality of our results. **(a)** The size of the largest connected component for the element-element and module-module networks for a scale-free distribution of module sizes with scale-free exponent $\lambda = 3$. We see that the critical points remain different as we increase the maximum module size cutoff N . **(b)** As per panel a but for a broader module size distribution ($\lambda = 2.5$). We see that increasing N can decrease the gap between the element and module critical points. **(c–d)** The same networks as in panels (a) and (b) but now we plot the size of the *second* largest connected component. This takes a maximum value at approximately the transition point p_c and may more clearly illustrate how the critical points change as N is varied. (color online)

Unlike the analytical models (Section 2), here we do not know the modules in advance, so we estimate them with an overlapping community detection algorithm (Ahn et al., 2010). This algorithm works by extracting *link communities* at the level of maximum partition density (Ahn et al., 2010), which were then converted to overlapping node communities to provide the estimated modules. Only communities with at least three nodes were considered (Ahn et al., 2010). These networks tend to be smaller than those previously discussed, introducing finite-size effects that mask the behavior of S (Figure 7). To overcome this, we additionally present S' , the fraction of *original* nodes that remain in the LCC. This slightly different definition behaves better for very small networks and high failure probabilities (small p) because the denominator does not go to zero, but the transition at the critical point is not as dramatic, making it harder to find the critical point. To more clearly demonstrate that the critical points of element and module networks in the empirical data are not the same, we also calculate R_{21} , the ratio of the size of the second largest to largest component ($R_{21}(p)$ tends to peak at the critical point). As shown in Figure 7, the modules fall apart more easily than the elements, qualitatively matching our model across a broad range of networks.

In Section 2.3 and Figure 4, we discussed a model of modules that relaxed the need for them to be completely dense, and showed that the robustness gap between the element network and module network remained. That we do not require completely




Fig. 6. Attacking modular networks. Here we consider the robustness of scale-free modular networks (compare to Figure 3) under intentional attacks where element failures are no longer uniformly random, but instead the probability for an element to fail is proportional to the degree of the element in the original network such that higher degree elements are more likely to fail than lower degree elements. We observe that, while smaller for attacks than random failures, the difference between the percolation critical points of the two networks remains. Simulations used 10^4 elements. (color online)

dense modules is further supported by the evidence presented here using real-world networks and their community structure. These module networks are not created by projecting a bipartite node-community graph. The modules themselves are not modeled but instead arise naturally from a community detection method. These detection methods attempt to find dense graphs, but do not impose structural restrictions. In Figure 8, we present the distribution of module densities—defined as the fraction of potential links within a module that actually exist—for all modules of each empirical network. We see that most modules are dense, but not completely dense: most modules have about two-thirds link density, corresponding to a value of $\rho = 1/3$ in our relaxed model. Since the empirical networks show qualitatively similar relative robustness, this further supports the fact that our results depend on the presence of dense modules but not on strict forms for those modules.

4 Discussion

We have used an analytically tractable network model to study the robustness of modular networks to the random failures of elements. By analyzing a second network detailing the connectivity between modules, we have shown that the overlapping modular structure of the network is more susceptible to random failures than expected. As mentioned previously, this modular network model makes mean-field assumptions about both the nature of the modules and how element failures lead to module failures. To understand whether these assumptions limit our results, we studied different models of modules within networks (Section 2.3) and different types




Fig. 7. Failures in a number of real, modular networks. Many of these networks are robust to random failures (the element networks exhibit very small p_c). The behavior of the largest connect component for all the empirical networks qualitatively matches that of the model, as the identified modules uncouple faster than the network itself. **(top)** Our original definition of S as the fraction of remaining nodes within the LCC tends to mask the transition for very small networks, as seen by the upward turn at small p for some of the red curves. **(bottom)** We additionally plot S' , the fraction of *original* nodes in the LCC. This leads to a less dramatic transition but also avoids the denominator of S becoming very small. **(insets)** Finally, to clearly demonstrate the robustness gap between the two networks, we also show the ratio R_{21} of the size of the second largest to largest component ($f_c = 0.7$) as a function of p , which tends to peak at p_c , further illustrating the difference in critical points for the two networks. (color online)




Fig. 8. Densities of empirically measured modules. For each of the four empirical datasets, we compute the distribution of densities for subgraphs corresponding to the modules found using link communities (Ahn et al., 2010). The density d is defined as the fraction of possible edges actually found within the module, i.e. $m/\binom{n}{2}$ where m is the actual number of links in the module and n is the number of nodes. We see that few modules are completely dense, except for the world wide web network where approximately 40% of modules are fully dense. Instead most network modules have densities between $d = 0.2$ and $2/3$. This means that the empirical results shown in Figure 7 do not require fully dense, mean-field modules for lower modular robustness to be present, further supporting the generality of our results. (color online)

of module failure mechanisms (Section 2.4) including targeted attacks (Figure 6). In all cases the presence of modules within the network affects the robustness of the system.

There are a number of interesting avenues for further work. We considered the simplest case of random failures but further analysis of purposeful attacks (where, e.g. elements with more connections are more likely to fail) are also important. Likewise, the model we use assumes that all links exist within modules, but links between modules are certainly possible. These additional “weak” links can only enhance the robustness of the element network, but will not strengthen the module network, so that the network’s functional resilience does not improve. Beyond structural characteristics of these modular networks it is important to understand the effect of failures and modular structure on critical phenomena such as synchronization (Arenas et al., 2008), contact processes (Sood & Redner, 2005), cascades (Motter, 2004; Buldyrev et al., 2010; Brummitt et al., 2012) or other dynamics (Dorogovtsev et al., 2008).

Finally, this work may also help to understand how analyses of empirical networks are affected by missing data, of critical importance when finding communities, or empirically discovering modules (Girvan & Newman, 2002). Here p is the probability that a network element is successfully captured by an experiment, such as a high-throughput biological assay or web crawler, and the “failure” of a module is now the inability of a hypothetical or idealized community detection method to discover it due to the module’s lack of density in the sampled network. In this scenario, our results—the difference between the critical points of the element and module networks—may indicate that, if the network is sampled down to the intermediate regime where nodes are connected but modules are uncoupled, the community overlap in the network will be underestimated, allowing even non-overlapping community methods to succeed. Of course, this is a simplified picture and requires further investigation. We do not know the true community structure and the networks are likely to be already missing data. Yet, since the existence of strongly overlapping community structure

has been established in many networks (e.g. Ahn et al., 2010) and as we have shown that sampling tends to reduce overlap between modules, we argue that community overlap in real networks is likely to be underestimated.

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A Brain network preprocessing

The Brain network was derived using normal subject fMRI data where each node is a “voxel” dividing the brain spatially and links exist between voxels whose respective




Fig. A1. Extracting the multiscale backbone and link communities of the fMRI brain network. We track the fraction of nodes and links remaining in the network as a function of the backbone threshold α . Choose α too small and little of the network remains; too big and the density is not altered. We see a small window near $0.35 < \alpha < 0.4$ where the number of links drops but the majority of nodes remain. We choose $\alpha = 0.37$ (indicated) to exploit this. (inset) Partition density (Ahn *et al.*, 2010) as a function of link dendrogram threshold for the extracted network. The vertical line denotes the threshold at which the dendrogram was cut to determine link communities. (color online)

BOLD time series are correlated. We begin with the top 200,000 most correlated links, measured using mutual information (Mørup *et al.*, 2010). A single voxel had very high degree, $k = 0.73 N$ (the next highest degree is $k = 0.096 N$) so we first remove it. This leaves 5,038 nodes and 196,311 links.

We further preprocess this dense, weighted network by extracting its *multiscale backbone* (Serrano *et al.*, 2009). To do so, we use the Serrano algorithm (2009) with local heterogeneity significance threshold $\alpha = 0.37$. To determine this value of α we use the following approach. The goal of the backbone extraction method is to prune potentially spurious links by finding significant links while disconnecting few nodes from the network. If α is too small many nodes will lose all their neighbors since few links will be significant. Yet if α is too high few links will be pruned since most links will appear to be significant. Therefore, we wish to choose α such that the density of links is decreased but few nodes have been removed. In Figure A1, we plot the fraction of nodes and the fraction of links remaining in the graph as a function of α . Indeed, we see a distinct window $0.35 < \alpha < 0.39$ where link removals occur but few nodes have been lost. We choose $\alpha = 0.37$, a value in the middle of this range where many links have been removed but nearly all nodes are still present in the network.

After extracting significant links using the backbone algorithm, the fMRI data is reduced to a final network of 5,038 nodes and 77,680 links. For the brain network (and all networks), link communities were extracted at the link dendrogram level of

maximum partition density (Ahn et al., 2010), providing the estimated modules. As in Ahn, et al. (2010), only communities with at least three nodes were considered. In Figure A 1, (inset) we plot the partition density of the Brain network as a function of the height (or threshold) of the link dendrogram (see Ahn, et al. for details (2010)). We see a sharp peak at a threshold near the root of the tree, giving a clear indicator for the most modular component of the network's link hierarchy.