

ARTICLE

From Chimera's Womb: The Manchukuo Bureaucracy and Its Legacy in East Asia

Rolf I. Siverson*

University of Pennsylvania

*Corresponding author. Email: siverson@sas.upenn.edu

Abstract

Within the Japanese Empire, the Manchukuo bureaucracy was unique for its high level of centralization and standardization. This study argues that Manchukuo's bureaucratic recruitment and training processes molded civil officials into a paramilitary force, dedicated to developmentalism and a radical belief in the transformative power of the state. It approaches the institutional and cultural development of the Manchukuo bureaucracy as an evolutionary process. As pan-Asian radicals, military officials, and reform bureaucrats competed for control of Japan's imperial project, their ideas and agendas merged into a hybrid system of bureaucratic management that served as a model for the wartime empire. Looking past the temporal juncture of August 1945, this study also foregrounds the legacy of the Manchukuo bureaucracy on postwar East Asia. Manchukuo's government institutions recruited and indoctrinated not just Japanese but Korean, Taiwanese, and other imperial subjects in the name of ethnic harmony. Back in their homelands, these men adapted to their experience and training into the foundations of developmental nationalism and authoritarian state structures during the Cold War.

Keywords: civil service; militarization; professionalization; statism; *Daidō gakuin*; South Korea; North Korea; Taiwan

Manchukuo (1932–1945) has long presented an interesting case for scholars of Japanese imperialism. Since Yamamuro Shin'ichi's 山室 信一 exploration of the chimera-like fusion of forces behind Manchukuo's founding, however, scholars have moved beyond the “puppet state” paradigm to interrogate its structural formation.¹ Many studies have shown how Manchukuo's hybrid sovereignty served as a proving ground for new ideas and institutions that had a profound impact on the Japanese metropole during wartime and beyond.² Scholars have paid particular attention to Manchukuo's authoritarian administrative institutions and the small group of bureaucrats responsible for developing them.³ A major pillar in their institutional reform efforts, however, was the transformation of the bureaucracy itself through drastic changes to the civil service appointment process. The product of their reform efforts, then, was not just the state but the agents who represented it. In fact, when politicians and intellectuals on the Japanese mainland took up civil service reform to meet the needs of wartime mobilization in the 1940s, it was to Manchukuo that many looked for examples.⁴ Yet, the historical development of Manchukuo's bureaucratic system remains relatively unstudied.

This study explores the institutional formation of the Manchukuo bureaucracy focusing on its recruitment and training processes. Over its short fourteen-year history, the Manchukuo bureaucracy

Field research for this article was supported by the Korea Foundation, Academy of Korean Studies, and the Japan Foundation.

¹Yamamuro 2004.

²Johnson 1982; Young 1998; Mimura 2011; Moore 2015.

³Johnson 1982; Mimura 2011.

⁴Spaulding 1967, pp. 177–78.

evolved into an organization that was highly unique within the Japanese empire for its level of centralization and standardization. Recruitment and training processes provided the small group of military and civil planners with an effective means of controlling and channeling young recruits' idealism into their new role as professional managers and vanguard soldiers for the state. The result was a cohort of bureaucrats with similar characteristics and backgrounds who were indoctrinated into the principles of militarism, developmentalism, and a radical belief in the state's authority to transform society.

These qualities developed through three distinct phases that are detailed in this article. In the first phase, radical pan-Asian activists laid the ideological and institutional groundwork for bureaucratic recruitment and training. In the second, military influence dominated, but increasingly came into conflict with Japanese reform bureaucrats demanding professionalization. The third phase saw the convergence and codification of these interests into a uniform bureaucratic culture under the rapid expansion of Manchukuo's wartime administrative state. As with other institutions in Manchukuo, then, the bureaucracy evolved as a hybridization of overlapping and competing political forces.

Looking beyond the collapse of the Japanese empire, this article concludes with a discussion of the legacy of the Manchukuo bureaucracy on postwar East Asia. Scholars of Japan have long argued that Manchukuo's bureaucratic elite translated their experiments on the continent into a foundation for technocratic institutions, fascism, and the developmental state after 1945.⁵ Less understood is the enduring impact of Manchukuo's bureaucratic system on the thousands of colonized subjects it recruited – particularly from Korea and Taiwan. The rising influence of former Manchukuo bureaucrats in their postcolonial homelands reflects the developmental history of the Manchukuo bureaucracy in significant ways. As the children of this chimeric system, their experience foregrounds Manchukuo's contribution to the formation of technocratic identities and the rise of authoritarian and developmental state structures not just in Japan but throughout Cold War East Asia.

Foundations of the Manchukuo Bureaucracy, 1920–1932

While Manchukuo only came into existence as a state in 1932, the distinctive features of its administrative structure must be understood within the political and intellectual context of the previous decade. The global trend towards liberal internationalism that came out of the First World War catalyzed increasing discontent and radical activism among the Japanese right. Beginning in the early 1920s, young Japanese military officers and right-wing study groups perceived that the world was entering a final stage of global conflict where only the complete mobilization of society could stave off total annihilation.⁶ Both groups judged the Japanese political order to be too corrupted by unfettered liberalism and capitalism to carry out the needed reforms. They therefore called first for a radical social transformation characterized by a return to the moral authority of traditional Asian values that would unite the people before the coming war. By the 1930s, right-wing activists in both military and civilian circles attempted to initiate radical reforms through increasingly militant action but met with limited success. So as a small group of Kwantung Army officers contemplated the expansion of the Japanese frontier into Manchuria, they saw it as an opportunity not only to advance strategic interests but also to experiment with institutional reorganization away from the political corruption and bureaucratic intransigence of the Japanese mainland.⁷

These plans came to fruition with the Kwantung army's invasion of Manchuria in 1931. In the face of international condemnation and limited central government support for their invasion and occupation, Kwantung army officers struck on an alternative arrangement that created an independent state under the protective guidance of the Japanese armed forces. The initial manifestation of this system envisioned a series of "self-governing bodies" (*jichitai* 自治体) under the direction of a "guidance

⁵For example, see: Johnson 1982; Mimura 2011; Moore 2015.

⁶Peattie 1975; Szpilman 2011.

⁷Peattie 1975, p. 101.

board” (*shidōbu* 指導部) with the oversight and guidance of the Kwantung Army.⁸ Lacking the expertise or local connections needed to build a state structure from scratch, army officers enlisted the help of local Chinese elites and Japanese civilians, particularly employees of the Southern Manchuria Railroad (or Mantetsu 滿鐵), in forming an administrative system. This alliance was tenuous and indeed collapsed in the summer of 1932, but from the standpoint of the bureaucracy, established a basis for much of its institutional structure and cultural character.

In this early period, the task of recruiting and training civil officials fell to Kasagi Yoshiaki 笠木 良明 (1892–1955), a Mantetsu employee and government reform activist. Kasagai had met renowned pan-Asian intellectual Ōkawa Shūmei 大川 周明 (1886–1957) early in his career at Mantetsu and been inspired to join Ōkawa in forming the right-wing reform group Yūzonsha 猶存社 in 1920. Kasagi had no particular sympathy for the Kwantung Army or its defensive goals, but he saw the invasion of Manchuria as an opportunity to create a new type of government administration based on Ōkawa’s vision for an Asian-style moral order.⁹ In his organizing capacity for the Guidance Board, Kasagi formed the “Self-Governing Guidance Training Center” (*Jichi shidō kunrenjo* 自治指導訓練所) and set about recruiting idealistic students who would form the backbone of Manchuria’s rural administration.

Though Kasagi held no formal position in the training center, his influence on the curriculum is evident both in the curriculum itself and his connection to most of the faculty. Despite its position as an educational institution for administrative officials, Kasagi’s training center placed ideological indoctrination at a higher priority than professionalization, with 25 percent of class time dedicated to learning about the “spirit of self-governing guidance” (*jichi shidō seishin* 自治指導精神) and “self-governing guidance methodology” (*jichi shidō hōhō* 自治指導方法).¹⁰ In this effort, Kasagi enlisted the help of Mukden lawyer and fellow Yūzonsha alumnus Nakano Koichi 中野 琥逸 (n.d.) to teach political philosophy and ideology, former Mantetsu employee and radical proponent of agricultural revivalism Kuchida Yasunobu 口田 康信 (1893–1945) to teach political science and nationalist ideology, and Mukden Library Director Etō Toshio 衛藤 利夫 (1883–1953) and Itō Musojirō 伊藤 六十次郎 (1905–1994) to teach Manchurian and Asian history in the pan-Asian context.¹¹ In addition, Kasagi brought in a parade of other pan-Asian ideologues both from Manchuria and Japan to give politically charged lectures that got students’ “youthful blood boiling.”¹²

Kasagi also stressed the need for “practical training” (*jissai kunren* 實際訓練) and developing an intimate connection with the countryside. Students went on frequent visits to various parts of the new country meeting with locals and collecting information. In addition to his preference for field training, these excursions enabled students to conduct vital propaganda work across the country in advance of the Lytton Commission in the spring of 1932.¹³ Moreover, despite his tenuous relationship with the military, Kasagi still saw a practical need for rudimentary paramilitary training. Physical exercise, including long marches through the countryside, was a central feature of the curriculum. Students also trained extensively in kendo, riflery, and horseback riding.¹⁴

Following the foundation of Manchukuo on March 1, 1932, Kasagi’s relationship with the Kwantung Army began to sour. Within the new government structure, the Self-government Guidance Board was transformed into the National Affairs Office (*Shiseikyoku* 資政局), which oversaw bureaucratic recruitment and training, with Kasagi as its head. Unbeknownst to Kasagi, however, the Kwantung Army signed a secret accord on March 10, 1932 with the days-old Manchukuo government giving the Army’s Fourth Special Division the right to approve or dismiss any ethnic Japanese

⁸Kasagi 1960, pp. 168–71.

⁹Kasagi 1960, pp. 43–60.

¹⁰Manshū Teikoku Kyōwakai chūō honbu 1940, p. 375.

¹¹Fujikawa 1981, appendix 5.

¹²Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai 1966, p. 20.

¹³Fujikawa 1981, p. 41.

¹⁴Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai 1966, p. 20.

official in the Manchukuo government.¹⁵ Army officials viewed Kasagi's support for decentralized regional authority, radical pan-Asian ideology, and growing powerbase as a threat to their plans for a more manageable centralized administration under Japanese control.¹⁶ It was Kasagi's recruitment activities for the second class of bureaucratic trainees, however, that spelled his undoing. In April of 1932, Kasagi traveled to Japan, without notifying the army, and joined his old mentor Ōkawa in screening a new batch of recruits. Army commanders only learned of Kasagi's unilateral action when ninety-seven young men (including three Koreans and two Chinese) arrived in Mukden the following month to start training. Even more alarming to military leaders was that this influx of new recruits coincided with the May 15 assassination of Japanese Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi 犬養毅 (1855–1932) – a failed coup attempt in which Kasagi's mentor Ōkawa was implicated.¹⁷ The incident provided Kasagi's opponents in both the army and the Manchukuo government with sufficient cause not just to purge him from his powerful position but also to reorganize the bureaucratic system. The National Affairs Office was eliminated, with its primary functions being divided among other departments under greater military control. Bureaucratic recruitment and training came under the purview of the powerful General Affairs Agency (Sōmuchō 総務庁) where Kasagi's training institute was reorganized as the Great Unity Academy (Daidō gakuin 大同学院).

In spite of his ouster, Kasagi and his ideas continued to have significant influence over bureaucrats in the early years of Manchukuo. Nearly all of the recruits Kasagi brought over from Japan in the spring of 1932 were allowed to continue with their training in the reorganized academy and received appointments with the blessing of the military.¹⁸ In January 1933, Kasagi returned to Japan where he founded the Society for the Construction of the Great Asia (Dai Ajia kensetsu kyōkai 大亜細亜建設協会). Through the organization, he continued to promote his ideas about political organization on the continent and recruit idealistic young men amenable to his philosophy to join the Manchukuo bureaucracy via the new system. He began publishing the monthly magazine *Great Asia* (*Dai Ajia* 大亜細亜) in May, from which he criticized the Manchukuo government's centralization and Japanization.¹⁹ Kasagi's disciples in Manchukuo's regional administration made it the unofficial journal of the bureaucracy, in which they continued to circulate his ideas and organize in resistance to centralization up until the major civil service reforms of 1938.²⁰ Meanwhile, a new political force had arrived in Manchukuo with other plans for the bureaucracy.

Militarization or Professionalization, 1932–1937

Just as the Kwantung Army was pushing out Manchuria-based idealists from the civil government in the summer of 1932, reform bureaucrats – newly arrived from Japan – began gaining influence. These were young men, predominantly mid-level officials, serving in the Japanese ministries of Finance (Ōkura 大蔵) and Commerce and Industry (Shōkōshō 商工省) who were critical of the reactive and regulatory state and dissatisfied with the inefficiency of politicization and inter-ministerial competition. Much like their counterparts in the military, reform bureaucrats were deeply critical of both capitalism and socialist internationalism and saw Manchukuo as an opportunity to refashion the state as an administrative, interventionist entity capable of meeting the large-scale technical challenges of modern society.²¹ Moreover, their willingness to concede authority over security-related issues to the military should have made for an ideal partnership.

¹⁵Furumi 1967, pp. 206–7.

¹⁶For more on the basis of this dispute see Katakura 1978, pp. 177–78; Kasagi 1960, p. 173; Komai 1952, pp. 256–57.

¹⁷Kasagi 1960, pp. 172–73; Fujikawa 1981, p. 55.

¹⁸One of the two Chinese recruits was not allowed to continue due to inconsistencies in his academic record. Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai 1966, p. 22.

¹⁹Kasagi 1960, pp. 175–76.

²⁰For more on regional officials resisting the central government see: Fujikawa 1981, pp. 89–103.

²¹For more on reform bureaucrats see Mimura 2011, pp. 29–40.

From the outset, however, reform bureaucrats had different ideas about bureaucratic recruitment that quickly came into conflict with the military leadership. The Kwantung Army had been filling various government departments through a complex system of ethnic quotas, with a small group of Japanese dominating supervisory and central government posts and Chinese relegated to low-level and rural administrative positions. Reform bureaucrats considered most of these existing officials “lacking in the knowledge and experience for modern government administration.”²² They particularly looked down on co-opted local Chinese officials, who they argued only had experience with the “half-feudal, half-colonial system” of the previous regime.²³ From the military’s perspective, however, this convoluted system of quotas, ethnic division of labor, and centralized authority – a not so subtle divide-and-conquer tactic – served their immediate goal of pacification. As the main force in carrying out the reorganization and administration of society, reform bureaucrats understood that they would first need to rationalize and professionalize the civil service, which, they argued, necessitated recruiting more suitable candidates from among Japan’s bureaucratic and intellectual elite.²⁴ This became a perpetual point of conflict between the military and the civil government in Manchukuo, but the military’s ultimate authority over personnel decisions gave them significant leverage over the evolution of the bureaucracy.

The dual objectives of professionalization and pacification were particularly reflected in the practice of direct recruitment in Manchukuo’s early years. Manchukuo’s legal regulations for bureaucratic organization (*kansei* 官制), as established in the spring of 1932, contained remarkable flexibility regarding appointments, which vested ultimate authority in the office of the Prime Minister of the State Council (Kokumuin sōri 國務院總理).²⁵ This was in part to facilitate military oversight over bureaucratic staffing, as discussed above, but it also enabled the special appointment of experienced officials to supervisory positions through an expedited and informal screening system based on faith in the quality and character of the Japanese imperial bureaucracy. This even included non-Japanese elites with experience in Japan’s military or colonial service.²⁶

While direct appointment was quick and efficient, it did not present a long-term solution to establishing either a professional bureaucracy or co-opting local elites for regional pacification. This would require a system for recruiting talented, if inexperienced, men and training them to carry out these duties. When the General Affairs Agency took over Kasagi’s Self-Government Guidance Training Center in the summer of 1932, it was promptly reopened as the Great Unity Academy (henceforth GUA) for this exact purpose. Despite the name change, however, much of the character of the previous institution remained intact.

The most significant change to the academy was the increased level of military involvement in its operation. The Director of the General Affairs Agency, a civil appointee, technically served concurrently as President of the GUA. The Kwantung Army, however, ensured that the position of headmaster (*gakkan* 学監) – in charge of recruitment, staffing, curriculum, and daily operations – always went to a military official. Fujii Jūrō 藤井 重郎 (1883–1937), a Japanese Army captain serving in the first reserves and contemporary of key figures in the invasion of Manchuria, served as headmaster for the first class of recruits in 1932 before returning to active duty.²⁷ His replacement, Nakahara Hachirō 中原 八郎 (d. 1948), also a reserve captain, oversaw the second through fifth classes of GUA recruits. Consequentially, the military’s control over training new bureaucrats resulted in an emphasis on physical discipline both in recruitment and instruction unlike anywhere else in the Japanese empire.

As part of the recruitment program established by Fujii in 1932, the selection committee considered physical strength and military discipline to be a crucial element in an applicant’s ability to succeed.

²²Furumi 1978, p. 60.

²³Furumi 1978, p. 41.

²⁴Furumi 1978, p. 60.

²⁵Satō 1932, p. 5.

²⁶Pak Sōngjin 2009, p. 223.

²⁷Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai 1972, pp. 143–44.

Manchukuo's harsh winters required a workforce that could operate effectively in temperatures frequently dropping below -20 degrees Celsius. As such, applicants were subject to a physical examination that generally followed military guidelines for height, weight, hearing, and vision, as well as screening for evidence of diseases and physical deformities.²⁸ In principle, applicants were also required to have completed Japan's compulsory military training (*gunji kyōren* 軍事教練) prior to their appointment.²⁹ In addition, the committee placed a priority on applicants with experience in martial arts and team sports. The result was a class of young men that were physically fit and had at least basic experience in organizational discipline that would serve as a foundation for their training in Manchukuo.

The military's influence over bureaucratic training also resulted in an increasing militarization of the GUA's practices and culture. The continued presence of anti-Japanese resistance forces in the countryside meant that some level of self-defense training was necessary for basic survival. The military, moreover, considered future bureaucrats – most of whom took appointments in regional government – an important force for pacification in the countryside.³⁰ Under military command, paramilitary training at the academy increased to 20 percent of all instruction time.³¹ At the most basic level, drill instruction and marching were emphasized to increase discipline and physical stamina. Students went on frequent marches through the countryside even in harsh weather conditions.³² They also practiced horseback riding, rifle and handgun marksmanship, martial arts, and carried out a simulated “police action” against bandits on the school campus.³³

While at the GUA, students were indoctrinated into a culture of service and blood sacrifice to the state. Particularly in Manchukuo's early years, when armed resistance in the countryside was rampant, the number of bureaucrats killed in the field was significant. GUA administrators promoted these deaths as the ultimate expression of the bureaucrat's “sacred duty.”³⁴ Lectures and songs told students to embody the spirit of the samurai (*shishi* 志士) sacrificing everything for the state.³⁵ Both the GUA and Manchukuo government Office of Information published memorial volumes commemorating the heroic deaths of bureaucrats.³⁶ In 1936, the national radio station even broadcast a dramatization of the death of a young Japanese bureaucrat and GUA graduate while on duty the previous year.³⁷

Aside from militarism and self-sacrifice, the GUA also promoted a culture of masculine freedom associated with the fleetingness of youth. The military headmasters were known to treat their students like soldiers heading off to war, encouraging them to engage in manly vices. On the school's opening day in 1934, Headmaster Nakahara declared: “... youth is truly like a flower. So, drink to your heart's content, and buy whores”³⁸ Though students generally had little free time during their education, Saturday night curfews were extended to give students time to go out on the town. These excursions were known to get quite rowdy. Shortly after the opening of the new campus building in 1934, a

²⁸At the screening in Kyoto in 1934, nine of the 108 candidates failed the physical for reasons ranging from vision problems to venereal disease. Rikugunshō 1934, p. 24. Failing the physical examination, however, did not always lead to elimination. In the final list of recruits for 1936, for example, 10 percent had failed the physical for minor medical issues. Rikugunshō 1936, pp. 6–16.

²⁹Koreans and Taiwanese were explicitly exempt from this requirement as compulsory military training was not extended to colonial subjects until 1943. Gaimushō 1932, p. 4.

³⁰Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai 1972, p. 61; Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai 1966, p. 41.

³¹Manshūkoku tsūshinsha 1935, p. 289.

³²Kitazawa 1977, p. 153.

³³Manshūkoku tsūshinsha 1935, p. 289; Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai 1966, p. 89.

³⁴Endō 1934, p. 3.

³⁵Hoshino 1939, p. 8. Through the lyrics of “Elegy for a Nameless Samurai Warrior” (*mumei no shishi o tomurau uta* 無名の志士を弔う歌), a popular song written by one of the school's first instructors, students declared: “I have destroyed my body to achieve virtue ... I will depart and become the ghost of the steppe, I will die and become the ghost of our nation's defense....” Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai 1966, pp. 531–32.

³⁶Kokumuin sōmuchiō jōhōsho 1937; Daidō gakuin 1940.

³⁷Min 1936, p. 90.

³⁸Chen 1977, p. 177.

drunken game of chicken caused one student to drop his pistol, which discharged a round that ricocheted through the halls. Since no one was injured, Nakahara wrote the damage off as an incident of “boys will be boys.”³⁹

The military leadership at the academy also made moves to promote professionalization, first by standardizing recruitment to favor graduates of Japan’s elite universities. The initial recruitment plan in December 1932 set application quotas for participating schools, with Tokyo Imperial University, Kyoto Imperial University, and Waseda University collectively receiving 30 percent of the available spots. This caused some degree of controversy among Japanese university students and administrators that ultimately resulted in the application of more uniform quotas.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of successful applicants from 1932 to 1935 were university graduates, predominantly from the imperial university system or elite private universities in Tokyo.⁴¹

The GUA’s military headmasters also replaced many of Kasagi’s ideologue lecturers with Manchukuo government department heads and prominent reform bureaucrats in a move to make instruction more practical. The visiting bureaucrats, however, considered the rowdy character and zealous ideology of the student body unbecoming of future government officials. Lecturers complained of arriving in class to find more than half the students truant. Moreover, they lacked the professional and technical skills needed for the modern administrative state and had no interest in learning them.⁴² By 1934, Director of the Office of Legal Affairs Ōdachi Shigeo 大達 茂雄 (1892–1955) was campaigning to shut down the academy, calling it “nothing more than a dormitory for Manchuria *rōnin* 浪人.”⁴³ This brought the issue to the attention of the central authorities in the Kwantung Army, who subsequently invited Kyushu University Professor Handa Toshiharu 半田 敏治 (1892–1967) to assess the situation.

Handa’s background as a member of both the military and intellectual elite made him an ideal choice to reform the GUA in a manner acceptable to both reform bureaucrats and the Kwantung Army. Graduating from the Japanese Military Academy in 1912, he had been a contemporary of many of the young officers agitating for political change who ended up in the Kwantung Army in the 1930s. After leaving active duty in 1924, he studied law at Kyūshū Imperial University under the supervision of former Yūzonsha member Kanokogi Kazunobu 鹿子木 員信 (1884–1949).⁴⁴ When he arrived in Manchukuo in the spring of 1934 as a full-time instructor at the GUA, he determined that the academy was not a complete loss. Handa appreciated the zealous spirit of the young students. That spirit, however, had to be channeled through structure and discipline into service for the state.⁴⁵

Handa proposed a number of reforms to establish administrative oversight and control over the instructional process that brought together stakeholders from both the Kwantung Army and reform bureaucrats. First, he argued that separating the academy from the General Affairs Agency and putting it under the direct supervision of a specially appointed president – drawn from high-ranking, active-duty military personnel – would provide more authoritative management and effective communication with military leaders. Next, Handa proposed appointing active-duty military officers and experienced bureaucrats as department heads charged with establishing discipline, order, and a standardized curriculum. In addition, he argued that permanent instructors should be limited and replaced with more active-duty officials appointed as special Education Officers (*kyōkan* 教官). Handa also called for reforms to the recruitment process by implementing an examination system

³⁹Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai 1966, pp. 559–60.

⁴⁰*Asahi shimbun*, January 8, 1933. For the full list of quotas see Gaimushō 1932.

⁴¹Miyazawa 2004, p. 188. This preference for elite students was apparent even among non-Japanese recruits. Of the twenty-six Koreans and eleven Taiwanese recruited between 1932 and 1937, eleven were graduates of imperial universities, and nine from private universities in Tokyo. Kim Minch’ol 1996, pp. 41–42; Xu 2012, pp. 134–42.

⁴²Fujikawa 1981, pp. 135–36.

⁴³Handa 1965, p. 13.

⁴⁴Kantōgun 1934, pp. 7–9.

⁴⁵Handa 1965, pp. 12–15.

– under the administration of career bureaucrats in the Office of Personnel – to ensure that all recruits had the basic skills and aptitude necessary for modern civil service. Finally, Handa proposed channeling the academy’s militarized culture through guidance and increasing student self-regulation and self-discipline.⁴⁶

Handa’s reforms proved acceptable to both the military and reform bureaucrats, not only ending calls for the academy’s closure but also extending those reforms across the Manchukuo bureaucracy. Beginning with the academy’s fifth class in 1936, the old guard of low- and mid-level bureaucrats were sent to the GUA for reeducation.⁴⁷ The following year the GUA President was granted statutory authority to devise and oversee training programs for both new recruits and active-duty personnel across all government departments.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, the former leader of the movement to shut down the academy, Ōdachi Shigeo, used his promotion to Director of the General Affairs Agency to carry out thorough civil service reform that codified and expanded on Handa’s proposals in the form of the Civil Service Law (Bunkanrei 文官令) of 1938.⁴⁹

Of Professionals and Partisans, 1938–1945

The civil service reforms of 1938 constituted a major step towards centralizing and rationalizing the bureaucratic ranks that coincided with major developments in Manchukuo’s position within the empire. Reform bureaucrats’ successful push for state-directed industrial development and mass mobilization, along with the expanding military conflict with China, necessitated a massive expansion of the administrative state that could not be filled through personnel exchanges from Japan alone. As a result, the Civil Service Law of 1938 made significant changes to recruitment practices and laid the foundations for Manchukuo’s bureaucratic culture during wartime.

The two most significant reforms in the Civil Service Law were the establishment of a civil service examination system and the prohibition of ethnic, class, or academic discrimination in hiring or promotion.⁵⁰ According to its authors, their objective was to create a fair employment system and promote greater ethnic and technical diversity.⁵¹ The underlying agenda of the reforms, however, was not so much diversity as uniformity. Unlike in Japan, the initial examination process for civil and legal officials was identical. In addition, the Manchukuo examination certified technicians (*gijutsukan* 技術官) and teachers (*kyōikukan* 教育官), thus ensuring that all government appointees met common standards.⁵² The Civil Service Law also required all active-duty bureaucrats appointed before 1938 to take and pass a Special Eligibility Examination (*tokubetsu tekikaku kōshi* 特別適格考試) in order to maintain their status.⁵³ This provided an avenue for purging from the government ranks those with ideological inconsistencies or lacking in proper skills.

Structurally, the civil service examination was not significantly different from that of the metropole. The examination process consisted of two separate tests.⁵⁴ The first was the Certificate Examination (*shikaku kōshi* 資格考試), a written exam designed to test applicants’ academic skills in seven required and two elective fields.⁵⁵ Questions were devised and evaluated by the Civil Service Examination

⁴⁶Handa 1965, pp. 15–17; Daidō gakuin kyōmuka chōsa ko 1942, p. 2.

⁴⁷Imura 1998, p. 122.

⁴⁸Daidō gakuin kyōmuka chōsa ko 1942, pp. 5–6.

⁴⁹Maeno 1985, p. 95.

⁵⁰Nakanishi 1941, p. 4.

⁵¹Kokumuin sōmuchō jinjishō 1939, pp. 183–84.

⁵²In Japan technicians were appointed through a simpler screening process and teacher certification was not regulated through the civil service law. For more, see Spaulding 1967.

⁵³Kokumuin sōmuchō jinjishō 1939, pp. 16, 62–63.

⁵⁴Between 1938 and 1940 there was technically only one examination consisting of a first-round written test and a second-round interview and physical examination. In 1940, the Civil Service Committee began referring to the written portion as its own unique examination. Effectively, however, the processes were identical. Nakanishi 1941, p. 38.

⁵⁵Nakanishi 1941, pp. 42–43.

Committee (Kōtō bunkan kōshi iinkai 高等文官考試委員會), whose members were prominent professors from Japanese universities and high-ranking officials in Manchukuo.⁵⁶

While the format of the Certificate Examination may have been familiar to those taking the civil service examination in Japan, the content was significantly different. The questions varied from year to year, but their underlying themes reveal both the concerns of reform bureaucrats and the Kwantung Army in establishing Manchukuo's bureaucratic character. Questions regarding basic and civil law reveal a strong concern that applicants understand the legal basis for the wartime state.⁵⁷ For example, questions focused on issues such as emergency powers (1938, 1942), the supreme right of command versus the advisory right of the cabinet (1940, 1943), the right of pardon or amnesty (1939, 1942), and the role of civil law in property claims (1938–1942). The questions in the East Asian History subject suggest that it was important for prospective bureaucrats to understand the role of the state in national prosperity. Questions specifically contrasted Japan's rapid emergence as a world power with Chinese stagnation and partition at the hands of Western imperialists (1939–1943). The history syllabus also tested applicants on their understanding of Japan's historical justifications for the expansion of the empire into the continent. Thus, it provided the examination committee with additional insight into a candidate's political and ideological disposition.⁵⁸

The second stage of the Civil Service Examination was the Employment Examination (*saiyō kōshi* 採用考試), which demonstrated both a continued concern for militarizing the bureaucracy and a unique interest in maintaining ideological consistency. The examination comprised two stages: an interview and a physical examination. The latter mirrored the military-inspired requirements and practices implemented by GUA recruiters in 1932, and the selection committee continued to look favorably on recruits with martial arts and athletic experience.⁵⁹ The interview, though similar in principle to the oral portion of Japan's Civil Service Examination, in practice was far more concerned with establishing an applicant's ideological position than his academic ability.⁶⁰ The case of Korean recruit Ku Ponghoe 具鳳會 (1920–1997) offers a useful example. According to Ku, the fact that he had graduated from Posŏng College (precursor to present-day Korea University) marked him as a potential anti-Japanese radical. During his interview, the committee began by asking him to give a critique of the Government-General of Korea under Minimi Jirō's 南次郎 administration. They followed up by asking his opinion on such controversial topics as the recently instituted name-change order for Koreans (*sōshi kaimei* 創始改名), assimilation policies, and the government-ordered shutdown of private Korean-language newspapers.⁶¹ Ku still managed to pass the examination, which suggested that having a politically sensitive background was not automatically disqualifying provided one could produce the correct ideological response.

The Civil Service examination was thus designed to recruit individuals capable of meeting the specific needs of Manchukuo. Successful candidates continued to come primarily from Japan's elite public universities, but an increasing number were graduates of higher technical colleges with advanced skills. The examination selected for those with a foundation in law and a strong understanding of the fundamentals of wartime mobilization and state intervention. Moreover, it continued to emphasize physical fitness and discipline as a basic requirement for government service. These traits served as the basis for Manchukuo's bureaucratic culture that was fully developed through the training process.

In addition to codifying recruitment practices, the Civil Service Law of 1938 also established a centralized system for indoctrinating new and existing bureaucrats and other state officials into a uniform "bureaucratic way" (*kanridō* 官吏道). The GUA continued to train central government officials, as well as administrators in the Concordia Association (Kyōwakai 協和会) mass party and

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 35–37.

⁵⁷For all examination questions between 1938 and 1943, see *Manshū shihō kyōkai* 1943.

⁵⁸Japanese history became a compulsory subject on civil service examinations in metropolitan Japan only in 1940 for similar reasons. Spaulding 1967, pp. 175–76.

⁵⁹Nakanishi 1941, p. 65.

⁶⁰Nakanishi 1941, p. 65.

⁶¹Ku 1986, pp. 67–69.

Manchukuo's new Special Public Corporations (*tokubetsu kōsha* 特別公社). Low-level local officials trained at Regional Administrative Training Centers (*chihō gyōsei kunren sho* 地方行政訓練所) through a GUA-devised curriculum.

The content of this training reflects elements of the shared, strongly statist political philosophy of reform bureaucrats and military elites. Interpretations of state theory varied somewhat between factions, but bureaucratic training materials demonstrate a broad consensus understanding of the state as an organic, total, and moral entity. The state in Manchukuo was fashioned as “living body” (*seimietai* 生命体) with individuals constituting organic “cells” collectively and interconnectedly contributing to its existence and development.⁶² The state was total and all-encompassing, functioning through individual, family, and ethnicity. State philosophy rejected the “mechanistic view” of independently operating individuals and sub-groups, arguing that the individual derived his very existence from the state.⁶³ The underlying force binding the state together was a fundamental “spirit” originating in Japan's developmental history but universalized in the creation of Manchukuo as the “national foundation spirit,” (*kenkoku seishin* 建国精神).⁶⁴ This unifying spirit was characterized by a moral order maintained through a series of social obligations based on a hierarchy of relationships derived from Confucian tradition that bound individuals to family, community, and state.⁶⁵ According to Handa Toshiharu, this moral order served as the basis for state power: “Morality is the first principle. Power, however, is necessary to make this a reality. Power is inherently justified in so far as it helps to realize and act in service of morality.”⁶⁶ In practical terms, this meant that Manchukuo was not governed by rule of law, but rather, the law served as a vehicle for a greater morality. This “unity of law and morality” (*hōdōichinyo* 法道一如) authorized the state to take extra-legal action when it was deemed to be an impediment to maintaining the moral order.⁶⁷ In this context, the role of the bureaucrat in Manchukuo embraced a growing trend among authoritarian states towards administrative activism.⁶⁸

In part a consequence of the ad hoc nature of Manchukuo's early legal establishment, the bureaucrat's legal relationship with the people was contradictory. In principle, Manchukuo was a state founded on the protection of fundamental human rights. Promulgated in 1932 and presented to the Western powers as evidence of Manchukuo's liberal foundation, the Human Rights Protection Law (*Jinken hoshōhō* 人權保障法) purported to defend the people's right to life, industry, and equality of race and religion. It also guaranteed the right to petition the government and protection from corrupt officials.⁶⁹ The state could, however, expressly revoke these rights during “war and times of crisis.”⁷⁰ Moreover, the rights themselves were contingent upon the boundaries of the law, which was merely a vehicle for a higher and poorly defined moral order.

As far as their training was concerned, the bureaucrat's relationship with the people was more as paternal guide than public servant. Despite the popular right to petition the government, Article Five of the Civil Service Law only required bureaucrats to “diligently study” (*kensan* 研鑽) and “consider” (*sasshi* 察し) the popular will and apply it to the creation and revision of national policy.⁷¹ As training manuals made clear, this consideration did not mean “pandering to the public will” but rather staying “one step ahead.”⁷²

⁶²Handa 1935, p. 138.

⁶³Fukutomi 1939, p. 114.

⁶⁴Kokumuin sōmuchō kōhōsho 1937, p. 18.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p. 133.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, p. 149.

⁶⁷Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōsho n.d., p. 37.

⁶⁸Training manuals specifically placed Manchukuo in line with Germany's 1937 civil service reforms, which abandoned the idea of the politically neutral public servant. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁶⁹Gaimushō jōhōbu 1932, p. 16–17.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 16–17.

⁷¹Kokumuin sōmuchō jinjisho 1939, p. 2.

⁷²Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōsho n.d., pp. 39–40.

Manchukuo's governing culture cast the people as objects in need of "guidance" (*shidō* 指導), both because of the exceptional and dire circumstances of the time and their innate inability to guide themselves. Instructors described Manchukuo as existing in a perpetual state of danger with the imperial ambitions of Britain, America, and Russia threatening on all sides.⁷³ This constant threat necessitated the rapid development of a "national defense state," which required guidance and direction from a class of skilled "managers" (*keieika* 経営家) and "spiritual guides" (*seishinteki shidōsha* 精神的指導者).⁷⁴ Moreover, Manchukuo's multiethnic population contained "many levels of cultural advancement" (*mindō* 民度), suggesting that not all people were uniformly capable of self-defense or self-government.⁷⁵ Manchukuo's non-Japanese population in particular needed assistance to have their primitive "fishing and hunting age" culture "opened up to modern civilization."⁷⁶ The bureaucrat, training manuals insisted, was the one with the necessary "resolve, skill and capacity" to guide these helpless people and cultivate the new nation.⁷⁷ This authorized bureaucrats not just to passively administer the law but to actively create it.⁷⁸

This authority to intervene in social, political, and economic life was itself modeled on the role of the military, with whom the bureaucracy acted as a junior partner. In his lectures to students, Handa Toshiharu argued that the military was the only organization to bridge the divide between the "feudal military spirit" and modern science. Soldiers embodied the spirit of the nation in their effort to establish a "moral world."⁷⁹ As such, their natural role was as the "vanguard" of the people.⁸⁰ Handa contended that the army's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was a manifestation of this spirit. The military had observed both the corruption and lawlessness of the Chinese regime, as well as their inability to hold back the threat of invasion by Euro-American imperialists. Under these conditions, the military took the lead in establishing order, justice, and economic development under an authority confirmed through blood sacrifice.⁸¹ As such, Handa commissioned the young bureaucrats to help extend the mission started by the military into all sectors of society and prepare for a total war.⁸²

The militarized model extended into bureaucratic professionalization that emphasized the bureaucrat's primary loyalty to the state. Since, according to Manchukuo's Organizational Law (*Soshiki hō* 組織法), the right to appoint government officials resided with the emperor and his government, bureaucrats learned that "like the soldier, [the bureaucrat] does not derive his status from the people."⁸³ As such, bureaucrats were directed to give their "loyalty" (*chūsei* 忠誠) to the state—a principle that was legally enshrined in the first article of the Civil Service Law.⁸⁴ This loyalty was a life-long commitment to the complete sublimation of the self for the state, which extended even beyond the term of one's appointment.⁸⁵

The state required order and demanded bureaucrats maintain "discipline" (*kiritsu* 規律), "self-restraint" (*sessei* 節制), and "obedience" (*fukujū* 服従).⁸⁶ In practice this meant strict observance of hierarchy and abandoning all other personal obligations. The Civil Service Law instructed bureaucrats to follow orders from their superiors "directly and to the letter."⁸⁷ Training manuals likewise told bureaucrats to heed the advice of their superiors and avoid letting their own personal thoughts and

⁷³Kokumuin sōmuchō kōhōsho 1937, p. 165.

⁷⁴Hoshino 1939, p. 8.

⁷⁵Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōsho n.d., p. 11.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*

⁷⁷*Ibid.*

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 11–12.

⁷⁹Kokumuin sōmuchō kōhōsho 1937, p. 61.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*

⁸¹*Ibid.*, p. 165.

⁸²*Ibid.*, pp. 168–69.

⁸³Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōsho n.d., p. 15.

⁸⁴Kokumuin sōmuchō jinjishō 1939, p. 2.

⁸⁵Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōsho n.d., p. 43.

⁸⁶Handa 1935, p. 141.

⁸⁷See article 14 of the Civil Service Law. Kokumuin sōmuchō jinjishō 1939, p. 3.

opinions intrude on their government work.⁸⁸ Even the needs of the family were to be subordinated to the state.⁸⁹ The ultimate expression of self-sacrifice, however, was laying down one's life for the state. By the end of the 1930s, the countryside was a far less dangerous place for bureaucrats than it had been in 1932, but Japan's expanding war in the Asia Pacific region – and the consequential rise in military conscription – provided ample opportunities for bureaucrats to commit to blood sacrifice.⁹⁰

At the GUA, future bureaucrats experienced order and discipline through strict hierarchy, surveillance, and regimentation in a manner more reminiscent of military recruits than civil servants. Students lived together in a dormitory with rooms broken up into squads run by a designated squad leader and a weekly duty officer. They were held to a strict code of conduct that dictated proper comportment and interpersonal relationships both inside and outside the school.⁹¹ Squad leaders and duty officers were required to complete daily reports on students' activities along with regular roll-call lists and submit them to the dean of students after breakfast every morning.⁹² Time was regulated by bugle calls and daily life punctuated by a series of harsh physical endurance activities.⁹³

In Manchukuo, the bureaucrat existed in a state of complete dependence on the state. During their training at the GUA, students relied on the state for housing, food, and clothing, as well as a modest salary.⁹⁴ Following appointment, they were forbidden from seeking employment or participating in business activities without prior permission.⁹⁵ At the same time, their relationship with the state afforded them certain rights and privileges exclusive to civil officials. First and foremost was a "right to status" (*mibunjō no ken* 身分上の権), which secured an individual's position within the bureaucratic hierarchy and the broader society for the duration of his appointment.⁹⁶ Additional financial and social benefits derived from one's status level. These included the rights to salary, public housing, pension, and reimbursement for expenses incurred in the course of their work.⁹⁷ In a very practical sense, these injunctions and incentives served to prevent corruption within the government via conflicts of personal economic interest. They also bound bureaucrats to the state.

The militarization of Manchukuo bureaucrats was not just disciplinary but also involved actual paramilitary training. As Japan's military commitments expanded after 1937 the Kwantung Army leadership extended military readiness outside the boundaries of traditional conscription to all government personnel. Building on the tradition of basic police training in the early years of the GUA, the leadership drastically expanded the complexity and scale of paramilitary training required of new bureaucrats. In 1938, the curriculum included training in the principles of military command, anti-aircraft defense measures and tactics, and truck driving, as well as public order and propaganda techniques.⁹⁸ Two years later, students were training in a variety of weaponry from machine guns and hand grenades to anti-aircraft guns. Classes covered military rules of order, radio operation and maintenance, anti-insurgency tactics, first-aid, and vehicle maintenance. Students participated in eighteen days of field exercises practicing maneuvers at squad, platoon, and schoolwide levels that culminated in two days of simulated combat.⁹⁹

In Manchukuo, then, bureaucratic identity operated in two interlocking modes that derived from the combined interests of military and bureaucratic reformers, and wrapped in the discourse of

⁸⁸Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōsho n.d., p. 38.

⁸⁹Korean student Han Chunggōn 韓重健 (b. 1919), for example, was nearly expelled for leaving to get married without permission from his GUA instructors. Han Chunggōn 1981, pp. 248–49.

⁹⁰The commitment to blood sacrifice appears to have been particularly prevalent, at least rhetorically, among non-Japanese bureaucrats. For example, see Kawashima 1973, p. 29; Fujinuma 1997, p. 8.

⁹¹Manshū Teikoku Daidō gakuin 1940, pp. 57–58.

⁹²*Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁹³*Ibid.*, pp. 54–55.

⁹⁴*Tonga ilbo* February 2, 1933.

⁹⁵Kokumuin sōmuchō jinjishō 1939, p. 3.

⁹⁶Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōsho n.d., p. 24.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 25–27.

⁹⁸Manshūkoku tsūshinsha 1938, p. 57.

⁹⁹Manshū Teikoku Daidō gakuin 1940, unpaginated insert between pp. 50 and 51.

traditional Asian values. Director of the General Affairs Agency, Hoshino Naoki 星野 直樹 (1892–1978), summed this up succinctly in his opening address at the GUA in 1938: “Today’s bureaucrats must ... be endowed with a union of the samurai’s spirit and the merchant’s business sense (*shikon shōsai* 士魂商才) ... without these progress can neither be established nor exist.”¹⁰⁰ These characteristics had, to a certain extent, been present in the Manchukuo bureaucracy from its very foundations, but the 1938 bureaucratic reforms codified, normalized, and reinforced it as the “bureaucratic way.” For those who experienced Manchukuo’s bureaucratic culture, particularly in those final years, the influence proved to be long lasting, manifesting itself in their careers over the following decades.

Legacies: Post-1945

The Soviet invasion of Manchukuo on August 9, 1945 and Japan’s unconditional surrender to the allies six days later may have spelled the end for Manchukuo but not for its bureaucrats. As Japanese returned to their defeated homeland, Koreans and Chinese who had worked in the Manchukuo bureaucracy found their way into newly independent states. Former Manchukuo bureaucrats brought and applied the skills and ideas they had developed to (re)building these states. The influence of Manchukuo’s bureaucratic culture varied in each situation, but the similarities foreground a legacy that extended into the foundations of the administrative structures of Cold War East Asia.

As the dominant power in Manchuria, researchers have highlighted the legacy of the Manchukuo bureaucracy in postwar Japan. There, the same reform bureaucrats who designed the Manchukuo system ascended to leadership positions in the postwar state, where they built on their experiences to fashion Japan into a developmental state.¹⁰¹ For these men, the compromises with the military had never been satisfactory, so the elimination of competition after 1945 was an opportunity to redesign the state according to an unfulfilled ideal.¹⁰² As a consequence, analysis of the developmental state and the Manchukuo model in Japan has tended to downplay its militarized aspects in favor of a legacy of technocratic professionalization.¹⁰³ To be sure, the authoritarian principles of “freedom through control, innovation through organization, autonomy via community, and status via hierarchy,” remained largely intact.¹⁰⁴ These, however, had always been points of overlap with the military in Manchukuo.

The legacy of Manchukuo’s bureaucratic system in other parts of Japan’s former empire, on the other hand, is not as well studied. While scholars have done much of the background work necessary to identify former Manchukuo bureaucrats from Taiwan and Korea and trace their post-1945 careers,¹⁰⁵ analysis of how they interpreted and adapted their experience to the radically changing conditions of their homelands remains limited. The evidence we have suggests that the blending of militarization and professionalization and the unique character of Manchukuo officialdom proved highly adaptable to the complex conditions of liberation, decolonization, and the rising Cold War.

South Korea is perhaps the best example. Following liberation, former Manchukuo bureaucrats were able to leverage their skills in service of the new state, but lacked the authority or experience needed for leadership in the multifarious politics of postcolonial Korea. By the late 1950s they were looking to their experience in Manchukuo as a remedy for what they perceived as an undisciplined and corrupt state.¹⁰⁶ Former Manchukuo bureaucrats, GUA graduates in particular, continued to associate through both formal and informal networks, utilizing these connections to build bridges with Manchukuo alumni in other sectors, including the military.¹⁰⁷ Their alliance in the 1960s with a

¹⁰⁰Hoshino 1939, p. 8.

¹⁰¹Johnson 1982.

¹⁰²Mimura 2011, pp. 196–97.

¹⁰³Johnson 1982.

¹⁰⁴Mimura 2011, p. 196.

¹⁰⁵Kim Minch’öl 1996; Pak 2009; Xu 2012.

¹⁰⁶Kwōn 1959.

¹⁰⁷Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai 1972, pp. 874–75.

small group of military officers, who also had experienced Manchukuo as graduates of the Manchukuo Military Academy, ultimately provided these bureaucrats with a position as junior partners in the transformation of the state under the dual banners of security and development in what one South Korean scholar has termed a “Manchurian modern.”¹⁰⁸

The development of this so-called Manchurian network of military and civil officials in South Korea is generally explained through the web of personal and professional ties that originated in the shared geographic and temporal context of Manchukuo.¹⁰⁹ However, the hybrid military-professional character of the Manchukuo bureaucracy suggests that the network was also built from a shared institutional experience and ideological vocabulary. Like their military counterparts, Koreans in the Manchukuo bureaucracy were trained to be self-disciplining and self-sacrificing, putting the needs of the state ahead of not only their own interests but also the people. They were taught to be highly critical of liberal capitalism, individualism, and democracy. Moreover, they were conditioned to be soldiers, both literally and figuratively, following the military’s lead. In this context, then, it is unsurprising that they came to embrace authoritarian developmentalism under military leadership as a solution to the strategic and economic conditions of the Cold War.

Former Manchukuo bureaucrats also fared well under militarized regimes even when the leadership had actively fought against Japan. In Taiwan, the small number of returning GUA graduates faced significant legal hurdles to continuing their careers. The implementation of martial law in 1949, however, appears to have catalyzed their reentry into public service, albeit predominantly in local and regional administration.¹¹⁰ Even in North Korea, a small contingent of former Manchukuo officials found success. Due in part to geographic proximity, many of the Koreans recruited into the Manchukuo bureaucracy were from Korea’s northern border regions.¹¹¹ Though most had fled south by 1948, the handful who chose the North rapidly achieved positions of power. The fact that most of these men possessed unique technical skills and experience is certainly one explanation for their success despite their history as Japanese collaborators.¹¹² Some of these men may also have held strong socialist beliefs even before their time in Manchuria.¹¹³ Nonetheless, the hybrid of militarized-professionalized qualities these men absorbed in Manchukuo served the security and developmental goals of the communist leadership in the North just as well as in the South. In most cases the ideological vocabulary was different, but the underlying aims were the same. In North Korea, former Manchukuo bureaucrats became champions for state centralization, mass mobilization of the population for developmental goals, and the expansion of the security state.

The continued presence of former Manchukuo bureaucrats in positions of power throughout East Asia suggests the adaptability of Manchukuo’s bureaucratic culture to new institutional forms. This is not to suggest that all these post-imperial states were structurally the same. Nor is it to argue that they were all modeled, intentionally or unintentionally, on Manchukuo. Nonetheless, the Manchukuo bureaucracy and its legacy offer a window into the rise of developmentalism and authoritarianism in the post-World War II era that deviates from the traditional Cold War binary. It identifies the military-bureaucratic nexus under the banner of development as a trans-war phenomenon with a genealogy in East Asia that runs, at least in part, through Manchukuo.

¹⁰⁸Han Sökchong 2016.

¹⁰⁹Kim Unggi 2008, pp. 133–35.

¹¹⁰Xu 2012, pp. 129–30.

¹¹¹Pak 2009, p. 229.

¹¹²North Korea’s first Minister of Energy, Kim Tusam 金斗三 (n.d.), was an official with Manchukuo’s Hydro-Electric Power Construction Office. Hwang Toyön 黄道淵 (1914–1976), who ran the North’s Office of Statistics, taught statistics at Manchukuo’s National Foundation University (Kenkoku daigaku 建国大学).

¹¹³Hwang Toyön’s university mentor was noted Marxist economist, Ninagawa Torazō 蜷川 虎三 (1897–1981).

References

- Chen Xiqing** 陳錫卿 (1977). "Daidō gakuin jidai no omoide ni, san" 大同学院時代の思い出三 ("Two or three memories of my time at the Great Unity Academy"). In *Tairiku kaisōroku* 大陸回想録 ("Memories of the Continent"), ed. Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin dai ni kisei tairiku kaisōroku henshū iinkai 満洲国大同学院第二期生大陸回想録編集委員会, pp. 176–78. Tokyo: Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin dai ni kiseikai.
- Daidō gakuin** 大同学院 (1940). *Junkoku no hana* 殉国の華 ("Glory of the National Martyrs"). Shinkyō: Daidō gakuin.
- Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai** 大同学院編纂委員会 (1966). *Ōinaru kana Manshū* 大いなる哉満州 ("Manchuria, How Vast!"). Tokyo: Daidōgakuin dōsōkai.
- Daidō gakuinshi hensan iinkai** 大同学院編纂委員会 (1972). *Hekikū ryokuya sanzenri* 碧空緑野三千里 ("Blue Skies and Green Fields for Three Thousand Li"). Tokyo: Daidōgakuin dōsōkai.
- Daidō gakuin kyōmuka chōsa ko** 大同学院教科科調査股 (1942). *Daidō gakuin kansei ichiran: ji daidō gen nen shi kōtoku hachi nen* 大同学院官制一覽：自大同元年至康德八年 ("Guide to the Organizational Structure of the Great Unity Academy: 1932–1941"). Shinkyō: Daidō gakuin kyōmuka chōsa ko.
- Endō Ryūsaku** 遠藤 柳作 (1934). "Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin no shimei koro shōwa kyu nen ni gatsu" 満洲国大同学院ノ使命 自昭和九年二月 ("The Great Unity Academy Mission: February, 1934"). In *Sankō shiryō kankei zakken/gakkō oyobi gakusei kankei dai go maki* 参考資料関係雑件ノ学校及学生関係 第五卷 ("Reference Matter Pertaining to Assorted Matters/Related to Schools and Students Volume Five"), January 31, 1934. Japan Center for Asian Historical Records アジア歴史資料センター (JACAR), Reference no. B05016165400.
- Fujikawa Yūji** 藤川 宥二 (1981). *Jitsuroku, Manshūkoku kensanjikan: dai Ajia shugi jissen no shito* 実録・満州国県参事官：大アジア主義実践の使徒 ("The True Story of Manchukuo's Regional Governors: Disciples in the Practice of Great Asianism"). Sakai-shi, Osaka: Ōminato shōbō.
- Fujinuma Torao** 藤沼 虎雄 (1997). "'Sen-kei' 'Man-kei' no koto" 「鮮系」「滿系」のこと ("Regarding Koreans and Manchurians"). In *Nanryō bojō zokuhen* 南嶺慕情 続編 ("Longing for Nanling Volume 2"), ed. Shinkyō hōsei dōsōkai keisōkai 新京法政大学同窓会勁草会, pp. 7–9. Tokyo: Shinkyō hōsei dōsōkai keisōkai.
- Fukutomi Ichirō** 福富 一郎 (1939). "Minzoku yūgō no michi" 民族融合の道 ("The Path to Ethnic Fusion"), *Ronsō* 1, pp. 99–166.
- Furumi Tadayuki** 古海 忠之 (1978). *Furumi Tadayuki wasure enu Manshūkoku* 古海忠之忘れ得ぬ満州国 ("Manchukuo, I Can Never Forget"). Tokyo: Keizai ōraisha.
- Furumi Tadayuki** 古海 忠之 (1967). "Manshūkoku no yume wa kienai" 満州国の夢は消えない ("The Dream of Manchukuo Does Not Fade Away"). In *Zasetsu shita risōkoku: Manshūkoku kōbō no shinsō* 挫折した理想国：満州国興亡の真相 ("Failure of an Ideal Country: The Truth about the Rise and Fall of Manchukuo"), Katakura Tadashi 片倉 衷 and Furumi Tadayuki, pp. 199–300. Tokyo: Gendai bukkusha.
- Gaimushō** 外務省 (1932). "Daidō gakuin gakusei boshū ni kansuru ken shōwa shichi nen jū ni gatsu" 大同学院学生募集ニ関スル件 昭和七年十二月 ("Regarding the Recruitment of Students for the Great Unity Academy"). In *Sankō shiryō kankei zakken/gakkō oyobi gakusei kankei dai san maki* 参考資料関係雑件ノ学校及学生関係 第三卷 ("Reference Matter Pertaining to Assorted Matters/Related to Schools and Students Volume Three"), December 10, 1932. JACAR, Reference no. B05016162500.
- Gaimushō jōhōbu** 外務省情報部 (1932). *Manshūkoku gengyō hōreishū* 満州国現行法令集 ("Current Laws in Manchukuo"). N.A.: Gaimushō jōhōbu.
- Han Chunggōn** 韓重健 (1981). "Daidō gakuin jidai no tsuioku to konnichi" 大同学院時代の追憶と今日 ("Memories of My Time at the Great Unity Academy and Today"). In *Amageru beki* 天翔るべき ("We Must Rise Above"), ed. Daidō gakuin dai jū hachi kisei 大同学院十八期生, pp. 246–50. Tokyo: Daidō gakuin dai jū hachi kisei kinen kaishi henshū iinkai.
- Han Sōkchong** (2016). *Manju modōn: 60 nyōnde Han'guk kebal ch'eje ūi kiwōn* ("Manchurian Modernity: The Origins of 1960s Korea's Developmental System"). Seoul: Munhak kwa chisōngsa.
- Handa Toshiharu** 半田 敏治 (1965). "Daidō gakuin to dai yon kisei no omoide" 大同学院と第四期生の思い出 ("Memories of the Great Unity Academy and Students in the Fourth Graduating Class"). *Daidō gakuin yon kisei kaihō* 2, pp. 11–18.
- Handa Toshiharu** 半田 敏治 (1935). "Daidō gakuin no shimei ni tsuite" 大同学院の使命に就て ("Regarding the Great Unity Academy's Mission"). *Dai Ajia* 3:5, pp. 135–44.
- Hoshino Naoki** 星野 直樹 (1939). "Daidō gakuin nyūgakushiki shukuji" 大同学院入学式祝辞 ("Congratulatory Address for the Opening Ceremony of the Great Unity Academy"). In *Hoshino sōmuchoukan kōenshū (nichibun)* 星野総務長官講演集 (日文) ("Collected Speeches of General Affairs Agency Director Hoshino (Japanese)"), ed. Kokumuin sōmuchō kōhōsho 國務院總務廳弘報處, pp. 11–18. Shinkyō: Manshūkoku tsūshinsha.
- Imura Tetsurō** 今村 哲郎 (1998). "Iwazaki Kenji hiaringu kiroku (1): Dairen zeikan, Daidō gakuin, Manshūkoku kanzeika" 岩崎健彦氏ヒアリング記録 (I) : 大連税関、大同学院、満州国関税科 ("An Oral History Record of Iwazaki Kenji (1): the Dalian Customs Office, the Great Unity Academy, and the Manchukuo Tax Office"), *Kan nihonkai kenkyū nenpō* 5, pp. 111–44.

- Johnson Chalmers** (1982). *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Kantōgun** 関東軍 (1934). “Daidō gakuin kyōju to shite Handa Toshiharu saiyo ni kansuru ken” 大同学院教授として半田敏治任用に関する件 (“Regarding the Appointment of Handa Toshiharu as a Professor at the Great Unity Academy”). In *Shōwa 9 nen “rikuman mittai dai 10 go” koro shōwa 9 nen 6 gatsu 7 nichi shi shōwa 9 nen 6 gatsu 8 nichi* 昭和9年「陸満密綴 第10号」自昭和9年6月7日至昭和9年6月8日 (“1935 Secret Correspondence between the Army and Manchukuo Number 10 from June 7 to June 8”), May 17, 1934. JACAR, Reference no. C01003000200.
- Kasagi Yoshiaki** 笠木 良明 (1960). “Manshū kenkoku ni tsuite” 満州建国について (“Regarding the Foundation of Manchuria”). In *Kasagi Yoshiaki ihōroku* 木良明遺芳録 (“The Memorial Record of Kasagi Yoshiaki”), Kasagi Yoshiaki ihōroku shuppan iin 笠木良明遺芳録出版委員, pp. 169–86. Tokyo: Kasagi Yoshiaki ihōroku kankōkai.
- Katakura Tadashi** 片倉 衷 (1978). *Kaisō no Manshūkoku* 回想の満州国 (“Memories of Manchukuo”). Tokyo: Keizai ōraisha.
- Kawashima Kaoru** 川島 馨 (1973). “‘Depāto no shōhin’ tachi: jū kisei no aru kiroku no tame” “デパート商品”たち: 十期生のある記録のために (“Department Store Goods’: Some Memories of the Tenth Graduating Class”). In *Tōtenkō wo tsuku* 東天紅を告ぐ (“The Morning Cock Crows”), ed. Daidō gakuin dōsōkai 大同学院同窓会, pp. 27–31. Tokyo: Daidō gakuin dōsōkai.
- Kim Minch’ŏl** (1996). “Manjuguk ūi kwallyo rŭl kkum kku nŭn Chosŏn in Taedong hagwŏn ch’ulshinja tŭl” (“Korean Graduates of the Great Unity Academy Who Dreamed of Being Manchukuo Bureaucrats”). *Minjok munje yŏn’gu* 12, pp. 40–45.
- Kim Unggi** (2008). “Ilbon ūi te Han ‘pesang pijŏnisŭ’ rŭl tullŏ ssan Han-Il ‘Manju inmek’ ūi kyŏlhap kwa yŏkhal” (“The Organization and Role of the Korean–Japanese ‘Manchuria Network’ in the ‘Indemnity Business’”) *Chŏngsin munhwa yŏn’gu* 31:3, pp. 131–53.
- Kitazawa Haruo** 北沢 治雄 (1977). “Hansei no ki” 半生の記 (“Memories of Half My Life”). In *Tairiku kaisōroku* 大陸回想録 (“Memories of the Continent”), ed. Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin dai ni kisei tairiku kaisōroku henshū iinkai 満州国大同学院第二期生大陸回想録編集委員会, pp. 144–56. Tokyo: Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin dai ni kiseikai.
- Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōshō** 國務院總務廳地方處 (n.d.). *Kanriidō* 官吏道 (“The Bureaucratic Way”), Chihō shokuin kunrenshō kyōzai 地方職員訓練所教材 (“Regional Employee Training Textbook”) vol. 3. Shinkyō: Kokumuin sōmuchō chihōshō.
- Kokumuin sōmuchō jinjisho** 國務院總務廳人事處 (1939). *Bunkanrei tsuke kankei shohōrei* 文官令附關係諸法令 (“The Civil Service Law and Related Laws and Regulations”). Shinkyō: Manshū gyōsei gakkai.
- Kokumuin sōmuchō jōhōshō** 國務院總務廳情報處 (1937). *Junkō resshiden dai ishū* 殉公烈士伝 第一輯 (“Record of Patriotic Martyrs Volume 1”). Shinkyō: Kokumuin sōmuchō jōhōshō.
- Kokumuin sōmuchō kōhōshō** 國務院總務廳弘報處 (1937). *Manshū kenkoku no shinshiki* 満州建國の眞意義 (“The True Spirit of Manchuria’s National Foundation”). Shinkyō: Kokumuin sōmuchō kōhōshō.
- Komai Tomokazu** 駒井 徳三 (1952). *Tairiku eno higan* 大陸への悲願 (“My Devotion to the Continent”). Tokyo: Dainippon yūbenkai kōdansha.
- Kwŏn Nyŏnggu** 權寧九 (1959). “Kongmuwdo hwangnip ūl wihan chaeŏn” (“A Proposal for Establishing a Civil Servant Culture”). *Chibang haengjŏng* 8:72, pp. 13–16.
- Ku Ponghoe** 具鳳會 (1986). “Fūtō hatō” 風濤 波濤 (“Surging Wind, Rough Seas”). In *Yūjō no kakyō: kaigai dōsō no kiroku* 友情の架橋: 海外同窓の記録 (“Building Bridges of Friendship: Memories of Overseas Alumni”), ed. Daidō gakuin dōsōkai 大同学院同窓会, pp. 64–82. Tokyo: Daidō gakuin dōsōkai.
- Maeno Shigeru** 前野 茂 (1985). *Manshūkoku shihō kensetsu kaisōroku* 満州国司法建設回想録 (“Memories of the Establishment of the Manchukuo Legal System”). Osaka: Nihon kyōiku kenkyū sentā.
- Manshūkoku tsūshinsha** 満州國通信社 (1938). *Manshūkoku gensei: kōtoku go nen han* 満州國現勢 康德五年版 (“The Current State of Manchukuo 1938”). Shinkyō: Manshūkoku tsūshinsha.
- Manshūkoku tsūshinsha** 満州國通信社 (1935). *Manshūkoku gensei: kōtoku ni nen han* 満州國現勢 康德二年版 (“The Current State of Manchukuo 1934”). Shinkyō: Manshūkoku tsūshinsha.
- Manshū shihō kyōkai** 満州司法協会 (1943). *Saishin Manshū Teikoku bunkan kōshi mondai zenshū* 最新満州帝國文官考試問題全集 (“The Complete Questions for the New Manchukuo Civil Service Examination”). Shinkyō: Manshū shihō kyōkai.
- Manshū Teikoku Daidō gakuin** 満州帝國大同學院 (1940). *Daidō gakuin yōran* 大同學院要覽 (“Conditions at the Great Unity Academy”). Shinkyō: Manshū Teikoku Daidō gakuin.
- Manshū Teikoku Kyōwakai chūō honbu** 満州帝國協和会中央本部 (1940). *Kyōwakaiishi shiryōshū dai ichi hō: Jichi shidōbu kankei* 協和会史資料集 第一號: 自治指導部關係 (“Documents Pertaining to the History of the Concordia Association Volume 1: The Self-Government Guidance Board”). N.A: Manshū Teikoku Kyōwakai chūō honbu.
- Mimura Janice** (2011). *Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Min Megumi** 民 恵美 (1936). “Aru ken sanjikan no shi” 或る健参事官の死 (“The Death of a Prefectural Governor”). *Dai Ajia* 4:6, pp. 90–96.

- Miyazawa Eriko** 宮沢 恵理子 (2004). "Daidō gakuin to Nichū kōryū katsudō" 大同学院と日中交流活動 ("The Great Unity Academy and Sino-Japanese Exchange Activities"). In *Ajia ni okeru ibunka kōryū: ICU setsuritsu 50 shūnen kinen kokusai kaigi* アジアにおける異文化交流 : ICU 設立50周年記念国際会議 ("Cultural Encounters in Asia: An International Conference Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of IUC's Founding"), eds. Hida Yoshifumi, M. William Steele, Onishi Naoki, Tachikawa Akira, Chiba Akihiro, and Itō Tatsuhiro, pp. 184–98. Tokyo: Meiji shoin.
- Moore Aaron Stephen** (2015). *Constructing East Asia: Technology, Ideology, and the Empire in Japan's Wartime Era, 1931–1945*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Nakanishi Keiji** 中西 敬爾 (1941). *Manshū teikoku bunkan (kōtōkan ininkan) jukenhō kansetsu* 滿洲帝國文官 (高等官委任官) 受験法解説 ("Manchukuo's Civil Service (Higher Officials and Junior Officials) Examination Law Explained"). Tokyo: Teikoku sōgō gakuin.
- Pak Sōngch'in** (2009). "Manjuguk Chosōnin kodūng kwallyo ūi hyōngsōng kwa chōngch'esōng" ("The Formation of Korean Higher Civil Servants and Their Identity in Manchuko"). *Tongyang chōngch'i sasangsa* 8:1, pp. 213–40.
- Peattie Mark R.** (1975). *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rikugunshō** 陸軍省 (1936). "Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin dai 1 bu dai 8 ki gakusei boshū ni kan suru ken" 滿洲国大同学院第1部第8期学生募集に関する件 ("Regarding Recruitment for the Eighth Class of the First Division of Manchukuo's Great Unity Academy"). In *Shōwa 11 nen "rikuman mittai 11.18~11.25"* 昭和11年「陸満密綴 11.18~11.25」 ("Secret Correspondence between the Army and Manchukuo, November 18–November 25 1936"), October 14, 1936. JACAR, Reference no. C01003208400.
- Rikugunshō** 陸軍省 (1934). "Manshūkoku Daidō gakuin shiganshashintai kensa ni kan suru ken" 滿洲国大同学院第1部第8期学生募集に関する件 ("Regarding the Physical Examination for Manchukuo Great Unity Academy Candidates"). In *Shōwa 9.9. 12~9.12.20 "Manju dai nikki (amaneshi) sono 13"* 昭和9.9.12~9. 12.20「満受大日記 (普) 其13」 ("Daily record of correspondence received from Manchukuo no. 13" September 12, 1934–December 12, 1934"). November 11, 1934. JACAR, Reference no. C04012057400.
- Satō Shirō** 佐藤 四郎 (1932). *Manshūkoku kansei benran* 滿洲國官制便覧 ("Manchukuo Government Organization Manual"). Dairen: Manshū shoin.
- Spaulding Robert M.** (1967). *Imperial Japan's Higher Civil Service Examinations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Szpilman Christopher W. A.** (2011). "Yūzonsha's 'War Cry,' 1920." In *Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, Volume 2, 1920–Present*, eds. Sven Saaler and Christopher W. A. Szpilman. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Xu Xueji** 許雪姬 (2012). "Zai 'Manzhōu guo' de Taiwan ren gaodeng guan: yi datong xueyuan de biye sheng wei li" 在「滿洲國」的臺灣人高等官：以大同學院的畢業生為例 ("Taiwanese Senior Officials in Manchukuo: The Case of Graduates from Tatung Academy"). *Taiwan shi yanjiu* 19:3 (2012), pp. 95–150.
- Yamamuro Shin'ichi** 山室 信一 (2004). *Kimera: Manshūkoku no shōzō* キメラ : 滿洲国の肖像 ("Chimera: A Portrait of Manchukuo"). Tokyo: Chūō kōron shinsha.
- Young Louise** (1998). *Japan's Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.