

a proxy for the intensity of their pro-market preferences, with implications for social welfare policy.

Nonideologue ministers are more centrist than their ideologue colleagues. However, nonideologues consist of two different ministerial types, which are distinguished from each other by their political seniority. *Partisans* are senior party figures, operationalized as party leaders, deputy leaders, those that are first or second in the party's electoral list, or leaders of the party's parliamentary group. They are assumed to be ambitious and skilled, and they prioritize vote seeking for their parties. They are dynamic ministers with the motivation and capacity to effect change. Finally, the typical minister is neither an ideologue nor a partisan; he or she is a party *loyalist* who prioritizes office seeking. With neither the motivation nor the capacity to effect policy change independently, the loyalist is a "safe pair of hands" (e.g., p. 19).

The provision of a rich, cross-national data set on employment and social affairs ministers is in itself a major achievement ("Replication data for Ideologues, Partisans and Loyalists: cabinet ministers and social welfare reform in parliamentary democracies" may be accessed at <https://pureportal.strath.ac.uk/en/datasets/replication-data-for-ideologues-partisans-and-loyalists-cabinet-m>). There is intriguing variation in those data. On the left, the proportion of ministers with a trade union background has fallen over time, while the proportion of loyalists has risen; on the right, the proportion of employment ministers with an "ideologue" professional background rose sharply from the 1990s, while the proportion of loyalists fell (pp. 45, 47); and ministers on the right have substantially more local political experience than those on the left (pp. 50-51).

Alexiadou's central finding is that the typical minister (the loyalist) does not have an independent influence on policy, but that dynamic ministers (ideologues and partisans) often do. Curiously, despite lacking the political resource of seniority in most instances, policy-driven ideologues can be just as effective in changing social welfare policy as vote-seeking partisans; Alexiadou reasons that they can be "empowered" by their policy beliefs (p. 238). However, partisans' effects are unconditional, while the effects of ideologues are conditioned by factors such as fiscal constraints or a strong finance minister. The effects of dynamic ministers are most evident in coalitions and minority cabinets, whereas in single party majority governments, even dynamic ministers mainly deliver the prime minister's policy. Partisan effects are usually present, but the ministerial type typically has greater explanatory power than partisan control of the portfolio or the partisan composition of the cabinet.

The study's findings on the relationship between social democrats and employment policy are intriguing. Senior and apparently centrist social democrats (partisans) holding the employment portfolio have driven increases in employment protection and spending on ALMPs, including training and employment assistance. However,

leftist social democrats (ideologues) do not appear to influence employment protection (despite their strong preferences), and their influence on ALMP spending is even negative for their less preferred measures.

The case studies are a valuable and dense trove of historical detail based partly on interviews conducted by the author. They deepen the analysis, uncovering and illustrating processes by which ministers influence (or fail to influence) policy. They also provide evidence of the behavior expected of ministerial types, such as left ideologues acting as interlocutors with unions. They advance the study's findings; for example, they show that partisans can make their mark before the government forms (p. 170). Descriptively, they illustrate the ministerial types. However, one of their most useful functions is to show how crude these types are and how ministers often defy neat classification. Among other things, they appear to show how the types may underestimate some loyalist ministers. These rich chapters also provide case-specific insights on multiple aspects of cabinet government: portfolio allocation, ministerial selection, incumbency advantages in coalition bargaining, and variation in the prestige of government ministries over time.

The book is not without its rough edges. Chapter 4 is a difficult read, not least because of a mismatch between Table 4.1 and the main text. The theoretical basis for distinguishing ideologues from others is considerably more developed for left ministers than those on the right (p. 41). The exemplification of Barry Desmond as an effective ideologue minister in Ireland may not give sufficient weight to evidence (presented in the book) that much of his influence came from his political seniority; he was arguably a hybrid partisan-ideologue.

For those studying government ministers or the political determinants of policy, *Ideologues, Partisans, and Loyalists* is a landmark contribution. It takes on a difficult question that few have addressed, and it points the way to a promising route forward in the study of ministers' influence on policy, focusing on relatively narrow tranches of policy and using indicators of policy preferences tailored to those policies. More broadly, it is part of a growing body of research that is developing cross-nationally applicable indicators of politicians' preferences. Studies of policy areas beyond social welfare and employment policies may fruitfully follow Alexiadou's lead. Much like its more dynamic protagonists, this is a book that makes a difference.

**Economic Voting: A Campaign-Centered Theory.** By Austin Hart. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016. 232p. \$105 cloth.  
doi:10.1017/S1537592718003821

— Matthew M. Singer, *University of Connecticut*

There is a large literature analyzing the "instability problem" in economic voting, explaining why the

economy's effect on incumbent support varies across countries and within them over time. Within this well-trodden ground, Austin Hart's book makes an important and novel contribution. While previous work has focused on structural conditions that obscure responsibility for economic policy choices or affect the economy's salience, Hart focuses on the strategic choices that parties make to emphasize or deemphasize the economy. He argues that campaign messages that prime the economy lead voters to emphasize recent economic trends as they evaluate the incumbent party, while campaigns that do not touch on economic themes lead voters to focus their attention elsewhere. The implication is that if the election campaign does not emphasize economic management, the ruling party will not be held accountable for economic outcomes that occurred on their watch.

The primary evidence for this argument comes from case studies of two U.S. and two Mexican presidential elections. These cases compare elections where some or all candidates attempted to prime the economy to those where no candidates emphasized economic management in their messaging. In the 1992 U.S. presidential election, Bill Clinton famously focused his attention on economic outcomes under George H. W. Bush. In the 2006 Mexican presidential election, Felipe Calderón changed his strategy midway through the campaign to emphasize his party's management of the economy and to raise concerns about how his rival, Andres Manuel López Obrador, would manage it. López Obrador and various civil-society actors subsequently focused on economic management in their messaging as well. In both of these cases, panel survey data reveal strong correspondence between voters' evaluations of the economy and their support for the incumbent party. Within-case evidence links this behavior to exposure to economic-themed campaign ads. In the 1992 U.S. elections, the connection between economic perceptions and evaluations of the economy was weaker for voters who did not live in areas where Clinton advertised heavily. In the 2006 Mexican elections, the connection between economic perceptions and support for the incumbent party was weak in the period before the candidates shifted their attention to the economy.

Voting behavior was quite different in the two elections where no candidate emphasized the economy. In the 2000 U.S. election, for example, George W. Bush had few incentives to dwell on the strong economy, while Al Gore chose not to focus on the economy, in part because his internal research showed that few voters gave him credit for its recent growth. A similar pattern emerged in the 2000 Mexican elections, as no candidates emphasized the economy in their messaging. The main opposition candidates, Vicente Fox and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, focused their campaigns on the possibility of regime change generally and, in the case of Cárdenas, on

social policy, while the incumbent party's candidate, Francisco Labastida, emphasized his ability to make his party more democratic and responsive. Content analyses of campaign advertisements in both cases confirm that economic appeals made up a small portion of the ads aired that cycle, and survey data show that economic perceptions had weak associations with voter choices in both races.

These four case studies are supplemented with shorter descriptions of campaign strategies and voter behavior in South Korea, West Germany, and Canada that show how economic voting was weaker in cases where candidates explicitly focused on noneconomic issues. Hart also looks at whether differences in estimated economic voting levels in the United States over the 1976–2004 period correspond to the weight that economic appeals received in the ads leading up to the election. All of these data points suggest that candidate messaging can activate or deactivate the economic vote.

The scope of Hart's study is impressive and unique. The analysis of campaigns from the United States alongside those from other countries is especially noteworthy. Far too often, discussions of campaign effects and public opinion dynamics in the United States do not take into account the lessons that could be learned by looking at similar dynamics in other countries. The four main case studies are richly analyzed. Panel data are used to minimize concerns about endogeneity and also to isolate the timing of opinion changes that can be matched to changes in campaign strategy. Systematic content analyses of campaign advertisement themes buttress the qualitative descriptions of campaigns' strategic choices. Then, for the case of the 2006 elections in Mexico, Hart directly tests the implied individual-level mechanism by looking at whether advertising exposure is associated with citizens perceiving management as the most important issue in the election. *Economic Voting* is also well written, with the cases presented in such a way that a reader who is not a specialist in any of the cases will find them engaging, while specialists on U.S. or Mexican politics will still find novel insights in the analyses.

The book establishes that campaigns can and do shape economic accountability. It does not, however, identify limits on campaigns' abilities to reshape the electorate's agenda. Yet not all attempts to prime an issue are successful. In the 2006 Mexican election that Hart analyzes, for example, Calderón's initial attempt to focus the electorate's attention on corruption did not gain traction with the voters. It is unclear why this frame did not resonate while an economic performance frame did. Elections where candidates offer competing frames, with one emphasizing the economy and the other deemphasizing it, such as in the 1992 U.S. election, also raise questions about why one framing effort is the more successful. While this author shows that candidate messages can activate economic

voting and thus merit further study in this context, further work on the conditions under which they can have this effect is needed. Specifically, I wonder whether voters should be brought back into the story as agents, choosing to respond to campaign appeals that bring them back to their core concerns, or if voters instead passively accept whatever agenda candidates lay out.

The role of structural factors in constraining priming choices is also left largely unexplored in the present analysis. While the elections analyzed by Hart include both strong and weak economies, it is unclear how much leverage candidates can have following a true crisis. As John McCain's pollster Bill McInturff said about campaign strategy after the Lehman Brothers' collapse in 2008, "The campaign implodes. There is no campaign anymore. There is only the economic crisis in America, and what you want to say about [it]" (Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government. *Campaign for President: The Managers Look at 2008*, p. 204). During periods of war, during a deep recession, or after extreme violence, politicians may be less able to shift the public agenda than in politically normal times similar to those explored in this book.

I also wanted to know more about whether the effectiveness of accountability priming differs within the electorate. Other studies find that certain groups are predisposed to focus on economic issues, compared to other issue publics with alternative concerns. Do activating campaigns affect the behavior of all of these groups? If not, these distinct, motivated issue publics might limit the ability of candidates to deflect or focus accountability. Further subgroup analysis into voters who changed their behavior and emphasized the economy after being exposed to a priming message would have clarified how much control parties have over the agenda.

Finally, this book leaves unanswered one of the questions that it uses to motivate the analysis: Do differences in campaign styles explain how the economy's effect varies across countries? Is the effect of campaign strategies larger than the effect of structural variables (clarity of responsibility, globalization, etc.) that previous studies emphasize? The limiting factor is likely a lack of reliable, comparable measures of campaign messages. Hopefully this book can motivate further work to reliably measure campaign content cross-nationally in order to answer these questions.

These open questions, however, should not overshadow the importance of what Hart has accomplished in this book. It provides clear evidence that campaigns matter and that candidates can and do shape accountability processes. It also is an example of cross-national campaign analyses that should be emulated. And it raises important questions about whether incumbent candidates can shirk accountability and the importance of meaningful opposition parties to focus the electorate on

key elements of incumbent performance. Students of campaign effects or electoral accountability will learn much from *Economic Voting* and should continue to develop the themes that Hart lays out in it.

**Latin America Since the Left Turn.** Edited by Tullia G. Falleti and Emilio A. Parrado. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017. 384p. \$69.95 cloth.  
doi:10.1017/S153759271800436X

— Federico M. Rossi, *CONICET—National University of San Martín, Argentina*

Tullia Falleti and Emilio Parrado have put together a group of stellar scholars to discuss a great variety of topics that have been central in the last decades of Latin American social dynamics. The panorama includes contributors who go beyond political science, including sociologists, anthropologists, lawyers, historians, and economists. Even though individual chapters are not interdisciplinary, the volume offers a multidisciplinary perspective focused on the social, political, cultural, economic, and legal dimensions of Latin America.

This edited volume is structured in four parts that organize the enormous variety of topics covered, a difficult task given so many foci from such diverse points of view and scholarly approaches. The topics are covered by a first section on "models of development," a second on "democracy," a third on "citizenship," and a final one on "decolonization." However, the chapters within each section cover many more issues in addition to those mentioned. For instance, in the first section, only the first chapter by Maristella Svampa actually discusses a model of development: neoextractivism. The other chapters discuss regional integration and social and fiscal policies.

There are some chapters that offer (implicit) dialogues among contributors, such as the discussion about key policies that might allow for the reduction of socioeconomic inequality in Latin America. On the one hand, Nora Lustig and Claudiney Pereira demonstrate that there was an impressive reduction of inequality under some left-wing governments (mainly in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay), and sparse improvements in countries that continued with the neoliberal path (mainly Peru and Mexico) due to a different combination of fiscal and social policies. On the other hand, Evelyne Huber and John Stephens show that social investment on education is as important as redistributive policies from a long-term perspective (since 1960) for the whole region.

There are some chapters that cover topics linked to the book title, such as the debate concerning the interpretation of the path and type of transformation ongoing in Venezuela since the Bolivarian Revolution. George Ciccariello-Maher says that Venezuela is more than postneoliberal, moving "toward the consolidation of a dispersed form of communal power that coexists tensely