

has examined in detail the diplomatic exchanges between the U.S. embassy in La Paz and the State Department for these years. U.S. concern about “Castro-communism” in Bolivia comes out loud and clear from this plentiful documentation, less so any nuanced understanding of the nature of the Bolivian Left a decade after the 1952 National Revolution.

At the heart of the book lies the so-called Plan Triangular, ostensibly a tripartite initiative involving the United States, West Germany, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), to “restructure” Bolivia’s ailing tin-mining industry. In practice, it was a U.S.-led plan to destroy the left-wing mining unions and their combative leadership, seen in Washington as dangerously communist in their leanings. This plan was initially seen by the Kennedy administration as a precondition for development assistance to Bolivia, although the virulent opposition of the miners themselves meant that it did not quite turn out that way.

Apart from embassy personnel and the miners, the key personalities in this drama were President Paz himself, Juan Lechín Oquendo, and (toward the end) Hernán Siles Zuazo, the three main MNR leaders from 1952. Paz, Field argues, was consistently seen by Washington as the only figure capable of containing and ultimately defeating the miners and their leadership. The book, which correctly describes the authoritarian nature of MNR rule at the time, provides a blow-by-blow account of how the notoriously wily Paz was pushed by Washington into a position that would break the back of the MNR and forestall any possibility that Lechín, Paz’s vice president, would succeed him.

The price paid for this pressure, though, was the political isolation of Paz from the MNR’s grassroots support and his progressive inability to call the shots. The book ends with the military coup of 1964 in which Airforce General René Barrientos, a flamboyant figure distrusted by the U.S. embassy, unceremoniously tossed Paz out of the Palacio Quemado and assumed power himself. A major preoccupation of the Alliance for Progress had been to build up the status of the Bolivian armed forces, effectively destroyed in the 1952 revolution, as the foot soldiers of “development” in “civic action” to build roads, construct schools, and the like. As Field shows, much of the money disbursed under the Alliance was military related.

Field’s lucid and scholarly account makes a significant contribution to the literature on this still rather under-researched period in Bolivia’s recent political history, helping us to understand the strength of anti-U.S. sentiment, not just on the left but within much of Bolivian society. Both in his text and copious footnotes, the author provides impressive detail on the convoluted politics of the time. Parallels emerge between the Paz administration of the 1960s and that of his successor as head of the MNR,

Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada—ousted as president in October 2003—also seen as a faithful ally of Washington. The denouements, however, proved rather different.

There are two additional critical comments that deserve mention. The first is that, arguably, the focus on the Plan Triangular and the attempt to crush the miners means that other aspects of the Alliance for Progress get rather short shrift. More could and should have been said about the process of development under way at this time in Santa Cruz, a key part of the 1940 U.S.-sponsored Bohan Plan that the postrevolutionary MNR governments sought to put into practice. Field refers at points to the emergence of right-wing opposition groups, specifically the Falange Socialista Boliviana (FSB), but fails to tell us much about how Santa Cruz was emerging as an economic powerhouse in these years. It was only a few years after the period under review that the *cruceño* Right took politics into its own hands with the 1971 coup by General Hugo Banzer Suárez.

The second comment is that Field could have contextualized the Bolivia story more broadly in developments elsewhere at the time in Latin America. Reference is made to Cuban activities in support of guerrilla movements, but Bolivia was by no means alone during this period in receiving the attention of Washington in its attempt to thwart left-wing movements. It would have been revealing to compare the activities of the Alliance for Progress in Bolivia with such initiatives elsewhere. This was, after all, the start of the period of military coups in other countries, beginning with the ouster of President João Goulart in neighboring Brazil (of which no direct mention is made).

Was the United States behind the Barrientos coup in Bolivia? Despite the close relations between Barrientos and the U.S. air attaché Colonel Edward Fox, Field thinks not. Ambassador Henderson, he argued, remained faithful to Paz until the end, and distrustful of the demagogic Barrientos. It was, he says, precisely the sort of technocratic, authoritarian government espoused by the Alliance for Progress and its operatives that helped, progressively, undercut the legitimacy of the Paz administration, opening the way for nearly two decades of military-dominated government.

Political Secularism, Religion, and the State: A Time Series Analysis of Worldwide Data. By Jonathan Fox.

New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 291p. \$99.99 cloth, \$34.99 paper.

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— Brent F. Nelsen, *Furman University*

Jonathan Fox is a prolific scholar and well-known student of religion and politics. His new book on state religion policies is as insightful as it is extensive. The sheer scope of his Religion and State (RAS) project, the data source at

the heart of this book, leaves one grasping for superlatives. Begun in 2000, the second round of data collection has resulted in a database (RAS₂) coding 111 government religion policies in 177 countries by year from 1990 to 2008 (367,410 observations). As the first major publication based on this expanded data set, *Political Secularism, Religion, and the State* essentially catalogs these policies, identifies major trends, and explores a possible general explanation for recent developments.

Much of the book—six of nine chapters—is devoted to “presenting and categorizing state religion policy” (p. 4). Fox claims boldly that the 111 types described here “constitute all types of identifiable religion policies that exist in today’s states” (p. 5). I am not inclined to disagree. The central chapters are both fascinating and tedious; the taxonomy of state religion policies uncovers striking oddities (who knew that Andorra pays the Catholic Church to maintain historical birth and marriage records, or that “witchdoctors” in Malawi face life in prison? [pp. 90, 141]), but the mind wanders while ploughing through descriptions of 30 forms of restriction on minority religions. Fox tries to vary the pace with illustrations from every part of the world and with descriptive tables summarizing variables described in the text, but despite these efforts, the central chapters are a slog—if ultimately rewarding.

A brief summary of these chapters is in order. Fox first identifies 14 categories of overall state religion policy divided into four types: states with official religions, preferred religion(s), neutral stances toward religion, and hostility toward religion. He then examines more specific laws and policies—categorized into 51 “types”—that indicate levels of state support for religion. The topics here are often politically controversial, ranging from laws covering marriage and reproduction, homosexual sex, restrictions on women, dietary laws, holiday business openings, blasphemy, and religious censorship to those providing financial support for clergy, religious schools, building repair, and pilgrimages. Fox turns next to the myriad ways governments regulate, restrict, and control all religions and the ways they discriminate against minority religions, often by restrictions on conversion and proselytizing. He finishes his empirical classification by looking more deeply at policies governing education, abortion, and proselytizing, and then examining religion in national constitutions.

Throughout these central chapters, Fox cross-tabulates countries identified as having adopted a policy or law by “majority religion,” specifically Catholic, Orthodox, Other Christian, Muslim, and Other Religions. Some results are not surprising; for instance, only Muslim-majority countries officially give female testimony less weight than male testimony in government courts (p. 73). But other findings are less intuitive: Orthodox countries are more likely than Muslim countries to restrict public observance of minority religious practices (p. 141).

Fox also identifies some important trends. Official state religion policy remained rather stable between 1990 and 2008, although of the countries that made changes, two-thirds increased support for (or became less hostile to) religion. Still, official policy on religion is less predictive of actual state support for religion than is often assumed. Many more countries changed individual policies regarding support for religion than changed official state policy: Most policy categories showed strong, steady increases in support regardless of religious tradition (although the trend is most dramatic in Muslim countries). In other words, governments worldwide are demonstrating greater willingness to offer tangible support to religion no matter what their “official” relationship. By 2008, every state in the study except South Africa was supporting religion in at least one small way.

State support for religion generally comes with some controls. Thus, most countries exert a level of control over the majority religion or all religions, with most actually increasing restrictions during the study period. All categories of regulation saw steady increases except that covering religious practices (i.e., public observances and religious gatherings). More disturbing from the perspective of religious freedom is the rapid increase in policies discriminating against minority faiths. Of the 30 specific types of discrimination coded, 28 saw increases and none saw declines. And while Muslim countries restrict minority religions the most, all three types of Christian countries have narrowed the gap since 1990.

So what is the big take-away? Fox’s main point is simple: Government involvement with religion is increasing worldwide: “[T]he majority of countries were more involved in religion in 2008 than they were in 1990. Also, the overwhelming majority of the 111 types of state religion policy were more common in 2008 than they were in 1990” (p. 2). Moreover, this empirical finding leads to his big theoretical point: secularization theory is wrong in predicting that religion will disappear or become irrelevant. Fox argues that religion is not going away, even in the most “developed” countries. He agrees that modernization weakens religion, but replaces secularization theory’s end-of-religion prediction with a different projection. In his view, modernization gives rise to an *ideology* of secularism [a “set of beliefs that advocates the marginalization of religion from other spheres of life” (p. 27)] that “competes with religion in the political and social arenas” (p. 26). He calls this the “secular-religious competition perspective,” positing a struggle between secular ideologies that seek to eliminate the role of religion in politics and society and religious ideologies that seek to enhance that role. In short, in most countries, a competition between secularism and religion is raging, and as Fox has shown, religion is winning—for now.

The competition perspective is more useful as an “approach” than as explanatory theory. Describing

secular-religious competition does not explain religion policy outcomes as much as it identifies the competitors, the arena of combat, and the weapons used. It tells you little about why religious forces have gained the upper hand, nor does it help you sort through other factors that—as Fox notes in his conclusion—influence state religion policy. But the book offers hints of things to come. Fox uses multivariate analysis to explain the impact of religion on abortion policy and explores the influence of constitutional clauses on specific religion policies. These are tempting morsels that may well lead to a larger feast as he and others continue to analyze this data.

Fox's major contribution here is to catalog and code government religion policies in a comprehensive database open to scholars (at <http://www.religionandstate.org>). He has done the grunt work—and deserves much praise. But now it is time for students of religion and politics to focus on solving the many puzzles to be found in the data.

Debates of Corruption and Integrity: Perspectives from Europe and the US. Edited by Peter Hardi, Paul M. Heywood, and Davide Torsello. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015. 242p. \$105.00.

The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption. By Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 314p. \$99.99 cloth, \$34.99 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592716003832

— Mlada Bukovansky, *Smith College*

Corruption is a slippery concept. Although in some respects it appears to be a measurable phenomenon, it is also a complex idea that requires a sense of sociopolitical, cultural, and ethical context to be rendered intelligible. Does this context-dependence leave us in the realm of cultural and moral relativism, where one man's bribe is another man's gift, or can we generate some higher order generalizations about the causes and consequences of corruption while remaining sensitive to contextual nuances? Some researchers may cast corruption as an individual behavior, while for others evoking corruption means assessing and making judgments about the quality of institutions in a particular society. When taking this latter approach, what standards do researchers use to assess institutional quality? What criteria for "good governance" do anti-corruption efforts use, and what outcomes do they aim to produce? How should researchers navigate the proliferation of quantitative data sets, rankings, and indices purportedly measuring corruption and quality of government?

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, recognizing that corruption is about institutions and not just individual behavior, tackles the governance criteria question head-on. She comprehensively and critically surveys available data sets, engages in her own quantitative and qualitative research, and thereby builds a defense of modernity, and what she

takes to be its central norm of "ethical universalism," as both the goal and the measure by which governance should be assessed. Her approach to corruption is holistic and aims at broad generalizability, analyzing both formal and informal institutions in both historical and contemporary case studies to offer a model of how corruption might be brought under control in any society (an admittedly rare achievement). For Mungiu-Pippidi, corruption control is about more than punishing individual norm or law violators; it is about building a modern impartial state in symbiosis with a free, individualist, market-oriented society—it is about travelling, in her words, "the road Denmark."

By contrast, the collection of essays edited by Peter Hardi, Paul M. Heywood, and Davide Torsello offers both behavioral and institutional views of corruption, and professes no generalizable standard but rather a series of explorations drawn from different disciplines: business, law, political science, philosophy, and anthropology among others. The extent to which these disciplines share any common standards regarding the definition of corruption and its opposite is left to the reader to decide. Several of the authors (Davide Torsello, Italo Pardo, Giuliana Prato) take an ethnographic approach to their case studies; the influence of anthropology is strong here. Eschewing anything like Mungiu-Pippidi's overarching conclusions, this volume's intervention in debates on corruption and its control remains pluralist and relativistic, not in the sense that pluralism and relativism might be considered defensible moral or philosophical standpoints, but rather in the sense that the volume refrains from presenting an overarching model or perspective. It is, its editors say, a "conversation" between disciplines and approaches. But conversation implies some common vocabulary and an intentional exchange of ideas. These aims can be difficult to achieve in edited volumes, as scholars may polish off their contributions without bothering to explicitly engage those with whom they share a common book cover. Inter-disciplinarity exacerbates this challenge. While Mungiu-Pippidi maps the road to Denmark, Hardi, Heywood, and Torsello offer a series of paths wandering through different institutional and ethnographic landscapes, but with no agreed destination.

Although Mungiu-Pippidi unashamedly embraces a Eurocentric vision of modernity, and might thus be dismissed by the post-moderns and post-colonials on this basis alone, her understanding of modernity is deep and nuanced. She writes, "European control of corruption can be regarded as almost the only historically successful process of state building in which a long transition to ethical universalism has resulted in an equilibrium where opportunities for corruption are largely checked by societal control of rulers and reasonable reciprocal control by the government. This evolution cannot easily be separated from the general European advancement to government accountability and