

explain many cases of “Wolf Warrior diplomacy” without reference to domestic audiences. Multiple motivations could simultaneously be present, of course, and beliefs can be motivated. Yet rather than the vitriol being artificially concocted, or unleashed contrary to the diplomats’ better judgements, the more common pattern may be one of genuinely held ideological and historical convictions being selectively released in pursuit of international political effects.

The book’s general focus on the PRC’s domestic politics as the central explanation for its assertive diplomacy is not by any means misplaced. It is, after all, the Party-state system that selects the most loyal, believing cadres into its diplomatic corps, imposes military-style discipline upon them, and demands belief in the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist prophecy of inevitable victory via constant political struggle. As the founding figure of PRC diplomacy Zhou Enlai declared: “Changing from military to diplomatic struggle is simply a matter of changing the front on which one conducts conflict.” With this in view, the PRC’s “Wolf Warrior diplomacy” is much less puzzling than it might appear.

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Law and the Party in China: Ideology and Organisation

Edited by ROGIER CREEMERS and SUSAN TREVASKES

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A number of notable changes have taken place since Xi Jinping came to power. Seemingly contradictory developments include: the primacy of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership and the progress of judicial professionalization, the call on morality for behavioural guidance and the emphasis on Socialist Core Values. How can we make sense of the rule of law rhetoric and the primacy of Party leadership under Xi Jinping’s administration? What is the relationship between morality and Socialist Core Values? In *Law and the Party in China: Ideology and Organisation* edited by Rogier Creemers and Susan Trevaskes, a group of distinguished scholars set out to answer these questions. The end goal of this volume is to “bring ideology back in.” Ideology not only (instrumentally) helps frame policy agenda, but fundamentally guides and shapes policymaking. By bringing the ideology back in, we should be able to reconcile the seemingly inconsistent development.

What is ideology, then? In his classic work, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (1966), Schurmann looked at the ideology of organizations, “a systematic set of ideas with action consequences serving the purpose of creating and using organization” (p. 18). The structure of CCP ideology consists of a “theory” or “pure ideology” derived from Marxism and Leninism, which gives Chinese Communists a unified and conscious world view, and a “practical ideology” – “the thought of Mao Zedong” – that provides instrumental guidance to analyse concrete problems and recommend rational action.

Inspired by Schurmann’s work, this volume examines how ideology informs the ways that the Party structures and governs itself, the state and society. This volume also updates Schurmann’s observation and analysis, first, in terms of the content

and origin of the CCP ideology. Section one of the book discusses how the CCP conceives of the nature of law and its position within its policy toolkit. Rogier Creemers (chapter two) substantiates the CCP ideology through three questions: what is the purpose of politics? who should be in charge? and by what method should they govern to achieve that purpose? Answers to these questions suggest that Party ideology constitutes “an important part of the very definition of legality and legitimacy” (p. 33). Ewan Smith (chapter four) takes on the specific idea of “*yifa zhiguo*” (to govern the nation according to law) and situates it in the temporal development under Xi since 2013. By examining the evolution of the Politburo doctrines on the rule of law, he highlights the instrumental and ephemeral features of Xi’s “nativist” vision of “Socialist Rule of Law with Chinese Characteristics.” Elaborating on the “nativist” element in Xi’s *yifa zhiguo* ideas, Delia Lin and Susan Trevaskes’s contribution (chapter five) unpacks the “ideological makeup of *yifa zhiguo*” against the absolute supremacy of Party leadership. They look at the Confucian and Legalist traditions from which moral values and the law-morality amalgam are made coherent, at least discursively, with the absolute supremacy of Party leadership. Gloria Davies (chapter three) takes a step back and reflects on ideologies that are constructed by the CCP and made sense of in academic discourse. In addition, she contends that ideology is formed not only of historically developed and systematic ideas but also the lived experiences of many in China, including academics, who are subject to explicit ideological requirements and implicitly take ideological perspectives.

In part two, this volume also advances Schurmann’s analysis of organizational development. It addresses how CCP ideological principles are manifested in the application of law and organizational design of Party–state relations and social control. Margaret Lewis’s (chapter six) “double-helix” description of Party–state relations depicts the bonds between the two and the shifts in their relationships. As the message about the CCP’s monopoly of power, as well as the power of Xi Jinping as the core, has become forcefully delivered inside China, the outside world should, Lewis argues, take the Party–state’s discourses seriously, in order to push back this “better model” of governance that claims to remedy flaws of multiple-party system and electoral democracy. Ling Li’s work (chapter seven) further details the distinctive Party–state relations in China, where the Party is linked to the state but does not supplant it. The ways in which the Party exercises control over the state and their evolution are illustrated by her meticulous study of the development of the Party’s disciplinary regime between 1949 and 2017. Samuli Seppänen (chapter eight) turns the focus from state laws to intraparty regulations as the Party strives simultaneously to limit formal legal processes and to regulate Party cadres’ use of power through formal rules. He highlights the tension between a non-legal regulatory system that relies on rationalist bureaucracy and a Marxist-Leninist one-party state that claims authority. As a result, intraparty regulations, like formal state laws, are subject to interpretation and remain insufficient to enforce the Party leaders’ will of disciplining the members. Adam Knight’s contribution (chapter nine) ends the volume with a study of China’s Social Credit System, as it extends application beyond financial services and reaches into judicial enforcement, accompanied by the re-insertion of a “morality” discourse on *chengxin*, or honesty and credibility. Constructing and instructing an “exemplary society,” a tradition since imperial China, finds its applications in contemporary Chinese cities that experiment according to local conditions. At the same time, it is elevated to an ideal of *chengxin* culture promoted under Xi Jinping.

As the book’s cover image implies, the dominance of the CCP has an imprint from the past. To identify elements from the past and to understand the rationale of the CCP’s toolkit, one needs to take “an internal perspective, (and) to take into account

the characteristic architecture of China's Party-state" (cover text). By bringing ideology back in and taking it seriously, we may begin to make sense of the multifront development of the CCP under Xi Jinping. All those who are interested in fundamental questions about what the CCP represents and why it rules the way it does will find reading this collection an enriching journey.

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How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate

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This fine book is quite unusual in one respect. It begins an investigation of the 1980s debate over China's economic reforms with a chapter-long dip into the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, centuries before the dawn of the Common Era, as well as the *Guanzi*, "a core text in ancient Chinese economic thought on price stabilization" (p. 18). The point of this is to establish China's very long experience of markets and prices and of state–market relations. That history extended right up to the 1930s war with Japan and the Civil War that followed, during which the Communists held extensive liberated areas in which they had to work with markets. In the early 1950s, they did so again in the course of extinguishing the great hyperinflation inherited from the Kuomintang. This past history fills the early chapters of *How China Escaped Shock Therapy*. When Mao Zedong's death in 1976 finally ended two calamitous decades of market suppression, the government did not have to rely on Western doctrine in restoring and managing markets. There was a wealth of Chinese experience to consult.

Of course, Chinese economists in the late 1970s and 1980s were also eager to understand Western experience and thus studied how the US, Britain and Germany transitioned from wartime-controlled prices back to free markets after World War II. Eastern European dissident economists (Janos Kornai, Włodzimierz Brus, Ota Sik et al.) were also consulted, as were American economists, such as J. K. Galbraith, James Tobin and Milton Friedman. All this is clearly laid out in the first part of the book.

The core of *How China Escaped Shock Therapy*, however, is contained in chapters five through eight, which chronicle the intensifying debate over how to implement the transition from a central planning regime to a market economy. Weber not only has read widely and deeply in the literature about this debate, but she also interviewed many of the surviving participants. As her title suggests, the main issue at stake was whether China should undergo "shock therapy," meaning a combination of rapid liberalization of prices ("big bang"), privatization, liberalization of trade, and price stabilization via tight fiscal and monetary policies. This was the "Washington consensus" approach favoured by the IMF and the World Bank, and which was to prove disastrous when applied in the former Soviet Union and much of Eastern Europe. It was also favoured by a group of economists in China who were captivated