

arises next: In what sense is a project that sees itself as “revealing” already existing deep-seated egalitarian norms that “arise from citizen’s actual practice” a *critical* project? The critical force of his argument rests on his ability to persuasively draw the distinction between his notion of reflexivity and mere circularity: “It [reflexivity] holds up a mirror to those societies without simply reflecting back the image they are used to seeing. The mirror in this case reveals widespread distortions in our internalized self-image. We see ourselves as democratic, egalitarian societies created for the mutual benefit of all members. Yet we systematically ignore inconsistencies in this view, particularly the extent to which some voices are allowed to dominate political and cultural discussions while others remain quiet” (p. 202). Reflexivity, then, seems to rely on some mechanism for holding people accountable to reconcile their contradictions or distortions.

Olson suggests a potential site of such “reflexivity” as he reviews both historical work and contemporary work on citizen attitudes toward equality. In the American context, Jennifer Hochschild’s (1981) *What’s Fair? American Beliefs about Distributive Justice* and Martin Gilens’s (1999) *Why Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy* provide work that Olson sees as suggesting the complexity and “confusion of people’s intuitions about equality” (p. 193). Survey research suggests that the vast majority of Americans incorrectly depict welfare recipients as predominantly African American, and Gilens links their reluctance to support Temporary Assistance for Needy Families programs to racist attitudes about the work ethic. Hochschild’s interview work demonstrates both the strength of American commitments to an egalitarian norm in political life and Americans’ resistance to it in economic life. Such attitudes, to be consistent, require strong boundary distinctions between the political and economic spheres—boundary distinctions that are difficult to defend in the face of research on participation that illustrates, for example, a significant inverse relationship between income and political participation.

Olson explores both the more immediate and the long-standing consequences of this relationship: unequal voice and unequal “capabilities” for participatory engagement. Reflexive democracy would remedy these inequalities with a more expansive understanding of social rights, as necessary features of equal citizenship and not merely contingent upon empirically demonstrable disadvantage, and with a participatory ideal that maintains two core commitments: 1) the use of agency-supporting policies to *promote* participation and 2) the idea that agency-supporting policies should *result* from participation (p. 98). Ultimately, a reflexive democratic state “allows citizens to become equal in their cooperative interdependence. . . . [It is] centered on promoting agency rather than simply equalizing the possession of goods and resources” (p. 20).

The conceptual interconnections among the participatory ideal, democratic legitimacy, and citizenship are admirably negotiated in Olson’s work. Yet I think he may, in light of his commitment to a political justification for the welfare state, have incurred a debt to extend his analysis. The development of reflexive democracy and of institutions and laws to remedy existing inequalities hinges on making contradictions, many of which have an enduring history, unendurable. This is ultimately a political project. Calling attention to the contradictory nature of our commitments to equality without also attending to the ways these contradictions have been maintained leaves much of the work of restructuring the welfare state undone.

While the justificatory framework for Olson’s argument is both persuasive and useful, his argument for change would be strengthened with a closer consideration of the way systems of structural privilege not only thwart the development of some capabilities but also shape motivations and interests consistent with maintaining patterns of exclusion and nonparticipation, as well as fostering alternative sites for and patterns of participation. He frames his own critique of the existing welfare state around patterns of convergence between disadvantage and nonparticipation. Yet as some more recent empirical work on the welfare state suggests, patterns of participation on the part of the disadvantaged are complicated (e.g., see Joe Soss, *Unwanted Claims: The Politics of Participation in the U.S. Welfare System*, 2000; John Gilliom, *Overseers of the Poor*, 2001). Work like this does not undermine Olson’s vision of reflexive democracy. It supplements its central strength: connecting our normative claims to citizen’s actual practices. *Reflexive Democracy* makes a critical contribution to our rethinking of these practices.

Liberty Beyond Neo-Liberalism: A Republican Critique of Liberal Governance in a Globalizing

Age. By Steven Slaughter. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 272p. \$75.00.

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— Jacob Segal, *Kingsborough Community College of the City University of New York*

Mainstream accounts define globalization as two connected processes. The first is the relentless increase in the interrelation of economic actors. The second is growing recognition of the superiority of “market forces” over state intervention in the economy. Free markets are seen as “natural” forces or “iron laws” of economics that only the economically illiterate or perhaps the insane would limit. Among the many impressive contributions made by Steven Slaughter is the distinction between what he calls “globalization” and “economic globalization.” The former, he argues, is the growing interdependence of economic actors that appears to be an inherent aspect of capitalist development. The latter, however, denotes the contingent

victory of free market ideology, or “neoliberalism” over other forms of liberalism. For Slaughter, economic globalization is not the inevitable victory of “natural” and efficient markets against the state. Economic globalization is a form of “governance” that involves state policy, relations between states, and norms and everyday practices. This governance was the creation of state policy and international agreements. Slaughter’s argument constitutes an updating of Karl Polanyi’s famous claim in *The Great Transformation* (2001) that nineteenth-century “laissez-faire” economics was an invention.

Slaughter argues that starting in the 1970s, neoliberal governance replaced the postwar “embedded liberalism” governance of Keynesian state intervention and international bargaining between states. He defines economic globalization in terms of three processes. “Deregulation” is the increasing dismantling of “political” impediments of the markets (p. 43). “Privatisation” is the process by which public functions are given over to the private sector or the sale of “state assets” to private actors (p. 43). Finally, “liberalization” concerns how the state stops limiting the so-called flow of trade and capital movements.

The heart of his book is Slaughter’s claim that neoliberalism contradicts the liberal principles of liberty and security. During the governance of embedded liberalism, states guaranteed necessities and a “social minimum” to individuals. The state sought to protect individuals from the instability of markets and negotiated with other states to protect its inhabitants from international market forces. Neoliberal governance means that the state does not protect the liberty of the individual from the turbulence of markets.

Slaughter examines three contrasting alternatives to contemporary neoliberalism. He discusses Kenichi Ohmae’s desire to reconstruct the concept of the nation-state in order to further limit the capacity of the state to regulate markets. In the work of Robert Reich and Anthony Giddens, Slaughter examines what he calls “contractual nationalism,” which aims to increase state action to protect the individual from the market and to enable the individual to better adapt to market changes. Contractual nationalists advocate increases in the minimum wage, investment in training and education, and regulation that demands better corporate behavior and protection of labor interests. The author discusses the “cosmopolitan governance” of Richard Falk and David Held, in which the international market is controlled through global democracy and not by individual states.

Slaughter finds these solutions lacking and turns to “neo-Roman republicanism” mediated through Machiavelli and Montesquieu, and developed by contemporary writers Philip Pettit, Maurizio Viroli, and others. Here he finds the path to redress the limits of neoliberalism. He defines neorepublican freedom as nondomination. The republican state promotes nondomination by protecting the indi-

vidual from the domination of other individuals and from economic forces. The state is not, as in liberal theory, a form of oppression only, but a source of “antipower” that reduces private domination. For Slaughter, republicanism promotes an enlightened patriotism and civic engagement because the republican citizens recognize the collective nature of their freedom. Republican freedom concerns the expansion of private choice. However, it is political because it requires the collective spirit of the state to exist. He examines a number of domestic and international policies that would promote this republican freedom.

One of the central contributions of this book is its excellent introduction to important bodies of thought, including theories of globalization and neo-Roman republicanism. Slaughter is a confident and adept writer and the book is well organized with helpful summaries. Readers interested in placing globalization in the context of contemporary political theory will be rewarded by a close study of this work.

The book does suffer from a number of gaps. Slaughter is a good writer but tends towards a too-abstract language. His account of economic globalization would profit from a concrete case study of the imposition of neoliberalism in one country. In addition, he devotes a long chapter to the “consequences of economic globalization.” This chapter is not well organized. The author does not clearly identify the costs and balances of economic globalization, as he fails to weigh the increase of overall global wealth (which he believes to be a result of economic globalization) against increases in inequality and instability. Further, he needs to take a clearer stand on the relationship of economic globalization to world poverty. Another problem is that his well-developed conception of republican freedom is not set against a considered idea of neoliberal freedom. It would be very interesting to set republican theory against, say, the notion of freedom found in the work of F. A. Hayek. Finally, Slaughter does not adequately demonstrate how the neorepublican state, purportedly a source of antipower, might, like any state, become a source of domination itself.

Despite all that, *Liberty Beyond Neo-Liberalism* deserves a wide readership, if only for its insightful use of republicanism in exploring globalization theory. More substantially, Slaughter provides a number of important reminders. He demonstrates the weaknesses of the theory that globalization constitutes the death of the state. Since state action was instrumental in the creation of neoliberal governance, the state can also take action to create a new global order more conducive to the liberal values to which neoliberals claim loyalty. Perhaps most vitally for a U.S. audience, he demonstrates that human freedom is not a “natural” fact whatsoever. Humans are not naturally free, and then subsequently exchange some freedom for benefits provided by the state (such as personal security). Instead, Slaughter demonstrates that freedom is always “constructed,” that

is, a social creation that requires the most comprehensive state activity. If globalization constitutes the “end of the state,” it means that the liberal dream of liberty and security has come to an end. He amply demonstrates that the former is not true and the second need not be.

Political Emotions: Aristotle and the Symphony of Reason and Emotion. By Marlene K. Sokolon. DeKalb: Northern Illinois Press, 2006. 227p. \$38.00.
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— Barbara Koziak, *St. John's University*

The thinking about emotion has thrived over the last decade; in the most various disciplines, from neuroscience to rhetoric, philosophy to anthropology, we are in the midst of a renaissance in the study of emotion. The result has surely been a more accurate account of cognition, persuasion, and group dynamics. Political science has been a bit slower to awaken. Happily, with Aristotle for inspiration, we have more new work to digest. In this book, Marlene Sokolon continues to reflect on just what Aristotle has to contribute. Several books have already worked this area, and so Sokolon ends up reiterating parts of this literature, but the book serves as an excellent resource for surveying the politically relevant emotions discussed in the *Rhetoric* and for encouraging conversation between current empirical political science and political theory.

Sokolon proposes to address three topics: in two chapters, Aristotle's theory of emotion, then contemporary approaches to emotion, mostly from psychology and philosophy; over several chapters, a survey of those emotions most relevant to politics; and finally, in a concluding chapter, the benefit of Aristotle's analysis for contemporary political research. These are general topics, and they stay that way because the author, for the most part, does not argue with anyone else's approach. For example, she cites Martha Nussbaum's *Upheavals of Thought* (2003) and my own book on Aristotle, *Retrieving Political Emotion* (2000), but does not dispute anything we say. Even when she focuses on the *Rhetoric*, her concern is with recounting and applying what Aristotle means, not with engaging the disputes over the interconnected issues of composition, audience, and intention, or even arguing with Aristotle. This gives the book an odd feel, at once polite and neglectful. What has the previous work on Aristotle been missing exactly that now needs to be supplemented? Certainly, she updates and expands. Indeed, no one has written a book that surveys every emotion discussed in the *Rhetoric*, showing how for Aristotle, each impacts individual political action, stability, and conflict in political regimes.

Sokolon provides a helpful schema for classifying the *Rhetoric's* 14 “salient” emotions: In the first group, the more motivating emotions concern the subject, family, or friends, and are more necessary for virtue (anger, calmness, love, hate, fear, confidence); in the second group, the

less motivating emotions are concerned with the wider political community, are less motivating, and less necessary for virtue (shame, shamelessness, benevolence and selfishness, pity, indignation, envy, emulation). In each case, the author considers how the emotion works in Aristotle's political dynamics, and then how each appears in a modern piece of rhetoric. This is surely the heart of the book, revealing the political in each emotion, nicely balancing the emotional theory by pointing to a piece of political oratory or a modern political issue. It is therefore disappointing when she misses an aspect of this application in a way that reveals a wider problem.

Take, for example, the discussion of pity. While she notes that the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric* diverge in the characteristics of pity, Sokolon eschews discussing the *Poetics* as a work not only of ancient aesthetics but also of political theory. Yet Greek theater was, after all, a political institution, subsidized by the social elites and the state for the benefit of the community, prefaced by the initiation of young citizen soldiers. Aristotle, no less than Plato, understands the formative role of cultural production, whether poetry, epic, or drama. The viewing of tragedies enables the education or, in Plato's case, miseducation of citizens. Rhetoric and culturally prominent stories connect; we would expect the way that orators use pity to recall the narrative performances of pitiful suffering, paradigmatic for that historical time and place. For Aristotle, liberal education, including the ability to view and appreciate such artistic production, shapes both human and regime character. Most recent accounts reject the idea that the effect of tragedy, catharsis, is a “release of emotions,” as Sokolon writes, but instead argue that it clarifies, configures emotional character, or focuses concern. It would be a mistake to miss how cultural institutions, not just conventionally political ones, create political character.

On the other hand, the author sensitively parses the varied issues related to *philia*—its translation, the differences among *philia* as emotion, virtue, and the practice—and is good on cataloging the political implications of trying to further *philia*—the need for private property, reducing economic inequality, the elimination of tyranny. Here, as in each discussion of an emotion, she points to a modern speech that uses the emotion, but these amount to very brief examples—one from Franklin Roosevelt's 1944 State of the Union speech. Still, to really fulfill the promise of an Aristotelian analysis, one needs to interweave several factors—the historical context, the cultural connotations of friendship, the orator's manner of invocation, and the institutional supports.

In a concluding chapter, Sokolon briefly surveys the diverse recent work on emotion in subfields of political science. She does not directly assess this work, but sticks to pleading the case for Aristotle's continuing importance for the endeavor. For example, Aristotle identifies more political emotions than does much contemporary writing,